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A.

AND

PREFACE.
The following pages liave been prepared with
in

a shape

for practical

use, the general

the action of all authorities acting

a

view to present

rules which must govern

in matters of taxation.

Had

a

similar task been previously undertaken, the writer would gladly
have been spared the labor; but

Mr. Blackwell's Treatise on Tax

Titles covers the ground only in part, and Judge Dillon, though

in the same direction, has not, in his

he has done valuable service

work on Municipal Corporations,
what

seemed

deemed

it advisable to go beyond

necessary to a legitimate and perspicuous

tion of that subject.

presenta-

Other writers have had occasion to discuss

only particular topics in the law of taxation, leaving
hensive examination of the general subject to be

a compre-

still entered upon.

The decisions in this country on the subject of taxation have
that it would be impossible to give abstracts

become so numerous,

of them all, within any reasonable
thought it preferable,

instead

group the references about

compass.

of attempting

The author has

a digest

the controlling

of them, to

principles.

The tax

systems of the several states are so dissimilar, that a mere digest of
the cases is exceedingly

liable to mislead, by giving,

rule of law, what is only

a

There

are,

or should

conclusion from

be, general

a

as a general

local law or custom.

principles underlying all the cases;

and an understanding of these vnll enable

one to make

use

of

decisions under the various tax systems, without confusion.

The subject of taxation
questions

seems

to invite some consideration of

of political economy; but these have been passed by

after bare mention, as not being necessarily

involved in

a discus-
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sion of the legal points.

for the legis-

They present considerations

lature in framing tax laws; but courts and ministerial officers must
enforce tax laws as they are, whether based on sound or unsound

principles of political economy.
The preparation of any treatise on taxation necessarily
the presentation of disputed points, and the expression

of opinions

This has been done in the following pages.

upon them.

involves

It

has

not been the purpose, however, to take any positions which it was

if

not believed the authorities would justify; and
done

this has been

in any instance, the references which are made to authorities

will doubtless enable the reader to detect the error.

Possibly it

may be thought, that on some points, too much importance has
been attached

to those fundamental principles which restrict the

power to tax.

But when one considers" how vast is this power,

how readily it yields

to passion, excitement,

prejudice or private

schemes, and to what incompetent hands its execution is usually
committed,

it

seems

unreasonable

to treat

as

unimportant,

any

stretch of power — even the slightest — whether it be on the part

of the legislature which orders the tax, or of any of the officers
who undertake to give effect to the order.

Especially is this so,

when it is understood how little restraint there can be on the ignorant action of
seldom

an effectual

remedy

And

corruption exists.
h'ave

acting with jurisdiction,

assessors,

can be administered

as the benefits

and how very
where

fraud or

of republican government

been reached through the efforts of the people to establish

and maintain the legitimate restraints upon the power to tax,
umvise

seems

checks

in

a

high degree, to slight or disregard

which the law has provided,

entrusted

whether those

to the hands of the judiciary, or those

it

any of the
which

are

which are the

lawful right of the people themselves, who are to bear the burden
of the particular tax.
TJnivbksity of Michigak",
Ann Arbor, January,

1876.

Thomas M. Coolet.
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LA¥

OF TAXATION.
CHAPTBE I.

TAXES, THEIR NATURE AND KINDS.

Befinition.

Taxes are defined as being the enforced proportional contribution of persons and property, levied by the authority of the state for the support of the government, and for all
public

needs.^

They are the property of the citizen, demanded and received by
the government to be disposed of to enable it to carry into effect
its mandates, and to discharge its manifold functions.^
The jus" The public revenues are a portion
■which each subject gives of his property in order to secure and enjoy the remainder." Montesq. iSpirit of the Laws, b. 13, ch. 1. " What are taxes but the
revenue collected from the people for objects in ■which they are interested;
the contributions of the people for things useful and conducive to their welfare." Agneio, J., in Hilbish v. Catherman, 64 Penn. St., 154, 159. Blackwell,
in his Treatise on Tax Titles, p. 1, defines taxes as " burdens or charges imposed by the legislative
power of a state upon persons or property, to raise
Substantially the same definition is given by
money for public purposes."
Field, Ch. J., in Perry «. Washburn, 30 Cal., 318, 350. And see Hanson «. Vernon, 27 Iowa, 28, 47, per Dillon, J. ; Matter of Mayor, etc., of New York, 11
Johns., 77, 80; Mitchell v. Williams, 27 Ind., 62; Loan Association v. Topeka,
20 Wall., 655, 664, per Miller, J. ; Philadelphia Association,
etc., v. Wood, 39
' Opinions

of Judges,

58 Me., 591.

Penn. St., 73, 83, per Lowrie, Ch.

J.; Exchange Bank of

J. ;

Glasgow v. Rowse, 43 Mo., 479, 489, per

v. Hines, 3 Ohio State, 1, 10, per
Driver, 1 Kan., 455, 463, per Kingman, J. In People
/!). McCreery, 34 Cal., 433, 456, it is said a tax is " a charge levied by the sovereign power upon its subjects.
It is not a charge upon its own property,
nor upon property over which it has no dominion."
Per Bhodes, J.
Wagner,

Bartley, Ch.

J. ; Judd

Columbus

v.

' Opinions of
Judges, 58 Me., 591 ; Davison ». Ramsay County, 18 Minn.,
" Tax
483.
legislation means the making of laws that are to furnish the
measure of every man's duty in support of the public burdens, and the means
of enforcing it." Philadelphia Association, etc. v., Wood, 39 Penn. St., 73, 83,
per Lowrie, Ch.
1

J.

2
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tification of the demand is to be found in the reciprocal duties of
protection and support between the state and its citizens, and the
exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction of the state over the per-

The citizen and the prop-

sons and property within its territory.

erty owner owes to the government the dutj' to pay taxes, that
the government may be enabled to perform its functions, and he
is supposed to receive his proper and full compensation in the
protection which the government affords to his life, liberty and
property, and in the increase to the value of his possessions by
the use to which the money contributed is applied.*
Taxes dififer from subsidies, in being regular and orderly,^ and
they differ from the forced contributions, loans and benevolences
of arbitrary and tyrannical periods," in that they are levied by authority of law, and by some rule of proportion which is intended
to insure uniformity of contribution, and a just apportionment of
the burdens of government.
In an exercise of the power to tax,

is

great and imperative,

it

While therefore the power

is

equalit}'.^

a

is,

the purpose always
that
common burden shall be sustained
by common contributions, regulated by some fixed general rule,
and apportioned by the law according to some iiniform ratio of

is

it

it

not arbitrary;
rests upon fixed principles of justice, which have
for their object the protection of the tax payer against exceptional
and invidious exactions,^ and
to have effect through estab-

J.
;

4

'

N. T., 419, 422, per Ruggles,
People V. Brooklyn,
ware Division Canal Company, 49 Penn. St., 524, per Agnew,

McEeen

J.

v.

Dela-

;

from " strangers " rather than from the " children."

Matthew

17

:

9.

is

'

Jacob's Law Die, "Tax;" Bouvier's Law Die, "Tax;" Ty.son u. School
Tribute
often used aa synonymous with tax, but
Directors, 51 Penn. St.,
the more ordinary meaning is, an exaction demanded by a conqueror, or by
some external authority whose power is too great to be resisted an exaction
26.

Law-

in Woodbridge

b.

Detroit,

Dana, 28,

31

;

Sutton's Heirs v. Louisville,

Dixcm, Ch.

9

;

of Rock Co.,
Wis., 410, 421 Christiancy, J.,
Mich., 274, 301 Grim v. School District, 57 Penn.

v. Supervisors

;

J., in Knowlton

J., in

5

Hobertson, Ch.

8

'

less and arbitrary exactions are sometimes called tribute when made by the
constituted government; as in the remonstrances of the Spanish Cortes to
their sovereign against such demands. Hallam's Middle Ages, ch. IV.

a

a

«

St., 433.
" Whenever the property of citizen shall
be taken from him by the sovereign will, and appropriated without his consent, to the benefit of the public,
the exaction should not be considered as
tax unless similar contributions
be made by that public itself, or shall be exacted rather by the same public

is

The equity of

it

it,

listed rules, operating impartially.
unless
exaction cannot support

a

I.]

CH.

particular

in accordance with

made

itieither can the apparent injustice of particular tax dewhen
demanded under general rules, which the wisfeat
dom of the legislature has prescribed for the general good.^
particular designation
applied by which
and distinguished from other taxes.

a

To some taxes

is

it

is

it,

a

law.^

they are commonly known

a

As thus
is

employed

exportation o)' consumption of goods.
has
broader meaning than custom, which
a

it

importation,

it

but in ordinary use

meaning nearly synonymous with tax,
means an indirect tax, imposed on the
a

Thus, the word duty has

duty

is

The term impost also signifies any tax, tribute or duty, but
seldom applied to any but the indirect taxes.
An excise duty
an inland impost, levied upon articles of manufacture or sale,

is

it

imposed on imports or exports.

to pursue certain trades or to deal in
certain commodities.
The term toll, in its application to the law
of taxation,
It was formerly applied to duties
nearly obsolete.
on imports and exports, but tolls as now understood are confined
almost exclusively to charges for permission to pass over

by

road or ferry owned

a

is

and also upon licenses

bridge,

the party imposing them.*

The taxing power an incident to sorereignty.

will from

such,

is

it

with that of which

is

is

of taxation

The power
coextensive
and
incident of sovereignty,
an incident. All subjects, therefore, over

an

constituent

members

of

tlie same community generally

Robertson, Ch.

J., in Lexington

v.

as

McQuil-

9

own tlie same kind of property."
Dana, 513, 517.
lan's Heirs,

tax that the party required to pay

it

no objection to

a

It

is

'

is

is

it

a

is

tax
may be,
Cush., 567, 573.

it

equitable

3

'

void unless legally assessed. Joydemanded contrary to
As
when
District,
liable for the
agreement with the state, but to pay debts for which the state
Northern Missouri R. R. Co. v. Maguire, 20 Wall., 46.
party taxed.
However

ner v. School

derives no ben-

»

See State ».

are not tolls.

30

N. J.,

447, 448.

a

:

Haight,

a

particular burden e. g., tax for school purposes levied upon
But in truth benefits always flow from the apmanufacturing corporation.
propriation of public moneys to such purposes, which corporations in common with natural persons receive in the additional security to their property
and profits.
See Ainesbury Nail Factory Co. v. Weed, 17 Mass., 53.
efit from the

This

case holds that

railroad fares

i
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which the sovereign power of the state extends are, in its discretion, legitimate subjects of taxation; and this may be carried to
any extent to which the government may choose to carry it.^ In
its very nature it acknowledges no limits, and the only security
against abuse must be found in the responsibility of the legislature
which imposes the tax to the constituency who are to pay it.
The judiciary can afford no redress against oppressive taxation, so
long as the legislature, in imposing it, shall keep within the limits
of legislative authority.^

Even

J., in McCulloch

a va-ongful

government,

if it

main-

ProviWarren
dence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet., 514, 563; Charles Eiver Bridge
Bridge, 11 Pet, 420 ; Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How., 73 ; Howell ®. State, 3 Gill,
14; Atkins i\ Hinman, 2 Gilm., 437, 449; Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Mom-., 330,
339; Perkins v. Milford, 59 Me., 315; People v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y., 419; Tallman v. Butler County, 12 Iowa, 531 ; Davenport v. Bailroad Co., 16 Iowa, 348;
State 1). Boll, 1 Phil.; N. C, 76, 85 ; Pullen v. Commissioners of Wake Count}^,
66 N. C, 361 ; Bridge Proprietors v. State, 21 N. J., 384, 386; S. C. on appeal,
22 H". J., 593 ; People v. Lawrence, 41 N. Y., 137, 141 ; Matter of Van Antwerp,
56 K". Y., 261; People v. Coleman, 4 Cal., 46; Taylor «. Palmer, 31 Cal., 240;
State V. Commercial Bank, 7 Ohio, 125; Hanna D.Allen County, 8 Blackf., 352.
" Power to tax is granted for the benefit of the whole people, and none have
any right to complain if the power is fairly exercised and the proceeds properly applied to discharge the obligations for which tlie taxes were imposed.
Such a power resides in the state government as part of itself, and needs not
to be reserved when property of any description
is granted to individuals or
corporate bodies."
Clifford, J., in North Missouri Bailroad Co. v. Maguire,
* * * that, 'no man's property shall be
20 Wall., 46, 60 :" The declaration
taken or applied to public use without the consent of his representatives, and
■without just compensation being made,' concedes no new right to the state,
but only regulates its exer'cise.
This is a right inseparably connected with
McOlure,
sovereign power witli or without its recognition by the constitution."
J., in Extension of Hancock Street, 18 Penn. St., 26, 30 : see Bank of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 19 Penn. St., 144. " By all the well settled and
acknowledged principles relating to the power of sovereign states, they have
the power to tax all persons or property within their jurisdiction."
Poland,
J., in Catlin v. Hull, 21 Vt., 152, 161 ; Blue Jacket ii. Johnson County, 3 Kans.,
299; Hagari). Supervisors of Yolo, 47 Cal., 222; Coite®. Society for Savings, 33
1 Marsliall,

Cli.

v.

Maryland,

4 "Wheat., 316, 428, 429 ;
v.

Conn., 173.

' " The judicial cannot prescribe to the legislative department of the
government limitations upon the exercise of its aclinowledged powers. The power to
tax may be exercised oppressively upon persons, but the responsibility of the
legislature is not to the courts but to the people by whom its members are
So, If a particular tax bear heavily upon a corporation or class of
elected.
cor, orations, it cannot, for that reason only, be declared contrary to the con-

tains order, receives
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a

if

capability of supporting itself by force of arms, may lay taxes,
overthrown before
collected, the whole prothough
levy
ceedings must fall to the ground with the authority that instituted them.^

Classification of taxes.

Taxes are said to be

Direct, under which designation would be included those which

upon the property, person, business, income,
who are to pay them
and

are assessed

of

;

those

etc.,

Indirect, or those which are levied on commodities before they

and are paid by those upon whom they ultimately fall, not as taxes, but as part of the market price of the
Under the second head may be classed the duties
commodity.
reach the consumer,

upon imports, and the excise and stamp duties levied upon manu-

The individual states have always derived their principal revenue from direct taxes, and the federal government from
those which are indirect,^ but the power of each to levy taxes of
factures.^

;

3

;

4

Perry,

v.

;

4

;
9

;

9

it

;

;

5

;

;

8

;

7

roll

8

Wall., 533, 548, per CTmbc, Cli. J. See CarMcLean, 25 Weston e. Charleston,
Pet., 449, 466 Lane County
Wall., 71, 77; Coite ». Society for Savings, 32 Conn., 173; Kirby
9. Oregon,
V. Shaw, 19 Penn. St., 338
Pittsburgh, etc.. Railroad Co. v. Commonwealth, 66
Blaokf., 353 State b. Newark, 26 N.
Penn. St., 73 Hanna v. Allen County,
J., 519 Tallman v. Butler County, 13 Iowa, 531 State v. Stephens, Texas, 137,
139 Gibson v. Mason,
Nev., 283, 306 Young v. Hall, Nev., 313, 234 Williams
" The sovereign right to lay and collect taxes
11.Cammack, 37 Miss., 209, 219.
grows out of the paramount necessities of government; an urgent necessity
remains unsatisfied." Nisbet,
which admits no property in the citizen whilst
J., in Parham «. Justices of Decatur,
Geo., 341, 353.
Veazie Bank e. Fenno,

stitution."

a

'

So held of
government set up in an attempted revolution
O'Byrne v. Savannah, 41 Geo., 331.

which failed.

1

;

;

1.

§

7

3,

4,

1

One chief reason for resorting to indirect taxes

"he government,

8

is

.

'

;

3

a

§

=

Kent's Com., 354 Story on
ch.
See also
Pol. Econ., b.
950-957;
Montesq. Spirit of the Laws, b. 13, ch. 7; Tucker's Pol.
Econ., ch. 14; Rogers' Pol. Econ., ch. 33. The term "direct taxes" is employed in peculiar sense in the federal constitution in the provision requiring
such taxes to be apportioned according to representation, and they are, perHylton v. United Stales, Dall.,
haps, limited to capitation and land taxes.
Wall., 433 Veazie Bank v. Fenno,
Pacific Insui-ance Co. u. Soule,
171
Wall., 533, 544.
Wayland's

Const,

that this method enables

in the language of Turgot, "to pluck the goose without mak-
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both descriptions is only restrained by certain principles of government, and by constitutional provisions which will hereafter be
referred

to.

Maxims of policy.

Writers on political economy lay down

certain principles which should govern the imposition of taxes, but
The
these are guides rather to the legislature than to the courts.

author of the " "Wealth of JSTations," in particular, has enumerated
certain maxims, the substance of which may be stated as follows :
1. That the subjects of every state ought to contribute to the support of the go^'ernment as nearly as possible in porportion to the

which they respectively enjoy under its protection. 2.
The tax which each is to pay ought, as respects the time and manner of payment, and the sum to be paid, to be certain and not
arbitrary. 8. It ought to be levied at the time and in the manner

revenue

in which it is most likely to be convenient to the contributor to
pay it ; and 4. It ought to be so contrived as both to take out
ing it cry out," since tliose who pay do not perceiye, or at least do not reflect,
that a part of what they pay as price is really paid as a tax. Montesqueiu
" There are two states in Europe where the imposts are very heavy
says :
upon liquors; in one the brewer alone pays the duty, in the other it is
levied indiscriminately upon all the consumei's; in the first, nobody feels
the rigor of the impost, in the second, it is looked upon as a grievance. In
the former, the subject is sensible only of the liberty he has of not paying, in the latter, he feels only the necessity that compels him to pay."
Spirit of the Laws, b. 13, ch. 7. The merchants and others who were the
customers of Jewish money lenders in lawless times are supposed to have
delighted in the plunder of the usurers, though they themselves were compelled to make it good in the additional interest demanded of them to compensate for the risks to which the lenders were exposed. Hallani's Middle
Ages, ch.

8,

pt. 3.

Indirect taxation may be as just as any other, provided it is justly laid.
To make it just, it must reach everything of the class on which it is levied.
If it reaches a part only, it must generally be unjust, because, while increasing the price of that portion which is taxed, it enables the producers of or
dealers in that portion which is not taxed, to demand a similar price, and
thus operates as a bounty to one class of the community at the expense of
This Is a perpetual difficulty attending the imposition of
other classes.
duties on imports, when the laws are not strictly enforced ; the smuggler

either undersells the honest dealer, or, if he sells at the same price, adds the
amount of the duties to his own profits, and to that extent has an advantage
In the market.

"

little

as

possible

brings into the public treasury.'

The following are the maxims in Mr. Smith's words

:

'

over and above what

it

and to keep out of the pockets of the people as
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The subjects of every state ought to contribute to the support of the
government as nearly as possible in proportion to their respective abilities
in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the
that
a

is

a

protection of the state. The expense of government to the individuals of
like the expense of management to the joint tenants of great
great nation
estate, who are all obliged to contribute in proportion to their respective in-

In tlie observation or neglect of this maxim consists
must be
Every tax,
called the equality or inequality of taxation.
three
of
the
sorts of
once
for
which
falls
one
all,
upon
finally
only
observed
is

it

terests in the estate.

what

necessarily unequal, in so
[rent, profit, wages],
In the following examination of differdoes not afiect the other two.
far as
shall seldom take much further notice of this sort of inequality,
ent tares,

I

it

is

mentioned

above

revenue

is

is

a

is

but shall, in most cases, confine my observations to that inequality which
particular tax falling unequally upon that jDarticular sort of
occasioned by
affected by it.
private revenue which
" II. The tax which each individual
bound to pay ought to be certain and

The time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to
all
to be clear and plain to the contributor and to every other
paid, ought

not arbitrary.
he

is

is

Where

it

otherwise, every person subject to the tax
pnt more or
less in the power of the tax gatherer, who can either aggravate the tax upon
any obnoxious contributor, or extort, by the terror of such aggravation, some
person.

to himself.
The uncertainty of taxation encourages the
insolence and favors the corruption of an order of men who are naturally unpresent or perquisite

not near so great an evil as

is

it

is

a

is

it

is

is

it

degree
"

a

very small
of uncertainty.
III. Every tax ought to be levied at the time or In the manner in wliich
most likely to be convenient to the contributor to pay it.
A tax upon the
rent of lands or of houses, payable at the same term at which such rents arc
levied at the time when
most likely to be convenient for
usually paid,
the contributor to pay, or when he
most likely to have the wherewithal to
Taxes upon such consumable goods as are articles of luxury, are all
pay.
manner tliat is very convenifinally paid by the consumer, and generally in
ent for him.
He pays them by little and little, as he has occasion to buy the
As he
at liberty, too, either to buy or not to buy, as he pleases,
goods.
must be his own fault if he ever suffers any considerable inconvenience from
is

from the experience of all nations,

I

a

it

a

The certainty of
popular, even where they are neither insolent nor corrupt.
what each individual ought to pay is, in taxation,
matter of so great imbelieve,
portance, that
very considerable degree of inequality,
appears,

such taxes.

it

a

it

" IV. Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep
out of the pockets of the people as little as possible, over and above what
brings into the public treasury of the state. A tax may eitlier talte out or
brings into the
keep out of the pockets of the people
great deal more than
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Of these maxims, the wisdom of which has secured for them
universal acceptance/ the second embodies a rule of absolute

right from which the authorities are not at liberty to depart ; the
first and third address themselves to the legislature which frames
the revenue laws ; the fourth also appeals to the legislative wisis perhaps less observed than either of the others, especially in those states which have never burdened themselves
with heavy debts or been tempted into wild and extravagant exIn such states a tendency has been apparent to heavy
penditures.
accumulations of money in the state treasury; accumulations not
dom, and

only unjust to the people whom they deprive of the use of the
money taken from them for considerable periods, but especially
impolitic, as they tempt those having the custody of them to a
use of them in loans ^— possibly in speculations — which, when
not strictly within the law, is always demoralizing and often leads

The maxim which is alluded to would justify

to defalcations.
public treasuiy in

the four

following ways:

First.

The levying of it may

require a great number of officers, ■nhose salaries may eat up the greater part
of the produce of the tax, and whose perquisites may impose another additional tax upon the people. Secondly. It may obstruct the industry of tlie
people, and discourage them from applying to certain branches of business
While
which miglit give maintenance and employment to great multitudes.
it obliges the people to pay, it may thus diminish, or perhaps destroy, some

which might enable them more easily to do so. Thirdly. By
and other penalties which those unfortunate individuals incur
who attempt unsuccessfully to evade the tax, it may frequently ruin them, and
thereby put an end to the benetit which community might have received from
the employment of their capital.
An injudicious tax offers a great temptation to smuggling ; but the penalties of smuggling must arise in proportion to
The law, contrary to all the ordinary principles of justice,
the temptation.
first creates the temptation and then punishes those who yield to it ; and it
commonly enhances the punishment too in proportion to the veiy circumstance which ought certainly to alleviate it; the temptation to commit the
crime.
Fourthly. By subjecting the people to the frequent visits and the
odious examination of the tax gatherers, it may expose them to much unof

the funds

the forfeitures

and though vexation is not,
necessary trouble, vexation and oppression;
it
is
expense,
speaking,
strictly
certainly equivalent to the expense at which
every man would be willing to redeem himself from it. It is in some one or
other of these four different ways that taxes are frequently so much more burdensome to the people than they are beneficial to the sovereign."
Wealth of
Nations,
' See

b. 4, ch. 3.

Mill's Pol.

Pol. Econ., ch.

21.

Econ., b.

5,

ch.

2,

§ 2; Tucker's Pol. Econ., ch.

14; Rogers'
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in condition at all times to meet

any state in having its treasury

it

it,

but
would condemn emphatically any
all possible calls upon
exactions from the people in advance of any needs of the government.'

pose

these maxims assume that the taxation

of obtaining

a

laid for the pur"Within the definitions given, the

revenue.

burden would not be taxation,

is

All

ture, but how, when, and upon what subjects

is

certain sum of money can be collected for

it

how

a

;

if

revenue were not the purpose.
But in laying taxes other considerations not only are but ought
to be kept in view the question being always not exclusively

public expendiwise and politic

lay the necessary tax under the existing circumstances,

to

having

regard not merely to the replenishing of the public treasury, but to
the general benefit and welfare of the political society, and

taking

notice, therefore, of the manner in which the laying and collection

would make

it,
is

a

a

it,

is

is

made by law in some states that the moneys in the treasury
Provision
so low as
may be deposited ip banks at a low specified interest. The rate
and the fact that the office
to constitute
temptation to bankers to obtain
of state treasurer is generally regarded as
prize beyond what the salary
-

strong presumptive

evidence that that officer expects to

profit to himself, either by obtaining a bonus from the favored
bank that receives the deposits, or by making loans at a higher rate than he
would be expected to account for to the state.
That such loans are regarded
evidenced by the fact that under the statutes of
as impolitic
number of
the states, they would constitute criminal embezzlement;
but that they are
is within the observation of
frequently made
commonly believed. Yet
all who have watched the course of public affairs, that legislation has some,
times been so shaped as to increase the already impolitic accumulations
in
hastened
in
state treasuries, and tax payers have been
up
making their payments by the imposition of heavy penalties for delay, when even the ordinary interest exacted from the tax payer would have accorded better with
state policy than collecting the money in advance of state needs, in order that
rate still lower.
The impolicy of such
might be deposited in banks at
diffifor which
in
some
cases
by
provisions
intensified
legislation has been
of
doubtful
Allusion
validity.
and
such
cult to account; so unjust are they,
penalty, payable to the state, on those who shall
here made to laws imposing
as if the state
tax purchase made by an individual
redeem their lands from
had an interest in preventing any citizen who, by .poverty or other cause,
later payhad failed to pay his taxes in season, from saving his estate by
ment.
That tliese heavy penalties have sometimes prevented redemptions
which otherwise would have been made — especially in the case of special
not to
taxes, like those for building school houses or constructing drains —
;

is

a

a

a

is

is

it

a

it

it

is

a

is

rrake some

be doubted.
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of the tax will affect the several interests in the state. And upon
this it may be observed that :
had in view may be to
1. In the laying of taxes, one purpose
encourage one branch of industry or trade, though at the expense
of another ; as where a tax is laid upon certain fabrics received

from abroad by the exchanges of commerce for the sake of encouraging the domestic producer of similar articles, on whose industry
Such a burden, however, may be
the tax operates as a bounty.^
so heavy that the market will not warrant its being paid, and in

producing revenue it merely prohibits importBut a law which, under the name of taxation, has for its
ation.
purpose only to embarrass and perhaps to destroy a certain branch
of commerce, if enacted by a state, would look to the general posuch

case, instead of

lice power for its justification, and if enacted by the general government would seem more properly to derive its force from the
authority conferred upon the government to regulate commerce
and the intercourse with foreign countries, than to an authority
conferred for revenue

purposes,

which such

a

law would not aim

or tend to subserve.'
'

Tucker's Pol. Econ., ch. 14. Mr. Justice Story in liis Treatise on tlie Consti9G5, asserts very broadlj' tlie power to tax for otlier purposes tlian for
He says: "The absolute power to levy taxes includes the power in
every form in which it may be used, and for every pui-pose to which the legislature may choose to apply it. This results from the very nature of such an
unrestricted power. A fortiori, it might be applied by congress to purposes
for which nations have been accustomed to apply it. Now, nothing is more
clear from the history of commercial nations, than the fact that the taxing

tution, §
revenue.

power is often, very often, applied for other purposes than revenue. It is often
applied as a regulation of commerce.
It is often applied as a virtual prohi-

bition upon the importation of particular articles, for the encouragement and
protection of domestic products and industry; for the support of agriculture,
commerce and manufactures (Hamilton's Reports on Manufactures in 1791) ;
for retaliation upon foreign monopolies and injurious restrictions (See Mr.
Jefferson's Report on Commercial Restrictions, in 17U3 ; 5 Marshall's Life of
Washington, ch. 7, pp. 482 to 487 ; 1 Wait's State Papers, 423, 434) ; for mere
purposes of state policy and domestic economy; sometimes to banish a noxious article of consumption ; sometimes as a bounty upon an infant manufac
ture, or agricultural product; sometimes as a suppression of particular em-

ployments ; sometimes as a prerogative power to destroy competition and secure a monopoly to the government. (See Smith's Wealth of Nations, b. 5,
ch.2, art.4.J"
«

Chief Justice Marshall says in McCuUough

v.

Maryland, that "

the power
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2.

They may be intended to discourage trades and occupations
■whicli may be useful and important when carried on by
iew persons under stringent regulations, but exceedingly mischievous
when thrown open to the general public and engaged in by many

or sale of intoxicating drinks.
Two purposes are
had
in
view
in
imposing such tax to limit the busigenerally
few persons, in order to more efficient and perfect reguness to
lation, and also to produce

a

:

a

a

manufacture

revenue.

As no

one

will pay the

may be made so heavy that no one can
and then
becomes prohibitory.
A tax laid for

it

afford to pay

and

obvious that the heavier the tax the fewer can

it

it, it,

afford to pay

is

profits of sales,

it

tax who does not expect to be reimbursed the expense from the

the double purpose of regulation and revenue must be grounded

tax would not authorize

a

a

er to

but the grant of powthe imposition of
burden in its
;

in both the police and the taxing power
nature and purpose prohibitory.^

And again, " if the right to lax exists,
right whicli in its nature acknowledges no limits. It may be carried
to any extent within the jurisdiction of the state or corporation which imposes
which the will of such state or corporation may prescribe."
Weston v.
Charleston,
Pet., 449. The learned Chief Justice in these cases was arguing
that
against the existence of the power and the idea he expresses so forcibly
the power to tax
so vast, and rests upon reasons which at times are so imperative that
may he exercised again and again, as the exigencies of the
exhausted or the privilege taxed
state may demand, until the property taxed
This statement has abundant illustrations in hiscan no longer be exercised.
by taxation, and even, in individual
tory, of people absolutely impoverished
cases, sold into slavery because they could not meet the demands of the state
upon them. It may justly be questioned, whether this strong statement, which
was put forth as
defense against an injurious tax, will fairly justify an affirmative exercise of power that has not revenue in view, but
tax
only called
in order that
In other
may be employed as an instrument of destruction.
words, whether the unavoidable incident to the exercise of power to demand
and collect revenue, can lawfully be the inducement to the exercise of the
a

power when revenue

a

not contemplated or sought.

Ex

parte Burnett, 30 Ala., 461. The early case of State v. Boon,
affirmed the right to levy tax of $1,000 on faro tables for the
a

1,

So held in
E. M. Charl.,

is

a

it

is

a

is

it

is

;

is

3

it,

it
is

to tax involves the power to destroy."

'

1

is

the heavy tax imposed in some states
persons. An example
and in some localities of other states on those who engage in the

purpose of prohibition, though the payment of the tax would not legalize the
use of the tables.
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Taxes in kind.
Taxes are generally demanded in money,
and any tax law will be understood to require money when a
But if the condition of any
different intent is not expressed.^
state, in the judgment of its legislature, shall require the collection of taxes in kind — that is to say, by the delivery to the proper
officers of a certain proportion of products

— or in gold or silver

bullion, or in anything different from the legal tender currency
of the country, the right to make the requirement is unquestionable, being in conflict with no principle of government, and with
Instances of taxes in
no provision of the federal constitution.

kind occurred in the colonial period,' and statutes requiring state
taxes to be paid in gold and silver, to the exclusion of legal tender

treasury notes, have been fully sustained in several of the states.'
Labor is sometimes required as a tax, but such requirement has
usually been confined to the labor needed to keep the highways

in repair, and it is a peculiar tax, to some extent at least in the
and the ordinary tax regulations do
not embrace a burden of this nature, except as it may be exnature of a police regulation

;

pressly named.*
Amenia v. Stanford,
Driver, 1 Kan., 455.
'

2

6

Johns.,

93 ;

Bryan

v.

Sunclberg,

5

Tex., 418

;

Judd

v.

Wall.,

71 ; 'Williams's Case, 3 Bland Ch., 186, 255 ;
Rives' Life of Madison, 146. An early tax by the French government in
Canada was of a certain proportion of all the heaver skins and moose hides.
Parkman's Old Regime, 302.
' Perry ». Washburn, 20 Ca]., 318, 350; State Treasurer b. Wright, 28
111.,
512; Trenholm v. Charleston, 3 S. Car. (N. S.), 347, 349 ; Whittaker v. Haley, 2
Oregon, 128 ; Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall., 71. It has been decided that
a state cannot compel state script to be received in payment of county, school
and district taxes; it not being money, and the creditors of the municipalities not being compellable to receive it in payment.
Wells v. Cole, 27 Ark.,

Lane County

v.

Oregon,

7

2

603.

In Sawyer v. Alton, 3 Scam., 127, 130, a provision of the constitution that
of levying a tax shall be by valuation, so that every person shall
pay a tax in proportion to the value of the property he or she has in his or
"

"

the mode

her possession,"
labor.

was held not to prevent the levy of a poll tax payable in
Pleasant «. Kost", 29 111., 490, 494, a highway assessment

In Town of

on property, payable in labor, was held not to be in the proper sense a tax.
And see Fox v. Rockford, 38 111., 451 ; State -o. Halifax, 4 Dev., 845. In Overseers of Amenia i). Overseers of Stanford, 6 Johns., 92, 93, where the
question was whether one who had worked out a highway poll tax had gained a

rfr,.
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Taxes not debts.

of

Taxes are not debts in the ordinary sense
that term, and their collection will in general depend on the
remedies -which are given by statute for their enforcement.

setofE

a

admissible,^ their assessment does not constitute

a

is

a

mon law action as

tax cannot in general be recovered in
comdebt.^
Taxes are not demands against which

a

an action at law,

a

is

a

is

Where no remedy
specially pi-ovided,
remedy by suit may
given which does not embrace
fairly be implied, but when one

tech-

;

" contracts between
nical judgment, nor are they
party and party,
but they are the positive acts of the
either express or implied

it
is

a

of

tax,

in that

a

statute wluch made the settlement depend on the payment
said, " Taxes, in the popular and ordinary sense of the term

under

settlement

laws are generally to be read), mean pecuniary contribuadded by way of defining
the sense betions; and when the word paid
It was therefore held that settlement was
comes more clear and certain."
it,

sense

a

is

(and

working out

And see Starkesboro i>.
highway assessment.
assessment of four dollars or two days' work on
and under 60, was held to be
poll tax, and as
a

An
21

such forbidden by the constitution of Nevada.

Haasett v. Walls,

9

Heinesburgh, 13 Vt., 215.
each male resident over

a

not gained by

Nev., 387.

Gordon, Quincy's Rep., 58; Andover Turnpike ». Gould,
Met., 520; Crapo v. Stetson,
Pierce v. Boston,
id., 398; Api>.
Gallatin
15
Dennis
530;
Hopkins,
Duulap
1).
111.,
Gray,
County,
pleton
N.J.,
26
».
id.,
477;
398;
Allen,
Camden
».
"Webster
Seymour,
D. Maynard,
Vt., 140, 185; Shaw J). Pickett, 26 id., 482; Packard u. Tisdale, 50 Me., 376;
Carondelet v. Picott, 38 Mo., 125 Perry v. Washburn, 20 Cal., 318 Richards
McCall v. Lorrimer, Watts, 351 Miller v. Hale, 26
V. Stogsdell, 21 Ind., 74
Wall., 71, 80. Compare Durant d. SuPenn. St., 432 Lane County i). Oregon,
26 Wend., 66.
In Baltimore v. Howard,
H. & J., 383-394,
pervisors,

'Ruddock

6

V.

;

said by Suchanan,

J.,

if

an act authorizes

it

will lie

1

for its -collection, assumpsit

a

tax but gives no remedy
for its recovery.
Other cases recognize
the right to maintain an action for taxes, and treat the statute remedy as cumulative merely.
See Dugan ». Baltimore,
Gill &J., 499; in which the
Ch.

that

is

6

;

7

;

4

;

:

8

5

7;

8

3

Mass., 39, 44;

court say the imposition and assessment of the tax " created the legal obligation to pay on which the law raised an assumpsit," notwithstanding the stat-

sole

a

has been

a

a

special remedy. And see State v. Steamshif) Co., 13 La. An., 497. It
decided in Vermont that if
tax be duly assessed against
feme
who afterwards marries, the husband's property, including the personal

ute gave

Himmelman

d.

Oliver,

is

contracts, but only when
;

est as

Cal., 281

it

is

not liable to be distrained for the satisproperty acquired by the marriage,
faction of the tax. Sumner ■».Pinney, 81 Vt, 717. Taxes do not draw interexpressly

given.

Haskell

v. Bartlett, 31

34 id., 246.

3

'Trenholm v. Charleston,
S. Car. (N. S.), 394; McCracken «. Elden, 34
St, 239; Pierce «. Boston,
Met, 520; Johnson v. Howard, 41 Yt, 132;

Himmelman

8

Penn.

v.

Spanagel, 89 Cal., 389.
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i^^'

^■

government througli its various agents, binding upon tlie inhabitants, and to the maliing and enforcing of which their personal
' And the law abolishing
consent individually is not required."
for
imprisonment for debt has no application to taxes, the remedy
the collection of which may include an arrest if the legislature
shall so
The repeal of a tax law before the tax is colprovide.^

lected puts an end to the tax itself, where no rights are reserved in
the repealing act, and nothing in the act indicates a contrary intent.'

The protection of

reciprocal.

Taxation and protection

the government being the consideration for which taxes are demanded, all parties who receive or are entitled to that protection, may be called upon to render the equivalent*
tion may be either to the rights of person, or to rights

The protecin property,

and taxes may consequently be imposed when either person or
But a personal tax cannot be
property is within the jurisdiction.
assessed against a nonresident,^ neither can the property of a non'

Pierce

v.

Boston,

Oal., 318; Webster
= Appleton V.

' Howe

V.

videre, 35

3

Met.,

530, per Shaw, Ch.

Seymour,

Hopkins,

Starliweather,

5

8

Vt.,

Gray, 530
17

135, 140;
;

Harris

J. ;

Johnson
v.

Wood,

Mass., 240; Fenelon's

Perry v. "Washburn, 30
-o. Howard, 41 Vt., 123.
6

T. B. Monr.,

Petiti)n,

7

641.

Penn. St., 173;

Board of Trustees, 71 N. C, 400;
23
511 ; McQuilkin v. Doe, 8 Blackf., 581 ; Mount
Lane,
3 S. & M., 695.
In Warren R. R. Co. v. Belid., 25 ; Ross v.
N. J., 584, it was decided that the tax might still be collected.

Augusta V. Nortli,
Abbott V. Britton,
!). State, C

v.

57 Me., 392;

Mitchell

i).

La. An.,

The right to tax an individual results from the genei'al protection afforded
to himself and his property. Vattel, b. 1, ch. 20. See Eggleston v. Charleston,
1 S. Car. Const. Rep., 45 ; Bank of U. S. v. State, 13 S. & M., 456 ; De Pauw v.
New Albany, 32 Ind., 204.
*

One who is not taxed is just as much entitled to the protection of government as one who is. Every resident of the state, and every owner of property
therein is liable to taxation, and it is this liability that entitles him to protection, and not the fact that he is actually taxed. Some persons are never taxed,
because they do not come within any of the rules which the state has prescribed for the apportionment of its burdens.
But the state prescribes these
rules in the discretion of its legislature ; and it prescribes them iu contemplation of its obligation to give impartial protection to all persons.
one ia
hia person, business or property comes within these rules, he must pay the
tax; if he does not, he is guilty of no neglect of duty, and chargeable with no

If

fault for not paying one. Youngblood i>. Sexton, Sup. Ct. Mich., Oct. Term, 1875.
' Dow V. Sudbury, 5 Met., 73 ; Heinman v. Stover, 43 Me., 497 ; People v. Supervisors of Chenango, 11 N. T., 503 ; St. Paul v. Merritt, 7 Minn., 258.
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it lias an actual situs within the state, so
to be under the protection of its laws.^
The mere right of a

resident be taxed unless
as

foreign creditor,

to receive from his debtor within

the state the

payment of his demand, cannot be sabjected to taxation within
" It is a
the state.
right that is personal to the creditor where he
resides, and the residence or place of business of his debtor is imThe power of taxation, however vast in its character,
material.
and searching
the
and

in its extent, is necessarily limited to subjects within

jurisdiction of the state. These subjects are persons, property
business.
Whatever form taxation may assume, whether as

duties, imposts, excises or licenses,

it must relate to one of these

It

is not possible to conceive of any other, though as
applied to them, the taxation may be exercised in a great variety
It may touch property in every shape, in its natural
of ways.
condition, in its manufactured form, and in its various transmutasubjects.

tions.

And the amount of the taxation may be determined by

value of the property, or its use, or its capacity, or its productiveness. It may touch business in the almost infinite forms in
the

which
tures,

it is conducted, in professions, in commerce, in manufacUnless restrained by provisions of
and in transportation.

constitution, the power of the state as to the mode, form
and extent of taxation is unlimited, where the subjects to which it
These are conceded or adapplies are within her jurisdiction.'"*
the federal

judged principles, and have ceased to be the subject of discussion

Corporations, it is also conceded, may be taxed
But debts
like natural persons on their property and business.
owing to foreign creditors by either corporations or individuals,
or argument.

The creditor cannot be taxed,
subject of taxation.
because he is not within the jurisdiction, and the debts cannot be
taxed in the debtors' hands, through any fiction of the law which
are not the

for this purpose, the property of the
debtors.
They are not property of the debtors in any sense ; they
are the obligations of the debtors, and only possess value in the
is to treat them as being,

tliough the owner
That personalty may be taxed -wliere it
Personal allegiance has no necessary connection
dent; see ch.
spoon V. Duncan,

Wall.,

4

An

alien may be taxed as well as

=

citizen.

a

See

nonresi-

with the
Wilher-

310.

Tax on Foreign Held Bonds,
ington Mills, 11 Allen, 265.
State

a

III.

right of taxation.

is

is,

'

15

Wall.,

300, 319.

See

Oliver

v. Wash-
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to
they are property, "but
call them property in the hands of the debtors
simply to misuse
stockterms. "^
Shares in
corporation are also the shares of the
taxed to him
holder wherever he may have his domicile, and
as his personal estate, can only be so taxed by the jurisdiction to
or
which his person
subject, whether the corporation be foreign

With

them

is

if

a

is

hands of the creditors.

domestic.^

If

it

were practicable to do so, the taxes levied by any government ought to be apportioned among the people according to the
benefit which each receives from the protection

affords him

but this

the government
The value of life

f

is

;

manifestly impossible.
and liberty, and of the social and family rights and privileges canand. by the. general
not be measured by any pecuniary standard
consent of civilized nations, income or the sources of income are
almost universally made the basis upon which the ordinary taxes
of State Tax on Foi-eigD Held Bonds, 15 Vf all., 300, 319, 320, per Field,
J., overruling several PennS3'lvania cases. See also Hayne v. Deliesseline,
McCord, 374; Oliver v. Wasliington Mills, 11 Allen, 268.

8

•■Case

;

'

Great Barrington v. County Commissioners, 16 Pick., 572 Newark City Bank
The Assessor, 30 N. J., 13; State d. Branin, 23 N. J., 484; State v. Bentley,
23 id., 532 Wliitsell e. Northampton County, 49 Penn. St., 526 post ch. III.
This statement must, however, be subject to the qualification that foreign
corporation must always accept the privilege of transacting business in stale,
on such terms as the state may see fit to exact.
a

a

;

;

1).

a

'

Mr. Thorold Rogers says, in his Treatise on Political Economy, that if taxation were determined by the comparative protection accorded to individuals,
women and children should pay higher rate than strong and healthy adults,
;

since they have more need of assistance and, if the law be effectual, get
more. And this, he shows, was in fact the theory of medieval (feudal) finance.
" The lord protected his vassal, the vassal assisted his lord
by his service or
his
But
minors
nnder
the English military tenures, and women
pnrse.
by
Bnder some forms of the military assize, were in the hands of guardians, who
were enabled to take the rents or profits of their estates, without account, durThe reason given was that there was no recipirocity of
ing legal incapacity.
service in these cases, and the plea might be justified, because, in an age of

is

it

violence, weakness taxes the energies of defense more than
excites the sentiment of pity. A more generous and less utilitarian theory has gradually preIt held that for practical purposes, and under the conditions of orvailed.

See also

Mill, Pol. Ecou.,

b. v. ch.

8.

Ch. 31.

§

post on the latter."

3,

a

a

is

too much indebted to the security which
ganized society, the strongest
wise and just government gives, to allow any such comparison between his
condition and the condition of the weakest, as shall tend to lay heavier im-
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is

upon the assumption, never wholly true in
point of fact, but sufficiently near the truth for the practical operations of government, that the benefit received from the governare estimated.

is

in proportion to the propertj'' held, or the revenue enjoyed
and though this can never be arrived at with
.under its protection
the
operation of any general rule, and would
accuracy, through

■

;^

ment

wholly just

could

be,

a

it

is if

it

experience has given us no better standard, and.
applied in great variety of forms, and with
But, as before
more or less approximation to justice and equality.
not be

is,

at

the general

;

is

considerations are always admissible what
aimed
not taxes strictly just, but such taxes as will best subserve

stated, other

welfare of the political society.'

1

" The idea of property consists in an established expectation, in the persuasion of heing able to draw such or such an advantage from the thing possessed,

of the

Now this expectation, this persuasion
cannot count upon the enjoyment of that
can only be the work of the law.
which regard as mine, except through the promise of the law which guaranIt law alone which permits me to forget my natural weakto me.
ties
It only through the protection of the law that am able to inclose
ness.
field, and to give myself up to its cultivation with the sure though distant
"Property and law are born together and die tohope of harvest."
take away laws and
Before
laws
were
made there was no property
gether.
Works,
of
Edinb. ed., vol.
Bentham, Theory
Legislation.
property ceases."
And speaking of the right to property, he justly adds " It
that
308.
right which has vanquished the natural aversion to labor which has given
which has brought to an end the migrato man the empire of the -earth
regard
tory life of nations; which has produced the love of country and
for posterity."
ch.
See Wayland, Pol. Econ., b.
Rogers' Pol. Econ.,
case.

a

is

:

1
;

3,

§

4,

a

;

;

I,

p.

;

*

*

I

is

it

is

I

I

according to the nature

ch. 21.

'An

early Maryland law recited that, "fines, duties

or taxes may properly
laid with political view for the good government
and benefit of the community."
Upon this Chancellor Bland comments as
follows: "A citizen may have
fine imposed upon him as punishment for
his misdemeanor or crime
means of insuring
duty may be imposed as
good conduct, and in aid of the police, as in the form of
duty for license to
treble
tavern, to retail spirituous liquors, to keep billiard table, etc.
keep
tax may be Imposed with
war,
political view, as upon ncm-jurors during
etc." Williams's Case,
Bland Ch., 186, 257. In the same case the learned
Chancellor refers to statutes of the colony which taxed bachelors as such.
This was not because they had more to be protected by the government than
other persons, but probably from
variety of reasons, one of the most influa

a

3

a

a

;

a

a

a

a

a

a

;

a

a

a

and justly be imposed or

they were better able to bear the burdens of
than men with families dependent upon them, or unmarried fe-

ential being that presumptively,
government,

2

males whose income

would commonly

be less.

The taxes goTernments

In

[CH. I.
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heen accustomed

have

modern times, governments

have

been accustomed

to lay.
to

lev}'' a

relying upon a single kind for
all the needs of the state, and sometimes levying a number of different kinds with a view to distribute the burden more equally or
more to the general acceptance.
None of these can invariably
operate justly, but all have advantages that may make one desirgreat variety of taxes

;

sometimes

able under one set of circumstances,

have changed.
mon will be briefly referred

Those which have been most com-

circumstances

only in

to.

These are not a common resort in modern

Taxes.

Capitation

and another the best when

could they be either just or politic.
As they regard, only the person, they must be shared equally
by all, except under governments where privileged orders are
recognized, and where they might be graded according to the ortimes,^ and

ders to which

a few cases

the several

persons

taxed belong.

If

the tax is

graded by property, it is obviously something besides a capitation
tax.

Land Taxes.

These may be measured by the production, by
The first method has seldom been re-

the rent, or by the value.

To some extent it would operate as a discouragement to industry ; and, while it might not be
burdensome to the cultivators of very productive estates, it might
sorted to in ealightened periods.'

preclude poor lands, whose production would barely pay for cultivation, from being cultivated at all ; in other words, would be
A tax, measured by rents, will
equal to the whole rental value.
usually come nearer to being a tax on the actual revenue of the
land proprietor ; and this standard is more common.
A variety
of land taxes, under different names, has been levied in Eng'

The taxes

assessed by this name have not always been taxes levied on per-

sons, but sometimes taxes exacted from

by tlie ca,pita.

districts or provinces, and measured
Such were the capitation taxes levied under the Roman Em-

pire, in apportioning which among individuals, one might represent several
capita, according to his wealth in land, while others escaped the tax entirely.
Gibbon's Decline and Fall, ch. 17.
5

ch.

It was made use of under the Boman Empire. Gibbon's Decline and Fall,
It has been occasionally employed in recent times. Tithes for the
17.

support of the Established

Church in England were

so measured.
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by rent, and
As, however, this tax
apportioned to the municipal divisions.
made
in
the
fourth
based upon valuations
year of William and
Mary (1692),
extremely unequal, and perhaps only continues

general land tax, measured

is

it

is

a

land, merging at last in

19

a

raised by it.^
monly laid by value. This
subject to some objections. In
order to insure equality,
new and rapidly imnecessary, in
proving country, that there should be frequent valuations, and
a

great official force, and involves

a

this requires

is

it

is

is

revenue

very small portion only of the whole
In this country, land taxes are com-

in because

to be acquiesced

heavy expense.

The apportionment of this expense among towns or other small

new valuation

is, is

states,

a

divisions of territory, the people of which are allowed to choose
the officers, reconciles them to the burden, and, in many of the
made

annually.^

An objection,

theo-

revenue.

A

is

tax to be thus paid cannot long continue, and

is

a

is

it

is

a

is

tax by assessed value
that
often
retically more serious,
wild and
poor and unproductive, or where
(where the land
from
tax which
paid
capital instead of from
uncultivated)
sel-

to be purposely laid but, in particular instances, almost
And in this country, where considerable
any tax will be such.
view to profit
portion of the community invest in lands with
from the rise in value, unproductive and uncultivated lands cannot be exempted from taxation because of the hardships of india

a'

;

dom

without exempting
large portion of the wealth of
the state now legitimately invested where
insuring large
cases,

is

it

a

vidual

profits to the owner.
These, except where the

Taxes on Hoxises.

to the lands, have been measured
1

307

;

»
1

as appurtenances

Bl. Com.,

houses

Broom & Hadley's Com.,

are treated

by rents, and

368, 373.

is

it

it

a

a

^

interthe light of the experience we have of the American system,
tax
assessed
accord"A
land
esting to note what is said by Adam Smith:
may be at first,
ding to general survey and valuation, how equal soever
To
very moderate period of time, become unequal.
must, in the course of

In

it

it

will probably, in

the long run, occasion

much more trouble

can possibly bring relief to the contributors."
pt.

3.

Nations, b. v, ch.

3,

vexation than

it

continued,

is

*

*

prevent its becoming so would require the continual and painful attention of
government to all the variations in the state and produce of every different
"an attention so unsuitable to the nature of
farm in the country,"
not
likely to be of long continuance, and which, if
is
government, that

and

Wealth ot

[CH. I.
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sometimes by hearths and windows.
because, among other reasons,

A hearth

it involved

tax was obnoxious,
inquisitorial visits of

rooms; and both hearth and window taxes
tended to limit among the poor the use of these conveniences, so
Both are now
important not only to comfort, but to health.
abolished in England.
officers

to inspect

These may be on all incomes, or on all with
such exemption as will enable the tax payer in a frugal manner to
The latter is the course usually
support himself and his family.
adopted, and in some cases incomes in excess of the exemption have
Taxes on Income.

been taxed a larger percentage as they increased in amount.
reasons which favor this discrimination would also

justify

a

The

heavier

proportionate tax on the thrifty classes in other cases ; and the principle once admitted there is no reason but its own discretion why
the legislature should stop short of imposing the whole burden of
government on the few who exhibit most energy, enterprise and
thrift. Such a discrimination is a penalty on the possession of these
qualities. But any income tax is also objectionable, because it is
inquisitorial, and because it teaches the people evasion and
fraud. No means at the command of the government has ever

it to arrive with anything like accuracy at the incomes of
its citizens, and they resist its inquisitions in all practical modes,
enabled

not only because they desire to avoid as far as possible the public
burdens which they are certain are not to be equally imposed, but
also because they are not willing that their private affairs and the
measure of their prosperity should be exposed to the public.^

The

by the United States during and immediately following the late war were escaped by a large proportion of those who should have paid them, and the assessors' retaxes imposed on incomes

a wholly inadequate indication of the annual private
of
the country.
In the United States, also, such a tax is
revenue
unequal because those holding lands for the rise in value escape

turns were

it altogether — at least until they sell, though their actual increase
in wealth may be great and sure.
Taxes on Employments.
• Gibbon

A

tax on the privilege of carrying on

refers to torture employed under the Empire to ascertain the profSee Decline and Fall, ch. 17.
its of employments.
Its employment upon tlie
J«ws in England is a familiar fact in history.

a
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will commonly be imposed in the form

a

a

is

;

of an excise tax on the license to pursue the employment and
regusum whose amount
this may be
specific sum, or
lated by the business done or income or profits earned. Somefor the purpose of

times small license fees are required, mainly

if

regulation, but in other cases substantial taxes are demanded because the persons upon whom they are laid would otherwise
escape taxation in the main,
Instances of hawknot entirely.
ers,

peddlers,

auctioneers,

will readily occur to

etc.

mind.

the

a

it

is

is

a

it

a

a

is

convenient
The form of
license, though not
necessary,
condiform for such a tax to assume, because
then becomes
tion to entering upon the business or employment, and
collected
without difficulty.
But
equally competent to impose and
collect the tax by the usual methods.'
of imposing these

as

of

on the Carriage
;

Taoces

Property.

by licensing

There are various methods
the

As

is

vehicles employed, by tonnage duties, etc.
the powers of the states are restricted as
Labor.

by taxing the

business,

in

to tonnage duties,

elsewhere

shown.

;

of

These,

a

country where wages
are only sufficient to supply the absolute needs of life, would necessarily fall on the employer but when the accummulations of laTaxes on the Wages

a

bor are relied upon for
competency and even for wealth, the
burden might be more felt by the laborer. In modern times
such taxes have been unusual.
on Servants, Horses, Dogs, Carriages,

'

tended as taxes on

In Ould

B.

These are in-

etc.

luxury and ostentation, and can seldom prove

Kic'umond,

23

Grat., 464, 468,

a

Taooes

city tax on lawyers was conheld license from

the state to practice

law, and the municipal tax went to

" Whilst
lawyer's license
says:
court of the commonwealth, and

J.,

a

tested for the reason, among others, that the persons taxed

nullify

it.

Anderson,

a

is

a

a

a

a

it,

a

a

is

a

a

is

I

a

it

is

is

a

is

it

is

it

a

him to jDractice law in any
not in the power of any municipality to
deprive him of that right, or to take away his license,
civil right and
privilege to which are attached valuable immunities and pecuniary advantfair subject of taxation by the state, or by municipal corporaages, and
tion where he resides and enjoys the privilege. It
vested civil right; yet
subject of taxation as property to which
as properly
man has
vested
cannot perceive that there would not be as much reason for saying
right.
that man's property
not taxable, because he has
vested right to
as for
that
license
not
taxable
because
he
vested right to
saying
lawyer's
has
it." And see Youngblood v. Sexton, Mich. Sup. Ct., Oct. 1875.
authorizes
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Each person assesses himself in determining howThe same may be said of taxes on
many he will.emploj or own.
plate and articles of display, when taxed directly.

burdensome.

These are objectionable for the
They lead to the same
same reasons that apply to income taxes.
evasions, and to some others which it is impossible to check or
Taxes on the Interest

of Money.

They are seldom levied

circumvent

eo

nomine.

Taxes on Dividends are more easily collected and do not usually

Dividends come from corporainvolve inquisitorial proceedings.
tions whose proceedings are usually semi-public, and while the
privacy of individuals is not invaded, neither are the demands of
the government liable to serious
method of raising revenue.

evasions.

These are laid in diminu-

Taxes on Legacies and Inheritances.'^

tion of

This is a common

new capital which now comes to the hands of parties on
the death of former owners ; and in theory they should not be
a

burdensome.

In

fact, however,

except when they are upon gifts

by will to others than tbe immediate family, or are on collateral
The property
inheritances, they are likely to be felt severely.
held by the head of the family, is usually, for all purposes of
supplying comforts and enjoyments, the property of all the family ; and a tax upon their succession to it on his death, comes in a
time of unusual

necessary disbursements to increase

the embar-

and burdens which

accompany the loss of their main
reliance and support.
Sometimes these taxes are levied on testamentary gifts and collateral successions only.
rassments

Taxes on Sales,

Bills of Exchange,

etc.

These when laid on the

instruments by means of which business is transacted, and imposed in the form of stamp duties, have the high recommendation
In Eyre v. Jacobs, 14 Grat., 433, a tax on collateral inheritances was objected to as opposed to the requirement that taxation of property should be
uniform. But the tax was sustained as not being a tax on property, but on
'

the privilege of succeeding to the Inheritance.
The tax is spoken of in the
case by Lee, J., as one of great antiquity, imposed upon the Romans as early
as the days of the Emperor Augustus, and often in early times by nations of
Europe, as well as in modern times. See also Williams's Case, 3 Bland. Ch.,
186, 359.

A similar

also overruled.

objection to such a tax in Tyson v. State, 38 Md., 577, was

that the cost of

collection

realized, and few
are besides
place from
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paid in small
time to time,
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small percentage of the sum
of payment are practicable. They
sums, as business transactions take
but

a
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are

and

therefore

not

much felt.

is

;

Indeed on many accounts they are the least objectionable taxes
that can be levied and the repeal of the most of those which
probably due
were levied by federal authority in this country
to the strong interest in favor of taxation calculated to aid particular branches of trade.
These would be likely to be imposed in
the form of stamp taxes.
The objections are very obvious, and
were thought to be conclusive in this country even when the need
Taxes on Newspapers.

of revenue was the greatest.
imposed with
between suitors and

These are usually

a

Taxes on Legal Process.

enter

a

view to adjusting, on an equitable basis, as
the public, the expenses of the administration of justice.
They
may be imposed as stamp fees on process, fees for permission to
suit,

etc.'^

Taxes on ConsumahJe Luxuries.

Articles like spirituous and

malt liquors, tobacco, etc., are generally subjected to heavy taxation as constituting mere luxuries, so that however severe may be
provisions for such taxation in Georgia,
That they may be laid without any such
Heiskell, 35. The right is easier
express authority, see Harrison v. "Willis,
defended than the policy, as the tax, if heavy, may in some cases be equivalent to
denial of justice. The heaviest taxes of this description have been
tliose indirectly imposed in ihe form of fees to judicial officers. For several
centuries such fees in England constituted the principal compensation of the
judges: the regular salaries even of those of the highest courts being insighappened
nificant.
Adam Smith found an advantage in this, for he says
that each of the superior courts of Westminster "endeavored by superior discould.
The
patch and impartiality, to draw to itself as many causes as
present admirable constitution of the courts of England was perhaps originally in great measure formed by this emulation, which anciently took place
between their respective judges, each judge endeavoring to give in his own
court the speediest and most effectual remedy which the law would admit for
pt. 2. These inWealth of Nations, b. v, ch.
every sort of injustice."
At times in this counsignificant salaries continued until the 17tli century.
try an idea has prevailed that the courts should be made self-supporting; and
now the general rule, at least as rein the case of the justices' courts this
is

1,

a

it

it

a

7

'

There are express constitutional
Nebraska, J^Tevada and Wisconsin.

gards their civil jurisdiction.
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it will never, of necessity, prove burdensome to the needy
The taxes are laid in various forms

classes.

on the importation,

;

the manufacture, and the sale. In the United States the inclination of late has been to make the tax on spirituous liquors as
heavy as can be collected; but experience demonstrates that a
point may be reached where any accession to the tax, by increasing the temptations to fraud and evasion, will tend to lessen the
amount collected.
Indeed the same may be said of all taxes ;
the higher they are, the more numerous

will

be the frauds, perju-

public duty ; and
when they reach a point where the chances of profit by clandestine manufacture or importation are in excess of the chances of
loss by detection, added to the tax, the revenue will be certain to
fall off very rapidly even though consumption is not diminished.
ries, betrayals of official trust, and evasions of

It

has recently been proved by the experience

of the federal ex-

cise laws that a tax of

fifty cents a gallon on spirits may be more
Great Britain at
productive than one of four times that amount
time
had
a
similar
taxes
tea.
on
one
experience with
Taxes on Exports.

These,

if the articles exported are a neces-

sity to foreign countries, tend to transfer to such countries a part
If not a
of the burden of supporting our own government.
diminish
and
In either
exportation
production.
necessity, they

will usually

in the latter, almost certainly,
and in the former by inviting retaliatory legislation by the counIn this country the states cannot levy export dutries affected.
ties, without the consent of congress, except for the purposes of
case they

be impolitic

;

inspection,^ and congress is also prohibited to lay any tax or duty
on articles exported from any state.^

These have generally been the chief reliance
They have been laid
of the federal government for its revenue.
on almost every conceivable article of use, taste or ornament, and
Taxes on Imports.

Some tariff
upon almost every possible theory and principle.
laws have perhaps been framed with a view to the just distribution of the burden, and for revenue purposes only ; others, while
having revenue mainly in view, have laid heavier duties on arti' Const 1J. S., art.

I, §

x.

U.

I, §

ix.

'■Const.

S., art.

I.]
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in competition with home manufactures,

while others, in some of their duties, have discarded the idea of
We have thus
revenue entirely, and looked solely to protection.
had revenue tariffs, protective tariffs, and revenue tariffs with in-

imposed would be more than made up to those who shared

it,

All have discriminated more or less against
cidental protection.
articles of mere luxury, but articles of prime necessity have, under
some, been taxed very heavily, on the supposition that the burden

by

advantages they would receive from the building
Whether the result has answered
up of manufactures at home.
question foreign to the purpose of the present work.
expectation

These have been

Taxes on Corporate Franchises.

a

a

is

the incidental

source of large

revenue in some states, while others have only placed corporations
on the same footing with individuals,

and taxed them on their

or imposed some specific tax intended as an equivalent
for property lax. A tax on corporate franchise may or may not
one of which corporations have
be just or politic. If the business
is

a

a

property,

a

the tax would reallj"- be paid
the other

hand, the business

by the community at large.
is

a

tax on their franchises, however heavy, would not
be burdensome, because the result would only be to add to the
cost of whatever the corporations supplied to the public, so that
monopoly,

If

on

one open to free competition be-

and in respect to which corporations would enjoy no especial privileges or advantages,
tax
upon the privilege of conducting the business under corporate
organization would be wholly unreasonable and unjust, because
a

a

tween corporations and individuals,

demand which, under such circumstances,

While, therefore,

a

a

;

it

would give individuals and partnerships an advantage in the
competition and their competition, keeping down prices, wauld
prevent corporations from indirectly collecting any portion of the
tax from the public, and leave them to bear the whole burden of
must prove ruinous.
tax on the corporate franchises of banks of

issue, which are not subject to competition, might be entirely just,

a

if

a

ruinous disadvantage.

of

a

trading company, with
which every individual might compete, would usually be wholly
continued, must result in the abandonment of
unjust, and
business which, under such circumstances, would be carried on at
one on the corporate organization
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These have been the main relimethod of raising revenue has

been to levy annual taxes on the value of

all the real and personal

property of the inhabitants, with limited exceptions, and irrespective of the income -which, by means of the property, is or may be
realized.
This seems at first view to be just, and in the belief
that it is just, it has been steadfastly adhered to notwithstanding
These diffithe many and very serious difficulties attending it.
culties pertain, for the most part, to the taxation of personal property, which is subject to the following very important objections :
1. It cannot be assessed without inquisitorial
process of some
kind, instituted for the purpose of ascertaining that which is
not open to public inspection,

and which the individual,

except

under the compulsion of such process, would not consent to disFew persons will voluntarily make a complete exhibit of
close.^
'The readenvill

information on this score in the accounts
which the current histories of England give of taxation in that country under
the house of Planlagenet.
A very interesting account of taxation under Ed■ward
is found in Audrey's National and Domestic History of England, b. 6,
ch. 18. The assessment and valuation of articles was so minute and particular
as to give us no small insight into the domestic life of that day, and into the
extent of the comforts and conveniences enjoyed by different classes of so.
ciety. Lingard, in his History of England, b. 4, ch. 2, has the following which
relates to taxation under Edward IH :
"The most ancient method of raising a supply was by a talliage on movable
find valuable

I

property, varying, according to circumstances, from a fiftieth to a seventh, and
descending from the highest classes down to the villeins ; and it is interest-

ing

to observe how

rapidly the art of taxation improved in every succeeding

reign.

" Under John, each individual was permitted to swear to the value of his
own property, and the bailiffs of prelates, earls and barons swore in the
place of their lords. The oaths were received by the itinerant justices who,
for that purpose, proceeded regularly from hundred to hundred ; and, according to the returns of the justices, the tax in its due proportion was levied by
the sheriffs.

" By Henry III, every man was compelled to swear, not
only to the amount
of his own movables, but to that of the movables belonging to his two next
neighbors ; and, if the accuracy of his statement was disputed, the truth was
inquired into by a jury of twelve good men of the county. The commissioners were not the justices, but four knights appointed by the justices; and
they were instructed to inquire into the value of every species of personalty,
with the exception of church ornaments, books, horses, arms, gold, silver,
jewels, furniture, the contents of the cellar and larder, and hay and forage for
private use.

I.J
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their affairs to the public, and still fewer, perhaps, have their
affairs in such shape that public officers can make an inventory
a

of their personal possessions, including property in the hands of
others or at
distance, and debts owing to them, without the asStatutes have recognized
sistance of the owners in preparing it.

the amount by his own oath

if

a

list to be presented by the tax
this difficulty, and provided for
payer under oath, or allowed the assessor to tax every person according to his own judgment, leaving the person taxed to reduce
he shall see fit, and be able to do

oath would be difficult

if

a

a

a

is

desirable
This
objectionable, not only as taking away
privacy in business and family concerns, but also as holding out
false
strong temptation to false swearing in matters where
so.

not impossible of detection.^

"Under the Edwards, the commissioners were appointed immediately by
They called before them the principal inhabitants of each towntlie crown.
ship, and bound four, six or more of them, by oath, to inquire into the value
of

on the day mentioned in the
which was generally the feast of St. Michael. By movables, they were to
understand not only corn, cattle and merchandise, but money, fuel, furniture
the movables possessed by each householder

act,

;

and, if any such articles had been sold.-removed or deand wearing apparel
stroyed since the day specified, they were yet to include them within the
amount. The exceptions allowed were few. The knights and esquires did

not return tlieir armor, horses or equipments, their plate of gold, silver or
clothes or jewels, or those which belonged to their wives; and
persons of inferior rank were exempted from payment for one suit of clothes
for the husband and another for the wife, one bed, one ring,
clasp of gold or
a

brass, their

is

a

a

silk sash or girdle for daily use, and cup of silver or porcelain.
It
evident that, in these inquiries, as the temptation was great, so also were

silver,

of concealment.
But the ingenuity of the commissioners kept
with the artfulness of the defaulters. Each year new regulations were
issued from the exchequer, and, sometimes within
short period, the amount
of tax from the same township was nearly doubled. This growing evil occasioned numerous remonstrances.
The people complained that the collectors
the means

a

pace

entered their houses and searched every apartment; that they defrauded the
king, and that they received bribes to spare some, while at the same time,
through pique and resentment, they aggrieved others."
'

This difflculfy has always existed. Latimer, in his sermon at Stamford, in
of Henry VIII, inveighs against
in this language: "When the
parliament, the high court of this realm,
gathered together, and there
fifteenth part of his goods to the king
determined that every man shall pay
then commissioners come forth, and he that in sight of men, in his cattle, corn,
worth an hundred marks or an hundred pound, will
sheep and other goods,
set himself at ten pound; he will be worth to the king but after ten pound.
Tell me, now, whether this be theft or no "
?

is

a

is

it

is

it

the time
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The assessment of personalty holds out constant and very

by concealing the
knowledge of every thing which the tax payer believes cannot
This is so well understood that it is
easily be discovered.
scarcely expected that citizens will voluntarily state what they
possess, or that officers will make much if any effort to discover.
powerful

temptations

to defraud

the

state

Indeed, the assessment of personal property reaches so small a proportion of the amount really protected by government, that it
might almost be said that laws for the purpose remain on the
statute books rather as incentives to evasion and fraud in the
dealings of the citizen with the state than
a revenue for public purposes.

as a means

of realizing

Such taxes are usually unjust in their discrimination between residents and nonresidents who enjoy the same protection
3.

of the laws. This will be manifest from an illustration : If money
is loaned at ten per centum, and the tax upon credits is one per
centum of the capital, the resident capitalist may count upon an
income of nine per centum upon his investments.
But the nonresident who could not be taxed in the state upon his loans
which are made there and protected and enforced by its laws,
would, upon the like investment, count upon ten per centum;
and this difference would not only be a serious discrimination
against the citizen, but it would, and does, encourage further
evasions and frauds, and particularly the loaning of moneys in
the names of nonresidents in order to escape taxation. It also

to citizens, whose investments do not
require personal attention, to take up their residence abroad ; any
saving of the tax being equivalent to an addition of that amount
to their incomes.
4. Taxation of personalty leads to duplicate taxation in various
presents

an inducement

Other taxes besides those by valuation reach such property, being laid in the shape of duties, excise and license fees,
etc. ; and, moreover, when property is moved from one jurisdic-

ways.

tion into another, where the time'fixed for assessment is different,
it may for that reason be twice assessed for a tax on valuation for
the same period of time.
5.

Such taxation

revenue

requires a large addition to the force of
officers which otherwise would be sufficient, and it ren-

ders necessary more frequent assessments than would be requisite

I.]

CH.

TAXES,

THEIR NATURE AND KINDS.

were taxation confined to that property, or those

29
subjects which

To make
in characteristics and ownership.
generally thought necessary that the tax payer's

is

just,

it

it

are more permanent

;

debts should be deducted

and this complicates the

difficulty of

is,

and leaves every man, in effect, to
ascertaining what his estate
make his own assessment, or subjects him to the arbitrary and
These are objections which
others, which are more obscure,

need not be mentioned.

A

;

every one feels and appreciates

tax on land

is

capricious action of the assessors.*

to these

not open

Whenever the law seeks to tax land and personalty
with equality, the general result
that land pays much the
is,

objections.

greater proportion of the tax, because this can

all be reached, and

cover

no inquisitorial proceedings are required to disand no frauds or evasions can conceal
from view.

it

it,

all be taxed;

have led some political economists to
advocate the omission of personalty from the customary taxation
by value, and the raising of the ordinary state revenue by tax laid
a

These and other reasons

a

few other subjects which, like land, are
observation
and inspection, and in respect
public
to which neither would harsh sifting processes be required, nor evaexclusively on land and

tax,

is

Such

it

sions be practicable, nor frauds invited.

a

open to constant

claimed,

is

a

while nominally falling upon
few, would in fact be diffused
through the whole community, and collected from all by being
added to the price of what
produced and distributed by the

just as we have found that tax upon any common article of consumption
paid in the end by the consumer,
is

a

classes taxed,

must

is

than

it

it

is

no more burdensome to the dealer who nominally pays
to any other member of the community of consumers.
Adam Smith declared, that " no tax can ever reduce for any considerable time the rate of profit in any particular trade, which
and

always keep its level with other trades in its neighbor-

'

Many statutes leave the assessors to estimate the personal estate, but allow
an excessive valuation by
statement under oath.
Under the almost universal custom of valuing property at from one-fourth to
one-third its estimated value, this privilege to the tax payer becomes of no
avail. A man having an estate of $30,000, may be taxed upon that sum, and
be ■without redress, because he cannot make oath that he is not worth so

if

on but $10,000.

the general valuation

is

much, when

a

the tax payer to reduce

at one-third

only, he should

be taxed

30
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And, indeed, in this country, during and after the great
civil war of 1861-5, it was generally found that a heavy tax
hood."»

iipon any particular article of consumption gave the business that
produced it a new and vigorous impulse of prosperity.'
These constitute

very considerable
source of income to the cities and villages of the country, and
When the amusements are of a
sometimes to the state itself.
Taxes

on Amusements.

a

public nature, like theatrical and other exhibitions and shows,
concerts, games of skill or chance, publicly performed, whether
for profit or otherwise, races, etc., they seem to be as proper sub-

In fact such a
jects of taxation as property or ordinary business.
tax is in the nature of a tax on luxuries, and therefore as unobThe limit to the right to tax
amusements, if any exists, has never been judicially pointed out,

jectionable

as a

tax can well

be.

but when the public are invited to share them, the right must be
clear.
On the other hand it would seem that strictly private and
family amusements ought to be considered wholly exempt, except
possibly when they involve such expense as to be beyond the enjoyment of the people generally, and for that reason to be properly
taxable as luxuries.

The foregoing by no means embraces all the subjects of taxation ; some others will be referred to as we proceed, but the enumeration here made may be sufficient for our present purposes.
Even marriages have sometimes been taxed ; though as a rule the
'

Wealth of Nations, b. v, ch.

11, p. 11, art. 4.

' Mr. David A.

"Wells has treated this general subject with ability in many
A pamphlet embodying the remarks of Mr. Isaac Sherman bepublications.
fore the N. Y. Assembly committee of Ways and Means, October, 1874, is exIt is highly probable that if personalty
ceedingly instructive and valuable.
were wholly exempted from taxation by value, the burden of state taxes would
be no more unequal than now, and that the general tone of public morality,
on the score of taxation, escaping the schooling in evasions which is now had,
would be higher. In our enumeration of taxes, we have not included charges
for postage. These, though called taxes abroad, are in this country locked
upon rather as reasonable charges for a branch of transportation which the
They are not burdens upon the people, because they
government undertakes.

regularly fall below the cost.
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in the case of marriages have been 'only such as
were supposed sufficient to cover the cost of proper regulations.^
fees imposed

if

'

In the British internal revenue law in force near the close of the great
wars with Bonaparte, marriage licenses were taxed ten sliillings if ordinary
and five pounds
The marriage certificate was also taxed five sliilspecial.
That law was very carefully prepared, witli view to producing as
revenue as possible without serious hardships.
The discriminations
Tlius, the keeper of one
against luxuries were properly very considerable.
pleasure horse was taxed 21. lis. M., but for two he was charged HI. 4s., and
for every additional horse 6?. more or thereabouts. One carriage with four
a

lings.
much

was

621.

13Z.,

and two

261.

For

one male sei-vant

the tax was

No tax was charged on incomes less than

501.

;

for ten

it

wheels was taxed

21. Ss.,

from that

a

to 1501.
gradually increasing tax was imposed, and incomes above 1501. paid
ten per cent. Occupations and legal instruments were specially taxed^ the
taxes on indentures of apprenticeship ranged from 15«. up to 50Z., and articles
a

of clerkship in the office of an attorney or solicitor in the higher courts were
130Z.
The window tax was 6s. 6d. on house with six windows and Sil.
10s. on one with fifty.

taxed
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CHAPTEE II.
THE NATURE OF THE TOWEIt TO TAX.

In

of three distinct departments of the government, and the apportionment of power between them, the authority to tax necessarily falls to the legislative. This is manifest
from the slightest consideration of what taxation is. It is the
the creation

making of rules and regulations under which the necessary revenues for all the needs of government are to be apportioned among
While the principles of the
the-pcoiile and collected from them.
British constitution remained unsettled and in dispute, the authority to lay and collect taxes was claimed for the executive, but
only as a branch of the supreme authority, which was his by divine right, to rule at discretion.' When this arrogant claim was
repudiiitcd and abandoned, it became one of the most inflexible
of government that the executive could levy no taxes
whatsoever except in the execution of laws that had been made
Indeed, the princiiDle goes farther than this.
for his obedience.
pi-inciples

It

a

a

is,

grant of the people who are taxed, and the
grant must be made by the immediate representatives of the peoAll revenue laws in Great Britain must, therefore, originate
ple.
with the popular house of parliament;
body very tenacious of
that taxes are

its privileges, and disposed to class

as revenue

even indirectly, bring revenue to the state.*

laws whatever will,

Following this pre-

is

it

;

it
is

'

is

" This power," said tlie attorney general in Hampden's Case, "
innate
in tlie person of an absolute king, and in the person of the kings of England.
of nature and obedience and subjection,
All magistracy,
of nature.

3

7;

is

is

is

not any way derived from the people, but reserved unto the
This power
king when positive laws tirst began. For the king of England, he is an
absolute monarch; nothing can bo given to an absolute prince but what
inHo
herent in his person. He can do no wrong.
the sole judge, and we
ought not to question him. Whore the law trusts, we ought not to distrust."
llallam's Const. Hist., ch.
State Trials, 836; Broom's Const. L., 306, and
=
4

noles.

Bl. Com.,

is

permitted

to

§

1,

;

;

Inst., 20

1

169 Vattel, b.
ch. 20,
241.
The house of lords
amend money bills, and the commons deny the power
even to reject them. See resolutions of 5th and 6th July, 1860.
not
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constitution requires all bills for raising revenue to originate in the house of representatives/ and there are
corresponding provisions in the constitutions of nearly one half
the states.*
While such provisions are of little or no importance
cedent, tHe federal

in this country, where the members of both branches of the legislature are equally responsible to the people, the requirement that
executive officers shall confine themselves strictly to executive
duties, is one of the most valuable principles of the government.

Indeed, the division of the powers of government is the most important of the checks and balances by means of which the benefits of orderly government are secured and perpetuated ; and the
least encroachment by one department on the powers of the other
is usurpation, for which the law is supposed to provide the adeExecutive and ministerial officers enforce the
quate remedy.

in doing

they must keep strictly within the
authority those laws confer, and they cannot add to or vary, in
the slightest degree, any tax lawfully levied.^ They neither have,
tax laws

;

but,

so,

"roving commission to levy and collect taxes
from the people without authority of law but [they] can only
do so in the manner prescribed by the law, which should be the
* * in
governing rule for their conduct in levying taxes
nor can have any

all cases."''
itself, as

So inflexible is this rule, that even the legislature
will be more fully shown hereafter, cannot clothe them

with its own authority for this purpose.' Where the people have
located the power, there it must remain and be exercised.

The power not judicial.
power to tax is not judicial.

"

It

is still more manifest that the

It

is the province of the judicial

'

During the second session of the forty-flrst congress, there was much discussion as to what constituted a bill for raising revenue, but nothing was
settled.

In the constitutions of Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Vermont.
"

" State V.

Bentley, 23

N. J.,

533; State v. Flavell, 34 id., 370.

Barlow v. The Ordinary, 47 Geo., 639, 643, per Warner, Ch. J.
' See the next chapter. The legislature cannot confer upon a state board a
discretionary authority to add to the amount which the statute authorizes
Houghton v. Austin, 47 Ual., 648.
to be collected by state tax.
*

3
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power to decide private disputes between or concerning persons,
but of legislative power to regulate public concerns, and to make
" The legislative
^
laws for the benefit and welfare of the state."

judiciary construes the
The legislature must therefore determine all questions
the

makes, the executive executes, and
laws."^

of state necessity, discretion or policy involved in ordering a tax
and in apportioning it ; must make all the necessary rules and regulations which are to be observed in order to produce the desired
returns, and must decide upon the agencies by means of which
" The judicial tribunals of the state
collections shall be made.

That is

have no concern with the policy of legislation.

a matter

resting altogether in the discretion of another coordinate branch
of the government.
The judicial power cannot legitimately question the policy or refuse to sanction the provisions of any law not
^
And it is
inconsistent with the fundamental law of the state."
as incompetent for the legislature to confer the power to tax upon
the judiciary

as

' Sichardson,
*

Marshall,

Ch.

Ch.

upon

If

the executive.*

J., in Merrill

v. Sherburne,

J., in Wayman

v. Southard,

1

N. H.,

199, 204.

10 Wheat.,

1, 46.

ough V. Greenough, 11 Penn. St., 489, 494; Bates v. Kimhall,
Newland v. Marsh, 19 111., 376, 382; Beebe v. State, 6 lud., 501,

Perry,

10

Yerg.,

^Bedfield,

59, 09 ; People v. Supervisors

J., in Powers in

Ch.

re., 25

Vt,

shall

the legislature

of New York,

16

Green-,

See

2 Chip.,
515;

77;

Jones

N. Y., 424,

v.
432

261, 365.

" The court of sessions under the con10
Hardenburg
stitution can only exercise powers of a judicial character.
The legislature
is incompetent to confer upon the court any other powers.
The assessment
of taxes is not a judicial act; it partakes of no element of a judicial character.
It is a legislative act; it requires the exercise of legislative power,
which for certain governmental purposes in the county may be devolved upon
a board of supervisors, but cannot be delegated to any branch of the judicial
Field, J., p. 403. In Heine
department."
Levee Commissioners, 19 Wall,.
bill in equity was filed to compel the respondent to levy tax for
655, 661,
the payment of overdue corporation bonds. The bill was dismissed. Miller, J.,
" Tha power we are here asked to
exercise
the very delicate one of
says,
taxation. This power belongs in this country to the legislative sovereignty,
■■

Kidd,

Cal., 402.

is

a

a

«'.

«.

state or national.

In

the case before us the national

sovereignty has nothing
from the legislature of the state.
concerned, the state has delegated the power to
So far as the present case
that body has ceased to exist, the remedy
the levee commissioners.
in
the legislature, either to assess the tax by special statute, or to vest the power

with it.

The power must

be derived

is

to do

is

If

is

is

in some other tribunal. It certainly
not vested, as in the exercise of an original jurisdiction, in any federal court. It
unreasonable to suppose that the
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abuse its powers and transcend its legislative functions by the enactment of that which is called a tax law, but which is not such
fact, then indeed the abuse may be arrested by the judicial arm

in
;

^

but the interference does not proceed on the idea of any authority
The judiciary inof the judiciary over the subject of taxation.
terposes on the application of any party whose rights are threatened by an unlawful exercise of authority ; and it is immaterial

with whom or what department the unlawful action originates, or
But so long as the legislation is
by what name it is designated.
not colorable merely, but is confined to the enactment of what
is in its nature strictly a tax law, and

long as none of the constitutional rights of the citizen are violated in the directions prescribed for enforcing the tax, the legislation is of supreme authorso

Taxes may be and often are oppressive to the persons and
corporations taxed; they may appear to the judicial mind unjust
and even unnecessary, but this can constitute no reason for judi-

ity.

cial interference.'

It is not only
legislature would ever select a federal court for that purpose.
not one of the inherent powers of the court to levy and collect taxes, but it is
an invasion by the judiciary of the federal government of the legislative
functions of the state government.

It

is a most extraordinary request; and a
consequences no less out of the way of ju-

compliance with it would involve
dicial procedure, the end of which no wisdom can foresee."

Reading etc. R. R. Co., 53 Penn. St., 140, 145. See Gault's Appeal,
33 id., 94; N. Y. & Erie R. R. Co. v. Sabin, 26 id., 243; Wharton v. School
Directors, 42 id., 358; Broduax d. Groom, 64 K. C, 244; Pullen e. County
Commissioners, 66 id., 361 ; McCullough v. State of Maryland, 4 Wheat., 816,
Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet., 511, 563; Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8
428; Providence
Wall., 533, 548 ; Heine ». Levee Commissioners, 19 id., 655 ; People v. Brooklyn, 4 K. Y., 419; Weber v. Reinhard, 73 Penn. St., 370; Sharpless v. Mayor
of Philadelphia, 21 id., 147 ; Bank of Pennsylvania ». The Commonwealth, 19
id., 144; Perkins ». Milford, 59 Me., 315, 318, per Appleton, Ch. J. ; DePauw v.
New Albany, 22 Ind., 204 ; Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev.; 283 ; Waters i>. State, 1
Gill, 302; Alcorn ». Hamer, 38 Miss., 652, 751; Blackwell on Tax Titles, 4tli
" The courts have no more power to assess, or comed., ch. 1 and cases cited.
mand the assessment of taxes than the legislature has to adjudge or command
Reese, J., in Justices of Cannon County ».Hothe adjudication of lawsuits."
denpyle, 7 Humph., 145, 147. The case was one of an application for mandamus to compel the county court to levy a tax to pay county debts. And see
Delaware R. R. Tax, 18 Wall., 206.
'

'

'

Maltby

v.

See "Veazie

Charleston,

2

Bank

v.

Fenno,

8

Wall.,

533, 548, per Chase,

Pet., 449, 466, per Marshall, Ch.

J. ;

Delaware

Ch.

J. ;

Weston v.

Railroad Tax,

18
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Tax legislation may be colorable merely, either because the
purpose for which the tax is demanded is not a public purpose, or
because of the absence of some other essential element in taxation.
When that is the case, the judiciary is the efficient check, and it

must protect

and protect the public against what,
in such a case, would be an attempt at lawless exactions.^
In some of the states the county courts or county justices are
individuals

But these, although exer-

to make the county levies.

empowered

cising inferior judicial functions, are really administrative boards,
possessing an authority corresponding to that which is exercised
in other states by county commissioners or boards of supervisors.
Their action in ordering taxes is quasi legislative, and governed

by the same rules

other legislative action.
states, also, tax proceedings are reviewed and confirmed by the courts before any sales of property are ordered or
demands conclusively fixed against individuals.
But this again

In

as

some

is not legislative.
the taxpayer, as

Such a review is supposed to be favorable to
it gives him an opportunity to take the opinion

of the court upon the legality of the demand made upon him,
without waiting until the collector comes and seizes his person or
his property. The proceeding is the institution of a suit on behalf of the state against each individual tax-payer or item of
property taxed, and it calls upon the court to apply the law to
the issues which such a suit presents.
Of the judicial nature of
such

a

review no question could well be raised.

Law of the land.

There is

constitutional guaranty which
has come to us from Magna Charta, which declares that no person
a

Wall., 206; Williams v. Cammack, 27 Miss., 209; State v. Bell, 1 Phil.
(N. C),
76, 85; Bridge Proprietors «. State, 21 N. J., 384, 380; S. C. on appeal, 22 id.,
693; Dailey c. Swope, 47 Miss., 367.
'

T3'son

V.

School

Directors,

51

Penn. St..

9 ;

Covington

v.

Southgate,

15

B.

Monr., 491, 498; Tide Water Co. v. Costar, 18 K. J. Eq., 518; Hammett v.
Philadelphia, 65 Penn. St., 146; S. C, 3 Am. Rep., 615; Sedgw. Stat. & Const.
Law, 414. On this clear principle, that the power to tax was legislative and
not judicial, and that the valuation of property for the purposes of taxation
was an incident to the taxing power, it was held in Auditor of State v. Atchison, etc., R. R. Co., 6 Kan., 500, that the supreme court could not be made
an appellate tribunal to review the valuations
the board of county clerks.

of railroad property made by
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stall be deprived of life, liberty or property, except by the judgThe alternative proment of bLs peers or the law of the land.
visions of this guaranty have sometimes been supposed to mean
the same thing, and the guaranty itself to entitle every person to
have any demand made upon him submitted to the determination
Such a construction applied in tax
of a jury of the vicinage.
thorough and radical change in the principles
on which taxation is now supposed to rest. It would cripple the
legislative power, and subject the action of the department whose
function it is to make laws on its own views of the questions of
cases

would work

a

public interest and public policy which the laws involve, to a reIt would not
view and possible reversal at the hands of a jury.
so much strengthen the judicial department as it would weaken
for the courts themselves, though juries sit with
and as a part of them, are compelled to recognize a large degree
Such indeof independence in the action of these assistants.
the legislative

;

pendence is often useful, and never can be seriously detrimental
when a verdict determines a single controversy only ; but to make

juries the assessors of the claims of the state upon individuals,
could only introduce anarchy ; one jury reaching one conclusion
regarding the public needs and the justice of its demands, and
another another, until the state would be without general rule,
and must

fall to pieces from the incurable insufficiency of its gov-

upon as an important provision in a charter of government can never have been
ernment.

Such

a

construction of

a clause agreed

intended.^

It

has long been settled that while one is to be protected

in his

This is now agreed on all hands. See Cruikshanks v. Charleston, 1 McCord, 360; State «. Mayhew, 2 Gill, 487, 497 ; Harper v. The Commissioners,
In Harris v. Wood, 6 T. B. Monr., 641,
23 Geo., 566 ; State v. Frazier, 48 id., 137.
it is remarked that taxes ai'e recoverable not only without a jury, but without
a judge, and the assessment of ministerial oflBcers has been made to operate
as an execution on the citizen, and the collector could distrain, and any public
collector could be subjected to judgment on motion for the amount.
"This
on
a
it
judgment;
issues without a judgment, and it is
process is not founded
for this very reason that it is adopted. The state cannot wait the tedious proIf she were compelled to do this, her honor
cess of getting a judgment.
Hence
might be compromitted, and the rights of her citizens jeoparded.
she clothes her collecting agents with the .power to issue process at once'
which will at once command her means." Per Nishet, J., in Doe v. Deavors, 11
"

Geo., 79, 88.
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" the judgof the land," he is entitled to
ment of his peers" only in those cases in which it has immemoriinterests by the " the

kw

ally existed, or in which it has been expressly given by law. The
clause recited from Magna Charta does not imply the necessity

is,

for judicial action in every case in which the property of the citiOn the contrary, a legislazen may be taken for the public use.
tive act for that purpose, when clearly within the limits of legislative authority, is of itself the law of the land. And an act for

is

as we
levying taxes and providing the means of enforcement
have seen, within the unquestioned and unquestionable power of
therefore the law of the land, not merely
the legislature.^
It
subject was much considered in "Weimer ■». Bunbmy, 30 Mich., 202,
212.
The following
an extract from the opinion
"There are, unquestionably, cases in which expressions have been used im:

is

'This

;

if

;

a

a

man
plying the necessity for common law trial before, in any instance,
can be deprived of his property but thej' will be found on investigation to be
If any court has ever decided
cases calling for no such sweeping statement.
that judicial proceedings are of constitutional necessity in appropriating property under the power of taxation, the case has not been brought to our attenThis would be most extion, and has been overlooked in our investigations.
tax
similar
to our own have
existed
for
the
necessity
systems
traordinary

it

cannot be said that
prevailed ever since our government was founded; and
tax laws are usually so popular as to disarm every person of any legal objections which he might suppose available to relieve him of their burdens. On
the contrary, no laws are contested more vigorously, and with none are people
more critical in looking after defects and infirmities. It may be safely asserted, without fear of contradiction, that if the collection of the revenue could

through legal proceedings, the true principle would not have
discovery, but the wheels of government would long ago
have been blocked by litigious parties until an entirely new system could be
need hardly be said that any new system in which courts
And
substituted.
should be made the administrators of -the revenue would necessarily be so
be made

to so late

it

been left

a

only

it

is

a

it

a

cumbrous, and so subject to impediments and delays, as to make
constitugreat public inconvenience.
tional provision requiring
" There
nothing technical, or, we think obscure, in the requirement that
process which divests property shall be due process of law. The constitution
makes no attempt to define such process, but assumes that custom and law
is. Even in judicial proceedings we do not ashave already settled what
is

lawful process, but we test their action
certain from the constitution what
by principles which were before the constitution, and the benefit of which we
assume that the constitution was intended to perpetuate.
there existed,
before that instrument was adopted, well known administrative
proceedings

If

a

legislative conviction of their necessity, had
which, having their origin in
been sanctioned by long and general acceptance, we are no more at liberty to
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rule to be observed, but in all
the proceedings and all the process -wbich it points out or provides
As has been well
for in order to give the rule full operation.
" the mode of
said,
levying as well as the right of imposing taxes
is completely and exclusively within the legislative power, which,
in

SO

far

as

it lays down

a general

it is to be presumed, will always be exercised with an equal regard
to the security of the public and individual rights and conveniThe existence of government depending on the prompt
and regular collection of revenue must, as an object of primary
importance, be insured in such a way as the wisdom of the legislature may prescribe.
There is a tacit condition annexed to the
ence.

ownership of property that it shall contribute to the public revenue in such mode and proportion as the legislative will shall
direct ; and if the officers entrusted with the execution of the laws

injury of an individual, the common
law entitles him to redress. . But to pursue every delinquent liable
to pay taxes through the forms of process and a jury trial would
materially impede, if not wholly obstruct, the collection of the
revenue." ^ There is no room for the supposition that in a matter
transcend their powers to the

of this public importance,

in collection is always
desirable, and often imperative, dilator}' proceedings of this nature were within the contemplation of the people when consentwhere promptness

infer an intent in the people to prohibit them by implication from any general
language, than we should be to infer an intent to abridge the judicial author-

The truth is, the bills of rights in the Ameriity by the use of similar words.
can constitutions have not been drafted for the introduction of new law, but
to secure old principles against abrogation or violation.
They are conservatory instruments rather than reformatory; and they assume that the existing
principles of the common law are ample for the protection of individual

rights, when once incorporated

in the fundamental

law, and thus secured

against violation.
" We are, therefore, of
necessity driven to an examination of the previous
condition of things, if we would understand the meaning of due process of
law, as the constitution employs

Nothing previously in

the term.

use,

re-

garded as necessary in government and sanctioned by usage, can be looked
upon as condemned by it. Administrative process of the customary sort is
as much due process of law as judicial process.
We should meet a great
many unexpected and very serious embarrassments in government if this were
otherwise."

Taylor, Ch. J., in Cowles
Hagars. Supervisors of Yolo,
'

v.

Brittain,

3

Hawks,

47 Cal., 333, 333.

304, 307 ; Crockett,

J., in
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It is safer, and,
ing to any general provision of the constitution.^
as we believe, more correct, to say that our constitutions have
upon in view of an immemorial practice
and rule of government under which the whole subject has been
entrusted to the legislative department ; and they are to be understood and construed in the light of that practice wherever the
been framed and agreed

people have not expressly undertaken to change it.''
' See Cowles v.

Hawks, 204, 207; State
Cottrell, 5 Mich., 251; High

Brittain,

per NoU,3.; Sears v.
Harper v. The Commissioners,

23

Geo., 566

;

Tift

Allen,

v.

3

o.

v.

3

McCord,

55, 60,

Shoemaker, 33 Cal., 363;

Griffin,

5

id., 185, 191.

Blackwell, in his Treatise on Tax Titles, p. 36, insists that the constitutional
provision we have referred to, renders judicial proceedings requisite iu every
case before an individual can be deprived of his property under the revenue
laws. He concedes, however, that it does not require such proceedings in
the ordinary understanding of the term. " The power to levy a tax," he says,
" properly belongs to the legislative power. The collection of it involves the
The legislature levy the tax,
exercise of judicial and executive functions.
direct that a demand shall be made upon the owner of the land for the tax
=Mr.

is

is

is

if

it,

refused, authorize the collector to seize
and
charged against
payment
the body or goods of the delinquent; and in case satisfaction
not had in the
one or the other of these modes, power
conferred upon the collector to sell
and convey the land itself. Now, before the power to sell the land can exist
under

the law, the fact

of the levy and nonpayment of the tax, the demand,

is

and return of no goods, or that the body cannot be found, must exist. These
facts must be ascertained to exist before the power of sale attaches. Whether
the power to decide the question of delinquency
vested by law in the regularly constituted judicial tribunals, or in those specially instituted for that
is

it

;

the
purpose, or in the collector himself, can make no kind of diflerence
exercise of judicial power, and the officer who sells performs an executive
function; so that in point of fact, the legislative, judicial and executive

Is

is

a

is

?

a

is

a

is

is

is

is

a

a

departments of the government, all aid in the execution of the taxing pow^er.
The legislature declare what facts shall constitute
cause of forfeiture; the
judiciary ascertain the facts, apply the rule of law prescribed, and pronounce
But in this there is surely some confusion of
judgment of condemnation."
terms. Where the statute requires no intervention of the ordinary judicial
tribunals in the assessment and collection of taxes, there
commonly in ths
even quati judicial.
An assessment by values
proceedings very little that
so, and the law generally is framed on that theory, and gives
certainly
parties assessed an opportunity to be heard. But under most of our laws the
subsequent proceedings are purely ministerial. What
there in the nature
county officer, looking over the lists in his office,
of judicial action when
draws off the description of lands not there credited with payment of taxes,
" decision of the
If this
and proceeds to advertise and sell them
quesand
judicial,
tion of delinquency,"
any act of any officer which
to be
judicial also. The sheriff as
step in regular proceedings
performed as
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LIMITATIONS UPON THE TAXING POWER.
power of the government to levy taxes upon its
citizens, there are nevertheless limitations upon it of a very distinct and positive character, which inhere in the very nature of the
Vast

as is the

Some of these limitations are commonly declared
power itself.
in the written constitutions, but the declaration is rather from
abundant caution than from any necessity, as the limitations are

equally imperative whether thus declared or not.^ In some cases
the courts in the exercise of their ordinary jurisdiction may and
do enforce the restrictions ; in others it is beyond their power to
much exercises judicial

power, when he sells property on the assumption
that a judgment has not been paid to himself or to some other person author,
ized to receive payment, as does the officer" who performs the function of
determining what land shall be sold for taxes. In either case there is nothing
which resembles judicial proceedings ; no hearing of parties ; no judgment by
the officer; not even any discretion allowed him for the exercise of judg-

It would seem, that if we can get around a requirement of judicial
action so easily as this, by calling something judicial that can only be mado
so by annihilating all distinctions, we may also avoid any other constitutional

ment.

requirement, by calling whatever is done the equivalent of that which has
This may be easy, but it is not safe. Any requirement of
been required.
judicial action is sometliing of more substance than is here supposed. As to
this safeguard of " the law of the land " in tax proceedings, neither the practice of governments nor the decisions of courts warrant us in saying that it
includes a
means,

judicial finding of delinquency

beyond

any question,

general law, by the proper

regular

department

and

before a sale can be made.

orderly proceedings,

of government

;

under

It
the

and means nothing

more.
■"

Taxation is bounded in its exercise by its own nature, essential charac-

teristics and purpose."
Agnew, J., in Matter of Washington St., 69 Penn. St.,
a
353, 363.
"In our time French writer has recorded that after attending a
debate in our House of Commons, he observed to an English statesman tliat

of the general principles of constitutional freedom.
we take that for granted.' " Knight's England, vol. 8, p.
is observable in the state constitutions that while they enter with con-

he had heard no assertion

The answer was,
417.

It

'

siderable minuteness into declarations
important principles of government
taken for granted.

of individual right, maaiy of the most
are usually not declared at all, but simply
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Whether this may be done in any given case will depend
upon whether the question which the case presents is or is not judicial.
do

SO.

The public good. Taxes are only to be imposed for the public good. But what persons or property the public good will require to be taxed, and when the tax shall be laid, and to what
extent the burden shall be imposed, are obviously not judicial
questions, but questions which address themselves to the judgment and discretion of the legislative department.
They must be
determined by the legislature, whose conclusion respecting them
must be final.*

Public purposes. It is the first requisite of lawful taxation
that the purpose for which it is laid shall be a public purpose.
The decision to lay a tax for a given purpose involves a legislative conclusion that the purpose is one for which a tax may be
But the determinalaid ; in other words, is a public purpose.
tion of the legislature on this question is not, like its decision on
ordinary questions of public policy, conclusive either on the other
The question,
departments of the government, or on the people.
what is and what is not

public purpose, is one of law ; and
though unquestionably the legislature has large discretion in
selecting the object for which taxes shall be laid, its decision is
not final.
In any case in which the legislature shall have clearly
exceeded its authority
pose not public,

a

in this regard, and levied a tax for

a pur-

it is competent

for any one who in person or
property is affected by the tax, to appeal to the courts for protection.
This subject will receive a more full consideration further
on.'

Territorial limitations.

It

has already been seen that per-

sons and property not within the territorial limits of a state cannot
be taxed by
' Ante, ch.

II.

« Post,

IV.

ch.

it.^

In such

a case the state affords

no protection,

' Ante, p. 14. The lands of au ludian tribe are -.not taxable.
Tlio ^- Y.
Indians, 5 "W.1II., 761. Nor the Indians themselves when not citizens. State v.
Ross, 7 Yerg., 84.
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and there is nothing for which taxation can be an equivalent.^
But where a person is resident within a state, his personal prop-,

erty in contemplation

of law

be required to pay taxes upon

real estate of
competent

a

him, and he may
it wherever it is situate,' while the
accompanies

nonresident is always taxable where it is.'

It

is

also for any state to provide that tangible personal

property situate within it may be taxed there irrespective of the
residence of the owner ; and sometimes state laws provide for
such taxation.*
The case of corporations is in some respects pe' "WTiere the shares

in a corporation are taxable to shareholders, it is not
competent to tax the corporation itself on the shares of nonresident shareholders. States. Thoffias, 36 N. J., 181.
' Inhabitants of Great Barrington v. County Com'rs, 16 Pick., 572 ; State v.
Branin, 23 K. J., 484; State v. Bentley, id., 532; Newark City Bank v. The
Assessors, 30 id., 13; Nashua Savings Bank v. Nashua, 46 N. H., 389;
Bemis v. Boston, 14 Allen, 366 ; Commonwealth «. Hays, 8 B. Monr., 1,3; Wilkey V. Pekin, 19 111., 160 ; Rieman v. Shepard, 37 Ind., 288 ; Johnson ii. Oregon
City, 3 Oreg., 827; Same v. Same, 3 id., 13; Griffith v. Carter, 8 Kan.,
565 ; Blood v. Sayre, 17 Vt., 609. But not in a state where it is merely passing
through. Hays v. Steamship Co., 17 How., 59G; Hoyt ». Commissioners of
of Taxes, 23 id., 243;
Taxes, 23 N. Y., 324; Parker Mills v. Commissioners
State v. Engle, 34 N. J., 425 ; Chauvenet v. Commissioners, 3 Md., 259 ; Hooper
D. Baltimore, 13 id., 464; "Whitsell
v. Northampton Co., 49 Peun. St, .536;
McKeen v. Same, id., 519; Union Bank v. State, 9 Yerg., 490; Conley v. Chedic, 7 Nev., 336. A mortgage must be taxed to the owner where he lives, not
where the land mortgaged is. Latrobe «. Baltimore, 19 Md., 13. Investments
by residents of the state in bonds and stocks of foreign corporations may bo

Worthington v. Sebastian, 35 Ohio St., 1. It is competent to provide by law for taxing shares in corporations at the place where
the business is carried on.
Tappan v. Merchants' National Bank, 19 Wall.,
taxed within the state.

490.

^Witherspoon

Jones

V.

o.

Columbus,

Duncan,

4 "Wall., 310;

Turner

v.

Burlington,

16 Mass., 208;

25 Geo., 610.

"Hood's Estate, 21 Penn. St., 106, 114; Maltby «. Reading R.R. Co., 53 id.,
State v. Falkinburge, 15 N. J., 320; Wilson ». New York, 4 E. D.
Smith, 675 ; Hoyt i). Commissioners of Taxes, 33 N. Y., 324 ; People v. Ogdensburg, 48 id., 390 ; Howell v. State, 3 Gill, 14 ; Rieman v. Shepard, 27 Ind., 288 ;
Catlins. Hull, 21 Vt., 153; Blackstone Manuf. Co. v. Blackstone, 13 Gray, 488;
Leonard v. New Bedford, 16 id, 292; Steere v. Walling, 7 R. I., 317; Hartland V. Church, 47 Me., 169; Desmond ». Machias, 48 id., 478; Mills v.
Thornton, 26 111., 300 ; St. Louis v. Ferry Co., 40 Mo., 580 ; People v. Insurance Co., 29 Cal., 533; Green i). Van Buskirk, 7 Wall., 139, 150. The same is
140;

true of business carried on within a state or municipality by nonresidents. See
Corflold V. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C, 371; Harrison v. Vicksburg, 3 S. & M., 581;
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culiar.

They may be taxed for their franchise, and they may also be taxed as persons where their business is carried on.''
And
as no state is under obligation to permit a foreign corporation to

franchises within' its territory, the
permission to do so may be granted under such restrictiond, or
permitted on such conditions regarding taxation as the state may
carry on business, or exercise

think proper or prudent to impose.*

Taxation and representation.

There is

maxim in our
of the people must impose
a

a

it

is

is,

government that the representatives
the taxes the people are to pay.
The form it sometimes takes
" taxation and
The maxim
familrepresentation go together."
iar in English law, where
became established as the result of
long, and at times bloody, controversy between the representatives
of the people on one side, and the crown on the other.
The

;

a

meaning there was the same that had been contended for in other
countries that the imposition of taxes was essentially
legislative power, and the sovereign

could levy none except as they
were granted by the representatives
of the realm.' In America
Winst., 70; State «. City Council of Charleston,
n. Fayetteville,
Speers, 633 Padelford v. The Mayor of Savannah, 14 Geo., 438 Pearce «. Augusta, 37 id., 597; Shriver v. Pittsburg, 66 Penn. St., 446. Compare Bennett
Birmingham,

id., 15.

31

■

V.

;

;

3

1

■Worth

a

a

at such locality
annexed as an incident to the shares, and
does
not matter where the domicile of the owner may be. The tax m.iy then bo

it

is

taxability

is

If

it

;

J.

Ontario
People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns., 358, 383, per Thompson,
v. Bunnell, 10 Wend., 186.
provision in the charter of
made
corporation that its shares shall be taxed at the domicile of the owner " their

Bank

it

enforced through the corporation, by requiring
to withhold the amount
from the dividends payable thereon."
Field, J., in Minot v. Railroad Co., IS

Wall.,

206, 330.

'Ducat

v.

Lounsbery,

21

Chicago, 48111., 173; Fireman's Benevolent
Association t.
id., 511; Fire Department of Milwaukee v. Helfenstein, 10

opinion of Taney, Ch. J., in Bank of
Cincinnati Mutual Health Assurance Co. v. Bosenthal, 55 111., 85; Fire Department u. Noble, 3E. D. Smith, 440; Same v.
Wright, id., 453 Deftroot D. Van Dwyer, 30 Wend., 390; Commonwealth v.
Melton, 13 B. Monr., 312, 218 Tatem v. Wright, 23 N. J., 439 Paul v. Virginia,
Wall., 168 Liverpool Ins. Co. d. Massachusetts, 10 id., 566 Ducat «.
Imlay,

20 Barb., 68

;

;

v.

Pet., 519

;

id., 410.
Broom's

De Laudimm, p. 28

Const. Law, 247

also Bates' Case,

Hampden's

Case,

3

j

C,

;

note to Fortescue's

See Clermont's

State Trials, 371

;

10

S.

'

Chicago,

2

;

;

8

;

;

13

;

Wis., 136 People
Augusta v. Earle,

State
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the corresponding contest assumed a different phase, and the max-

im took on a different meaning as a rallying cry in the contest for
The American colonies insisted upon the right of
independence.
the colonial legislatures to vote the local taxes; disputing any
such right in the parliament of Great

Britain, which was a body

in which the colonists had and could have no representatives.
That body, it was claimed, could legitimately exercise over them

only of an imperial legislature to regulate external

the authority

and those of the empire at large, leaving internal conWhat the
cerns to the control of their own representatives.
maxim really meant was, that the local legislature must make the
concerns,

local laws

;

it was violated in the particular

of taxes, and conse-

quently brought that subject prominently to notice, though the
The same principle has sometimes
principle itself was general.
been appealed

if it meant that no person could be taxed un-

to as

in the body which voted the tax he was represented by some
one in whose selection he had a voice ; but it never had any such

less

and never could have, without excluding from taxation
a very large proportion of all the property of the state.
If the
of
for
in
the
voting
government were the
representatives
privilege
meaning,

only or even the principal benefit received from government, there
might be the highest reason in exempting the nonvoting infant or
but this privilege to any particular individual, as compared with the protection of life, liberty and property, is
And so long as all persons cannot participate
really insignificant.
in government, the limits of exclusion and admission must always
alien from taxation

;

be determined on considerations of general

public policy.

It

is

not doubted that, so far as can be prudently and safely permitted,

all who are to pay taxes should be allowed a voice in raising
them ; if for no other reason, because those they vote they will
But the maxim that taxamore willingly and cheerfully pay.^
Const. Law, 306, and note, 370. Similar but less
the
same
principle in France and Spain are narrated
successful contests for
by Mr. Hallam and other writers.

Trials,

825 •, S.

C, Broom's

' The aim of all the contests from which have sprung the liberties of England and America has been to establish and defend the principle of self taxaMr.
tion, as that which must constitute the main security against oppression.
And
see
Burke insists upon this in his speech on Conciliation of America.
Works of Madison III, 105. The sense of the oppression of any burden is

LAW OF TAXATION.

46

[CH.

III.

tion and representation go together is only true when understood
in a territorial sense which embraces the state at large ; every person in the state being represented in its legislative body, and that
body determining the taxation not only for the state at large, but
also, within certain limits, for each division and municipality of

The local right is subordinate to this general authority.

the state.^

;

is it

it

a

it,

are to do so, not voluntarily but
greatly increased if they wlio are to bear
at the command of others. Locke expresses this idea when, in his Treatise on
Civil Government, he says, of burden imposed as compared to one volunworketh diversely
tarily assumed, tliat " may be all one to the purse, but
This
well illustrated in English history for heavy taxation
to the courage."

right of the commons to grant the taxes became
But
the chief importance in the right of those who pay taxes
finally settled.
constitutes the
to vote them, consists in this: that in monarchical countries
only substantial and continuous check upon tyranny, and in any country the
only security against robbery under the forms of law. Aa the Spanish Cortes
said in one of their remonstrances, "there remains no other privilege or libthis be taken away." Hallam's
erty which can be profitable to subjects
well expressed hj Lawrence, J., in Harward
Middle Ages, ch. IV. The idea
is

if

it

dates from the time when the

D.

Co., 51

Drainage

Hurlburt,

Mich.,

See also Gage v. Graham, 57 id., 144;

111., 130.

It

People

v.

it

ing that

a

it

a

Harr., 38^, 336, Mr. James A. Bayard, of counsel,
v. Jefferson,
school district tax, voted by the inhabitants of the district, claimwas void. " A citizen of the state who does not reside in the district
3

Steward
a

'

In

objected to

is

a

it

9.

44.

is

tax law
to be so
very justly laid down that
that
the
are
not
to be
people
construed as to harmonize with the principle
taxed except with their own consent or that of officers truly representing them.
has been decided that where
In Indiana
Keasy v. Bricker, 60 Penn. St.,
has voted aid to
the boundaries of
township have been extended after
work of internal improvement, the territory brought in cannot be subjected to
the tax so voted. Alvis t>. Whitney, 43 Ind., 83.
24

is

may, by the act, be taxed without having the right to vote, and when he can derive no benefit from it; as he can neither send his own children nor other
children. This violates the first principle of republican government, that, as to
citizens, taxation goes with and
dependent on representation." But the court
affirmed the tax without discussion.
That the property of persons who have

right, to

taxable, see Wheeler

State o. Ross,

;

6

9

3

a

1

In

7

vote

Macon, 20 Ark., 17.

is

®. Wall,
Allen, 558; Smiths.
Yerg., 74, 77, Catron, Ch. J., has something to say about the tyranny of taxation without representation, but the
case did not call for it.
In Marr v. Enloe, Yerg., 452, where the power to
authorize
county court to levy taxes for county purposes was denied, stress
was laid on the fact that the members of the court were not elected by the
people. Upon the general right of the people to tax themselves through their
representatives, see Pope v. Phifer,
Heis., 682; Sanborn d. Kice Co., Minn.,
273; People ii. Hurlburt, 24 Mich., 44; People v. Chicago, 51 111., 58; People
53 N. Y., 128 State «. Lefflngwell, 54 Mo., 458.
». Batcheller,
It has often

not the
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To what extent the federal government may rightfully levy
taxes in districts not represented in the federal legislature, is perIn the Districi of Columbia, •which by
haps not entirely clear.
the national constitution was set apart for federal purposes and
under the exclusive jurisdiction of congress, the power is
unlimited, and whoever becomes a resident of the district must
do so with the understanding that he can participate in the govplaced

may compel a municipality to tax itself for police
Taylor v. Board of Health, 31 Penn. St., 73 ; People v. Meha.
ney, 13 Mich., 481. And for highways and other like purposes of general
But these subjects
concern.
See Harrison Justices v. Holland, 3 Grat., 247.
•will be elsewhere considered.
Tax laws are undoubtedly to be construed, if
possible, so as not to impose taxes without the consent of the people taxed, or
their immediate representatives: so held of a tax for mil itary bounty purKeasy v. Bricker, 60 Penn. St., 9 : and see Lexington v. McQuillan's
poses.
Heirs, 9 Dana, 513, 517; Madison Co. «. The People, 58 111., 456, 463; Hampshire ». Franklin, 16 Mass., 75, 83 ; Cheauey v. Hooser, 9 B. Monr., 330 ; Maltus
And we shall endeavor to show further on, that,
V. Shields, 2 Met. (Ky.), 553.
in some cases, this assent is necessary.
That a stranger, coming into a town, becomes liable to a license tax as an
" inhabitant and member of the corporation," see Plymouth «. Pettijohn, 4
" It is just that it should be so ;
Dev., 391 ; Whitfield v. Longest, 6 Ired., 268.
for, as the defendant has, in the security of his property, the benefit of the
night watch and of the other police establishments, he ought to contribute
Per Huffin, Ch. J., in Wilmington v.
reasonably towards their expenses."
In FalRoby, 8 Ired., 250, 254; and see Edenton «. Copeheart, 71 N. C, 15G.
mouth ®. Watson, 5 Bush, 660, 661, Sardzn; 3., in discussing an act of the
legislature which empowered the town of Falmouth to impose a license tax
not exceeding $100 on the sale, by retail, of all spirituous, vinous or malt
liquors in said town, or within one mile thereof, said : " It is insisted for the appellee that the power, which this enactment purports to confer on the trustees
of the town, to exact a license fee for the privilege of keeping a tavern or
vending ardent spirits outside of, although near, the town limits, is within the
interdiction of the fourteenth section of article 13 of the state constitution,
viz.: '!N"or shall any man's property be taken or applied to public use witliout the consent of his representatives, and without just compensation being
previously made to him.' Had the exercise of the power complained of been
the imposition of an ordinary tax merely on the property of the appellee, situated within the corporate limits of the town, for municipal purposes, we
should not doubt the correctness of the objection; or even if the exaction of
the sura in controversy, in consideration of a trade license, had been made for
local revenue purposes alone, though not in the usual form of taxation, we
should regard it witliin the constitutional prohibition; for the legislature
could not delegate to the corporation the right to cither license for compensation or tax a privilege to be enjoyed beyond its limits, except a police regulabeen decided that a state

purposes.

See
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only to the extent that congress may permit.^ There
can be no doabt also of the right of the federal government to
levy stamp taxes and imposts of every description, by laws which
shall have uniform operation throughout all the states and terriernment

But
government
taxes for territorial purposes, corresponding to the taxes which are
levied by the states for state purposes, it is theoretically at least
the right of the people of the territory, when organized with a
tories

within

the jurisdiction

of the general

It is not to
local legislature, to levy and expend for themselves.
be supposed that the right will be denied by the general government, and if it should be, and the local taxes be imposed and
expended by the direct interposition of congressional authority,
it is not too much to say that such action would be inconsistent
with the maxim of government now under consideration, whether
valid in law or not.^

The power not to toe delegated. The power to impose taxes,
like any other branch of the legislative authority, must be exercised by the legislature itself, and cannot be delegated

to ministe-

tion having reference to the comfort, safety or welfare of society within its
local jurisdiction.
Cooley's Const. Lim., 677. But, in our opinion, the exac
tion of a fee of f 100 for the privilege of vending ardent spirits in such proximity to the town as to render its exercise liable to affect the good order or
peace of the local community, did not infringe any constitutional right of the
appellee. The privilege granted to him was one w^hich public policy requires
should be subjected to such legal restraints and regulations as will, as far as
The legislature,
practicable, prevent its abuse to the detriment of society.
having the general power to do ihis, properly delegated thatjjower to the local
The authority so
government of the community immediately interested.
conferred on the trustees does not appear to have been abused by an excessive
or unreasonable exaction, and the rights of the appellee were certainly not invaded by a compulsory one." A city ordinance, taxing wagons used in the

city for pay, cannot apply to wagons owned by those residing outside who
it could, it would be
employ them in hauling into and out of the city.
taking property for private use — for the use of that particular community of
which the owner formed no part. St. Charles o. Nolle, 51 Mo., 123.

If

'

Loughborough

States,

v.

Blake,

5

Wheat., 317, 334.

See also

Kendall

e.

United

13 Pet., 524.

' Upon

the subject of territorial powers of taxation, the following cases are
Miners' Bank d. Iowa, 12 How., 1; Vincennes University n. Indiana, 14 id., 268 ; Williams v. Bank of Michigan, 7 Wend., 539 ; Swan v. Wilinstructive:

liams, 2 Mich., 427.
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rial officers, or even to another department of the government.^
This is a principle which pervades our whole political system,
and when properly

understood,

admits of no exception.

The

'Dillon Mun.

Corp., §§ 60, 567, 618, and notes; Cooley's Const. Lim., 117,
cited;
6 N. Y., 93; St. Louis «.
Thompson s. Scliermerhorn,
205, and cases
Clemens, 53 Mo., 133; Hyde v. Joyes, 4 Bush, 464; People v. Clark, 47 Cal.,

Each of these was

456.

a case

to delegate to an administrative

in which

undertook
a municipal corporation
the power to determine the plan and
for which a tax was ordered ; and it was

oflBcer

extent of a municipal improvement
held there was no power to do so.

Subsequent acts of affirmance by a city
council could not vitalize such action. Hyde «. Joyes, supra. And see Randolph V. Gawley, 47 Cal., 458; Mercer County Court v. Navigation Co., 8
Bush, 300, 307. But it is no delegation of the taxing power to refer to the
city engineer and a committee of the council to determine when repairs In a
are needed, and how much of. the old improvement can
street improvement
Covington v. Boyle, 6 Bush, 304. The following
he used in making them.
cases may also be referred to : Bellinger v. Gray, 51 N. Y., 610, decides that
the duties imposed by the tax laws upon boards of supervisors, of examining
the assessment rolls and equalizing the valuation of the real estates in the different towns and wards, and of estimating and putting down in the assessment
rolls the respective sums to be paid as taxes, are quasi judicial, and cannot be
delegated, but must be performed by the boards as such ; after they have determined what changes are to be made, the mere act of changing is clerical, but
the rolls must be completed before the warrants required to be issued are an-

In Scofield v. Lansing, 17 Mich., 437, it appeared that the city
charter required the common council (as a condition precedent to raising a tax)
to declare by an entry on their minutes, what portion of the expense of an improvement should be assessed to the owners of premises benefited thereby,
Held, that this duty could not be
and specifying tlie amount to be assessed.
nexed thereto.

to perform, as the determination of those facts
delegated to commissioners
was vital to the levy. The following cases are also in point here:
Under
the act for the establishment of common schools, the inhabitants of the school
district, at their regular meeting, must vote a precise and definite sum as a tax
on the inhabitants of the district for building a school house. They cannot at
their meeting delegate to the trustees a discretionary power as to the aggreEobinson v. Dodge, 18 Johns., 351 ; Trumgate amount of tax to be collected.

Hill,

46.
A city cannot delegate to its ministerial oflScers
to tax, though they may be authorized, under general regulations, to issue licenses when the taxes are paid. See East St. Louis •». Wehrung, 46 111., 392. The following cases have discussed to some extent what

hull

the

V.

White,

5

power

constitutes a delegation of the power to tax: State «. Sickle, 34 N. J., 135;
MenserB. Risdon, 36 Cal., 339; Brooklyn v. Breslin, 57 K". Y.,591; Mclnery t).
Reed, 23 Iowa, 410; Ould v. Richmond,
111., 354;

Vt., 94.

23 Grat, 464,471; Eossb. Chicago, 56
Warren v. Grand Haven, 30 Mich., 24; Johnson v. Saunderson, 34
The subject was largely considered in Houghton v. Austin, 47 Cal.,

646.

4
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department for the exercise of the
legislative power, and they vest it with no authority to relieve
itself of the responsibility by a substitution of other agencies.
But it is never assumed by the people that the legislature can
take such supervision of all the infinite variety of interests in the
people

create a legislative

state, and of all local as well as general

affairs, as to be able to

in every instance precisely what is needed in matters
of taxation, and precisely what purposes shall at any time, under
There is a difthe particular circumstances,
be provided for.
determine

ference between making the law and giving effect to the law
one is legislation

and the other administration.

;

the

We conceive

that the legislature must, in every instance, prescribe the rule
under which taxation may be laid ; it must originate the authority
under which, after due proceedings, the tax gatherer demands the
contribution ; but it need not prescribe all the details of action,
or even fix with precision the sum to be raised or all the par-

ticulars of its expenditure.
If the rule is prescribed which, in
its administration, works out the result, that is sufficient ; but to
refer the making of the rule to another authority, would be in
excess of legislative power.
An illustration or two may possibly

The legislature, with the utsufficiently explain the principle.
most propriety, may provide for a court of claims or a state board
of audit, whose adjudications against the state shall be final upon
it ; and may direct that the amounts awarded shall go into the general levy for the year.
a proper agency.

A

Here is

rule to be properly worked out by
like provision for the adjustment of claims
a

against counties,
A fund
for contingent expenses may be put at the disposal of the executive or of other state officers, to be used for public purposes not
previously enumerated in detail by the legislature.
But to leave
to a court of claims or any state officer or board the power to
determine whether a tax should be laid for the current year, or
at what rate, or upon what property, or how it should be collected, and whether lands should be sold or forfeited for its satisfaction ; all this prescribes no rule, and originates no authority ;
cities and townships may also be made.

it merely attempts to empower some other tribunal to prescribe a
rule and set in motion the tax machinery.
And this is clearly
The legislature must make the law, but it may
incompetent.

CH.

LIMITATIONS UPON THE TAXING POWER.

III.]

51

prescribe its own regulations regarding the ministerial agents that
are to execute it.

One clearly defined exception to the general rule exists in the
case of municipal corporations in the levy and collection of local
Immemorial custom which tacitly or expressly has been
incorporated in the state constitutions, has made them a part of
and in their case
the general machinery of state government,
taxes.

the state does

little beyond prescribing rules of limitation, within

which, for local purposes, the power to tax is left to them with
authority subordinate to that of the state to make rules for its
regulation and execution.'
Justices, 4 Jones Eq., 323; Taylor v. Newbern, 3 id., 141;
Floyd, 3 Jones Law, 313; Wingate v. Sluder, 6 id., 552; Commissioners V. Patterson, 8 id., 183; Wilmington v. Roby, 8 Ired., 350; Steward
V. Jefl'erson, 3 Harr., 335 ; Lockhart d Harrington, 1 Hawkes, 408 ; Cheaney n.
Hooser, 9 B. Monr., 330; Slack u. Bailroad Co., 13 id., 1, 9; Battle v. Mobile,
9 Ala., 234; Steiu v. Mobile, 24 id., 591; Osborn v. Mobile, 44 id., 493; Harrison V. Vicksburg, 3 S. & M., 581; Smith v. Aberdeen, 35 Miss., 458; Hope v.
Deaderick, 8 Humph., 1; Trigally u. Memphis, 6 Cold., 383; Bull v. Read, 13
Grat., 78; Case of County Levy, 5 Call, 139; People v. Kelsey, 34 Cal., 470;
Washington v. State, 13 Ark., 753 ; State v. Noyes, 10 Post., 379, 392 ; Burgess
V. Pue, 3 Gill, 11; Alexander v. Baltimore, 5 id., 383; Kinney v. Zimpleman,
36 Texas, 554, able opinion by Walker, J.; St. Louis v. Laughlin, 49 Mo., 559;
St. Louis V. Savings Bank, 49 id., 574; People v. Hurlburt, 34 Mich., 44, 108;
Butler's Appeal, 73 Penn. St., 448 ; Cooley's Const. Lim., 191 and cases cited.
For an early case denying the power of the legislature to delegate to county
boards the power to tax, see Marr v. Enloe, 1 Yerg., 453. In the subsequent
case of Hope v. Deaderick, 8 Humph., 1, the right to empower local bodies
In A-rbegust ®. Louisville, 3 Bush,
to levy local taxes was fully sustained.
371, 375, 376, Williams, J., speaking of an extension of city boundaries which
was complained of as permitting unjust local taxation of suburban property,
" Whatever may be said of the intrinsic justice of such measures, there
says :
is no power in the courts to control this, when the taxing jDOwer is conferred
in good faith, to uphold local government, and give police regulations to the
population, and not merely to embrace taxable property for revenue purposes in
See also Swift «. Newport, 7 Bush,
order to lighten the burdens of others."
37.
In the colony of Massachusetts, the right to raise money by taxation of
the interests of the proprietors of a town seems to have been conferred on the
proprietors as a corporation, and they enforced the tax by sale of such interBott v. Perley, 11
ests, but they did not sell interests set off in severalty.
Mass., 169. The case of Anderson «. The Kerns Draining Co., 14 Ind., 199, is
one difBcult to be reconciled with the general principle asserted in the text,
The Kerns Draining Co. was a
that the power to tax cannot be delegated.
corporation formed under a general statute of that state, which permitted as.
'Caldwell

Thompson

v.

o.
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contracts.

There

are

have pledged the state in a more or less
formal manner, that on some particular subject of taxation the
state should refrain, either wholly or for some definite period, from

"which state legislatures

levying any taxes whatever, or should levy them only to a certain
extent.
Whether such a pledge could bind the state has beea
The general rule is that one
made the subject of controversy.
legislative body cannot by its own action narrow the scope of the
legislative power, but with the same amplitude that it comes to
sociations voluntarily to incorporate themselves for the purpose of the construction of levees and drains, and authorized them -when incorporated to take
property for the purpose of such levees and drains, and to tax those who were
benefited for the expenses. Anderson, being thus taxed for benefits accruing
from a drain, resisted payment, but a judgment against him was supported.
Perkins, J., does not allude to the question of the power of the legislature to
make such a delegation of authority, but confines his attention to the question
whether the purpose is a public purpose.
the drain is constructed to pro-

If

mote the public health, he assumes the purpose to be public
does not show the contrary, he assumes that to have been

;

and as the record
the object and af-

it,

firms the judgment.
With great respect for that eminent judge, if such a power to tax can be given by general law to any persons who will organize to take
we do not see why the levying and collecting of tlie whole revenue of the

of arbitrary rulers in former peClair and Monroe Levee and Drainage Co., 51 III.,
130, 135, the supreme court of Illinois deny the right of the legislature to confer upon private corporation the power to tax. While basing the denial in the
main on clause of the constitution which, in conferring the power to tax on
municipal corporate authorities, they understand was intended to exclude its
exercise locally by any other authorities,
justly said \>y Lawrence,!.,
" The power of taxation is, of all the powers of government, the one most
li.ible to abuse, even when exercised by the direct representatives of the peoover others without refple; and if committed to persons who m.iy exercise
erence to their consent, the certainty of its abuse would be simply
question
of time. No person or class of persons could be safely entrusted with irreand such
sponsible power over the property of others
power
essentially
despotic in its nature, and violative of all just principles of government.
matters not that, as in the present instance,
to be professedly exercised for
public uses, by expending for the public benefit the tax collected. If
be
tax, as in the present instance, to which the persons who are to pay
have
never given their consent, and imposed by persons acting under no responsibility of official position, and clothed with no authority of any kind by those
is, to the extent of such tax, misgovernment of
whom they propose to tax,
as
our
character
forefathers
same
the
The
thought just cause of revolution."
Pond
Co.
Draining
v. Hooper,
Met. (Ky.), 350,
case of Cypress
equally emstate may not be farmed out after the manner
v. St.

a

In Harward

is

2

it

a

it it

it

is

It

is

;

a

a

it

is

it

a
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it must pass to the successor.'

Pledges, thereiore, or
stipulations by one legi-slature regarding the future levy of taxes,
though they may under some circumstances charge the conscience
of the members or their successors, are not limitations on legislaone body,

tive power, but may be observed or disregarded as it shall be
An excepthought the public necessity or policy may require.
tion, however, is held to exist in case of an agreement by a state,
entered into for a consideration, to refrain from exercising this
that provision of the federal constitution which forbids
the state passing laws which impair the obligation of contracts,
applying as well to contracts by the state itself as to those between
individuals.
And therefore, where a state exchanged lands with
power

;

Indian tribe, and stipulated by legislative act that those conveyed to the Indians should not thereafter be subject to any tax,
an

this stipulation was held to be binding as a contract, and available on behalf of those who subsequently by legislative permission
became purchasers from the Indians.^
A number of cases, for
phatic against the right to delegate any such power of local taxation.
The
Drainage Co. Case in 11 La. An., 338, was one in which it is not surprising that

could not all agree in the conclusion. In that case the legislation
permitted a private corporation to drain the low lands near New Orleans at
the court

the expense of the proprietors, though the assessment upon the proprietors
was made not by the corporation but by assessors.
The court at first held
this assessment unconstitutional, but a change of two members taking place
in its composition, it was then sustained as only an ordinary case of assess-

Of course the state cannot confer upon a muni,
which she does not herself possess: e. g., to tax the
O'Donnell v. Bailey, 34 Miss., 386. In
agencies of the federal government.
some of the state constitutions, however, there are express limitations on the
power of the state to tax which do not in terms apply to municipalities.
ment on a basis of benefits.

cipality

'

16

a power

to tax

Cooley's Const. Lim., 125-127, 280-284.

'New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch., 164. Compare Armstrong s. Athens Co.,
Pet., 281. In Home of Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wall., 430, an act which, for

of encouraging the establishment of a charitable institution, dethat its property should be exempt from taxation, was held to be a
contract.
So an exemption from taxation, for ten years, of lands which had
been donated to the state for reclamation, was held not subject to repeal as to
the purpose
clai'ed

So where a bonus was paid for
a corporate charter, the state agreeing not to impose any further tax upon the
corporators during the existence of their charter under the act. it was held
that a tax on the stockholders by reason of their shares was in violation of
all lands sold.

this agreement.

MeGee v. Mathis, 4 Wall., 143.

Gordon

v.

The Appeal Tax Court,

3

How.,

133 ;

followed in
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whicli this Las been the precedent, are referred to in the note, but
it is conceded in all of them that there must be a consideration to
the state for the relinquishment, or the elements of a contract will
be wanting.

An exemption, from motives of

state policy merely,

may be withdrawn at any time when the like motives incline the
^
legislature in the opposite direction ; and in any case the intention of the state to bind itself by an exemption, must be clear, as
all presumptions are against

it.^

Wendover v. Lexington, 15 B. Monr., 358, 364. An act exempting the stock of
a railroad company and its real estate from taxation for 36 years was sustained
as a contract, in Tomliuson v. Branch, 15 Wall., 460; as was a perpetual ex-

in Humphreys v. Pegues, 16 Wall., 344; see also Pacific R R. ».
Maguire, 30 Wall., 36. That a license tax cannot be imposed on a franchise
which a corporation has acquired by a surrender of valuable rights, was decided in Lucas «. Lottery Commissioners, 11 G. & J., 4S0. That the franchise
to set up a lottery is not a contract, see Moore v. State, 48 Miss., 147: but
see also Broadbent v. Tuscaloosa, etc., Association, 45 Ala., 170.
emption

' Christ's Church

Philadelphia, 34 How., 300; East Saginaw Salt Manuf
Mich., 359 ; S. C. in error, 13 Wall., 373. In the first
Co. ■».East Saginaw,
of these cases was considered a legislative act which provided that " the real
property, including ground rents, now belonging, and payable to Christ's
Church Hospital, in the city of Philadeljihia, so long as the same shall continue to belong to the said hospital, shall be and remain free from taxes."
Held, that the exemption so given was a mere privilege, bene placitum, and
And the privimight be revoked at the pleasure of the sovereign authority.
lege being recalled by a subsequent act, the property of the hospital became
taxable like any other. In the second case a legislative act had provided that
companies and corporations formed, or that might be formed, for the boring
for and manufacturing salt in the state of Michigan, should be entitled to
certain benefits conferred by the act, one of which was that " all property, real
and personal, used for the purpose mentioned, shall be exempt from taxation
This was considered a mere bounty law, dependent for its
for any purpose."
continuance upon the dictates of public policy, and the voluntary good faith
of the legislature.
In Home of the Friendless ■».Rouse, 8 "Wall., 430, the exemption, which was held irrepealable, was contained in the charter of the corIt was objected that no consideration for Oie exemption was shown,
poration.
it
was
replied by the court that none was necessary beyond the benefits to
but
the community, which it is to be assumed were anticipated from the corporation.
On the general subject, see Hagar v. Supervisors of Yolo, 47 Cal., 333;
Ramsey v. Hoeger, Sup. Ct. 111. (1874), 6 Chicago Legal News, 818.
t).

19

^"

The right to levy and collect taxes is a necessary incident of every government, essential to its very existence, and is never presumed to have been surrendered or abandoned except by clear words, and for what is deemed, at the
time, by the law-making power, an adequate consideration.
The surrender
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having been authoritatively determined that the charter of a
private corporation is a contract between the commonwealth and
the corporators, it follows that whatever stipulations it contains
regarding taxation of the corporate franchises or property are irAn exception to this sweeping statement exists
repealable.^
cannot be extended by implication ; and if one tax is expressed, it cannot be
presumed to extend to others. No power to tax need be reserved ; it exists
and remains unless expressly yielded." Jones, etc., Manuf. Co. v. Common,
wealth, 69 Peun. St., 81, 137. See also Commonwealth «. Bird, 12 Mass., 443 ;
Dale ». Governor, 8 Stew., 387 ; Brainard v. Colchester, 81 Conn., 407, 410 ;

Randolph,
13 Vt., 525, 531 ; People v. Roper, 35 N. Y., 639 ; People t). Commissioners of
Taxes, 47 id., 501; Bradley v. McAtee, 7 Bush, 667; S. C, 8 Am. Rop., 309;
Nor. Mo. R. R. Co. v. Maguire, 49 Mo., 490; S. C, 8 Am. Rep., 141 ; Pacific R.
R.Co. v. Cass Co., 53 Mo., 17 ; Wendover v. Lexington, 15 B. Monr., 258, 263 ; Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. V. Marshall Co., 3 W. Va., 819 ; Stein v. Mobile, 17
Ala., 234 ; S. C, 34 id., 591 ; St.ate v. Bank of Smyrna, 3 Hous., 99 ; Erie R. R.
Co. V. Commonwealth, 66 Penn. St., 84; Gtilman v. Sheboygan, 3 Black, 510,
513 ; Armstrong v. Athens Co., 16 Pet., 281 ; Lord «. Litchfield, 36 Conn., 116 ;
S. C, 4 Am. Rep., 41 ; Bridge Proprietors v. State, 31 N. J., 884, 386 ; S. C. on
appeal, 23 id., 593; Bangor v. Stetson, 56 Me., 374; Portland, etc., R. R. Co. v.
Saco, 60 id., 196, 198; People «. Lawrence, 41 N. Y., 137; Academy of Pine
Arts V. Philadelphia, 33 Penn. St., 496; Miller v. Kirkp.atrick, 29 id., 226;
Macon v. Central R. R. and Banking Co., 50 Geo., 630; Smith v. Macon, 30
Easton Bank v. Commonwealth,

10

Penn. St., 442, 450; Herrick

v.

7

a

is

a

a

a

a

it

;

;

4

:

it,

Ark., 17; Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet., 514,563; Philadelphia, etc.,
B. K. Co. o. Maryland, 10 How., 376, 398 ; Minot v. Philadelphia, etc., R. R.
Co., 18 Wall., 306; Nor. Mo. R. R. Co. v. Maguire, 30 id., 46; Erie Railway v.
Pennsylvania, 31 id., 597. Naming a rate of taxation, but not expressly limitdoes not preclude its being raised.
State v. Parker, 32 N. J., 426 coming
Bush, 478 Erie R. R. Co. v. Commonpare Louisville R. R. Co. v. Louisville,
wealth, 66 Penn. St., 84 St. Louis «. Boatmen's Ins. and Trust Co., 47 Mo., 150.
"While
were better for the interest of the community that this power
should on no occasion be suiTcndered, this court has always held that the
state, unrestrained
legislature of
by constitutional limitation, has full control over the subject, and can make
contract with the corporation to exempt
its property from taxation, either in perpetuity or for limited period of time.
reasonablu
If, however, on any fair construction of the legislation, there is
made out, this doubt must be solved in favor of
doubt whether the contract
the state.
In other words, the language used must be of such character as,
fairly interpreted, leaves no room for controversy."
Bailey v. Pacific R. R.
Co.,
Chicago Legal News, 366 (Sup. Ct. U. S., per Dams, J.).
;

,

8

;

;

'

Piqua Bank v. Knoup, 16 How., 369 Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 id., -331, 339
Wall 4"0 Washington University v.
of the Friendless v. Rouse,
Rouse, id., 439; Wilmington, etc., R. R. Co. k. Reid, 18 id., 264; Humphreys
V. Pegues, 16 id., 244; Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. McLean Co., 17 111., 391.
Home
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of amendment or repeal is expressly reserved, as well as where, by the constitution of the
Where such
state, all charters are granted subject to that right.
is the provision of the constitution, it is a limitation upon the
where, by the charter,

the right

powers of the legislature, of which every person must take notice, and there is no room for the implication of a contract in restraint of the taxing power.* Municipal charters are not contracts,
but are granted for public purposes, and amended or repealed at
the discretion of the legislature.'

of agencies of government.

Exemption

No state can im-

property, or other subjects of taxation,
This is selfevident, but it
which are not within its jurisdiction.
has peculiar application in this country under the federal consti-

pose taxes on persons,

tution, which apportions the sovereign authority between the state
and the nation, and gives to each over certain subjects an exclusive jurisdiction.
Whatever pertains to this exclusive jurisdiction is excluded from the taxing power of the other as much as if

it were beyond its territorial limits.
as

The rules upon this subject,

they have been laid down by the authorities, appear to be the

following:
1. Every person within a state owing temporary or permanent
allegiance to it ; all property of every description within the state
and entitled to the protection of its laws ; every private franchise, privilege, business or ocdupation, is subject to be taxed by
the state, in return for the benefits received and anticipated from
state government and protection.

But they are also on precisely

the same grounds subject to be taxed by the federal government,

whenever its necessities or policy shall be thought to require it.'
' State V.

30 N. J., 368 ; Same v. Same, 31 id., 531 ; State v. Newark,
Iron CityB'k v. Pittsburgh, 37 Penn. St., 340; Commonwealth
B. E. Co., 55 id., 452 ; Union Improvement Co. v. Common,

Miller,

35 id., 157, 162;

Fayette Co.
wealth, 69 id., 140
V.

35

Wis.,

257;

;

West Wisconsin

Tomlinson

«.

R

Jessup,

15

K. Co.
Wall.,

v. Supervisors
4.54;

Trask

of Trempealeau,

v. Magulre,

18 id.,

391.
4 Wheat., 518, 629, per Mars7iaU, Ch. J.;
and
8, 9, 10; Cooley's Coast. Lira., 276; Story on
Dillon on Mun. Corp., g§ 49,
XXXIV,
and cases cited.
Const., 4th ed., ch.
= Dartmouth

2

It

College

v.

Woodward,

is said in Lane County

Oregon, 7 Wall., 71, that with the exception
of the restrictions expressly imposed by the constitution of the United States,
i).
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It

is the theory of our system of government that the state
and the nation alike are to exercise their powers respectively in
as full and ample a manner as the proper departments of govern2.

shall determine

ment
,

to be needful and just, and as might be

This theory by
by any other sovereignty whatsoever.
necessary implication excludes wholly any interference by either
the state or the nation with an independent exercise by the other
done

of its constitutional powers.
If it were otherwise, neither government would be supreme within what has been set apart for its
exclusive sphere, but on the other hand, would be liable at any
time to be crippled, embarrassed, and perhaps wholly obstructed
in its operations at the will or caprice of those who for the time

And that an exercise
being wielded the authority of the other.
of the power to tax might have that effect is manifest from a consideration of the nature of the power.
Any " power which in its
nature acknowledges no limits," ' and which, even in a lawful and
legitimate exercise may be carried to the extent of an absolute
appropriation of the property or destruction of the franchise or
privilege upon which it is exerted,^ must be incapable of being
admitted within its sovereignty by another, with due regard to a
If this be so,
safe and independent exercise of its own authority.
then under the constitution of the United States which contemplates an independent exercise by state and nation severally of their
constitutional powers, it must follow
conclusion,
3.

—

as a necessary

and inevitable

That the means or agencies provided or selected by the fed-

eral government as necessary or convenient to the exercise of its

functions cannot be subjected to the taxing power of the states.
of taxation in respect to property, business and persons within
its limits remains entire. There is nothing in the constitution which contemplates authorizing any direct abridgment of this power by the national legisthe state power

lature.

Marshall, Ch. J., in Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet, 449, 466 ; Lane
County V. Oregon, 7 Wall., 71 ; Bank of Commerce «. New York, 2 Black,
620; Carroll ®. Periy, 2 McLean, 25 ; Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Monr., 330, 839 ;
Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall., 533, 548; State ». Bell, 1 Phil. (N. C), 85.
Compare Berney v. Tax Collector, 2 Bailey, 654.
■Per

*

McCullough
Bank v. Fenno,

Maryland, 4 Wheat., 316, 431, per Marshall, Ch.
Wall., 533, 548, per Chase, Ch. J.

V.
8

J. ;

Veazie
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The states cannot tax a bank chartered by congress

as the

III.

fiscal

they cannot tax the loans of the United States contracted under the power conferred upon the government to borrow money,^ nor the revenue stamps issued by the
United States,' nor the salary or emoluments of federal ofiicers.*

agent of the government/

also follows, —

It

4.

That the federal government is also without power to tax

the corresponding means or agencies of the states, or the salaries

of state officers

;

the state

in the exercise of its functions being

entitled to the same immunity from congressional interference
And a state municipal
that the nation is from that of the state.'
corporation, being only a portion of its sovereign power, created
as a convenient if not a necessary part of the machinery of state
'

Maryland, 4 Wheat., 316, 368 ; Osborn v. Bank of United
States,
Property occupied for the United States, but not owned by
it, was heUl taxable to the owner in Speed v. St. Louis County Court, 43 Mo.,
383.
And the fact that the government has an interest in real estate does not
preclude the taxation of other interests to the owners.
State v. Moore, 13
McCullough

V.

Id., 738.

9

Cal., 56.
^

Weston 1). Charleston, 3 Pet., 449 ; Bank of Commerce v. New York, 3
Black, 620; Bank Tax Case, 3 Wall., 200; Van Allen «. Assessors, 3 id., 573;
People «. The Commissioners, 4 id., 244; Bradley ». People, id., 459; The
Banks v. The Mayor, 7 id., 16; Bank v. Supervisors, id., 36. Compare State »,
Jackson, 33 K. J., 450; Commonwealth v. Hamilton Miinuf. Co., 13 Allen,
298; Commonwealth v. Provident Inst., id., 313; Coite v. Society for Savings,
33 Conn., 173. A tax ou the franchise of a corporation whose capital is in part
invested in United States securities, is not a tax on sucl^ securities.
Society
for Savings v. Coite, 6 Wall., 594; Provident Institution i). Massachusetts, id.,
611; Hamilton County «. Massachusetts, id., 633.
A city cannot tax state
bonds unless specially authorized.
Augusta v. Dunbar, 50 Geo., 387.
2

Palfrey c. Boston, 101 Ma.ss.,
County ». Elston, 33 Ind., 37.
9

Or its treasury notes.

Montgomery

16 Pet., 435.
In Melcher v.
Met., 73, a clerk in a post office was held taxable by the state on his

■•
Dobbin

Boston,

329.

j}.

Commissioners

of Erie County,

income.

Ward «. Maryland, 13 Wall., 418, 437, per Clifford, J.; The Collector «.
Day, 1 1 id., 113 ; Railroad Co. ■».Peniston, 18 id., 5 ; Friedman ■b.Siegel, 10
Blatch., 827; Warrens. Paul, 22 Ind., 376, 279; State v. Gaston, 33 id., 1; Pifield V. Close, 15 Mich., 505; Union Bank v. Hill, 3 Cold., 335; Smith v. Short,
s

Ala., 385 ; Jones v. Keep's Estate, 19 Wis., 369 ; Sayles v. Davis, 22 id., 235 ;
Moor B. Quick, 105 Mass., 49; S. C, 7 Am. Rep., 499; Coolcy's Const, Lim.,
484, and cases cited.
A railroad wholly owned by a state and operated by
not taxable under the U.
revenue laws. Georgia v. Atkins,
Abb. U. S., 22,
1

S.

it,

40
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government, is as much exempt from the taxation of the federal
government, in all its revenues and property, as the state itself.*

A

tax upon persons may possibly, in some cases, tend to
embarrass the operations of either national or state government,
5.

in which case it would be void unless imposed by the government which was liable to be inconvenienced by it.
And, on this
ground, it has been held, that a state tax of a certain sum on
every person leaving the state by public conveyance was invalid ;
the tendency being to embarrass

the functions

of the national

government, by obstructing the travel of citizens and officers of
the United States in the business of the government and the
transportation of armies and munitions, of war.^

It

is customary for the federal government, in receiving a
new state to the union, to require from it — and probably without
6.

' United States v. Eailroad Co., 17 Wall., 373. A state may tax its own municipal organizations, or their corporate property, if it shall see fit, but there
is always a presumption against the intention to do so.

Compare Wayland
Mobile, 24 Ala., 591 ;
State v. Gaifney, 34 N. J., 133 ;
v. School Directors, 43
Penn. St., 21, 25 ; and Louisville v. Commonwealth, 1 Duv., 295. The grant in
general terms to a city of the power to tax will not authorize the city to tax
Piper v. Singer, 4 S. & E., 354; Nashville v. Banli
state or county property.
of Tennessee, 1 Swan, 269. See People v. McCreary, 34 Cal., 433, 456 ; People
It has been held ia MasV. Doe, 36 Cal., 230; People v. Austin, 47 Cal., 353.
sachusetts that lands of a county used for county purposes are exemptfrom all
taxation, whether imposed for general purposes or for local improvementii.
Worcester County v. Worcester, 116 Mass., 193.
v. County

Commissioners,

with Stein
Directors of Poor

4 Gray,

500,

v.

Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall., 35. The like principle was recognized in
State v. Jackson, 33 N. J., 450, where a bounty voted to relieve a town from
a draft was held invalid, as tending to defeat the legislation of congress on
That case was decided by a divided court, and the decision is
the subject.
In State Treasurer v. Philadelphia, etc.,
opposed to the current of authority.
R. R. Co., 4 Houston, 158, a law which imposed a state tax on railroad companies of ten cents on every passenger carried within the state, excepting
soldiers and sailors of the United States, was held to be not a tax upon the
business of the carrier, measured by the number of persons carried, but a tax
upon the persons carried, to be collected by the carrier for the state, and, consequently, so far as it operated upon persons entering into, departing from, or
passing through the state, was, in effect, a regulation of commerce between
The
the states, and, consequently, within the decision in Crandall v. Nevada.
It
will
but
ability,
accustomed
Bates
with
his
case is reasoned by Chancellor
«

from the statement of the case, that some of the objections to the Nevada act could not be made to this.
be seen
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necessity/— a stipulation that the public domain, lying within its
limits, shall not be taxed by the state. The disability remains
efEective until the United States has made sale, or other disposition, of the lands, but it then terminates, notwithstanding the
title may not have passed by the actual execution and delivery of
patent of conveyance ; the land being actually severed from the
public domain by the sale itself.^ But this principle will not
apply in any case until the right to a patent is complete, and the
equitable title fully vested in the party without anything more
to be paid or any act to be done, going to the foundation of the
right^

Nor will it apply where,

as one

of the conditions of the

within a time named
are to be open to preemption and settlement like any portion of
grant,

the lands not sold by the grantee

the public domain.*
7.

in

Eailroads owned and controlled

by private corporations are

certain sense public conveniences and agencies, but they constitute no branch or part of the government, and are not properly
a

governmental agencies, even though the government may employ
them for the transportation of its troops, its mails, etc., or for
other purposes.
The corporations owning them are consequently
entitled to claim no exemption based on any implication that they
are essential to the operations of the government.^
And the same
Blue Jacket v. Johnson County, 3 Kansas, 299. A possessory interest
in the public lands for mining purposes may be taxed as being a species of
People v. Shearer, 30 Cal., 645 ; People v. Cohen, 31 Cal., 210.
property.
' See

Carrol -o. Perry, 4 McLean, 25 ; Witherspoon v. Duncan, 21 Ark., 240 ; S. C,
4 Wall., 210; Puget Sound Agricultural Co. v. Pierce County, 1 Wash. Ter.
Eep., 180 ; Carrol ■».SaflFord, 3 How., 441 ; Astrom v. Hammond, 3 McLean,
107; People v. Shearer, 30 Cal., 645; Hull «. Bowling, 18 Cal., 619; Iowa
Homestead Co. d. Webster County, 21 Iowa, 221 ; McGoon v. Scales, 9 Wall.,
See U. P. E. R. Co. ■».McShane, 18 Int. Rev. Rec, 68.
23.
°

' Railway

Company v. Prescott, 16 Wall., 603, in which
ditions of the grant was, that the cost of the government

case

one of the con-

surveys, selections,
etc., should be prepaid by the grantee before the lands should be conveyed.
Company v. Prescott, 16 Wall., 603. Compare this with Tucker v.
Ferguson in the same court, 7 Chicago Legal News, 78 (1875).
' Thompson v. Pacific R. R., 9 Wall., 579. Compare People v. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 43 Cal., 398 ; Huntington v. Same, 2 Sawyer, 503 ; Inhabitants of
Worcester v. Western R. R. Corp., 4 Met., 564, 568; Boston & Me. R. R. v.
Cambridge, 8 Cush., 237. In the case of the Union Pacific R. R. Company,
■"Railway

OH.

LIMITATIONS UPON THE TAXING POWER.

III.]

61

is true of any other private corporation, notwithstanding the fact
that the governmen-t may find it convenient to make use of the
corporation for its purposes, just as a private individual might be
employed for the same or any other purpose if the government
had need of his services.^

Taxes on commerce.

The federal constitution provides''
that no state shall, without consent of congress, lay any imposts
or duties on imports or exports, except what may be necesUnder this provision
sary for executing its inspection laws.
a state law imposing a stamp duty on bills of lading of gold and
silver to be carried out of the state has been held invalid as constituting a tax on exports.' But the provision has no application to
articles transported merely from one state into another.*
The
same clause of the constitution forbids the states without the consent of congress

to lay any "duty of tonnage." The precise
meaning of this phraseology has been the subject of some controVessels are taxable as property, and possibly the tax may
versy.
be measured by the capacity, when they are taxed only as propchartered by congress, and in which the government has important interests
with some power of control, the states have no power to tax. IT. P. R. R. Co.
V. Peniston, 18 "Wall., 5.
A state hank chartered for the benefit of the state, and
with the faith and credit of the state jjledged for its support, is not subject to
taxation by a municipal .corporation.
Nashville v. Bank of Tennessee, 1 Swan,
269.
' The national

banking law permits the banks organized under it to be
only limiting taxation to a particular mode, and prohibiting its being in
excess of that of state banks.
The permission thus given to tax remo-ves
any implied exemption that might otherwise exist. See Union Nat. Bank v.
Chicago, 3 Bissell, 83. The right of congress to inhibit the taxation of national banks except as it shall provide, is assumed in many cases.
See Flint
V. Boston, 99 Mass., 141.
to
tax
a
railroad
The right
company is not affected
by the fact of its property being mortgaged to the United States.
Thompson
V. Pacific R. R. Co., 9 Wall., 579.
taxed,

'Art. 1,§

10, par. 3.

California, 34 How., 169. See what is said of this case by Mr.
Justice Miller in Woodrufi' v. Parham, 8 AVall., 133, 137. A stamp tax on
foreign bills of exchange was sustained in Ex parte Martin, 7 Nev., 140.
^Alrny

V.

Woodruffs. Parham, 8 "Wall., 133. It was held in Jackson Iron Co. v. Auditor General, Mich. Sup. Ct., 1875, that a tax on iron ores of one and a half
cents a ton if taken out of tlie state for smelting, while if reduced within the
state they were exempt, was a tax on commerce and therefore void.
*
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erty and not as vehicles of commerce ;' but any such distinction
must be somewhat questionable.
It has been often held that a,
"
tax on vessels at a certain sum "
was forbidden.^ And it
ton
per

seems that a tax of a certain sum upon every vessel

arriving in

port is to be regarded as a duty of tonnage, though demanded
irrespective of the vessel's capacity.' The federal constitution also
provides that congress shall have power to regulate commerce
■with foreign nations, and among the several states and with the
The constitution, and the laws made in pursu-

Indian tribes.''

being supreme over the several states, the power of
regulation cannot be interfered with, limited or restrained by any
exercise of state authority.
When therefore it is held that a
is,

ance thereof

it

a

it,

at the discretion of the authority which wields
power to tax
power which may be carried to the extent of an annihilation of
that which
taxes, and therefore may defeat and nullify any

is

a

it

authority which may elsewhere exist for the purpose of protection
and preservation,
follows as
corollary that the several states
cannot tax the commerce which
regulated under the supremacy

is

a

a

is

a

of congress.'
But
tax on property that may be the subject of commerce
under congressional regulation,
not tax on commerce. Neither
tax on property that has been the subject of such commerce,
is

it

taxed only as property, and in common with all other
An importer of foreign goods, in his
property within the state.*

■where

Mobile Trade Co., 43 Ala., 578. See Steamship Co. v. Port Wardens,
State Tonnage Tax Cases, 13 id., 204.
Sheffield v. Parsons,
Stew.
Port., 303 Harbor Master ■».Railroad Co.,
Strob., 594; State v. Charleston,
Rich., 286; Lott ». Morgan, 41 Ala., 346;
Johnson v. Drummond, 30 Grat., 419. See Gibbons v. Ogden,
Wheat.,
186; Hays v. Steamship
Co., 17 How., 590; Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 id.,
237 Steamship Co. v. Port Wardens,
Wall., 31. The point
authoritatively
determined in Cannon d. New Orleans, 20 id., 577.
Steamship Co. v. Port Wardens,
Wall., 31. It
not, however, incompetent for state to authorize
city to collect
wharfage charge on all vessels
Marshall b. Vicksburg, 15 Wall., 146.
touching at its wharves.
Art.
In Foster v. County Commissioners,
par.
Minn., 140,
state tax upon
was decided that
licensed trader within an Indian reservation would be in conflict with this provision of the constitution.
Wheat., 316, 435, per Marshall, Ch. J.
McCullough v. Maryland,
Brown v. Maryland, 13 Wheat., 419, 437 Waring a. The Mayor, Wall.,
id., 475, 479.
110; Purvear v. Commonwealth,
;

1,

7

it

a

a

3.

4

a

a

8,

1,

§

a

6

Is

6

;

*
*

5

8

;

«

'

is

9

3

4

3

&

31

;

V.

«

C

'

Lott
Wall.,
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not the subject of state taxation, and cannot
be required to pay a license fee as importer ;^ and his sales are exempt from state taxation, because he purchases, by the payment of
as such, is

capacity

the duty, a right to dispose of the merchandise as well as to bring
it into the country ; and the tax, if it were admissible, would intercept the import, as an import, in the way to become incorporated
with the general mass of property, and would deny it the privilege of becoming so incorporated until it should have contributed
to the revenue of the state.' But when the importer has sold the
imported package, or has otherwise mixed the goods with the general property of the state by breaking up the package, a state tax
which then finds the articles already incorporated with the mass of

it,
is

a

^t,

property by the act of the importer, is not a tax upon commerce.*
A tax upon freight taken up within a state and carried out of
or taken up out of
state and brought within
held to be
is

a

tax upon the commerce between states, even though no distinction
made between freight carried wholly within the state, and

a

a

that brought into or carried through or out of it* The same has
tax upon the use of locomotives and cars employed
been held of
railroad which runs from one state into another.
on
As property, locomotives may be taxed, but

not their use

vehicles of
A tax upon the masters of vessels
commerce between states.'
in
certain sum on account of
foreign commerce, of
engaged
foreign country into the state,
every passenger brought from

Maryland,

v.

Mayor,

Waring

land,
8

v.

8

'

'Browa
Wall., 29.

V.

12 "Wheat.,

Wall.,

419, 437.

a

On the other hand,

tax upon commerce.'

And

110, 152, per Clifford,

tax on exchange and
see

Low

v.

Allmond,
Wall., 148.

Houston, 612; Hinton

Lott,

v.

40

Austin,

J., citing Brown

Wheat., 419, 448, and Almy v. California, 24 How., 169, 178.

12

2

a

a

is

a

as

Ala.,

123;

v.

13

Mary-

See State

S. C. in error,

8

8

4

3

Wheat., 419, 487; Waring v. Mayor,
Wall., 110.
Brown c. Maryland,
Articles imported may be taxed after they have passed from the hands of the
Waring v. The
importer, even though they remain in the original packages.
Wall., 110. See Low v. Austin, 13 Wall., 29; KenneyD. Harwell,
Mayor,

«

Philadelphia,

Passenger Cases,

etc.,

How.,

Wall.,

R. R. Co.,

283.

282.

See

Erie Railway

also

Abb. U. S., 323

S.

v.

15

;

'Minot

of State Freight Tax,
N. J., 581.

3

Case

State, 31

7

*

42 Ga., 416.

a,

18

Co. v.

Wall.,

206.
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money brokers,* a tax on legacies to aliens,'' a tax on the gross
receipts of a railway company,^ have been held not to be taxes
on commerce, and consequently not an interference with the constitutional powers of congress.

Taxes in abridgment of the priyileges and immunities of citizens. The federal constitution provides that the
citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the several states.* Among these privileges and immunities is that of being exempt in other states from
higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the citizens of such
other states.^ Under this provision, while it is entirely admissible to levy taxes upon the business or property of nonresident
traders within the state,' it is not competent to require them to
take out

pay therefor a sum greater than that demanded of residents.' Different methods of procedure may be
expedient in order to secure uniformity of taxation as between
a license and to

and these are not objectionable if unithey have a tendency to secure it.'

residents and nonresidents,

formity is the purpose, and

Corporations are not citizens within the meaning of the clause of
'

Nathan

»

Mager

'Tax

' Art.

Louisiana,

v.

v. Grima,

8

8

How.,

How.,

73.

490.

on Railway Gross Receipts,
4,

§
'CoTfield

3,

par.

15

Wall.,

284, 289.

1.

«. Coryell, 4 "Wash. C. C, 371,380, per Washington, J,; Wiley d.
Parmer, 14 Ala., 627; Scott v. Watkins, 23 Ark., 556, 564; Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen, 2C8.
« Duer V.

Small,

4 Blatch.,

263 ; Commonwealth

v.

Milton,

13

B. Monr., 212,

218.

'Ward

Maryland,

Wall., 418; State ». Korth, 27 Mo., 464; Crowr.
v. Welton, 55 Mo., 288, a tax was sustained
which was levied on those dealing in articles " not the growth, produce or
manufacture of the state." Tiie court held It not to be within the rule of
Ward V. Maryland, and not to be a tax on the produce of other states, but
only on the business. The same decision was made in State ». Hodgdon, 41
Vt., 139.
State,

V.

14 id.,

237.

In

13

State

' To

provide a different method for assessing the lands of nonresidents for
taxation from that provided for residents — e. g., to assess the latter on lists

handed in by themselves, and the former on an appraisement by residents in
the vicinity — does not infringe on the privileges and immunities of nonresidents.

Redd

v. St,

Francis Co.,

17

Ark.,

416.
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it is no violation of the

privileges and immunities of citizens of other states to require a
corporation, of which they are stockholders, to submit to such
taxation as the state shall see fit to impose as a condition of do-

ing business therein.^
Taxes

which

impair the obligation

of contracts.

state can pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts.^

ISTo

It

has never been held incompetent, under this provision, to tax, as

personal property, contracts for the payment of money, or which
have a money value ; and the right to do so may be assumed.^
But these, it seems, can only be considered as the property of the
owner where he has his domicile, and, consequently, are only
taxable there.

To tax in one state contracts owned in another, is

held to impair their obligation, and, consequently, to be inadmissible, even though they are made and payable in the state imposing the tax, and are secured by mortgage in that state.*
' Tatem v. Wright, 23
»

Const, of TJ. a., art.

3 See

Catlin

v.

Hull,

N. J.,
1,

21

§

429, and otlier cases cited, ante, p. 43.

10, par. 1.

Vt.,

152.

State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15 Wall., 300. The act of the legislature
which came under consideration in this case required the treasurer to retain
five per cent, of the interest payable to its creditors, and pay it into the treasField, J., says : " The power of taxation, however
ury of the commonwealth.
vast in its character and searching in its extent, is necessarily limited to subjects within the jurisdiction of the slate. These subjects are persons, propWliatever form taxation may assume, whether as duties,
erty and business.
It is not
imposts, excises or licenses, it must relate to one of tliese subjects.
possible to conceive of any other, though as applied to them, the taxation may
be exercised in a great variety of ways. It may toncli property in every
shape ; in its natural condition, in its manufactured form, and in its various
And the amount of taxation may be determined by the value
transmutations.
It may touch
of the property, or its use, or its capacity, or its productiveness.
in
it
is
in
conducted,
Infinite
forms
which
professions,
business in the almost
Unless restrained by
in commerce, in manufactures, and in transportations.
provisions of the federal constitution, the power of the state as to the mode,
form and extent of taxation is unlimited, where the subjects to which it applies are within her jurisdiction.
" Corporations may be taxed lilte natural persons, upon their property and
business. But debts owing by corporations are not property of the debtors in
any sense ; they are obUgations of the debtors, and only possess value in the
With them they are property, and in their hands they
hands of the creditors.
may be taxed. To call debts property of the debtors is simply to misuse terms.
*

6
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Other restraints

ou

[CH.

the power of taxation.

It

III.

is cus-

tomary for the people in framing constitutions for the states to impose other restrictions on the power of taxation, some of which we
With the exception of
shall take occasion to consider hereafter.
those already mentioned, and such as may thus be expressly imposed, the power is limited in extent only by the will of the
N"o limitations or restrictions upon the exergovernment itself.
cise of this essential attribute of government can be raised by
implication ; but the intention to limit or abridge it must be expressed

in clear and unambiguous language.^

All

the property there can be, in the nature of things, in debts of corporations,
belongs to the creditors to whom they are payable, and follows their domicile,
wherever that may be. Their debts can have no locality separate from the
parties to whom they are due. This principle might be stated in many different ways and supported by citations from numerous adjudications, but no
number of authorities and no forms of expression could add anything to its
obvious truth, which is recognized upon its simple statement.

" The bonds issued by the railroad
company in this case are undoubtedly
property, but property in the hands of the holders, not property of the obligors. So far as they are held by nonresidents of the state, they are property
The law which requires the treasurer of
beyond tlie jurisdiction of the state.
the company to retain five per cent, of the interest due to the nonresident bondholder, is not, therefore, a legitimate exercise of the taxing power. It is a law
which interferes between the company and the bondholder, and under the pretense of levying a tax, commands the company to withhold a portion of tlie
stipulated interest and pay it over to the state.
It is a law which thus impairs
the obligation of the contract between the parties. The obligations of a contract depend upon its terms and the means which the law in existence at the
time affords for its enforcement.
A law which alters the terms of a contract
by imposing new conditions or dispensing with those expressed, is a law
which impairs its obligations; for, as stated on another occasion, such a law
relieves the parties from the moral duty of performing the original stipulations of the contract, and it prevents their legal enforcement."
See also
Railroad Co. «. Jackson, 7 "Wall., 262; Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen,
268.
Compare Catlin v. Hull, 21 Vt., 152. In Commonwealth v. Hamilton
Manufacturing Co., 12 Allen, 298, it was decided that the fact that a part of its
stockholders are residents of another state would not exempt a corporation
from tlie payment in full of an excise tax measured by the market value of its
stock. It was held by the supreme court of South Carolina in Jenkins v. Charleston, T Ch. Leg. News, 78 (1874), that the stocks of the state or its municipalities might be taxed within the state, though owned by nonresidents; and that
the case was not within the case of State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, supra.

'Lane County

J.,

426, 435,

Ante, p. 54.

d.

Oregon,

per Depue,

J.;

Wall., 71, per
Eyre v. Jacob,

7

CJutse,
14

J.;

State v. Parker, 32

Grat., 422, 426, per Lee,

N.

J.
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CHAPTEE lY.
THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH TAXES MAY BE LAID.

IS

The general rule. All definitions of taxation
imply that it
to be imposed only for public
purposes/ and whatever differ-

ence of opinion may exist regarding the
admissibility of taxation
in particular cases, the fundamental requirement, that
the purpose
shall be public, will be conceded on all sides. Nor will
any question be made, that the right and t-he duty to
determine in the first
instance what are and what are not public
purposes, is devolved
upon the legislative department.
It falls there of necessity, because the taxing power is a branch of the
legislative, and the

legislature cannot lie under the necessity of requiring the
opinion
or the consent of another department of the
government before
it will be at liberty to exercise one of its
acknowledged powers.
The independence of the legislature is an axiom in
government ;
and to be independent, it must act in its own
good time, on its
own judgment, influenced by its own reasons, restrained
only as the
people may have seen fit to restrain the grant of legislative
power
in making; it. The legislature must,
consequently, determine for
itself in every instance, whether a particular
purpose is or is not
one which so far concerns the public as to render taxation
admissible.

But it is also generally admitted, that the legislative determi-

nation on this subject is not absolutely conclusive. It
may be
sufficiently so to put the administrative machinery of the state in
'

This is

as true under one

form of government

as under anotlier. In Sidney's
where he has occasion to refer to the doctrine
of courtiers, that the revenue voted to the liing is to he spent as he thinks
convenient instead of being devoted strictly to public purposes, he very
truly remarks,
that this " is no less than to cast it into a pit of which no man ever
knew the
bottom. That which is given one day is squandered away the next the
;
people
is always oppressed with impositions to foment the vices of
the court; these
daily increasing, they grow insatiable ; and the miserable nations are compelled to hard labor in order to satiate those lusts that tend to their
own

Treatise

ruin."

'■

On Government,"

Ch. 3,

§6.
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motion, but when the exaction is made of an individual, and the
power of the state is made use of to compel submission, he has
always the right to invoke the protection of the law. And an
appeal

to the law

for protection of personal property must neces-

which lies at the foundation of the
demand, a judicial question, upon which the courts cannot refuse to pass judgment
It has been forcibly, and yet very truly

sarily render the question,

power in the legislature to make any and
every thing lawful which it might see fit to call taxation, would,
"when plainly stated, be an unlimited power to plunder the citizen.^
In asserting the right, in any particular case, the legislasaid, that an unlimited

ture merely asserts its jurisdiction to act; but questions of jurisdiction are not usually concluded by a decision in its favor made
by the party claiming it ; they remain open, and may be dis-

This is

puted anywhere.

as

true of courts

as

it is of the legislature ;
by any tri-

comes from the law, and is not obtained

jurisdiction
bunal through

When, therefore,
simple assertion that it exists.
the question of the validity of taxation becomes judicial, if it
shall appear that the exaction is made for a purpose not public,
a

individual to protection is clear.

the attempt

Such an exac-

the competency of the legislative

tion is not within

it,

the right of the

to enforce

power, and

however honestly made, could only be

an attempt to take property from its possessor under an authority

opposed

to

the

deposit

the

is

it

" The
which the law of the land does not recognize.
theory of
our governments, state and national,"
has been truly said, "
of unlimited

The
power anywhere.
the judicial branches of these

legislative and
governments are all of limited and defined powers. There are limitations on such power which grow out of the essential nature of
all free governments.
Implied reservations of individual rights,
without which the social compact could not exist, and which are
executive,

*
* Of
by all governments entitled to the name.
all the powers conferred upon government, that of taxation

is

respected

;

;

8

;
;

4

;

S.

S.

;

;

;

;

;

8

;

9
;

'

Tyson v. School Directors, 51 Penn. St.,
Washington Avenue, 69 Penn. St.,
Am. Rep., 255 Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417, 431 Freeland v.
S. C,
Hastings, 10 Allen, 570, 575 Hooper v. Emery, 14 Me., 375, 379 Allen v. Jay,
C, 11 Am. Rep., 185 People v. Township Board of Salem,
60 Me., 124, 139
C, Am. Rep., 400 Morford ». Unger,
20 Mich., 452, 459
Iowa, 82, 93
Hanson v. Veraon, 27 Iowa, 38.

352
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most liable to abuse.

Given a purpose or object for which taxation may be' [awfully used, and the extent of its exercise is in
its very nature unlimited.
It is true that express limitation on
the amount of tax to be levied or the things to be taxed may be
imposed by constitution or statute, but in most instances for
"whicb taxes are levied, as the support of government the prosecution of war, the national defense, any limitation is unsafe. The
is,

entire resources of the people should, in some instances, be at the
The power to tax
therefore, the
disposal of the government
strongest, the most pervading of all the powers of government,

* *
reaching directly or indirectly to all classes of the people.
This power can as readily be employed against one class of individuals and in favor of another, so as to ruin the one class and
is

if

there
no
give unlimited wealth and prosperity to the other,
implied limitation of the uses for which the power may be exerTo lay with one hand the power of the government on
cised.

is

is it

a decree under legislative forms."

Presumption in favor of legislation.

It

is

'

It

is

is

a

is

it

the property of the citizen, and with the other to bestow
on
favored individuals to aid private enterprises and build up prinone the less
done under
vate fortunes,
robbery because
law
and
called
taxation.
This
forms
of
not
the
legislation.

not inconsistent

with this doctrine that in every instance the highest consideration

it

is

a

should be paid to the determination of the legislature that tax
not lightly to be assumed that its members
should be laid. It
have come to the examination of the subject with any other than
due investigapublic motives, or that they have failed to give

The presumption on the other hand must
with honesty and fair puralways be that they have considered
it

tion or reflection.

the result of their deliberate judgpresumptions tending to support the

is

pose, and that their action
And with all these
ment

it

it

would seem but reasonable and proper that
legislative action,
when not clearly satisfied that an
the courts should support

;

;

;

'

Miller, ■/., in Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 "Wall., 6.55, 663. And see
Freeland r. Hastings, 10 Allen, 570, 57.5 Hooper v. Emery, 14 Me., 3T.5, 379
AUen V. .Jay, 60 Me., 124; S. C, 11 Am. Rep., 185; (Jove v. Epping, 41 N. H.,
539; Crowell r. Hopkinton, 45 X. H., 9; Cnrtis D.Whipple, 24 Wis., 350;
People r. Flagg, 46 X. Y., 401 Tyler o. Beacher, 44 Vt., 648, 651.
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error has been committed.
This is the general rule in constitutional law when the validity of legislation is involved,^ and it is
applicable with peculiar force to the case of a legislative decision
upon the purpose for which a tax may be laid.

For in the first place, there is no such thing as drawing a clear
line of distinction between purposes of a public and those of a
The question is embarrassing to legislatures, and
private nature.^
is equally embarrassing to the courts.
All attempts to lay down
general rules whereby the difficulties may be solved have seemed,

when new and peculiar cases arose, to add only to the emban-assinstead of furnishing the means of extrication from

it.

ment

it

;

in which the community taxed has no interest
it

when

appar-

imposed for the benefit of others, and
would be so pronounced at first blush."*
And still
notes; 3edg. on Const, and Stat. L., 41.4;
182, and numerous cases cited in notes.

§

'Story on Const.,
Cooley, Const. Lim.,

is

ent that the burden

where

is

it
it a
is
is

it

if

a

it

said in
particular purpose may be raised by tax,
one case,
will be promotive
there be the least possibility that
"
in any degree of the public welfare.*
A tax law,"
said in
"
another case,
must be considered valid unless
be for
purpose

Money for

1482, and

3

Booth

4

6.

5. is

3.

3.

1.

)

(b

3.

3.

:

1.

'

These are enumerated by Adam Smitli, as
General Purposes of Taxation.
follows
The defense of the commonwealth.
This includes the expenses
of forts, arsenals, ships of war, a standing army and its equipment, the arming and disciplining of the militia, military roads and means of transportation of troops, etc.
The administration of justice.
The expense of public works and public institutions, of which he enumerates — (a.) Public works
and institutions for facilitating the commerce of the society —
Institutions
—
for the education of youth
(c.) Institutions for the instruction of people of
all ages. 4. The expense of supporting the dignity of the sovereign.
Dr. Wayland enumerates more perfectly the purposes for which the public
funds are most commonly expended, as follows:
The expenses for the support of civil government, including in these the compensation of judicial,
Expenses for the purposes of education,
legislative and executive ofBcers.
classified by him as common education and scientific education.
Expenses
for maintaining religious worship, which, however, he considers inadmissible. 4. Expenses for the improvement of coasts and harbors, and whatever
necessary for the security of external commerce, and for roads, canals, etc.
The expenses of war.
Expenses of pauperism.

Sharpless

13

9

Hooser,

«.

N. Y.,

Woodbury,

33 Conn., 118, 128, per

Philadelphia,
B. Monr., 330, 345.
v.

143, 149.

21 Penn.

And

see

St.,

Butler,

J.

147, 174,

Guilford

v.

following, Cheaney v.
of Chenango,

Supervisors
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another presents the same idea in language but little different :
"
To justify the court in arresting the proceedings and in declaring the tax void, the absence of all possible public interest in the
purpose for which the funds are raised must be clear and palpable ;
so clear and palpable as to be perceptible by every mind at first
'
blush."
These are very strong and sweeping assertions, but they
are supported by many others equally emphatic and comprehensive, which are to be met with in the adjudications of courts.*

The very emphasis, however, with which the principle is declared
renders it peculiarly liable to mislead, unless it is examined in
the light of the adjudicated cases in which it has been applied,
generally with explanations, and often with necessary qualifications.'

Grade of the goTernment which taxes.

In considering the
of
the
of
legality
purpose
any particular tax, a question of first
importance must always concern the grade of the government
"
which assumes to levy it. The " public that is concerned in
in any matter of government, is the public the particular government has been provided for; and the "public pura legal sense

"

for which that government may tax is one which concerns
its own people, and not some other people having a government
of its own, for whose wants taxes are laid. There may, therefore,
pose

be a

public purpose

as regards

the federal union, which

would

not be such as a basis for state taxation, and there may be a pub-

lic purpose which would uphold state taxation, but not the taxation which its municipalities would be at liberty to vote and collect.
The purpose must in every instance pertain to the sovereignty with which the tax originates

;

it must be something with-

' Brodhead v. Milwaukee, 19 Wis., 624, 653, per Dixon,
Speer v. School Directors, 50 Penn. St., 150.

Ch.

J.

And

see

" The exercise of the taxing power must liecome wanton and unjust — be
grossly perverted as to lose the character of a legislative function — before

2

so

will feel themselves entitled to interpose on constitutional
the legislation of a free people, especially in reference to
arrest
To
grounds.
for the common good, is to restrain tlie popular soverself-imposed
burdens
clear warrant in the letter of the fundamental law."
have
eignty, and should
Schenley o. Alleghany City, 35 Penn. St., 138, 130, per Woodward, J.
the judiciary

'This

is forcibly put by Dixon, Ch.

Co., 35 Wis., 167, 180.

J., in Whiting

v. Sheboygan

etc.

K. R.
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in its jurisdiction so as to justify its making provision for it. The
rule is applicable to all the subordinate municipalities ; they are
clothed with powers to accomplish certain objects, and for those
objects they may tax, but not for others, however interesting or

important, which are the proper concern of any other government
or jurisdiction. State expenses are not to be provided for by federal taxation, nor federal expenses by state taxation, because in

by the government
upon whose public the burden of the expenses properly rests. To
neither case would

the taxation be levied

provide for such expenses would consequently not be a purpose
in which the people taxed would in a legal sense be concerned.
This is the general rule ; some apparent exceptions there unquestionably are, where the nation and the state have common interrequire the action of both,
and would justify the levy of a tax by either or both to accomAn illustration would be the case of a tax
plish the one object.
for the common defense against the public enemies, which might
ests and a

common duty, such

as may

be levied by each, because the purpose would in a strict sense be
as to both.

public

The grade of the government is also important for another rea-

A

government is one of delegated and limited
powers, whose authority is generally to receive a somewhat strict
construction, and which must find the purposes for which it may
tax clearly confided to its charge by the state. It is not suffison.

municipal

cient that

a purpose may seem to belong properly to its jurisdicor
that
the court may believe it ought to have had authortion,
ity over it ; but it must be seen that the authority has been conferred in fact. It is otherwise with the state, which has all the

power of taxation not withheld from [[exercise in the making
of the state and federal constitutions, and in support of whose
action consequently the most liberal intendments are to be made.
It is otherwise with the federal union also ; for though its powers
are not

general

like those of the state, but are limited and

de-

fined by the federal constitution, yet as they concern the most
important matters of government, and relate to subjects not of
domestic concern merely but of international intercourse, and to
other matters which sometimes call for broad and comprehensive
views, and make a policy of liberal expenditures wise and statesmanlike, it would be neither reasonable nor prudent to subject its

CH.
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That which it

rules.

decides to be an object of public expenditure must generally be
so accepted, and error in its action must be corrected by discus-

sion and through public opinion and the elections.

General expenses of gOTernment.

Every government must

provide for its general expenses by taxation ; and in these are to
be included the cost of making provision for those public needs
or conveniences for which, by express law or by general usage, it
devolves upon the government to make provision. As regards
the federal government, a general outline of these is to be found
in the federal constitution.
That government is charged with the
common defense of the union, and for that defense it may raise
and support armies, create and maintain a navy, build forts and
arsenals, construct

military roads,

etc.

It

has a

like power over

the general subject of post offices and post roads, and over other

subjects enumerated iu the federal constitution and subjected to its
It may contract debts, and it must provide for their
authority.
payment.

For all these purposes it may levy taxes, and its power

in so doing to select the subjects of taxation and to determine the
rate and the methods is as full and complete as can exist in any
sovereignty whatsoever, with the exceptions which are prescribed
by the constitution itself.
These exceptions are the following :
1. That duties, imposts and excises must be uniform throughout the United States.*
2. A capitation or other direct tax must be laid in proportion
to the federal census or enumeration, according to which the representation of the states in the popular branch of congress is determined.^

No tax or duty can be laid on articles exported from any state.^
To these express restrictions is to be added the following,

3.

■which

is always implied

' Const, of TJ. S., art.
per Chase, Ch.

J.

' Const, of U.
per Chase, Ch.

' Const, of U.

I, §

S., art. 1,

J.

S., art.

not a tax on exports.

§

I, §

:

8, par. 1 ;

9, par. 4;

9,

par. 5.

Agulrre

v.

Veazie Bank
Veazie Bank

A

v.

Fenno,

8

Wall.,

533, 541,

v.

Fenno,

8

Wall.,

533, 541,

tonnage duty laid on foreign

Maxwell,

3

Blatch., 140.

ve.^sels

is
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or its agencies of government,
nor any which can tend to impair the sovereign powers of the
states, or impede the exercise of their essential functions.'
4.

No tax can be laid on

a state,

Some taxes levied by the federal government are directly calFor an illusculated and intended to benefit private individuals.

tration, it gives bounty land or pensions to those who have performed military or naval services for the country, notwithstanding it has made no promise, and is consequently under neither a
legal nor a moral obligation to do so. But the primary object in
all such bounties is not the private but the public interest.
To
show gratitude for meritorious public services in the army and
navy by liberal provision for those who have performed them, is
not only proper in itself, but it may reasonably be expected to
powerful influence in inciting others to self-denying, faithservices in the future, when the government,
which is so ready to be generous as well as just, shall have need
The same may be said of a like recognition
of their assistance.
have

a

ful and courageous

of valuable public services rendered by other persons : the question in every case is not one of power, but of prudence and public
policy.
Imposts laid on any other consideration than the production of
revenue have been often objected to as being only colorably taxaBut
tion, and therefore not warranted by the taxing power.
where the impost produces

revenue,

it is

a tax, and

it cannot be

invalid merely because, if laid in some other way or at some other
rate, the revenue would have been greater.^
Nor can the motives
'Ante, pp. 56-59, and cases cited.

'" No

doubt all taxation should be general and, as far as practicable, equal.
Legislation either to benefit or burden particular classes under the idea that
it is for the good of the state at large, infringes upon the natural and guarantied right of acquiring, possessing and protecting property, subject to fair
and equal contributions to the just and necessary expenses of government in
the exercise of its proper and legitimate functions.
A government which
assumes the ofiBce of controlling and directing the lawful industry of the citizens into the channels which it may choose to deem best, assumes what does
not legitimately belong to it. Some states in modern times, in undertaking to
find work for the people, have discovered that it was a sure way to make work
for themselves. But we cannot sit in judgment upon the wisdom or expedi.
ency of laws. An act of the legislature must clearly transcend the limits of
the power confided to that department of government, or more properly

IV.]
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have influenced the selection of objects for taxation, or determined the rate, be inquired into for the purpose of invalidating
■which

it

proper motives in the legislature are always conclusively presumed.' If therefore it should be conceded that a tariff of duties
discriminating between articles of merchandise in order to protect
:

or encourage particular branches of home industry, was unwise,
impolitic, or contrary to the spirit of the federal constitution, it
could not for that reason be treated as invalid.
Of public policy

in matters of federal taxation the congress must judge, and the
spirit of the constitution is supposed to address itself to the legislature rather than to the courts.
Every tax must discriminate,
and only the authority that imposes it can determine how and in
what directions. The motives that influence the members of a
legislative body raise questions between them and their constituents alone.* Indeed it is only when a burden is imposed which it is
impossible to bear ; one which is laid not for the purpose of producing revenue, but in order to accomplish some ulterior object
which the general government lacks the power otherwise to accomplish, that a case is presented which really can be said to be fairly
Such a burden, it may be said,
debatable on the score of power.
" tax " which is
recognized
comes under no definition of the word
in public law. It demands no contributions for the service of the

to add nothing to the public revIt annihilates that upon which it is levied, and it differs
enue.
from confiscation only in this, that confiscation seizes something
of value, and appropriates it to the needs of the government, thus
makino- it useful, while this seizes it for the purpose of destrucstate

;

it adds and is expected

tion only.

But even in such

cases,

it is held that the presumption

speakino', it must violate some prohibition, either express or necessarily implied, either of the federal or state constitution, before it can be pronounced
by the judicial department to be unconstitulional and void." Sharawood. J., in
Durach's Appeal, 63 Penn. St., 491, 495. As to the general right of congress
to tax, see United States v. McKinley, 4 Brewster,

^46.

V. Crump, 8 Leigh, 120, 154; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y., 533, 545,
& Erie K. R. Co. v. Cooper, 33 Penn. St., 378 ; Wright v. Defrees,
Sunbury
555
; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md., 376 ; Newman, ex parte, 9 Cal.,
303
8 Ind. 398,
15 Geo., 480; McCardle, ex parte, 7 Wall., 506, 514; JohnMorris,
503- Lyon v.
Met.,
Ky., 566; Flint etc., Plank Eoad Co. i). Woodhull, 35
son' v. Higgins, 3
49 Mo., 604, 607 ; State «. Pagan, 23 La. An., 545.
Hays,
v.
Mich., 99, 103 ; State
2 See Story on Const., § 1677; Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall., 533, 548.

' Goddin
•
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action must

preclude the judiciary from inquiring into the purpose of the legislation.^

Public purposes in general.

For the most part the term

public purposes is emploj'ed in the same sense in the lavf of taxation and in the law of eminent domain. But both in the legislation of the country and in the judicial decisions some differences
have been recognized, and, as we think, with good reason. An
appropriation under the right of eminent domain is only a forced
sale which one is compelled to make for the public good.

As

the consideration paid on such sale is pecuniary, and is supposed
to be equal to the full value of what is taken, no injustice results

On the other hand, no
to him whose property is appropriated.
pecuniary consideration is paid when money is demanded under
the power of taxation ; and if the money is taken in order to be
appropriated to private purposes, the benefits which the tax payer
might be presumed to receive from its being used for the needs of
the government, to enable it to protect and defend him with its
other citizens, are not realized.

In

such a case the supposed con-

sideration to the individual for taking his property wholly fails.
A more liberal construction of public purposes is consequently
admissible in the law of eminent domain, where an error in the
direction of too great liberality could not be seriously detrimental,
than in the law of taxation where a like error would result in the
most serious injustice.

There are provisions in a number of the state constitutions under which one needing a private way across the land of another
may have the way established against the will of the owner, by
making out his necessity to the satisfaction of a proper public
officer, or of a jury, and by paying such damages as shall be asThis is an extension of the law of eminent
sessed against him.
domain,^

but it has its foundation in public policy, and the appro-

' Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 "Wall., 533, 548. That the right to tax
may be carried to the extent of destruction is strongly jDrotested against in Berney v.
Tax Collector, 3 Bailey, 654, 672, per Harper, J.

' In

it has been held that private roads might be laid out by
compulsory proceedings without any such constitutional
permission.
Ilaryey v. Thomas, 10 Watts, 68 ; Case of Pccopson Road, IG Penn. St., 15 ; Sherman V. Buick, 32 Cal., 241.
a few cases
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priation is supposed to accomplish a public purpose in bringing
into use a parcel of real property whicli otherwise would be or
A proposition to make such a
might be practically inaccessible.
private way at the public expense by means of an exercise of the
power of taxation would, by general consent, be pronounced

wholly inadmissible,

being a proposition to appropriate the
The difference in the two
public revenues to a private purpose.
cases is felt and appreciated the moment they are stated, and tho
as

wisdom of recognizing it in legislation has also been very generally felt. There are also some cases in which, without the aid of
constitutional provisions, it has been held that private property
may be appropriated under the law of eminent domain, in order
to enable private parties to establish and carry on their business
enterprises,

notwithstanding

it would be incompetent to aid the

An
by payments from the public treasury.
illustration is the case of lands appropriated for the pui'pose of
creating a reservoir for water, by means of which a water power
may be made available in private hands for manufacturing pursame

enterprises

The right to make the appropriation has been sustained,
on the ground that, within the meaning of the law of eminent
poses.

domain, land is taken for the public use whenever its taking is for

the general public advantage, and that the establishment of power
for manufacturing purposes is an object of such great public interest — especially where manufacturing is one of the great industrial pursuits of the commonwealth — as fully to justify the declaring it

public use and to authorize for the purpose the appropriation of private property by individuals or corporations.^
a

' Hazen v. Essex Company, 12 Cush., 475, 477, per S7i<m, Cli. J. ; Great Falls
Manuf. Co. v. Fernald, 47 N. H., 558, per Perley, Cli. J. The following cases

Manuf. Co., 12 Pick., 67; BosNewman,
12 id., 467; Harding ». Grodton & Koxbury Mill Corporation v.
lett, 3 Yerg., 41. The courts of Wisconsin have sustained such laws. Newcomb V. Smith, 1 Chand., 71; Thein v. Voegtlander, 3 Wis., 461, 465; Pratt v.
Brown, Id., 603. But with some hesitation of late; see Fisher «. Horicou Co.,
10 id., 351; Curtis v. Whipple, 24 id., 350; note of Judge Bedfield to Allen
V. lahabitants of Jay, 12 Am. Law Reg., 493; S. C, 60 Me., 124; also 11 Am.
Bep., 185. They have also" been sustained in other states; Olmstead v.
Camp, S3 Conn., 532; Jordan v. Woodward, 40 Me., 317; Miller i>. Troost,
14 Minn., 365; Vcnard v. Cross, 8 Kan., 248; Harding «. Funk, id., 315; Burgess b. Clark, 13 Ired., 109; M'Afee's Heirs «. Kennedy, 1 Lit., 93; Smiths.
are to the same effect:

Fiske

■».Framingham
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On the other hand, the right to exercise the power of taxation
in aid of the manufacturing enterprises of private persons or corporations has seldom been asserted, and whenever asserted has
The views of the learned Chief
been most emphatically denied.

Justice of Maine on this subject have been so clearly and point— whether
edly stated, in response to an inquiry by the executive

the legislature has authority, under the constitution, to pass laws
enabling towns, by gifts of money or loans of bonds, to assist in-

—
dividuals or corporations to establish or carry on manufactures
that it is deemed advisable to present the material portions of his
negative reply

in the

note.^

T. B. Monr., 58; Shackelford «. CofiFey, 4 J. J. Marsh., 40;
River Co., 6 Rand., 245 ; Ash v. Cummings, 50 N. 11.,

Connelly,

1

Crenshaw

v. Slate

591.

" The line of demarkation may not always be clear and distinct and well
is for public and governmental and what for private
—
between the general legislation for the whole people and the spepurposes
'

defined between what

cial for the individual. But the questions proposed leave no doubt as to tlie
special phase of legislation to which they refer. They are obviously limited
by and embrace what is special and private, excluding by their very terms
whatever may or can, by the most enlarged and liberal construction, be regarded as relating to municipal, governmental or public objects of any de* * * "Individuals and corporations
embark in
scription whatsoever."
manufactures for the purpose of personal and corporate gain. Their purposes and objects are precisely the same as those of the farmer, the mechanic
They engage in the selected branch of manufactures for
or the day laborer.
the purpose and with the hope and expectation not of loss but of profit. By
the very assumption of the interrogatories, they are engaged in private and
corporate undertakings for private and corporate emolument. All municipal,
police, educational, public or governmental purpose, whether of peace or of
war, is excluded from our consideration by the manifest purpose of the inquiry." * * * " Xhe inquiry is whether the legislature can authorize a
town, by a majority or any other vote, to give away the property of an unwilling minority to an individual or manufacturing corporation whom or which
The question relates only to manufacsuch majority may select as donees.
tures ; but if the riglit of confiscating the private property of an individual
for the purpose of giving it away to one branch of industry can be conferred
upon towns, one does not easily see wliere or what bounds can be imposed or

limitations made. The general benefit to the community resulting from every
description of well directed labor is of the same character, whatever may be
the- branch of industry upon which it may be expended.
All useful laborers,
no matter what the field of labor, serve the state by increasing the aggregate
of its products — its wealth. There is nothing of a public nature any more
entitling the manufacturer to public gifts, than the sailor, the mechanic, the
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the right is met with in the opin-

ion of an eminent federal judge, in a recent case, in which a town,
under an authority which the legislature had attempted to confer,

The like
private manufacture.*
doctrine was afterwards affirmed in the federal supreme court.
had voted its bonds

in aid of

a

After consideration of the general nature of the power to tax, the
court declare it to be "beyond cavil that there can be no lawful

is not laid for a public purpose.
It may not be easy
to draw the line, in all cases, so as to decide what is a public purIt is undoubtedly the duty
pose in this sense, and what is not.
tax -which

of the legislature, which imposes or authorizes municipalities to
impose a tax, to see that it is not to be used for purposes of a
private interest instead

of a public use ; and the courts can only
in interposing when a violation of this principle is
clear and the reason for interference cogent.
And in deciding
whether, in a given case, the object for which the taxes are assessed falls upon the one side or the other of this line, they must
be justified

be governed mainly

by the course and usage of the government,

the objects for which taxes have been customarily and by long
course of legislation levied, what objects or purposes have been
considered necessary to the support and for the proper use of the
Whatever lawfully
government, whether state or municipal.
this,
and
to
and
is
sanctioned
time
the acquiescence
by
pertains
of the people, may well be held to belong to the public use, and
proper for the maintenance of good government ; though this may
not be the only criterion of rightful taxation.
" But in the case before us, in which the towns are authorized
to contribute aid, by way of taxation, to any class of manufactures, there is no difficulty in holding that this is not such a public purpose as we have been considering. If it be said that a
benefit results to the local public of a town by establishing manuOur government is based upon equality of rights.
All honest employments are honorable. The state cannot rightfully discriminate among occupations, for a discrimination in favor of one branch of inThe state is equally
dustry is a discrimination adverse to all other branches.
to protect all, giving no undue advantage or special or exclusive preference
to any." Opinions of Judges, 58 Me., 590.
lumberman or the farmer.

I Commercial National Bank
Cleveland

v.

lola,

9

Kan.,

689 ;

v. lola, 3 Dillon, 353.
See National Bank of
Opinions of Judges, 58 Me., 590, 596.
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factures, the same may be said of any other business or pursuit
which employs capital or labor.
The merchant, the mechanic,
the banker, the builder, the steamboat

the innkeeper,

owner are

equally promoters of the public good, and equally deserving the
aid of the citizens by forced contributions. No line can be drawn
in favor of the manufacturer which would not open the coffers of
the public treasury to the importunities of two-thirds the business
men of the
or town." '

city
Further authorities in support of the position that there is a
distinction in the meaning of public use, as employed in the law of
Cuseminent domain and of taxation, would seem unnecessary.

tom must have great influence

in determining the proper limit of

but it is manifest that the adjudications recognize
certain incidental benefits to the public as constituting such a
public interest as will justify an exercise of the eminent domain
which, in the case of the power of taxation, are not admitted as
either power;

constituting any basis whatever for its employment. Few cases
have undertaken to point out the distinction,^ but the courts have
acted upon it in many cases.
Per Miller, J., in Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall., 655, 664. See also
Allen V. Jay, 60 Me., 124; S. C, 11 Am. Rep., 185. Taxation in aid of private
enterprises is properly characterized by Dickenson, J., in Opinions of Judges,
58 Me., 590-603, as taxation "to load the tables of the few with bounty that
the many may partake of the crumbs that fall therefrom."
'

however. Whiting v. Sheboygan etc. R. R. Co., 25 Wis., 167, 190, per
Dixon, Ch. J. In Teople v. Town Board of Salem, 20 Mich., 452, 477, the following remarks are made in response to the argument in favor of the right to
tax, drawn from the admitted right of eminent domain for the purpose in
■See,

"
question : Reasoning by analogy, from one of the sovereign powers of government to another, is exceedingly liable to deceive and mislead.
An object
may be public in one sense and for one purpose, when, in a general sense,
and for other

purposes, it would be idle and

misleading to employ the
governmental powers exist for public purposes, but they are
not necessarily to be exercised under the same conditions of public interest.
same term.

All

a

is

it,

The sovereign police power which the state possesses is to be exercised only
for the general public welfare, but it reaches to every person, to every kind of
business, to every species of property within the commonwealth.
The conduct of every individual and the use of all property and of all rights is reguto any extent found necessary for the preservation of the public
lated by
order, and also for the protection of the private rights of one individual
The sovereign power of taxation
against encroachments by other.?.
employed in great many cases whore the power of eminent domain might be

CH.

THE PUEPOSES FOR WHICH TAXES MAY BE LAID,

IV.]

An

81

of the purposes which are recognized as justiThe
fying taxation is not needful, and is scarcely practicable.
most of them pass unchallenged.
To preserve the public order;
enumeration

of civil rights and the punishment

to provide for the enforcement

made more immediately efficient and available if constitutional principles
would suffer it to be resorted to; but each of these powers has its own peculiar and appropriate sphere, and the object which is public for the demands
of one is not necessarily of a character to permit the exercise of another. * *
*

*

"If we

examine the subject critically, we shall find that the most imin the case of eminent domain, is the necessity of accomplishing some public good which is otherwise impracticable; and we
shall also find that the law does not so much regard the means as the need.

portant consideration

6

a

if,

is

it

a

a

it,

a

is

a

a

a

a

it

it,

a

a

it

it,

is

a

is

it

is

a

it,

The power is much nearer akin to that of the public police than to that of
taxation ; it goes but a step further, and that step is in the same direction.
" Everj' man has an abstract right to the exclusive use of his own
property
for his own enjoyment, in such manner as he shall chcjose; but if he should
choose to create a nuisance upon
or do anything which would preclude
reasonable enjoyment of adjacent property, the law would interfere to impose
restraints.
He
said to own his private lot to the center of the earth, but he
would not be allowed to excavate
indefinitely, lest his neighbor's lot should
The abstract right to make use of his own prop"
disappear in the excavation.
compelled to yield to the general comfort and- protec
erty in his own way
lion of the community, and to
proper regard to relative rights in others.
of
his
The situation
property may even be such that he
compelled to disbecause the law will not suffer his regular business to be carried
pose of
on upon it. A needful and lawful species of manufacture may so injuriously
cannot be tolerated in
affect the health and comfort of the vicinity that
densely settled neighborhood, and, therefore, the owner of lot in that neighborhood will not be allowed to engage in that manufacture upon
even
his
and
business.
The
in
butcher,
be
the
legitimate
regular
vicinity
though
of whose premises
village has grown up, finds himself compelled to remove his business elsewhere, because his right to make use of his lot as
place for the slaughter of cattle has become inconsistent with the superior
right of community to the enjoyment of pure air and the accompanying
The owner of
lot within the fire limits of
blessings and comforts.
city
unable to erect
may be compelled to part with the property, because he
and the local regulations will not jiermit one
brick or stone structure upon
of wood.
" Eminent domain only recognizes and euforces the superior right of the
similar way. Every
community against the selfishness of individuals in
right to exist, and community has right to
branch of needful industry has
be permitted to exist; and
for that purpose, a peculiar lodemand that
of
an
individual,
in
possession
already
essential, the owner's right to
calitj',
must
to
the
yield
superior
undisturbed occupancy
interest of the public. A
the
farm
of every unwilling person, and the busirailroad cannot go around
ness of transporting persons and projJertj' for long distances by rail, which
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of crime ; to make compensation to public officers and to others
who perform services for the public ; to protect public property ;
to erect and keep in repair the necessary public buildings; to pay
the expenses of legislation and of administering the laws ; all these
are purposes which, in a consideration of the law of taxation, call
has been found so essential to the general enjoyment and welfare, could never
have existed if it were in the power of any unwilling person to stop the road
at his boundary, or to demand unreasonable terms as a condition of passing
him. The law interferes in these cases and regulates the relative rights of the
as strict regard to justice and equity as the
does not deprive the owner of his property,
but it compels him to dispose of so much of it as is essential ou equitable
terms. While, therefore, eminent domain establishes no industry, it so regu-

owner and of the community
circumstances will permit.

with

It

lates the relative rights of all that no individual shall have it in his power to
*
*
preclude its establishment.
"
* *
But when we examine the power of taxation with a view to ascertain the purposes for which burdens may be imposed upon the public, we
perceive at once that necessity is not the governing consideration, and that

in many

it has little or nothing to do with the question presented.
Certain objects must of necessity be provided for under this power, but in regard to innumerable other objects for which the state imposes taxes upon its
citizens, tlie question is always one of mere policj , and if the faxes are imposed, it is not because it is absolutely necessary that those objects should be
accomplished, but because on the whole it is deemed best by tlie public authorities that they should be. On the other hand, certain things of absolute
necessity to civilized society the state is precluded, either by express constitutional provisions, or by necessary implication, from providing for at all;
and they are left wholly to the fostering care of private enterprise, or private
liberality. We concede, for instance, that religion is essential, and that without it we should degenerate to barbarism and brutality; yet we prohibit the
state from burdening the citizen with its support, and we content ourselves
with recognizing and protecting its observance on secular grounds. Certain
professions and occupations in life are also essentia], but we have no author,
ity to employ the public moneys to induce persons to enter them. The necessity may be pressing, and to supjily it may be, in a certain sense, to accomplish a " public purpose ; " but it is not a purpose for which the power of taxation may be employed.
The public necessity for an educated and skillful
in
some
particular locality may be great and pressing, yet if the
physician
people should be taxed to hire one to locate there, the common voice would exclaim that the public moneys were being devoted to a private purpose. The
opening of a new street in a city or village may be of trifling public importance as compared with the location within ic of some new business or manufacture; but while the right to pay out the public funds for the one would be
cases

unquestionable, the other by common consent is classified as a private interest, which the public can aid as individuals if they see fit, while they are not
permitted to employ the machinery of the government to that end. Indeed,
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and all are absolutely indispensable in
All these may therefore be passed by while

as eacli

orderly government.
attention is directed to cases not so clear, the determination of
which will sufficiently indicate the bounds which usage in representative government has prescribed as the proper

limit to

a

lawful

expenditure of the public moneys.

Religious instruction.

This to individuals is an object of the
very highest moment, and formerly it was thought to be the duty
of government to provide for it. The more enlightened opinion
of the present day refers it exclusively to the voluntary action of

It

the people.^

is expressly forbidden by many of the state con-

it,

the opening of a new street in the outskirts of a city is generally much more a
matter of private interest than of public concern ; so much so that the owner
of the land voluntarily throws it open to the public without compensation;
yet even in a case where the public authorities did not regard the street as of

it

sufficient importance to induce their taking the necessary action to secure
as a
be doubted that the moment they should consent to accept

it

would not

a

gift, the street would at once become
public object and purpose, upon which
the public funds might be expended with no more restraints upon tlie action

in that particular, than if
were the most prominent and
essential thoroughfare of the city.
" By common consent also large portion of the most urgent needs of sociIt this in its
relegated exclusively to the law of demand and supply.
ety
is

is

a

it

of the authorities

natural operation, and without the interference of government, that gives us the
proper proportion of tillers of the soil, artisans, manufacturers, merchants and
professional men, and that determines when and where they shall give to soHowever great the need in the
ciety the benefit of their particular services.
direction of any particular calling, the interference of the government is not

it

is

a

it

public want,
considmight be supplying
tolerated because, thougli
ered as invading the domain that belongs exclusively to private inclination
We perceive, therefore, that the term " public ■purpose," as
and enterprise.
employed to denote the objects for which taxes may be levied, has no relation
to the urgency of the public need, or to the extent of the public benefit which

follow.
tinguish the

It

is, on the other hand,

a

is

merely a term of classification, to diswhich,
according to settled usage, tlie government is to proobjects for
vide, from tlwse which iy tlie like usage, are left to private inclination, interest or
liberality.
" It creates broad and manifest distinction — one in regard to which there
to

is

it

need be neither doubt nor difficulty — between public works and private enthe business of governterprises, between the public conveniences which
those
which
and
interest
and
private
competition will supply
ment to provide
whenever the demand is sufficient."
•

Dr. WayCooley, Const. Lim., ch. 13 and cases referred to in the notes.
"
land justly observes that The onlj' ground on which taxes for the support of
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stitutions that public moneys shall be appropriated to religious
worship. It is true that in selecting the objects of taxation, buildings and other property made use of for that purpose are generally exempted from taxation. This is done without discrimination between sects, and is generally defended upon the ground
that public worship is a public benefit which may properly be
encouraged in this indirect way. The discrimination is opposed by
some persons, but whether or not it is proper or politic, it cannot
be declared unwarranted by the general principles of government.
As already observed the question what taxes shall be levied and
upon what classes of persons or property is always one of public
But another view is not
policy which the legislature must solve.
Whoever contributes to the supentirely without plausibility.
port of churches, also contributes to pay the taxes, if any, which
are imposed upon them.
But as mpst persons who pay taxes at
all do, in some form, and with some regard to their ability, contribute to the support of churches, it is of little importance to the
general public whether taxes are levied on church property or not,
as whatever is collected from such property, while it goes to difrom individual property, will at
the same time increase to the same extent what the individuals
pay for the support of religious instruction, so that the burden in
minish what will be collected

in the other. We
do not say that this view is strictly correct, but it is perhaps
safe to say that the inequality occasioned by the exemption of

the one case

will be substantially the same

as

-church property from taxation is not so great as without reflection
one would be likely to suppose.

Secular instraction.

It

may be safely declared that to
bring a sound education within the reach of all the inhabitants
religion can he defended is tliat Its existence is necessary for the support of
pivil government, and that it can be sustained in no other manner than by
The first assertion we grant to be true ; the second we utterly
compulsion.
we do not believe that any taxation for this purpose is necesHence
den}'.
that
religious societies have a right to ask of the civil government
All
sary.
for transacting their own affairs which societies of
the
same
privileges
is,
This they have a right to demand, not because they
sort
other
possess.
every
but
because the exercise of religion is an innocent
societies,
are religious
If tliese bo not granted, religious men are opmode of pursuing happiness.
pressed, and tlie country where such oppression prevails, let it call itself what
it may, is not free." Wayland, Pol. Econ., b. 4, ch. 3, § 3.
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has been a prime object of American

government from the very
first.
It was declared by colonial legislation, and has been reiterated in constitutional provisions, to the present day.
It has
an imperative

as

regarded

duty of the government; and

when question has been made concerning

it,

been

the question has re-

lated not to the existence of the duty, but to its extent.
is

question of extent

one of

But the

public policy, and addresses itself to

the legislature and the people, not to the courts.^

And

the ten-

And this

cation.
;

lic

is

a

dency on the part of the people has been steadily in the direction
of taking upon themselves larger burdens in order to provide
more spacious, elegant and convenient houses of instruction, and
to place within the reach of all
more generous and useful eduusually done by the direct action of the pub-

the state or its municipalities constructing and owning

edifices, and supporting

the

the schools, academies, colleges and uni-

versities.
interesting

Also Stewart

case
«.

1.

§

3,

/

a

is

a

is

is

is

it

is

it

a

a

is

Met., 508.

a

See the very

4,

'

of Cnsliing v. Inhabitants of Netrburyport,
Kalamazoo, 30 Mich., 69. That tax for the
within
support of free schools
general grant of the power to tax for
"municipal purposes," see Horton o. School Commissioners, 43 Ala., 598.
Dr. Wayland, in speaking of the liberality of construction in determining the
purposes of taxation, says: "It must not, of course, always be expected thaK
the product created by consumption (in public expenditure) will be
visible,
tangible, material substance. Thus we see no physical, tangible product as
the result of taxes for the support of civil government.
But we receive the
benefit in security of person, property and reputation; or in that condition
of society which, tliough
be incapable of being weighed and measured,
absolutely essential both in individual happiness and individual accumulation. The same may be said in substance concerning the taxes paid for general education.
Here, whether the tax payer receives his remuneration in instruction given to his own children or not, he yet receives
in the improvement of the intellectual and social character of his neighbors, by which his
rendered more secure, the labor for which he pays
property
better performed, and the demand for whatever he produces
more universal and more
constant. The same may be said of the public expenditure by which the
moral and social character of community
elevated, the taste of
nation
refined, and an impulse given to eflForts for the benefit of man. With this
view, no one could oppose the expense incurred in bestowing upon public
edifices elegance, or even, in some cases, magnificence of structure, in the
public celebration of remarkable eras, and in the rewards bestowed upon
those who have by their discoveries enlarged the boundaries of human
knowledge, or by their inventions signally improved the useful arts." Pol/
Econ., pt.
ch.
10

[CH. IV.
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In

some states a practice has prevailed, while making liberal
provision for instruction in public schools, to also give assistance

to institutions owned

and controlled

by private corporations or
The legal right to do this

by religious bodies or denominations.
In one case in Massachusetts,
has received but little attention.

constitutional provision which required moneys raised for
public schools to be applied to those only which were under the
order and superintendence of the public authorities, it was denied
that the legislature could lawfully authorize a town to take monunder

a

for the public schools and appropriate
them in support of a school founded by a charitable bequest,
under which the order and superintendence of the school was
eys which had been raised

in trustees who, though a majority were to be chosen by
inhabitants
of the town, were yet limited to the members of
the
certain religious societies.'' And in Wisconsin the authority of
the legislature to empower a town to tax its citizens in aid of the
vested

of buildings for an educational institution to be owned
and controlled by a private corporation was denied on general
" It strikes
us," say the court, " at the first blush, that
principles.
this is not the levy and collection of money for public purposes,
as clearly as if the institute were not an incorporated body, but a
erection

resolved upon the establishment of a like institution.
If it were such an institution,
or a grammar or classical school, or a seminary built up and
established by individual enterprise, as by persons engaged in
the profession of teaching, or by others, and owned and controlled by those contributing towards
and the emoluments
of private individuals

it,

mere association

corporation,

where there

is

a

a

no certain and deQnite personal responfrom the tax payers, which
just and

is

is

it

belonging to them, we apprehend that no one would contend
that the people [of the town] might be taxed for the purpose of
donating the moneys to it. The fact that
an institution inact
of
the legislature does not change its character
corporated by
in this respect.
It but most frivolous pretext for giving to

'

a

sibility, money exacted
honorable man engaged in the same business would hesitate to
receive though paid without opposition, and to enforce the payment of which, against the will of the tax payers, he would never
Jenkins

v.

Andover, 103 Mass., 94.
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tbink of resorting to coercive measures, provided the same were
It can no more be supported bj taxation than if it were
lawful.
unincorporated, or a private school or seminary of the kind above
supposed."

It

'

has been decided to be competent

for the legislature to au-

in aid of the erection of buildings for
a state educational institution to be constructed within it.' In
thorize

a

town to tax itself

that case the purpose, as regards the state at large, was clearly
public, but the locality was allowed to assume a special burden
on the ground of special and peculiar benefits.
A case in New

York

perhaps goes further, inasmuch as

it sustains the authority

village to render such assistance.^
While it is perhaps entirely proper to regard the incidental benefits
to the locality as constituting a just basis for an exceptional tax
of the legis ature to require

a

a

it,

no such ruling would be admissible where the buildupon
ing itself was not to be one owned and controlled by the public,
and where consequently the sole ground for any taxation would
be the incidental benefits to flow from
private undertaking.

This has been so clearly shown

in

will authorize

a

is

:

a

case from which we have
that
from
we
the
copy
opinion instead of attemptalready q\ioted,
ing any statement of the general doctrine in our own language
" That
not the kind of .public benefit and interest which
resort to the power of taxation.

Such benefits

accrue to the people of all communities from the exercise in their

midst of any useful trade or employment, and the argument, pursued to its logical result, would prove that compulsory payment

Whipple,

v. Amherst,

■University,

Legal News,

37

Ind.,

Wis.,

24

12

155

power would be obviously incom-

350, 353, per Dixon,

Ch.

J.

Allen, 500. See also Marks ». Trustees of Pardue
Burr v. Carbondale, Sup. Ct. 111., 1874,
Chicago
6

Merrick

V.

a

is

Curtis

;

'

a

Such

controversy.

2

mit of

a

or taxation might be made use of for the purpose of building up
and sustaining every such trade or employment, though carried
on by private persons for private ends, or the purposes of mere
That there exists in the state no
individual gain and emolument.
power to tax for such purposes,
proposition too plain to ad-

350.
a

"

Gordon v. Cornos, 47 N. Y., 608. In that case, however, there was to be
school in the stale building, free to the children of the village.
State
v. Haben, 23 Wis., 660.
Compare
grammar
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patible with the genius and institutions of
practice of all liberal governments, as well

a free people
as

;

and the

all judicial author-

ity, is against it. If we turn to the cases where taxation has been
sustained as in pursuance of the power, we shall find in every one
of them that there was some direct advantage accruing to the

public from the outlay, either by its being the owner or part ownor obtained with the
money, or the party immediately interested in and benefited by the
works to be performed, the same being matters of public concern ;
or because the proceeds of the tax were to be expended in defraying the legitimate expenses of government, and in promoting the
er of the property or thing to be created

peace, good order and welfare of society.
efit or interest

of this nature,

Any direct public

no matter how slight, as

ben-

distin-

guished from those public benefits or interests incidentally arising
from the employment or business of private individuals or corIn thus endeavoring
porations, will undoubtedly sustain a tax.
must be beneficially interested in order
to justify the raising of money by taxation in cases like the present, we of course do not intend to include all purposes for which
Taxes may be levied and collected for
money may be so raised.
to define how the public

charitable purposes, but these constitute a peculiar ground for the
exercise of the power which does not exist here.
" So claims founded in equity and justice in the
largest sense,
a
tax
in
will
such
and
gratitude,
support
claims, however, and
;
we think all others where taxation is proper, except claims founded in charity, may be referred to the general principle above spoken of, of public interest in, or benefits received by the transaction

out of which the claims arose."

^

Public charity.

The support of paupers and the giving of
assistance to those who by reason of age, infirmity or disability,
are likely to become such, is by the practice and the common
consent of civilized countries a public purpose.
The laws not
only exempt from taxation the limited means of such persons, but
they go further, and provide public funds with which to furaish
them retreats where they can be supplied with the necessaries, and
to a reasonable extent, with the comforts of life. Hospitals are
also provided where
' Curtis

V.

Whipple,

24

dependent
Wis.,

classes

350, 354, per

can

receive

Dixon, Ch.

J.

medical aid
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asylums where tte deaf, the dumb and the

blind may be supported and taught, and where the insane may be
kept from doing or receiving harm, and can have such careful and
scientific treatment, with a view to their restoration, as they would
not be likely to receive elsewhere.
He would be a bold man who
in these days should question the public right to make provision
for these benevolent objects.
And this provision might not only
be made by the establishment of institutions for the purpose, but
private institutions might undoubtedly be aided with public funds

in consideration of services to be rendered to the public and expenses to be incurred by them in assisting and relieving the same
necessitous

and dependent

classes.^

The buildings and property

of charitable bodies may also, with the utmost propriety and justice, be exempted from taxation, as by implication public buildings for the same purpose are exempted.'

Private business
'But it
ciations

enterprises.

However important it may

is not competent to levy taxes to be paid over to individuals or assoare charitable.
So held in a case where the

simply because they

legislature had required the agencies of foreign insurance companies to pay
over two per centum of their receipts to an association for the relief of dis"
the legislature may command such a contribution as this,
abled firemen.
we are unable to see why they may not command every citizen to contribute,

If

not only to this association, but to every charitable association; and indeed,
There
to every man who spends his money and means in a charitable way.
ai-e associations for all sorts of charity — why may not the legislature require
us to contribute to them all, if they may require this class of people to con-

Lowrie, Ch. J., in
tribute to this one? We cannot answer this question."
Philadelphia Association etc. v. Wood, 39 Penn. St., 73, 83.
' In Directors of the Poor v. School Directors, 43 Penn. St., 31, 35, in which
it was claimed that a public poor house was taxable for school purposes under
general words in the statute, Lowrie, Ch. J., uses the following vigorous lan" Tax the poor house to support the schools ? Why this would be to
guage :
take the poor taxes to support the schools; and the people must be taxed to
pay the officers who perform such foolish service. If' we require the townships, counties, towns, cities and state, and the road, school and poor authorities to tax each other, we shall furnish fees enough for several hundred
officers engaged in transferring from one public body to another the taxes
which it has collected for its public purposes. These poor taxes must be collected to support the schools and roads, and scJwol taxes to support the poor,
and so on all around. Surely it is not too much to say that this is absurd. The
public is never subject to tax laws, and no portion of it can be without express
statute.

No

exemption law is needed for any public property held as such."
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individual citizens should prosper in
their industrial enterprises, it is not the business of government to
be to the coramunity that

states leave every man to
depend for his success and prosperity in business on bis own exertions, in the belief that by doing so his own industry will be
more certainly enlisted, and his prosperity and happiness more

aid them with its means.

Enlightened

It

may therefore be safely asserted that
taxation for the purpose of raising money from the public to be
given or even loaned to private parties, in order that they may
use it in their individual business enterprises, is not recognized as

likely to be secured.

a public

use.

In contemplation of law it would

be taking the

common property of the whole community and handing it over to
private parties for their private gain, and consequently unlawful.
Any incidental benefits to the public that might flow from it
could not support it

as

legitimate taxation.^

"Allen ®. Jay, 60 Me., 124; S. C, 11 Am. Rep., 185. See a valuable note to
In it reference is
this case by Judge Redfidd, 13 Am. Law Reg., N. S.,,493.
made to the recent case of Lowell ■». Boston, 111 Mass., 454, as follows:
"The foregoing opinion and the still more recent decision of the supreme
judicial court of Massachusetts, in the case of Lowell v. The City of Boston,
justify the expectation that some limits will hereafter be placed to
the power of interested parties through the legislature to carry forward private
The case of Boston grew out of an act of
e7iterprises by means of taxation.
the legislature, at a special session called largely for that purpose, by which
the city was authorized to issue bonds not exceeding $20,000,000, at five per cent,
interest when payable in gold, or six per cent, if payable in currency ; the
avails of these bonds to be loaned to the owners of land upon which buildings were destroyed by the great fire of November last. Commissioners were
seems to

appointed to manage the loan, and were required to take a first mortgage upon
the land at less than three-fourths its value, as security for the money advanced,
at seven per cent, interest.
Here there was a case where there could be no
reasonable danger of loss, and a high probability of some gain to the city by
means of the larger rate of interest paid by the borrowers than that paid by
the city. There could be no fair question either that such a proceeding would
afford great accommodation to the property owners on the burnt district,
and that it would greatly conduce to the speedy restoration of that portion of
the city, and thus naturally to the increase of the wealth and business prosperity of the city, and to some extent, to the greater convenience, accominodation and prosperity of the inhabitants of the city generally.
And still the
court, unanimously, so far as we learn, came to the conclusion that the statute
was void, and perpetually enjoined all proceedings under it." A town cannot raise money by tax to distribute among its citizens according to numbers.
Hooper

v.

Emery,

14

Me., 375, 379.

Towns cannot raise moneys for

the pur-
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There are some cases in which taxation
has been allowed for the benefit of private persons on considerations not of charity so much as of justice. Any exercise of the

Moral obligations.

powers of government is liable to cause injury to particular individuals.
When the injury is merely incidental, these individuals
have no legal claim to indemnification.
Nevertheless, it seems
eminently proper and just, in some exceptional cases, to recognize
a moral obligation resting on the public to share with the persons
injured the damage sustained ; and this can only be done by means
of taxation. All governments are accustomed to recognize and
pay equitable claims of this nature under some circumstances;
claims, for instance, for the destruction of private property in war,
and sometimes for incidental injuries occasioned by the construction of

a

public work, or for loss in performing

a

contract to con-

struct it*

in making compenlaw
remedies, but it may
sation within the strict limits of common
recognize moral or equitable obligations, such as a just mar) would

In

these cases the legislature is not confined

likely to recognize in his own affairs, whether by law required
The principle is clear, but it has sometimes been
to do so or not.
employed with considerable severity against municipal corporabe

tions in compelling them to recognize claims which appeared to
the legislature more just than to those who were required to pay
them.^

— e. g., poll taxes upon its male inpose of abating a particular class of taxes
habitants — and consequently cannot appropriate public moneys for that purpose.
' See

Cooley v. Granville, 10 Cush., 56.

Friend

v.

Gilbert,

108 Mass., 408.

This principle was carried very far

Brewster s. Syracuse, 19 N. Y., 116.
It has been decided that a municipal corporation has power to defend and
indemnify its officers where they have incurred liability in the bona fide dis-

in

charge or attempt

In Briggs

v.

their duty. See cases cited in next note.
Vt., 15, 30, Williams, Cli. J., says: "Towns must

to discharge

Whipple,

7

always indemnity the collector against any damage he may sustain, where a
recovery is had against him on account of the want of power to lay the tax, or
any illegality in granting tlie same." This is certainly the statement of a
sound principle in morals, but it is uot clear that the collector would have a
legal remedy against the town in case of its failure to indemnify.

It

was held (without discussion) in Wilkinson v. Cheatham, 43 Geo., 258,
that in providing for the removal of a county seat the legislature had power
to cause commissioners to be appointed to assess the damages suiTered by in^
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To furnish amusements to
its citizens is not one of the functions of government. But to
Anmsements and celebrations.

parks or other grounds which shall be open to
the public use and occupation for healthful recreation and enjoy-

provide public

dividuals in consequence, and

to levy a county tax to pay the same.

This was

officers who have

certainly going; a great way. On much stronger grounds
been subjected to liability in performing or in the attempt to perform public
duty, have been held justly entitled to indemnity from the public funds. Nelson B. Milford, 7 Pick., 18, 23; Hadsell «. Hancock, 3 Gray, 526; Fuller v.

id, 340; Baker v. Windham, 13 Me., 74; Pike v. Middleton, 13
431; BanBriggs v. Whipple, 6 Vt., 95; Sherman v. Carr, 8 R.
croft V. Lynnfield, 18 Pick., 566, 568. It was held in Beals v. Supervisors of
Amador, 35 Cal., 624, that the legislature, having apportioned the debts of
county on dividing
might subsequently require the payment of interest
upon it; this being only just. Also that the power was not affected by the
circumstance that
debt by assignment had become the property of an individual, who would reap the benefit of the legislation.
In Blanding v. Burr, 13 Cal., 343, 349, Field, J., speaking of case In which
for
city had been required to issue its bonds for equitable demands upon
not one of
which no legal remedy existed, says
"The question presented
power in the legislature to impose upon the corporation the payment of claims
for which no consideration has been paid, but of power to provide for claims,
meritoi-ious in their character, for which an equivalent has been received, and
from the payment of Which the corporation could only escape on strict technical grounds. That the legislature can provide for the payment of claims,
invalid in the forum of the law, but equitable and just in themselves, would
seem unquestionable.
It may become, for example, of the highest importance to
municipal corporation, that counsel should be employed to defend
its rights of property assailed by different parties, but its charter may not
confer authority to employ the counsel or to meet his charges. Professional
services, rendered under such circumstances, would not constitute
legal
would be competent for the legislacharge upon the corporation, but that
ture to authorize the payment of the charge, and the imposition of tax for
that purpose, no one will deny. Or, take
city has
still stronger case:
issued, iu pursuance of law, its bonds, the annual interest
maturing, and the
relied to pay the same have failed, and has
sources of revenue on which
no power to borrow the money within the requisite time, but individuals possessing the means come forward and, at the request of its authorities, advance
the necessary money to protect the honor and good faith of the city. A claim
for reimbursement would not, under the circumstances, in face of positive
prohibitions of the charter to raise money except in particular way, be valid
and binding, but that the legislature could authorize its payment, and the
raising of the means by taxation without trenching on any constitutional
11

278;

restrictions,

is

a

it

it

is

a

a

a

it

a

a

:

is

a

it,

a

a

it,

a

N. H.,

I.,

Groton,

clear."
is

In Guilford v. Supervisors of Chenango, 13 N. Y., 143, 149, Dcnio, J., says:
" The legislature
not confined in its appropriation of the public moneys, or
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ment is not only proper but bigbly commendable, and in large
towns may almost be said to be absolutely necessary.* The great
public parks of the world are great public blessings, in which the
poor participate with the rich, and from which they, perhaps,
How far a state or a
derive the larger share of positive benefit.
town should go in making these attractive, the legislative wisdom
must provide, and it will be likely to err but seldom in the
direction of liberality so long as careful provision is made for an
honest expenditure of public funds.'
Government sometimes provides for the celebration of important
events or eras.
Cities or towns have no authority to do this, at
least without express legislative permission.
Such are the decisions in cases where public money has been voted to celebrate
the declaration of independence, or the closing military success
in the revolutionary war.^ It is not very clear that the power
could be conferred upon them if the legislature were disposed to
do so.
in favor of individuals, to cases in which a
legal demand exists against the state. It can thus recognize claims founded in
equity and justice in the largest sense of these terms, or in gratitude or charity
restrictions, it can make appropriaIndependently of express constitutional
tions of money whenever the public ■well-being requires, or will be promoted
and
is the judge of what
for the public good. It can moreover,
by
under the power to levy taxes, apportion the public burdens among all the
particular section or potax paying citizens of the state, or among those of
well settled that the authority to raise money by the
litical division. It
exercise of the taxing power is not in conflict with the constitulional provision protecting private property from seizure. The two principles coexist in
is not difficult to distinguish between them."
the constitution, and
it

is

a

it

is

the, Slims to be raised by taxation

it,

of

In Attorney

a

pt.

is

3.

*

applied.
dle Ages, ch.

*

impatience,

a

limit beyond which taxes will not be borne without
when they appear to be called for by necessity and faithfully
But the sting of taxation
wastefulness."
Hallam's Mid-

difficult to name

1,

" It

is

'

a

'

town was held to have auGeneral v. Burrell, 30 Mich., 35,
to
its
and
hold
land for town purposes,
purchase
general power
thority under
public square.
to buy and hold

;

:

§

;

1

3

Denio, 110; Tash v. Adams, 10 Cush., 353; New Lon'Hodges V. Bufl'alo,
Allen, 319 Hood v. Lynn,
Gerry v. Stoneham,
V. Brainard, 32 Conn., 553
110.
id., 103, 107; Dillon's Mun. Corp.,
In the case last cited, the following remarks are made b}- Bigelow, Ch. J.,
" It was
regarding the force of usage in the construction of town powers
urged by the counsel for the respondents, that the appropriation in the present
don
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One of the most important functions
of government is the making provision for public roads for the
The variety of these is great, and the modes
use of the people.
No question is made
of construction and operation are different.

Highways and roads.

of the competency of the legislature to levy taxes for the common highwa}', the improved turnpike and macadamized road,
the planked or paved street, the canal, the tramway or the railway. Any or all of them may be constructed by the state, or,
under state authority, by the municipal subdivisions of the state

They may be suplimits they may be needed.^
ported and kept in repair by taxation of the state or of proper
within whose

districts, or private corporations may be invested with the franUpon
chise of constructing them and taking tolls for their use.
of
The
differences
arises.
opinion
these points, also, no question
inight be justified and sustained on tlie ground of usage. But tlie answer
to tliis argument is twofold. In the first place, there is no evidence in the
case of the existence of any such usage or custom in the towns or cities of
It is not even alleged in the answer of the respondents.
this commonwealth.
Certainly, the court cannot take judicial cognizance of it. But even if sucli
usage was alleged and proved, it would not alter the case. An unjawful
expenditure of the money of a town cannot be rendered valid by usage, howAbuses of power and violations of rights derive no
ever long continued.
A casual or occasional exercise of the power
sanction from time or ciistom.
case

by one or a few towns will not constitute a usage. It must not only be general, [reasonable and of long continuance, but, what is more important, it
must also be a custom necessary to the exercise of some corporate power, or
the enjoyment of some corporate right, or which contributes essentially to the
necessities and conveniences of the inhabitants.

The usage relied on in the
present case, if established, would not satisfy either of these last named reqnisities, which are necessary to give it validity. It is said by this court, in a
recent case, that there are many things in the management of town affairs,
which are done without objection and pass by general consent, which cannot,
when objection is made and they are brought to the test of judicial investigation, be supported as strictly legal. Sikes v. Hatfield, 13 Graj', 353. The
present case is an illustration of the truth of this remark."

In Philadelphia n. Field, 58 Penn., 320, it was held competent for the legislature to provide for the construction of a free bridge over the Schuylkill,
opposite one of the streets of Philadelphia, and to require the expense to be
The cases of Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend., 65 ;
borne by taxation of the city.
'

Norwich «. County Commissioners, 13 Pick., 60; Hingham, etc., Corporation
0. Norfolk County, 6 Allen, 353, and Board of Wardens ». Philadelphia, 42
Penn. St., 209, were cited with approval. Some of these will be referred to
hereafter.
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which are met with, regarding taxation for public conveniencies
of this nature, have principally arisen in those cases in which
the legislature has permitted or required the municipal corporations or subdivisions of the state to become stockholders in private corporations organized for the purpose of constructing them,

or to make loans or donations to such corporations in order to
assist them in their entei-prises.
On the one hand, it has been
insisted, that the state cannot subject itself and its property, as a
corporator, to the risks of a business conducted and managed in
part, perhaps mainly, by individuals for their own benefit ; and
that if it can do so in one business, because of benefits that may
flow to the public in consequence of their being supplied with
convenient facilities for travel and transportation, there is no
reason in the nature of things why it may not do so in any other
case where benefits to the public might reasonably be anticipated
in consequence of their being furnished any other valuable conveniences

or facilities.

The public, it has also been claimed,

could not be taxed in aid of such private corporations, because
the benefits anticipated fi'om them would be purely incidental,
not differing in their nature from those which might flow from
the establishment of a

mill for the manufacture of bread stuffs,

or from any other manufactory of a useful kind, or from any useful and necessary private business ; and, consequently, could not,
on the principles already stated and universally recognized as
sound, constitute any basis for taxation. On the other hand, the
argument has been, that corporations for the construction of turnpikes, canals, railroads, etc., had a duplicate nature, and were both
public and private ; that the taking of property for them was
universally recognized as being for a public use ; that the ways
they constructed or proposed to construct were quasi public highways on which the public at large were entitled to equal and
impartial accommodations, and that for all these reasons there was
a public interest in their construction which constituted them
public purposes within the meaning of the law of taxation, and
rendered the question of public assistance to them
purely of policy and not at all one of power.

a

question

The question concerns first, the power of the state, and,
ond, the power of the municipal

large is concerned,

bodies.

a large preponderance

So far

as

of decisions

the

sec-

state at

is in sup-
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port of the authority to aid these corporatioQS by an exercise of
the power to tax, and this by taliing stock in such corporations,
or by making to them loans or donations.^ As to the municipal
bodies, it is conceded that they have no such power unless it is
specially conferred by the legislature ; the general authority to
construct streets, roads and bridges not comprehending such a
case.^
It is also conceded that any special authority must be
strictly pursued, or the actioa of the municipality under it will

But when the legislature has thought proper to

be invalid.
it,

confer the power, and care has been observed to keep strictly
in the municipal action, the same cases already referred
within
to sustain the action as standing on the same ground, and as be-

ing supported by the same reasons which would support the like
action when taken by the state itself.'

nitude

is

is a

a

'

" Imprcvemcnt of coasts and harbors, and all that is necessary for the security of external commerce, must be done by the public. Internal improvements, such as roads, canals, railroads, etc., may, in general, be safely left to
individual enterprise. If they would be
profitable investment of capital,
individuals will be willing to undertake them. If they would be an unprofitable investment, both parties liad better let them alone. The only case in
which
that in which their maggovernment should assume such works
too great to be intrusted to private corporations.
"Whenever they
principles on which the expenditure should be made are

are undertaken, the

Bullock

3,

Wayland's

§

4,

the same as those which govern the expenditure of individuals."
ch.
2.
Pol. Econ., b.

5

V.

v.

;

;

State

3

=

Met. (Ky.), 171; Stokes v. Scott County, 10 Iowa, 166,
Curry,
Wapello County, 13 id., 388 La Fayette v. Cox,
Ind., 38. A
considerable number of cases in which proceedings of municipal bodies in
aid of railroads have been held to vary from the special authority, and consequently invalid, recognize and proceed upon this principle.
173

is

is

8

3

9

3

Talbot V. Dent,
B. Monr., 520; M'Clenachan v. Curwen,
Yeates, 863;
Commonwealths. McWilliams, 11 Pa. St., 61; Goddint. Crump,
Leigh, 120;
Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend., 65, and cases collected in Cooley's Const. Lim.,
In Loan Association u. Topeka, 20 Wall., 655, 660, from which lib119, note.
eral extracts have already been made, Mr. Justice Miller gives the following
condensed statement of the arguments for and against municipal aid to railroads:
"The subject of the aid voted to railroads by counties and towns
has been brought to the attention of the courts of almost every state in the
Union. It has been thoroughly discussed in those courts. It
quite true
that a preponderance of authority
to be found in favor of the proposition
that the legislatures of the states, unless restricted by some special provision
of their constitutions, may confer upon these municipal bodies the right
to take stock in corporations created to build railroads, and to lend their
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has been decided that an assessment for making and opening

a road where no road has in fact been

laid out, and where, con-

sequently, the land is the subject of private ownership, and no
highway would exist when the money was expended, would be
illegal and

void.^

It has

also been held that a city has no authority

credit to such corporations.
Also, to levy the necessary taxes on the inhabitants, and on property within their limits subject to general taxation, to enable them to pay the debts incurred. But very few of these courts have
decided this without a division among the judges of which they were composed, while others have decided against the power altogether.
" In all these cases, however, the decision has turned upon the question,
whether taxation, by which this aid was afforded to the building of railroads,
was for a public purpose. Those who came to the conclusion that it was,
held the laws for that purpose valid. Those who could not reach that con-

clusion held them void. In all the controversy, this has been the turning
point of the judgments of the courts. And it is safe to say that no court has
held debts created in aid of railroad companies, by counties or towns, valid on
any other ground than that the purpose for which the taxes were levied was
a public use, a purpose or object which it was the right and the duty of state
The argovernments to assist by money raised from the people by taxation.
gument in opposition to this power has been, that railroads built by corporations organized mainly for purposes of gain — the roads which they built being under their control and not that of the state — were private and not public
roads, and the tax assessed on the people went to swell the profits of individuals and not to the good of the state or the benefit of the public, except in a
remote and collateral way. On the other hand, it was said that roads, canals,
bridges, navigable streams, and all other highways had, in all times, been
That such channels of travel and of the carrying
matter of public concern.
business had always been established, improved and regulated by the state,
and that the railroad had not lost this character because constructed by indi-

vidual enterprise aggregated into

"We

a corporation.

view of it is not the true one,
a public nature conferred on
especially
to
such
as
the
obtain
power
right of way, their subjection
, these corporations,
and
the
lilce, which seem to justify
,' to the laws which govern common carriers,
the proposition. Of the disastrous consequences which have followed its
recognition by the courts, and which were predicted when it was first estabare not prepared to say that the latter
as there are other cliaracteristics

of

lished, there can be no doubt."

Eennebeck, 17 Me., 196 ; and see People v. Supervisors of
The same reasons would render void all subscriptions
to internal improvements which are made without any precautions to secure
the construction of the works, and which contemplate the payment of the
money or the delivery of the securities subscribed in reliance only on the
In some cases, large
good faith and business prudence of the corporators.
sums thus subscribed and
■ paid have been wholly misappropriated.
'

Philbrook

s.

Saginaw, 36 Mich., 23.
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of a bridge over a
mill race running through the center of the street, and owned by
The duty of the owners of the race to restore
private parties.
the street which they occupied to a passable condition, could not
thus be transferred to the public, or to any portion of the public.^
to

assess on

abutters upon

a street the expense

Municipal water and gas works.

The propriety and

neces-

sity of provision by taxation for a supply of water for the extinguishment of fires, and for the general use of the inhabitants of
large towns, is not disputed. Costly expenditures are sometimes
made in the construction of public works for these purposes, and
large sums are in some instances paid to corporations or individuals who furnish or contribute to furnish the public supply.^
•People

V.

Rochester, 54 N.

' Mayor of New York

507.

Bailey,

3

Denio,

433 ; West v. Bancroft,

33 Vt., 367 ;

Cabot, 38 Ga., 50; Wells v. Atlanta, 43 id., 67; Dillon's Mun. Corp.,
In Van Sicklen v. Burlington, 37 Vt., 70, 75, in
97, 371, note, 438, note.

Rome

§§

v.

Y.,

V.

it was held competent for a town in its corporate capacity to vote
for
money
procuring apparatus for the extinguishment of flres, and to aid fire
companies formed for the purpose, the following remarks are made hjIsMm,
J. : " There is no doubt that towns or municipal corporations, as well as pri■which

are limited to the exercise of such powers as are expressly
given them; that is, the inhabitants of a town cannot by a vote impose a tax,
or appropriate their funds, for objects entirely foreign to their political or municipal duties — such as to build a county jail, 10 Vt., 506; to repel the public

vate corporations,

enemies of the country, 13 Mass., 373 ; or to build a county road, 11 Pick., 396.
But when the object is within their duty and jurisdiction as a municipal corporation, they may exercise such powers as will enable them fully to discharge
the duties devolving upon them. Our statute on this subject is nearly a transcript of that of Massachusetts. In that state it is provided by statute, that
'
towns may vote money as they shall Judge necessary for the support of the

ministry, schools, the poor, and other necessary charges arising within

the

same town.'

On the question whether this latter and general clause is limited
to the objects previously specified, Ch. J. 8Mw, in the case of Willard ii. Newburyport, 13 Pick., 230, observed, ' that it seems very clear that this statement
was not intended to be an enumeration of objects and purposes for which
towns may raise money, but the expression of a few prominent objects by
way of instance, and a general reference to others, under the term of other
On the same construction, the general words in our act,
necessary charges.'
that money may be voted ' for the prosecution and defense of their common
rights and interests, and for all other necessary and incidental charges,'
must not be limited to the objects specially mentioned in that act, but will
be extended to other matters that fall within their rights and duties. It has
always been found diflicult to define the limits within which towns may act,

or give any definite rules by which we may ascertain when their votes will.
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Cities may also be authorized to construct gas works in order to
furnish their citizens with light, as well as to supply the- corporate
needs/ or they may be empowered to contract for the corporate

The more common
wants with private corporations or persons.^
for
which towns and cities customarily levy taxes we pass
objects
over

as not

requiring enumeration.'

Military bounties.

The general government having author-

ity to declare war and conduct warlike operations, no question

J.

'
Sliaw observed, that perhaps no better approximation to an exact description can be made, than to say that it embraces that
large class of miscellaneous subjects affecting the accommodation and conve-

be deemed illegal.

Ch.

nience of the inhabitants, which have been placed under the municipal jurisdiction of towns by statute or usage.' "
' See "Western

Saving Fund Society v. Philadelphia,

31

Pa.

St., 175 ; Same ».

Same, id., 185.
= See

A

Wilson

v.

La Porte,

33

Ind.,

258.

for ringing the bell,
is prima facie not a town purpose, but it may be shown by the vote to levy it
to be such, by showing that it is to be done as compensation for the use of the
Woodbury «. Hamilton, 6 Pick., 101. A
meeting house for town purposes.
town may appropriate money for the repair of a fire engine used by the town
but owned by individuals. Allen v. Taunton, 19 id., 485. And for the repair and regulation of clocks used for the benefit of the citizens of the town
Willard v. Newburyport, 12 id., 227.
generally.
To what extent municipal corporations may be legally justified by their
general grant of power in levying taxes to defray the expense of procuring
legislation for their benefit, has in some cases been made a question. The
bounds of such authority, must, it is conceived, be very much restricted.
Probably no case which comes within the principle of the early Rhode Island
tax to raise for Mr. Boger Williams £100, to remunerate him for obtaining
the colonial charter (Arnold's Rhode Island, vol. 1 p. 205) would be quesSome attention to the interests of a local community at the state captioned.
ital is frequently essential, and no reason is apparent why the expense may
not be considered a proper municipal charge. See Bachelder v. Epping, 8'
Post., 354. Compare Frankfort ». Winterport, 54 Me., 250. But lolhy servicesare services a municipality has no right to employ and no power to pay.
The
practice is immoral and corrupting, and will not be tolerated in the law. The
subject is fully and satisfactorily considered and discussed by Chapman, J.,
in Frost ». Belmont, 6 Allen, 152, who in denying the right of a town to pay
for lobby services in procuring its charter, cites with approval the cases of
Pingrey «. Washburn, 1 Aiken, 264; Gulick ®. Ward, 10 N. J., 87; Wood -o.
MoCann, 6 Dana, 366 ; Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 W. & S., 315 ; Harris o. Roof,
10 Barb., 489; Sedgwick v. Stanton, 14 N. Y., 289; Fuller v. Dame, 18 Pick.,
473. And sec Hatzfleld d. Golden, 7 "Watts, 182.
5

tax to repair a meeting house, and to pay the sexton
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in order to pay bounties for

The several states may
military services performed or promised.
with as little question do the same. But it is no part of the
duty of a township, city or county, as such, to raise men or
money for warlike operations ; and under the general grant of
municipal powers, they are without authority to impose upon
their people any burden by way of taxation for any such purpose.^

No reason is perceived, however, which should preclude

them, under tie proper legislative sanction, from devoting their
funds to this purpose to any extent that may be necessary to enable them to secure a voluntary performance of any duty which

may rest upon their inhabitants to contribute their proportion to
the public defense.
And so are the authorities. The several
divisions of the state, under proper enabling legislation, may promise and pay bounties to those who will volunteer
to fill any call made upon their people for their proportionate
municipal

contribution to the public armies in time of actual or threatened
hostilities.' They may also pay bounties to those who have voluntarily entered the public service from or

as representing

their lo-

' Stetson «.

Kempton, 13 Mass., 272; Gove «. Epping, 41 N. H., 539, 545;
Hopkinton, 45 id., 9; Baldwins. North Brandford, 32 Conn., 47;
Webster D. Harwinton, id., 131; Cover «. Baytown, 12 Minn., 124; Petersburg
V. Moss, 52 Penn. St., 448; Meek«. Bayard, 53 id., 217; Fiske v. Hazzard, 7 R
I., 438; People v. Supervisors of Columbia, 43 N. Y., 130; Alley v. Edgecombe, 53 Me., 446; Wahlschlager v. Liberty, 23 Wis., 362; Wilson v. Buckman, 13 Minn., 441 ; Dillon on Mun. Corp., 103. Furnishing a uniform for a
voluntary military company is not witliin the compass of " town charges."
Claflin V. Hopkinton, 4 Gray, 502.
Crowell

'

t).

50 Pa. St., 150, 159 ; Waldo v. Portland, 83 Conn,,
Bartholomew ■». Harwinton, id., 408 ; Fowler v. Danvers, 8 Allen, 80 ;
Lowell V. Oliver, id., 147; Cass v. Dillon, 16 Ohio St., 38; Opinions of Judges,
52 Me., 590, 595 ; Washington
County v. Berwick, 56 Pa. St., 466. Where the
municipality has taken action for the payment of such bounties in advance
of legislative authority, it may be conferred retrospectively.
Booth «. Woodbury, 32 Conn., 118 ; Crowell v. Hopkinton, 45 N. H., 9 ; Shackleford v. New.
ington, 46 id., 415; Ahl v. Gleim, 52 Pa. St., 432; Weister «. Hade, id., 474;
Grim v. School District, 57 id., 483 ; CoflFman v. Keightly, 24 Ind., .509 ; Board
of Commissioners v. Bearss, 25 id., 110 ; Comer v. Folsom, 13 Minn., 219 ; State
«. Demorest, 32 N. J., 538; Taylor d. Thompson,
42 111., 9; Barbour ?;. CamHolden,
55 id., 572; Burnham v. Chelsea, 43 Vt., 60;
den, 51 Me., 608; Hart v.
Butler V. Putney, id., 481 ; Lowell v Oliver, 8 Allen, 247.

Speer v. School Directors,

363 ;
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caHty in advance of any such promise.* And they may raise moneys by tax in order to refund to individuals any sums advanced
by them to relieve the municipality from a draft, or to fill its
quota of a call, on an understanding, based upon informal corporate action, that the sums should be refunded when
assigned

legislation could be had. permitting it,' and perhaps also where the
advancements were made without any such informal action.^ But
they cannot be empowered to refund to individuals sums which
such individuals may have paid in order to procure substitutes
in military service, for themselves as individuals, in an impendSuch payments being made by the parties in their
ing draft.
own interest, the repayment of them by the public could be nothing else than an appropriation of public moneys to a private
purpose.*

It

The public health.

is not doubted that the preservation

of the public health is a public purpose of prime importance.
Sanitary regulations are indispensable in large towns, but they
The right to provide for drainmay be made for every locality.
ing low lands for the purpose is well settled,' and the right to
protect low lands from overflow may also be justified on the same
reasons.
See also Freeland
«. Milwaukee, 19 Wis., 834, 853.
Allen, 570; Cass v. Dillon, 16 Ohio St., 38; State ». Richland,
Veazie v. China, 50 Me., 518; Kunkle v. Franklin, 13 Minn., 127.
> Brodhead

v. Hastings,

10

2

v. Hadre, 52 Pa. St., 474.

"Weister

See

People

v.

Sullivan,

20 id.. 382;

43 111., 412, 413 ;

Campbell, 49 id., 316 ; Susquehanna Depot v. Barry, 61 Pa. St., 317.
Compare Gregg «. Jamison, 55 id., 468.

Johnson
»

See

-b.

Kelley

v.

Hilbish

Marshall,

Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen, 570, 585.
Micheltree a.Sweezey, 70 id., 278;
Harris,17 Id., 608; Perkins v. Milford,

69 Pa. St., 319 ;

v. Catherman, 64

Pa.

St., 154;

Cass B.Dillon, 16 Ohio St., 38; State®.
59 Me., 315.
■•
Freeland v.

See also

9.

Pease

».

Hastings, 10 Allen, 570

Crowell

Chicago,

v.

Hopkinton,

21 111., 500, 308 ;

Westminster, 97 Mass., 334
shall, 69 Pa. St., 319

;

;

Usher

Perkins

v.

59 id., 545 ; Cover v. Baytown, 12

Tyson «. School Directors,
N. H., 9 ; Miller v. Grandy,
Ferguson ». Landraw, 5 Bush,
;

45

v.

315 ;

Penn. St.,

Mich.

540 ;

230 ; Estey ®.

Kelley ii. MarThompson d. Pittston

Colchester, 38 Conn., 547

Milford, 59 Me.,
Minn., 124.

51
13

;

Woodruff 1). Fisher, 17 Barb., 234; Hartwell v. Armstrong, 19 id., 166;
Anderson ». Kerns Draining Co., 14 Ind., 199, 203; Draining Company Case,
11 La. An., 338; Sessions v. Crunkilton, 20 Ohio, N. S., 347, 349.
»
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Under the head of calami-

Protection against calamities.

ties against which the government should or might make provision
for protection, may be mentioned fires, the overflow of the coun-

try by great freshets, the washing away of the shores of the sea, or
the banks of rivers in populous districts, destruction of persons or
property by wild beasts, and the like. If the danger is sufficiently
great and extensive to make

the threatened

general concern, the purpose is

calamity

a matter of

public; if not, it will not justify

taxation.

Payment of the public debt.

For whatever purposes taxes
The converse of
may be laid, government may contract debts.
this is equally true, that for whatever purposes debts may be conIt follows that the payment of the
tracted, taxes may be laid.
public debt is always a public purpose, not only because of the
importance of meeting the public engagements, but also because
for public purposes.
But
the debts themselves were contracted
an unlawful debt is no debt at all.

If

it has been contracted in

violation of law or of the constitution, and for any other than a
public purpose, it cannot be a public purpose to make provision
for its payment.
The purpose must be determined by the consideration for the debt, and not by the fact that public officials have
unwarrantably assumed to contract it.^

Exclusiveness of public interest.

The purposes

to be ac-

complished by taxation need aot be exclusively public in order
There are sometimes cases
to warrant an exercise of the power.
in which the public have equally with private parties an interest,
and in which, therefore, an apportionment of the burden between
the public and such individuals might be appropriate.

In

such

public interest may properly invoke legislative action
for the levy of a tax ; and the legislative determination as to the
just proportion to be borne by the public must be conclusive, so
cases the

public are concerned.' Cases in illustration
might be suggested of a building for the common use of the public authorities and of private parties, and of a way for the use of
far at least

as the

the public, but
■See

Nougues

» See

Eddy

207.

v.

«.

in which individuals
Douglass,

Wilson.

43

7

Vt.,

have such a peculiar and

Cal., 65, 75.
363.

Compare Greenbanks v. Boutwell, 43 id.,
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special interest that the public authorities may decline to do more

than to share with such parties the expense of the way. Taxation in these cases has relation to the public interest only, and
the fact of private interest in the same object is an incidental circumstance of no legal importance.

LAW OF TAXATION.

104

[CH V.

CHAPTEE V.
THE PURPOSE MUST PERTAIN TO THE DISTRICT TAXED.
The general rule.

It

has been seen that

it is essential in tax-

ation that the purpose for which contributions are demanded from
It is also equally esthe people shall be public in its nature.
sential that this purpose should be one which in an especial manner pertains to the district within which it is proposed that the
contribution shall be collected.
pressed

The general idea has been ex-

in the preceding chapter, but^the subject seems to require

a more particular consideration.

If

a single township were to be required to levy upon its inhab-

itants and collect and pay over to the state whatever moneys were
necessary to pay the salaries of the several state officers, it would
" at
be
blush," that the enactment was not one
apparent

[first

which, either in its purpose or tendency, was calculated to make
the taxpayers of that township contribute only their several proportions to the public purpose for which the tax was to be levied.

If,

on the other hand, for the purpose of purchasing

and orna-

city park or any other improvement of mere local contax should be imposed iipon the whole state, it would
venience,
be equally manifest that equality and justice were not the purpose of the imposition, but that, if carried into effect, the people
of the state not residing in the city would be compelled to conmenting

a

a

tribute to

purpose in which, in

legal sense, they had no intersupposed are extreme cases, but the
would
which
principle
govern them is universal, and the occasions
est

'"

a

whatever.^

The

a

cases

If the legislature

should arbitrarily designate a certain class of persons on
whom to impose a tax either for general purposes or for a local object of a
public nature, without any reference to any rule of proportion whatever, having no regard to the share of public charges which each ought to pay relatively to that borne by all others, or to any supposed peculiar benefit or profit
which would accrue to those made subject to the tax which would not enure
to others, so that in eflfect the burden would fall on those who had been selected only for the reason that they might be made subject to the tax, we cannot
doubt that the imposition of it would be an unlawful exercise of power, not warranted by the constitution, against the exercise of which a person aggrieved,
Bigelow, Ch. J., in Dorgan v. Boston, 13 Allen, 223,
might sue for protection."
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for its application are not infrequent. Briefly stated, the principle
is this : The burden of a tax must be made to rest upon the
state at large, or upon any particular district of the state, according as the purpose for which it is levied is of general concern to
the whole state, or, on the other hand, pertains only to the partic-

ular district.

A

state purpose must be accomplished by state

taxation, a county purpose by county taxation, or a public purThis
pose for any inferior district by taxation of such district.
is not only just, but it is essential.
To any extent that one man
is compelled to pay in order to relieve others of a public burden
properly resting upon them, his property is taken for private purpalpably as it would be if appropriated to
the payment of the debts or the discharge of obligations, which
the person thus relieved by- his payments might owe to private
"By taxation," it is said in a leading case, "is meant a
parties.^
poses, as

plainly and

as

certain mode of raising revenue for a public purpose in which the
An act of the legislature
community that pays it has an interest.
authorizing contributions to be levied for a mere private purpose, or for a purpose which, though it be public, is one in which
the people from whom they are exacted have no interest, would
not be a law, but

commanding the periodical payment
of certain sums by one portion or class of people to another."^
237.

a sentence

The following remarks

adelphia,

65 Penn.

I

St., 146,

are made by Sharswood,
151 :

" There

J., in

Hammett

«.

Phil-

is no case to be found in this

believe after a thorough research, in any other, with limitations
in the constitution or without them, in which it has been held that the legislature, by virtue merely of its general powers, can levy or authorize a municipality to levy a local tax for general purposes. * * *
" It may be shown logically, and that without difficulty, that such a doctrine
lands us in this absurd proposition : that the whole expenses of government,
general and local, maybe laid upon the shoulders of one man if one could be
A. conclusion so monstrous shows that the
found able to bear such a burden.
premises must be wrong. Such a measure would not be taxation but confiscastate, nor, as

tion."
'Lexington «>.McQuillan's Heirs, 9 Dana, 513; Howell b. Bristol, 8 Bush,
Wells v. Weston, 23 Mo., 384; Gilman v. Sheboygan, 3 Black, 578;
23 Wis., 660; Madison County ». People, 58 111., 456; Bright
Haben,
B.
State
V. McCullough, 37 Ind., 223; Knowlton «. Rock County, 9 Wis., 410; Halei-.
Kenosha, 39 id., 599; Sleight v. People, Sup. Ct. 111., 1875; 7 Chicago Legal
I

493, 497;

News, 392.

'Black, Ch.

J., in

Sharpless

v.

Philadelphia,

31

Pa. St.,

147, 174:

"

It

is of
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is,

This very forcible statement of the general doctrine has met with
universal acceptance and approval, because it is as sound in mor" To tax
als as it is in law.
occupations outside of the city," it is
said in another case, "for the benefit of those living in the city, is
in eSect taking the property of the citizen for private use ; that

is

^

a

it

a

particular community of which the outside citizen
be called
tax, or the appropriation
forms no part.
"Whether
of property, the result
precisely the same."

for the use of

a

is

Instances of violation of the rule. The cases in which so
rule
likely to be disregarded will naturally be those in
plain

is

which doubt might exist whether the circumstances were such as
Cases of highways afford some illusto warrant its application.
tration. In the northern and western states, the cost of these

is

a

it
is

not surprising to find
usually borne by the towns, and
general impression prevailing in some quarters, that the towns must
always bear it. But there
probably no state that does not pro-

;

vide for highways of more general importance than the ordinary
town ways highways that are very properly called and treated
as state or county roads, and which are made and kept in repair

of

part

it

cannot tax itself for the purposes of the road, except as
the larger district to which
belongs.*

a

is

a

In such case,
by an expenditure of state or county moneys.
the stale or the county
the proper taxing district, and the town

the essence of all taxation, that

it

it

a

;

it

should compel the discharge of the burden
those
whom
rests
and
if the state should attempt to compel anyupon
by
single county by taxation to pay the salaries of the state officers, or the expenses of the legislature, no one would for
moment doubt that while the act
was arbitrary, unjust and tyrannical,
was also unconstitutional." Eyer-

Utley, 16 Mich., 269, 276. See Washington Avenue, 69 Pa. St., 352; S.
Am. Rep., 255 Lexington v. McQuillan's Heirs,
Dana, 513, 516, per
Rolertion, Ch. J. Weber ■».Reinhard, 73 Pa. St., 870, 373, per Sharswood,
J. Sanborn ii. Rice, Minn., 273.
;

9

V.

;

9

;

C.

8

son

its limits but near

lice purposes.

it,

a

6

;

'

Adams, J., in St. Charles v. Nolle, 51 Mo., 123 S. C. 11 Am. Rep., 440.
Contrast with this the case of Falmouth v. Watson,
Bush, 661; in which litown on those selling intoxicating drinks outside
cense fees imposed by
were sustained as being imposed, partly at least, for poLanghorne v. Robinson, 20 Grat., 661.

See also

a

a

1

»

People V. Supervisors of Dutchess,
Hill, 50. In this case, the board of
supervisors undertook to require two towns to raise town taxes for
bridge,
which, under tlie law, was
charge upon the county.
Parsons v. Goshen, 11
Pick., 396. This differs from the last in that here the town voluntarily as.
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A

case equally plain would be that of a single locality assuming to tax itself, or the state assuming to compel it to tax, for the
construction of a state work, or the erection of a state public

The right to impose an exceptional portion of the burden on the locality where such a work is to be constructed or
building erected, on the ground that it receives special and pecuIt is not of
liar benefits therefrom, will be considered elsewhere.
building.

that we speak in this place ; but of the right of a town to assume,
or of the state to compel it to assume, as a town charge, the burden of that which unquestionably should rest upon the state, and
It is manifest
which in a legal sense concerns the state alone.
there can be no such right so long as taxation is laid on general
rules, and not at the arbitrary caprice of legislative bodies.''

principle of assessments by
benefits is resorted to for improvements which commonly are conIn no part of
structed by an expenditure of the ordinary taxes.
the law of taxation has the practice of our state governments left
the discretion of the legislature more entirely unfettered than in
More difficult

cases arise where the

laying and apportioning such assessments, and the case must be
sumeii to tax itself for the construction

of

a road, the expense

of which was

In neither of these cases was any question
by law to he borne by the county.
at issue regarding the power of the legislature to impose an exceptional portion of the expense upon towns specially benefited. The legislature made
the burden wholly a county charge, and the county in the one case and the
town in the other, assumed to set aside the legislation and substitute a rule

of

its own.
1 See

case

v. TJtley, 16

Ryerson

latter case

will

Mich.,

269 ; State v. Haben,

be referred to more at length hereafter.

of Livingston County

«. Wieder, recently

of Illinois, and to be found in
N. J., 352, the case was this : A city

It

22

Wis.,

660.

This

is supported by the

decided by the supreme court

In

Bergen v. Clarkson, 6
was partly in the two counties of Midcity tax was voted to purchase of Middlesex county
64 111., 427.

dlesex and Somerset. A
an interest in the court house for the purpose of accommodating the corpora" The money thus raised and
;
tion with public buildings. Kinsey, Ch.

J.

was not applied to the exigencies of the city ; it was raised
had no legal existence, and appropriated as a mere gift to
which
for a purpose
The effect therefore was to compel the inhabitants of the corporthe county.
thus appropriated

ation residing on the Somerset side of the city, who had to build and maintain
a court house of their own, to assist in defraying the expenses of the public

The tax was consequently illegal. The case
buildings of another county."
Co.
Sup.
People,
1875, 7 Chi. Leg. News, 292, presented a
111.,
of Sleights.
and
was
decided
the
same way.
similar question,

108

LAW OF TAXATION.

[CH-

V,

most extraordinary and clearly exceptional to warrant any court
in declaring that the discretion has been abused, and the legisla-

tive authority exceeded.
In Pennsylvania, it has been decided
that a case of clear abuse existed in an act imposing a special assessment upon the premises fronting on a county road, and others
lying within a certain distance therefrom, for the purpose of constructing the road on a very costly plan, not, as the court found,
for the local, but for the general

The act, consepublic benefit
It must be conceded that this

quently, was adjudged void.^
legislative application of the law of special assessment was oE very
questionable propriety, and the conclusion of the court was doubt-

it leaves us in great doubt touching the
exact bounds of the legislative discretionary authority in this

less just, notwithstanding
regard.'*

Taxing districts in general.

The cases which have been

instanced show that the nature of the object to be accomplished
will, in many cases, determine the district within which the tax
But, in other cases, there may be
questions of fact to be examined and considerations of equity to
be weighed before the proper bounds of a taxing district can be
must be levied and collected.

fixed upon.
When a local improvement is to be made or a local
work constructed for the general public good, the general theory
of taxation would seem to require that the cost should be collected from the state at large, or, in other words, from the whole

But, as has already
public for whose benefit it is to be made.
been remarked of the common roads, it is not the custom of the
country to provide for these improvements by general taxation.
Instead of apportioning the cost of each through the state at
'

In

case

re Washington Avenue,

of People

Springwells,

v.

69
25

Penn. St., 353; S. C, 8 Am. Rep., 255. The
Mich., 1E3, in its main facts hears some re-

The legislature proposed to assess upon a townscmhlance to the foregoing.
ship the expense of a costly road, which was to he constructed by state agenls
under state authority, and taken out of the control of the local officers. The
act was adjudged invalid on the ground that by the constitution the state was
forbidden to engage in internal improvements, and the towns were given control of these local works, and of the expenditure of their moneys therefor.

' People

V. Plagg, 46 N. Y.,
Washington Avenue. It was

expensive road.
Shaw V. Dennis,

a ease

See also People v.
5

Gilm.,

405.

usefully be compared with the case of
of compulsory town taxation for a like
Supervisors of Richmond, 20 N. Y., 252 ;

401, may
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it lias been found more satisfactory and more consistent

with the general system of local government, that the works
should be apportioned for construction
divisions of the state in which they respectively are
structed, and that each division should be left to bear
that which falls within it. The advantages of this
themselves

among the
to be conthe cost of
system

ars

obvious.

Presumptively the cost of these works is apportioned
through the state as equally and justly in this mode as by
Moreover,
spreading the cost of all among the whole people.
when each community is thus taxed for those works only which
are constructed in the immediate vicinity, and the importance of
which its members may be supposed to feel and appreciate, it is
to expect that they

reasonable

will bear the cost more willingly

and cheerfully than they would their proportion of a work at a
distance, of the necessity of which they could know nothing
except by report, and the construction of which they might
attribute to local and personal considerations. These are not the
only reasons for leaving highways and other public works of a
similar nature to be constructed by the local divisions of the state
only. Such a course has been found conducive to economy in
expenditure, because the community upon wham the whole cost
falls have the opportunity, and will be certain to have the disposition, to watch with reasonable jealousy in order to see that

nothing is wasted and nothing is plundered. At the same time,
as all local improvements tend to confer special and peculiar
benefits upon the local community beyond what are received by
the state at large, the people thus immediately and specially bene-

fited may generally be relied upon to make liberal appropriations
for the public works which are to add to the comforts, conveniences, and, perhaps, the adornment of their neighborhood,
because the very moneys they thus vote appear to return to them
in the increased value which the expenditure confers upon their

It

is found to be

apportionment of the cost of
public highways which leaves each separate division of the state,
either town or county, to defray that which is to be expended
within its limits.
estates.

a wise

of public works, however, which by general
consent are not regarded as being general in their nature, though
As an illusthe use thereof may be open to the general public.
There is

a class
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tration may be taken the case of, the pavement of a city street
The street itself is a public highway, but the necessity for a
heavy expenditure in paving arises from causes that are purely
Moreover, in large cities, the pavement becomes absolutely
essential, and must be made by the owners of adjoining property,
if not provided for by the public. The ability to make profitand they might, perable use of their property depends upon
it,

local.

if,

it

if

all
at their own expense,
and
when
individual
property was improved and occupied;
action was relied upon, there was any method of insuring uniformity of action in the time, manner and expense of improving
haps, be safely left to provide for

The necessity, however, for public supervision and

the streets.

manifestly imperative, and the necessity for making
the improvement
local burden
almost equally imperative,
a

is

is

direction

was specially important to

few persons only.
a

street may
city work, the expense of paving
be levied upon the whole city, or
system of apportionment may
be resorted to, analogous to that which
adopted in the con-

is

a

as

a

Considered

a

is

it

not to be supposed that the state at large would understand and appreciate the absolute need of an improvement which
since

is

;

struction and working of highways in general
that
to say, the
cost of any such work may be assessed upon that part of the city
which receives peculiar benefits from it.
The latter method
a

it,

a

would require either
division of the city into taxing districts
for the several local improvements within
or the creation of
district
for
each
special taxing
improvement, setting apart for the
purpose that portion of the city which was believed to receive
the special benefits.
These special taxing districts are most common, and they are either fixed after an examination of the

is

main,

it

it

a

circumstances of each particular case with
view to ascertaining
how far the special benefits extend, and what property shares in
them, or they are determined by some general rule which, though
may not be strictly just in any particular case, will, in the
supposed, apportion

all such expenses with reasonable

equality and fairness.

purely

a

the taxing district for any particular burden

is

it,

Establishment of districts.
"When the nature of the case
fix
the
does not conclusively
power to determine what shall be
legislative
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or controlled, except as it
Eefermay be limited or restrained by constitutional provisions.
ence to the cases cited in the margin will show that this is a principle which the courts assert with great unanimity and clearness.'
" The judicial tribunals," it has justly been said, " cannot interfere
with the legislative discretion, however onerous it may be." * And
power, and not to be interfered with

when it was objected that a certain construction of a statute would
throw upon one locality the expense of constructing a road for
" the conclusive answer " was declared to be " that
state
purposes,

the state may impose such a burden where, in the wisdom of the

legislature, it is considered

that it ought to rest."

*

The right to

Brooklyn, 4 N. Y.,419, 425; Shaw v. Dennis, 5 Gilm., 405, 416,
Philadelphia ». Field, 58Penn. St., 320; Langhorne v. Robinson,20 Grat, 601 ; ConwcU v. Connersville,
8 Ind., 358 ; Malchus v. Highlands, 4
Bush, 547; Challis «. Parker, 11 Kansas, 394; Hingham, etc., Turnpike i).
Norfolk County, 6 Allen, 353 and cases cited. In Howell v. Buffalo, 37 N. Y.,
267, 273, Parker, J., speaking of the legislative power over special assessments,
"
says : The legislature was not bound to apportion the tax among the taxable
persons within the city, but might, according to its own view of justice and
right, apportion the whole tax among a part of such persons. It saw fit to
apportion the tax upon the owners of the lands which had been benefited by
the improvement, in proportion to the amount of such benefit. As it is impossible, under the doctrine adverted to, to say that it had not the constitutional
power so to do, so it can scarcely be contended that, in so doing, it violated
any principle of justice or right." Where lands constituting one parcel are situate in two townships or counties, they may under general legislation be made
taxable in the one in which the owner or occupant has his domicile. Savmders V. Springstein, 4 Wend., 429 ; Hairston v. Stinsou, 18 Ired., 479 ; Ellis v.
Hall, 19 Penn. St., 292. But this mode of assessment cannot be claimed as a,
right by the owner. And assessment of the separate parts in the counties,
etc., in which they lie, is not bad as to either for want of jurisdiction.
Patton
V. Long, 68 Penn. St., 260.
'People

perOaton,

V.

J.;

^Banney, J., Scoville «. Cleveland, 1 Ohio, N. S., 126, 138. The same judge
in Hill «. Higdon, 5 Ohio, N. S., 248, 245, after speaking of former decisions
*
*
in the same state says : " It was there shown
that the right to
a
purpose necessarily included the power to determine the
tax for such
extent, and upon what property the tax should be levied ; and that its imposition upon the property particularly and specially benefited by the improvement, was but a lawful exercise of the discretion with which the legislative
body was invested, in apportioning the tax." " We see," he says further on,
"no reason to doubt the correctness of these conclusions." See also what is
said by Bapallo, J., in Gordon v. Cornes, 47 N. Y., 608, 611. Also Allen v.
Drew, 44 Vt., 174, 187; Alcorn v. Hamer, 38 Miss., 662, 761.
* Johnson,

Ch.

J., in People

e.

Supervisors

of Richmond,

20

N. Y.,

253, 255.
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do this where the constitution has interposed no obstacles is declared to be not now open to controversy, if indeed it ever was.^
The legislature judges finally and conclusively upon all questions
of policy, as it may also upon all questions of fact which are
involved in the determination of a taxing district.^
And having the authority to determine what shall be the taxing districts, the legislature must also be left to its own methods
of reaching the conclusion.

Most cases

will

be settled by general

See to the same effect, Shaw v. Dennis, 5 Gilm., 405. The case was one in
■which the legislature had required the levy of a special tax upon the taxable
property of a single precinct for the purpose of repairing and maintaining a
bridge over the Eock river at that place. The court declared the act valid,
and that it was always in the power of the legislature to determine the district
in which a tax shall be levied. See also Philadelphia v. Field, 58 Pa. St., 326 ;
Waterville v. Konnebeck Co., 59 Me., 80.

J.

That the legislature
'People «. Lawrence, 41 N. Y., 137, 141, per Mason,
may establish taxing districts independent of county or township, or boundaries of political subdivisions, see Malchus v. Highlands, 4 Bush, 547; Shelby
Co. ■».Railroad Co., 5 Bush, 225; Shawc. Dennis, 5 Gilm., 405, 416; People
V.

Hawes,

34 Barb.,

' Litclifield

69.

See also the next page.

Vernon, 41 N. Y., 123, 133. This was a very peculiar case of
Ormer, J., states it thus :
district for a local improvement.
" An examination of the case shows tliat, at the time of the passage of the act,
the Long Island Railroad Company had the right of way in a tunnel constructed in Atlantic street, Brooklyn, for a railroad operated by steam, and
were operating their road thereon ; that the legislature deemed ii expedient to
close the tunnel, grade the street, lay a track upon the surface to be operated
by horse power, etc., and to authorize the making of a contract with the railroad company for doing the work and effecting the changes for a, sum not
To carry into effect this design, the act in question was
exceeding $125,000.
passed, authorizing the commissioners, whose appointment was provided for
in the act, to make the contract, and to make an assessment for the. payment
of the contract price, together with the incidental expenses, upon the lands
and premises situate in the district specified in the act. This local assessment
for those purposes, it is apparent, was based upon the ground that the territory
subjected thereto would be benefited by the work and change in question.
Whether so benefited or not, and whether the assessment of the expense
should for this, or any other reason, be made upon the district, the legislature
was the exclusive judge." See also Hoyt v. East Saginaw, 19 Mich., 89, 43.
In Kansas it is held that where several streets are to be improved, it is competent to make one district of them all, and apportion the expense by frontage
along them all. Parker ». Challis, 9 Kansas, 155 ; Challis v. Parker, 11 id.,
394.
As to the assessment of railroad property in the same state, see pott,j^.
V.

a special taxing

114, note..
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but taxes for extraordinary purposes may require special
legislation, or at least may justify it. In such cases it may be
proper to enter upon such inquiries into the facts as cannot well
body of the state, whose duties are too multitudinous to admit of special investigations on a
be made directly by the legislative

hearing of evidence or on personal examination by its members.
Under such circumstances it may be proper and convenient to
refer the whole subject to the local authorities ; and this in the
case of local works or improvements is the course usually adopted.

The state does not determine whether

city shall be improved
and a tax levied therefor, but, by provision in the city charter, or
by special legislation, it refers the whole subject to the city common council, under such directions, regulations and instructions
as

a

it may be thought proper or prudent to give or impose.

The

state does not apportion the counties and towns into school districts, and order the construction of district school houses ; but
by general law submits the subject to the people specially con-

This is the general course, and it has been found to be

cerned.

the satisfactory,

and therefore the wise course.

And if

an appor-

tionment is to be made on the basis of benefits to property, the
local authorities may be and usually are empowered to refer the
assessment of benefits to officers or commissioners chosen for the
purpose, whose report, when under the provisions of the

law it

shall become final, will settle the limits of the special taxing district. These are only methods of giving effect to the legislative
authority over this subject*

Diversity of districts.
as

Taxing districts may be as numerous
The district for a
the purposes for which taxes are levied.

single highway may not be the same as that for the school house
located upon it. It is not essential that the political districts of
the state shall be the same as the taxing districts,^ but special
districts may be established

for special purposes, wholly ignoring

Brooklyn, 4 N. Y., 419, 430; Lexington v. McQuillan's Heirs, 9
Williams v. Detroit, 3 Mich., 500 ; Dorgan v. Boston, 13 Allen, 223 ;
Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N. Y, 116; Hingham, etc., Turnpike Co. v. Norfolk
County, 6 Allen, 353 ; Salem Turnpike, etc., Co. v. Essex County, 100 Mass., 383 ;
Appeal of Powers, 39 Mich., 504.
'People

Dana, 413

' People

V.

;

V.

Central

R. R. Co.,

43 Cal., 398,

In which It was decided to he
Malchus v. Highlands,

competent to divide a county into revenue districts.
8
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A

scliool district may be created of territory taken from two or more townships or counties, and the benefits of a highway, a levee or a drain may be so peculiar that justhe political divisions.

tice would require the cost to be levied' either upon part of a

township or county, or upon parts of several such subdivisions of
the state.^
The political divisions of the state are necessarily
regarded in taxation only where the tax itself is for a purpose specially pertaining to one of them in its political capacity, so that, as
already stated, the nature of the tax will determine the district.

Overlying districts.

Even when the purpose for which

a

tax

is demanded pertains to the state at large, or to one of its divisions, so that a general levy throughout the state or such division
is essential, there may be peculiar reasons why a part of the general public who are conceirned in the purpose should bear a proportion of the burden greater than that which should be borne by

A

pertinent illustration might perhaps be the case of
It would be clear,
a tax for the construction of a state capitol.
should
be
such
a
tax
we should say, that
spread over the state at
the others.

large, because the purpose is a state purpose, and every individual

C,

Withrow'a Corp. Cas., 361, in which an act was sustained
district near Newport, with authority to grade and
macadamize
with
roclc or gravel, any public road passing through or
or
pave
vote of two-thirds the owners of real estate, by
on
a
favorable
into the same,
such
road
or through which any
may pass. See also County Judge v. Shelby
R. R. Co., 5 Bush, 225. A strong illustration of legislative power in establishing districts is afforded when several streets are put into one district for
the purposes of improvement, and the cost of improving all is assessed
throughout the district; as in Challis v. Parker, 11 Kans., 394.
4 Busb,

547 ; S.

which created

' County

3

a special

Judge v. Shelby R. R. Co., 5 Bush, 325. See also People v. Draper,
Buffalo, etc., R. R. Co. v. Supervisors of Erie, 48 id., 93; Litchfield V. McComber, 42 Barb., 288, 299 ; Sangamon, etc., R. R. Co. «. Jacksonville,
14 111., 163; Bakewell «. Police Jury, 20 La. An., 384; MaTchus v. Highlands,
4 Bush, 547; Norwich v. County Commissioners,
13 Pick., 60; Brighton «.
Wilkinson, 2 Allen, 27 ; Attorney Gen'l «. Cambridge, 16 Gray^ 345 ; Salem
Turnpike, etc., Co. v. Essex County, 100 Mass., 382. In Kansas a statute for an
of railroad property as a whole, and an apportionment to the difassessment
ferent counties and townships, was sustained in Missouri River, etc., Co. v
Morris, 7 Kans., 210; Sams v. Blake, 9 id., 489; Smith v. Lea^enworth Co.,
Several states assess railroad property in a similar manner. In
9 id., 396.
railroads
can only bo taxed as an entirety and by the state. AcpleKentucky,
gate V. Ernst, 3 Bush, 648.
15

N. Y.,

533;
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But it is

also apparent that the people and the property at the place where
the structure is proposed to be constructed would receive special
and probably very great benefits

in consequence

of the construc-

tion, beyond what they would receive in common with all others.
The fact is often recognized in the voluntary contributions which
are made by the people to secure the location and construction of
state buildings

at the place where

they reside or own property

;

and the question then arises whether these peculiar benefits may
not constitute a basis for special taxation. To make them such,
it would be necessary there should be two taxing districts : the
one embracing the whole state, and the other embracing only the

district which, in the opinion of the legislature, was so peculiarly
justify an exceptional burden upon its people and

benefited as to
property.

In such

a case the people

within the minor district,

which is also embraced within the larger district, would contribute
twice to the same burden ; but this, though apparently a violation
of the principles of taxation, is not so in fact, if the establishment
of the minor district has only equality and justice in view, and if
each taxpayer, though twice called upon, is by the two assessments only required to pay what, as between himself and the rest

of the state, has been found to be his just proportion of a burden
which, though general in its^nature, distributes its benefits unequally.

This doctrine has been applied in Pennsylvania to the case of
county town, which, in addition to its proportion of the county
levy, was specially assessed for the expense of constructing a
" The
court house and jail.
advantages of a county town," it
too
"are
well
was said,
appreciated, not to make every village use
a

all its exertions to have

court house provided for its benefit and
convenience, .and as its inhabitants profited by, not only the disbursement of the tax among them, but a permanent increase of
a

their business and an appreciation of their property, they were
morally bound to contribute in proportion."'
In the state of New

York it has also been applied to a state work of public improvement, — a canal — which conferred or was likely to confer local
'

Gibson, Ch.

J., in Kirby

v. Shaw, 19 Penn. St., 258, 261,
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It

has also been applied

benefits on a locality specially taxed.^

to the case of a building erected for the accommodation of a state
educational institution.
In one case where a local tax was constructed to meet a portion of the cost of erecting at that place a
building for the state agricultural college, the principles which
underlie such cases were so clearly stated that a! quotation from
the opinion will be more satisfactory than any synopsis that might
be attempted, or any restatement in our own language.
"
It may at first sight seem," it was said, " as if the establishment
of 'a college and its endowment and support by tha commonwealth for the education of all persons within the state, who
might wish to receive instruction in certain branches of science or
art, would stand on the same footing as the public schools, and thai
money raised for such an object ought to be apportioned and distributed in such manner as to bear on all persons and property
equally, without resort to local taxation, which would operate

We are not
certain sense disproportionately.
prepared to say that this proposition is in all respects incorrect.
We doubt very much whether it would be competent for the
legislature to impose the whole burden of supporting such an in-

partially, and in

a

municipality, section or district of
But we are clear in the opinion that there may exist

stitution upon any particular
the state.

which would render it just and expedient, and
strictly within the exercise of constitutional authority, for the
legislature to enact that a portion of such a public burden should
a state

of facts

be borne by persons and estates situated within certain limits, and

If
special assessment on them for that purpose.
the establishment of a public institution of general utility or
necessity in a particular locality would be productive of direct

to authorize

a

and appreciable benefit to persons or estates

in the vicinity, either

by increasing the value of property there situated, or by the opportunities which it would afford to those residing in the neighborhood to enjoy certain common advantages and privileges, with
greater facility and at less cost than others having an equal right
to participate in them, but who reside or own estates more remote-

ly

situated,

or in distant parts of the state, we can

' Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend., 65.

^.Ala.,

399.

See also

see no reason

Harbor Commissioners

v. State,
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or benefits should not be taken into
consideration, in determining the mode in which the public burden of defrayingthe cost of the institution should be apportioned
■why

these special advantages

While perfect equality in the raising of money
for public charges is inattainable, it would certainly approximate
and distributed.

more nearly to an equitable apportionment of them, to provide

that such portion of the expenditure for a public object as will
inure directly to the benefit or profit of a certain town or district, should be borne by the estates situated and persons resident
therein, leaving only that sum to be treated as a public charge,
and to constitute a general assessment on all persons and property
in the commonwealth, which may reasonably be supposed to be
Such disexpended for the equal and common benefit of all.
of a public burden would be reasonable, because it
would tend to equality ; and it would be proportional, because it
would be borne in proportion to the benefits which each would
tribution

receive."^

A

like principle is sometimes applied to the construction and

These, as has been said, constitute
improvement of the streets.
highways for the accommodation of the general public, but are
calculated, by their improvement, to increase largely the value of

all property fronting on, or lying in the immediate vicinity of
Should the legislature determine that the cost of a street
them.
improvement should be borne in part by the whole city, and in
part by an assessment made on the basis of benefits within a district to which the improvement was exceptionally valuable, we
know of no valid objection that could be in terposed.
Whether
whole expense, the adjacent property the whole, or, on the other hand, the expense be apportioned between two districts, one of which includes the whole
city, and the other the adjacent property only, must be deterthe city

shall

' Bigelow, Ch.

bear

the

J., in Merrick v. Amlierst, 12 Allen, 498, 504. See to tlie same
Marks «. Pardue University, 37 Ind., 155 ; Gordon v. Comes, 47 N. Y.,
Every sucli special assessment must of course have express legisla608, 614.
tive authority.
It could not be made under the general power conferred upon
a municipality to levy taxes for c'orporate purposes.
This was afBrmed and
explained in Livingston County u. Welder, 64 111., 427. See also Burr «.
Carbondale, Sup. Ct. 111., 1875, 6 Chicago Legal News, 350. Also Chap.
effect,

XX.
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mined by the legislature on a consideration of all the equities
Other local city improvements may unbearing on the case.'
doubtedly be provided for in the same way.
The legislature has sometimes applied the same doctrine to the
case of general city taxation ; constituting two districts, the one,
consisting of the whole city, to be assessed equally, and the other
consisting of the more compact portions of the city, which, because
receiving a larger share of the benefits of city government, in the
protection afforded by the police and fire departments and the
like, was required to pay a greater proportionate share of the exIt is not perceived that such a case
pense of such government
difiers in principle from the other cases of overlying districts
which have been mentioned.

Nevertheless, in one

case, the power

of the legislature to discriminate in city taxation between what
may be designated the out property, and that in the parts compactly built, has been denied, on the ground that the city constituted the taxing district for city purposes, and such a discrimination would give distinct rules of taxation within the same district,

limit except the legislative discretion ; a doctrine wholly inconsistent, it was said, with
This conclusion seems to us
the constitutional idea of taxation.^
to the number of which there ccwild be no

to impose restraints on the constitutional power of the legislature
to establish taxing districts, which can hardly be justified in reason,
or by the decisions in analogous cases.
Legislation, such as was
not been uncommon in other

condemned

in the

and in some

cases, has passed the test of

case, has

judicial scrutiny.^

states,

Such

' See

Municipality «. White, 9 La. An., 446; Municipality v. Dunn, 10 Id.,
Cliicago v. Lamed, 34 111., 203 ; Ottawa v. Spencer, 40 id., 211 ; Patton v.
Springfield, 99 Mass., 627; S. C, 2 Withrow's Corp. Cas., 484.

57 ;

' Knowlton

ville

V.

of Eock County,
Ohio, N. S., 589.

v. Supervisors

Richards,

5

9

Wis.,

410, 421.

Compare Zanes-

Serrill v. Philadelphia, 38 Penn. St., 855, 358. In that case it appeared that
the legislature had provided that land within the city of Philadelphia, which
the assessors should mark " rural," should be taxed only two-thirds, and a
2 See

part of it only one-half, what others were taxed for city purposes, they being
released from the rest " because," as Woodward, J., says, " rural owners derived
no benefit from lighting, paving and cleaning streets," etc. The act was enforced without question as to its validity. And see Gillette «. Hartford, 31
Conn., 851. The cases of Henderson v. Lambert, 8 Bush, 607 ; Benoist v. St
Louis, 19 Mo., 179, and Lee v. Thomas, 49 id., 112, are all directly opposed to
the case in Wisconsin.
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legislation is sustained on the ground that it is only an equitable
apportionment of the burdens of municipal government between
those who receive a part of its benefits only, and those who participate in them all.^
A different case has been presented in some other states. City
boundaries having been extended so as to embrace the lands of
parties who insisted that their premises were agricultural lands
no benefit from the city government,
such parties sought the protection of the courts, and prayed for
injunction to restrain the imposition upon them of any tax in excess of what they would have been chargeable with had the bounda-

merely,

and would

receive

ries not been extended to embrace them.

It

is to be observed of

full

and exclusive
legislature which
authority to determine the proper bounds of the municipal divisions of the state, and also to establish the taxing districts, had
such

cases that the

has

in fixing the city boundaries without any
discrimination in the taxation of property within

proceeded to do so, and

provision for a
them, had determined that no such discrimination should or ought
The whole subject was one committed exclusively
to be made.

to the judgment and discretion of the legislature, whose members
would make inquiry into the facts in their own way, and act upon
No question could be made of the complete
their own reasons.
jurisdiction over the case, and if the action was unfair, and led to
unequal and unjust consequences, it seems difficult to suggest any
ground upon which it could be successfully assailed that would
not warrant

a

judicial review of legislative action in every case in

which parties complain of injustice and inequality.
Nevertheconsidered
less the courts have
themselves warranted in inquiring
into the facts, in order to determine whether the extension of municipal boundaries was fairljr warranted, and having in some cases
reached the conclusion that it was not, and that the extension was
made for the purpose of subjecting to taxation adjacent property
that would not receive the benefits of municipal government, and
'

In Gillette ». Hartford, 31 Conn., 321, 357, Butler, J., delivering the opinion
of the court, assumes as probable that the persons within the city limits whose
lands have been brought in by an extension of city lines, had been so brought
in on the application of the old corporation and against their own desire, and
that the discrimination in taxation in their favor was only a just protection
against inequality and unfairness.
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was not in fact urban property, they have undertaken to protect
the owners of property thus unfairly brought in, against the un-

In
equal taxation to which the legislation would expose them.
doing this they have not assumed to nullify the legislative action
in extending the municipal limits, but they have undertaken to
modify and relieve against its consequences, and to do this upon
the express ground that the motive which has influenced the legis-

lation was not legitimate.^

by very able judges, whose
opinions are always entitled to the highest respect, but it seems
Some of these decisions are made

to harmonize them with the conceded

difficult

principles govern-

ing the law of taxation. For, 1. They do not question legislation
as being in excess of legislative authority, as might be done where
are voted for a purpose not public

but they leave the
legislation to stand, and only interfere to qualify its effect, on the
ground that it has been adopted on improper grounds and will
operate unequally ; 2. This is done on an inquiry into the facts,
taxes

and
on a

;

substitution of the judicial conclusion for the legislative
subject not at all judicial ; a subject, too — the proper limits

a

— upon which persons are certain to differ
widely, and where an inquiry into the facts after the judicial
of city extension

method of an examination of witnesses

is usually much less satisfactory than that personal knowledge and investigation which
legislators are supposed to possess or to make.^
'Cheaney
Sharp's

Morfoi-d

v. Hooser, 9 B.

Ex'r
v.

Davenport,

v.

Donavan,

Monr.,

17

330; Covington «. Southgate, 15 id., 491;
id., 223; Arbegust v. Louisville, 3 Bush, 271;

Unger, 8 Iowa, 82; Langworthy v. Dubuque, 13 id., 86; Fulton v.
id., 404 ; Buell «. Ball, 20 id., 282 ; Deeds «. Sanborn, 26 id., 419 :

17

Deiman ». Fort Madison, 30 id., 543; Bradshaw v. Omaha, 1 Neb., 16. The
point is thus stated in a recent case in Kentucky : " As in ordinary cases of
taxation, in which the reciprocal benefits are deemed commensurable, so the
subjection of lands included in tlie town extension to the burden of a municipal tax is not considered an unlawful appropriation of private property to
public use, unless the legitimate object of improving the town shall have been
palpably perverted to the unauthorized purpose only of lessening the burden
of taxation on the inhabitants, who will not be otherwise benefited by the exSwift V. Newport, 7 Bush, 37, 40, per Sohertson, J.
tension."
* As to correcting
the injustice of legislative action by the judiciary in
matters of taxation, reference may be had to what is said by Gibson, Ch. J., in
Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Penn. St., 258, 361.
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Those cases in which it has

been held incompetent for a state or municipality

levy taxes

to

its limits, have generally indicated the want of jurisdiction over the subject of the tax as the
But such a burden would be inadmissible,
ground of invalidity.
also, for the further reason that, as to any property or person outon persons or property not within

side the district

in which the tax was levied, the want of legal

interest in the tax would preclude its being subjected to the burden.
A state can no more subject to its power a single person or
a single article of property whose

residence

is in

or legal situs

another state, than it can subject all the citizens or all the propThe accidental circumerty of such other state to its power.
stance that it may happen to have the means of reaching one and

i

not the rest can make no difference; there must be an interest in|
the subject matter of the tax ; there must be between the state
and the tax payer a reciprocity of duty and obligation

;

and these

in contemplation of law would be wholly wanting in the case
This is the general rule; whether it is subject to
supposed.'
In Missouri it has been held to
exceptions may be a question.
be incompetent for the legislature to empower a city to tax for

it,

and
city purposes the land outside the city but adjacent to
therefore receiving, possibly, some of the benefits of the city

7

a

'

State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 "Wall., 300. Compare Jenkins ».
Charleston, Sup. Ct., So. Car.,
town had
Chicago Legal News, 78. Where
for more than twenty years exercised jurisdiction over part of another with

2

a

tax levied within this part by such first mentioned town
its acquiescence,
Ham v. Saw3'er, 38 Me., 37, 39. And see Hughwas nevertheless held void.
But where an act sets off one town from
Horrell,
Ohio,
v.
281.
Lessee
ey's
may provide that taxes to pay existing liabilities shall be assessed
and collected in both by the existing oflScers as if the act had not been passed.
Winslow V. Morrill, 47 Me., 411. Towns cannot even by agreement establish

it

another,

5

;

the rule that each may tax lands of its residents lying in the other
there
Mass., 547. In some
being no statute permitting it. Dillingham v. Snow,

is

is

it

is

states
provided by law that, where occupied lands lie partly in two townthe mansion house, or in
ships, they may be taxed together in that in which
which the principal portion
situate. See Bausman d. Lancaster, 50 Penn.
v.

Reed, 48 Me., 386

30 id., 346; State ». Metz,

State «. Hay, 31

N. J.,

275

;

Judliins

;

208

;

St.,

Hoffman,

State «.
4

Saunders v. Springstein,
Wend., 429. Assessments upon personalty as depending upon the residence
of the owners will be considered in another chapter.
39 id., 122;
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The contrary has been held in
government and expenditures.*
Virginia, where land for half a mile outside the corporate limits was
made taxable to pay the interest of a debt contracted in aid of in-

in voting

whose people have no voice

it,

ternal improvements.'^
And in Indiana an objection to similar
legislation was put aside with very little consideration,^ less, one
would suppose, than its importance deserved. It is certainly difficult to understand how the taxation of a district can be defended

in selecting the purposes,

'

ject, and the city

is

a

a

or in expending it. A city has sometimes been allowed to exact
license fee of those engaging in the sale of intoxicating drinks
case regulation is- the principal obnear its limits, but in such
the party chiefly concerned.*

Wells V. "Weston, 22 Mo., 384, 386, approved in
And see Wilkey v. Pekin, 19 111., 160.

St. Charles v.

Kolle,

51

id.,

122.

20 Grat., 661. In this case the city of Lynchburg
tax " upon the lands, property and persons of all
persons within the town proper and corporation, and for half
mile round
about and beyond its present tax paying limits," for the purposes of aid to
v. Robinson,

a

a

to levy

a

'Langhorne

was authorized

The act was sustained in reliance upon New York
made by the judge delivering the opinion,
after referring to the undoubted right of the state to delegate tlie power of
can imagine no reason
taxation to municipal authorities, "On principle
why the power might not as well be delegated to any other persons in the
discretion of the legislature." If we understand this opinion literally,
would sustain the legislature in delegation to the city authorities of Lynchburg, or of any other favored town, of any indefinite power of taxation for
any public purpose whatever, and upon any portion of the state; the town
authorities in doing so, acting for and with the authority of the representatives
of the people chosen to the legislature.
But doubtless this was not intended.
It evident that the particular tax involved in that case was thought by the
court to be just; had
been otherwise, perhaps the principle involved
would have received further consideration.
it

is

a

it

I

cases, and the broad assertion

is

railroad corporation.

is

is

8

'

Conwell D. Connersville,
Ind., 358, 362. Damson, J., says: "The appellant, in his brief, propounds this inquiry: 'Can the appellees tax property
lying outside of the corporate limits, and within two hundred yards?' No
adduced in relation to the point involved in the inargument or authority
Hence, we are inclined to answer briefly that the act of 18<t9
terrogatory.
invests the president and trustees with full power to tax property within two
hundred yards of the corporate line. And we do not advise that that act
in conflict with the constitution."
5

•*

Falmouth v. Watson,
Bush, 660. A town cannot give its ordinance such
extra territorial effect without express authority by statute. Strauss v. Pontiac, 40 111., 301.
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purpose in respect to which a public expenditure is to be made, it is obviously not essential that the
expenditure should be within the district, nor that a public work
created by means thereof should have its situs within the district.
The district interest must be the true test whether an object is or

To give locality to

a

is not a proper object of district taxation

;

and

are had by the district, the interest is manifest.

if

the benefits

The case of city

waterworks located outside its limits is an illustration.^
'

Goddin «. Crump, 8 Leigh, 120, 155, per Tucker, President; Dentoa v.
Jackson, 2 Johns. Oh., 317, 336. But in general, specific authority would he
required to enahle a municipality to expend money outside its territorial limits for a purpose which presumptively Is not local. Thus, a town under its
general authority to vote taxes for township purposes cannot raise money to
build or repair a bridge outside. Concbrd v. Boscawen, 17 N. H., 465. Compare North Hempstead v. Hempstead, Hopk. Ch., 388; Riley •». Rochester, 9
K. Y., 64. A city may be authorized to purchase and improve a public park
outside its limits. M'Callie v. Chattanooga, 3 Head, 817.
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CHAPTEE VI.
EQUALITY AND UNIFORMITY IN TAXATION.
Eequirement of equality.

There is no imperative require-

If

ment that taxation shall be equal.

there were, the operations of

government must come to a stop, from the absolute impossibility
of fulfilling it The most casual attention to the nature and opNo single tax
eration of taxes will put this beyond question.
can be apportioned so as to be exactly just, and any combination

of taxes is likely in individual cases to increase instead of diminishing the inequality.
Theoretically, tax laws should be framed
with a view to apportioning the burdens

government so that each
person enjoying government protection shall be required to contribute so much as is his reasonable proportion, and no more.
The tax law that comes nearest to accomplishing this
in theis,

o-f

ory, the most perfect.

But to accomplish this

it

may not be requisite to require the tax-gatherer to call upon every individual,
It
and collect from him in person this reasonable proportion.
may possibly be found that the most equal and just tax can be
collected from the fewest persons.''
A tax on an article of prime
necessity, which few produce, but all use, may be collected of the
it,

producers alone without their feeling the burden beyond what
others would feel
because the tax in the natural course of business would be added

to the price of the commodity, and would

be collected by the producers from the whole community of con-

Such

a

tax would be generally distributed, and would
be wanting in equality only because of the fact that articles of
prime necessity are not consumed by different members of the
sumers.

a

community in proportion to their means or income, and therefore the poorer classes would pay more than their just proportion.
To collect all the revenues of government by tax on breadstuffs exclusively, would consequently be to compel unequal con-

■whole

popuiatifii.

4.

2,

3,

5,

1

ch.
Smith, Wealth of Nations, b.
pt.
art.
State taxes on property
collected
from
very few cersons, five to eight per cent, of the
"b" valuatioa ar"
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by means of the

A tax on an article which is purely one
necessities of the poor.
of luxury would probably be more equal, and certainly less unjust, and would be diffused with some proportion to income ; every
man would tax himself, and would
the disposition and

ability to pay.

abstain or indulge as he felt
To collect the whole revenue

an article of luxury like spirituous liquors,
might be as little liable to objection as any other method if it
were practicable, but to attempt the collection of all from one arof the state from

ticle would require a tax so heavy as to be difficult of enforcement, and which would probably defeat the purpose of the law
"We
by diminishing the consumption as the price increased.
have already

that other kinds

of taxes are open to serious
objections on the score of equality and justice. A tax on property by valuation, which seems perhaps most fair of all, is subject,
as has

seen

been shown, to difficulties which

preclude its being laid,

apportioned or collected with absolute justice.

The objections

need not be repeated here.

It

being thus manifest that there are serious and often insurmountable difficulties in the way of equal taxation, it remains to
be seen what is the rule of law where in the particular case the
On this subinequality can be pointed out and demonstrated.
The legislature
ject, certain points have already been covered.
must decide when and how and for what public purposes a tax
shall be levied, and must select the subjects of taxation. This is
legislative, and the legislative conclusion in the premises must be
It follows that a tax cannot be ataccepted as proper and final.
tacked on averment and proof that some other tax for the same
purpose would have been more just and more equal.
An excise
tax on one kind of business only is not illegal for the discrimina-

it is always to be conclusively presumed that the legislature found good and controlling reasons impelling the action it
tion

;

has taken, and that, in view of all the circumstances which were

known to its members, the tax which has been provided for is
reasonable.^
,

Very strong language has been used by the courts in some
' See

De Camp v. Eveland,

Ohio, N. S., 159,
Va., 11.

165 ;

19

Barb.,

81 ;

People «. Brooklyn, 4

Nor. Ind. R. R. Co. v. Connelly, 10
N. Y., 419 ; Lusher v. Scltes, 4 W.
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of the expressions.
The case in Pennsylvania in which the legislature allowed the
county borough to levy a tax for the erection of a court-house
and jail for the use of the county, was thought by some of its citicases,

and it may be useful to collect some

zens to be void

because unequal.

The court thought otherwise.

" there is no limitation of it.
regards taxation," say the court,
Equality of contribution is not enjoined in the bill of rights,

"As

and probably because it was known to be impracticable.
Previous to the convention of 1838, we had double taxation of tracts
of unseated lands lying foul of each other ; of lands and mortgages of them
charters

of grounds and rents issuing out of them ; of bank
and bank dividends under them, and perhaps of some
;

other things.
On the other hand, it was known that other descriptions of property had not been taxed at all. Since then, the
exigencies of the state have brought to light many new sources
of revenue, and more would have been discovered had more been

No one imagined, however,

that the inequality had
made the previous taxation unconstitutional.
" If
equality were practicable, in what branch of the government would power to enforce it reside ? Not in the judiciary,
wanted.

unless it were competent to set aside a law free from collision
with the constitution, because it seemed unjust. It could interpose only by overstepping the limits of its sphere, by arrogating
to itself a power beyond its province ; by producing intestine disby setting an example which other organs of governIt is its peculiar duty to keep
the first lines of the constitution clear, and not to stretch its powcord, and

ment might not be slow to follow.

in order to correct legislative or executive abuses. Every
branch of the government, the judiciary included, does injustice
er

'

Gihson, Ch.

J., in Kirby

v.

Shaw,

19

is

a

would be powerless for good."

'

might not,

it

and

if
it

abused

;

a

;

?

if

is

is,

for which there is no remedy, because everything human is imThe sum of the matter
that the taxing power must
perfect.
be left to that part of the government which
to exercise it.
" But what
this power were so managed as to lay the public
burthens on particular classes in ease of the rest
It illogical
to argue from an extreme case or from the abuse of
power to
negation of it. Every authority, however indispensable, maybe

Penn. St., 358, 260. "Equality of taxation,

OH.
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" Perfect
equality in the assessment of taxes," it is said in an"
is unattainable. Approximation to it is all that can be
otlier case,
Under any system of taxation, however wisely and carefully
framed, a disproportionate share of the public burdens will be
had.

thrown on certain kinds of property, because they are visible and
It is
tangible, while others are of a nature -to elude vigilance.
only where statutes are passed which impose taxes on false and
unjust principles, or operate to produce gross inequality, so that
they cannot be deemed in any just sense proportional in their
effect

on those who are to bear

the public

charges, that courts

can interpose and arrest the course of legislation by declaring such
enactments

"

void." '

Perfectly equal taxation," it has again been said, "will remain an unattainable good as long as laws and government and
man are imperfect." * " There is no provision in the constitution
maxim of taxation, means equality of sacrifice. It means apportioning the
contributions of each person towards the expenses of government, so tliat lie
shall feel neither more nor less inconvenience from his share of the payment
than every other person experiences from his.
This standard, like other
standards of perfection, cannot be completely realized."
Mill., Pol. Econ.,
b. 5, ch., 2, § 2. There is a very elaborate examination of this general subject
in Williams's Case, 3 Bland. Ch., 186, 220.
as a

Ch. J., in Commonwealth
v. Savings Bank, 5 Allen, 436, 436.
Oliver,
Allen,
Lowell
«.
8
Ould
247;
See
v Richmond, 23 Grat., 464, 473;
Howell «. Bristol, 8 Bush, 493. " Equality can never be hut appi'oximation."
Redfield, J., in Allen v. Drew, 44 Vt., 174, 186.
' Sharawood, J., in Grim v. School District, 57 Penn. St., 433, 437.
'

Bigelow,

Compare

Durach's Appeal,

People v. Worthington, 21 111., 171; Commonwealth v. N. E. Slate & Tile Co., 13 Allen, 391 ; Youngblood v. Sexton,
Sup. Ct. Mich., October term, 1875. In Coburn v. Richardson, 16 Mass., 213,
215, a tax on the lands of a nonresident for parish purposes was assailed.
Parker, Ch. J. " Numerous are the inconveniences and great is the injustice
■which may flow from this statute. But it is for the legislature alone to determine
whether these are or are not counterbalanced by any greatpublic good which
may be expected to he produced by it." In Conner ■!).Fulsom, 13 Minn., 219,
222, in which a town bounty tax was contested, on the ground that it benefited
in part another town, as in fact it did, Wilson, Ch. J., holds this language.
" It is generally true that a city, town or county, in
expending money for the
advancement of its own local interests, either directly or indirectly benefits
some other subdivision of the state.
If it builds a road or bridge, or aids in
building a railroad, or in making any other public improvement, from which
benefit to itself is expected to accrue, frequently some other subdivision ot
the state is directly and equally benefited ; but it has not been considered that
63 Penn. St., 491;
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shall be equal.
Sound policy requires that it
But perfect equality is not possishould be, so far as possible.
ble.
Indeed, if this was necessary there could be no taxation
except such as would include every person and every thing ;
*
These are
which would be manifestly impracticable and unjust."
that taxation

strong expressions,
strict accuracy.

but they do not go beyond the demands

But are there not

of

which on their face are manifestly so
to furnish conclusive evidence that equal-

cases

unequal and unjust as
ity has not been sought for but avoided; that oppression,
tice was desired, and confiscation, not taxation intended

?

not jusSuch

it surely is possible to conceive, and if such has never been
the intent of legislation, it is certain that it has sometimes been
cases

the result.

It

has already been stated that inequality

does not necessarily

follow the restricting of a tax to a few subjects only, or to a single
A license tax cannot be deemed unequal because reachsubject
ing one occupation only, if it is to reach all who "follow that. Let
it reach all of a class, either of persons or things, it matters not
whether those included in it be one or many, or whether they reside in any particular

It

locality or are scattered all over the

would be only when individuals

state.

of the class were singled out

a legal objection to an appropriation or tax for such improvement.
our constitution required absolute or perfect equality in taxation, such
objection would perhaps have to be admitted.
But perfect equality is not re.

this would be

If

All taxes
quired, nor is it possible.
in the language of the constitution.
just principles applicable

'

should

be as nearly equal as may be,'
the taxes imposed are disU'ibuted on
alike to all for whose benefit the appropriation is

If

made or intended, substantial equality is attained, and no constitutional right
invaded."
Compare People v. Whyler, 41 Cal., 351, 354, per Rhodes, J.
' Sharswood,

J., in

Weber

u.

Reinhardt,

73 Penn. St., 370, 373.

See Opinions

of Judges, 58 Me., 590 ; Loan Association o. Topeka, 20 Wall., 655, per Miller, J.
" It was justly remarked by Judge Ellsworth in Savings Bank v. New London, 20 Conn., 117, and again in Carrington ». Farmington, 21 id., 65, 72; that
Studied discriminations are made in
taxes are at best arbitrary and unequal.
all tax laws in favor of or against particular persons or subjects, or trades, cr
The character of this kind of legislation, as arbusiness, or institutions.
and capricious, is well exemplified in the recumulative
partial,
bitrary,
From
the nature of the case there can be no uniform
of
congress.
cent acts
the
assessments."
McGurdy, J., in Coite v. Society for Savings,
rule of making
33 Conn., 173, 184.
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for exemption, that the inequality would be manifest.^ To tax
all loans of money would be equal, and would enable all to adjust
their rates of interest accordingly ; but to tax all except those
made by A., B. and C, or all but those of the inhabitants of a
single city, would be unequal, and would create an invidious and
unjust distinction in favor of the excepted persons, which would
give them the advantage of higher net rates. The one would be
taxation

;

the other would be lawless exaction.

This,

as a general

principle, is undoubted.^
'Durach's Appeal, 62 Penn. St., 491, 494; Fletcher v. Oliver, 25 Ark., 289;
State V. Parker, 82 N. J., 426, 435, per Depue, J. ; Youngblood v. Sexton, Sup.
Ct. Mich., Oct. Term, 1875. In the Franklin Insurance Co. v. State, 5 W. Va.,
349, a tax of three per cent, on the premiums of insurance companies was held
void ; the constitution requiring taxation to be equal and uniform, and this
tax law applying to no other class of subjects or corporations, or to individuals.
The tax seems to have been regarded as a tax on property. Surely the
requirement of uniformity cannot make it essential that all persons or subjects
Does it mean
shall be taxed, nor that all corporations shall be taxed alike.
than
that
tax
and
shall be laid equally
uniformly
any more
any particular
upon the persons or subjects within the class taxed ? Would not a tax of one
per cent, on the net earnings of all railroad companies be equal and uniform ?
And if this is inadmissible, how can there beany equalization of taxation, as
between, for instance, the insurance company and the saloon keeper, unless
everything is brought to the standard of a property tax, in which case those
who ought to pay most would sometimes pay least? To determine whether a
tax on insurance companies alone would be unequal or unjust, it would be
necessary to look to the result. The tax, we must suppose, would go to increase the premiums, and if the community generally insured, the tax would
be generally distributed
through the community, and would be paid in proportion to the protection received. See Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 13 Grat.,
In State v. Charleston, 12 Kich., 702, 732,
767 ; Carter v. Dow, 16 Wis., 298.
Dunkin, Chancellor, says : " Essential characteristics of any system of taxation,
properly so called, are certainty, equality, universality. All the persons or
property within a state, district, city or other fraction of territory having a
local sovereignty for the purpose of taxation, should, as a general rule, constitute the basis for taxation."
Like language is made use of by Tuck, J., in
O'Neal V. Bridge Co., 18 Md., 1, 23, and it is quite true and just where taxation
by values) is what the law provides for; but it has but limited application to
the taxation of business in any form. That the legislature cannot designate
one class of persons because of their race as special objects of taxation, see
Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal., 534.
' A remarkable case of invidious exemption occurs in the
legislation of
Arkansas for 1871. A statute purporting to be passed in the interest of immigration

and manufactures,
9

exempts every species

of
"

manuftictvj'e

and min-
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There are some cases in which it has been customary for the legislature to make certain exemptions, either of
persons or property, from the general rule which it has prescribed

Exemptions.

on the subject of taxation. Some of these, such as the exemptions of household furniture, tools of trade, etc., and the limited
personal property which very poor persons may be possessed of,
are to be looked upon rather as being in the nature of limitations
of the general rule, than as exceptions from it ; the taxation is
only of all that is possessed over and beyond what has been left
out as absolutely needful to the owner's support.^ The same may
be said of some kinds of property, such as church property, school
property, burying grounds and the like, which are by many persons looked upon as fit objects for the public contributions.

Implied exemptions.

Some things are always presumptively
exempted from the operation of general tax laws, because it is
reasonable to suppose they were not within the intent of the
legislature in adopting them.

A

state may,

if

the legislature see

ing — the capital employed therein, the property used therefor, and tlie productions while in the ownership and possession of the original manufacturer
or miner — from all taxation for a period of five years. Had the act stopped
here, a question might possibly be made whether the exemption was unjust.
It might be contended that releasing the manufacturer from taxation while
leaving competition open would be likely to reduce prices in proportion as
But the legislathe cost of production was diminished by the exemption.
tion referred to went on to provide that no corporation or individual should
have the benefit of the act whose productions should not average $900 per
month.
In other words, it exempted all the large manufacturers, but left the
smaller ones not only taxed as before, but compellable also to share with the
rest of the community in making up to the state what would he lost by not
taxing the others. If anything could add to the injustice of an exemption of
a portion only of those engaged in a particular business, it would be that the
discrimination was made against the very class that the policy of the law
is thought to favor ; namely, the men of small means.
It was decided in Nashville v. Althorp, 5 Cold., 554, that where a merchant's
privilege is taxed, discriminations can not be made: e. g., between those
living within and those without a city. Compare Robinson «. Charleston, 2
Eich., 317.
■"
do not well perceive what definition can well be
to the words

I

given
taxable property,' unless they be made to mean all property not exempted by
law from taxation.:' Harper, Ch. J., in City Council v. St. Philip's Church, 1 Mc-

'

Mul. Eq., 139,
Smith, 4 Fla.,

144.
154.

See

Martin

s..

Charleston,

13

Rich. Eq.,

50, 52 ;

Levy

v.
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;

but to

would render necessary new taxes to meet the demand of
this tax, and thus the public would be taxing itself in order to
raise money to pay over to itself, and no one would be benefited
do

so,

but the officers employed.
It is always to be assumed that the
general language of statutes is made use of with reference to
taxable subjects, and the property of municipalities is not in any

It

therefore,

is

it

is

is,

by clear implication excluded.^ It
not, like government agencies, excluded from the
power of tax laws, but
beyond the grasp of their intent.

proper sense taxable.

'

III., 37; Directors of the Poor v. School Birectors,
of poor house) State v. Gaffney, 34 N. J., 133 (case
And see People «. Doe,
of city water works and land acquired therefor).
36 Cal., 220; People v. Austin, 47 Cal., 353; Gibson v. Howe, 37 Iowa, 168;
Trustees of Industrial University v. Champaign County, Sup. Ct. 111., 1875,
Chicago Legal News, 160 (case of property conveyed to trustees in trust for
Duvall,
state educational institution).
In Louisville v. Commonwealth,
295, 296, the following language
made use of by Soiertion, J., the question
being whether property belonging to the city of Louisville was taxable for
state purposes: "A general law concerning persons may include artificial as
well as natural persons, and every corporation
legal person. Even the
United States and every separate state, and every county in each state, are
in law
quasi corporations, and each of all such corpoi'ations
person.
And, consequently,
tax on the real estate of all persons would, without
qualification or exception, literally include that of every corporation, municipal as well as private. But in this respect there
an obvious and essential
distinction between municipal and private corporations.
A private corporabank or railroad or turnpike, is, in technical language, altogether
tion, like
But municipal corporation, like state,
personal.
county or the city of
Louisville, is much more than
person. While nominally
person,
political power, and each in its prescribed sphere
vitally
imperium in,
All are constituent demands of one total sovereignty. The city of
imperio.
Louisville, to the extent of the jurisdiction delegated to
but
by its charter,
an, etfluence from the sovereignty of Kentucky; governs for Kentucky, and
its authorized legislation and local administration of law are legislation and
administration by Kentucky through the agency of that municipality. The
tax law of Kentucky constructively applies to persons only, and not at all to
political bodies exercising in different degrees the sovereignty of the state.
Were this not true, then the statute literally embracing all persons, and the
person, her capital and penitentiary, and other
state being in one sense
public propertjr, would, like the estate of
natural person, be subject to
and so too would the court houses and jails and
assessment for taxation
poor houses of all the counties of the state. But neither
state nor
county
has ever been considered
person contemplated by any tax law ever enacted.
People

V.

Salomon,

51

it

is a

a

a

a

;

a

a

is

it

a

is

a

a

a

a

a

is

a

a

is

a

is

is

1

a

7

;

43 Penn. St., 21, 25 (case
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Before referring to the express exemptaxation, which it has been customary to

Express exemptions.

tions from general
make, it may be well to refer to certain constitutional provisions
which have been adopted in different states with a view to secure
uniformity in taxation. The provisions are various, and a reference to such as have come under

judicial consideration will

suflfice

for our purpose.
" all
property shall
Arkansas. The constitution provided that
be taxed according to its value

;

the manner of ascertaining which

shall direct, making the same equal
Where the legislature, by a
and uniform throughout the state."
city charter, undertook to exempt the property of the inhabitants
from taxation for the construction of roads in the county of v/hich
to be

as the general

assembly

the city formed a part, this was held

invalid

as a

violation of the

rule of uniformity which the constitution had established.^
"
California. The constitution requires that taxation shall be
" all
property in the state shall be
equal and uniform," and that
taxed in proportion to its value."
Under this the following rul"
all property in the state " was to
ings have been made : 1. That
be understood as intending all private property only, and that it
did not include
And

the

public

property belonging to the United

not the only real reason for their constructive exclusion equally
except the municipal property of Louisville, used for the convenience and
facility of its local governments " "We think so, and without elaborate argudoes

-we so adjudge."
It was, nevertheless, held that such property as
the corporation might own, not for carrying on its municipal government,
liiut only for the convenience or profit of its citizens, individually or collec-

ment

tively, and which, therefore, it would own and use as a private corporation,
would he subject to taxation under such general words of the statute as would
embrace the like property owned by a private corporation. This private side to
a public corporation has often been recognized in othei- than tax cases. Bailey
ffl. New York, 3 Hili, 531; 3 Denio, 438; Lloyd d. New York, 5 N. Y., 369;
Storrs u. Utica, 17 id., 104; Western Tund Savings Society ». Philadelphia,
ii. Duckett, 20 Md., 468 ; Detroit v. Corey,
31 Penn. St., 175 ; Commissioners
9 Mich., 165; post, ch. XXI.
That the general power conferred upon a municipal corporation to tax, will
not authorize the taxation of state or county property, see Nashville v. Bank
of Tennessee, 1 Swan, 269 ; Piper «. Singer, 4 8. & R., 354.
'

Fletcher «. Oliver, 25 Ark., 28^. For other cases construing the constitutional provision, see Washington v. Stale, 13 Ark., 752 ; McGhee v. Mathis, 21
id., 40.
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That exemptions of

private property would be inconsistent with the requirement of
equality and uniformity, and consequently were forbidden.*
3. That special assessments for local improvements need not be
levied by value,' but that whatever basis was adopted, exemptions of property falling within the class assessed were forbidden.*
That the requirement of uniformity in the taxation of property was not violated by a tax on business graduated by sales.^
6. That authority to a board of supervisors to remit a tax or a
part of a tax in a specified district, would be inconsistent with
4.

the requirement of uniformity, and consequently invalid.^

6.

That

law is not void for want of uniformity, because
of the regulations of different counties as regards enforcing cola state revenue

of delinquent taxes being different.''

lection

A

that taxation on property shall be ad
valorem only, will preclude the taxation of cattle by the head.'
But the constitutional requirement of uniformity is not violated
Georgia.

provision

by taxes on business.'

The constitution prescribed that the "general assembly

Illinois.

shall provide for levying a tax by valuation, so that every person
and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his or
her property."
Also that "the corporate authorities of counties,
townships, school districts, cities, towns
'

People

V.

taxation, see

McCreery, 34 Cal.,
People v. Wliyler,

and villages

may be

is " equal and uniform " in
41 Cal., 351, 355, per RJwdes, Cli. J.

As

433.

to what

''Peoples. McCreery, 34 Cal., 433; Peoples. Wliartenby. 38 id., 461; PeoV. Eddy, 43 id., 331; S. C, 18 Am. Rep., 143; Lick t. Austin, 43 Cal., 590.

ple

'Burnett

v.

Sacramento,

13

Cal., 76; Blanding

San Francisco Gas Co., 28 id., 345

Lyon,

Walsh

;

».

Burr,

13

id., 343; Emery

v.

«. Mathews, 39 id., 133 ; Crosby v.

37 id., 242.

J People

V. S.

» Sacramento

'Wilson
'People

F. & A. R. R. Co.,
v. Crocker,

v. Supervisors
V.

16

35 Cal., 606.

Cal., 119.

of Sutter,

47 Cal., 91.

(Case of a levee tax.)

Central Pacific R. R. Co., 43 Cal., 398.

tion, see further,

As to equality in taxaBeals «. Almador Co., 35 Cal., 634; Chambers ®. Satterlce,

40 id., 497.
8 Livingston s.

'Burch
Ins. Co.

».

Albany,

13. Savannah,

Augusta,

41 Geo., 31.

43 Geo., 596;

50 id., 530.

Bohler

«. Schneider,

49 id., 195;

Homo
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for corporate purposes, such taxes to be uniform in respect to persons and property
within the Jurisdiction of the body imposing the same." As to
" were manifestly
these provisions it has been decided that they
inserted in the fundamental law for the purpose of insuring

vested with power to assess and collect taxes

equality in the levy and collection of the taxes to support the government, whether levied for state, county or municipal purposes.
The design was to impose an equal proportion of these burthens
upon all persons within the limits of the district or body imposing
them.
Under these provisions the legislature has no power to exor
release a person or community of persons from their proempt
portionate share of these burthens.
selves, they are unable to delegate

Not having such power

them-

such .power to these inferior
These provisions preclude discrimination in favor of
bodies."
or against any classes of property or persons whatsoever ; ^ they require the taxation of loans or any other credits, these being property as much as lands or chattels in possession ; ^ they do not ad^

'

Walker,

Connel],

13

J., in Hunsaker

People, 58 id., 456

;

v. "Wright, 30 111., 146, 148.

O'Kane «. Treat,
Dunham v. Chicago,

id., 138

;

35 id., 557, 561 ;

Trustees d. McMadison County v.

See

55 id., 357.

' Primm v. Belleville, 59111., 143; discrimination
infavov of improvements
and of personalty ; Bureau County «. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 44 id., 330 ;
Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. ■».Boone County, 44 id., 340; discrimination against
railroad property.
'Trustees r. McConnell,

12

III.,

138.

In People

v.

Worthington,

31

id., 171,

the rule strongly and clearly : " The constitution
means as it declares, that each shall pay a tax iu proportion to the property
■which he has, whether that property consists of farms or mortgages ; of visi173, Caton, Ch.

J.,

states

hlc substances or choses in action. It is not to be denied that this rule of
taxation must in some, nay In many instances, operate unequally and even
oppressively ; and such may be the case of the defendant here. He sells a
piece of land and gives- a deed, and takes a note and a mortgage to secure the
purchase money. He is- taxed" for the amount due on the mortgage, and the
purchaser is taxed for the land, and if the purchaser neglects to pay these
taxes, then the seller must do it himself or lose his security.
This is a
hai-dship no douLt, but like many other hardships which befall mankind, it
results from the failure of another to perform his duty, and must be provided
against by grea'er cautioa in selecting a purchaser, or in seeking satisfaction
of him for the taxes paid on the land. It may be true in one sense to say
that it is double taxation to tax the horse which is sold and also the note which
is given for the purchase money ; and so is it to tax the note which is given
for one hundred dollars borrowed money, and also the money which is bor-

CH.

EQUALITY

VI.J

AND UNIFORMITY

IN TAXATION.

135

mit of residents in one part of a road district being exempted from
*
nor of one class of counties
taxes for the roads in another part ;
being taxed a higher rate for state purposes than another class
which happens to be more largely indebted for local purposes

;

*

; and so we might go on throughout the whole system of human transactions which involves a credit for things tangible which are within the state
and subject to taxation ; and even so it is if they are beyond tlie state, for the

rowed

presumption is that they are taxed wherever they may be. Whatever rights,
credits or choses in action which may be taxed, are so much over and above
the money and other physical objects within the state, and are in the same
sense double taxation ; for those very credits must ultimately be paid with
those physical objects if they are ever paid. * * Although we might think
that the provisions of the constitution on the subject of taxation

are

and unequal, or even arbitrary and oppressive, neither the legislature
courts can, for any such reason, disregard them."

unjust
nor the

' O'Kane v. Treat, 25

The exemption was of residents within a
111., 557.
municipal corporation from being taxed for roads beyond its limits but within
the same road district.
Compare Heasant v. Kost, 39 111., 490, 494 ; Madison
County

».

People, 58 id., 456.

'Eamseyu. Hoeger, Sup. Ct. 111., 1874 ; 6 Chicago Legal News, 318. The
of an attempt, indirectly, to saddle upon the state the local indebtedness incurred in the aid of railroads.
One important question under the provisions of the constitution of Illinois
regarding taxation must be considered as still open. The constitution of 1870
declares that " the general assembly shall provide such revenue as may be needful by levying a tax by valuation so that every person and corporation shall pay
a tax in proportion to his, her or its property, * * * but the general assembly
shall have power to tax * * * persons or corporations owning or using
franchises and privileges in such manner as it shall from time to time direct
by general law, uniform as to the class upon which it operates." In assumed execution of this authority, the legislature of 1873 passed an act provid.
ing as follows : "The capital stock of all companies, now or hereafter created under the laws of this state shall be so valued by the state board of
case was one

equalization as to ascertain and determine respectively the fair cash value of
such capital stock, including the franchise, over and above the assessed value
of the tangible property of such company or association. Said board shall
adopt such rules and principles 7or ascertaining the fair cash value of such capital stock as to it may seem equitable and just, and such rules and principles,
when so adopted, if not inconsistent with this act, shall be as binding and of

if contained in this act, subject, however, to such changes,
alterations or amendments as may be found from time to time to be necessarv
by said board ; provided, that in all cases where the tangible property or capital stock of any such company or association is assessed under this act, the
the same effect as

stock of any such company or association shall not be asUnder this law the state board of equalization adopted
sessed in this state."
the following resolution :
shares of capital
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but they do not preclude taxes being laid on other subjects than
property by some other standard than that of value, and conse" Sesolved, That for the purposes of ascertaining the fair cash value of the
capital stock including the franchises of all companies and associations, now
or hereafter created under the laws of this state, or for the assessment of the
same, or so much thereof as may be found to be in excess of the assessed or
equalized value of the tangible property of such companies and associations,
respectively, we, the state board of equalization, hereby adopt the following
rules and principles, viz:
" 1. The market or fair cash value of shares of capital stock, and the market
or fair cash value of the debt, excluding indebtedness for current expenses, shall be combined or added together, and the aggregate amount so ascertained shall be taken and held to be the fair cash value of the capital stock, including the franchises, respectively, of such companies and associations.
" 3. From the aggregate amount, ascertained as aforesaid, there shall be
deducted the aggregate amount of the equalized or assessed valuation of all the
tangible property, respectively, of such companies and associations ; such
equalized or assessed valuation being taken in each case, as the same may be
determined by the equalization or assessment of property by the board, and
the amount remaining in each case, if any, shall be taken and held to be the
amount and fair cash value of the capital stock, including the franchjise, which
this board is required by law to assess, respectively, against companies and
corporations now or hereafter created under the laws of this state."
The supreme court of the state sustained this assessment, not, however, pass"
ing upon the questionof itsfairness or justice, which they expressly disclaimed
the right to do, but conceding to the state board of equalization the right to arrive
at the valuation by any such rules as they should devise, which seemed to them
As the assessment made under these
calculated to reach the proper result.
rules would be of the whole value of the franchise as if no indebtedness existed, there would manifestly be in the case what would be equivalent to double
taxation ; but as in valuing individual property under the laws of Illinois,
debts are not deducted, this was no more than would exist in other cases,
and the court attach importance to this fact as bearing upon the competency
of the board to establish such rules. It is to be observed, however, that the
law provided for assessing " the fair cash value of such capital stock includA franchise may have a distinct value by itself irrespecting the franchise."
is

a

it,

ive of any debts that may be owing by the corporation or person possessing
as
farm may have irrespective of the mortgage upon it; but there
cer-

it

a

it

is

a

tainly some difficulty in understanding how the capital stock of corporation
can be valued without taking into account its indebtedness, or how, if the
corporation owes so much that its capital stock
absolutely worth nothing,
could have for any legal purpose
and could be sold for nothing,
"fair
by taking as the measure of its value that which rencash value " given
a

it

if,

it

valueless. It may be that
by enforcing the debt, the capital stock
should become the property of the creditors,
would then have value equal
to the previous value of the debt; but this would be by the substitution of
ders
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Neither do
quently, taxes on polls are not unconstitutional.^
they tate from the legislature the power to commute for taxes, receiving instead what thej shall regard as an equivalent.'*
The constitution provides that " the general assemIndiana.
bly shall provide by law for a uniform and equal rate of assesssuch regulations as shall
secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, both real and
personal, excepting such only for municipal, educational, literary,
scientific, religious or charitable purposes as may be specially exment and taxation, and shall

It

prescribe

provides that "the general

assembly
shall not pass local or special laws" "for the assessment and collection of taxes for state, county, township or road purposes."
Of these provisions it has been said, they " do not prohibit local
empted by law."

also

They require a general,
taxation for objects in themselves local.
uniform levy for state purposes, but they do not forbid local taxNor do we think they prohibit indirect
ation under general laws.
Such
taxation by way of licenses upon particular pursuits, etc.
indirect taxation may be made effectual as a police regulation.
The taxing, which is a part of the legislative power of the state,
Indirect taxais supreme, except where limitations are imposed.
tion, by way of tariffs, etc., has ever been regarded
exercise of the taxing power, and we do not

a

legitimate

think a provision in

the constitution requiring the general levy of direct taxes for
state purposes to be upon a uniform assessment, implies a prohibition of all other taxation. Such, at all events, is not the
conventional force of its language."^
one thing of Talue for another.

Before that time, certainly, the debt is no part

of the capital stock. In these remarks no question is made of the correctness
of the decision of the supreme court, which is certainly able and plausible.
The opinion is given in full in 6 Chicago Legal News, 319. The federal
circuit court for the same circuit held the assessment void, and it is believed
the question is now in the United States Supreme Court.
' Sawyer v. Alton, 3 Scam., 127. This case arose under an earlier
constitution, but the provisions were substantially the same.

' Illinois Central B. R. Co.

v. McLean County, 17 111., 291, where an ad vafor a percentage of gross receipts.
And see State
People, 4 Scam., 303; Hunsaker v. Wright, 30 111., 146.

lorem tax was commuted

Bank

v.

'Perkins, J., in Anderson v. Kerns Draining Co., 14 Ind., 199, citing La Fay.
ette V. Jenners, 10 id., 70, 75 ; The Bank ■o.New Albany, 11 id., 139 ; Walk.
Am. Law, 3d ed., p. 133 ; Aurora v. West., 9 Ind., 74. To the same effect is
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to be
these provisions require the rate of assessment
be equal
equal for all purposes throughout the state, but only to
and uniform throughout the district for which the tax is levied.'

Nor do

Nor do they preclude the legislature making exemptions,^ but

of
they do preclude the levy of a specific tax on one species
property for any public purpose ; for example, a specific tax by
the acre on real estate for highway purposes.'
"
Iowa. The constitution provides that the property of all corporations for pecuniary profit, now existing or hereafter created,
shall be subject to taxation the same as that of individuals."
This provision would preclude exemptions of corporate property
from taxation, and consequently would require the court, in any
doubtful case, to construe a revenue law as not intending such an
exemption.*

"
provision that taxation shall be equal and uni"
form throughout the state will not preclude the legislature auThe
thorizing the taxation of callings, trades and professions.
taxation will be equal and uniform if all persons in the same
calling, trade or profession within the taxing district are taxed
Louisiana.

A

But it would preclude a discrimination as between those
carrying on the same business,' and it would preclude a specific
alike."

Bright
Elliott,

v.

J.

McCullough,

27

Ind.,

223,

in which the authorities

are reviewed

by

Auditor of Warren County, 9 Ind., 174 ; Conwell ii. O'Brien, 11
id., 419 ; Covington Drawbridge Co. v. Auditor of Warren County, 14 id., 331 ;
Bright V. McCulloch, 27 id., 223.
' Bank of the State v. New Albany, 11 Ind., 139. See Bank of Conners' Adamson

ville
3

V. State,

Bright

V.

v.

16

id., 105

;

McCullough,

King
27

v.

Madison,

Ind.,

17

Id., 46.

223.

*Iowa Homestead Co. v. Webster County, 21 Iowa, 221. If we understand
correctly the case of Dubuque, etc., R. R. Co. v. Webster County, 21 id., 335,
the provision above quoted would not prevent a taxation of corporations on
their gross receipts in lieu of taxation on property.
' Municipality v. Dubois, 10 La. An., 56 ; New. Orleans v. The Bank, id., 735 ;
New Orleans v. Staiger, 11 id., 68 ; New Orleans o. South Bank, id., 41 ; New
Orleans v. Turpin, 13 id., 56; Merriman v. New Orleans, 14 id., 318; State b.
Valkman, 20 id., 585 ; Hodgson v. New Orleans, 21 id., 301. The doctrine applied to the case of license fees for theatrical and other exhibitions. Charity
Hospital V. Stickney, 2 id., 550 ; Municipality v. Duncan, id., 183.
«

New Orleans

». Home

Ins. Co.,

28 La.

An.

449.
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tax on any species of property, the value of which is not uniform, as, for example, a specific tax on cotton by the pound.^
The constitution ordains that "the county comMaryland.
shall
missioners
exercise such powers and 'duties only as the legislature may from time to time prescribe ; but such powers and duties, and

the tenure

of office shall be uniform

throughout the
by law for the

Where the legislature made provision
levy of a tax, by the county commissioners of a single county,
state."

for the support of public schools therein, the objection to this
legislation, that it gave powers to and imposed duties on the commissioners of that county which were peculiar and exceptional,
was held not to be well taken.
It was not the purpose of the
constitution that all local regulations should be the same in all
parts of the state, or that every locality should levy taxes for the

no others, or that the county commissioners
should exercise their uniform powers on precisely the same subAnd this legislation was not to be regarded as giving exjects.
same objects

and

ceptional authority, but as requiring a special exercise, in one
county, of the uniform power to tax which the commissioners
possessed
'

Sims

in all the counties.^
Jackson,

La. An., 440. See Livingston ». Albany, 41 Geo., 21,
Also, State «, Endom, 23 La. An., 663, in which it
•was decided that a specific tax on drays, wagons, carriages, etc., in proportion
to the number of animals drawing them, was forbidden as not being a uniform tax on the business which was taxed. A law which should make no diacrimination in the taxation of business, we should say would in some cases,
produce the grossest injustice and inequality; and it may be seriously questioned whether the requirement of uniformity in the taxation of business
could be understood as forbidding the classification of those engaged in the
business ; for example, underwriters, by the business done or premiums rev.

23

for the same principle.

ceived ; merchants, by the capital invested or sales made, etc.
tionment of taxes accordingly.
Bowie, Ch. J., in Commissioners
Allegany County, 20 Md., 449, 457,
application, we copy from it:
" It is said, there is no law
=

;

and the appor-

of Public Schools v. Commissioners of
As the decision is of very general

458.

conferring on the commissioners of the counties
generally, power to make provision for public schools, and therefore the act
of Allegany county is special, local, unequal, contrary to the letter and spirit
of the constitution, which designed that all parts of the state should be subject to the same taxation for the same objects.

" When the organic law
imposed this feature of uniformity upon county
commissioners and other county officers, it cannot be supposed it was designed
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Massachusetts.
The constitutional provision that the legislature
shall only impose proportional and reasonable taxes is not violated
by permitting a town in which a state agricultural college is
located, to levy a tax to pay an exceptional portion of the cost of
erecting buildings for such college.^

Michigan. The provision that " the legislature shall provide
a uniform rule of taxation, except on property paying specific
taxes, and taxes shall be levied on such property as shall be preto ignore the varieties of situation and condition of tlie people of the several
counties, and the different institutions established among them. Tlie levy
were substituted, had exercourts for ■which tlie county commissioners
cised, from the organization of the state government, the power of levying
taxes for every local purpose which the peculiar wants of each county might
require, under the sanction of general or special acts of legislation.

" The legislation of the

state exhibits various systems of internal regulation
respect to roads, schools, paupers and criminal ti-ials, in the several counties, all of which ultimately involve the exercise of the power of taxation.

in

Some of these systems, since the adoption of the new constitution, have been
the position assumed
codified as part of the public local law of the state.

If

requiring provision for tlie support of the
of
or
the support of paupers, which are not uniroads,
county
130or, repairs
the
and
form throughout
state,
require the levying of taxes for such purposes,
are ipso facto void, because not within the powers legitimately granted by
in this

case

be correct, the laws

the constitution.

3,

'

is

is

is

it

*

*

§

'

'

is,

is

is

;

is

is

is,

" Uniformity of power does not necessarily imply identity of purpose or obthat the one
an attribute,
ject. The difference between power and object
faculty or means the other an end or fact to be accomplished.
Power
special. As in mechanics, the motive power may be applied
general, object
to au almost infinite variety of uses; so in politics, the power of taxation,
which the great motor of government, may be exercised for the promotion of
every object of society, among the chief and noblest of which
the diffusion
of knowledge and' the education of the peoijle.
" The power to levy all needful taxes, and to
pay and discharge ail claims
on or against the county which have been expressly or impliedly authorized
Code of Maryland), conveys authority and
by law (conferred by art. 28,
imposes the duty of providing for any local object sanctioned by the legislature.
In this instance, the commissioners of the couuty are not
left to inference as to their duty and obligation to exercise the power of
taxation, but are expressly enjoined to exert
for the most salutary public purposes. The power here called into requisition
uniformly vested
in the commissioners of all the counties in the state, as
indicated in the
public general laws. Its application to various specific objects
shown by
the public local laws."
Merrick

«. Amherst,

12

Allen,

498.
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scribed by law ;" also that " all assessments hereafter authorized
shall be on property at its cash value," do not preclude a taxation
of business as such, although the property employed in the business is also taxed.^

The constitution provides that "all property on

Minnesota.

which taxes are to be levied shall have

a cash

valuation, and be

It is not compeequalized
throughout the state."
tent where equality and uniformity are required to impose a tax
exclusively upon one subdivision of the state to pay a claim or
and uniform

which is not peculiarly the debt of such subdivision,
or to raise money for any purpose not peculiarly beneficial to such

indebtedness

subdivision.'^

Missouri.

A

constitutional

requirement that taxation shall be
uniform, and shall be levied on property in proportion to its value,
is not violated by the taxation of income and salaries.
The pur-

of it is to make the burdens of government rest on all propOutside
erty alike; to forbid favoritism and prevent inequality.

pose

restriction, the legislature must be the sole
propriety of taxation, and define the sources of revthe exigencies of the occasion may reqiiire.'

of this constitutional
judge of the
enue as

>Wolcott V.

' Sanborn

People,

17

Mich., 68; Kitson

v.

Ann Arbor,

26 id., 325.

Rice, 9 Minn., 273. That the provision would preclude penalfailure
to list property for taxation, see McCormick «. Fitch, 14 id., 352.
ties for

'

».

There is a summary of the doctrine of
V. Rouse, 43 Mo., 479, 489.
J.,
in
this
case
which
is deserving of being copied at
Wagner,
by
the courts
length :
" That taxes should be uniform, and levied in proportion to the value of the
property to be taxed, is so manifestly just that it commends itself to universal
But, notwithstanding the constitutional provision, there are some
assent.
kinds of taxes that are not usually assessed according to the value of property,
and some which could not be thus assessed ; and there is perhaps not a state
in the Union, though many of them have in substance the same constitutional
provision, which does not levy other taxes than those imposed on property.
" Every burden which the state imposes upon its citizens witli a view to
revenue, to carry on the operations of the state government, or for the support
of municipal corporations, is a branch of the power of taxation, whether imTlie license fees
posed under the name of a tax or some other designation.
of
those
who
required
particular
pursue
employments
which are sometimes
are, when imposed for revenue, taxes. Lawyers and physicians may be compelled to pay a license for practicing their professions, for the purpose of revenue ; and although not levied on property, it is still a tax. Stamp duties are
Glascow
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The constitution provides that " laws shall be passed
by a uniform rule all moneys, credits, investments in

bonds, stocks,

joint stock companies or otherwise

real and personal

;

and

also

all

property according to its true value in money

;

It is customary to require that corporations shall pay a certain sum
annually, in proportion to their capital stock paid in, or by some other standard, which is generally fixed for mere convenience.
It therefore seems plain
taxes.

'
requirement that taxation upon property shall be in
proportion to its value,' does not include every species of taxation; nor, in-

that the constitutional

would it be possible to place such an interpretation upon it without
doing the grossest injustice.
"A very large proportion of revenue is derived from other sources than a
direct levy on property, and the doctrine contended for would release the
former and throw the whole burden upon the latter. In cases of municipal
corporations, a different construction has always prevailed.
Assessments for
the opening, making, improving, or repairing streets, the draining of swamps,
the throwing up of levees, and the like local works, have been usually made
upon property with some reference to benefits which it was supposed the
property would receive.
" The requirement that property should be taxed in proportion to its
value,
applies as much to these local assessments as any other species of taxes.
The
local authorities have only such power as is delegated to them by the state,
and the state can confer no power against the prohibitions of the constitution.
" There are three general classes of direct taxes : capitation, having effect
solely upon persons; ad -oalorem, having effect solely upon property; and income, having a mixed effect upon persons and property.
" The argument of the plaintiff's counsel proceeds on the hypothesis that
This is a
every species of tax comes within the constitutional prohibition.
The whole practice of the state has been different, and it has never
mistake.
been challenged, nor could it be, on legal principles. The statutes provide
for a poll tax, which is in violation of the ad valorem rule, and is unequal, yet it
A license is imposed upon shows, peddlers,
is clearly within the constitution.
auctioneers, dram shops and billiard tables, all of which taxes ai-e in violation
of the ad valorem principle, but not therefore unconstitutional.
The taxes imposed are uniform as to the particular classes, but not in proportion to the
deed,

taxes assessed on other property.

" The constitution enjoins a uniform rule as to the imposition of taxes on
all property, but does not abridge the power of the legislature to provide fot
a revenue from other sources.
It was intended to make the burdens of government rest on all property alike — to forbid favoritism and prevent inequality. Outside of the constitutional restriction, the legislature must be the sole
judge of the propriety of taxation, and define the sources of revenue as the
The income tax was uniform and
exigency of the occasion may require.
the
classes
which
it
upon
as
to
operated
equal
; it did not come within the
'
the
term
as
used
property,'
and designated in the constitution,
meaning of
and I think it was not in conflict with any provision of that instrument."
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but burying grounds, public school houses, houses used exclusively for public worship, institutions of purely public charity,

public property used exclusively for any public purpose, and personal property to an amount not exceeding in value two hundred
dollars for each individual,
from taxation,"
the property

oE

by general

may,

laws,

be exempted

This provision renders it imperative that all
which exemption is not permitted by it shall be
etc.

taxed, and precludes any other exemptions than those indicated,
as well when the tax is for a municipal

levied for

purpose

as

when it is

a state purpose.''

It also precludes the debts of the tax payer being deducted
from the value of his property ; this being inconsistent with the
But it does not
requirement that all property shall be taxed.^
preclude the taxation of business,

as such, the

licensing of stores,

etc.3

A

constitutional provision that " all property shall
be taxed according to its value," and that " no one species of
property from which a tax may be collected shall be taxed
Tennessee.

' Zanesville

«.

Richards,

6

Ohio, N.

S.,

589.

See

Hill

v. Higdon, 5 id.,
" Before the adop-

In-the case first cited Ranney, Ch. J., says:
tion of the present constitution, the whole matter of taxation was committed to the discretion of the general assembly.
It might be levied upon such
The right to make exproperty and in such proportion, as the body saw fit.
But this discretion no longer
ceptions and exemptions, was unquestionable.
The public burdens are made to rest upon the property of the state,
exists.
and whenever money is to be raised by taxation, the positive injunction is,
that ' laws shall be passed, taxing by an uniform rule, all monej'-s, credits, in243, 246.

vestments

in

bonds, stocks,

joint

stock

companies, or otherwise;

and also

all real and personal property, according t-o its true value in money.'
Without express authority of law, no tax, either for state, county, township or corporation purposes can be levied, and we see no reason to doubt that this section of the constitution is equally applicable to, and furnishes the governing
The
principle for, all laws authorizing taxes t» be levied for either purpose.
to
secure
of
the
was
and
provision
uniformity in the imequality
great object
position of these public burdens. The convention was very well aware that
much the largest part would be required to answer the purposes of tliese
local subdivisions ; and equally well that it could only be levied as the general assembly should provide."

"

Baker

a.

Cincinnati,

11

Ohio, N.

S.,

' Bank of Columbus «. Hines, 3 Ohio, N. S., 1.
ment of money are to he taxed by value, and if of
Id.
534.

Obligations for the payno value, are not taxable.

144

L i.^

[CH. VI.

TAXATION.

OF

any species of property of equal value," has no
reference to the taxation of privileges, and such taxation is in
the discretion of the legislature.
It is therefore competent to
higher than

authorize a town to levy license taxes on the various occupations
carried on therein.'
The requirement that taxation shall be equal and
Virginia.
uniform does not preclude the state from authorizing a county to
levy a tax on a county office,^ nor does it require the license taxes
On this
on privileges or occupations to be equal or uniform.*
last point the decision in "West Yirginia is to the contrary.*
Wisconsin.
The constitutional provision that " the rule of tax"
ation shall be uniform
extends to taxation by cities, towns and

It

counties, as well as that levied by the state."

does

not

pre-

clude license taxes under the police power.' And the state having for a long period been in the practice of collecting specific
taxes from corporations in lieu of the taxes on property levied gen-

erally, it was decided
such

the opinion of the judges, that

against

specific taxes were not in violation of the constitutional

re-

quirement of uniformity.'

It

The general right to make exemptions.
what is the rule regarding exemptions,
by the state constitution.
'

Adams

«.

' Gilkerson
tors

V.

Somerville,

Baltimore,

N. J.,

gas, 18

2

■».Frederick

11 ;

Head, 363

Justices,

where

; State v.

13

to see

none is prescribed

Crawford,

Grat., 577.

remains

3

id., 460.

See also Gordon's

Execu-

Compare Camden & Amboy K. E. Co. v. HilleSame ii. Commissioner of Appeals, 18 id., 71, and Gardner
5

Gill,

231.

in whicli a provision in a charter that the corporation
should pay a certain tax, " and no other tax or impost shall be levied or assessed " upon
-was held to apply to county and town taxes as well as those
imposed for state purposes.
21

id., 557,
it,

D. State,

13

Grat., 767.

W. Va.,

This

349.

case

referred to, ante,

p'.

®. State,

is

<

Franklin Ins. Co.

5

'

Slaughter v. Commonwealth,

Knowlton v. Supervisors of Rock Co., Wis., 410; Hale
Black, 510.
Gilman v. Sheboygan,
9

b.

Dow,

16

Wis.,

'

Department v. Helfenstein,
Kneeland

v.

Plankroad Co.,

11

298 (dog license)
id., 136.

Milwaukee,
id., 35.

15

Wis.,

454,

;

;

«

Carter

■». Kenosha,

29

2

id., 599

Tenney

v. Lenz, id., 566

overruling Attorney

;

^

129.

Fire

General

v.
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The exemptions commonly made by express statute are based
upon reasons so forcible that tbey have seldom been contested.
We refer now to the exemptions of tools of trade; of the limited
personal property of very poor persons ; the property of corporations or associations devoted exclusively to the work of public
charity, or in other directions where what they accomplish operates in the relief of public burdens, and the like. Exemptions of
t'le pn)|)f'rLv of religious societies, and of persons or corporations
engaged in instruction, have not passed unchallenged on the score
of right and policy ; but the power to make them is unquestioned.

And upon

subject of exemptions, the following rules
are deduced from the authorities :
1. The general rieht to make exemptions is involved in the
the general

right to apportion taxes, and must be understood to exist wherever it is not forbidden.^
The right is supposed to be exercised
on reasons of state policy, and presumptively such exemptions
contribute to the general public benefit.^
Exemptions thus granted on considerations of public policy,
may be recalled whenever the legislative view of public policy
shall have changed.
To the individuals, corporations or associa2.

tions benefited

by them, they are to be regarded as favors or
privileges merely, to continue during the pleasure of the sovereignty, and there can be no breach of faith — certainly no want
of power — in terminating them at anytime. Cases illustrative
of this principle are cited on
1 Butler's
V.

North,

N. J.,

a

previous page.'

Appeal, 73 Penn. St., 448.

Mo., 464; Hill v. Higdon,
Indianapolis «. Sturdevant,

27

312 ;

People v. Colman, 4 Cal., 46 ; State
Ohio, N. S., 243; State v. Parker, iiS
24 Ind., 391.
See

5

homestead is sometimes exempted, and Avhen it is, if it is taxed with
a part, the sale of tlie whole for taxes is void.
Pirn V. Clemans, 19 Iowa, 372, 874; Stewart v. Corbin, 25 id., 144. An exemption from taxation of all property employed in manufactures, was assumed
to be valid in Gardiner C. & W. Factory Co. v. Gardiner, 5 Grcenl., 133. New
^ The

the tract of which it forms

York

once had a statute which exempted from taxation the buildings, machinery and manufactured articles in the hands of the manufacturer of every
cotton, woolen or linen manufactory within the state.
See Columbian Manf.

Co. «. Vanderpool, 4 Cow., 556. Such exemptions are much less questionable
and much less pernicious than would be an exemption of the property of a
portion only of those engaged in a particular manufacture, leaving those with
whom they would compete to pay taxes.

J

Ante, p. 54.
10

See

in addition

to cases there cited.

Hospital

v.

Philadelphia,

LAW
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The intention to exempt must in any case be expressed in
clear and unambiguous terms ; taxation is the rule, exemption is
3.

the exception.^

All

They embrace
exemptions are to be strictly construed.
This general rule has many
only what is within their terms.
4.

Penn. St., 339 ; Commonwealth v. Fayette, etc., R. R. Co., 55 id., 453 ;
Brewster ij. Hough, 10 N. H., 138 ; St. Joseph v. Railroad Co., 39 Mo., 476 ; State
24

Dulle, 48 id., 383; Tomlinson v. Jessup, 15 Wall., 454. When officers have
power by law to make exemptions in special cases, if they refuse to make one,
the party concerned is without remedy unless an appeal is given by law.

V.

Clinton School District's Appeal,
admissible where an examination

56 Penn.

St., 315.

Such a jjower is only

into facts is essential in order to determico

whether the case is within the general rule of exemption which is prescribed
by law. A general power to exempt property from taxation cannot be conferred by the legislature even upon a municipal corporation.
Brewer Brick
Co.

V.

Brewer, recently decided by the supreme court of Maine.

" Taxation is an act of sovereignty to be performed, so far as it conveniently can be, with justice and
equality to all. Exemptions, no matter how meritorious, are of grace, and
must be strictly construed."
This was said in a case where the court felt
to
hold
that
a
married
woman was subject to a tax for the raising
compelled
of bC'Uuty moneys, though her husband was actually in the military service.
Crawford v. Burrell, 53 Penn. St., 319, 330. See also Lord Colchester v. Kewney,
Law R., 1 Exch., 368 ; Piatt v. Rice, 10 Watts, 353 ; Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet., 514; Minot v. Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co., or The Delaware Railroad Tiix, 18 Wall., 306; Trask v. Maguire, id , 391 ; Gordon v. Baltimore, 5
Gill, 231; Howell v. Maryland, 3 id., 14; Baltimore ?). State, 15 Md., 376;
Hannibal, etc., R. R. Co. v. Shacklett, 30 Mo., 550; Washington University «.
Rouse, 42 id., 308; Pacific R. R. Co. v. Cass County, 53 id., 17; Stewart v. Davis, 3 Murphy, 344 ; State v. Town Council, 12 Rich. Law, 339 ; Anderson v.
State, 23 Miss., 459; B. & O. R. R. Co. «. Marshall County, 3 W. Va., 319;
SamOB. Wheeling, id., 372; State v. Bank of Smyrna, 3 Houston, 99; Municipality «. Railroad Co., 10 Rob. (La.), 187; Louis Canal Co. «. Commonwealth,
7 B. Monr., 160 ; St. Peters Church v. Scott County, 12 Minn., 395 ; Portland, S.
& P. R. R. Co. 1). City of Saco, 60 Me., 196 ; State v. Parker, 33 N. J., 426 ;
Hart V. Plum, 14 Cal., 148; People v. Whyler, 41 id., 351; Biscoe e. Coulter,
18 Ark., 423 ; Harvard College v. Boston, 104 Mass., 470, 475 ; Orr «. Baker, 4
Ind., 86; City of Indianapolis v.- McLean, 8 id., 328; City of Madison v.
Pitch, 18 id., 33 ; Methodist Church v. Ellis, 38 id.,. 3 ; Washburn College v
Shawnee County. 8 Kans., 344; Vail s. Beach, 10 id., 314; St. Mary's College
V. Crowl, 10 id., 442 ; Miami County v. Brackenridge,
12 id., 114; No. Mo. R.
R. Co. V. Maguire, 20 Wall., 46. A general law c^n the subject of taxation,
manifestly intended as a revision of all laws on the subject, operates to repeal
the previous exemptions which it does not in terms renew. Columbian Manf
Co. 11. Vanderpool, 4 Cow., 5 56; Pox's Adm'rs v. Commonwealth, 16 Grat., 1.
' See
a7ite,

pp. 52-56, and' cases cited in the notes.
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illustrations, one of the most striking of whicli is found in the
The general
case of exemption of church and school property.
exemption of such property from taxation, it is held, will not
exempt them from special assessment for local improvements,
such as the paving and repair of the streets on which they stand,
and the like.
In the leading case, the words of the exemption
" should be taxed
were, that no church or place of public worship
"
by any law of this state."
Upon this the court remarked : The
word

taxes means burdens,

charges or impositions, put or set upon

or property for public uses ; and this is the definition
which Lord Coke gives of the word talliage, 2 Inst, 232 ; and
Lord Holt in Carth., 438, gives the same definition in substance
persons

of the word tax.

The legislature intended by that exemption to
relieve religious and literary institutions from these public burdens, and the same exemption was extended to the real estate

in value fifteen hundred dollars.
But to pay for the opening of a street in the ratio of the benefit
or advantage derived from it is no burden. It is no talliage or
tax within the meaning of the exemption, and has no claim upon
of any minister not exceeding

the public

benevolence.

minister

well

as

and the maxim of law, that qui sentii commodum
onus,
perfectly consistent with the interests of

science and religion."

And yet

these assessments are

a

is

debet sentire

of other persons pay for such an improvement
it is benefited ? There is no inconvenience or

as

-^

in proportion
hardship in

the real estate of a

it,

as

Why should not

legal exer-

Patterson

v. Society,

etc.,

24

N. J.,

8

;

;

g.

,

3

etc.,

6

;

Chegaray

3

'

of New York, 11 Jolins., 77; Bleeker v. Ballou,
Jenkins, Sandf 409 People u. Koper, 35 N. Y., 629
Buffalo City Cemetery c. Buffalo, 46 id., 506; Northern Liberties v. St. Johns
Church, 13 Penn. St., 104; Crawford v. Burrel), 53 id., 219, 220; Second UniK. I., 235; Matter of College St.,
versalist Society v. Providence,
id., 474;
of Mayor,

Matter

Wend., 263

385;

State

Robertson,

d.

id.,

504; State

v. Newark, 27 id., 185; State

v. Mills, 34 id., 177; State «. Newark, 35 id., 157;
Am. Rep., 223; Broadway Baptist Church «. McAtee,
Bush, 508;
Gill, 383, 396; Baltimore
Am. Rep., 480; Alexander D.Baltimore,
Md., 517; LeFevre^. Detroit,
Mich., 586; Kendrick v.
B. Cemetery Co.,
Ohio, 189, 197; Armstrong d. Treasurer of Athens County, 10 id.,
Parquar,
285; Cincinnati College «. State, 19 id., 110; Brewster -». Hough, 10 N. H.,
138 Seymour v. Hartford, '21 Conn., 481 Bridgeport v. N. Y. & N. H. R. Co.,
C,
Church v. Fort Wayne, 36 Ind., 338
36 id., 255 First Presbyterian
10 Am. Rep., 35; Palmer v. Stumph, 29 Ind., 329; Trustees of Church v. Ellis,
38 id.,
Bank of Republic v. Hamilton, 21 111., 53 Canal Trustees v. Chi;

S.

;

;

;

8

7

2

8

5

8

10

3
;

S.

C,
C,

;

S.
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cise

power,

and can

only be justified

on that

cago, 12 id., 403; Chicago v. Colby, 20 id., 614; McBride v. Cliicago, 22 id.,
574 ; Peoria v. Kidder, 26 id., 351 ; Pleasant !). Kost, 29 id., 490, 494 ; Paine v.
Co. ■». Alexandria, 17
Spratley, 5 Kans., 525; Orange & Alexandria K.
Gratt,, 176; Crowley v. Copeley, 3 La. An., 329; La Payette v. Orphan Asylum,

R

1; Rooney ?). Brown, 21 id., 51; St. Louis Public Schools v. St. Louis,
Mo., 468; Slieehan v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 50 id., 155; S. C, 11 Am.
Eep., 413 ; Lockwood v. St. Louis, 24 ,Mo., 20 (sewer tax) ; Emery v. Gas Co.,
28 Cal. 345; Taylor v. Palmer, 81 id., 340; Hale v. Kenosha, 29 Wis., 599;
Seamen's Friend Society «. Boston, 116 Mass., 181; Agricultural Society v.
Worcester, id., 189. The real estate belonging to the board of public schools
of the city of St. Louis, is liable to be assessed under and by virtue of the
ordinances of the city of St. Louis, for the construction of sewers, paving of
sidewalks, opening of streets, etc. St. Louis Public Schools b. City of St. Louis,

4 id.,
26

26 Mo., 468.

Some of the exemptions in these cases seem very strong and comprehensive,
but they were generally applied only to the customary taxes.
The following
instances may be given : In Baltimore v. Cemetery Company, an exemption
from "any tax or public imjjosition whatever " was held to apply only to
"taxes or impositions levied or imposed for the purpose of revenue," and not
" such charges as are inseparably incident to
to relieve the cemetery from
its location in regard to other property ;" e. g., an assessment for paving the

In Buffalo City Cemetery v. Buffalo, 46 N. Y., 506, where the
" all public taxes, rates and assessments,"
cemetery was by law exempt from
" We
it was held not exempt from a paving assessment.
Folger, J., saj's :
think that the current of authorities in this and some of the sister states runs
street in front.

to this result:

that public taxes, rates and assessments,

are those

which

are

levied and taken out of the property of the person assessed, for some public
or general use or purpose, in which he has no direct, immediate and peculiar
interest; being exactions from him towards the expense of cari-ying on the
government, either directly and, in general, that of the whole commonwealth,
or more mediately and particularly through the intervention of municipal
corporations
upon

;

and that those charges and impositions which are laid directly
in a circumscribed locality, to effect some work of local

the property

a

it

;

is

it,

convenience, which in its result is of peculiar advantage and importance to
the property, especially assessed for the expense of
are not public but are
local and private so far as this statute
concerned."
In Patterson v. Society,
"
etc., 24 N. J., 385, the exemption was from " taxes, charges and impositions
but
was held not to extend to an assessment for grading and paving street.

N. J., 185, the exemption was from " charges and impositions," and the same ruling was had. In Bridgeport «. N. Y. & N. H. R.
E. Co., 36 Conn., 255, the railroad company paid tax which, by its charter,
was to be " in lieu of all other taxes;" but the company was, nevertheless,
street assessment.
held liable to
These cases show that the general inclination has been to confine the application of all such general language to the taxes imposed for ordinary revenue.
has been held that an assessment for altering
But in Massachusetts
street
37

?.

Newark,

a

it

State v.

a

In
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how far

a

extends,
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nicety to determine

or even a qualified exemption from taxation

general
case

some portion thereof

of

corporation which employs its means or
in the purchase of property not required for
a

is a civil imposition witliin the meaning of a college cliarter exempting the
" all civil impositions, taxes and rates." Plarvard Colcollege property from
lege

V.

Boston, 104 Mass., 470.

' People V.

Brooklyn,

Society, etc., 24 N.

J.,

4 jST.

385;

Y.,

419; Sharp v. Spier, 4 Hill, 76; Patterson v.
Fuller, 34 id., 227; State v. Newark, 35 id.,

State v.

Weeks ■».Milwaukee, 10 Wis., 342; Motz ». Detroit, 18 Mich., 495;
Baltimore v. Cemetery Co., 7 Md., 517; Glascow «. Rouse, 43 Mo., 479,489;
McComb V. Bell, 2 Minn., 295; Pray v. Northern Liberties, 81 Penn. St., 69;
Walsh V. Mathews, 29 Cal., 133; Chambers v. Satterlee, 40 id., 497; Yeatman
V. Crandall, 11 La. An., 220; Matter of Opening of Streets, 20 id., 497; Reeves
V. Treasurer of Wood Co., 8 Ohio, N. S., 333 ; Hines v. Leavenworth,
3 Kans.,
168, 171;

186.

"
exemption from all taxes and assessments" held to exempt from assessState ». Newark, 36 N. J.,
ments for benefits, as well as from general taxes.

An

13 Am. Rep., 464. Compare Patterson v. Society, etc., 24 N. J., 385 ;
Gilbert,
The
11 Johns., 443; Codman v. Johnson, 104 Mass., 491.
Oswald «.
An exemption
following cases of exemptions maybe specially mentioned:
from a state tax will not preclude the levy of a tax by a city.
Martin v.
Charleston, 13 Rich. Eq., 50. An exemption of charitable societies from taxation, held to embrace the case of a masonic grand lodge, which for fifty
years had not been taxed, this neglect to tax being regarded as having fixed
State v. Addison, 2 S. Car., N. S., 499. An
the construction of the exemption.
universities,
academies
and school houses, held not
of
exemption
colleges,
"
of
fine
as
none
can
claim an exemption unless
arts,
to extend to an academy
the exemption be so clearly expressed in the statute as to admit of no other
construction." Academy of Fine Artss. Philadelphia, 23 Penn. St., 496. The
exemption from taxation of the property of soldiers in actual service will not
Tobin ©.
exempt from a tax actually imposed before the soldier enlisted.
Morgan, 70 id., 389. An exemption of "all houses of religious worship and
the pews and furniture within the same," will exempt only that part of a
building occupied for religious worship, and if other portions are leased for
business purposes, they are taxable. Proprietors v. Lowell, 1 Met., 538. An
exemption of such real estate of literary and scientific institutions " as shall
be actually occupied by them, or by the officers of such institutions for the
purposes for which they were incorporated," held not to extend to a house
built on the real estate of Harvard College and leased by the corporation to
one of the professors for a dwelling; the occupation of a lessee not being
such an occupation as was intended by the statute. Pierce v. Cambridge, 3
Cush., 611. The same exemption held applicable to a farm and tlie farming
stock owned by an educational institution, and by it worked solely to raise
produce and do team work for a boarding house kept to supply students with
board at cost. Wesleyan Academy v. Wilbraham, 90 Mass., 599. Compare

478 ; S.

C,
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the purposes

it

is,

for which its corporate privileges were conferred,
though capable, perhaps, of being made useful and profitable as
an aid in its corporate business.
in each instance,
The question
has been inwhether such property, in the manner in which
J.,

buildUnder an exemption of school buildings,
not exempt.
ing occupied in part for school and in part for other purposes
Wyman v. St. Louis, 17 Mo., 335. An exemption of every school house and
college, incorporated academj' or other
every building erected for the use of
building used and occupied for
seminary of learning, held not to embrace
private boarding school. Chcgaray v. New York, IS N. Y., 220. To tlie same
effect
State v. Boss, 24 N. J., 497.
See
peculiar case, Mass. General Hospital V. Somerville, 101 Mass., 319. Bequests to colleges, etc., held to be taxable under the general statute taxing bequests, though after being received they
■would be exempt under
general provision exempting the property of such
institutions.
Barringer v. Cowan,
Jones' Eq., 436. Exemption from " taxation of every kind" does not exempt from an assessment for street improvements. Sheehan v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 50 Mo., 155. Compare Dunleith,
etc.. Bridge Co. v. Dubuque, 33 la., 427; Brightman d. Kirner, 23 Wis., 54.
Exemption of the stock of railway company from taxation held to include
all property necessary and proper for the purpose of laying, building and
sustaining the road. Ordinary of Bibb County v. Central R. R. Co., 40 Geo.,
646.
Where the sliares of stock in
corporation were exempt from taxation,
the property of the corporation was held to bfc exempt also. Baltimore v. B.
Gill, 288. See State v. Brinin, 23 N. J., 484. A specific
& O. R. R. Co.,
railroad company held to preclude taxation of its property by
state tax on
valuation.
Camden & Amboy R. R. Co. v. Commissioners, 18 id., 11. And
see State v. Cook, 33 id., 338; Cook v. State, 83 id., 473; Douglass v. State, 34
id., 485. A branch road to procure gravel held liable to ordinary taxation.
State V. Hancock, 33 id., 315. Compare State «. Hancock, 35 id., 537. A provision in railroad charter was th at " all machines, wagons, vehicles or carriages,
belonging to tlie company, with all its works and all the property which may
accrue from the same, shall be vested in the respective shareholders forever,
in proportion to their respective shares, and shall be deemed personal estate, and
3Sr.

497.

a

Eoss, 34

is

V.

a

a

6

a

a

3

a

a

is

a

a

a

a

State

a

exempt from any charge or tax whatever."
This makes all the property of
the company, owned and used for its purposes, personal estate and exempt.
A cily in which the company owns property cannot dispute this exemption
on the ground of its lessening its power to pay its debts. Richmond v. Richmond & DanviUe R. R. Co., 21 Grat., 604. General exemption of the property
of corporation from taxation construed to include the franchise.
Wilming-

V. Reid, 13 Wall., 364; Raleigh,
etc.. Railroad Co. v. Reid, 13 id.,
Berry, 17 N. J., 80; Camden & Amboy R. R. Co. •». Hillegas, 18
Id., 11; Same v. Commissioners of Appeal, id., 71. An exemption of the
" stock" of corporation
an exemption of its gross income also, it being
to
the
stock.
an
State «. Hood, 15 Rich. Law, 177.
accessory
but
Capital, has been held, signifies the actual estate, whetlier in money or
owned by an individual or corporation.
property, which
In reference to

ton R. R. Co.

a

is

v.

a

is

it

269; State
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within the intent of the exemption?

The general inclination of the courts has been to hold, that a
charter which provides for a certain tax, and " that no other tax
or impost shall be levied or assessed" upon the corporation, will

it

it,

exempt from taxation all the property held by
necessary to
effect the purpose of the incorporation, but not other property
held by
which, though convenient and tending to increase the
is

not necessary to the corporation and its business.
But
always
question of special construction and not of
a

this

is

profits,

general law.^

a

a

2

1

;

4

;

3

;

a

it

a

5

is

it

the aggregate of the sum subscribed and paid in, or to be
corporation,
paid in, by the shareholders, with tlio addition of profits on tlie residue, after
the deduction of losses. People v. Commissioners of Taxes, 23 N. Y., 192, 219.
In Mechanics' etc. Bank v. Townsend,
Blatch., 315, capital was held not to
include surplus earnings, though undivided.
A railroad company paid the state specific tax under
law which provided that
should not " be assessed with any tax on its lands, buildings or
Held not to preclude municipal taxation.
equipments."
Orange & Alexandria R. R. 1). Alexandria, 17 Grat., 176. Compare this with Richmond ■».Richmond & Danville R. R. Co., 21 id., 604, where an exemption from " any charge
or tax whatsoever " was held to cover municipal as well as state taxes.
See
also Southern R. R. Co. s. Jackson, 88 Miss., 334; Neustadt v. Illinois Central
R. R. Co., 31 111., 484; Gardner v. State, 21 N. J., 557.
Effect of consolidation of railways on previous exemption of one of the
roads. See Tomlinson v. Branch, 15 Wall., 460 Charleston v. Branch, id.,
470.
An exemption from taxation of " property necessarily used in operating
the railroad," held to apply to an inn used exclusively by persons arriving and
departing on the railroad. Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co. u. Board, etc., of Crawford County, 29 Wis., 116. Por other cases of special exemption, see State
Ind., 43 Orr v. Baker,
id., 86 Lord v. Litchfield, 36
Bank v. Madison,
J.,
v.
35
N.
40.
And
see Rex v. Calder,
Conn., 116; State
Haight,
B. & Aid.,
263; State v. Minton, 23 N. J., 529; Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bayless,
Gill, 355; State v. Norwich & Worcester E. R. Co., 30 Conn., 290; Armstrong
1). Athens Co., 16 Pet., 281.
An exemption for the benefit of
religious society ceases on its making
New Haven v. Sheffield, 30 Conn., 160. And as to strict
sale of the property.
construction in general, see Erie Railway v. Pennsylvania, 21 Wall., 492.

Wliere

is

is

a

is

a

'

canal
exempt from taxation the toll house
not taxable.
Co.
v.
Commissioners
Nav.
of
Berks
Co.,
11
Penn.
St., 202.
Schu3'lkill
exempt, this will cover its water stations and depots, but
Where railroad
not warehouses, coal lots, coal shutes, machine shops, wood yards etc., which
are only necessary to the profits to be made by the company. Railroad ». Berks
8

6

id., 70. See Lehigh Co. ». Northampton,
County,
W. & S., 331; Wayne
V. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., 15 Penn. St., 351, 357, where the sub-

Co.

152

[CH. VL

LAW OF TAXATION.

Inyidious exemptions.
■would seem,

it
ought to be either made on the basis of contract, in

An exemption,

which case the public is supposed

to be admissible,

to receive

a

full equivalent

lengtli; N. Y. & Erie R. R. Co. v. Sabin, 26 id., 242;
Co., 30 id., 232; Lacltawaaa Iron Co. v.
of
Luzerne
Co., 42 id., 424; Milwaulcee, etc., R. R. Co., v. Supervisors
Crawford, 29 Wis., 116; Milwauliee, etc., R. R. Co. d. Milwaulice, 34 id., 271;
Orange, etc., R. R. Co. v. Alexandria, 17 Grat., 176, wliicli does not allow the
implied exemptions; Vermont Cent. R. R. Co. v. Burlington, 28 Vt., 198;
Souhegan Nail, etc., Factory «. McConike, 7 N. H., 309; Gardiner «. State, 21
N. J., 557; States. Mansfield, 23 id., 510 ; State «. Flavoll, 24 id., 370; State
». Blundell, 24 id., 402; State v. Belts, 24 id., 555; State v. Newark, 25 id.,
315 ; State «. The Collector of Newark, 26 id., 519 ; State Treasurer v. Somcrville & Easton Railroad Co., 28 id., 21 ; State v. Elizabeth, 28 id., 103 ; State
■B. Lester, 29 id., 541 ; State i>. Hancock, 83 id., 315 ; Hannibal & St. Joseph
Railroad Co. v. Shacklett, 30 Mo., 550 ; State v. H. & St. Jo. R. R. Co., 87 id.,
265; Boston & Me. R. R. Co. v. Cambridge, 8 Cush., 287; Wilmington R. R.
ject is considered

West

Chester

at

Gas Co. «. Cliester

V. Reid, 13 Wall., 264, 268, per Davis, J.
An exemption to a railroad company of" all machines, wagons, vehicles or
cai'riages belonging to the company, with all their works," etc., held to apply
to their real estate as well as to their rolling stock. Richmond v. Richmond
& Danville R. R. Co., 21 Grat., 604, citing Baltimore v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 6
Gill, 238. A provision that a certain tax on the capital and debts of railroad
"
companies sliould take the place of all other taxes on railroads and horse
raib'oad property and franchises," held to exempt propei-ty whether used for
railroad purposes or not. Osboru v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co., 40 Conn., 491.
And see in general. The Tax Cases, 12 G. &. J. 117.
A general exemption of railroad property from taxation has been said to be
coextensive with the right of the railroad company to take property for its use
by condemnation, and that the limit of such right is the limit of the exemption. State V. Hancock, 83 N. J., 315; Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co. «. Milwaukee, 34 Wis., 271.
The act incorporating the Illinois Central Railroad Company provides as
follows : " The * * * stock, jaroperty and assets belonging to said company shall be listed by the president, secretary, or other oflBcer, with the auditor of state, and an annual tax for state purposes shall be assessed by the
auditor upon all the property and assets of every name, kind and description

Co.

Whenever the taxes levied for state purposes
belonging to said corporation.
shall exceed three-fourths of one per cent, per annum, such excess shall be
deducted from the gross proceeds or income herein required to be paid by
said corporation to the state, and the said corporation
is hereby exempted

from all taxation of every kind except as herein provided for." Seld, that
this exemption did not apply to a wharf boat and to a steamboat used
principally in conveying the passengers and freight from the terminus
of the road to the terminus of another railroad, thus making connections. Illinois Central R. R. i'. Irvin, Sup. Court 111., 1875, 7 Chicago Legal News, 286.
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therefor, or it ought to be made on some
policy, such as might justify a pension or
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ground of public
a donation of the

public funds on some general rule of which all who come
It is difficult to conceive
■within it may have the benefit.^
exemption law which selects single individuals or corporations, or single articles of property, and taking them oub
of an

of the class to which they belong, makes them the subject
of capricious legislative favor.
Such favoritism could make
no

pretense

to

equality

legitimate tax legislation.

;

it would lack the

It

is

semblance

certain that municipal

of

bodies

or taxing officers have no authority to make such. exemptions
unless expressly empowered by legislation ; and to make any
would render invalid the whole tax roll on which the exempted
The motives of the
property or person ought to have appeared.
exemption or the beneficial purposes expected to be accomplished
No man is obliged'' to be more
by it can make no difference.
than
the
law requires ; each may stand strictly on his
generous
legal rights, and refuse to submit to any 'exaction that purposely
is made more burdensome to him than the rules of law permit.^
'

"A common burden should be sustained by common contributions, regulated
by some fixed general rule, and apportioned according to some uniform ratio
Thus, if a capitation or personal tax be levied it must be imof equality.
posed on all free citizens equally and alilce, or if an ad valorem or specifio tax
laid on property, it must be laid equally, according to value or kind, on all
the property, or on each article of the same kind, owned by every citizen ;
and no citizen or class of citizens owning any property of the kind subject to
taxation can be exempted constitutionally on any other ground than that of
be

valuable

might

and peculiar public services

be entitled to

enjoy exclusive

;

for otherwise

one man or set of men
or legal exemptions which

privileges,
are substantially the same, without the only constitutional consideration of
public services." JRobertaon, Ch. J., Button's Heirs v. Louisville, 5 Dana, 38,
31.

' Per Paine, J., in Weeks s. Milwaukee, 10 Wis., 343, 263. The case was one
of an exemption of a block in the city of Milwaukee on which a hotel was
about to be constructed ; the common council directing it to be made " in view
of the great public benefit which the construction of the hotel would be to the
city." Compare Exchange Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio, N. S., 1; Adams v. Beman,
In Henry v. Chester, 15 Vt., 460, a tax list was held void on
10 Kansas, 37.
two grounds; "1. The plain and obvious requisitions of the statute in regard
to making up were disregarded, both by important and essential omissions,
and by arbitrary additions without even the color of right or legal warrant. If
this may be done and still the list be regarded as legal, so might it with equal
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The legislature is equally powerless if the constitution has pre-

scribed a rule of equality which forbids exemptions.' Such a
rule, it has been seen, is prescribed by the constitutions of some
of the states, which in terms or by necessary implication require
all private property in the state to be taxed in proportion to its
value.^

Accidental omissions from taxation.

It has

been decided

in

omissions from taxation, of persons or property that should be taxed, occurring through the negligence or default of officers to whom the execution of the taxing

a number of cases that accidental

propriety if the entire real estate in town were omitted or inserted wliolly at
random, witliout even the form of an appraisal." See State v. Branin, 23 N.
J., 484; Hersey e. Supervisors, etc., 16 Wis., 185; Crosbys. Lyon, 37 Cal.,
242; Primm v. Belleville, 59 111., 142; Kneeland ». Milwaukee, 15 Wis., 454;
Smith t). Smith, 19 id., 615; People v. McCreery, 34 Cal., 433. Including in
the assessment persons who are not liable, and against whom a tax cannot bo
enforced, does not invalidate the tax against the rest. Inglee v. Bosworth, 5
Pick.. 498. See Dillingham v. Snow., 5 Mass., 547.
An illegal exemption by the common council of one man from a sewer tax
will not authorize another to have his tax enjoined where it appears that his
Page v. St. Louis, 20 Mo., 136.
payment is not increased by the exemption.
The principle is that no one is to be heard to complain of that which works
no injury to him.
See Sanford «. Dick, 15 Conn., 447; Case e. Dean, 16

Mich.,
'

12.

In Gilman

Sheboygan, 2 Black, 510, it was held that under a constituprovision requiring that " the rule of taxation shall be uniform, and

tional

v.

taxes shall be levied upon such property as the legislature shall prescribe,"
it was not competent to provide that a tax for a special improvement should
be laid exclusively on real estate. The cases of Weeks «. Milwaukee, 10

Wis.,

Knowlton v. Supervisors of Rock Co., 9 id., 410; Lumsden v.
id., 282, and Attorney General v. Plankroad Co., 11 id., 35, 42, are
referred to as having settled the construction of the constitution of the state
which would forbid the sweeping exemption of personal property. It is to
242;

Cross,

10

law of the state at that time required the taxation
of " all property, real and personal, not expressly exempted therefrom." Com
pare Bright v. MoCullough, 27 Ind., 223 ; Primm v. Belleville, 55 111., 142. In
assessing by benefits the tax will be void if it appears that exemptions are
made of property which should be taxed. Alexander v. Baltimore, 5 Cill,

be observed that the general

383, 390.

Compare Page

v. St.

Loui^, 20 Mo., 136.

O'Kane «. Treat, 25 111., 557, 561 and other cases already cited. A
provision that all real property shall be subject to taxation
exemptions, amounts to a prohibition of further exenumerated
certain
with
Oliver,
25 Ark., 289.
v.
Fletcher
emptions.
2 See

constitutional
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laws is intrusted, wonld not have the effect to vitiate the whole
tax. The reasons for this conclusion are summarized in one of
the cases as follows : " The execution of these laws is necessarily
intrusted to men, and men are fallible, liable to frequent mistakes
If such errors on the part of
of fact, and errors of judgment.
those who are attempting in good faith to perform their duties
should vitiate the whold tax, no tax could ever be collected.
And therefore, though they sometimes increase improperly the
burden of those paying taxes, the rule which holds the tax not
thereby avoided is absolutely essential to the continuation of the
government."
J., in

^

It

seems difficult

to resist

the force of this rea-

Milwaukee, 10 Wis., 243, 263, wliere the following
upon; Speer v. Braintree, 34 Vt., 414; State v. The
Collector of Jersey City, 24 N. J., 108 ; Insurance Co. v. Yard, 17 Penn. St.,
See also State v. Randolph,
331; Williams i). School District, 31 Pick., 75.
25 N. J., 427, 431; Smith v. Smith, 19 Wis., 615; Schofield v. Watkins, 22 111.,
34 Cal., 432.
66 ; Dunhajn «. Chicago, 55 id., 357, 361 ; People ». MoCreery,
In Watson v. Princeton, 4 Met., 599, 602, Shaw, Ch. J., says that the case of omission, through error of judgment or mistake of law, to tax property that should
he taxed, can give no right of action to recover back any portion of the tax
paid by another. " Various other remedies may be resorted to to secure just
The law is strict in requiring that the whole valuation
and legal taxation.
shall be laid before the tax paying inhabitants, in order that any omission,
mistake or irregularity may be corrected before the tax is collected.
It is for
the interest of the town, and of the inhabitants generally, that each inhabitant
liable should be taxed, and to the extent of his liability; and therefore it must
be presumed to be the inclination of assessors to impose rather than omit a
tax, in case of doubt, leaving the Individual aggrieved to raise the question if
he shall think tit. And the final remedy, if the inhabitants believe that their
are acting upon erroneous principles, is to elect others in their
assessors
See also George v. School District, 6 Met., 497; Dean ii. Gleason, 16
places."
Wis., 1. There has been some disposition in Illinois to hold that, even in the
case of intentional omissions, the parties aggrieved should be left to their remedy against the assessor, and the tax roll sustained.
Schofield «. Watkins, 23
111., 72 ; Merritt v. Farris, 32 id., 303, 311 ; Dunham ». Chicago, 55 id., 357, 361.
But see Primm v. Belleville, 59 id., 143. In Muscatine v. Railroad Co., 1 Dill.,
536, 543, Mr. Justice Miller, at the circuit, had occasion to consider the efiect
of omitting to tax certain property which, as it was claimed, the constitution
expressly required should be taxed with all other. He said : " A statute of
Iowa exempts railroad property from all other taxes except one per cent, per
annum paid into the state treasury.
The constitution of the state declares
that all taxation shall be uniform. Whether this constitutional provision (the
exact terms of which I have not attempted to state) renders the statute void,
ia a question upon which the supreme court of this state has twice, as
am
^Paine,

Weeks

v.

cases are cited and relied

I
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it applies to the case of a mistake of law with the

Indeed where
same cogency as to the case of a mistake of fact.
the omission has occurred through no purpose to evade or disrewhich produced it seems wholly

gard official duty, the occasion
immaterial.^

If

tbe question wag presented to the circuit
informed, been equall}' divided.
court by way of supervisory control over the otHcers, who, under its command, are collecting this tax, whether this railroad property should be

I

I

do not see how it could avoid
confess
am asked to
an
to
order
assess the property,
deciding it. But, instead of
This, it will be
declare all other assessments void, because it is not assessed.
assessed

the same as other property,

I

I

can only enjoin its col'
seen, is a very diflferent question; and it is clear that
lection on the ground that it is void.
The case of Oilman v. Sheboygan, 2
Black, 510, is relied on as authority for the latter proposition. In that case,
after the city of Sheboygan had issued bonds in- aid of a railroad, the legislature of that state passed an act declaring that the tax to pay these bonds should
The constitution of
be assessed exclusively on the real estate of the city.

Wisconsin has a provision similar to the one referred to in the constitution of
Iowa, and the supreme court of the United States held this attempt to make a
part only of the taxable property of the city resjionsible for this particular
debt, was a violation of the constitution, which rendered the tax levied under
that statute void.
" In the case before us there is no attempt to render any species of
property
liable to taxation for any specific debt, or class of debts, but an exemption of
the railroad from all other burdens in consideration
may be more or less than its share of such burden.

of

a definite sum,

which

"Whether this exemption

forbidden by the constitution or not, I am quite clear that it does not
render void the tax which is levied upon other property.
" The case of Oilman v. Sheboygan does not go so far as this, either in the
facts on which it is grounded, or the reasous by which the judgment was sustained. There is a manifest difference between an attempt to impose the enlire burden of a debt already incurred by a municipality, upon a particular
species of property, and the attempt to exempt a species of property from all
other taxation, in consideration of a sum supposed to be its just share of the
It is not inappropriate to look to the consequences of
general public burden.
holding that this failure to assess the railroads renders all other tax void. It
applies to the tax assessed for all other purposes as well as this tax. Every
nonresident holder of property in the state could apply to me and insist on an
injunction against the tax on his property. And if the state judges believe
it to be void, they would be bound on the same principle to suspend the collecfi(m of all taxes throughout the entire state.
A proposition which loads
inevitably to such a result can not be sound. I cannot therefore grant an injunction on this ground, whether railroad property is liable to taxation or not."
be

v. McCreery, 34 Cal., 433, where the mistake was one of law,
was held not to be fatal.
the
omission
but

'See People
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A

Inyidious assessments.

tax when assessed by valuation
may be made unequal and oppressive by the unfairness with
which the valuation is made. The remedies for an excessive
valuation we have no purpose to consider in this place
long more properly to a subsequent part of the work.
eral rule, a tax cannot depend for its validity upon the

;

they be-

As

a gen-

ability to

is

it

it,

Value is matter
justify it to the satisfaction of a court or jury.
of opinion, and when the law has provided officers upon whom
the opinion of these officers to
the duty is imposed to make
The court cannot
which the interests of the parties are referred.
sit in judgment upon their errors, nor substitute their own
opinions for the conclusions the officers of the law have reached.

It

a

a

it

is

that there may be circumstances under
Supwhich the action of these officers will not be conclusive.
that
peradventure,
admitted, or established beyond
pose
possible, however,

a

by the law to apportion
public officer who has been empowered
certain burdens among the citizens, as in his judgment shall be
fraudulent purpose, and instead of
just, has been actuated by
attempting to carry the law into effect, has wholly disregarded its
m.andate, declined to bring his judgment to bear upon the question submitted to him, and arbitrarily, with the intent and purpose

"

A

question,

it

Such

a

would

seem,

be that the citizen

?

to be unquestioned or unquestionable, can
has no remedy against the wrong intended

it

a

to defeat the equity at which the law aims, has determined to imparticular citizen. Suppose this
pose an excessive burden upon

could admit of but one answer.

to accomplish

He

is

ments, his cupidity or his malice.

;

is

discretionary power cannot excuse an officer for refusal to exerHis judgment
cise his discretion.
not his resentappealed to
the instrument of the law

His judgment may indeed be final

means of prevention.

if

a

;

a

particular end, through specified means and when
he purposely steps aside from his duty to inflict
wanton injury,
in
him
has
not
disarmed the law of the
the confidence reposed
he

Merrill

v

»

Assessor indeed are clothed with

Humphrey,

24

Mich,,

170.

Sec Same Case, 11

a

correction."'

it,

but an arbitrary and capricious exertion of
official authority, being without law, and done to defeat the purpose of the law, must, like all other wrongs, be subject to the law's
shall exercise

power which

Law Reg., N.

S.,
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is quasi judicial, but fraud vitiates even the most solemn judgments of courts, and the action of these quasi judicial bodies cannot stand on any higher ground.
It may be that all presumptions should

to protect them against
personal actions at the suit of parties aggrieved, but such presumptions cannot preclude inquiry when their action is questioned for
fraud. The policy of the law may protect the person, but it
would be defeated if legal effect should be given to such frauduso

far favor their action

as

lent levies.*

Duplicate taxation.

It

has been remarked on a preceding

that when personal property is taxed, duplicate taxation is
sometimes imposed.
By this was meant that such property sometimes, after being subjected to one levy for the support of governpage^

ment for the current year, is by a change

jected to taxation

a

of circumstances subsecond time for the support of government

Such a case would generally occur in
during the same period.
consequence of the removal of the property, after the listing in
with note by Judge Eedfield.
See also Albany, etc., R. R. Co. v. Canaan,
Barb., 244; BuflFalo, etc., R. R. Co. u. Erie County, 48 N. Y., 93; Western
R. R. Co. V. Nolan, 48 id., 513 ; Fuller v. Gould, 20 Vt, 043, 644 ; Stearns v. Miller,
25 id., 20; Wilson v. Marsh, 34 id., 352; State i>. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 7
208,
16

Kev., 99. That neither a state nor a municipality has a right to discriminate in taxatiou between residents and nonresidents,
see ante, p. 64; City
Council of Charleston ads. State, 3 Speers L., 719 ; Nashville v. Althorp, 5
Cold., 554.
Compare Jones v. Columbus, 25 Geo., 610, where it was held
competent to discriminate between residents and nonresidents of a city in
the taxation of slaves employed therein.
But any such discrimination must
be expressl}' authorized by law.
Robinson ». Charleston, 2 Rich., 317.
The recent case of Adams v. Beaman, 10 Kansas, 37, should be considered
in connection with the Michigan and Wisconsin cases referred to in this and
the succeeding note.
' See Lefferts ». Supervisors

of Calumet,

Wis., 688, where it was decided that
would be restrained where the taxing oflBcers in their
assessment had fraudulently discriminated against the complainant ; Merrill v.
Humphrey, 24 Mich., 17, a similar case with the same holding; Milwaukee Iron Co. 11. Hubbard, 29 Wis., 51, approving and following the case
See also Mason v. Lancaster, 4 Bush, 406, 408.
first cited.
Inequality in a
legal sense is not produced by certain tax paj'ers taking proceedings which
vacate an assessment as to them, while others, who have lost the like right by
delay, remain taxed, especially when the lands relieved are liable to reassessment. Matter of DeLancy, 52 N. Y., 80.
the collection

»

Ante, p. 28.

of

a tax

21
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jurisdiction, into another where the time of listing was later.
A system of indirect taxes, combined with a system of general taxation by value, must often have the effect to duplicate the
burden upon some species of property or upon some persons, and
the taxation of stockholders in a corporation, and also of ihe corone

There is
poration itself must sometimes produce a like result.
also sometimes what seems to be a double taxation of the same
property to two individuals ; as where the purchaser of property
on credit is taxed on its full value, while the seller is taxed to the
same amount on the debt.'

How this would operate may be

" all
" to be " taxed in
property
proportion to its value," it is held not competent to exempt solvent debts from
'

In California,

wliose constitution

requires

People v. McCreery, 34 Cal., 432 ; People v. Yerke,
Black Diamond Co., 37 id., 54; People v. Whartenby,
38 id., 461. For a decision to the same purport in Illinois, see Trustees v. McConnell, 12 111., 138. The fact that the debt is secured by mortgage on propPeople v. Eddy, 43 Cal.,
erty which is also taxed, can make no difference.
331 ; compare Lick v. Austin, id., 590.
But in Savings and Loan Society v.
Austin, 46 id., 415,the majority of the court held that a debt/or money loaned,
taxation to the creditor.

35 id., 677;

People

v.

if the mortgaged property was also taxed. The reasoning of the court may be thus summarized ;
the debt is taxed, the mortgagee will take this into account in
making the loan, and it goes to increase the interest he demands. In effect,
■which -was secured by mortgage, could not be taxed to the creditor

If

therefore, the tax on the debt will be paid by the mortgagor. But he also pays
the tax on the property, and consequently duplicate taxation is imposed upon
him. This reasoning, if applied universally to indirect taxation, would keep
the boards very busy in correcting the inequalities of tax legislation. And

why it should

be

apparent, since

limited

if all

of a loan secured by mortgage, is not very
for property sold are taxed, it may with consider-

to the case

debts

able plausibility be argued that the seller has anticipated the tax and added it
to the price, so that the purchaser pays twice when he comes to pay the assessment on the property bought.
But then, whether the tax does increase the interest demanded on the loan, must depend on circumstances.
all loans are

If

taxed, it may be conceded that the interest will be increased ; but if only a
part of them are taxed, those making the taxed loans may not be able to add
the tax to the ihterest. In a locality, for instance, in which nonresidents were
loaning money freely, a resident might be compelled to submit to a loss of the

?

inequalities.

a

is

is

it,

tax in order to be able to make any loans at all. And then one v/ho has borrowed money without security may be taxed on that, or on what he hasbouo-ht
with
and if the lender
faxed on the loan, why
not this also
case of
duplicate taxation
These are suggestions merely, but they may serve to indicate the labyrinth of difficulties into which the courts would be thrown if
the effects of taxation were thus to be traced up for the purpose of
correcting
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readily perceived by supposing the extreme case that all the property in a town is sold on credit, in which case, if the property is
taxed to the purchasers, and the debts to sellers, it is manifest
that the town taxes twice as much wealth as lies within its
borders.

Now, whether there is injustice in the taxation in every instance in which it can be shown that an individual who has been
direcLly taxed his due proportion is also compelled indirectly to
It is
contribute, is a question we have no occasion to discuss.
snfJficient for our purposes to show that the decisions are nearly,
if not quite, unanimous in holding that taxation is not invalid because of any such unequal results.^

It

cannot be too distinctly
borne in mind, that any possible system of tax legislation must
inevitably pi-oduce unequal and unjust results in individual instances

;

and

if inequality in result must defeat the general law,

then taxation becomes impossible, and governments must fall
back upon arbitrary exactions.
But no such impracticable prinWhile equality and justice
ciple is recognized in i-evenue laws.

It is no objection to a tax graduated by tbe amount of a merchant's sales,
that a part of the goods sold had been purchased of another who had paid a
tax thereon. Mayes v. Erwine, 8 Humph., 390.
The money of a depositor may be taxed to him, and the deposits of the bank,
'

including this, may also be taxed to the bank. Yuba Co. v. Adams, 7 Cal.,
And see other cases further on.
Income may be taxed though invested in real estate which is taxed the same
year. Lott v. Hubbard, 44 Ala., 593.
Income, as used in a statute exempting incomes from taxation, held to mean
Wilcox v. Middlesex County, 103
the creation of capital, industry and skill.
Mass., 544. lucome means that which comes in and is received from any
business or investment of capital without reference to the oulgoing expenditures. Profits, on the other hand, are understood to mean the net gain of any
business or investment, taking into account both receipts and payments. Income, as applied: to the aflfairs of individuals, expresses the same idea that
revenue does when applied tothe affairs of government.
People ii. Supervisors of Niagara, 4 Hill, 30, affirmed 7 Hill, 504. As to difference between
" annual value " and " annnal income," see Troy Iron and
Nail Factory v.
Winslow, 45 Barb., 331. There is a case in Texas in which the indirect results of taxaticm were followed up somewhat sharply.
The law subjected " all
property-, real and personal'," with certain exceptions, to taxation.
A planter
was taxed on his corn and cotton, but contested the tax as duplicate, because
he had already been taxed on his slaves and mules by which he produced the
corn and cotton. The objection was found by the court to be insurmount35.

able.

State V. Jones, 5 Texas, 883.
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are constantly to be aimed at, impossibilities are not demandedTax legislation must be practical.^ It is one of the reasons for
indirect taxes, and other taxes than those on property by

levying
exvalue, that they tend to diminish the inequalities that would
The
ist if a single species of taxation only were to be levied.
law has
legislature must judge of the general result, and when the
as
apportioned the tax, individual hardships must be regarded
which are incident to regular governThe same necessity that justifies any taxation will justify
ment.
and sustain any reasonable provisions for giving it effect. The
necessity of the state and reasonable provisions for the security
among the inconveniences

of the individual must be equally considered ; the state is no more
to be deprived of its revenue, because of individual hardship, resulting from general rules, than is the individual to be stripped of
his property without law, because in its necessity the state finds it
more convenient to take

it thus than by regular proceedings.

incidental hardship or inconvenience must be submitted

The
to in

either case.

These general views have often been declared by able jurists.
"Property," it is said in one case, "is liable in many cases to be
taxed twice, when it would appear difficult or unsafe to make
Thus, stock in trade may be taxed
provision by law to prevent.
to the owner, while he may be indebted for

it to many persons,

who may be taxed for those debts or the money loaned to purEeal estate may be taxed to a mortgagor in possession
chase it.
while the mortgagee is taxed for the money secured by the mort* * * So imperfect are all human institutions, that
gage.
perfect equality in the imposition of burdens is not to be exThese provisions for valuation are not considered to be
in conflict with the general purpose to have all property subjected
to taxation once, and only once at the same time." ^ " The power
pected.

'

" There is nothing poetical

about tax laws.
Wherever they find property
they claim a contribution for its protection, without any special respect to the
owner or his occupation." Lowrie, Oh. J., in Pinley v. Philadelphia, 33 Penn.
St., 381.

'Augusta Bank v. Augusta, 36 Me., 255, 359, per Shepley, Ch. .1. See People
Worthington, 31 III., 171; Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Penn. St., 358; St. Louis Life
Ins. Co. v. Assessors, 56 Mo., 503, per Voris, J. For cases of apparent double
taxation by a tax on business, see Savannah v. Charlton, 86 Geo., 460 ; Burch

v.

11
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to tax twice," it is said in another
once."

1

case,

[CH.

"is

as

ample

as

VI.

to tax

We make out, therefore, no conclusive case against a

71. Savannah, 43

id., 596

;

Saci'amento

v.

Crocker, 16 Cal.,

119 ;

Coulson

■€.Har-

Woolman «. State, 2 Swan, 353. As to tlie impossibility of
avoiding ineqnalities in liigliway taxes, see Hiugliam, etc., Turnpilse Co. v.
Norfolk Co., 6 Allen, 358, 359, per Bigelow, Ch. J.
In Williams «. Cammack, 27 Miss., 309, 224, Handy, J., speaking of a special
levee assessment, says: "Nor is it any objection to the constitutionality of
Every revenue l>ill,
the act that it operates injuriously upon the appellant.
and every work of public improvement must, more or less, have such an effect. But they must be submitted to as the necessary action of the machinery
of government, and as individual sacrifices to the general good, in order that
This principle rests
the advantages of the social compact may be enjoyed.
on the very foundatisns of society, and is illustrated in every day's experience ;
the citizen yielding his natural rights, even of life, liberty or property, to
the public good. But he can only claim immunity when it is secured to him
by the principles of the constitution."
lu People «. Whyler, 41 Cal., 851, 355, a levee tax was objected to as not
equal, because not apportioned according to benefits. The court held that it

ris,

43 Miss., 728;

was required to be apportioned by value, and Rhodes, Ch. J., says: "A tax is
equal and uniform which reaches and bears with the like burden upon all the

property within the given district, county, etc. It bears the like burden when
the valuation of each parcel is ascertained in the same mode — the mode prescribed by law- — and when it is subject to the same rate of taxation as other
property within the district, county, etc. Absolute equality is unattainable,
and the benefits derived or to be derived from the expenditure

of the tax

can-

not be taken into account."

iWest Chester Gas Co. -o. Chester County, 30 Penn. St., 232, per Porter, J.,
cited with approval in Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 66 Penn.
id., 84. Congress
St., 73, 77-8. See also Erie Railway Co. i>. Commonwealth,
having levied a tax upon an article, is not thereby precluded from levying
another.

Yard,

9

U. S. v. Benson, 2 Cliff., 512. In Philadelphia Savings Fund v.
Penn. St., 359, 361, in referring to the case of The Carlisle Bank, 8

Watts, 291, the following remarks are made: "The horror of double taxation,
manifested in that case, is unsuited to tlie times ; for it has obtained, and must
prevail in the exigencies of the commonwealth; moreover, it is expressly recognized and established by the fith section of the act of 16th April, 1845. It
exists in the case of ground rents, where the ground itself and the reditum
issuing from it are taxed ; in a tax upon a mortgage to the whole value of the
land, and the land itself. And so, where A. borrows money on mortgage and
loans it to C. on bond, and who loans a part of it to D., it is taxed in the curIn the complexity and involutions of busirent of each actual employment.
dollar
is
a
employed
ness,
many times in a day, and in each actual employment represents the property, business, or the person of him wlio uses it. And
in cases of this kind, it is tlie usufruct and not the actual or identical money,
that is taxed."

In

Pittsburgh,

ete,j B.

R. Co.

1>.Commonwealth,

C8

Penn. St.

CH.
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twice the same property for
This may have been intended, and in many

tax, when we show that it reaches
the same purpose.

cases at least, is admissible.*
" It
[the case in judgfollowing remarks are made by the same court:
considered unment] resulted even in double taxation, that has never been
lawful in this state. On the contrary, it is of frequent occurrence. The real
and personal property of a corporation may be taxed, although it pays a tax
on the stock which purchased it. Lackawana Iron Co. v. Luzerne County, 43
Penn. St., 424, 431. See Cai-bon Iron Co. d. Carbon County, 39 Penn. St., 351 ;
West Chester Gas Co. v. Chester County, 30 Penn. St., 333; Philadelphia Sav77, tlie

ings Fund 1). Yard, 9 id., 361. The power of the legislature is as ample to tax
twice as to tax once (30 id., 332) ; and it is done daily, as all experience shows.
Kirby v.
9 id., 861.
Equality of taxation is not required by the constitution.
Shaw, 19 id., 258. The stock may be full taxed to the institution and also to the
stockholders (Whitsell v. Northampton County, 49 id., 526, 539) ; and the stockholder in a corporation of another state is obliged to pay a tax to Pennsylvania
on his stock, he being a resident here, although the whole profit and stock is
subject to taxation in the state of its location." See also Toll-bridge Co. v.
Osborn,

Conn.,

35

J.

503, per Voris,

Louis Life Ins. Co.
In Eyre v. Jacob, 14 Grat.,

7 ; St.

Board of Assessors,

422, a tax on collateral

Mo.,
inherit-

S6

of property was repoints out that it is not a tax on property, but
of succeeding to the inheritance.

ances was sustained against

quired to be uniform.
on the privilege

v.

Lee,

an objection

that taxation

J.,

'

The case of The Toll-bridge Co. i). Osborn, 35 Conn., 7, is a very strong one.
corporation w as chartered to build and maintain a toll-bridge, with power,
" for the purpose of carrying the resolve into effect," to purchase and hold

A

it,

lands not exceeding one hundred acres. The company built the bridge, and
soon after purchased a large quantity of mud flats adjoining the bridge, and
which became of great value and were profitably
erected wharves upon

An

rented.

corporation,

in 1847, provided that the real estate of any private
" above what was required and used for the
transaction of its ap-

act, passed

a

if

propriate business," sliould be liable to be assessed and taxed to the same extent as
owned by individuals. Held, that the real estate thus used by the
company for wharves, was liable to taxation under the statute.
The facts in this case were such, that the property was really taxed several
times. By the decision of the court, the corporation was compelled to pay
this property;

the shareholders

;

a

a

a

paid
tax upon their shares of
stock which represented this property; and the corporation also paid
tax
upon Its capital stock and, furthermore, as
great part of the stock was
tax upon

a

a

a

owned by railway company, they might be taxed as shareholders, and also
upon their capital stock, of which these shares were
part, while the shareholders in the railway company might be required to pay
tax upon their
shares also.

is

it

it

The court held, that
mattered not, so long as the legislative intent was
was the general policy of the law to avoid duplicate taxation,
clear. While
yet, where the meaning of the statutes
clear, the court cannot pronounce

[CH. VI.

LAW OF TAXATIOIT

164

in which duplicate taxation may be
understood — and which we think is the proper sense — which
would render it wholly inadmissible under any constitution requiring equality and uniformity in taxation. By duplicate taxation in
There is

a sense, however,

requirement that one person or any one
shall directly contribute tivice to the same burden,

this sense is understood
subject

of taxation

the

ivhile other subjects of taxation belonging
to contribide but once.

to the same class

are required

for instance, how a tax on a merchant's stock
by value could be supported, when by the same authority and for
the same purpose the same stock was taxed by value as a part of
his property. This is a very different thing from one tax upon
property and another upon the business, though the latter may

We do not

see,

indirectly reach the property
tion of ultimate effects ; but
only under

a

;

a

different name.

here is no circumlocution, no ques-

tax levied twice on the same subject
The same may be said of a tax on

the property of a corporation and also on the capital which is invested in the property

;

if the latter is taxed

as

property, this also
would be the taxa-

is duplicate taxation, and as much unequal as
tion of a farmer's cattle by value, when on the same basis it is
taxed as a part of his general property. When, for instance, the
money paid in as capital of a manufacturing corporation has been
invested in buildings and machinery, these are what then represent
the capital, and to tax the capital as valuable property distinct from
that which then represents it would be to tax a mere shadow ; ^ it
them invalid because they admit of duplicate taxation.
Manuf. Co. ii. Commonwealth, 69 Penn. St., 137.

'That the capital of

Comijare Jones, etc.,

is represented by the property in which
it has been invested, can hardly require the citation of authorities, but the
following may be referred to. Gordon o. Baltimore, 5 Gill, 331 ; Baltimore v.
a corporation

Baltimore and Ohio E. R. Co., 6 id., 288 ; Tax Cases, 12 Gill and J., 117 ;
Eome R. R. Co. v. Rome, 14 Geo., 375 ; Augusta ». Georgia R. R., etc., Co., 26
id., 651 1 Hannibal, etc., R. R. Co. v. Shacklett, 30 Mo., -^50; Auditor, etc., «.
New Albany, etc., R. R. Co., 11 lud., 570; Conwell v. Connersville, 15 id., 150;
Mutual Ins. Co. u. Supervisors of Erie, 4 N. Y.,442; Salem Iron Factory ■v.
Danvers,10Mass.,515;
Amesbury Woolen, etc., Co. ■o. Amesbury, 17 id., 461;
Boston, etc., Glass Co. v. Boston, 4 Met., 181 ; Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston,
9 id., 199 ; Bangor & Piscataqua R. R. Co. v. Harris, 31 Me., 533 ; Cumberland
Marine R. v. Portland, 87 Me., 444; Savings Bank v. New London, 20 Conn.,
111,117; Bridgeport v. Bishop, 33 id., 187; Toll Bridge Co. -o. Osborn, 35 id.,
7 ; New Haven v. City Bank, 31 id., 106 ; Bank of Cape Fear -o. Edwards, 5
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stand for the substance in order

that it might be taxed, when the substance itself is taxed directly
"We do not speak here of a
under its own proper designation.
taxation of the property and also of the franchise ; those being
two things

as

will be seen further on.

^

against duplicate taxation.

Presumption

It has very

pro-

laws was
perly and justly been held that a construction of the
not to be adopted that would subject the same property to be twice
the express
charged for the same tax, unless it was required by
^
It is a fundawords of the statute, or by necessary implication.

mental maxim in taxation that the same property shall not be
subject to a double tax payable by the same party, either directly
or indirectly ; and where it is once decided that any kind or class
of property is liable to be taxed under one provision of the statutes,
it has been held to follow as a legal conclusion, that the legislature
could not have intended the same property should be subject to
another tax, though there may be general words in the law which
would seem to imply that it may be taxed a second time.

This

^

Fitcliburgh K. R. Co. v. Prescott, 47
of a corpoi-ation,
N. H., 63. For the distinction
v. New York
Bank
of
Commerce
see
and a tax on its capital as property,
v. People,
Wall.,
Bradley
573
;
City, 3 Black, 630 ; Van Allen v. The Assessor, 3
capital
the
4 id., 459. The law of these cases is that where the tax is on

Ired., 516

Smith

;

«.

Exeter, 37 N. H., 556

;

hetween a tax on the franchise

hy

a valuation

it is invalid

as property,

if

the capital is invested

in

nontaxa

hie securities.

'When the capital stock of a corporation is required to be assessed at its
" actual value," this moans above or below the par value according to the fact,
Oswego Starch Factory v. Dolloway, 31 N .Y., 449.
2

Salem Iron, etc., Co. «. Danvers, 10 Mass., 514; Amesbury Woolen, etc., Co.
17 id., 461; Water Power Co. t). Boston, 9 Met, 199, 302 ; Bank of

D.Amesbury,

Georgia «. Savannah, Dudley, 130 ; Gordon's Executors v. Baltimore, 5 Gill, 231 ;
The Tax Cases, 12 Gill and J., 117 ; Savings Bank v. New London, 30 Conn.,

Ill,

117;

R. Co.,

Toll Bridge
40

id., 491;

Co.

v.

Osborn, 35 id., 7; Osborn

Smith v. Burley,

9N. H,423;

v.

N.

Y.

and

Savings Bank

N. H. R.
d.

Ports-

mouth, 53 N. H.,17.
3

Savings Bank

v.

423 and other cases.

Nashua, 46 N. H., 389-398, citing Smith v. Burley, 9 N. H.,
And see Osborn «. N. Y. and N. H. R. R. Co., 40 Conn.,

In State v. Sterling, 20 Md., 503, a law taxed savings banks a certain
percentage on all the deposits held by them on a certain day. Held to be void
because not exempting the investments in securities otherwise taxed or not

491, 494.

taxable at all.
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sound and very just rule of construction, and it has been applied in manj cases where, at first reading of the law, a double
is

a

taxation might seem to have been intended.

^

A few instances

Application of tlie presumption.

in which

this rule of presumption has been applied will show what taxation
has been held to be in effect duplicate taxation, and for that reason
excluded from the general language made use of in tax laws.
shares in any incorporated
taxable
company possessing
property were taxable to the owners
in the towns of their residence respectively. While this was in
force, a manufacturing corporation was assessed under the gen-

Under

a statute

in Massachusetts,

eral law for the taxation of property to its owners, for
and personal estate

It

all its real

in the town where its business was carried

on.

was held that this taxation of shares was by implication to be

regarded as standing in the place of a taxation of the personal
estate to the corporation itself, since,

As

in effect be duplicate taxation.

if both were taxed, it would

to the real estate, however, the

The taxes upon that had always, in
that state, been paid exclusively to the town in which it was situated.
In all successive valuations made in pursuance of the
laws for that purpose, each town had been charged with the value

conclusion was different.

therefore be unjust

if

in the apportionment of the tax

It would

among the several towns.
estate which

it,

of all the real estate within

the real

in estimating the amount of taxes

was included

a

town, by being assessed as represented by the shares
of stockholders elsewhere, should be exempted from contributing
to the discharge of such taxes.
The policy of all the tax laws
had been that the land should contribute to the local taxes irrespective of the residence of the owner, and

this was intended in the

case

the implication that

of corporate real estate was so strong

;

7; 4

id., 484

Smith

v.

v.

;

Mumford,

Exeter, 37

IST.

R. I.,

H., 556

Greenl.,

10

Cush.,

Savings Bank v. Gardiner,
Bridge Co. v. Osborn, 35 Conn.,

478, 482

;

American Bank

;

;

128

4

;

4

;

^Bank of Georgia s. Savannah, Dudley, 132 Factory Co. v. Gardiner,
Glass Co. d. Boston,
Met., 181 Savings Bank v. Worcester,

133

5

charged on

Toll

Hannibal, etc., R. R Co., 37 Mo., 265. In the case of Kimball v.
Milford just decided by the supreme court of New Hampshire
Am. Law
Times' Reports, 504), stock in foreign corporation, which by its charter pays
specific tax in lieu of all others, was held not taxable in New Hampshire,

a

a

(2

State «.

under its statutes.
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that the counteracting presumption against an intent to impose
duplicate taxation must yield to it.^
So in Georgia it has been held under a city charter empow,ering the corporation in general terms to levy taxes on real and
while the city might tax the stockholders of
a bank upon their shares, this taxation would by implication exIn Pennsylclude the taxation of the bank on its capital stock.^
personal

estate, that

vania it has been decided that a tax on the discount business of a
bank is in a degree a tax upon the capital of the bank. Where
therefore it was provided by its char-ter that the bank should not
be subject to taxation on its capital stock, for any other than state
purposes, the tax on its discount business would be inadmissible

but for the fact that the charter was granted under and subject to
a provision in the state constitution which made it at all times
subject to legislative alteration or repeal.^
So in Massachusetts it is held that a bank which pays a specific
tax on its capital stock is not taxable on collaterals deposited with
' Salem Iron Factory

10 Mass., 514.
This case was followed
in Ameshury Woolen, etc., Co. v. Amesbnry,
17 id., 461.
And see as to the real estate, Amesbury Nail Factory Co. ii. "Weed,
17 id., 53; Tremont Bank v. Boston, 1 Cush., 142; Boston "Water Power Co. v.
Boston, 9 Met., 199. In Middlesex R. R. Co. •». Charleston, 8 Allen, 330, where
shareholders in a street railway were taxable on their shares in the towns
where they resided, it was held not competent to tax the personal property of
the corporation used in and necessary for the prosecution of its business.
"The value of the personal property owned by the corporation is included as
a subject of taxation in the value of the shares ; as in the case of banks, insurance companies, manufacturing corporations and other railroads." Soar, J.,
p. 333. Compare The Tax Cases, 12 G. & J., 117. To tax a bank on its prop-

after some change

in

v.

Dauvers,

the statute,

tution

-0.

Gardiner,

4

I.,

erty and also the stockholders on their shares was regarded as duplicate taxation, and not allowable under the Maryland laws, in Gordon's Ex'rs v. Baltimore, 5 Gill, 231, and Baltimore v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 6 Gill, 288. And see
in Rhode Island, American Bank v. Mumford, 4 R.
478; Providence Insti-

Bank of Georgia

id., 484.

it

a

«

Savannah, Dudley, 132, citing with approval the Massachusetts cases.
So where
bank was exempt from any tax, except one of
twenty-five cents on every share of its stock owned by individuals,
was dev.

were not taxable on their shares.

Edwards,
Ired., 516. See also Johnson
State V. Tunis, 23 N. J., 546.
5

=

Iron City Bank

v.

Pittsburgh,

37

Bank of Cape Fear

v. Commonwealth,

Penn. St., 340.

7

cided that stockholders
V.

Dana, 338;

it
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So where the shares in a corporation
security for loans.^
were by its charter exempt from taxation, the shares in the hands
of the shareholders are to be understood as exempt also.^
On the other hand a tax on the market value of the capital
stock of a corporation, over and above the value of its real and
as

personal property, is not duplicate taxation

by reason of the tan-

gible property being also taxed, but is a tax upon the franchise.'
So a tax on the deposits of savings societies has been, held a tax
And where by
on the franchise and not a tax on property.^
"
statute
no income shall be taxed which is derived from property
subject to taxation ;" a merchant may nevertheless be taxed on
his income under the general law taxing income from a profession,
" net result of many
trade, or employment, this income being the
combined

influences

;

the use of the capital invested

*

*

;

the personal

labor and services ;
the skill and ability with which they
lay in or from time to time renew their stock ; the carefulness and
good judgment with which they sell and give credit ; and the
^

Waltham Bank

v.

WaltUam, 10 Met., 334 ; Tremont Bank v. Boston,

1

Cusli.,

Iron Factory v. Danvers, 10 Mass., 514.
' State V. Branin, 23 N. J., 484, citing Johnson v. Common-wealth, 7 Dana,
342; Tax Cases, 12 G. & J., 117; Gordon's Ex'rs d. Baltimore, 5 Gill, 281;
Smith B. Burley, 9 N. H., 423. See also State v. Bentley, 23 N". J., 532; State
and see Salem

142;

Powers, 24 id., 400 ; Bank of Cape Fear v. Edwards, 5 Ired., 516.
pare Wilmington, etc., R. R. Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall., 264.
«.

And

com-

held in Hamilton County v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall., 632, in reliance
See Commonwealth «.
upon a settled course of decisions in Massachusetts.
Hamilton Man'f. Co., 12 Allen, 298, 306. Shares of stock in a foreign corpora^ So

tion may he taxed in full to resident owners, irrespective of the taxation of
Dwight d. Boston, 12 Allen, 316. A state
its property where it is located.
franchise
or
the
of a corporation by such rule as it may
tax
the
capital
may

And if the corporation be a railroad
prescribe, even though it be arbitrary.
a
in
two
states, one state may fax the corporation on a
company owning road
proportional part of its stock, measured by the length of the road in that
state.

Minot

j).

Philadelphia,

etc.,

R. R. Co.,

18

Wall.,

206.

Wall., 594; Provident Institution v. Massachusetts, id., 611. See Portland Bank v. Apthorp, 12 Mass, 252; People
■».Savings Bank, 5 Allen, 428; People ». Supervisors
of Niagara, 4 Hill, 30 ;
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.«. New York, 7 id., 201 ; Bank of Utica v. ITtica, 4
Paige, 399 ; Coite i>. Society for Savings, 32 Conn., 173 ; Coite v. Conn. Mu.
Life Ins. Co., 36 id., 512; Illinois Mu. Ins. Co. v. Peoria, 29 III., 180; Olivers.
Washington Mills, 11 Allen, 268; Commonwealth v. Caiy Improving Co., 98
Society of Savings

■*

v. Coite, 6

Mass., 19; Attorney Gjeneral

i\ Mining

Co.,

99

id., 148.
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foresight and address with which they hold themselves prepared
for the fluctuations and contingencies affecting the general comTo express it in a more summerce and business of the country.
mary and comprehensive form, it is the creation of capital, indusSo it is competent to tax brokers upon their annual receipts, notwithstanding they pay a license tax for the privSo a tax upon the amount of
ilege of carrying on that business.^

try and skill."

^

the nominal capital of a bank, without regard to loss or deprecia-

" one annexed
tion, has been likened to

to the franchise as a roy-

alty for the grant.'" A tax on the interest paid by a corporation
on its indebtedness, though collected from the corporation, is still
a tax on the creditor ; the corporation being only made use of as
a convenient means of collecting the tax.*
So a tax on the shares
of stockholders in a corporation is a different thing from a tax on
the corporation itself or its stock, and may be laid irrespective of

any taxation of the corporation when no contract relations forbid.'
So it has been held that a corporation which was required to pay
'

Wilcox

^ Drexel

v. Commissioners
v.

Commonwealtli,

of Middlesex,
46

103 Mass., 544, per Ames,

Perm. St., 31.

In tliis

case

J.

the tax law was

objected to as retrospective because, in order to arrive at the proper measure of
taxation, it required a return of the receipts for the preceding year, and made
that the basis of taxation, but the court justly held there was nothing to this.
3

Bank of Commerce

v.

New Ysrk,

2

Black,

C20, 639, per Nelson,

J.

'HaightD. Railroad Co., 6 Wall., 15; Railroad Co. «. Jackson, 7 id., 263;
United States v. Railroad Ce., 17 id., 323. In the second of these cases a state
tax on the interest on bonds issued by a railroad company and secured by
mortgage on aline lying partly in another state was held to be void, on the ground
that to the extent of the road out of the state she was " taxing property and interests beyond her jurisdiction."
It is to be said of this case that the plaintiff
was a nonresident, and for that reason not taxable in the state on his bonds
under the subsequent decision of the same court. State Tax on
Foreign Held
Bonds, 15 Wall., 300, 328. Railroad bonds are taxable to the owners
notwithstanding the company pays a tax on " the market value of their stock and
their funded and floating debt, in lieu of all other taxes on railroad
property
and franchises."
Bridgeport v. Bishop, 38 Conn., 187.
»

Tremont Bank

Boston,

;

;

8

;

9

26

\

v.

St.',

1 Cush., 143 ; State v. Petway, 3
Jones Eq., 396 ;
N. J., 181 ; Lycoming County c. Gamble, 47 Penn.
106
Whitsell V. Northampton County, 49 id., 536; Union Bank ■!).State,
Yerg.',
493; Oswego Starch Factory ». Dollaway, 31 N. Y., 449; People
v. Bradley,'
39 111., 130, 141
Conwell v. Connersville, 15 Ind., 150; Van Allen v.
Assessors,
Wall., 573, 584 State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 id., 300, 328 Cumberland
Marine Railway s. Portland, 37 Me., 444.

State V. Thomas,

■
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tax on dividends, might nevertheless be taxed on its " net earnings or income ;" this not being the
same thing as dividends.^
So in case of a corporation which pays
a specific tax, an exemption " from any other or further tax or im-

a bonus on its capital

in lieu of

a

position," will not prevent any real estate it maj'- own, and which
" The
is not needed for corporate purposes, from being taxed.
power granted to a corporation to hold land is limited to the purposes for which the power was conferred. This is the general rule,
The
and governs in the construction of the exempting clause.
tax levied may so far operate as a double tax, the property being
already taxed in the shape of capital ; but if the company choose
to invest capital in property not necessary for their business, such
as the legislature did not contemplate in their grant, they cannot
complain that it is twice taxed.

Doable taxation is not uncon-

stitutional."^

It

has often been decided

that

a

tax on the franchise of

and also on its capital or property, was

poration,

a cor-

not duplicate

The franchise, nevertheless, has a property value, and
question of construction, it may sometimes be necessary to

taxation.^
as a
'

Jones,

etc.,

Manf g

Co. v. Commonwealth,

69

Penn.

St., 137.

That stock

divided among stocldiolders as profits are dividends, see Leliigh Crane Iron
Co, 1). Commonwealth, 55 Penu. St., 448; State v. Farmer's Bank, 11 Ohio, 94;
Sun Mu. Ins. Co.

J., in

v.

New York,

8

N. Y.,

241, 350.

Newark, 25 N. J., 315, 317, citing Tatem v. Wright, 23
id., 429.
See also Railroad Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall., 364, 268, per Dams, J.,
Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Irwin, Sup. Ct. 111., 1875, 7 Chicago Legal News,
-

Potts,

State v.

•386.

' Carbon Iron

Co. v. Carhon County, 39 Penn. St., 351 ; Lackawana Iron Co.
Luzerne County, 43 id., 434; Tremont Bank ■«. Boston, 1 Cush., 143; Com.
monwealth v. Lowell Gas Light Co., 13 Allen, 75 ; Commonwealth v. Hamil
ton Manf. Co., id., 298 ; Wilmington, etc., R. R. Co. v. Reid, 64 N. C, 226
Mason v. Lancaster, 4 Bush, 406 ; Monroe Savings Bank v. Rochester, 37 N,
V.

Y.,

365 ;

Bank of Commerce v. New York,
18 Wall., 206.
In Commonwealth

road Co.,

Black, tj20, 629 ; Minot v. Rail
N. E. Slate & tile Co., 13 Allen
defendant corpsration held prop
2

v.

J., says: "The fact that the
erty which was the subject of taxation in. other ways, does not render this tax
upon its franchise illegal. In the practical operation of the powers of taxation, which are given in several forms, it is inevitable that double taxation
shall occur in some cases. The legislature may relieve against it by allowing
deductions if it sees fit to do so; but the court can only apply the law as it
391, 393, Wells,

stands."

still

If

in nontaxable securities, the franchise may
Bank v. Rochester, 37 N. Y,, 365. And see

the capital is invested

be taxed.

M:,nroe Savings
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hold that an exemption of the property of a corporation from taxation is an exemption of the franchise also. It has been so held
in the case of a railroad corporation whose charter provided that
" the
property of said company and the shares therein shall be
^

The intent
from any public charge or tax whatever."
in such a case, when reasonably apparent on the face of the legisIt has been held that a tax on the capital
lation, must control.
exempt

stock measured by dividends was not

tax on dividends, and the
liable to a tax on net earna

corporation paying it was therefore
ings under a statute which provides that corporations not paying
A tax on
a tax on dividends shall be taxed on net earnings.^
" the
capital stock actually paid in or secured to be paid in," is a
tax on the capital at its nominal amount, and is not to be increased or diminished by accumulations or losses.*

These cases

will perhaps illustrate sufficiently the "power of the legislature to
impose taxation that in its result duplicates the burden, as well as
the force of the presumption that the legislature,

in its desire to

lay all burdens of government justly, has never intended duplicate taxation unless plain language expressive of that intent has
been employed.

So far, the subject has been considered as the questions of
equality and justice in taxation arise on the tax laws themselves.
Of the steps necessary or proper to be taken in order to secure
equality under such laws, it will be necessary to speak further on.
Society for Savings
id.,

611 ;

i).

Hamilton Co.

Coite,
v.

6

Wall.,

594;

Provident Inst.

v.

Massacliusetts,

6

Massachusetts, id., 632.

Eailroad Uo. ?). Eeid, 13 Wall., 264; Raleigh, etc., Railroad
In New Jersey where a corporation by its charter was
certain tax on its capital stock paid in, and it was declared that " no

'Wilmington
Co.

-I).

Reid, id., 369.

to pay a

further or other tax or impost shall

be levied or assessed upon said company,"
this was held to exempt not the franchises merely, but the property also.
State V. Berry, 17 N. J., 80; Camden & Amhoy R. R. Co. v. Commissioner of
Appeals, 18 id., 71. So it has been held that a tax on the gross income of a
corporation cannot be laid when the stock is exempt. State v. Hood, 15 Rich.,
177.

Iron Co v. Commonwealth, 59 Penn. St., 104. A tax on capital invested in shipping is not duplicate taxation as applied to vessels upon which
the harbor master's fees have been paid.
State v. Charleston, 4 Rich., 286.
2 Phoenix

' Farmers' Loan & Trust

Co. v. New York,

Utica, 4 Paige, 390 ; People
don V. New Brunswick Bank,
«.

v.
6

7

Hill,

261,

citing Bank of Utica

Supervisors of Niagara, 4

N. J.,

100 ;

Rudderow

Hill,

20.

See Gor-

v. State, 31 id., 513.
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Commuting taxes.

Tax laws sometimes provide for commu-

that is to say. for the substitution of something else for
the tax that is levied.
Thus, road taxes are sometimes levied in
labor, with permission to commute bv the payment of what is
tation

;

deemed an equivalent in money.

Many of the special exemptions

we have referred to were in the nature of commutations

;

the state

something asTan equivalent for the ordinary taxation which was released.-' Sach commutations are competent
has

received

individuals

as between

it

is

cludes others,

it

if,

when not forbidden by the constitution, and are supposed to proBut a commutation must not be invidious ;
duce no inequality.^
selects one class for favor, and ex-

void.'

Diversity of taxation in different districts.

Eeference has

been made to cases which recognize the right to establish different

rules of taxation in different districts, even when by the state
constitution uniformity and equality in taxation are required.
Such general rules are made in view of the universal custom to
consult the circumstances of different districts, and the wishes of
their people regarding the taxes to be levied therein as district

all presumptions are against any purpose to set aside
that custom.
different system
Local taxes may be levied on
in the different municipal districts, and for different purposes;
and

a

;

taxes

'See Gardiner

v. State,

N. J.,

21

557;

DaugMrill

v.

Ins. Co.,

31

Ala.,

91.

was

a

Wis.,

privilege.

Milwaukee,

etc.,

a

is is

a

a

a

railroad company pays
tax on its annual income in lieu of tax on
its property, the tax so paid
full equivalent for the propsupposed to be
and
there
no
room
therefore
for applying the rule of strict conerty tax,
struction against the company, as if the substitution of one tax for the other

"Where

R. R. Co.

v. Supervisors

of Crawford,

29

116.
;

4

*

State Bank D. People,
Scam., 303 Illinois Central Railroad v. McLean
County, 17 111., 291. It was one of the stipulations in the charter of the Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., that the corporation should pay to the state one-fifth

of the passenger fares received for passage on its branch road between Washington and Baltimore. A stipulation of this nature violates no provision of
B. & O. R. R. Co. v. Maryland, 21 Wall., 456. The
the federal constitution.
same decision
State,

1

aflBrmed

had previously

that the stipulation

Gill,

been made by the state courts, and the position
state constitution.
Waters v.

did not violate the

302, 308.
a

commutation

7

a

2

in labor for
highway tax; the permission to
to
male
tax
only
extended
payers between the ages of 21 and
commute being
Chi. Leg. News, 393.
50.
Cooper v. Ash, Sup. Ct. 111., 1875,
So held of
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only when they are laid to • supply mere local
works and conveniences, but also when they are for purposes —
like the highways, for instance — which, though paid for locally,
'
are for the benefit of the whole state and the use of all its
and

this,

not

people.^

It

Monopolies.

seems

scarcely necessary to say, that the

rule

will forbid the power being employed for
That it is capable of
the purpose of building up monopolies.
being so employed needs no demonstration ; and that it someof equality in taxation

especially in the arrangement of the
customs duties, is unquestionable; always, of course, under the
Taxpretense of an apportionment of taxes for the public good.
times has been so employed,

of business and the license taxes are peculiarly liable to
abuse in this direction,^ especially if they undertake to limit the
number to whom permits shall be granted ; and if the state can
ation

exempt

the large manufacturer from taxation while taxing his

feeble competitor,

as has been done

in one state at least, it may

in this way a long stride in the direction of establishing a
The spirit of a free constitution, if not its letter, formonopoly.
bids such legislation, and sound public policy forbids it also.
take

One reason why taxation for private purposes is inadmissible, is

that its tendency

is to the building up of monopolies at the
expense of the public who would suffer from them;' it begins in
a pretense for the public good, and it ends in crippling the general industry while

it excites the general discontent.'*

in general, People v. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 43 Cal., 398 ; Bright
McCullough, 27 Ind.. 323 ; Commissioners of Scliools v. Alleghany County,
Md., 489, 457 ; Merrick v. Amherst, 12 Allen, 500.
' See

v.
20

'See Judge JSToifs article on Monopolies
p. 370.

1,

Charles

royal proclamation

in the International Review, Vol.
was able to exact large sums of money by enforcing a
forbidding the erection of buildings in extension of Lon-

I.

don, and granting special permits on the payment of large sums for the priviGreen's England, ch. 8, sec. 5.

lege.

3 See

Ch.

J.

■•The

Philadelphia Association
right of

a

city

ment has been denied

v.

Wood,

39

Penn.

St.,

to levy a tax for the construction

in

some states, on the express

73, 82, per

Lowrie

of

a patented paveground, that the patent
in bidding for the con-

was a monopoly, and there could be no competition
tract to construct it.
Nicholson Pavement Co. v. Fay, 35 Cal.,°695; Same v.
Painter, id., 699; I>ean v. Charlton, 23 Wis., 590; Burgess
D.Jefferson,
21
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It

Permanence in legislation.

be added,

should

that in

order that tax laws may not be oppressive, they should not be
Tariff laws frequently changed
subject to frequent changes.
become a serious impediment to the business of the country,
men to calculate

on the part of business

from the impossibility

:

is,

To all the other contingencies of business is
upon the future.
that the federal
added this one, which
perhaps, greatest of all
legislature may so change the customs laws as to detract considerably from the market value of merchandise on hand, or
increase largely the cost of something employed in manufacture,
or in some other way to change greatly the outlook for any particular

trade.

The excise

laws are seldom

serious injury to individuals; and

without

changed

if

others, perhaps, make fortunes by the change, the possibility of such prosperity leads to
speculations in possible changes, and even to endeavors to procure

alterations for speculative purposes.
Changes in other tax laws
are not so injurious, but they are always liable to be oppressive,
in individual

cases, and.

for this reason are not to be made except

Mere inconveniences, to which the people
have become accustomed, or even impolitic or unequal taxation
to which trade and business have adapted themselves, are usually
to cure positive evils.

than considerable changes in the law with
view to
their correction.
This
consideration of policy, with which
the courts have no concern, but
seems sufficiently important to

it

a

is

a

less harmful

justify mention in this connection.
La. An„
100

;

Y,

143.

In

Contra,

Hobart D.Detroit,

re Dugro, 50 id., 513.

17

Mich.,

346;

Jra re Eager, 46 N.
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CHAPTER VII.
THE APPORTIONMENT OP TAXES.
The distinction between an exercise of the eminent domain, and
one of the power to tax, consists mainly in this : that the one is
an exceptional exaction for the public benefit, while the other is
an exaction based upon the idea that it is only an equal and fair

In

contribution to the public wants.*

order to make

it equal and

is a necessary element in all taxation.
The apportionment of a tax consists in a selection of the subjects

fair, apportionment

to be taxed, and in laying down the rule by which to measure the
contribution which each of those subjects shall make to the tax.'^

be

'

a

restrained as

is,

therefore, unlimited^ unless
part of the power of taxation."

the power of apportionment

it

" The
power
Apportionment is therefore a matter of legislation.
of taxing and the power of apportioning taxation- are identical and
Taxes cannot be laid without apportionment, and
inseparable.

The methods of apportionment are diverse and numerous,
but all taxes may possibly be arranged under the three heads of
specific taxes, ad valorem taxes, and taxes apportioned by special
benefits.

impose

a

Specific Taxes.

Under

this head may be ranged

specific sum by the head or number,

those which

or by some stand-

yond

a

ard of weight or measurement, and which require no assessment belisting and classification

cense taxes

and other

of the subjects to be taxed.

taxes on business

Li-

or occupations,

stamp
taxes, taxes on franchises and privileges, are usually specific, as are
also many excise and customs taxes.
;

4

1
;

1

;

is

it

'

1

People?). Brooklyn, N. T., 419 post, Ch. XX.
" The power to tax
necessarily involves the right to designate the property
to be levied in other words, to apportion the tax."
on which
Ranney, J.,
Ohio, N. S., 126, 123, citing Cincinnati v. Gwynne,
in Scoville v. Cleveland,

Blackwell on Tax Titles,

v.

'

People
Buffgles,
House, 43 Mo., 479, 489.

Lebanon,
v.

19

id., 418.

Brooklyn,

'

Bonsall

J., in

4

Ohio., 192

;

10

N. Y.,

419, 426-7.

Sec Glascow

v.
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by which they are laid is o£
itself a complete apportionment. Ministerial officers have nothing
to do but to list the subjects of taxation ; classify them where that is

As

regards all such taxes, the law

necessary

;

ascertain

the number, weight, measurement,

collect the sum which the law has definitely

fixed.

If

etc., and
the taxes

listing may not be required,
but the individual who is to pay them will purchase his stamp or
his license, by voluntary payment, as he may have occasion.
are stamp or license taxes, even the

Ad

Valorem Taxes.

A large proportion

are of this description, and so,

of the duties on imports
sometimes, are many of the taxes

The statute laying them
which make up the internal revenue.
of appraisers in apporthe
action
prescribes the rule, but requires
By far the larger proportion
tioning them between individuals.
of all state taxation is also upon property by a valuation, and effect
only be given to it by means of assessors, who value the property and apportion the tax by their estimate.

can

As between districts, where an
Taxes Apportioned by Benefits.
object for which taxes are to be'levied pertains to two or more,
apportionment by its own
action directly, with reference to the supposed interest of each in
It
such object, or to the benefit each is likely to derive therefrom.

the legislature sometimes

makes

the

may also provide for the apportionment by commissioners appointed
for the purpose.^ This often becomes necessary in the case of roads
and bridges lying partly in two or more districts, and also on the
division of towns, counties,
' See Salem

cited.

The

Turnpike,

case was one

etc.^

etc., Corp. v. Essex

of

County, 100 Mass., 2S2, and cases

appropriation of a turnpike road under the
apportionment of the cost among the counties, cities
the

eminent domain, and an
and towns -which it accommodated.

See also Shaw

v. Dennis,

5

Gilm., 405.

division of a county or town and the setting ofl' of territory for a new
one, the old county, unless it is otherwise provided by statute, will retain
the property and remain liablefor the debts. North Hempstead ». Hempstead,
^ On the

2 Wend., 109, 135; Hartford Bridge Co. v. East Hartford, 16 Conn., 149, 171;
Windham v. Portland, 4 Mass., 384-390 ; Hampshire v. Franklin, 16 id., 76, 85 ;
Medford v. Pratt, 4 Pick., 222; Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 29 Vt., 12,20;
Milwaukee v. Milwaukee, 12 Wis., 93. It will also retain the right to proceed
in the collection of the tuxes previously voted, and they will belong to it
thougli collected in part from territory now set off. Devor v. McClintock, 9
W. & S., 80; Waldron «. Lee, 5 Pick., 323; Ilarman ». New Marlborough, 9
Cush., 525 i Moss v. Shear, 25 Cal., 38 ; Morgan County v. Hendricks County,
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Elsewhere the constitutional provisions of a number of the
states are referred to, which require state taxation of property to
The judicial decisions are also cited, which hold
be by value.
that the local levies, commonly known under the head of
ments, though laid under the taxing power, are not taxes

assessas the

term is employed in the constitutions, and consequently may be

laid by some other standard than that of value, if the legislature
shall so prescribe. The standard more often established than any
other is one which seeks to put upon each item of property a tax
proportioned to the special benefit it is to receive from the expenditure. There are different methods of making the apportionment between individuals:
1. Assessors or commissioners
may
be empowered

to examine

the district and apportion the tax ac-

2. The
they shall find that benefits will be received.
legislature may determine that the benefits will be in proportion

cording

as

to value, area or frontage, and direct an apportionment accordingly.
In another place it is shown that either course is admissible.''

General

principles of apportionment.

The principles by
which the legislative apportionment of taxes is to be tested have
been so admirably stated in a Kentucky case, that we prefer
quoting the language of the court in preference to any attempt
at stating them in our own language : " When shall a tax be
levied?
To what amount?
tax ?
Direct or indirect ?

Shall it be

capitation or property
Ad valorem or specific ? And what
classes of property are the fittest subjects of taxation ? are all
questions wisely confided by our constitution to the discretion of
the legislative department, subject to no other limitation than
that of the moral influence of public virtue or responsibility to
a

33 Ind., 234.
See Alvis v. Whitney, 43 id., 83. But it is competent for
the legislature to make apportionment of debts and property in such a case, or to
provide for its being done, and to compel the necessary taxation to do what,
may
be just in the premises.
Bristol v. New Chester, 3 N". H., 524; Londonderry
1). Derry, 8 id., 320; Willimantic v. Windham, 14 Conn.,
457; Hartford

Co. v. East Hartford,

pelier
93;

«.

16

id., 149-172;

East Montpelier,

29

State v. Rice, 35 id., 178;

Vt,

Bridge

Granby

v.

Thurston,

12-20: Milwaukee

o.

23

id., 416; Mont-

Milwaukee,

13

Wis.,

Bowdoinham v. Richmond, 6 Greenl., 112; Mar!
shall County Court D. Calloway County Court, 2 Bush, 93; Richland
County
V. Lawrence County, 12 111., 1 ; Borough of Dunmore's
Appeal, 52 Pa. St., 374.
' See Chapter

XX.
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But in some other respects, and so far as the
public opinion.
power of taxation may be effectual without being thus limited, it
is in our opinion limited by some of the declared ends and principles of the fundamental laws.
Among these political ends and
principles, equality, as far as practicable, and security of property
against irresponsible power, are eminently conspicuous in our

An

state constitution.

exact

equalization

the

of

burdens of

taxation is unattainable and Utopian.
But still there are well
defined limits within which the practical equality of the constitution may be preserved, and which, therefore, should be deemed

Taxation may not be
impassable barriers to legislative power.
■universal, but it must be general and uniform. Hence, if a capitation tax be laid, none of the class of persons thus taxed can
be constitutionally exempt upon any other ground than that of
land within

if

tax be laid on land, no appropriation
the limits of the state can be constitutionally ex-

public service

;

and

a

the owner be entitled to such immunity on the
The legislature, in the plenitude of
ground of public service.
the taxin g power, cannot have constitutional authority to exact
empted,

unless

would

not be

a

the legislature might choose to call

it,

from one citizen, or even from one county, the entire revenue for
the whole commonwealth.
Such an exaction by whatever name
tax, but

undoubtedly, the taking of private property for public
use, and which could not be done constitutionally without ,the
consent of the owner or owners, or without retribution of the
would

be,

value in money.
" The distinction between constitutional

taxation and the tak-

a

ing of private property for public use by legislative will, may
not be definable with perfect precision.
But we are clearly of
the opinion, that whenever the property of
citizen shall be

a

taken from him by the sovereign will, and appropriated without
his consent to the benefit of the public, the exaction should not
tax unless similar contributions be made by
be considered as
that public itself, or shall be exacted rather by the same public
will, from such constituent members of the same community generally, as own the same kind of property.
" Taxation and representation
And
responsibility
form

is

go together.

representative
one of the chief conservative principles in our

of government.

When taxes are levied, therefore, they
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must be imposed on the public in whose name and for whose
benefit they are required, and to whom those who impose them
And although there may be a discrimination in
are responsible.
the subjects of taxation, still persons in the same class, and
property of the same kind, must generally be subjected alike to
This alone is taxation according to
the same common burden.
And this
our notion of constitutional taxation in Kentucky.
is,

in our judgidea, fortified by the spirit of our constitution,
ment, confirmed by so much of the twelfth section of the tenth

'Nor shall any

property be taken or
applied to public use without the consent of his representatives,
"^
and without just compensation being previously made to him.'
article

as declares,

man's

Apportionment presumptively just.

Whatever

the

rule

is

it

thus established

Bobertson,

operates unjustly.^
Cli.

J., in Lexington

v.

McQuillan's Heirs,

9

>

instances

it

is

is

preby legislation,
of
the
legislature as
sumptively as just and equal in the opinion
not to be questioned for imthe circumstances would permit. It
policy, and cannot be overthrown by showing that in particular
of apportionment that

Dana,

.513, 516.

See

also Youngblood v. Sexton, Sup. Ct, Mich., Oct. term, 1875.

:

a

2

a

8

is

a

is

;

;

^

Asto diversity in apportionment, see Anderson v. Kerns Di'aining Co., 14
Ind., 199 Layton i). New Orleans, 12 La. An. 515 Wallace v. Shelton, 14 id.,
Taxation of merchants by sales
not unequal.
498.
Sacramento ii. Crocker,
That the courts can afford no relief for what is merely an un16 Cal., 119.
wise apportionment, see Tall man i). Butler County, 13 Iowa, 531.
That
license tax may be apportioned in reference to the size of the town
to be exercised, see State v. Schlier,
in which the privilege
Heiskell,
A singular case of apportionment was that in Ould v. Richmond, 23
281.
license tax on lawyers, who were classified in six
Grat., 464. The tax was
classes by the finance committee of the common council, and the tax was difThe tax was sustained against an objection to
ferent in the several classes.
The
classification
seems to have had in view the value of -the
its inequality.
privilege the license gave, the extent of the business, the income, eto.
In Berney «. The Tax Collector,
Bailey 654, 681, O'Niell, J., in speaking
" It may
to objections which were made to
tax on bank dividends, says
be that the tax on the dividends

it

to

it,

If

would

be constitutional.

If an

act purports

is

it

is

a

is

it

may operate unequally in that
is virtually
tax on money at interest, which
not generally subjected to taxation:
This
not addressed to the proper forum;
objection, however,
belongs to the
legislature, not to the judiciary, to decide on its propriety and force. The
legislature may select any property they please, to be taxed.
the tax
to
operate generally on every citizen, who may own the property declared liable
to exempt one class

of
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But the requirement of ap-

And -whenever the tax is a direct
portionment is imperative.^
levy on property, there must be a taxing district. Given a tax
and a district, then the sum demanded of any one person, or laid
upon any one parcel of property, must have iixed relation to the
that demanded of every other person or
laid upon every other piece of property. Without this the exactions of money for the public are mere forced contributions, and
taxation will differ from the eminent domain only in this, that
■whole

tax,

as

well

the latter demands

as to

the property of the citizen when necessity re-

it

it,

and on making compensation, while the former exacts
quires
at discretion and without compensation.^
Of apportionment in general

rules may perhaps

the following

is

1.

:

safely be predicated
Though the districts are established at the discretion of the
fixed upon must
legislature, the basis of apportionment which
the district.'

;

if

There cannot be two rules
of apportionment for the same tax in the same district
there
could be, there might be any number, and in effect there would
be none at all, and every man might be assessed arbitrarily.*
be applied throughout

a

a

it

it

citizens, owning property upon which
tax in the hands of others,
imposes
miglit be
discriminating tax, and unconstitutional." In Youngblood v.

Sexton. Sup. Ct., Mich., Oct. term, 1875, a tax on business was objected to
because the sum levied was uniform and did not discriminate
according to

clearly within the power of the
say,, this
legislature, who must determine conclusively whether this method
or
not
more just and politic than any other.
v.

Chester,

J.

Vt.,

Tide Water

460

Portage,

O'Kane

v.

Coster,

18

N.

is

J.

Eq.,

8

Treat,

Water Co.

;

35 111., 557, 561

;

3

;

Lamed, 34 111., 203 Creole v. Chicago, 56 id., 422
95; Wilson c. Supervisors of Sutter, 47 Cal., 91.
■"Tide

v.

J., in Woodbridge v. Detroit,
Mich., 274, 309, following and
Lexington d. McQuillan's Heirs,
Dana, 513. Compare State v.
12 Wis., 562; Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 id.,
242,, 258; Chicago v.

Christiancy,

fipproving

Co.,

9

'

15

v. Coster, 18

N.

Fletcher

J.

Eq.,

Weller

v. Oliver,

v. St.

25

In Wilson

Paul,

Ark.,

5

Henry

518, per Beasley, Ch,

;

'

is

is

the business done; but the court

Minn.,

289.

Supemsors of
was held incompetent to authorize the supervisors to
Sutter, 47 Cal., 91,
remit levee tax on part of the district. And yet
would have been competent originally to so bound the district as to exclude the part on which
was
®.

proposed to remit the tax.
That the basis of the apportionment

is

it

a

it

it

518.

not necessarily

the same for general

the appoetiostment

vilJ
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the apportionment must be general, a diversity in
the methods of collection violates no rule of right, and is as much
admissible as a diversity in police regulations. Indeed, this may,
2.

Though

Thus,
under some circumstances, be an absolute necessity.
'
before the civil war had been brought to a termination, the
taxes under internal revenue laws were laid by general rules, but
special regulations were required for their enforcement in insurland tax might be assumed by one
state, while in another it might be necessary to have elaborate provisicjns for the sale of the property taxed.
3. It is no objection to a tax that the rule of apportionment
rectionary

districts.

So

a

which has been provided for it fails in some instances, or even in
Evasions of duty are liable to
many instances, of enforcement.
and local taxes, even when value is the standard, is illustrated by the case of
33 Md., 296.
It appears from that case that for the
purposes of an apportionment of state taxation among the municipal divisions,
Insurance Co. B.Baltimore,
the nominal

capital of private coporations was assumed to be the value. But in

imposing the tax on the corporations themselves, or their members, the actual
value was ascertained. This method would be likely to lead to some' inequalities in the distribution of state taxation between districts, but they could not
be serious.

In this connection may be mentioned several cases in which classes of taxable properly were attempted to be relieved from the apportionment.
In one
of these, the personal property was not to be taxed for the payment of a city
debt, for the rea-son, probably, that the purpose for which the debt was contracted was supposed to have benefited specially the real estate. Oilman v.
Sheboygan, 3 Black, 510.
Others were where in assessing the real estate for municipal taxes, the value

of improvements was required

to be excluded.
In all these cases, the discrimheld to be beyond the constitutional power of the legislature.
the tax is to be assessed for a corporate purpose, it must be uniform
as to persons and property.
The burden must be imposed upon all the property within the limits to be taxed.
Any other rule would utterly destroy the

ination has been

If

If

equality and uniformity contemplated by the constitution.
personal property or improvements may be exempted, with the same propriety and justice
the law might

compel one half the real estate within this district to sustain

Tlwrnion, J., in Primm ». Bellville, 59 111., 143 144;
Wis., 599. The tax in the Wisconsin case was for a
railroad debt; in the other for a sewer.
In Baltimore v. Hughes, 1 G. & J.,
480, where a city council had authority to levy a tax for a public improvement on the district benefited thereby, it was held that if the ordinance
providing for the tax showed the improvement to be for the general benefit
of the city, and not of the particular district in which the tax was ordered,
the

Hale

whole
D.

burden.

Kenosha,

the tax was void.

29
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by one individual cannot
If the law establishes
give another a legal right to be excused.
a uniform rule, its validity cannot depend upon the certainty
or uniformity of its enforcement.^
4. The apportionment of the tax is not to be extended to emThis is a matter
brace persons or property outside the district.
occur under all laws

;

but an evasion

of jurisdiction, and if there are any exceptions to the rule they
must stand on very special and peculiar reasons.^
5. Although exemptions may be made, as has been previously
shown, special and invidious discriminations against individuals
are illegal.^ This, so far as we know, is not disputed ; and there
is plausible ground for at least a question, whether the principle
may not apply in some cases to the establishment of small districts for the construction of important public works ; districts,
the establishment of which, in view of the purpose for which the

tax is to be laid, is equivalent to the singling out of a few persons
It has been held in one case that a
for invidious discrimination.
statute was void which, as to certain portions of a city street, empowered the common council to cause it to be improved in
ner exceptionally expensive,
against their

will, when

a man-

at the cost of the abutting owners, and

as to

all the other streets of the city the

owners of the larger proportion of the frontage must petition for
such an improvement before

looked upon

as an abuse

it could be

ordered.^

The statute was

of the legislative power to apportion tax-

In United States v. Riley, 5 Blatch., 204, 209, Shipman, J., speaking of tlie
internal revenue law, says : " The law is uniform, and thereby conforms to the
constitution.
Its validity does not depend on the celerity or uniformity with
which it can be executed in some disturbed districts of the country. Tax laws,
both state and national, are required to be uniform. This is an elementary
principle of legislation, resting upon the solid foundation of justice. But it
Is a novel doctrine that a law, uniform in its provisions, can be annulled by
the refusal of a portion of those on whom it is designed to operate to comply
with its provisions.
If this notion were to prevail, civil commotion or foreign
invasion within a small district of the country would paralyze the government and repeal the fundamental law upon which its existence depends."
'

= See

ante, pp. 14, 42.

^Therule of uniformity applies to wharf and dockage charges laid on
commerce of a city. People v. 8. Fr., etc., Railroad Co., 35 Cal., 606.
"

Howell V. Bristol, 8 Bush, 493,
Washington Avenue, 69 Ponn.

698 ;

497.

Compare

St., 303.

Covington

the

v. Casey, 3 id.,
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must be very clear to warrant
the court in holding that the legislature, in acting upon a subject
■within its admitted authority, has deprived itself of power by
es

it

as perhaps

;

was.

But the

case

abusing it.'
Arbegust «. Louisville, 3 Bush, 271, 375, WilUam.1, J., lias the following
remarks regarding the change of taxing districts by extension of city boundaries ; " When, in the judgment of the legislature, the interest of a suburban
'

In

population demands local regulations, and the peace, tranquillity and order (jf
the public indicates that such is necessary, we cannot doubt its constitutional
power to so enact, nor question its power to tax, for such purposes, the real as

well

as the personal estate

of

the people, nor the large as

well

as the small lots

for it is more consonant with the entire genius, equality and
justice of our constitution and laws, that each should bear the burdens of that

included therein

;

government which protects his person and property according to the worth
estate, than to discriminate against the small in favor of the large prop-

of his

But whatever may be said of the intrinsic justice of such a
erty holders.
measure, there is no power in the courts to control this, when the taxing power
is conferred in good faith to uphold local government and give police regulations to the population,

and not merely to embrace taxable property
nue purposes in order to lighten the burdens of others."

for reve-
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CHAPTEE VIII.
OFriCIAL ACTION IN MATTERS OF TAXATION.
Necessity

for official action.

Taxation is an act of govern-

Government can only perform its functions by means of
officers, and must make all its demands upon its citizens through
the medium of official action.
However just it may be, that an
individual, in any condition or under any specified circumstances,
ment

should contribute a part of his means to government revenues,
there is no lawful method of compelling him to do so, except
through the compulsion of official process. ISTo individual as such,
or by virtue of his citizenship, can compel another to perform his
He must come clothed with the authority of
duty to the state.
the state for the purpose, or, in contemplation of law, he comes as
a trespasser, whose

lawless intrusion

may rightfully be resisted

and repelled.

Officers, who are.

An

office is defined to be a public charge

or employment, and he who performs the duties of that office is
There are legislative, executive and judicial officers,
an officer.'
with duties pertaining to their respective departments of the government, and there are also inferior officers, commonly designated
whose duty it is to execute
mandates
lawfully
directed to them by superiors, whether of one department or of
another.' The proceedings in tax cases are entrusted by the law
in part to officers who perform mere ministerial duties, and in
part are confided to those who, though not belonging to the judi-

ministerial,

cial department,

have functions which in

a

certain sense are judi-

cial.

Officers de facto.

It

is sometimes found that the person who
is performing the duties of an office is not the one to whom the
' MarsTicll, Ch.

J., United States v. Maurice, 2 Brock., 96, 103. Bouvier's
definition of an ofBcer is " one who is lawfully invested with an office ;" which
seems to exclude what are known as otfioers ck' facto.
''

Bouvier Die, Tin, Officers;

People

v.

The Governor,

29

Mich.,

320.
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law, if properlj' followed, would have confided it. This may hapmethod by which the
pen from an uncertainty regarding the
result of
officer should be chosen, a dispute of fact concerning the
If
the election which has been held, or from many other causes.
in
such case, a person claiming to be chosen solves the doubt
any

in his own favor, and takes possession of the office, and if the pub-

of the
acquiesce in his assumption, he then performs the duties
office, and comes within the definition which has been given of an
officer. But while he is an officer in fact, if he is not rightfully

lic

such, he may at any time be ousted of his position by judicial proceedings, instituted in behalf of the state, at the instance of the

Perhaps also the law of the state will allow
the person rightfully entitled, and who, by the wrongful possession,>is excluded from the office, to institute a proceeding for the
public prosecutor.

From what has been said, it will be
purpose on his own behalf.
seen that there may therefore be officers dejure and officers de facto.
An officer dejure is one who not only is invested with the office, but
who has been lawfully appointed or chosen, and therefore has a
right to retain the office "and receive its perquisites and emolu-

An

officer defacio is defined to be one who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes to be, and yet is not a good

ments.

He comes in by claim and color of right,
or he exercises the office with such circumstances of acquiescence

officer in point of law.''

on the part of the public, as at least afford a strong presumption
of right, but by reason of some defect in his title, or of some in-

formality, omission or want of qualification, or by reason of the
expiration of his term of service, he is unable to maintain his possession, when called upon by the government to show by what

It

title he holds

it.^

acquiescence

and reputation attach certain important consequences

is immaterial in what the defect consists, or
whether the claim is in good faith or merely colorable. The public

1 Ld. Baym., 658, per Holt, Cli. J.; King v. Corp. of
BedEast, 356, 368, per EUeriborough, Ch. J.; Tucker v. Aiken, 7 N.
H., 113, 140; Davis «. Police Jury, 1 La. Au., 288; Ray v. Murdock, 86 Miss.,
693.
"A.n officer de facto is one who exercises the duties of an office under
'

Parker

ford Level,

v.

Kett,

6

color of appointment

Conn., 585, 588. To the same effect
Strang ex parte, 31 Ohio, N. S., 610.

Painter,
438 ;
«

or election to that office."

17

Blackwell on Tax Titles,

93-3 ;

Wilcox

v.

Starrs,

J., in Plymouth

-o.

is Brown v. Lunt, 37 Me.. 433,

Smith,

5

Wend., 331.

'
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to his occupation of the office, which the interest of the state does
not permit to depend upon his own motives or the degree of plaus-

ibility which attaches to his claim.'
Usurpers.

It

is possible also that one may attempt to per-

' 111 several recent cases, where persons have been performing official functions under assumed legislative authority which proved to he unconstitutional, the position has been taken, that^one who acts as an officer under
legislation of this nature, could not he an officer de facto, because the legislation was no law and consequently could give no color of right. It has also

been insisted, that an officer de facto always is one who comes in by color of appointment or, election by the authority having competent power to appoint or
elect; so that, if any office is elective, it matters not that the governor claims
and exercises the right to appoint, and that the appointee is enabled by public
acquiescence to act: the appointment being without authority of law, the apThe subject is very carefully considered in State
pointee is a mere usurper.
471
; S. C, 9 Am. Eep.,409, where the autliorities are
«. Carroll, 38 Conn., 449,
are summarized by Butler, Ch. J., as folis one whose acts, though not those of a lawful
principles of policy and justice will hold valid, so far

The conclusions

reviewed at length.

lows:

"An

ot&aer de facto

officer, the law upon
as they involve the interests of the public and of third persons, where the
duties of the office were exercised; 1. "Without a known appointment or elec-

of reputation or acquiescence, as were
people, without inquiry, to submit to or invoke his
him to be the officer he assumed to be. 2. Under color of

tion, but under such circumstances
calculated

to induce

action, supposing
a known and valid appointment or election, but where the officer has failed
to conform to some precedent requirement or condition, as to take an oath,

give a bond, or the like. 3. Under color of a known election or appointment,
void because the officer was not elegible, or because there was a want of
power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or
irregularity in its exercise ; such ineligibility, want of power or defect being
unknown to the public. 4. Under color of an election or appointment by or
pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be
In Commonwealth v. McCombs, 56 Penn. St., 436, substantially the
such."
same conclusion was reached.
So it was also in Ex parte Strang, 31 Ohio,
N. S., 610, where the legislature, in disregard of a requirement of the constitution, had made an appointment.
The following cases, the most of which
are referred to in State v. Carroll, support the same views ; O'Brian v. Knivan, Cro. Jac, 553 ; Harris v. Jays, Cro. Eliz., 699 ; Parker ». Kett, 1 Ld. Raym.,
658; Fowler v. Beebe, 9 Mass., 381; Taylor ij. Skrine, 3 Brev., 516; Wilcox d.
Smith, 5 Wend., 331 ; Parker «. Baker, 8 Paige, 428 ; People v. Kane, 33 Wend.,
414; People «. White, 34 id., 530; Burke ii. Elliott, 4 Ired., 355; Gilliam v.
Eeddick, 4 id., 308; Brown v. Lunt, 87 Me., 423, 428; State v. Bloom, 17 Wis.,
531; People v. Bangs, 24 111., 184; Clark v. Commonwealth,
29 Penn. St., 129;
Mallett V. Uncle Sam Co., 1 Nev., 188 ; Kimball v. Alcorn, 45 Miss., 151 ; Cocke
16 Pet., 71 ; Gibb v. Washington,
V. Halsey,
1 McAU., 4-30 ; Vaccari v. Ma.xwell, 3 Blatch., 368,
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form the duties of an office, wlio-is neither chosen to do

pur-

so,

Such

suant to law, nor is supported

by the public acquiescence.
a person cannot acquire the reputation of being the officer he
assumes to be ; he is a mere usurper, and his acts are wholly void

for all purposes.

No one is under obligation to recognize

claim to the office, and whoever does
the consequences.

It

so

his

must take upon himself

is of high importance that the encourage-

ment of such claims should not be allowed to bring disorder and

insecurity into public

afEairs.-'

Questioning title of officer de facto. The case of an officer
de facto is different.
To deny validity to his acts would lead to

It would compel
insecurity in both public and private affairs.
those having occasion to transact business with a public officer,
before they could put faith in his official acts, to go into a careful
examination of all the evidences of his title, and of the provisions
of law bearing upon them, in order to determine

whether the

as-

sumption of official character is warranted by law, and is supported
" It would conby a compliance with the necessary formalities.
He must look to
stitute every citizen a judge of official titles.
the constitution to see that the officer was eligible to an election
or appointment

;

to the statute to ascertain when, where and how

the election or appointment is required to be made, and to the
poll books and archives of the state for the purpose of ascertaining the facts ; and then determine at his peril the mixed question
of law andfact involved in the ascertainment of official character."^

The mere statement of the case

is sufficient

to show that

such a requirement would in the highest degree be unjust to the

But to treat
private citizen, and detrimental to public interests.
the official acts of a de facto incumbent as void would be equally
' See

Plymouth «. Painter, 17 Conn., 585, 593 ; Peck v. Holcombe, 3 Port.,
Keeler ». Newbern, 1 Phil., N. C, 505; Munson v. Minor, 53 111., 594.
In Birch v. Fisher, 13 S. & R., 208, an assessment made by persons not
339;

shown to have been either elected or sworn, held to be by " mere intruders
who came in without color of authority."
An officer who holds over in good
warrant
of law, is not a usurper. Kreidler v. State, 24
faith, though""vvithout
Ohio, N. S., 22. Compare State v. McFarland, 25 La. An., 547. To support
one's acts as those of an officer de facto, they must have been done under color

of an office whose duties have

been discharged by

Iowa, 229.
°

Blackwell on Tax Titles,

94.

him.

Bailey

v.

Fisher,

88
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controversy should arise collaterally,
as commonly it must, the officer himself would not be a party to
the record, and would have no opportunity and no privilege of
meeting the issue raised, although the decision might as effectuunjust to him.

"When

the

if he had been proceeded against
" This would
directly by the appropriate process of quo warranto.
ally determine his right to act,

as

contrary to the principles of natural
Until he is removed by projustice and the policy of the law."
ceedings directly instituted for the purpose, and in which he is
" he holds the office
by the sufferance of
permitted to be heard,
the state, and the silence of the government is construed by the
be judging a man unheard,

of his acts, which is equivalent to a pre"When the government acquiesce in the acts of

courts as a ratification
cedent authority.

such an officer, third persons ought not to be permitted to quesWhen, however, the officer himself attempts to
tion them."^
right in his- own favor, it is not unreasonable to require
him to defend his right, as he would be compelled to do if he
should assert title to any article of property as against the true

build up

a

His^suit for the legal fees may therefore be successfully
resisted, as may any attempt by him to enforce official process by
the aid of the law.
These are cases in which he is a party, and is
owner.

properly called upon to demonstrate his title. Besides, if citizens
were not permitted to resist his official claims in such proceedings,
their acquiescence in them, until the state itself should be able to
conclusion the formal proceedings to try the title, would
be only an enforced acquiescence, and could not justly support a
title to an office by reputation.
The most that public policy
could require in such cases would be that his de facto incumbency

bring to

a

should be evidence of

a

right prima facie in his favor, but leaving
And if he is sued for

the actual right subject to be disproved.'

'Blackwell on Tax Titles, 94; Bucknam v. Ruggles, 15 Mass., 180. See
People D. Lothrop, 24 Mich., 235. Proceedings of a common council in levying a tax cannot be contested on the ground that by a change in the charter a
portion of the seats were vacated, if the members continued
Scoville V. Cleveland, 1 Ohio, N. S., 126.

de facto to act.

^Kent V. Atlantic Delaine Co., 8 R. I., 305, where it was held that one who
sues as collector to recover a ta.'j gives sufficient prima facie evidence of his
authority if he shows he has acted as such officer iu regard to that tax; but
that this ^jrraa/aCTe case is open to rebuttal.
See also Coltou tj. Beardsley
of
v.
Auditors
Wayne
3S Barb., 29;
Benoit, 30 Mich., 17G; Pejepscott Propri-
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any act whicli he can only justify as an oiScer, he is put to the
proof that he was' duly elected or appointed, and that any conditions precedent have been complied with.^

Talidity of acts of officers
the public, by whose

de facto.
the

acquiescence

facto oiScer has been
have transacted official

de

who

to act, and individuals

permitted

On the other hand,

business with him, have a right to rely upon the

validity of that

by him, to the same extent precisely as if
the same acts had been performed in the same way by an officer de
jure. When such acts come collaterally in question, neither the
public, that has thus acquiesced, nor individual citizens, are permitted to question them. They are as valid, to all intents and
which

-has been done

if the title to the office had been unquestionable.
This is the general rule, as it has been settled on grounds of public policy from the time of the j'ear books.^
purposes, as

It

iu Universalist Society «.
is
chosen
sole prudential com108,
ineligible person
mittee of a school district, his assessment of a tax voted hy the district is
void.
etors

V.

Leach,

Ransom, 14 Mass.,

35

Vt.,

'Lightly

that

if

145.

was decided

an

Clouston, 1 Taunt., 113; Riddle ®. Bedford, 7 S. & R., 386,
Fetterman v. Hopkins, 5 Watts, 539 ; Pike «. Hanson, 9 N. H., 491 ; Colburn «. Ellis, 5 Mass., 427; Fowler d. Beebe, 9 id., 231, 334; Sprague «. Bailey, 19 Pick., 436; Patterson j). Miller, 3 Met., Ky,, 493; People «. Hopson, 1
Denio, 574, 579; Greene «. Burke, 23 Wend., 488, 493; Schlencker ti. Risley, 3
Scam., 483 ;' Blake «. Sturtevant, 13 N. H., 567 ; Cummings v. Clark, 15 Vt.,
D.

653;

ble

Olney
Curd,

d.

Pearce,

1

Head, 582.

R.

I.,

393;

293;

Samis

v.

King,

In First Parish in

40 Conn., 298, 810;

Sherhourne v. Fiske,

Tena-

a

8

a

if

it
is

3

said
parish assessors fail to take the oath of office, tax assessed by them
would be illegal and might be recovered back.
Cush., 264. But
tax which
has been paid cannot be recovered back on the ground that the collector de
that

B.

is

facto had never been legally elected and sworn. Williams c. School District
21 Pick., 75.
It not intended to assert here that in every case in which the
state might oust an officer by quo warranto an individual could also take advantage of

defect in his title.

a

The inquiry on behalf of the state may and
that which individuals may institute. A 'prima
facie right
sufficient as against individuals, but only an indefeasible right as against
the state. As an illustration of what
meant, the case of one holdinnlegal certificate of election may be taken if
lawful election was held, the
certificate may conclude private parties, but the government would be at lib-

a

a

;

is

is

does go beyond

it

and show that the election was accomplished by illegal
for any other reason the prirm facie case was defective. See
the discussion in Auditors of Wayne «. Benoit, 20 Mich., 176.
erty to go beyond

"

The law favors the acts of one in

a

«

votes, or that

reputed authority,

and the inferior
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It

remains to be seen whethIt has
er these general principles are applicable in tax cases.
sometimes been urged that in tax proceedings there was no proper

Olficers de facto in tax cases.

room for the application of the doctrine, which is applied in other
cases in support of action by officers de facto ; that the proceedings
are summary and for the most part ex parte; that they may deprive the owner of his freehold by means of process which usually and perhaps necessarily is somewhat arbitrary, and that he is
therefore entitled of right to have

all the security, which the law

have; in the character

and standing of
of an officer duly and properly chosen for the particular duty ; in
has intended he should

"
authority is lawful." Vin. Abr., tit. Officer," G., 3.
Bac. Abr., "Offices and Officers," B.; People v. Collins, 7 John's., 549,

shall never inquire
See

if his

135; People v. Dean, 3 Wend., 438; WilParker v. Baker, 8 Paige, 429; People v.
Kane, 23 Wend., 414; People v. White, 24 id., 520; Fowler v. Beebe, 9 Mass.,
231 ; Commonwealth o. Fowler, 10 id., 290; Nason «. Dillingham, 15 id., 170;
Bucknam D. Buggies, id., 180; Gilmore «. Holt, 4 Pick., 257; Williams i}.
School District, 21 id., 75; Blackstone v. Taft, 4 Gray, 250; Burke v. Elliott, 4
Ired., 355; Gilliam v. Reddick, id., 368; Farmers & Merchants' Bank B.Chester, 6 Humph., 458; Beard v. Cameron, 3 Murph., 181; Brush o. Cook, Brayt,
89 ; Taylor «. Skrine, 3 Brev., 516 ; Plymouth v. Painter, 17 Conn., 585 ; Douglass 1). Wickwire, 19 id., 489 ; State v. Carroll, 38 id., 449 ; Samis v. King,
40 id., 298; McGregor v. Balch, 14 Vt, 428; Downer B.Woodbury, 19 id.,
329; Lyon v. State Bank, 1 Stew., 442; Barret «. Reed, 2 Ohio, 409; Johnson
V. Steadman, 3 id., 94, 96; Eldred «. Sexton, 5 id., 216; Ex parte Strang, 21 Ohio,
N. S., 610 ; Justices of Jefferson v. Clark, 1 T. B. Monr., 83, 86 ; Rice v. Commonwealth, 3 Bush, 14; Priokett v. People, 1 Gilm., 525, 529; Keyser «. McKissam, 3 Rawle, 139; Riddle v. Bedford County, 7 S. & R., 386, 392; Baird
11 id., 411; Neal -o. Overseers, 5 Watts, 538; McKim
v. Bank of Washington,
■».Somers, 1 Penrose & Watts, 297; Commonwealth
v. McCombs, 56 Penn. St.,
436 ; Gregg v. Jamison, 55 id., 468 ; Cooper v. Moore, 4 Miss., 386 ; Kimball v.
Alcorn, 45 id., 145; Cabot «. Given, 45 Me., 144; Jones D.Gibson, 1 N. H.,
266 ; Moore v. Graves, 3 id., 408 ; Morse v. Galley, 5 id., 232 ; Slate v. Tolan,
33 N. J., 195 ; Leach v. Cassidy, 23 Ind., 449 ; McCormick «. Fitch, 14 Minn.,
253; Auditors of Wayne County b. Benoit, 30 Mich., 170; Ex parte Bollman,
4 Cranch, 7-5; Sawyer v. Steele, 3 Wash. C. C, 464; Willink v. Miles, Pet. C. C,
188 ; Ronkendorf v. Taylor, 4 Pet., 349 ; Lawrence v. Sherman, 3 McLean,
488 ; United States v. Bachelder, 2 Gall., 15.
There is a discussion in McNutt v. Lancaster, 9 S. & M., 570, of the question whether, where the statute declared that the acts of one who should presume to execute the duties of au office, before taking the official oath, should
be " absolutely void," could have any validity as those of an officer de facto.
No decision was reached.

551;

cox

Mclnstry

V.

Smith,

v. Tanner,

5

9

id.,

id., 231, 334;
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in
the official oath of such officer, when one is required by law ;
the official bond i£ one is made necessary ; and indeed such securstrict compliance with every provision which has been made by the revenue laws lor the protecThe reasons are plausible, but they are not
tion of taxpayers.*

ity

as

would be afforded by

a

Indeed if official action of officers

very conclusive.

de facto

in

is

it

is,

it,

judicial positions can be sustained, as it often has been,^ though
diffinot only property but also liberty may depend upon
cult to suggest any distinguishing reason to remove tax cases from
The clear and very strong
the application of the same principle.
that the general policy of the law
preponderance of authority
requires the acts of officers defado to be sustained in tax cases,
tinder the same circumstances and on the same imperative reasons
that sustain them in others.^

Estoppel against

intruders

who liave acted.

The

rule

is

which supports official action, may perhaps in some cases be carIf one has
above stated.
ried with propriety even farther than
assumed to act as an officer under revenue laws, and has made collections, as such, he cannot be permitted, when the government calls
upon him for an accounting,

to turn about and say that he was

;

;

6

v. Page,

is

2

'

N. H., 182 Payson v. Hall, 30 Me., 319 Coite v.
Wells, Vt, 318; Isaacs «. Wiley, 12 id., 674; People v. Hastings, 29 Cal.,
449.
Some of the cases whicli may seem to support this view are properly to
be referred to some other principle.
They turn often upon the question,
whether the statute
mandatory in requiring tliat something should be done,
which has been omitted, or whether the person who has assumed to act as
olBcer held defado the particular oflBce to which the duty pertained; or some
other question foreign to the precise point now under discussion.
Cardigan

3

2

1

3

5

;

1

*

Lord Dacre's Case,
Leon., 288 Margate Pier v. Hannam,
B. & Aid.,
Wilcox v. Smith, Wend., 231; People ®. Kane, 23 id., 414; People s.
White, 24 id., 520; Browns. Lunt, 37 Me., 423; Taylor i). Skrines,
Brev.,
516; Mallett s. Uncle Sam Co.,
Nev., 188; Clarke. Commonwealth, 29 Penn.
St., 129; Laver v. McGIachlin, 28 Wis., 864; In re Griffin,
Am. Law Times,
266;

Tajflor,

Pet., 349;

Humph.,

195.

19

id., 329;

Messer,

Aiken,
Sheldon

17

145;
v.

id., 420;

Hall

«.

Spear ij. Ditty,
Coates, 10 Ohio,

Cush8

v.

Vt.,
278;

Allen v. Armstrong, 16 id., 515 Scott v.
TwomWy s.Kimbrough, 24 id., 4.59, 474 Konkendorf
Rays. Murdock, 36 Miss., 692; Jones d. Scanland,

14 Iowa, 584;

;

32

Miller,
Ark., 556
«.

Smith

Jackson,

6

Watkins,

«. Woodbury,

«.

2

N. H.,113;

;

Downer

Washington
t).

Aiken,

7

v.

Greenl., 218; Adams

;

419;

Tucker

'4

iug,

2

3

93.
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'never elected or appointed, but has acted as a mere usurper -without
right, and that the proper remedy of the government was to have
resisted his intrusion, or caused his ouster.
On every principle
of right and justice he is precluded from denying his official charSuch a person has a right at any
time to refuse to proceed farther in official action, and he cannot
be held responsible as for a neglect of duty in such refusal ; but
acter under such circumstances.*

it is doubtful if one under any circumstances,

even though he be

a mere usurper, who has collected revenue for the government under claim of right, can be permitted to protect himself against an

accounting, by showing that he Was an intruder without any just
To the extent that he has acted, the govpretense to the place.
ernment may properly adopt his agency, and require him to give
to taxpayers, who have recognized his authority, the benefit of
their payments.Jolinston V. Wilson, 2 IT. H., 202, 20G ; Horn v. Whittaker, 6 id., 88 ; Sandwicli V. Fish, 2 Gray, 298, 301; Barrington v. Austin, 8 id., 444; Wendell i: Fleming, id., 613; Cheshire v. Howland, 18 id., 321; Williamstown V. Willis, 15 id., 427; Borden v. Houston, 2 Texas, 594; BillingsIn Jones v. Scanland, 6 Humph., 195, it
ley V. State, 14 Md., 369.
been
chosen sheriff.
By law such a choice
that
a
defaulter
had
appeared
He
nevertheless
and
acted in the collection
was absolutely void.
gave bond
of taxes. On motion, judgment was entered on his official bond for failure
to pay over. Reese, J.: "The election of sheriff was void, and he did not thereby become sheTiK de jure ; but thus intruding himself into office, and assuming its duties, he became sheriff de facto, and those who voluntarily bound
themselves for the faithful jjerformance of his duties cannot absolve themselves from their obligation, by insisting that he was no sheriff.
They will
be held to their undertaking, till the proper public authority has produced
his amotion from the office which he in point of fact fills."
'

'

Maurice, 2 Brock., 96 ; Bell ■».Railroad Co., 4 Wall.,
8 Blackf., 339; Church v. Sterling, 16 Conn., 387;
Commonwealth v. Philadelphia, 27 Penn. St., 497 ; Wentworth v. Gove, 45 N.
H., 160 ; Trescott t). Moan, 50 Me., 347. A Sheriff who has collected taxes
without having the proper list is nevertheless liable to account.
The Governor V. Montgomeiy, 2 Swan, 618. Cases of sale of the office of collector and
the effect thereof are found in Meredith v. Ladd, 2 N. H., 517 ; Carleton v.
Whitcher, 5 id., 196; Tucker v. Aiken, 7 id., 113; Alvord «. Collin, 20 Pick.,
418; Howard v. Pr»ctor,7 Gray, 128; Spencer v. Jones, 6 id,, 502.
Where the
fact of an official oath is in question it may be shown by parol that the oath
was taken, though the law requires a record.
Briggs «. Murdock, 13 Pick.,
598;

See

United

States v.

State «. Cunningham,

805; Pease

v.

Smith, 24 id., 122;

Hall

s.

dishing,

2

Greenl., 218; and see
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Action by joint boards.

In some cases, under the tax laws,
is required to be taken by a board comgosed of
several persons.
It may then appear that there has been an imofficial action

possibility to secure concurrence, or that, thi-ough neglect or inadvertence, less than the whole board has acted ; and it becomes
necessary to determine whether, in any such case, the action can
be supported.

The rules of law on this subject are well settled.
The law contemplates, that all the members of a board, who are
to exercise a joint public authority, shall meet to consider the
subject of their authority, and that the whole board shall have
the benefit of the judgment and advice of each of the members.

In revenue

c;ases,

especially,

and in others

in which the official

action may eventuate in divesting the citizen of his estate, it is to
the Jaw intended that this joint deliberation and action should be for the benefit of the citizen also. If, therefore,
be supposed

no such meeting is held, and no opportunity had for

joint consul-

tation and action, the joint authority is not well executed, even
though all acting separately may have signed such a document as
would have been sufficient, were it the result of a proper meeting.
Such action is not the action of the board, but of individuals.
It is always presumable that it might have been different had
there been a meeting and comparison
contemplated.

of views, such as the law

At

any rate, there can be no conclusive or satisof what would have been the joint judgment,

factory evidence
when it has never been exercised ; and the members of the board
have no discretion to substitute individual action when the law
has required the action of the organized body.^
No custom of
the locality, or long continued practice

can sanction

a dispensa-

The members of the board are officers
of law, and must obey the rules that presumably for beneficial
tion of this rule of law.

Scott V. Watkins, 33 Ark., 566. And as to the right of a collector to contest
the validity of a tax he has collected, see People v. Brown, 55 N. Y., 180.
31 "Wend., 178, 183, per Cowen, J. ; Lee v. Parry, 4
Powell v. Tultle, 3 N. Y., 396 ; People v. Supervisors of Chenango, 11 id., 563; Fuller v. Gould, 20 Vt., 643.
If only two of a board of three qualify and act, there is no board, and the
Schenck «. Peay, 1 Dill., 267; S. C, 1 "Woolw., 175. So, if
action is void.
only two of the three are chosen, the two cannot act. Williamsburg v. Lord,
51 Me. 599.
And see Downing ■o.Rugar, 21 Wend., 178, 182.

' See Downing v. Rugar,

Denio, 135

;

13
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But the law does not

require impossibility, and it may be found impossible for the
In such a case, it is to be premembers to agree in joint action.
sumed the intent was, that the law should not fail of execution,

but that the action of the majority should be sufficient.

And,

where a majority have acted, the legal intendment in favor of the
correctness of official action, requires us to conclude

that such

action is the result of due meeting and consultation, or at least of

duly called, at which all had the opportunity to attend,
It is therefore prima facie valid,
majority did attend.

a meeting

and

a

though the legal presumption in its favor may be overcome
evidence that no such meeting was called or had.^
'

In Middleton

a board

of live

«.

Berlin,

18

An

assessors.

by

Conn., 189, a tax list was signed by one only of
attempt was made to support it by showing a

usage of the town to divide the town into districts, in each of which one of
the assessors acted separately ; but the court said " assessors are the officers

of the law, and must obey the law, and no direction of the town, or long continued usage can justify a departure from the law." See People b. Supei-visors of Chenango, 11 N. Y., 563. In Kinney ». Doe, 8 Blackf., 350, the list was
made by the official lister, but it was not shown that two householders
with him as the law required, and it was held void.

acted

*In

support of the general princii)le, that the action of a majority is sufiScient, soe Wadham College, Cowp., 877; Grindley ®. Barker, 1 B. & P., 236;
The King v. Beestou, 3 T. R., 592; Withnell v. Gartham, 6 id., 388; Cooley v.
O'Connor,

12 "Wall., 391, 398;

Commonwealth

«.

Canal

Commissioners,

9

Alton, 7 N. H., 253 ; Babcock v. Lamb, 1 Cow., 238 ;
Rogers, ex parte, 7 id., 526 ; McCoy ». Curtice, 9 Wend., 17, 19 ; Downing v.
Rugar, 21 id., 178 ; Crocker «. Crane, id., 211, 218 ; Doughty v. Hope, 3 Denio,
594; Bank of Chenango v. Brown, 26 N. Y., 467; Caldwell v. Harrison, 11
Ala.. 755; Soens v. Racine, 10 Wis., 271; Sprague B.Bailey, 19 Pick., 436;
Williams v. School District, 21 id., 75; Fire District v. County Commissioners, 108 Mass., 142 ; People v. Coghill, 47 Cal., 361 ; Johnson v. Goodridge, 15
Me., 29 ; Bangor ii. Lancey, 21 id., 472 ; Lowe v. Weld, 52 id., 588.
This is on the ground that all are presumed to have met and consulted, a
T^'atts,

466, 471 ;

Jewett

v.

presumption that may be overcome by proof.
Doughty i). Hope, 3 Denio,
594,598, per Branson, J.; Ex parte Baltimore Turnpike Co., 5 Binn., 481;
Blackwell on Tax Titles, 111. Under the decisions which are above cited, it
is difficult to understand how a case like Howard i>. Proctor, 7 Gray, 128, can
There, one who was selectman and also assessor, was chosen
be supported.
and
it
was decided that the choice was valid, tliough his bond w.as
collector,
to be approved by the selectmen, and the assessors, in certain cases, had au-

The decision was put on the ground that these
to remove him.
boards might act by majorities; but the very natiu-e of the action was such as
to preclude one member of the board from consultation and action with the
thority
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required of an officer in the performance of official duty are to be taken, in the proceeding in which
They are not to be
they are made, as of unquestionable verity.
attacked, and proof entered into in a collateral proceeding, to
the returns and certificates

which the officer is not

if

to show that

a party,

they are

false.^

public. See also
Mich., 498, Is contra.
Where a drainage law provided that the commissioners shall jointly view
and assess, etc., this requires the presence of all, both in viewing and assessing. People V. Coghill, 47 Cal., 361. Compare Palmer v. Doney, 3 Johns. Cas.,
rest, or

Fox

he could act, made

Fox,

V.

him Interested adversely

Kinyoii

24 Ohio (N. S.), 335.

d.

Duchene,

to the

21

346.

Flud d. Pennington, Cro. Eliz., 873; Harrington v.
Elkins, 4 Burr., 3129; Andrews v. Linton, 1 Salk.,
Taylor,
Johns., 481,483; Putnam v. Man, 3 Wend., 202,
14
265; Wheeler d. Lampman,
Boomer
Case v. Redfield, 7 id., 398;
v. Laine, 10 id., 525; Baker v. McDuffle,
23 id., 289; Sperling ». Levy, 1 Daly, 95,98; McArthur v. Pease, 46 Barb.,
■Com.

Dig. Return,

17

423; Livermore

Gardner

v.

Gr. ;

East, 378; Rex

v.

Hosmer,

v.

Bagley, 3 Mass., 487,512; Slayton v. Chester, 4 id., 478;
6 id., 324, 327 ; Bott v. Burnell, 9 id., 96 ; Estabrook
v.

Hapgood, 10 id., 313, 314; Bott
id., 313, 320; Bean v. Parker,
Thayer

v.

Boynton

«.

Stearns,

1

Willard,

10

«.
17

Burnell,

Pick., 109,112; Whittaker
id.; 165, 169; Bruce
Campbell

«.

b. Nimms, 14
Pond, id., 433;

id., 163; Saxton

11

id., 591,601; Lawrence

v. Sumner,

Holden,

v. Webster,

«.

21

7

id., 551,555;

id., 187, 189: Pullen

Gray, 28 ; McGough v.
Allen, 505; Hathaway v. Phelps, 2 Aiken, 84; Stevens ». Brown,
3 Vt., 420; Eastmans. Curtis, 4 id., 616; Barret d. Copeland, 18 id., 67, 69;
White River Bank v. Downer, 29 id., 332; Lewis v. Blair, 1 N. H., 68; Whiting v. Bradley, 3 id., 79, 81 ; Sias v. Badger, 6 id., 393 ; Brown v. Davis, 9 id.,
76 ; Angier v. Ash, 26 id., 99 ; Clough
o. Monroe, 34 id., 381 ; Ladd o. Wig-

i>.

Haynes,

11

Wellington,

Gray,

379 ;

15

6

id., 421; Bolles s. Bowen, 45 id., 124; Morse «. Smith, 47 id., 474;
Elwell, 14 Ohio St., 240; Eastman v. Bennett, 6 Wis., 233; Carr v.
Commercial Bank, 16 id., 50; Castner i>. Symonds, 1 Minn., 437; Tullis v.
gins,

35

Phillips

B.

Brawley,

3

180 ;

id., 377

McDonald

v.

;

Folsom

v.

Leewright,

Carii,

31

5

id., 29

id., 333

;

; Reeves

Stringer, 44 id., 400; Washington, etc., Co.
Tillman v. Davis, 28 Ga., 494; Brown i>. Way,

Higgins,

Delenger

v.

v. Reeves,

33

Kinnear,

id.,

28 ;

26 Mo.,

Stewart

Ter., 116;
u. Riston,
3 Gill. & J., 86; Tribble d. Frame, 3 Monr., 51; Caldwells «. Harlan, 3
McConnel «. Bowdry's Heirs,
349, 351
id., 393 Smith v. Hornback,
A
K. Marsh, 378, 393,393; Small v. Hagden,
Litt., 16,17; Trigg v. Lewis'
Ex'rs,
id., 129, 133; Hunter ®. Kirk,
Hawks, 277; Stinson «. Snow,
Fairf.,
263
Wilson i). Hurst's Ex'rs,
Pet. (C. C.;, 441 Hawks v. Baldwin, Brayt.,
85; Welsh v. Bell, 32 Penn. St., 12; Faxon's Appeal, 49 id., 195; Hill v. Grant,
49 id., 200;
Rice v. Groff, 58 id,, 116; Ayres v. Duprey, 27 Texas, 593;
Angell V. Bowler,
R. I., 77 Castner v. Styer, 23 N. J., 236 State v. Clerk of
Bergen, 25 id., 209 Martin v. Barney, 20 Ala., 369 Crow v. Hudson, 21 id.,
5C0; Hinckley v. Buchanan,
Cal., 53.
Wash.

;

1

;

5

;

;

;

;

3

;

1

3

4

1

;

1

id., 531; Allender

id',

38

3

v.

4

J).
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return, he has his remedy by

ofScer.^

In

general it is believed that these rules have been held to be
applicable in tax cases."
'

Wheeler v. Lampman, 14 Johns., 481 ; Putnam v. Man, 3 Wend., 202 ; Case
«. Rcdfield,
7 id., 398; Baker v. McDuflBe, 23 id., 289; McArthur v. Pease, 46
Barb., 423; Livermore ■!).Bagley, 3 Mass., 487,512; Slayton «. Chester, 4 id.,

Pick., 551;
Piillcn
V. Haynes, 11 Gray, 379 ; Campbell v. Webster, 15 id., 28 ; McGough «. Wei.
lington, 6 Allen, 505 ; Clough v. Monroe, 34 N. H., 381 ; Lewis v. Blair, 1 id.,
68 ; Sias v. Badger, 6 id., 393 ; Augier v. Ash, 86 id., 99 ; Belles v. Bowen,
45 id., 124; Tomliuson v. Long, 8 Jones L. 469; Albright v. Tapscott, 8
id., 473; McBee D. State, 1 Meigs, 188; Castner s. Symonds, 1 Minn., 437;
Folsom V. Carli, 5 id., 333; Goodal v. Stuart, 8 Hen. & Munf., 105, 112; Trigg
V. Lewis' Ex'rs, 3 Litt., 139,138; Hunter ». Kirk, 4 Hawks, 877; Stinson j;.
Snow, 1 Fairf., 263; Philips «. Ewell, 14 Ohio St., 240; McDonald ». Leewright 31 Mo., 29 ; Stewart «. Stringer, 41 Id., 400 ; State «. Clerk of Bergen,
25 N. J., 209; Mentz b. Hamman, 5 Whart., 150; Faxon's Appeal,
49 Penn.
St. 195 ; Eastman v. Bennett, 6 Wis., 238.
' There are oases which hold official returns of ministerial officers to be
478; Gardner
Boynton

v.

».

Hosmer,

Willard,

6

id., 324,327; Whitaker

10 id., 165, 169;

Bruce

v.

i).

Holden,

Sumner,

7

81 id., 187, 189;

only

prima facie evidence of facts recited: Cockrell i). Smith, 1 La. An., 1; Waddell
V. Judson, 12 id., 13; Leverich v. Adams, 15 id., 310; Wallis u. Bourg, 16 id.,
176; Newton v. Prather, 1 Duv., 100; Fleece v. Goodrum, 1 id., 308; Kingsbury V. Buchanan, 11 Iowa, 387; Pomeroy ». Parmelee, 9 id., 140, 150;
Owens D. Ranstead, 22 III., 161, 167; Rivard.«. Gardner, 39 id., 125, 139; Gregg
V. Strange, 3 Ind., 366; Doe v. Attica, 7 id., 641; Butler v. State, 20 id., 169;
Tucker v. Bond, 23 Ark., 268 ; Ingraham v. McGraw, 3 Kans., 531.
In Lothrop v. Ide, 13 Gray, 93, a collector sued for arresting a person on a
tax warrant, relied upon his return as showing that the party had no goods on
which to levy. The plaintiff was allowed to give evidence that he offered to
turn out goods in satisfaction of tlie tax. On exceptions the following opinion was given by Dewey,
:
" The questions in the
present, case concern the admission and effect of the
evidence offered by the plaintiff, that prior to tlie actual arrest of the plaintiff
for the nonpayment of his tax, he tendered to the defendant sufficient person-

J

al property, that might have been levied upon to satisfy the same.
The objection to its admission is that it contravenes the return of a sworn officer.
The officer does not in the present instance directly aver that there were not

sufficient goods of the plaintiff that might have been found to levy upon, but
merely says, 'not finding sufficient goods upon which it may be levied,' he
arrested the body. Tliere is no allegation that he made search for the goods,
or-that the same might not have been found with proper diligence.
Without

deciding the more general question of directly contradicting a return of a collector of taxes, and whether, in a suit brought against such collector for an
illegal arrest, his return is to be considered pmna facie evideccc
and
merely,

CH.
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CHAPTER IX.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF TAX LAWS.
encounOne of the most serious of the difficulties which are
tered in the administration of the revenue laws, is that of ascer-

taining the intent of the legislature in the enactment of particular provisions, and in giving that intent the proper application
and effect.

Eules of construction in general.
struction

Artificial rules of con-

have probably found more favor with

the courts than

The application of them has oftentimes been pushed to an extreme which has defeated the plain
Penal laws have
and manifest purpose in enacting the laws.
have

they

ever deserved.

presumed to be correct until the contrary be shown, it might perhaps be sufficient in the present case to say that no such direct averment is made here.
" But the court are of the opinion that, in case of an action instituted against

of taxes for an illegal arrest, the certificate of the collector is not
conclusive evidence in his own favor. In cases of certificates of field-drivers,
they have been treated as prima facie evidence of their doings rather than
a collector

In

somewhat loose language, formerly used, they were said
of proof, by which language we understand, when used
in reference to this class of cases, not a change of the technical burden of
conclusive.

the

to change the burden

proof upon the issue, but that they are to avail until controlled by a greater
In Pickard v. Howe, 13 Met., 307, it
weight of evidence overpowering them.
was considered &a prima fade evidence, and also in the case of Bruce v. HolPick.,

In

case of Barnard v. Graves, 13 Met., 19, it was said
that the certificate of a collector of taxes, of his doings on a levy of his warrant, is to be deemed prima fade evidence as to all matters upon which they
are by law to make returns.
We have not felt that the decision in Livermore

den,

31

187.

the

Bagley, 3 Mass., 513 should require us to come to a different result in the
present case from that stated in Barnard v. Graves.
" The evidence
being, admissible, we think it is such as would have warranted the jury in returning a verdict for the plaintiff.
The authority to arrest the body, which is given by Rev. Stat., ch. 8,
arises
11,
only where the
§
collector cannot find sufficient goods upon which to levy. This provision
continues in force at all times previous to an act of arrest."
In Bowen v. Donovan, 33 Ind., 379, it was held competent to defeat a lax
sale of lauds by showing that the tax-payer had personal
property from which
«.

the tax might have been collected.

And

see Scales ».

Alvis,

13

Ala.,

617.
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out of all meaning, and in remedial laws remedies
have sometimes been found which the' legislature never gave.
In some
Something of this fate has befallen the revenue laws.
of the earlier cases thej seem to have been regarded as things
been construed

which, like the obligations entered into with a usurer, were to be
confined to the very letter of the bond, if enforced at all ; and
every intendment was made against them and the proceedings

The legislature has endeavored

under them.

to remedy the evil

It has passed statutes from
by going to the opposite extreme.
time to time in the supposed exercise of a control over rules of
evidence which, if literally construed and enforced, are in the nature of judicial decrees, determining conclusively against the per-

property has been seized for taxes, all such questions
of law or right as he might raise in support of his inheritance.
son whose

It

is difficult

to determine

strictness of some of the

which is more

unreasonable,

the old

tax proceedings, or the
new strictness of some legislation against those who have the
misfortune to be confronted with a tax deed.
courts

against

The intent to govern.

The underlying principle of all construction is that which seeks the intent of the legislature in the
words employed to express it. Beyond the words we are not to
If the law is
look, where the meaning is plain and intelligible.^
plain and unambiguous, the legislature must be intended to mean
what has been plainly expressed, and nothing remains but to
When doubts arise on the ilieaning
give the intent effect.^
'

The construction of a statute is to be gathered only from the worcls used
they are plain and intelligible. Therefore, where a statute providing
for the summary arrest of a defaulting collector, authorized him to be released
on giving bond after he had been committed to prison after his arrest, it was
held that a bond taken without committing him to prison was unauthorized.
■where

Daggett
«

V.

Everett,

United

19

Me., 373.

Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358, 399; Sturgis i). Crowninshield, 4
People v. Purdy, 2 Hill, 31, 35; S. C, 4 id., 384; Newell v.
People, 7 N. Y., 9, 83; McClusky ». Cromwell, 11 id., 503; People «. N. Y.
Central B. R. Co., 24 id., 485, 492 ; Alexander u. Worthington, 5 Md., 471 ;
Cantwell v. Owens, 14 id., 215; Case v. Wildridge, 4 Ind., 51; Spencer s. State,
Wlieat.,

States s.

122, 202;

Ludlow's Heirs v. Johnson, 3 Ohio, 553 ; Ezekiel «. Dixon, KelMurphy, 23 N. J., 180; State v. Blasdel, 4 Nev., 241 ; Patterson
■V.Yuba, 13 Cal., 175 ; District Township v. Dubuque, 7 Iowa, 262 ; Bidwell v.
Whittaker, 1 Mich., 479; Bartlett v. Morris, 9 Port., 266; McAdoo v. Benbow.
63 N. C, 461, 464.
5

id., 41, 49

]y, 146;

;

In re
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of the words, the antecedent law, the evil to be remedied, the
circumstances under which the law has been enacted, and to some
extent the contemporaneous or even the subsequent practical construction may be resorted to, for any light they may possibly
And here rules of interpretation come
throw upon the meaning.
in which are discussed with more or less fullness in various eleBut rules of interpretation are only in the
mentary treatises.^
by means of which we may be enabled to
If the
reach an intent which has been doubtfully expressed.
intent is plain without them, they are useless, and may introduce
doubts where none existed; but if the words are capable of sevnature of suggestions,

eral

constructions,

certainty,

they

serve to indicate,

may

with reasonable

the one which was in the mind of the legislature.

In

Construction of revenue laws.

the construction of the

is of course to be had of the
That purpose is to supply
purpose for which they are enacted.
But in the proceedings to obthe government with a revenue.
revenue laws,^ special

consideration

tain this it is also intended that no unnecessary injury shall be
inflicted upon the individual taxed.
While this is secondary to
the main object — the impelling occasion of the law — it is none

in constitutions to insert
provisions to secure the citizen against injustice in taxation,
Care is taken

the less a sacred duty.

' See
especially

Blackstone's

the Treatises of Sedgwick &
additions; Bishop on Statutory
Cooley Const. Lim., Chapter IV.

Commentaries;

Smith; Dwarris oa Statutes, with Potter's
Crimes

;

Story on the Constitution

' It may

;

wliile under the federal government the term
most usually applied to the laws by which taxes are laid and collected is
revenue laws, in a number of the states that term is seldom made use of as applying to the 1.1WS of the state for the corresponding purpose. There is no
substantial difference, however, in the meaning of the two terms, tax laws and
revenue laws. In Peyton v. Bliss, 1 Woolw., 170, 173, Mr. Justice Miller says :
'
Any law which provides for the assessment and collection of a tax to defray
the expenses of the government is a revenue law.
Such legislation is commonly referred to under the general term " revenue measures," and
measures

be noted here, that

include all the laws by which

I

those

the government

provides means for

meeting its expenditures.
can imagine no definition of a government
revenue which would not include all the money raised by any form of taxation." But an act imposing a penalty which goes to the government is not for
that reason merely a revenue law. Kevenue laws are those laws
only whose
principal object is the raising of revenue, and not those under which revcnue may incidentally arise. The Nashville, 4
Biss., 188.
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and all legislative action is entitled to the presumption that this
has been intended.

We are therefore

at

liberty to suppose

that

the two main objects had in view in framing the provisions of
any tax law, v^ere first, the providing a public revenue, and second,
the securing of individuals against extortion and plunder under
The provisthe cover of the proceedings to collect the revenue.
ions for these purposes are the important provisions of the law.
Other provisions may be made for subordinate purposes; to encourage order, regularity and promptitude in the proceedings, and
to give to the government a security against losses and frauds
beyond what might be had in the integrity of officers.
The question regarding the revenue laws has generally been,
The general
whether or not they should be construed strictly.
rules of interpretation require this in the case of statutes which
may divest one of his freehold by proceedings not in the ordinary
sense judicial, and to which he is only an enforced party.
It is
thought to be only reasonable to intend that the legislature, in
making provision for such proceedings, would take unusual care
to make use of terms which

would

plainly express

its meaning,

in order that ministerial officers might not be left in doubt in the
exercise of unusual powers, and that the citizen might know ex-

A strict construction
actly what were his duties and liabilities.
in such cases is reasonable, because presumptively the legislature
has given in plain terms
exercised.

It

all the power it has intended should

has been very generally supposed

be

that the like

strict construction was reasonable in the case of tax laws.

Mr.

Dwarris in his Treatise on Statutes has the following remarks :
"Statutes made for the advancement of trade and commerce,
and to regulate the conduct of merchants, ought to be perfectly
clear and intelligible to persons of their description.
By the use
of ambiguous clauses in laws of that sort, the legislature would
be laying a snare for the subject, and a construction which conveys such

an imputation

ought never to be adopted.
Judges,
therefore, where clauses are obscure, will lean against forfeitures,
leaving it to the legislature to correct the evil, if there be any.
With this view, the ship registry acts, so far as they apply to
defeat titles and to create forfeitures,
as penal, and

are to be construed strictly,

not liberally, as remedial laws.

In like

manner in

the revenue laws, where clauses inflicting pains and penalties arc
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this plain reason,' said Heath, 3.,

ambiguously or obscurely
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in
in

favoi°of the subject; 'for
'
at hand to
Hubbard v. Johnstone, that the legislature is ever
more, clearly what has
explain its own meaning, and to express
" The same author on another page
been obscurely expressed.'

"

rule of law, that every charge upon
the subject must be imposed by clear and unambiguous lanActs of parliament which impose a duty upon the pubguage.
says

:

It

is a well settled

lic will be critically construed with reference to the particular
"When there is any amlanguage in which they are expressed.
biguity found, the construction must be in favor of the public ;

when the public are to be
charged with a burden, the intention of the legislature to impose
^
This
that burden must be explicitly and distinctly shown,"
because it is a general

rule,

that

rule expresses the view which it is beIt is also that which
lieved has always prevailed in England.^

statement of the general

'

Dwarris on

Statutes,

743, 749.

Quotations from a few cases maj'be here given. In Warrington ». Furbor,
" Where
8 East, 243, 245 (case of a stamp tax), Lord Ellenhorough, Ch. J., says :
the subject is to be charged with a duty, the cases in which it is to attach
^

ought to be fairly marl^ed out, and we should give a liberal construction to
In Williams v. Sanwords of exception confining the operation of the duty."
" In the
gar, 10 East, 66, 69 (case of turnpike tolls). Lord Elleriborough says :
construction of these tax acts we must look at the strict words, however we
may sometimes lament the generality of the expression used in them ; but we
must construe those words according to their plain meaning with reference to
the subject matter." In Demi «. Diamond, 4 B. & C, 244 (case of an ad valorem

J., says: "It is a well settled rule of law that every
the
must be imposed by clear and unambiguous lanupon
subject
charge
It
was
therefore
held that a conveyance in consideration of natural
guage."
love and affection was not taxable as a "sale." In Tompkins v. Ashby, 6 B.
duty on sales), Bayley,

& C, 541, 543 (case of a stamp duty). Lord Tenterden, Ch. J., says: "Acts of
parliament imposing duties are so to be construed as not to make any instruments liable to them unless manifestly within the intention of the legislature." In Doe V. Snaith, 8 Bing., 147, 152 (case of a stamp duty), Tindal, Ch.

J.,

says: "As all stamp acts, being a burden on the subject, must be clearly
expressed, wherever they impose the burden,
should say that even if there
were doubt, we should take the smaller sum." In Wroughton t>. Turtle, 11

I

Mees. &W., 561, 567, Park, B., says: "It is a well settled rule of law that
every charge on the subject must be imposed by clear and unambiguous
words."
In Marquis of Chandos v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, 6

Exch., 464, 479, Pollock, C. B., says : " It is a well established rule in the construction of revenue acts that a duty cannot be imposed ou the subject
except
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Like views have
in the several states.'
Thus, Mr.
been frequently expressed by the federal courts.
Justice Story in giving reasons for holding that the revehas

been

adopted

did not intend to levy a certain permanent
"
My reasons for this conclusion are
duty on indigo, says :
as
conceive,
general rule in the
these : In the first place, it
is,

1841

a

of

act

I

nue

interpretation of all statutes, levying taxes or duties, upon subjects or citizens, not to extend their provisions, by implication, beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge their
operation so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out,
a

although standing upon close analogy. In every case, therefore
of doubt, such statutes are construed most strongly against the
government, and in favor of the subjects or citizens, because burdens are not to be imposed nor presumed

to be imposed,

beyond

be

a

Hence, in the present case,

construed.

if
it

what the statutes expressly and clearly import. Revenue statutes
are in no just sense remedial laws, or laws founded upon any permanent public policy, and therefore, are not to be liberally
matter of real
a

doubt, whether the intention of the act of 1841 was to levy permanent duty on indigo, that doubt will absolve the importer from

imposed upon the citizen upon vague or doubtful interpretations."

^

is

it

it

would otherwise
paying the duty, beyond the period when
be free.'"'
Duties
said by Mr. Justice Nelson "are never

The meaning of the legislature must be distinctly made out
by clear words.
from the terms of the statute."
In Gurr v. Scudds, 11 Exch., 190, 193, Pollock,

If

a

it

is

:

C. B., says "
there
any doubt as to the meaning of the stamp act,
ought to be construed in favor of the subject, because
tax canuot be imposed without clear and express words for that purpose."

Powers

V.

Wigglesworth,

Barney,

2

States v.

5

2

United

3

;

8

a

a

is

Story, 369, 373.

Blatch., 203, 203.

,

6

4

4

is

9

'

" Statutes which impose restrictions
ufion trade or common occupations,
which
an
or
tax
or
excise
upon them, must be construed strictly." Parlevy
ser, Ch. J., in Sewell ». Jones,
Pick., 413, 414. "A statute confemng authority to impose taxes must be construed strictly." Anderson, Ch. J., in
Fla., 403, 403. " A strict construction of the [tax] law
Moseley v. Tift,
fully authorized by the nature and consequences of the proceeding."
Stuart,
J., in Barnes v. Doe, Ind., 132, 183, quoting Williams «. State, Blackf 36.
" It
well settled rule that every charge under stamp act must be imposed
Ray, J., in Smith «. Waters, 25 Ind., 397i
by clear and unambiguous words."
399.
See Savannah ». Hartridge,
Ga., 23; Williamsburg «. Lord, 51 Me.,
599 Boyd ®. Hood, 57 Penn. St., 98.
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" The
revenue laws," it is said in another case are not to be so
construed as to extend their meaning beyond the clear import of
the words used."^

In another

case remarks are made by an able

circuit judge, which apply with great force to nearly all the federal revenue

laws.

"

In construing

a severe

declaring a
heavy forfeiture (and according to one construction claimed, for
small offenses), it is just to say, that those who arc called upon to
statute,

conduct their business affairs in view of all its provisions, ought
to be fairly apprised of its requirements, and its penalties of whatever kind.

They are bound to know the law, but law makers owe

to them

the duty to make the law intelligible

business

it is to construe or expound

a

;

and those

whose

law which is of doubtful or

double meaning, should not incline to the harshest possible meaning, when it is obvious that those to whom it is to be applied
may well have been led to trust in another, which is less severe,
This is not saying that laws of
but equally satisfying its terms.
the

kind in question are to be strictly construed in favor of the

subject and against the state, but only, that they should be construed with reasonable fairness to the citizen.'' ^ There are some
opinions

the

from which,

however,

cases,

duced.

if

the expressions made use of

are taken literally,

Thus it is said in one

a

case

:

in

different rule might be de" A revenue law is not to be

strictly construed, but rather the contrary, so as to attain the ends
In other cases it is said that, " the
for which it was enacted."^
penalties annexed to violations of general revenue laws do not
make them penal, in the sense which requires them to be con*
And in the decision of a recent case in the United
strued strictly."

"Eevsupreme court, a similar view seems to be taken.
"
are not to be regarded as penal, and
enue statutes," it is said,
They are remedial in their chartherefore to be construed strictly.
States

acter

and to be construed liberally, to carry out the purposes of their

enactment."^
'
2
3

United States
Woodruff,
Deady,

J.,

v.

Watts,

J., in United

1

Bond, 580, 583, per Leavitt,

States v. Distilled Spirits,

in United States

v.

Olney,

1

Abb., U.

10

J.
Blatch.,

S., 375, 383.

438, 433.
See

Twenty-

eight Cases, 3 Ben., 63.
■»United States v. Barrels of Spirits, 3 Abb., U. S., 305, 314, per Billon, J.
And see United States i>. Cases of Cloth, Crabbe, 356.
5 United States u. Hodson, 10 Wall., 395, 406, citing Cliquot's Champagne,
3 Wall., 114, 115.
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highly probable that the word remedial has been em-

seems

ployed by the learned judge delivering the opinion in this case,
in a sense differing from that in which it is commonly used in the
law. A remedial law, as the term is generally employed, is someAn author of acthing quite different from the revenue laws.
cepted authority expresses the ordinary understanding, when he
" one which
defines a remedial statute to be
supplies such defects

and abridges

such superfluities

of the common law

as

may have

been discovered*; such as may arise either from the imperfection

of all human laws, from change of time and circumstances, from
mistakes and unadvised determinations of unlearned (or even
learned) judges, or from any other cause whatever ; and tliis being
done either by enlarging the common law where it was too narrow
and circumscribed, or by restraining

luxuriant, has occasioned

it where it was too lax and

another subordinate division of remedial

acts into enlarging and restraining

statutes.

So it seems that

a

remedial statute may also have its application to, and effect upon
other existing statutes, and give the party injured a remedy ; and
'
for a more general definition, it is a statute giving a party a mode
of remedy

for

a

wrong where he had none or a different one

before.""'
Mr. Justice Blackstone

speaks

of statutes

against

frauds

as

remedial, but the context shows he is speaking of statutes giv" when the
ing parties a remedy against frauds ; and he adds :
statute acts upon the offender and inflicts a penalty, as the

or

a fine,

pillory

it is then to be taken strictly, but when the statute acts

upon the offense

by setting aside

the

fraudulent

transaction,

it is to be construed liberally."^ Another author in point
out
the distinction between penal and remedial laws remarks
ing
" the
that
remedy for breach of a remedial statute is by an action
for damages, sustained from such a breach, at the suit of the party
grieved ; that for breach of a penal statute, bj' an action of debt
here

Bl. Com.,

86.

s
1

is

«

Dwarris on Statutes, 73, citing, Chitty's note
the same.
The definition in Bouvier's Law Dictionary
Potter's

Bl. Com.,

88.

to

1

1

'

is,

for the penalty, or, in more concise terms, the legal distinction bethat the former gives relief
tween remedial and penal statutes

Bl. Com.,

86.
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to the party grieved ; the latter imposes penalties for offenses committed." -^ These considerations would seem to justify the conclusion that the learned judge, in applying the word remedial to tax
laws, has used it in some political or special, rather than in the
strict legal sense, and that it was not the intention of the court to
overrule the opinion of Mr. Justice Story in Wigglesworth's case.*
There may and doubtless should be a distinction taken in the
construction of those provisions of revenue laws which point out
the subjects to be taxed, and indicate the time, circumstances

and

manner of assessment and collection, and those which impose penalties for obstructions and evasions.
There is no reason for pecu-

liar strictness in construing the former.
Neither is there reason
for liberality.
The difference in some cases is exceedingly important. The one method squeezes everj'thing out of the statute
words do not perforce retain ; the other
reaches out by intendment, and brings within the statute whatThe
ever can fairly be held embraced in its beneficent purpose.
which

the unyielding

it is studied ; the other expands it.
Every lawyer knows how much easier it is to find a remedy in a
one narrows the statute

as

There must surely be a just and safe
medium between a view of the revenue laws which treats them as
harsh enactments to be circumvented and defeated if possible, and
statute than an offense.

they acquire an expansive quality in the
hands of the court, and may be made to reach out and bring
within their grasp, and under the discipline of their severe provisa view under which

'ISPet. Abr.,
s. Giles,

ris on
-

9

Geo., 253.

And

Cummings «. Frye, Dudley, 183; Carey
Also the instance of remedial statutes in Potter's Dwar-

297, note.

see

Stat., 231, 245.

The opinion in TJ.

S. v. Hodson,

10 "Wall., 395, refers to

Cliquot's Cham-

pagne, 4 Wall., 114, which in turn refers to Taylor ». United States, 3 How.,
The opinion in this last case was given hy Mr. Justice Story, and the
193.
language made use of, which consists largely in a quotation from the opinion

given in the lower court, does not express his own views so clearly as was cusWhat is manifest in his opinion is, that the
tomary with that learned judge.
point was not regarded as of importance In that case, the meaning of the
statute being plain ; and while the distinctron pointed out by the lower court
between penal and remedial laws is approved and shown to be in accordance
with the authorities, it is not clear that the general remarks of the judge were
It would have been a remarkable circumstance if
intended to go further.
Mr. Justice Story had overruled liis own opinion, delivered so recently that, at
that time, his son (and reporter) had not issued the volume containing it.
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it is only conjectured may have

Eevenue laws are not to be construed
from the standpoint of the tax payer alone, nor of the government
alone.
Construction is not to assume either that the tax payer,
been within their intent.

who raises the legal question of his liability under the laws, is
necessarily seeking to avoid a duty to the state which protects
him, nor, on the other hand that the government, in demanding its
dues is a tyrant, who, while too powerful

to be resisted, may jus-

tifiably be obstructed and defeated by any subtle device or ingenious sophism whatsoever.
There is no legal presumption either
that the citizen will, if possible, evade his duties, or, on the other
hand, that the government

All

will exact unjustly or beyond its

needs.

construction, therefore, which assumes either the one or the
other, is likely to be mischievous, and to take onesided views, not
The govonly of the laws, but of personal and official conduct.
ernment

in its tax legislation is not assuming

hostile position
we have elsewhere said, is apportiona

towards the citizen, but, as
ing for and as the agent of all, a duty among them ; and the citizen, it is to be presumed, will perform that duty when it is clearly
made known to him, and when the time of performance
has
arrived.

Unjust exactions, if such are made, must be attributed

to human imperfection, not to intent; and frauds and evasions are
to be supposed exceptional. A recent decision of the supreme
court of Connecticut lays down a rule, which, as applied to those
provisions of the revenue laws which apportion the taxes and give
ordinary remedies for their collection, seems not objectionable,
though more liberal than is recognized by the authorities gener-

The

and the question was whether
tax on " persons who are residents "of the taxing districts, could be applied to the personalty
In support of such
belonging to the estate of a deceased person.
a construction it is said : "The greatest, and perhaps the only,
that we cannot
objection that can be urged against this rule
that
in
strictness
the
deceased
or his estate
resident of the
say

ally.

for imposing

case,

a personal

a

is

is,

a statute

case was a revenue

is

This objection assumes that the statute
to be strictly
But we do not think that the doctrine of strict conconstrued.
district.

struction should apply to it. Statutes relating to taxes are not
Alpenal statutes, nor are they in derogation of natural rights.
though taxes are regarded by many as burdens, and many look
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money arbitrarily and unjustly extorted from

by government,

and hence

justify themselves

and quiet

their consciences

in resorting to questionable means for the purpose of avoiding taxation, yet, in point of fact, no money paid
returns so good and valuable a consideration as money paid for
taxes laid for legitimate purposes.

They are just

as essential

and

government itself ; for without them, in some form,
The small pittance we thus pay is
government could not exist.
the price we pay for the preservation of all our property, and the
protection of all our rights. But there is not only a necessity for
important

as

taxation, but it is eminently just and equitable that it should be
as nearly equal as possible.
Plence it is the policy of the law to
all
require
property, except such as is specially exempted, to bear
of the public burdens.
Not only so, but the law
manifestly contemplates that property rated in the list shall be
liable for all taxes, town and school district taxes alike. This is
its proportion

evident from the provision that district taxes shall be laid on the
town list, with special provision for certain changes rendered
necessary in order to tax all the real estate situated within

district, and none situated without, and also to
each instance upon the right person.

assess the

In construing

the

tax in

statutes relat-

ing to taxes, therefore, we ought, where the language will permit,
so to construe them as to give effect to the obvious intention and
meaning of the legislature, rather than to defeat that intention by
'
a too strict adherence to the letter."

Cornwall ». Todd, 38 Conn., 443,447, per Carpenter, J. So it is said in Hub.
bard v. Erainard, 35 id., 563, 568, by Sutler, J.: "A law imposing a tax is
not to be construed strictly because it takes money or jiroperty in invitum
(although its provisions are for that reason to be strictly executed), for it is
taken as a share of a necessary public burden; nor liberally, like laws intended to efiect directly some great public object, but fairly for the government and justly for the citizen ; so as to carry out the intention of the legislature, gathered from the language used, read in connection with the general
purpose of the law, and the nature of the property on which the tax is imposed,
and the legal relation of the tax payer to it." And in Rein v. Lane, Law K.,
"We must construe the words of the
2 Q. B., 144, 150, Blackburn, J., says:
statute imposing tlie duty according to the intention which those words exAnd in Lord Foley v.
press when used in such a statute for such a purpose."
Exch.,
Revenue,
R.,
Kelley, C. B., justly
Law
3
263,
268,'
of
Ccmimissioners
"
ordinary rules
thattlie
for
the
and
the
state
subjects
it is better
remarks that
of construction should be applied." Prof. Parsons in his Treatise on Con'
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If there

should be any leaning in such cases it would seem that
it should be in the direction of the presumption that every thing
is expressed in the tax laws which was intended to be expressed.
The laws are framed by the government for its own needs, and if
imperfections are found to exist, the legislature, in the language
of Mr. Dwarris,

"is

at hand to explain its own meaning,

express more clearly what has been obscurely expressed."

and to

But

there can be no propriety in construing such a law either with ex-

ceptional strictness amounting to hostility, or with exceptional
It is as unfavor beyond that accorded to other general laws.
reasonable

it as an enemy to individual
it is to seek for sophistical reasons for grasp-

to sound a charge upon

and popular rights, as

ing and holding by its authority every subject of taxation which
the drag net of the official force has brought within its supThe construction, without bias or prejudice, should
seek the real intent of the law; and if the leaning is to strictness,
it is only because it is fairly and justly presumable that the legislature, which was unrestrained in its authority over the subject,

posed compass.

has so shaped the law as, without

ambiguity or doubt, to bring
within it everything it was meant should be embraced.
In the state revenue laws the penal provisions are few and by
no means severe.

In

the federal

revenue

laws, some of them

are of a severity very seldom to be met with in penal statutes, and

only to be justified by the supposed impossibility of collecting the
revenue without them.
In illustration of what is here said, reference need only be made to the case of forfeiture of property for
the mere indulgence of a fraudulent intent never carried into effect

;

a forfeiture too, which may be visited upon a purchaser who has

bought in good faith, and

without suspicion of the intended
provisions are to be construed with liberality,
there is no reason why any other penal provisions whatsoever
should not be.
fraud.^

If

such

" It is
3, p. 287, states the proper rule very clearly and concisely :
well settled principle that every charge upon the subject must be imposed
by clear and unambiguous words, 'f * But it is equally certain that no interpretation will be adopted which must defeat the purpose of the law, protracts, vol.
a

vided the language of the statute admit fairly and rationally of au interpretation which sustains that purpose."
'

Henderson's

Distilled Spirits,

14

Wall.,

44.
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Construction of local powers to tax. In tlie construction of
any grant of the power to tax made by the state to one of its

has

intended to grant at all

;

terms, all

it

it

is is,

municipalities, the rule which is accepted by all the authorities
that
The reasonable presumption
should be with strictness.
held to be, that the state has granted in clear and unmistakable

and whatsoever au-

;

is

thority the municipal officers assume to exercise, they must be
able to show the warrant for in the words of the grant.
There
no inherent power in the municipalities to levy taxes
they can

if

tax only as the state in its wisdom has thought proper to permit,
and
the state has erred in the direction of strictness, the legislature alone can correct the evil.-'

3

;

;

8

8

;

8

8

3

9

;

;

;

;

a

14

a

a

8

a

is

it

it

is

§

3

;

3

7

6

;

;

;

;

9

;

8

;

7

;

;

3

;

1

9

8

;

;

2

:

4

'

See the following cases which have laid down and will serve to illustrate
this rule of strictness Sharp v. Spier,
Hill, 76 Doughty v. Hope, Denio,
574; Tallman v. White,
IST. Y., 06; Manice v. id.,
id., 120; Cruger !). Dougherty, 43 id., 107; Litchfield v. Vernon, 41 id., 123; Mays v. Cincinnati, lOhia,
N. S., 208 Cincinnati «. Bryson, 15 id., 625 Reed v. Toledo, 18 id., 161 Jonas v.
Cincinnati, 18 id., 818; Savannah v. Hartridge, Geo., 28; Augusta «. Walton,
37 id., 630; Sanders i). Butler, 30 id., 079; Vanover v. The Justices, 37 id., 354;
Kichmond v. Daniel, 14 Grat., 885; Orange & Alexandria R. K. Co., v. Alexandria, 17 id., 176; Holland a. Baltimore, 11 Md.,186; Bouldin d. Baltimore, 15
Ind., 458; Kyle v. Malin,
id., 18; Harmony v. Osborne,
id., 34; Indianapolis V. Mansur, 15 id., 113; Carrou b. Den, 26 N..J., 594; Leavenworth v. NorKan., 432 Snyder n. North Lawrence,
ton,
id., 82 Shawnee County t. Carid.,
115
«.
ter,
Chicago Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 20 111., 280 Drake i). Phillips,
40 id., 388; Douglass «. Placerville, 18 Cal., 643; Hewes ». Reis, 40 id., 255;
Kniper v. Louisville,
Bush, 509 Campbell County Court v. Taylor, id.,
206 Broadway Baptist Church ». McAtee,
id., 508 Bullock v. Curry, Met.,
Pick., 415 Nichol v. Nashville,
Ky., 171 Boston v. Schaffer,
Humph.,
252; Philadelphia t). Tryon, 35 Penn. St.,- 401; Bennetts. Birmingham, 81 id.,
15
St. Louisu. Laughlin, 49 Mo., 559 St. Charles v. Nolle, 51 id., 132; Lott v.
Ross, 88 Ala., 150 Montgomery v. State, 38 id., 162 Henry ,;. Chester, 15 Vt.,
La. An., 515; Ashevilleu. Means,
460; Municipality v. Panes,
Ired.,406;
Dean v. Charlton, 27 Wis., 532; Clark v. Davenport, 14 Iowa, 494; Fairfield ?;.
Ratcliffe, 20 id., 396 Oregon Steam, etc. Co.. v. Portland,
Ore., 81 United
Am. L. Reg., N. S., 394; Leonard v. Canton, 35 Miss.,
States V. Burlington,
605; Cooley's Const. Lim.,195.
189; Dillon, Mun. Corp.,
" The power to tax
high governmental power, but fortunately for the
cannot be exercised by the legislative authority without limit, and
people
can only be
when the legislature grants that high power to another tribunal,
exercised in strict conformity to the terms in which the power
granted, and
departure in any material part -will be fatal to the attempt to exercise it."
Bush, 206, 208. It was held in
Peters, J. in Campbell County Court v. Taylor,
to
the
voters of
this case that authority
county to vote specified tax was
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This rule confines the municipalities, in the levy of taxes,
strictly to the ordinary purposes for which such municipalities
are accustomed to make levies.
The customary grant does not
go a step beyond this, and unusual purposes cannot be brought
■within the scope of their taxing power without an express grant
This is not only in
which clearly indicates the special object.^
accordance with the general rule that construes

sovereign grants
The mischief of a

with strictness, but it is also obviously wise.
strict construction is easily obviated by the legislature ; but the
mischief of a liberal construction may be irremediable before it
can be reached.^
It is in accordance with this rule, that the au" for county purthority conferred upon a county to levy a tax
"
was held, in Georgia, not to warrant a tax for the conposes
struction of public buildings ; county purposes, as understood in
that state, being the support of the poor, public education, and
In Maine, it was held that a general power in a town
the like.^
to tax for corporate purposes would not include the right to tax
in order to make a toll bridge free.* "Whatever doubt might be
not exercised by a vote of the county excluding a city tlierein.
See for a simiprinciple, Attorney General v. Supervisors of St. Clair, 11 Micli., 63. Au-

l.or

to levy a tax on taxable property will not authorize a specific tax on
an insurance company (not on their capital). Augusta i). Walton, 37 Geo., 620.
It will authorize a tax on the shares in a bank without their being specially

tliority

mentioned.

Fredericlc v. Augusta,
National Bank, 47 id.,

; Pearce v. Augusta, 37 id., 597 ;
statute
Augusta
authorizing a tax on divicent,
dends over a certain per
on capital, means capital actually paid in, and
not merely authorized capital. Street Kaihvay Co. i). Philadelphia, 51 Penn.
v.

id., 561

5

563.

A

St., 465; Philadelphia v. Ferry Railway Co., 53 id., 177. A power to tax all
personal property within a city, held not to reach shares in a railroad owned
by a resident. Richmond v. Daniel, 14 Grat, 385. An interpretation of a
statute for the assessment of a special tax which will interfere with the general

tax law, is not to be adopted unless there is the clearest language to justify it.
State V. Douglass,
1 Stetson V.

33

N. J.,

Kempton,

13

363.

Mass., 273

;

Alley

u.

Edgecomb,

53 Me., 446.

' Where

a city has authority to levy taxes
only to a certain percentage on
the assessment, the power to levy more is not to be implied from the fact that,
by the charter, it is made the duty of the city to erect hospitals, poor houses,

etc., and more
1

would

be needed for those purposes.

Leavenworth

v.

Norton,

Kansas, 432.

3 Vanover v. The Justices, 27 Geo., 354.
As to what are " county purposes "
in Minnesota, see McCormio v. Fitch, 14 Minn., 252.

'Bussy

V.

Gilmore,

3

Green].,

191.
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tbere can be none, we should sup-

of the correctness of those which have held that

tax for necessary town charges would not warrant

military forces or to pay military bounties.

a

power to
tax to raise
a

This is clearly no

part of the corporate duty of a town, and could not be supposed
within the intent of the legislature in providing for necessary
town charges.^
Similar rulings have been made in a great variety
of

in which particular powers have been claimed ; but the
reader must be referred to works on the special subject of municipal law, for a reference to these decisions.*
cases,

'

The leading case on this point is Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass., 273, 378, in
which Parker, Ch. J., gives his idea of what constitutes town charges, as follows: "The phrase necessary charges is indeed general; but the very generality of the expression shows that it must have a reasonable limitation. For
none will suppose that, under this form of expression, every tax would be leThe proper construction of
gal which the town should choose to sanction.
the terms must be that, in addition to the money to be raised for the poor,
schools, etc., towns might raise such sums as should be necessary to meet
the ordinary expenses of the year; such as the payment of such municipal
officers as they should be obliged to employ, the support and defense of such
actions as they might be parties to, and the expenses they would incur in performing such duties as the laws imposed, as the erection of powder houses,
providing ammunition, making and repairing highways and town roads, and
other things of a like nature: which are necessary charges, because the effect
of a legal discharge of their corporate duty. The erection of public buildings for the accommodation of the inhabitants, such as town houses to assemble in, and market houses for the sale of provisions, may also be a proper
town charge, and may come within the fair meaning of the term necessary;
for these may be essential to the comfort and convenience of the citizens.
But it cannot be supposed that the building of a theater, a circus or any other
place of mere amusement, at the expense of the town, could be justified under
Nor could the inhabitants be lawfully taxed
the term necessary town charges.
or monument, these being matters of taste
a
statue
of
raising
for the purpose
and not of necessity, unless, in populous and wealthy towns, they should be
thought suitable ornaments to buildings or squares, the raising and maintenance of which are within the duty and care of the governors or officers of
Compare Lisbon v. Bath,
See Alley v. Edgecomb, 53 Me., 446.
such towns."
21 N. H., 319 ; Bangs v. Snow, 1 Mass., 181 ; Cruckshanks v. Charleston, 1
McCord, 360 ; State v. Charleston, 2 Speers, 633 ; Simmons v. Wilson, 66 N.

C,

336.

on Municipal Corporations is specially referred to. Mention of the
following cases may, perhaps, be useful in this connection : A vote at a town"
ship meeting to raise all the law will allow for school purposes," held good,
though informal. State «. Sickles, 24 N. J., 125. The authority that may
2

Dillon

vote a tax cannot refer it to a committee

or to officers with power.

State Vi
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liability of

power

to abuse.

The liability of the taxing

power to abuse is often assigned as a reason why, in particular
But this is
cases, it should be held not to have been conferred.
"
illogical and unreasonable.
Every authority, however indispen-

if it might not, it would be powerless
The point is forcibly put by the supreme court of

sable, may be abused, and

for good."
Ohio. " It has been strongly urged that this power is peculiarly
liable to abuse. It is liable to be abused ; perhaps peculiarly so.
^

Yet

But so is all government, and all governmental powers.
ernment is nevertheless

a necessity among men.

It

is

a

gov-

very bad

government indeed which is not better than the inevitable anarchy
and outrage which follow the. absence of all government.
And
the fact that a power is liable to be abused, affords no conclusive

argument against it." ^ It is only a reason for caution in construction, in order to be certain that the power is intended to be given,
and for holding the donee of the power to a strict execution of
the authority.

Directory and mandatory provisions.

Much use is made in

the law of taxation of the words directory and mandatory, as words

of classification of the various provisions of tax laws, as regards
the imperative nature of the obligation they impose on the revenue officers to obey them strictly.

All

the provisions of a statute

not on their face merely permissory or discretionary, are intended
to be obeyed, or they would not be enacted at all ; and therefore
they come to the several officers who are to act under them,

as

Sickles, supra; Robinson v. Dodge, 18 Johns., 351. ; Trumbull v. TVliite, 5 Hill,
County Court v. Navigation Co., 8 Bush, 300. A tax, purporting
to be levied by the authorities of two districts, meeting and acting jointly, is
46 ; Mercer

State v. Reeves, 28 N. J., 520. Authority to a county to levy a tax for
county buildings, -will not authorize the issue of bonds for the purpose.
Shawnee County ii. Carter, 2 Kansas, lin. The power to impose license fees
is not contained in a grant of general local legislation.
Sanders v. Butler, 80
void.

Geo., 679. A city charter, conferring power to tax in general terms, is to be
understood, in speaking of " property within the city," to mean visible prop-

erty within the city, and would not include debts owing to a citizen by peoabroad. Johnson v. Lexington, 14 B. Monr., 648. Followed in

ple residing

Covington v. Powell,

2

Met. (Ky.), 226; Louisville v. Henuing,

J., in Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Penn. St., 258,
' BrinkerTioof, J., in Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood
> OiUon,

333, 343.

Ch.

See

Breevort v. Detroit, 24 Mich., 322, 325

23 Conn-, 189, 203.

1

Bush, 381.

260.

County,
;

8

N. S.,
Nichols,'

Ohio,

Bridgeport

».
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But the negligence of officers, their mistalies of fact

commands.

or of law, and many other causes
dience,
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and when

the

will

often

prevent

a

provisions which have been

strict obe-

disregarded

constitute parts of an important and perhaps complicated system,
it becomes of the highest importance to ascertain the effect the
failure to ohej. them shall have .on the other proceedings with
which they were associated in the law.
The form the question
most commonly assumes is this : Some official act which the law
provides for, and which constitutes one step to be followed by
others in reaching a specified result, having failed to be taken.
Does the authority to proceed toward the intended result, terminate when that particular

proceeding go on to

rial ?

If

a

step has been

neglected,

or may the

conclusion treating the neglect

as immate-

the proceeding fails at that point, the requirement of

the official act which has been neglected

is said to be mandatory,
but if it may still proceed, the requirement is directory only ;
that is to say, the law directs that particular act to be performed, •
but does not imperatively command it as a condition precedent to
anything further.

In

some cases the question assumes a different form.

The mu-

nicipalities, it has been seen, levy and collect taxes not only for
their own purposes, but also under state apportionment for the
The power to levy taxes is usually conferred
state at large.
upon them in merely permissory terms ; terms implying a discretion to levy them or not at the will of the local majority or the
local board. These may sometimes raise the question whether
they are intended to confer a discretionary authority merely, or,
on the other hand, whether they were not meant to impose a duty
and put the municipality under an imperative obligation.

A

solution of this question will commonly depend upon the
If the tax is
purpose of the tax for which authority is given.
for purely local purposes, the permission to levy it can seldom be
anything more than an enabling statute, of which
advantage may be taken or not, at discretion ; but if it is for genIn
eral purposes, the law must be regarded as imposing a duty.
regarded

as

whatever terms the authority is conferred upon a county to levy
its proportion of the state tax, the levy is imperative ; and permissory words in the statute may be construed as commands, and
a

reluctant local authority may be coerced into

a

performance of
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The rule is the same where what :s authorized is for
the purpose of meeting some legal obligation of the municipality ;
" for where a
statute directs the doing of a thing for the sake of
justice or the public good, the word viay is the same as the word
the duty.

In most cases,
duty equally imperative.^
however, the question whether any particular provision of a tax
law is mandatory or not, will arise between the government and
shall," and imports

a

its officers, or some one claiming under their proceedings on the
one side, and the person taxed on the other ; and the form it will

will

whether the person taxed is entitled to defeat any
proceeding which is being taken adversely to him, by reason of
the failure on the part of the officers to observe some direction
take

be,

nnder which they derive their authority.
If he
may, it is because the direction was mandatory, and obedience
to it a condition precedent to any further adverse proceedings.

of the statute

The phraseology of the statute may sometimes settle this question very conclusively. If by the use of negative words it requires
a particular proceeding to be taken in a particular time or man-

if not

ner, and makes it void

it is so

so done,^ or

gives it effect, provided

or declares that, unless it is taken, subsequent proshall
not be had,^ or prohibits its being done except at the
ceedings
time the statute prescribes,' or if any terms plainly imperative are
employed, the intent is clear, and no discretion can be permitted
done,^

It

in construction.

is not often, however, that these or similar
words are met with in the statutes which define official duties under the revenue laws, and the construction of particular provisions must be left for determination in such light as the obvious

And
purpose they were intended to accomplish may afford.
that purpose, it would seem, ought generally to be conclusive.
1 Kex B.

2 Salk., 609.
See Kex v. Inhab. of Derby, Skinner, 370;
Justices, 3 Virg. Cas., 9 ; Justices of Clark County i>. Railroad
Co., 11 B. Monr., 143; Coy v. Lyons City, 17 Iowa, 1 ; State v. Harris, 17 Ohio,
N. S., 608; Baltimore v. Marriott, 9 Md., 160, 174; New York i). Furz, 3 Hill,
612 ; Minor -c. Mechanics' Bank 1 Pet., 46 ; Mason ». Fearson, 9 How., 248 ;
Supervisors v. United States, 4 Wall., 435 ; Galena v. Amy, 5 id., 705.

Virginia

Barlow,

v. The

=The

King

v.

Hepswell,

5 The

King

v.

Inhab. of

■•Stayton v.

Hulings,

' In re Douglass,

46

7

8

B. &

C,

466.

St. Gregory, 3

Ind.,

N. Y.,

144.

43.

Ad.

v.

El.,

99.
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No one should be at liberty to plant himself upon the nonfeasances or misfeasances of officers, under the revenue laws, which in
no way concern himself, and make them the excuse for a failure
On the other hand he
on his part to perform his own duty.
be
at
to
insist
that
directions which the
liberty
ought always to
law has given to its officers for his benefit shall be observed.
Many eminent judges have endeavored to lay down a general rule
on this subject, by which the difficulties in tax cases may in general be solved.

In

one of the most recent cases in which this has

been attempted, the general doctrine is stated as follows

:

" There

many statutory requisitions intended for the
guide of officers in the conduct of business devolved upon them,
which do not limit their power, or render its exercise in disregard
of the requisitions ineffectual. Such generally are regulations
are undoubtedly

to secure order, system, and dispatch in proceedings,

designed

and

disregard of which the rights of parties interested cannot be
injuriously affected. Provisions of this character are not usually
by

a

mandatory, unless accompanied by negative words,
importing that the act required shall not be done in any other
But when the requisitions
manner or time than that designated.
regarded

as

prescribed are intended for the protection of the citizen, and to
prevent a sacrifice of his property, and by a disregard of which
his rights might be and generally would be injuriously affected,
they are not directory but mandatory. They must be followed,
The power of the officer in all
or the acts done will be invalid.
the
measure
and conditions prescribed
such cases is limited by
^
for its exercise."
The same rule in nearly the same terms has been laid down in
other cases,^ and it seems a sound and just rule, and may reasonably be believed to be in accord with the legislative will in the
'

Field,

'

J

,

in French

«.

Edwards,

13

Wall.,

506, 511.

Pick., 64, per Sliaw, Ch. J., approved
Milbury,
See especially Torrey
and followed in State v. Jersey City, 35 N. J., 381, 386 ; Clark ii. Crane, 5 Micli.,
151, 154, per Manning, 3. ; O'Neal v. Va. & Md. Bridge Co., 18 Md., 1, per Tuck,
J. ; McDonough v. Gravier, 9 La. An., 540 ; Spear v. Ditty, 8 Vt., 419 ; Sliawnee
County «. Carter, 2 Kansas, 115 ; Wheeler v. Chicago, 24 111., 105, 108 ; Walker
v. Chapman, 33 Ala., 116 ; Kelly v. Craig, 5 Ired., 129 ; Magee v. Commonwealth, 46 Penn. St., 358. All acts required by the statute in order to make
the tax chargeable are conditions precedent and must be strictly complied
■with,

e.

or the tax bannot be collected.

21

Hewes

v.

Reis, 40 Cal., 255.
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which it is applicable. All legislation must be supposed
to take into account the possible, if not probable mistakes and
irregularities of officers in executing the provisions of the law,
and it is hardly reasonable to infer an intent, on the part of a
cases to

failure of administrative officers to comply
■with any provision made for the benefit of the state exclusively,
or merely as a guide in orderly proceedings, should deprive the
state of all benefit to be derived from a compliance with other
legislative body, that

a

provisions that embody the main purpose and object of the law.
Nor, on the other hand, is it to be supposed the legislature intended its own securities for the protection of individual rights
and property should be disregarded

with impunity.'

Instances of mandatory provisions.

What,

then,

are

the

provisions of tax laws which are made for the benefit and protection of the individual tax payer?
In many cases this question,
as applied to particular provisions, is easily solved ; in others
there is more difficulty.
That the tax payer shall be entitled to
such protection as the official responsibility of officers can give
him ; that the tax shall be voted by the competent authority and
under any conditions which the law has prescribed; that there
shall be official warrant for any compulsory
' See

15
9

Vt

Corbett

v.

Bradley,

279, 292.

Nev., 106, lOS, per Lewis, Ch.

J. ;

J. ;

Briggs

;

-

all

v. Georgia,

Dryfuss
v. Pish, 2 Gray, 298, 301, SMw, Ch. J., in anmade on behalf of a defaulting collector, that certain

, 61, 72, per Hubbard,

Wis.,

7

proceedings

v. Bridges,

45 Miss., 247 ; State v. Lean,

In Sandwicli

swering an objection

provisions regarding the authority to collect had not been complied with,
" The provisions of the statutes as to the form of
warrants and tax lists,
says :
and the place where the lists shall be deposited, are intended for the benefit of
the taxpayers. As to all other persons they are directory merely, and not conditions precedent. Defects in the warrant or tax list might be a good excu.se
for not executing the warrant. But to say that a collector who has collected
the money without objection by the tax payers, is not liable to account therefor would be as contrary to the rules of law as to justice. He can only avail
himself of such defects as have prevented his performance of his duty."
2

Where the statute provided that a tax voted at an annual town meeting in
March should be assessed on the tax list of the May following, it was held
mandatory and the town incompetent by vote to authorize the selectmen to
assess it on the list of the previous year.
Alger v. Curry, 38 Vt., 383. Where
the statute requires the tax list to be verified by an oath " made and sub-

scribed," this means an oath duly certified in writing, and the absence of it is
"
Applying to the case the rules which have govfatal to the proceedings.
erned the courts in passing upon this class of titles, the objection must be held
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to any
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lawful demand

whatever upon the citizen.

They are of the highest importance,
because it is only by means of the requirement of official action in
an orderly manner and at periodical times, that he can be protected

Moreover, they go to
against arbitrary and capricious action.
make up the power which the law gives to its agents over the
property and persons of the people ; and without the power to act,
all attempted action is a trespass upon individual rights.^ There
must be

voting of the tax by the proper authority ; there must
be an assessment and an apportionment. So far all is clear.' So
a

The assessor acts under a special and limited authority, conferred by
the law and not hy the owner of the estate.
He is the mere instrument to
fatal.

The proceeding is construed strictly, and the power must be
pursued
strictly
in every particular. The law requires that every prerequisite
to the exercise of the power to sell the estate must precede its exercise.
pass the title.

The agent must pursue the power or his act will not be sustained by it. These
principles have been recognized by this court in their application to tax titles in
Yenda v. Wheeler, 9 Texas, 408; Robsono Osborn, 13 id.,
repeated decisions.
298 ; Wafford v. McKinna, 33 id., 36."
Wheeler, Ch. J., in Davis v. Fames, 36
id., 396, 297.
Chapter VIII. Where an act providing for local improvements required the certiticate of the commissioners of public works, as to the amount of^
expense paid or actually incurred by the city, as the basis of the assessment, it
was held that nothing could be the substitute for this. The affidavit of the
Petition of Cameron, 50 N. Y., 503.
surveyor will not be received.
■See

^"

Many of the provisions of our statute regulating the imposition of taxes,
Some are doubtless conditions ; such
must be considered directory merely.
as those which are intended to secure an equality of taxation or burdens
among the citizens, that is, that the citizen may know for what he is taxed,
know his valuation, and have notice of the time and place of appeal." CoulIn O'Neal v. Va. &
ter, J., in Insurance Co. v. Yard, 17 Penn. St., 381, 888.
Md. Bridge Co., 18 Md., 1, 23, Tuck, J., explains the distinction between directory and mandatory provisions in tax laws, and refers to Youngs v. State, 7
G. & J., 253, and other Maryland cases. Where the statute required the county
judge in case of default of a tax collector to collect and pay over, on his own
knowledge or on complaint of the treasurer, to' hold a court within 20 days to
try such delinquent collector, this was held to be in point of time directory
" but
merely, the time not being prescribed for the benefit of the collector,
rather to quicken the diligence of the judge, so that justice may be promptly
administered and the greater certainty of collections insured." Stickney v.
Ala., 108. A requirement that taxation shall be by value is manLife Association v. Board of Assessors, 49 Mo., 512. Where a lot
datoiy.
omitted from the assessment of the preceding year is to be placed upon the
roll with the valuation of the last year when it was assessed, if the lot was
Huggins,

10

LAW

218

or TAXATION.

'

[CH. IX.

all provisions designed to give Ilim tlie opportunity of a review of
the assessment, whether by the assessors themselves or on an apEvery
peal from their conclusions, are exclusively in his interest.
notice which the statute provides for to that end, whether by publication or otherwise, must be given with scrupulous observance
of all its requisites.
The notice cannot be shortened a single day
without rendering it ineffectual ; the presumption being that the
law has made it as short as was deemed consistent with due proA published notice cannot be received as the substitute
tection.^
personally delivered to the party concerned.^
The same rules apply to any notice required of subsequent proceedings: if required to be given within a certain time, or in any
prescribed mode,' it must be so given. A statute declaring that
for

a notice to be

People v. Goff, 52 N.
" when the statute
Chandler v. Spear, 22 Vt., 388, 398, says,
under which the sale is made directs a thing to be done, or prescribes the
form, time and manner of doing anything, such thing must be done, and in
the form, time and manner prescribed, or the title is invalid; and in this renever on the roll, it cannot be put on under the provision.

Y.,

434.

Hall, J., in

Ditty,

9

Vt,

282;

Bellows

v.

if

not literally, be complied with. Spear u.
Elliott, 12 id., 569, 574; Sumner v. Sherman, 18

spect the statute must strictly,

Sawyer, 17 id., 122, 124. But in determining what
is required to be done, the statute must receive a reasonable construction; and
when no particular form or manner of doing a thing is pointed out, any mode
id., 909, 612

;

Carpenter

v.

which effects the object with reasonable certainty is sufficient ; and in judging
of these matters the court is to be governed by such rational rules of construcSpear i). Ditty, 8 Vt., 419, 431 ; Bellows v.
tion, as direct them in other cases.
Elliott, 12 id., 569, 574; Isaacs ». Shattuck, 12 id., 668."
' See cases cited in Chapter

XV.

'Moulton ». Blaisdell, 34 Me., 283; Lovejoy d. Lunt, 48 id., 377. And see
Lagroue v. Rains, 48 Mo., 536. Where the notice is to be given personally and
also by publication, a failure in either is fatal. Appeal of Powers, 29 Mich.,
504.
2 The statute required the sheriff at the next term of the
county court preceding a tax sale, to return a list of the lands on which taxes were unpaid,
with the names of the owners if known, and other particulars, and this was
to be read aloud, recorded in the minutes, and posted in the room.
Held to be
mandatory. Kelly v. Craig, 5 Ired., 139. In Sprague v. Bailey, 19 Pick., 436, a

provision that notice of abatement to those who should pay their taxes promptly, should be posted in public places, was regarded directory merely. The point
was not reasoned. All provisions regarding notice of sale and the place of
State v. Rollins, 29 Mo., 267 ; Rubey v. Huntsman, 32
sale are mandatory.
id.,,
A tax was assessed to the owner of the
501 ; McNair v. Jenson, 83 id., 313.
equity of redemption and lands

sold therefor.

The statute then in force pro-

'
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all resolutions, etc., involving an appropriation of money, or taxation, shall be published "in all the newspapers employed by the
corporation," and not be passed until after notice has been published at least two days, is plainly intended to be imperative.^
to make the right to redeem more valuable to
him must be observed ; and here time may be of the very highest
Whatever

tends

importance ; and at no stage of the proceedings should the requiThese are illustrations
sites of notice be more strictly observed.

of mandatory requirements.

Many

others

are noticed in other

chapters.^

Instances of directory provisions.

On the other hand, the
requirement of an official bond or oath from an officer is for the
protection of the public, and not of the tax payer.^
So in general the fixing of an exact time for the doing of an
act is only directory, where it is not fixed for the purpose of
giving the party a hearing, or for any other purpose important to
him.*
So the requirement of a warrant to the town assessors requiring them to assess the state tax, is directory, as this becomes
vided that no sale of real estate for taxes should affect the rights of any person
not taxable therefor, unless a written demand was first made upon said person
No demand in this case was
by the collector for the payment of said taxes.
made upon the mortgagee before the sale. Held, that a repeal of this statute
did not leave him liable for the tax. Tinslar ■».Davis, 13 Allen, 79.
1 Petition

of Douglass,

46

N. T., 43; Petition of Smith, 53 id.,

536.

'See in general, in addition to the cases already cited regarding mandatory
Hoffman?). Bell, 61 Penn. St., 444 ; Kniper «. Louisville, 7 Bush,
599; First Presb. Ch. v. Fort Wayne, 36 Ind., 338; Sibley v. Smith, 3 Mich.
486; Rayner v. Lee, 30 id., 384; People v. Clark, 47 Cal., 456; Richardson v.
46 id., 68; Culver «. Hayden, 1 Vt., 359 ; Richardson «. Dorr,
Heydenfeldt,
5 id., 9 ; Brown v. Wright, 17 id., 97 ; Judevine v. Jackson, 18 id., 470 ; Taylor
V. French, 19 id., 49 ; Langdon v. Poor, 30 id., 13 ; Lane v. James, 25 id., 481
provisions,

see also post, Chapter

'See Hale
ante, Chapter

b.

XV.

Gushing,

VIII.

3 Greenl.,

In Vermont the

38; Scarborough s. Parker, 53 Me. 253
decisions are that if the collector appointed

to collect any tax assessed on lands for roads and bridges shall fail to give the
bond, any sale made by him is void.
See Oatman v. Barney, 46 Vt.,
594, and cases cited.
required

*

Hart

twenty

V. Plum, 14 Cal., 148.
As where an assessment was to be filed within
days, but this was only to make it a lien. Magee v. Commonwealth,

46 Penn. St., 858.
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A

provision that the true
value and the equalized value of lands shall appear in distinct
columns on the roll is directory only, as the failure to obey it in
no way affects the person tased.^ So putting a special tax in a
act without

it.^

column by itself on the roll when it should be put with the town
tax is equally harmless, and therefore cannot affect the proceedAnd manifestly the tax payer has nothing to do with any
ings.^
accounting by the officer, or with any report or document to be
made by him for the security of the public or for the information
of superiors only, and which is not to be warrant for, or to affect
in any manner subsequent proceedings for enforcing the tax.* In
the margin many other cases are referred to in which statutory
provisions have been decided to be merely directory.^
Alvord V. Collin, 20 Pick., 418. la this case it was decided that a levy
which was excessive as to the school tax, but not excessive in the aggregate
'

was valid.

' Torrey v. Milbuiy, 21 Pick., 64. The failure of the clerk to enter the word
sold in the hook opposite the description of the land as required by the statute,
does not defeat the sale.
Playter v. Cockran, 37 Iowa, 258.

*Wall

D.

16 Mich., 228.
Compare Case «. Dean, 16 id., 12. A
that a school district tax should be assessed within thirty days

Trumbull,

statute required

clerk of the district should certify to the assessors the sum to be
This is only directory.
Pond v. Negus, 3 Mass., 230 ; Williams ii.
School District, 21 Pick, 75; similar ruling in Gale i;. Mead, 2 Denio, 160;
Gearhart v. Dixon, 1 Penn. St., 224 ; Smith v. Crittenden, 16 Mich., 152 ; Harrison
For somewhat similar proviCo. Commissioners
v. McCarty, 27 Ind., 475.
sions held to be mandatory, see Mix v. People, Sup. Ct., 111., June term, 1874,
2 ; Cowgill i). Long, 15 111., 203.
7 Chicago Legal News,
Compare Eamcs v.
Johnson, 4 Allen, 382.
after the

raised.

The clause in the tax warrant, " and you
Metcalf, 4 Mich., 578.
are hereby directed to settle with the selectmen by the 20th day of Septembei
next," is merely directory, and does not limit the collector's power to that time.
*

Tweed

Picket

V.

v.

Allen,

10

Conn., 145.

Wheat, 594; U, S. v. Kirkpatrick, 9 id., 720; U. S. v.
Dandridge, 12 id., 64; Hale u. Cushing, 2 Greeul., 218; Muzzy d. White, 3
id., 290 ; Scarborough v. Parker, 53 Me., 252 ; Holland «. Osgood, 8 Vt., 276,
280 ; Cortiss v. Corbiss, 8 id., 373, 390 ; Allen v. Parish, 3 Ohio, 187 ; Pry v.
Booth, 19 Ohio, N. S., 25 ; Vance v. Schuyler, 1 Gilm., 160; Webster v. French,
12 111., 303; State v. McGinly, 4 Ind., 7; Staytou v. Hulings, 7 id., 144; Noland V. Busby, 28 id., 154; New Orleans v. St. Eomes, 9 La. An., 573; Edwards V. James, 13 Texas, 52 ; Lawrence v. Speed, 2 Bibb, 401 ; Hayden v.
Dunlap, 3 id., 316; People v. Allen, 6 Wend., 486; ^x parte Heath, 3 Hill, 43;
Jackson v. Young, 5 Cow., 269 ; People v. HoUey, 13 Wend., 481 ; Striker v.
5

Craig

1}. Bradford,

3
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The basis of an apportionment of

lawfully be retrospective

as

the reverse

;

that is to

say, it may

as well have regard to benefits theretofore received as
which may be received thereafter.
Where taxes are
levied for a series of years upon the same valuation of property,
they are necessarily retrospective, and one may be taxed upon
property which he has long ceased to own when the tax is levied.

to those

But there is commonly

presumption that any new tax law was
not intended to reach back and take for its standard of apportion" New
ment a state of things that may no longer be in existence.
burdens," it is very justly said, " ought always to be prospective,'" and it is reasonable to suppose the legislature has intended
a

that they should be.

Such

to the contrary course

by the rigor of the phraseology."

supposition is in harmony with the
general rule of law which requires the courts to "always construe
statutes as prospective and not retrospective, unless constrained

This

is

'■*

a

2

9;

1841

8

;

Pennsylvania Ins. Co.,

" would not apply

measured
to

13

by dividends

Penn. St., 165. In that case
" from and after January

it

v.

ta.x

1,

a

Commonwealth
was decided that

a

■

a

is

a

it

;

2

8-

1

;

3

;

8

;

3

7

Kelley, Hill,
Gale v. Mead,
Denio, 160; People v. Peck, 11 Wend., 604;
Denio, 252 Elmendorf v. New York, 25 Wend., 693, 696
Doughty 1). Hope,
People V. Cook,
N. Y., 67 Pond v. Kegus, Mass., 330 Lowell ». Hadley,
Met, 180; People v. Doe., IMicli., 451; Parks «. Goodwin, Doug., Mich., 56;
Mich., 267; People v. Hart well, 12 id., 508; State i>.
Hickey v. Hinsdale,
Click,
Ala., 25, 26; Savage v. Walsh, 26 id., 620; McKune v. Weller, 11 Cal.,
49; State v. County Commissioners, 29 Md., 516; Huey «. Van Wie, 23 Wis.,
The omission of the collector to en613 Adams v. Seymour, 30 Conn., 402.
ter upon his warrant the true day and year when he received
does not invalidate his proceedings under it. Goodwin v. Perkins, 39 Vt., 598. The right
tax on the market value of the capital stock
of the commonwealth to levy
defeated
not
by the neglect of the city assessors to make reof corporation
turn of the corporation to the treasurer of the commonwealth as required by
statute. Commonwealth v. New England Slate & Tile Co., 13 Allen, 391.

dividend declared by the proper committee De1841.
by the directors until January
4,

cember 30, 1840, but not passed upon

;

it

it

a

is

a

is

7

;

«

Woodward, J., in Price v. Molt, 52 Penn. St., 315, 316. And see Philadelphia V. Perry Railway Co., 52 id., 177 Marsh s. Chestnut, 14 111., 223 Thames
Conn., 550; Warren R. R. Co. v. Belvidere, 35 N. J.,
Manuf. Co. v. Lathrop,
Mich.,
356; Potter's Dwarris on Statutes, 163, 166;
Hall,
19
584; Clark v.
Cooley'.i Const. Lim., 370, and cases cited. A law declaring that certain depaid will
fenses shall not be made to tax deeds until the redemption money
Conway v. Cable, 37 111., 82. Wliere taxes are levied
not apply to prior sales.
appears clearly
repealed by subsequent act, unless
law which
under
will be asthe
to
work
retrospectively,
intended
repeal
tliat the legislature
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the rule not only as a construction of the grant of power, but also
as to all the incidents '
a remedial provision may well

though
be presumed to have been intended to reach back for the purposes of justice.^ And in cases where a tax is levied to meet expenses previously incurred, or to pay the cost of something of
;

which the persons to be taxed have already had the benefit, any
presumption against an intent to give the law retroactive operation may be overcome by the apparent justice of such a construction.
Slimed ihat it intended the taxes to be collected according to the law in force
wlieii they were levied. Oakland v. "Whipple, 44 Gal., 303. In Allen v. Drew,
44 Vt., 174, an act was construed so as to govern the proceedings
by one suband
the
one first
sequently approved, the two having been pending together,
approved expressly in terms referring to the other. A statute making mortgagees personally liable for taxes on the land after taking possession, held applicable to mortgages given before but under which the mortgagees took possession after the statute was passed. Andrews v. Worcester, etc., Ins. Co., 5 Allen,
65.
'

In Gerry v. Stoneham, 1 Allen, 319, a statute providing that where a p.arty
was assessed more than his due and legal proportion, the tax and assessment
should be void only for the excess, and a recovery by suit should be limited
to the excess, was held not applicable to pending actions.
'When the Michigan tax laws have been revised, it has been held that
stringent provisions therein designed to favor tax titles must be understood
to apply to cases originating under the revision.
Clark v. Hall, 19 Mich.,
Auditor General, 20 id., 398. That revision, however, contained
a section which required every person redeeming from the tax sale to pay,
not only the redemption money with heavy interest to the ijurchaser, but also
a penalty of twenty-five per cent, to the state.
Now there was no more reason
and no more justice in the state exacting a penalty for the privilege to one
party to redeem from the tax iiurchase of another, than there would be for demanding a like penalty for the privilege of redeeming from an execution sale,
or for voluntarily paying an honest debt; the exaction, if legal — which may
well be questioned — was unjust and impolitic, for it tended to bring about
the forfeiture of estates, and every state is interested that this shall not happen
356 ; Smith ».

It was, therefore, held to be a reasonable presumption, when
was
repealed, that the state intended the repeal to apply to past
this provision
future
sales.
as well as to
People v. Auditor General, Sup. Ct. Mich., at
to its citizens.

Compare Tinslar ii. Davis, 13 Allen, 79,
June term, 1875, not yet reported.
which was a strong case for the application of the opposite presumption.
The
repeal of a tax law which makes deeds on tax sales prima facie evidence of
title, where it is done by a new tax law which contains a similar provision,
will not prevent deeds given under the repealed law being prima facie evidence of title; the fair presumption being that the legislature intended that
Blackwell v. Van VIeet, 30 Mich., 118.
rule to be continuous.
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CHAPTEE X.
CURING DEFECTS

IN TAX PROCEEDINGS,

A

subject intimately connected with that of the construction of
tax laws, is that of the power of the legislature by other legislation to dispense with obedience to those regulations which have
been prescribed by itself for the protection of those who are taxed.

It

is

a

subject which presents, perhaps, more intrinsic difficulties

than the other.

An act of
1. It may

may assume any one of several forms :
assume the form of a rule of conclusive evidence,

dispensation

which should preclude a departure from the law being shown.
2. It may take the form of a mandate to officers, commanding
them to give effect to proceedings that have been taken, disregarding any defects.
8.

It

may be

a special

curative statute to heal defects in certain

specified proceedings which have been taken.
4.

It

may be a general curative statute to heal irregularities or

defects in any proceedings whatsoever previously taken.

It

may be a general statute for future cases, which, while
marking out a course for the officers to pursue, shall at the same
5.

time declare

that irregularities shall not vitiate any proceedings

had under the statute.
6. Besides these, there may be either a special or a general law
for reassessing the tax, when the proceedings for its collection have
proved ineffectual.
Legislation coming under each of these heads is to be met with

in the statutes of the several states, and is entitled to some consideration.
Conclusive Rules

A

legislative act which should
declare a tax conveyance conclusive evidence that the title of the
former owner was divested, and was passed by the deed to the
1.

of Evidence.

purchaser, could only be supported under the sovereign legislative power to frame and change at its will the rules of evidence.

That power is confe_ssedly great, but it is not unliniitcd.

It

is a

[CH. S.
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power to shape and mould, for the purposes of justice, the rules
under which parties are to make a showing of their rights, and not
" The most formal cona power to preclude their showing them.
veyance may be a fraud or a forgery ; public officers may connive
with rogues to rob the citizen of his property ; witnesses may testify or officers certify falsely, and records may be collusively
manufactured for dishonest purposes ; and that legislation which
would preclude the fraud or wrong being shown, and deprive the
party wronged of all remedy, has no justification in the principles
A statute, therefore,
of natural justice or of constitutional law.
which should make

tax deed conclusive evidence of

complete
title, and preclude the owner of the original title from showing its
invalidity, would be void, because not a law regulating evidence,
a

■*■

a

cases

is

is

it

but an unconstitutional confiscation of property."
In this conhad to
that
no
reference
to
nection,
say
hardly necessary
under statutes of limitation, nor to cases resting on princi-

2.

ples of equitable estoppel.
Legislative

A

Mandates.

them to give effect to

mandate

to officers

invalid proceedings would

for reasons equally conclusive.
an inquiry into the facts,

commanding
be ineffectual

If

it

is

a

it

is

such an act proceeds without
naked attempt to transfer one
man's property to another by mere legislation, and this
not an
If
authority which belongs to any legitimate government.^
Sexton, 29 Iowa, 356.

id., 12; Wliite

ii.

5

a

a

a

;

;

a

7

S.

3

;

;

3

;

;

16

;

v.

Case v. Dean,

S.

'

And see Groesbeck «. Seeley, 13 Mich.,
Flynn, 23 Ind., 46; Corbin v. Hill, 21
Iow.i, 70 Abbott b. Lindenbower, 42 Mo., 163
C, 46 id., 291 Wright «.
Nev., 341, 349 Young v. Beardsley, 11 Paige, 93 East KingsCradlebaugh,
ton V. Towle, 48 N. H., 57; S. C,
Am. Kep., 174; Taylor d. Miles, Kans.,
C,
Am. Rep., 558; Powers u. Puller, 30 Iowa, 476. The case of
498;
Smith D. Cleveland, 17 Wis., 556, contains some very general and unqualiiied
deed may be made conclusive that the mere
language on tliis subject. That
sale was according to law has been held in Iowa.
McCready v. Sexton, 29
Iowa, 356 Ware v. Little, 35 id., 234 Jeflfrey v. Brokaw, id., 505. Under
waiTant for collection of
provision that, before issuing
local assessment,
McCroady

329;

it

the assessment shall be examined and certified as correct by street commissioners, and the attorney and counselor of the city, which certificate shall be
conclusive evidence of regularity of the proceedings,
has been decided that

v. Middleton,

Bay, 353; Wilkinson

v.

Lelaud,

3

Bowman

1

«

is

the certificate would only cover the formal proceedings.
It does not determine the fact that the assessment
made against the proper persons. ^Newell
V. Wheeler, 48 N. Y., 486.
Pet., 627, G57;
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it is usurpation of author-

The legislature must prescribe
ity, and for that reason void.^
rules, but when questions arise between parties whether rules have
been complied with, the
3.

judiciary is the appointed arbiter.

A

Special Curative Acts.

special

act to cure defects in tax

In the
proceedings may undoubtedly be passed in some cases.
margin a number of cases are mentioned where the power to cure
defects in legal proceedings

has been distinctly affirmed, and they

are in point here.*

There are some limitations of the power,
embarrassment

in considering them,

and there is some

because, though

often al-

luded to, they have never been very fully examined in the judiTerrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43
bertson v. Hogan, 3 id., 32, 34.
'

An

;

Ervine's Appeal,

16

Perm. St., 256, 266

;

Lam-

act requiring the board of supervisors of a county to proceed to the
and assessment of drain taxes, some portion of -whicli had

apportionment

already been adjudged void, and the others palpably were so, was adjudged
void on this ground in Butler c. Supervisors of Saginaw, 26 Mich., 32. The
cases of Lewis v. Webb, 3 Greenl., 326; Lane v. Dorman, 3 Scam., 238, 243;

How., Miss., 635, 661 ; Ervine's Appeal, 16 Penn.
Mich., 193 ; McDaniel v. Correll, 19 111., 226 ; Denny v. Mattoon, 2 Allen, 361 ; Budd v. State, 3 Humph, 483 ; Wally's Heirs v.
Kennedy, 3 Yerg., 554, and Piquet, appellant, 5 Pick., 64, are referred to as
illustrating under different circumstances the distinction between legislative
Campbell

c.

Union Bank,

6

St., 256, 366 ; Cash, appellant, 6

and

judicial

ough
8

V.

authority.

Greenough,

See also Lambertson v. Hogan, 3 Penn. St., 33 ; Greenid., 489, 494; Haley v. Philadelphia, 68 id., 45; S. C,
Calhoun ». McLendon, 42 Geo., 405 ; Trustees o Bailey,

11

Am. Rep., 153, 155 ;
Ela., 338 ; People v. Frisbie,

10

36

Cal., 135

;

Sydnoru. Palmer, 33 Wis., 406, 409.

Kearney v. Taylor, 15 How., 494; Strauch ». Shoemaker, 1 W. & S., 166,
175 ; McCoy v. Michew, 7 id., 386 ; Williston c. Colkett, 9 Penn. St., 38 ; Montgomery «. Meredith, 17 id., 43; Dunden v. Snodgrass, 18 id., 151; Schenley ■».
Commonwealth, 36 id., 39 ; State «. Union, 33 N. J., 350 ; State «. Newark,
34 N. J., 236; Walter «. Bacon, 8 Mass., 468, 473; Patterson v. Philbrook, 9
id., 151, 153; Locke v. Dane, 9 id., 360; Trustees v. McCaughcy, 2 Ohio, N. S.,
152; Butler ■d. Toledo, 5 id., 225; Cowgill v. Long, 15 111., 202; Mitchell «.
Deeds, 49 id., 416; Boardman v. Beckwith, 18 Iowa, 293; Allen ■».Archer, 49
Me., 346 ; People v. Seymour, 16 Cal., 333 ; People v. Todd, 33 id., 181 ; Boyce
«. Sinclair, 3 Bush, 361; Davis u. State Bank, 7 Ind., 316; Lucas «. Tucker,
v. Logansport, 39 id., 533 ; Brevoort v. Detroit, 34 Mich.,
17 id., 41 ; Musselman
■ Pillsbury v. Auditor General, 26 id., 345 ; Tucker v. Justices, etc., 34 Geo.,
832
370; Bellows v. Weeks, 41 Vt., 590. The legislature may validate a city ordinance so as to save the lien of a tax levied under it. Schenloy v. Common-

wealth 36 Penn. St., 39.
15
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cial decisions, or even enumerated.
Some of the restrictions that
should attend the exercise of the power rest in policy only, and
therefore address themselves to the legislative judgment and
sense of right, but do not constitute limitations upon legislative
One of these concerns the retroactive character of such
power.
legislation ; there being a special liability to abuse in retrospective legislation.
The people in some states have felt this so
strongly, that by their constitutions, retrospective laws have been
^
expressly forbidden ; but in the absence of any such express re-

is,

striction, there is nothing in the fact that curative statutes operate retrospectively which can preclude their passage.'*
Another
that they may be invidious and inobjection to such laws

untouched.

a

others

for confirmation certain prosingle district, for instance — leaving all
But the defects may be in single district
as they select

a

by favoritism,
ceedings — those of
spired

in effect be made by

reason why they may not

a

if

only, and the need of legislation exclusively confined to ic.
Moreover, in different districts different regulations may have
been politic originally, and
so, there can be no very conclusive
retrospective

;

Cities always have
sanction of the regulations actually applied.
rules of taxation differing in some particulars from those which
prevail in towns and, as in the case of police regulations, such
rules must be allowed to vary, because in some cases there may

But we should

be the most conclusive reasons why they should.

it,

a

think the very limit of such legislation would be reached, when
in their opeparticular assessment and the proceedings under
ration throughout the district, were confirmed. To discriminate

it

a

in such proceedings, and say they shall be valid as to a particular
purcliaser, or against
particular person or estate taxed, would
not be legislation, because
would establish no rule. Its purpose would be, while leaving in force the rule which defeats the

is

'

Provisions of this nature will be found in the constitutions of Louisiana,
New Hampshire, Missouri, Tennessee and Texas. In North Carolina retrospective taxation of sales, purchases and other acts done,
forbidden.
Newark. 27 N. J.,
which is but

;

185

is

a

a

a

statute

a

'

People v. Supervisors of Ingham, 20 Mich.,
mode
of continuing or reviving tax which
05. A
might be supposed to have expired, and is in this sense retrospective, but
which does not give judicial construction to former statute,
not unconstitutional,
Stoekdale x. The Insurance Co., 20 Wall., 323.
State e.
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case of a favored

No department of the government possesses this authority. And all special confirmations of assessments and other proceedings are forbidden in some states by the constitutional requirement that all laws shall be general.
One ver}' precise limit to the power to cure these proceedings
is this : They cannot be cured when there was a lack of jurisdiction to take them.
This is a rule applicable to every species of
Curative laws may heal irregularities in aclegal proceedings.
party.

tion, but they cannot cure a want of authority to act at all.^
What constitutes a want of jurisdiction is the difficult question in
these cases.
And in this regard the rules which apply to retrospective and to prospective healing acts are the same.
It is certain that whatever the legislature could noi have authorized originally it cannot confirm.
The unauthorized acts of
power it did not before
Therefore no unconstitutional taxation can be confirmed,

individuals cannot confer upon the state
possess.^

a

that entirely wants any e-ssential element of taxation.
Taxation without an assessment must consequently be incapable

and none

of confirmation, because apportionment is indispensable.^
'
D.

Denny v. Mattoon,
McCorrell, 19 111.,

Doherty,

Joynes,
Goldtree, 44
''

Allen,

361 ;

Nelson

v.

Rountree, 23 Wis., 367;

v. Rote,

68 Penn.

Daniel

St., 348 ; State v.

Ex'r v. Cunningliam, 30 Grat., 31,109, per
R. Co. «. McQuilkin, 13 Kans., 301 ; People v.
Cal., 333; Abbott v. Lindenbower, 43 Mo., 163.

60 Me.,

J. ;

3

236, 238 ; Pachards

And if

504; Griffin's

Atchison,

etc., R.

National Bank of Cleveland

v.

lola,

9

Kans., 689, 696, per Dillon,

J.

^ The Pennsylvania statute of 1815 declared that " no inequality in the assessment or in the process or otherwise, shall be construed or taken to affect the
title of the purchaser, but the same shall be declared to be good and legal."
Also that only "when the owner or owners of lands sold for taxes shall have
paid the taxes due on them previously to the sale, or within two years thereafter shall have tendered the amount of the taxes and costs with twenty-five
per centum additional, and the tender has been refused, shall he or they be
entitled to recover the lands by due course of law, and that in no other case
Notwithstanding this act
and on no other plea shall an action be sustained."
it was decided that if an unseated lot was j)ut on the seated list, and then
transferred to the unseated without notice to the owner, a sale on this assessment would be void. Millikin v. Benedict, 8 Penn. St., 169, reviewing and approving Lorimer v. McCall, 4 W. & S., 133; and Harpers. Mechanics' Bank,

W. & S., 214. In Commercial Bank v. Woodside, 14 Penn. St., 404, 409,
Bell, J., says: " It is essential to the validity of every tax sale of lands that
the subject of it should bo assessed and returned, by some competent authority.
7

'
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party has been illegally deprived of the opportunity to be
heard in opposition to the assessment, the defect is jurisdictional.^
the

And it is

purpose cannot be affirmed ; the inability to authorize such a tax being perpetual.^
A tax discriminating against an individual could not be affirmed ; but a merely excessive levy for lawful purposes, apportioned through the district, might ba
It has often been decided
clear that a tax for an illegal

in

tax was the want of previous
But a tax
legislation, this might be supplied retrospectively.'
that, where the only defect

a

as unseated, or, where it lias been rated as a seated tract or lot, that it he transferred to the unseated list, by the commissioners of the county, or their authorized agents, with notice to the owuer, if that he possible. This is the
doctrine of all the cases in which the subject has been treated. They settle

indisputably, that an omission, in this particular, is uncured by the act of
It is the assess1815, which applies only to irregularities in the proceeding.
4
ment says Lorrimeru. McCall, 4 W., 351; S. C,
"VV. & Serg., 133, which
confers the power to sell in the same manner as a judgment on which an execution is issued. "Without this, there is no authority to divest the title of
the owner, and if a tract be returned as seated it cannot be sold for taxes.
To
the same

Barr,

169."

effect are the other adjudications, down to Milliken «. Benedict, 8
To the same eflect is Stewart v. Trevor, 56 Penn. St., 374. That

the want of an assessment is not an irregularity capable of being tlius cured,
see Steward v. Shoenfelt, 13 S. & R., 360 ; Bratton v. Mitchell, 1 W. & S., 310 ;

Miller

St., 432: McReynolds v. Longeuberger,
J). Hale, 26 Penn.
57 id., 13.
That the want of a notice required by the constitution is an incurable defect,
see Wilson v. McKenna, 52 111., 43. An assessment so defective as to be totally
void cannot be cured by legislation.
People v. HoUiday, 35 Cal., 300. So
with a want of valuation : People v. Savings Union, 31 id., 132. The confirmation by a city council of a void assessment cannot make it good. Doughty t).
Hope, 3 Denio, 594.
' See Thames

Manufacturing Co. v. Lothrop, 7 Conn., 550, which however
is not an adjudication upon the point. Marsh i). Chestnut, 14 111., 223; Billings 13. Detton, 15 id., 218, are decisions which support the text. If one man's
land is taxed to another and sold, the sale is void and cannot be made otherAbbott D. Lindeubower, 42 Mo., 162. And see Hume o.
wise by legislation.
land is taxed by a city which is not within
"Wainscott, 46 id., 145.
the
tax cannot be validated though
afterwards brought in. Atchison, etc., R.

it

R. Co.,

V.

McQutlkin,

2

Conway
Borchsenius,

'In

Grim

®.

13

Cable, 37

30

Wis.,

is

it,

If

Kans., 301.
111.,

82; Hart

d.

Henderson,

Mich.,

17

318;

Dean

v.

235.

School District,

It

If

by

a

any drregularity or want of authority in levying

it

:

"

a

57 Penn. St., 433, Sharswood, J.,
speaking of
has
not
been
bounty tax, says
pretended, and could not be, that the legislature had not the power antecedent to authorize it.
so, they could cure
v.

retroactive

law, even
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been paid, would be void and

incapable of confirmation, the officer losing all jurisdiction
proceed when payment has been made.''

to

The general rule has often been declared, that the legislature may
validate, retrospectively, the proceedings which they might have
authorized in advance.
Therefore, if any directions of the statute fail of observance, which are not so far oE the essence of the
thing to be done that they must be provided for in any statute on
the

subject,

the legislature may retrospectively cure

the

But there- are probably some exceptions to this general

defect.

rule.

If

the law has afforded the party an opportunity to be heard, when
it might have been dispensed with, he has a right to rely upon
this for his protection, and we should doubt the right of the
There are some
legislature to take, it away by retroactive law.
cases which, we think,

recognize this right to

a

hearing which

the law has given, as constituting an exception to the general
And the reason of the
right of the legislature to cure defects.
exception

will apply

to all cases

in which notice to the party, by

publication or otherwise, has been provided for his protection.
If this can be dispensed with by a healing act, the very provision
for a notice for the party's protection becomes a trap for his destruction.'^

though therehy a right of action, -whicli had been vested in an individual,
sliould be divested. It is within tlie principle of all the decisions of admitted authority." And see Booth v. Woodbury, 33 Conn., 118 ; Crowell -o. Hopkiuson, 45 N. H., 9; Lowell v. Oliver, 8 Allen, 247; Comer ii. Folsom, 13
Minn., 219 ; State v. Demorost, 33 N. J., 528; Barbour v. Camden, 51 Me., 608;
Board of Commissioners v. Bearss, 25 Ind., 110; Taylor i). Thompson, 42 111.,
9 ; Tucker v. Justices, 34 Geo., 370.
'

Beading

v.

Finney,

73 Penn. St., 467.

^ In Miller v. Hale, 26 Penn. St., 432, in which it was
decided that a sale of
unseated lands, made before the expiration of a year from the time when the
tax was due and unpaid, could not be validated by the statute curing irregularities, the following remarks are made by Woodward, J. : "
it be granted
that this was a regular assessment, or that its irregularities were such as the
curative provisions of the act of 1815 would remedy, it cannot be claimed

If

'

due and unpaid for the space of one year before ' tlie
condition on which the jurisdiction of the treasurer is expressly
limited by the first section of the act of 1815. It was said with great truth,,
by Judge Huston, in McCall i). Lorimer, 4 Watts, 351, 353, that taxes cannot be
that the taxes were
sale —

a
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4 and

5.

Prospective

Curative

Laws.

As already

observed,

a

general healing statute is subject to the same rules as a special
act for the like purpose, and requires no separate consideration.
A statute providing that in proceedings thereafter to be taken,
errors and irregularities shall not vitiate, comes also under the
same

restrictions upon legislative authority,^

though possibly it

due unless they have been assessed.
It is, indeed, the assessment that makes
the tax. It is the duty of all owners of unseated lands to return them for
taxation, and to pay the taxes when assessed ; but how is he to pay before they
are assessed?
It is not for him to fix the valuation or the rate, but for the
; and, until they have performed their duty, he has no
But, when the assessment lias been made and the tax ascerduty to perform.
tained, there is no authority for proceeding to sell the land until the tax shall
have remained unpaid a year. A sale short of that period is simply void.

county commissioners

It

is like a sale where there has been no assessment, which has often been deto pass the title. Nor does the curative provision of the
fourth section of the act of 1815 apply to such a sale, for that was intended to
clared insufficient

remedy irregularities in proceedings where jurisdiction had attached, not to
confer jurisdiction in cases that were beyond the purview of the act. A system was provided by the legislature for enforcing the i)ayment of taxes upon
unseated lands, but until a tract has been assessed

and the tax remained

due

and unpaid a year, it is not within the system nor subject to any of its
such were not the rule of decision, titles could be divested,
provisions.

If

without notice

to the owner, whenever it suited the interest or caprice of the
officers
to expose them to sale.
A law, intending to promote public
county
a
wanton sacrifice of private rights, would thus become an
objects without
instrument of intolerable mischief, and the doubts of its constitutionality,
which, with all its checks and balances, attended its enactment and early his-

tory, would grow into
book."
The cases of Milliken

a

conviction that

■would

sweep

it

from

the statute

v. Benedict, 8 Penn. St., 169, and Commercial
Bank
id., 404, turn upon a failure to give a notice which, in advance, might have been dispensed with. See also Prindle v. Campbell, 9
■c."Woodside, 14

Minn.,

313 ; Dubuque

v.

Wooten, 38 Iowa, 571.

But

see People v. Seymour, 16

Cal., 332.

A

Minnesota tax law came under review in Prindle -o. Campbell, 9 Minn.,
Among other things it provided, that "all the instructions and directions herein given for the assessing of lands and personal property, and the
levying and collecting of taxes and assessments, shall be deemed only direc1

213.

tory, and no en-or or informality in the proceedings of any of the officers entrusted with the same, not afi'ecting the substantial justice of the tax itself,
shall vitiate, or in any wise afi'ect the validity of the tax or assessment, or of
the title conveyed under the sale for taxes under this chapter."
Held, that this
does not embrace such errors and informalities as go to the jurisdiction of the

CH.
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may go farther in some particulars, as the parties concerned would
be apprised in advance that they were not to rely upon an exact
compliance with the law, and would be under greater obligation to
watch the proceedings.
It is not an objection to a curative statute
that it is passed while suits are pending, and was designed to defeat

the proceedings cured.

The court must apply the statute

officers chargecT with the performance of the duties imposed by tlie chapter, or
tlie validity of their acts, but only such as do not substantially affect the material steps in the proceedings.
Meld, further, that a defective notice of sale was
not cured by the act. An assessment in which the lands of two persons were
assessed together under one aggregate assessment was in Hamilton b. Fonddu
Lac, 25 "Wis., 490, 495, lield void, and the defect not corrected by a statute that
an assessment shall be valid, " notwithstanding any omission, defect or irreguPaine J., says " it would be clearly going beyond
larity " in the proceedings.
the scope and intent of this act to say that it made valid an assessment against
one person of a tax upon another person's lots. That is something more than
a more omission, defect or irregularity in the proceedings."

Under the Pennsylvania statute the following irregularites held to be cured :
A failure of the assessor to sign his roll. Townsen v. Wilson, 9 Penn. St.,
A sale of seated land with unseated; the sale being good as to the pro370.
portion of the tax for which the unsealed was chargeable, and the title passing
Mitchell d. Bratton, 5 "W. & S., 451 ; Campbell v.
after redemption expired.
Wilson, 1 Watts, 503; Harper «. McKeehan, 3 W. & S., 338; McCord ii. Bergautz, 7 Watts, 487 ; Dietrick «. Mason, 57 Penn. St., 40. Paying over surplus
mtmeys instead of giving a surplus bond. Eogers v. Johnson, 67 id., 43, citing
and relying upon Ash v. Ashton, 3 W. & S., 510, and Iddiugs o. Cairns, 3
Grant's Cas., 88. The statute does not cure the want of a deed.
Hoffman ii.
Bell, 61 Penn. St., 444. As to curing irregularities in general, see Laird v.
Heister, 24 id., 452; Cuttle «. Brockway, 24 id., 145; Heft «. Gophart, 65 id.,
A Massachusetts statute
510, 518; Witherspoon v. Duncan, 4 Wall., 310, 317.
provided, that "if in the assessors' list, or their warrant and list committed to
the collector, there shall be any error in the name of any person taxed, the tax
assessed to him may, notwithstanding such error, be collected of the person
provided he is taxable, and can be identified by the asapplied to the case of one taxed by his surname only.
Tyler

intended to be taxed
sessors."

This

;

Hardwick, 6 Met., 470. See Sargeant «. Bean, 7 Gray, 125, where this statute
And for cases under a law for like purpose in Ohio,
was further considered.
The
see Welker e. Potter, 18 Ohio, N. S., 85 ; Upington v. Oviatt, 24 id., 333.
cases under the Iowa statute go farther, we think, than any others, in sanctioning broad powers in the legislature to cure defects. The following are
referred to : Eldridge o. Kuehl, 37 Iowa, 160 ; McCready «, Sexton, 39 id., 356 ;
Hurley v. Rowel, 31 id., 64; Rima v. Cowan, 31 id., 461; Thomas v. Stickle,
v. Oliver, 33 id., 513; Bulkley v. Callanau, 33 id., 461;
32 id., 71; Henderson
Ware ». Little, 35 id., 334 ; Jeffrey v. Brokaw, 85 id., 505 ; Genther r. Fuller, 36
».

id., 604.
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already passed into judgment."
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Reassessments.

a

statute

cannot affect cases

The method of curing defects by reassess-

ment of the tax is less open to abuse than any that has hitherto
been mentioned.
"Whether this is done by general law, which

in which tax proceedings prove invalid, and
authorizes the same tax to be imposed on the persons or property
provides for all

cases

that should be charged therewith, by proceedings begun de novo,
or assumes the form of a -special law providing for the like reassessment in any particular case, it is scarcely possible that it
should cause serious injustice beyond what is incident to all tax
legislation. In the new proceedings the party concerned has all

in
and he is precluded by

the opportunity to watch the various steps, and to be heard

review of them, that he has in any case,
nothing that has taken place in the proceedings

which proved
abortive. The assessment is for the purpose merely of enforcing
against him a duty which he was likely to evade, by reason of the
nonfeasances or misfeasances of the officers whose duty it was to

it ; and

proceeding gives him the same opporthat is given in other cases, and is conducted on principles that operate generally, he has no reasonable
ground of complaint.* The only cases in which hardship is likely
enforce

as the new

tunity of being heard

v. Long, 15 III,, 202; Miller D.Graham, 17 Ohio, N. S., 1; State
Iowa, 340 ; State v. Norwood, 12 Md., 19.5 ; Hepburn v. Ourts,
7 Watts, 300;
Grim s. School District, 51 Penn.St, 433. Certiorari dismissed
■where a defect in the assessment was cured by special act after it was sued out.
State v. Apgar, 31 N. J., 358. And see Newark ■!).State, 32 id., 453 ; Bristol «.
Supervisors of Ingham, 20 Mich., 95 ; Ex parte MoCardle, 7 Wall., 506 ; U. S. o.

'See Cowgill

V.

Squiers,

Tyner,

11

26

id., 88.

^Lambertson

v. Hogan, 2 Penn. St., 22 ; People v. Supervisors of Saginaw,
Mich.,
22.
26
The legislature has no authority to reverse judgments directly
or indirectly, and a legislative act legalizing a tax roll and healing defects
therein will be so construed as not to affect an existing judgment for tresspass
against the collector for seizing and selling property to satisfy the illegal
tax. Moser v. White, 29 Mich., 59.

3A statute which, in case of an invalid or irregular tax, provides that it
may be assessed by the assessors for the time being, " to the just amount to
which, and upon the estate or to the person to whom such tax ought at first
to have been assessed," may be used to correct

Goodrich «. Lunenburg,
the wife, of a tax wrongfully put to
entire list.

9

the

an error which extends to the

It justifies a reassessment to
husband and abated the preceding

Gray, 38.
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to be inflicted by such legislation, are those in ■which a tax is reassessed upon an estate which has changed hands since the tax
should have been collected from it ; but a proper examination oE
the records will, in most cases, lead the purchaser to a discovery
of the liability, and enable him to provide against it.^ Where
the tax itself was originally void by reason of having been levied
for an illegal purpose, it is obviously impossible to breathe vital-

If

had.^

was void because of

disregard of

a

lation has been

it it

it,

ity into it by new proceedings.^ If it was void because of want
of legislation justifying
may be reassessed after proper legis-

a

it

it

a

apportionment, or for any reason affecting
part of the list only,
may be reassessed with the proper corrections, where correcAnd here
tions are practicable.*
may be observed that judi-

if

cial decision against the first proceedings,
based upon errors
and defects merely, and not upon the vicious nature of the tax

Still another
that which

Hubbard

a

a

provided by
judicial review

We do not refer

proper application.'

and see Overing v. Foote, 43

v. Garfield, 102 Mass., 72

:

year.

on

sometimes
to have

statutes allowing the parties concerned

of the proceedings

method of curing defects
a

is

Judicial corrections.
It
may be noticed.

Such

reassessment.

is

bar to

a

not

a

is

decision merely
points out the error, and the reassessment may be of all others
the most proper and effectual way of correcting it.^
itself,

N. Y.,

290.

Delaware DiTision Canal Co.

For

'

29

Wis.,

400.

Charlton,

Dean v. Charlton,

Mich.,

'

26

590;

451

23

27

Dean

Wis.,

Wis.,

590

522;
v.

v.

In

See

Brevoort
:

■».

Health, L. B.,

Wis.,

;

Dean

23

B
,

■•See

V. Charlton,

6

Mills

v.

Q.

3

'Dean

Charlton,

v. Commonwealth,

is

it

;

;

4

;

'

a

change of title,
That the tax may he reassessed, notwithstanding such
That
see Tallman v. Janesville, 17 Wis., 71 Cross ». Milwaukee, 19 id., 509.
local assessments may be reassessed as well as general taxes, May v. Holdridge, 23 id., 93; Brevoort «. Detroit, 24 Mich., 323. And as to such laws in
id., 579, 590 State v. Newark, 34 N.
general, see further, Tweed v. Metcalf,
J., 236 In re Van Antwerp, 56 N. Y., 261. A failure to require the payment
not payable, or the
of a tax, or the decision of the auditor general that
no
works
as
years,
estoppel
for
subsequent
against the state.
receipt of taxes
50 Penn. St., 399.

Porchsenius,
re

"S'an

Cook

».

30 id., 236.

Antwerp,
Ipswich

N. Y.,

56

261.

Local Board

of

Detroit, 34 Mich., 323.

compare Butler

v.

Supervisors

of Saginaw,

22.

cases

of this nature,

see State v.

Jersey City,

35

N. J.,

381;

Miller

v.
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in which proceedings are, under general laws,
referred to a court at some stage for confirmation, but to those m
■which the proceedings are attacked after their conclusion, and
now to those

cases

they are subjected to a judicial examination with a view to the
correction of any errors, if correction shall be found practicable.

hj

Of the errors that creep into
the records of tax proceedings very many are merely clerical, or
occur in consequence of a failure to put in proper form the evi-

Corrections

amendment.

in themselves

dence of transactions

must stand by the record
record may be as fatal as

;

and

failure

a

failure

a

Tax proceedings

correct.

to make the proper

to take the

proceeding of

If,

which the record should have been made.

is

if

is

a

is

the defect in
record
obviously clerical and
that
to say,
the record on its face sufficiently
nothing more;
shows that the proper steps have in fact been taken, but there
however,

some error on the part of the recording officer in putting the evi-

upon the record in precise conformity to the law some
omission of
word, or the accidental employment of one word for
a

;

dence

or any similar error which cannot mislead the mistake
may be overlooked, and the court, when the record becomes the
subject of judicial investigation, may by intendment supply what
;

omitted,

record

and correct

what

is

is

another,

erroneous,

and then

sustain

the

though the proper corrections had been made by the reBut corrections cannot be made by incording officer himsell*
tendment unless the necessary facts appear, either in tlie record
as

1.

is

Graham, 17 Ohio, N. S.,
The statute in each case
quite peculiar.
That
of New Jersey forbade any collateral questioning of the proceedings in the
case of certain assessments for local objects, but permitted them to be reviewed at any time on certiorari, or other proper proceeding in the supreme or circuit court.

'Mr. Blackwell,

it

a

2

speaking of Atkins v. Hinman,
Gilm., 437, 451, says:
"Where in collateral action, amendments of the tax record were permitted
in the circuit court, the supreme court sustained them upon the ground
that they were only corrections of clerical mistakes, and could prejudice no
person's rights; that they brought no new matter in the case, and gave no additional eflBcacy to the proceedings, but simply put them in stricter conform
And
ity to the provisions of the statute.
must be remembered that these
amendments were of the judgment and precept under the Illinois statute of
1839, and the anterior proceeding on the files of the court, furnished the facts
•whereon the amendments were based."
Blackwell on Tax Titles, 399.
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actually made, or in the official documents on file from -which,
the record should have been drawn up; the courts cannot imply
the existence of facts which are not recited any wliere in the
as

official proceedings.

Where the proceedings are conducted under the supervision
of a court of record, or must go before such a court for confirmation, the facts which do not appear of record may be supplied by
leave of the court, on a proper showing by affidavit.^ The author-

ity

of the court to permit such amendments, in order to make
the record correspond to the facts, is probably not different from
what it is to permit amendments in the exercise of its ordinary

jurisdiction.

If

the facts to be supplied are such as affect

individual cases on

the roil, and may prejudice the parties, it would seem to be a matter of right that the persons to be affected should have notice of
an application to amend, and an opportunity to meet the showing.

This should certainly be so if the application is made at

a stage

of the proceedings when the party, if the correctio n is made, will
have no opportunity subsequently to raise any questions regarding the propriety or justice of the amendment. As an illustration,
the case may be instanced of a judgment which is erroneous
reason of some defect which

ment

;

by

it is desired to supply by an amend-

in such case clearly the party against whom the judgment

is to be validated should be allowed the privilege to contest the
truth of that which it is proposed to put upon the record, and by
And the application ought to
which it is expected to bind him.^
be a distinct proceeding for the purpose,

and not be made

in

a

suit

brought to recover lands which have been sold under the judgOn such an application counter affidavits would be adment.^
' Young ». Thompson, 14
« See

Dunham

111., 380, 381.

v. Chicago, 55 111., 357.

' In

an action of ejectment, to recover possession of land by virtue of a tax
such an
title, motion was made to amend the precept. Treat, Ch. J., says : "
amendment is allowable, it should only be made upon a distinct application

If

The application should have no connection
would introduce much confusion
A court engaged in the trial of
,ind inconvenience into judicial proceedings.
and
embarassed,
be
to
delayed
by a motion to amend the
not
a case ought
in question before it.
which
is
but
collaterally
record of another proceeding,
Such an application might involve the necessity of bringing in other parties
to the court for that purpose.

with any other

case.

A

contrary course
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missible, and the court ought to insist upon a very clear showing
of the facts, before giving its sanction to the introduction of any
changes in a record not originally made under its supervision.
There is a manifest difference between such a case and the correction of errors in the record of proceedings which have been taken in
the court itself, and of which the judges themselves may be presumed to have some I'ecollection.

There are undoubtedly cases in which ministerial officers may
correct errors without judicial permission ; and there are also some
cases in which it would be apparent they could have no such

Still other cases may be open to reasonable doubt.
Where the defect consists merely in the failure to copy into a

power.

book of records the official document which evidences some legal

it at any time,
This
be
done
by the officer
by making the required record.
may
who should have done it in the first place, or it may be done by his
successor in office.
But where the document which should go

transaction,

the proper recording officer may correct

difficulty is presented.
involving the right to make amendments have been
in the state of New Hampshire, and it inay be useful

upon record is defective,
Many

cases

considered

a case

of more

to notice them.

In

validity of

town vote to raise money
was in question, and the court, while the cause was on trial, permitted the record to be" amended so as to show that the proper
a

very early

case the

vote had been had.

a

The amendment was made by the person

who was town clerk at the time the meeting was held ; and the
The authority to
case does not show that he was still in office.
make the amendment was not much considered ; the judge con" On this
tenting himself with saying that,
point we think that
great care must be taken that amendments
and cliflferent interests before the court."

Pitkin

be made only accordv.

Yaw,

13 111., 251, 253.

In

another case the samejudge, in speaking of a defective judgment on a delin" It may be that tlie circuit
quent tax list, says:
court, upon a proper application, will allow tlie record to be so amended as to show when thejudgment
was rendered. But until the record is thus perfected, no title can be asserted

Young ?). Thompson, 14 111., 380, 381.
under the proceedings."
"Where the
certificate of publication of the collector's notice of his intended application
for judgment for taxes is deficient, it may be amended by order of the court,
upon notice being given to the opposite party, even after judgment.
T. Chicago, 55 111., 357, citing Coughran v. Gutchens, 18 III., 390.

Dunham
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ing to the fact

but we have no doubt that
amended to conform to the truth." ^

In

;

the next case

in which

a

a

237

record may be

like question was raised, the point

was more fully considered.
It was admitted that there were defects in the record of town proceedings, which would be fatal to a
tax title then under consideration in a case on trial, unless they
could be cured.
The defects are summed up by the court, and
the case disposed of as follows : " The return of the posting up
of the warrant for the town meeting is insufJPcient.
It does not
state when it was posted up.
Nor does it show that it was posted
at a

It

public place.

does not appear

that Thirston, who was

And

chosen collector, took the oath of office prescribed by law.

there are defects in the return of the collector, to which exceptions have been taken.
" The tenants
move that these proceedings may be amended.
It has been already settled that the records of towns may be
amended

to conform to the truth of the fact.^

The amendment

must be made by the person who was in office at the time.'
"It seems probable that in the prior cases where amendments
have been allowed, the officers who were permitted to make them
were not in office at the time ; if they were, it must have been
under subsequent election ; and the right to have the amendment
made cannot depend upon the question whether the officer has

The form in which such amendments are to
again been elected.
It would be very dangerbe made, has never yet been settled.
ous to sanction alterations of the books themselves, by erasures
and interlineations.

And

we are of opinion that they should be

only upon evidence showing the truth of the facts, and
then by drawing out in form the amendment which the facts authorize. The amendment, with the order under which it is made,
made

may then be annexed to the books where the original is recorded,
so that the whole matter will appear ; and in furnishing copies the
original and amendment should both be furnished.

"But it is

objected,

on the part of the

demandant,

that no

Bishop 11. Cooe, 3 N. H., 513, 516, per BicJiardson, Ch. J., who cites, as authority, Welles V. Battelle, 11 Mass., 477, and Taylor v. Henry, 3 Picls., 397.
'

Citing Bishop v. Cone, 3 K. H.,
digan V. Page, 6 N. H., 182.
2

3

Taylor

ii.

Henry,

3

Pick.,

397.

513 ; "Welles v. Battelle,

11

Mass., 477

;

Car-
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That when she
amendpient ought to be made to her prejudice.
purchased, these defects in the vendue title were apparent, and
that she must be presumed to have purchased with knowledge
that the title was defective.
" The
rule is that amendments of records are made with
general

saving of the rights of third persons acquired since the existence
of the defect.
Chamberlain v. Crane, 4 K. H. 116 ; Bowman v.
Stark, 6 id., 459.
" To
apply this rule, however, to all cases of defects in sales of
lands for ta.xes, would, in effect, be very nearly denying a right to
amend ; as the owner of the land sold would attempt to defeat any
amendment, by conveying to some friend, who would bring a suit
in his behalf.

It

would, at least, be necessary to confine the application of the principle to cases where the land had been actu-

ally conveyed bona fide.

"Bat

might exist, when the purchaser, although he
might not have found upon the records all that was necessary to
make a formal and valid record, might have been well assured,
from what he did find, that all that was necessary had in fact been
instances

done.

" For instance, in relation to the two first defects in the records
in this case — in the I'eturn of the warning of the meeting, and in
the record of the oath of the collector — although these records
are not sufficient in point of law, they lead

the mind of any one

And
to the belief that what was requisite was probably done.
in such cases, where the fact appears to be stated, but not in a
formal manner, there is no reason wby he who purchases should
not be subjected to the same liability to have the amendment
made, and the record put in form, that his grantor would have
to recover the land.
" There are cases
where, although all that is required may not
appear of record, it may be left to the jury to presume that all
been, had he attempted

it,

that was required was done.
As in Bishop v. Cone — although
the application of the principle in that case may, perhaps, have
been questionable, on account of the transactions having been so
an amendment
recent, that, if the trutli would have warranted

it

necessary,

is,

is

a

But where what

is

might have been made. Whether that principle could be applied
not necessary to determine.
subsequent purchaser,
against
although not formally stated,

so

CH.
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far set down as to lead to

correct record miglit
have been made, there seems to be no reason why a purchaser,
who has access to the records, should not take it subject to a right
a

belief that
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a

to have the record put in form, if the truth will warrant it.
"
When, on the other hand, nothing appet^rs upon the record in
relation to any particular fact necessary to make out a title, nor
is any thing set down from which it is naturally to be inferred
that the fact existed, a subsequent lona fide purchaser ought not
to have his title defeated by supplying
ing

a

record instead of amend-

a record."^

The subsequent

in New Hampshire are in accord with
It is said that
these, and fully sustain them in their conclusions.^
" it has never been held that such amendments could be allowed
cases

by any other tribunal than one of the superior courts." ^ And
yet unless some statute confers upon them the authority, it is not
9 N. H., 168, 176, per Parher, Ch. J.
Tlie judge thereupif
the
"upon
principles,
that
these
facts
will -warrant it "
on proceeds to say
out
in
detail
the various defects which ho points
may be amended. But he
adds, " we must first have evidence to show tliat these amendments may be

'

Gibson

v.

Bailey,

made with truth."

' On the trial of Bean

N. H.,

390, involving the validity of
it appearing that there was no return upon the
warrant calling the meeting, the selectmen who were in otHoe when it was held
v.

Thompson,

19

a tax voted at a town meeting,

were permitted, on motion, to make the proper return.
Woods, J., says:
" Leave is often granted to officers, whose returns of their doings, or records of
public transactions, are, by law, made evidence, to correct errors or to supply
to the truth.
The interest which the public have in the
the
and the responsibility of the officer himrecord,
and
fullness
of
correctness
of
his
own
doings, are primarily a good cause for grantself for the accuracy

omissions,

to conform

it,

ing such indulgences tending to the promotion of reasonable objects. And it
has never been deemed an objection to the amendment of a return or record,
except that
that proceedings were pending which might be aflfected by
where rights or claims bona fide have intervened, amendments that would entirely defeat them have been in some instances denied." And he refers to
Gibson «. Bailey, supra, as laying down the proper rule on the subject. In
Scammon «. Scammon, 28 N. H., 419, 429, Bishop v. Cone and Gibson v.
In Cass d. Bellows, 31 id., 501,
Bailey, are again referred to with approval.
they also are approved, but the proper person to make the corrections then

'

•0. Putney,

Pierce

they could
v.

not be made.

Richardson,

37

Bell,

J.

48 id., 138.
v.

Bichardson,

37

N. H.,

306, 311, per

See further

id., 306, 309

;

;

necessary was dead, and consequently
Prescott V. Hawkins, 12 id., 19 Pearce

Jaquith

2-iO

[CH. X.

LAW OF TAXATIONS.

An early

a

it,

very clear whence tliey derive
nor how township officer, or one
who has been such, can, in this collateral way, have authority conferred upon him to do anything which, without such authorization,
would be an illegal act.
quoted in ISTew Hampcorrection bj- town clerk, of his
shire, involved the validity of
The
own motion, to cure
defect in an entry made by himself.
often

was sustained

the clerk might have made

the court expressing the opinion that

it

amendment

;

a

a

a

case in Massachusetts,

at any time while he held the office,

is

a

a

it

a

it

held in the
subsequent election.' But
same state that the successor of the clerk can have no authority
to make corrections in records of transactions which were had
before he came into office.*
In Vermont
has been said that " the practice of amending
and altering the records, when
controversy has arisen, to meet
even though under

is

it

a

a

particular case, or in consequence of decision of the court, cannot
be defended."'
In later case the right to amend, under proper
" While
restrictions, was asserted.
obvious," say the court,
" some limits must be fixed to such amendments, we do not feel

other

cases,

it

a

prepared to say, as matter of law, that they are never allowable.
If the officer making the record were out of office, or were party
to the suit, as in Hadley v. Chamberlin, 11 Vt, 618, and in many
might be improper.

*

*

Bat we think in gen-

a

a

it

must be regarded as the right of the clerk of
town, or
other municipal corporation, while having the custody of the
records, to make any record according to the facts.
And we do
not perceive that his having been out of office and restored again,
could deprive him of that right. But even the officer could not
alter or amend
record upon the testimony of third persons ordieral

it

narily, and ought not to do
upon his own recollection, unless
in very obvious cases of omission or error, of which the present

1

might fairly be regarded
Welles

v.

Battelle,

11

as

one probably.

Mass., 477, 481, per Parker, Ch.

Such amendments

J.

v.

2

«

Henrj', Pick., 307. The defect consisted in the failure to record
the adjournment of the town meeting at which the new clerk was cliosen.
Taylor

it

a

a

'

Williams, Ch. J., in Hadley d. Chamberlin, 11 Vt., 618. The amendment
was made in open court on the trial of cause involving the sufficiency of the
record.
One peculiarity of the case was that the officer making the amendment was
party to the suit, and made
for his own protection.
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documents or min-

utes."'

It

is observable of this case that the amendment,

which con-

sisted in the signing of the record of warning of a school district
meeting,

was made by the clerk on the trial of a cause, where the

record was in question, and without the permission of the court.
From the case it appears that " the court decided that they had
no power over the clerk, and could give him no directions, but
said that in the opinion of the court the clerk had a right, if he
chose to do so, to amend the record in that particular, if such
amendment would be according to the truth ; but that the clerk
must judge for himself whether he would or should make such
amendment, and the court added that if such amendment was
made, the record, in the

ble."

opinion of the court, would be admissiThis remark distinguishes the case broadly from those in

New Hampshire, and leaves the responsibility of all amendments
with the officer himself.

In New York,

in which the afliidavit of the assessors,
attached to the assessment roll, was found to be defective, the
opinion was expressed that it would be competent for the board
of supervisors, when in session for the purposes of a review of the
in

a case

rolls, "to send for the assessors of any one town to come before
them, and supply omissions, and make the necessary affidavits,
where the omission occurred through accident or mistake." ^ This
opinion appears entirely reasonable ; and it would seem that the
officer who, through any carelessness or error, has executed, or
even delivered, a defective process or return, ought to be at lib-

erty to correct it at any time afterwards, before any decisive action
has been taken, under the process or document amended, and
while, therefore, there is no possibility that the error can have
prejudiced any one.
Of course the amendment could not be made by one who w;is
no longer in office, as under such circumstances it would not be
an official
^Reclfidd,
«

Parish

act.^

Ch.

Neither could it be made under circumstances

J., in Mott

«. Golden,

3.'}

v.

Reynolds,

N. Y.,

27

Vt.,

S06, 308.

463, 405, per Morgan,

J.

"The first ques^Shaw, CIi. J., in Ilartwell o. Littleton, 13 Pick., 339, 233.
tion is whether the town clerk of a former year, who does not now hold that
IG

LAW

242

[CH. X.

TAXATION.

OP

it could operate unjustly upon the rights of parties. Thus,
it has been held in Vermont, that if a taz sale is fatally defective
by reason of the failure of the town clerk to certify in his record
"where

is,

that the advertisements were published as required by law, the
clerk cannot make it good by amending his record after the time
that the
The reason
for redeeming from the sale has expired.
owner, relying upon the record, may have omitted to redeem, in-

But until the
his land has not been legally sold.^
rights of third parties have intervened, or conclusive action has
been taken in reliance upon the records or documents, as repreasmuch

as

is

a

it

not perceived
senting in their imperfect state the actual facts,
and
preserved
why mistake once made should be crystalized
shall
inall
that
the
destruction
of
follow,
as an instrument for
stead of being corrected, that legal proceedings

may be supported
;

is

is

it

is

one of public policy
irpon it. The question to some extent
wise to hold strictly to the rule, that
and while undoubtedly
records shall not be tampered with to the injury of parties conno principle or reason of public policy which
cerned, there

a

should preclude the correction of errors before rights have become fixed, but many considerations which support it.
No amendment can make valid tax sale that was void for

if

a

proper description of the land in the assessment and
And
fatal errors occur in tax consubsequent proceedings.^
want of

not.

It

has been held in Welles

v.

Battelle,

11

Mass., 477, that where

a

a

former year,
oflBcc, can be allowed to come in and amend the record of
made whilst he was in that office; and the court are of opinion that he can-

clerk

a

continues in office several years, hy repeated annual elections, lie may amend
the record of
former year, notwithstanding an election has intei'vened, and
though he does not hold the office under the same appointment.
But we

a

a

it

is

is

a

is

is

think there is an obvious distinction in principle between the two cases. In
the latter the clerk not only knows the fact, in relation to which the amendto be made, which
ment
circumstance common to both, but he still
enjoys the confidence of the town,
by their vote entrusted with the custody
held responsible for their purity and correctness under
of their records, and
the sanction of his official oath, and all such other guards as the law has
necessary to prescribe in the case of clerk actually in office. The
thought
intervening election is substantially
continuance of the clerk in the same
And see School District v. Atherton, 13 Met., 113.
office."

'

'

Judevine
Poor, 30 id.,
Roberts

v.

v.

Jackson,

13.

Vt., 470, approved and followed in Langdon
Compare Jaquith v. Putney, 48 N. H., 138.

Chan

Lin

18

Pen,

23

Cal., 259.

v.
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they can neither be amended by the officer, nor corrected by motion in a court of law.
The proper tribunal for that
purpose is a court of equity. A court of law, where the defect-

veyances,

ive conveyance was in question, might order the case continued
to give opportunity for relief in equity, but could not do more.''
An officer to whom return has been made by another, has no
authority to amend such return,^ but a correction in an immate-

rial point can give no one
'

Annan
Hawkins,

v. Baker,
12

id.,

49

a

N. H.,

ground of complaint.^
161, 171, per Nesmith,

J., citing

Prescott

19.

«

Blight V. Banks, 6 T. B. Monr., 193, 206 ; Blight v. Atwell, 7 id.,
See Bellows v. Weeks, 41 Vt., 590, 600; Jones v. Tiffin, 34 Iowa, 190.

'

Case

Iowa,

B.

see

Dean,

Jones

v.

Mich., 13. As to amendments permitted by statute in
TitHn, 34 Iowa, ISO ; Conway n. Yoimkin, 38 id., 398.

16

v.

2C4, 268.
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CHAPTER XI.
THE VOTING OF THE TAX.
Necessity

for legislative authoritj'.

There must be distinct

legislative authority for every tax that is levied. This is a principle that admits of no exception whatever,' unless one is made by
the constitution of the state, operating to that extent as a restriction upon what would otherwise be the soverign legislative power
And in the several states the principle applies
over this subject.
to every tax, whether state or municipal.

But while the legislature must originate the power to tax, and
the rules under which taxes are to be levied, the determi-

prescribe

nation of the amount, even of

tax, may be referred to some
state auditing board is provided for by
a state

other authority.
"When a
the constitution of the state, the allowances

of the board

will

per-

haps be made conclusive, and be required to go into the general

tax levy for the year.^ And in any case there seems to be no
objection in principle to legislation under which the salaries of
state officers, the general expenses of state government, and other
demands against the state, which are audited in accordance with
general legislation, shall be provided for by a levy made under
general rules, without the necessity

of

a

special

act prescribing

No legislative power is dele-

the amount of the particular tax.
gated by such an arrangement.

The amount of the local taxes is determined in various ways

In

1.

some cases they are fixed

direction
' See

;

as

will

:

by the legislature or under its

be shown in a subsequent

Non-is

chapter.

2.

In

some

i). Russel, 5 Cal., 249 ; Litchfield b. Vernon, 41 N. Y., 123 ; Allen
R.
R. Co.. 44 111., 85 ; Bangs «. Snow, 1 Mass., 181 ; Stetson b
D. Peoria,
Kempton, 13 id., 272; Lisbon «. Bath, 21 N.H., 319; Daily v. Swope, 47 Miss.,
367; Columbia v. Guest, 3 Head, 413; Cruikshanks v. Charleston, 1 MoCord,
360; State B. Charleston, 2 Specrs, 623 ; Simmons v. Wilson, 66 N. C, 336;
Vanover ». Justices, 27 Geo., 354; Lott v. Ross, 38 Ala., 156; Richmond «.
Daniel, 14 Grat, 385; Bullock v. Curry, 2 Met., Ky., 171; Bright «. McCuUough, 27 Ind., 223.

etc.

*

See People v. Supervisors

of Queens,

1

Hill,

195.
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by local boards, which exercise a quasi
legislative authority ; such as the boards of supervisors of many
states, the county courts or boards of justices of others, the comcases they are determined

mon councils of cities and boroughs, the village boards of villages,
the township boards or selectmen of towns, and the corresponding
boards in other corporate bodies.
3. Many taxes are required to
be voted by popular assemblages

composed

of all the voters of

municipality to be taxed, or, in some instances, of certain
classes of the voters, supposed to be specially interested in the
tax. It is consistent with the practice of early days that this
the

method shall be adopted in all districts whose population is not
too great to render it impracticable ; and we find it general in
school districts, and to
even some small cities.

well

a

large extent also in towns, villages and
But in the larger districts like counties,

in the cities generally, the authority is of necessity confided to representatives of the people, who are usually chosen by
popular ballot.
as

as

A

Toting taxes in popular assemblages.

popular assemconvened in such

blage for any legal purpose must be regularly
manner as the law may have prescribed.
The coming together
of
the
of
a
of a majority
people
municipality, or even of all the
people, at a time and in a manner not provided for by law, and
the voting upon the levy of a tax, will have no legal force or val-

idity whatever.

In levying

taxes,

or in exercising

any other

shall be exercised in an orderly manner, at

a

One of these invariably

the state has prescribed.

is,

function of government, the local community are wielding a part
of the sovereign power of the state, but only with the state's permission, and under such conditions, restrictions and regulations as
that the power

meeting assembled

after due notice, and conducted according to legal forms, in order
that there may be full opportunity for reflection, consultation and
deliberation upon the important work to be done.
Nothing short
of this will insure deliberative meetings, or prevent popular gatherings degenerating into mobs, and thereby defeating the purposes
for which they are authorized.

this manner provision

is

a

Corporate meetings may be appointed by general statute which
certain day in the year in which they are to be held. In
names
usually made for annual town meetings

LAW OF TAXATION.

246

[CH.

XL

Of sucb statutes every citizen takes
notice at his peril, and a meeting assembled at the time and place
This is probably the rule even
appointed is a lawfal meeting.
where the notice of the meeting, which some statutes require to
and school district meetings.

the notice by publication being only additional to the notice by statute, and being
provided for by way of additional precaution, to remind the people
of the statutory provision which they are nevertheless bound to take
be given by publication, has been omitted

;

The right
notice of, whether the publication takes place or not.
to hold the meeting comes from the statute, not from the pubThe same statute will commonly specify the sublished notice.^
jects which may be considered at such meetings, and will limit
levy taxes which is permitted to be exercised.^
All special meetings must be regularly called as the statute may
have prescribed.
The following are customary regulations : That

any power

to

shall be called by the officers of the municipality,
either on their own motion or on the application of a certain number of the voters or freeholders; that it shall be notified either by
the meeting

delivered or its contents stated to the several voters,
or by notice published or posted in a manner particularly indicated by the statute ; and that the subjects to be considered at the

a warning^

shall be specified in the warning or notice.
Wilh all
these provisions there must be careful compliance, and the meeting when held must confine itself strictly to the subjects indicated
in the notice or warning.''
meeting

People V. Cowles, 13 N. Y., 350; People «. Brenham, 3 Cal,, 477; State v.
Jones, 19 Iml., 356; People v. Ilartwell, 13 Mich., 508; Dislion v. Smith, 10
Iowa, 212; State v. Orvis, 20 Wi?., 235; State v. Geetze, 22 id., 363. See
Marcliant v. Langwortliy, 6 Hill, 646..
1

-

As to the necessity of a vote of the electors Ijefore a school tax can bo
levied in Arkansas, see County Court v. EobinsoQ, 27 Ark., 116. And in California, see People v. Castro, 39 Cal., 65.
'DiflFerence between "calling" a meeting and "warning" it: see Stone?).
District, 8 Cush., 593; Rideout «. School District, 1 Allen, 232. And
see as to the call, George v. School District, 6 Met., 497.
School

"That a tax can only be voted at a meeting legally warned,
King, 34 Vt., 156. As to what is a sufficient warning, see Allen

see Bowen v.
v.

Burlington,

Where the warrant for a meeting specified as the-object " to adopt
such measures in relation to their ministerial concerns as may then and there
seem expedient, and to act thereon as they see cause," 7ield sufficient to sup-

45 id., 203.
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In

voting taxes all the local bodies act in a political capacity,
and their action is to be favorably construed, and not to be overruled or set aside by judicial or any other authority, so long as
they keep within the limits of the power bestowed upon them.
But their action in voting taxes should always appear of record.
"Every essential proceeding in the course of a levy of taxes," it
is said in one case, " must appear in some written and permanent
form in the record of the bodies
Such

a

thing

as a

authorized to act upon them.
parol levy of taxes is not legally possible under

port a vote of money in fulfillment of a contract between the minister and a
Blackcommittee, under wliicli lie was to discontinue the pastoral relation.
and
committee
a
district
hum ■».WalpoleiO Pick., 97. A warrant "To choose
to act on other business that may be thought necessary,"

does not authorize pre-

for calling subsequent meetings by the clerk, and therefore
Little v.
a subsequent meeting called by tlie clerk cannot legally vote taxes.
Merrill, 10 Pick., 543. A warning for a school meeting which stated the object
to be "to take into consideration the expediency of raising for the use of
schooling for the year ensuing," held suflScieut. A vote was taken " to raise
one cent and five mills on the dollar" on the list for the year, without naming any time of payment. Held to be sufficiently definite, and the tax would
Bartlett t>. Kinsley, 15
be payable on demand, or within a reasonable time.
Conn., 327. As to the effect of custom on the construction of votes of town
meetings, see Preeland «. Hastings, 10 Allen, 570, 578-9. An article in the
warning of a school meeting, to sep whether the district will have a school
the ensuing winter, and to see what method the district will take to pay the
expenses of said school, is sufficient to authorize the district to vote atax upon
Chandler v. Bradish, 23 Vt.,
the grand list to defray the expenses of the school.
416.
A warning to see if a town will vote a tax for the purpose of paying a
bounty does not authorize a vote to borrow money for that purpose. Atwood
A school district tnx voted at a meeting not legally
». Lincoln, 44 Vt., 382.
Haines v. School District, 41 Me., 246; Rideout v. School Discalled is void.
trict, 1 Allen, 232; People v. Castro, 39 CaL, 65. A tax voted for a purpose not
Holt's Appeal 5 R. I., 603.
specified in the notice of special meeting is void.
Construction of particular notices; Williams b. Larkin, 3 Denio, 114; Torreys.
Milbury, 21 Pick., 64. A tax voted at a meeting warned without naming the
hour of the meeting in the warrant \x void, and it will not justify the collector in an action of trespass against him for taking property to satisfy the tax.
Sherwin v. Bugbee, 16 Vt., 439. The return of a freeholder upon a warrant
from the selectmen for warning a meeting of the inhabitants of a school disti'ict, that he had warned them according to law, was held to be conclusive in
an action by one of the inhabitants against the assessors for assessing a tax
Saxton v. Nimms, 14 Mass.,
on him which had been voted at such a meeting.
"
every town meeting shall be held in
814. Under a statute which provided that
pursuance of a warrant under the hands of the selectmen," a warrant signed
by one only was held void, and atax voted at a meeting held pursuant thereto
scribing

a method

.
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And in another, in which the action of

the ]aws.'^i

a

XL

convention

a
county tax was in question,
a convention is the only evidence to
But if the record is lost, the
county tax duly granted."^

of town delegates in voting
record of the doings of such
show a

[CH.

a

was invalid, and one who had paid it might recover back of the town. Reynolds V. New Salem, 6 Met., 340. As to the effect of fraudulent neglect to
give notice or giving misleading notice, see People ». Allen, 6 Wend., 486 ; People «. Peck, 11 id., 604 ; Marchant ». Langworthy, 6 Hill, 646 ; Randall t). Smith,
Denio, 214. That in proving notice of a meeting it is not sufficent to state
in the affidavit or return that the notice was given " in. accordance with the
act," but it should state the facts, see State v. Hardcastle, 26 N. J., 143 ; Ilard1

Cardigan «. Page, 6 N. H., 182 ; Tuttle •». Cary, 7
But
i). Highway Commissioners, 14 Mich., 528.
see Briggs v. Murdock, 13 Pick., 305 ; Houghton v. Davenport, 23 id., 235 ; Bucksport d. Spofford, 12 Me., 487. Wlierethedefendantsinanactionof trespass justified as assessors, and showed by the records of the town that they were duly
elected at a town meeting legally warned, they were held not bound to go behind the records to show that the proceedings of the warning officer had been
regular.
Thayer b. Stearns, 1 Pick., 109. In a vote of a school district laying a
tax for its purposes, it is notessential to its validity that the particular object for
which it was laid should be specified. "West School District -o. Merrils, 12 Conn.,
436. A school house having been erected undei' invalid votes, the district may
lawfully vote a tax to pay for it. Greenbanks b. Boutwell, 43 Vt., 207. As to such
meetings in general, their regularity and powers, see Blackburn e. "Walpole, 9
Pick., 97; Perry v. Dover, 12 id., 206; Littler. Merril, 10 id., 543; Williams i>.
School District, 21 id., 75 ; School Districts. Alherton, 12 Met., 105 ; Cardigan ».
Page, 6 N. H., 182 ; Nelson v. Pierce, id.., 194 ; Brewster «. Hyde, 7 id., 206 ; Lisbon V. Bath, 21 id., 319 ; Schoff «. Gould, 52 id., 512; Hunti). School District, 14
Vt., 300 ; Pratt v. Swanton, 15 id., 147 ; Sherwin v. Bugbee, 17 id., 337 ; Wyley
•0. Nelson, 44 id., 404 ; Greenbanks
v. Boutwell, 43 id., 207 ; Allen v. Burlington, 45 id., 202; Lauder «. School District, 33 Me., 239; Jordan ». School District, 38 id., 164 ; Belfast, etc., R. R. Co. ». Brooks, 60 id., 568 ; State b. Hardcastle, 26 N. J., 143; Hardcastle v. State, 27 id., 551. The officers or the inhabitants merely treating the proceedings of an invalid meeting as valid does not
make them so. Pratt v. Swanton, 15 Vt., 147.
castle

11. State,

Greeul., 426

'

:

Campbdl,

27 id., 531 ;

compare People

J.,

ers, 29 id., 504:
'' Bichardson,

v. Wliite,
McQuilkin,

in Moser
Doe

J., in

u.

Mich.,
Blackf.,

29

59, 60.

8

335.

See also appeal

of Pow-

v. Page, 6 N. H., 182, 191.
See Farrar ». FesFowler, J., says : " The records of taxes were properly
received to prove the taxation which, being matter of record, could be proved
in no other way, unless the loss of the records were first shown."
In Gearhart V. Dixon, 1 Penn. St., 224, 228, it is said of the record of a school tax,

Cardigan

senden, 89 id., 268, 277.

that, "where it was defective, it might be explained or supplied by parol tes*
*
The law does not require school directors to keep a record
timony.
o f their proceedings, although it is better that they should do so."
Compare
Moor V. Newfield, 4 Greonl., 44.
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And any

are subject to parol proof as in other cases.'

informalities are to be overlooked and disregarded if the substantial requisites of a vote appear.^
It is always to be assumed that

all these inferior municipalities have decided wisely and well
upon the matters of discretion submitted to them, and it is inanywhere to attack the validity of their action, upon
the ground that the facts and circumstances which were laid
competent

before, and which surrounded them, did not call for the conclusion

which they reached.
From this broad statement the only exception that need be made, is that which rests upon the power of
legislative supervision and control, when they refuse or neglect to
perform

a

duty to the state, or when they vote local taxes which

seem to the legislature impolitic and oppressive.

A

learned and able court has spoken very clearly and pointedly

concerning the absence of power in the judicial tribunals to entertain appeals from the municipal bodies, in the exercise of their
The case was one in which the
discretionary power to tax.
attempt was made to enjoin school directors from the levy of a

"No such appeal lies, for none is given by
tax regularly voted.
law.
Most of our tax laws entitle the citizen to a hearing before
he is obliged to pay ; not to a judicial hearing, indeed, but to an
'

3

Farrar
Heiskell,

■».Fessenden,

596 ;

Irwin

N. H.,
Miller, 23

39
v.

268 ;

Quinby

«.

North American,

etc., Co.,

111., 401.

b. HolVt., 336, 339. As to the particularity required in specifying the
" all that is necessary in this
purpose of the tax, Peck, J., says, in that case
respect is that a vote of a town raising money sl.ould indicate, in general
terms, the purposs or object for which the money is raised; and if that purpose or object is such as ccmes within the scope of the powers of the town, it
is sufficient. It is not necessary to the validly of the vote that it should state
the particular facts which sh.m' the present nen.essitj'' of the town for the use
of the money. The object specified being within the powers of the town, it
is to be intended that the town has judged properly as to the occasion and
See, also,
necessity for the exercise of the power in the particular instance."
as to the sufficiency of a vote for a school tax, Adams v. Hyde, 27 Vt., 221 ;
"West V. Whittaker, 37 Iowa, 598. A failure of the officers to sign the record of
the board of supervisors, does not vitiate a tax levied by it. Lacey v. Davis,
4 Mich, 140 ; People -c. Eureka, etc., Co., 48 CaL, 143 : Martin v. Cole, 38 Iowa,
'■'As

brook,

to what is a sufficient vote in raising a town lax, see Blodgett
39

The record cannot be attacked collaterally,
Taylor v. Henry, 3 Pick., 397; Manning
Hartwell v. Littleton, 13 id., 229; Edd_6;
id.,
6
24 How., 387.
Jeffersonville,
e.

and its recitals

141.

false.

v.

ii.

shown to be

Fifth Parish in
Wilson,

43

Vt.,

Gloucester,
362;

Bissel
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tribunal, generally the county commi'sThis is thesioners ; but the school law gives no such appeal.
reason why the ear of the courts should be open to well founded
complaints on the part of the citizen ; but where he has iio
to some special

appeal

irregularity, no neglect of duty, no excess of authority to complain of, nothing, indeed, but an indiscreet use of clearly granted
discretion, he will vex the judicial ear in vain, for the judicial
The power of taxation, altoarm can redress no such wrong.
gether legislative, and in no degree judicial, is committed by the
of schools, to the directors of school

legislature, in the matter

If

districts.

strain them.

But if

If

they transcend their powers, the court can reIf they misjudge tlieir power, the court can correct
they exercise their unquestionable powers unwisely',

can compel them.
them.

refuse to perform their duties, the court

the directors

there is no judicial remedy." '

This is

a clear

and strong state-

ment of a wise and salutary general principle.

Restrictions upon municipal taxation.
municipal corporations to tax, there are
which may be stated as follows :.

a

Upon the power of

number of restrictions

Those imposed by the constitution of the United States.No state can confer upon its municipalities a power to tax, which
1.

'

J., in Wliarton

School Dh-eotors, 42 Penn. St., .?58, 'i^i. See,
District, 31 Pick., 75, 82 ; Petition of
Po-wers, 52 Mo., 318. In each of these cases it -was held, that after a school
district had properly decided upon the erection of a school house, the determination "was final, and that no inquiry could be entered upon regarding the
necessity for the building. So in Jenkins n. Andover, 103 Mass., 94, 104,
where the attempt -was to enjoin a tovi'n from purchasing ground for a cemeterjf, on the ground that it -was unnecessary, and that the expense would be
Woodward,

to the same

effect,

Williams

v.

v.

School

and unreasonable. Chapman, C. J., after showing that the
language of the statute, authorizing to-wns to provide burial grounds, is veiy
broad, and leaves them to judge what sum shall be raised, -^'hat quantity of
land shall be appropriated for the purpose, and how it shall be fenced, laid
disproportionate

out, arranged and managed, without any specified restriction, denies the jurisdiction of the court to control their discretion in these particulars, and declares that "the exercise of their discretion extends to matters of taste," in
the matter of making the burial grounds beautiful and attractive, instead of
unsightly and repulsive. That courts cannot restrict or restrain a power conferred to grant licenses for revenue, see Kemper •«. Louisville, 7 Bush, 599;
citing Mason v. Lancaster, 4 id., 406. As to the conclusiveness of a school

district

vote, see

Eddy

v.

Wilson,

43 Vt., 3C3.
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by the charter of general government is forbidden to itself.

The

-limitations imposed upon state authority are imposed with equal
emphasis -upon every subordinate instrument of the state machinery.'
And here
2. Those imposed by the constitution of the state.
it is not a matter of course, that restrictions imposed on the state
are restrictions on its corporations also.

Some

restrictions are

imposed on the state itself as a corporation, which are
not intended to apply to its municipal creations, while others
declare a general policy, and are limitations upon the state
It is clearly
power to tax either generally or by delegation.
sometimes

within

the province of the people, when

stitution, to limit the state

as

they agree upon

a con-

they think proper, and to give, in

some particulars, a larger liberty to the municipal corporations

if

that shall be thought wise.
The question upon these limitations
is one of construction merely.^
But except as these express
restrictions limit the state power specially, the state can delegate

'tonone of the subordinate bodies an authority which, if no such
body existed, it could not itself exercise.
Those which inhere in the nature of taxation itself.
These
have been sufficiently dwelt upon in another place.^
4. Those which inhere in local taxation specially, and confine
3.

it to purposes and objects which are local.
5.

Those which the state attaches,

to the exercise of the authority

as

conditions or regulations,

it gives.

One of the most important purposes to be subserved
' Stuyvesant v.

by formal

New York, 7 Cow., 588 ; Illinois Conference Female College
Haywood v. Savannah, 12 Geo., 404; O'Donnell v. Bai-

«. Cooper, 25 111., 148;

ley, 24 Miss., 386.

'

See Slack v. Railroad Co., 13 B. Monr., 1, 16 ; Dubuque County v. Railroad
Co., 4 Greene (Iowa), 1 ; Clapp v. Cedar County, 5 Iowa, 15 ; State v. "Wapello
County, 13 Iowa, 388; Clark v. Janesville, 10 Wis., 136; Bushnell v. Beloit, 10

id., 195; Prettyman v. Supervisors, 19 111., 406; Robertson b. Rockford, 31 id.,
451; Johnson v. Stark County, 34 id., 75; Perkins v. Lewis, 24 id., 308; But-

Dunham, 27 id., 474; People v. Chicago, 51 id., 17, 34; Richmond v.
Scott, 48 lud., 568; People i). Supervisor, etc., 16 Mich., 354; Bay City -o. State
" public taxes," held not to
Treasurer, 23 id., 449, 504. An exemption from
Morgan «. Cree, 46
be an exemption from taxation for municipal purposes.
Vt., 773; S. C, 14 Am. Rep., 640.
ler

B.

3 See

Chapter

III.
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-written

protection of
action on the part of majorities.

constitutions

is

the

minorities

against

Such oppressive
action in the case of the local bodies might consist in the levy of
enormous taxes, or the incurring of enormous debts, under the
influence of temporary excitements and passions, for purposes
■which cooler reflection would condemn.
By some state constitutions it is expressly made the duty of the legislature, in conferring
local powers of taxation, to impose restrictions on the power in
oppressive

Such a provision is addressed to the
order to prevent its abuse.
discretion of the legislature, who will impose such and such only
as are deemed advisable.^
In the absence of such provisions in
^
conferring the power to tax, it is restricted only as is above shown.

But in thus authorizing local taxation,

the state does not deprive

itself of the general power to control.
There is nothing in the
nature of a contract in such a delegation,' and what the state
It may attach new congives it may at any time take away.
'
In this case it was decided, that
People V. Mahaney, 13 Mich., 481, 487.
the power of a police board, to determine what sums should be raised for
their purposes, was limited; the statute contining the power to the necessary-

Paiue v. Spratley, 5 Kans., 525; Bank of Rome v.
Rome, 18 N. Y., 38; Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio, N. S., 243, 248; Northern Ind. R.
R. Co. B. Connelly, 10 id., 159, 165; Maloy r. Marietta, 11 id., 636. A provision requiring the legislature to restrict the power of municiiial taxation is
complied with, in an act for a special street assessment, by limiting it to an
assessment to the middle of the block upon adjacent property.
Hines v.
police

expenses.

Leavenworth,

3

And

see

Kans., 186.

-

The state may give complete power to tax all the subjects of taxation
within the municipality.
Wingate r. Sluder, 6 Jones L., 552; Durach's Appeal, 63 Penn. St., 491; Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Monr., 330, 339; Augusta s.
IVational Bank, 47 Geo., 562. Authority to assess "all taxable property"
embraces all taxable at the time the authority is given, and all made taxable
by subsequent legislation. Butfalo v. La Couteulx, 15 X. Y., 451. A limitation
of taxes to a certain percentage of the assessed valuation is enlarged by implication when the legislature authorize the creation of any particular debt,
to the extent that may be necessary to meet the demand.
Commonwealth v.
Commissioners of Alleghany County, 40 Penn. St., 343. Compare United States
3 Am. Law Reg., K. S., 374.
1). Burlington,
*

Where a state has no power to lay a certain tax, or to contract a certain
debt, but it nevertheless assumes to do so, such a law is void, and cannot be
treated as a contract between the state and those who have claims for which
the

law undertakes to provide payment.
Legal Xews, 318.

1S74, 6 Chicago

Ramsey

v.

Iloeger,

Sup. Ct., III.,
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been collected,

if,

ditions, it may impose new restrictions or make new regulations.^
These are matters of legislative discretion. Even after a tax had

in the opinion of the legislature, the purpose

would doubtless have power to
impolitic,
interpose and forbid the money being appropriated to it. This
"would seem to be
legitimate exercise of the general power of
control and supervision which the legislature retains over all the
a

it

was unwise and

inferior

for political purBut the most efficient restriction of all, for practical purposes.
that rule of law which requires all municipal organposes,
izations or boards to show their grant of any authority they may
assume to exercise.
has been said — and the remark
Towns,
it

by

it

is

entities which have been created

;

applies to all such organizations — are corporations of limited
powers they cannot vote and assess money upon the inhabitants
for all purposes

indiscriminately, but must be confined to the
established powers of towns, as settled by positive enactment or by
well defined and ancient usage.^ They cannot, therefore, tax
a

'

A general authority givea tiy city cliarter to tax property for its purposes does not preclude the state making exemptions within the city afterwards.
Eichmond t. Richmond and Danville E. E. Co., 21 Grat., 604.
city

If

for the annual assessment has passed,
to
for
an
assessment
for the current year of the propcompetent
provide
Bush,
37.
Swift ». Newport,
Compare "Waldron ij. Lee,
erty newly added.
Pick., 323 Jackman v. School District, Gray, 413. The right to tax may
he taken away by the legislature even after the tax has been levied. Augusta
V. Xorlh, 57 ile., 393.
are extended after the time

5

;

5

7

is

it

boundaries

Ch. J., in Gushing c. Newburyport, 10 Met., 508, 510.
There
very valuable statement in this case of the power of towns In respect to
For a history of the legislation of ;5Iiohigan terrischools, and its history.
a

-S7iaw,

is

subject, and the powers of the districts, see Stuart
District, 30 Mich., 69.
As to the right to establish free schools in particular district of state by
statute which leaves the final decision to the voters of the district, see Bull
?;.Eead, 13 Grat, 78. The right to refer such questions to the voters of the locality
was also affirmed in Slack r. Eailroad, 13. B. Monr.,
28 Stein v. Mobile,
The legislature may, in its dis24 Ala., 591, and numerous other cases.
cretion, create independent school districts without the assent of the residents, and authorize a board chosen by its voters to make an annual levy
for the erection of buildings and the support of schools therein.
(The
took from the towns
most plausible objections to the act seemed to be, that
authority ivhich properly pertained to them, and that the district was composed of parts of two townships, and the constitution required township
"
Kuhn v. Board of Education,
officers to be chosen by the voters thereof.")

tory and

state on the same

;

9,

it

1,

a

a

a

■c.School
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except for the very purpose allowed by law, and in the manner
and under the conditions prescribed by law.^

In particular

have been
authorized to be levied only after they have been petitioned for
This is a condition precedent
by a certain number of taxpayers.

Conditions precedent.

to any

In Iowa it

tax.^

cases taxes

has been decided

that if the township

upon the sufficiency of such a petition, and
declared it sufficient and levied the tax, this is conclusive in all
collateral inquiries ; the decision being on a matter within their
But in New York the decisions were otherwise.^
jurisdiction.^
trustees have passed

W. Va., 499. On the creation of a new district by tlie union of two, tlie
It has no power to bargain and pay
property of botli becomes its property.
tlie
old
district
of
over to
the value
its school house, or to levy a tax for the
purpose. Bacon v. School District, 97 Mass., 421. Where a district is divided
after a tax is assessed, the inhabitants set oflF remain liable for its portion of
the tax. Waldron v. Lee, 5 Pick., 833.
That a school district tax is not
within a statute which limits the amount of a tax for town and county purposes, see Taft ii.Wood, 14 Pick., 362; Goodrich v. Lunenburg, 9 Gray, 38, 40;
Blickensderfer ii. School Directors, 20 Peun. St., 38.
4

'

A

tax voted to build a school

valid; that being

a

house on a site not legally designated is inMarble v. McKenney, 60 Me., 332.

condition precedent.

assessors, before assessing any school district tax,
in whicli district the lands of persons residing out of the town

Where the statute required
to determine

should be taxed, and to certify their determination to the town clerk, who
ifsW, that an assessment without complying with

was to record the same:

this requirement was invalid, and an inhal)itant of the district might avail
himself of the defect. The determination, it will be seen, was really as to
Taft v. Wood, 14 Pick., 362. Sec
what should be the limits of the district.
School District, 100 Mass., 134. By statute a town was not to
oftener than once in ten years, " so as to change the taxation
A tax levied in a new district established in violaof lands of proprietors."
also Rawson

v.

be redistricted

tion of this provision, is void.
Holmes c. Baker, 16 id., 259.
-

of

the grand

v.

District,

School

10 Gray, 85.

See

of
condition precedent, and
grand jury without action upon it would not justify

Where an extraordinary

two-thirds

Gustin

jury,

tax was authorized

on the recommendation

held, that this was a

the adjournment of the
the tax. Cooper v. Rowe, 42 Geo., 229.
n-tyan v. Varga,

87

Iowa, 78; West

b.

Whitaker, id.,

598.

N. Y., 439; People ». Mead, 24 id., 114; Same®. Same,
case of People v. Brown, 55 N. Y., 180, the
satne point was somewhat considered, but it became unnecessary to decide
as the collector, who was defending
proceeding to compel him to pay over
*

Starin ». Genoa,

In

23

the subsequent

a

it,

36 id., 221.

moneys he had collected, was held incompetent
poit, chapter

XX.

to raise the question.

See

CH.
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some cases taxes are allowed to be voted by taxpaj'ers only,

•while taxes

in general

are voted by tbe whole body of the elec-

Such legislation is admissible, and the submission must
conform to it.' When taxes are voted by a city council or other
local body, a common and very useful provision is one that the
tors.

yeas and nays shall be entered on the journal, so that no member

shall

his proper share of responsibility for the vote."
Without such a provision, it would be necessary only that the
record should show a quorum present and a resolution adopted.^
escape

Eepeal or modification of local powers. The power to vote
local taxes is at all times subject to the legislative modification
and control.*
The general law may modify their powers even
when they were conferred by special charter, if the terms of the
general law are sufficiently comprehensive for the purpose.' But
'

In

sucli

cases,

if

tlie question

voters, the vote is void.

Bullock

to the whole hody of the
Met., Ky., 171. It has been demay authorize less than a major-

is submitted

Curry,
cided in North Carolina that the legislature
ity to vote taxes. State v. Woodside, 9 Ired., 496

As

106.
-

to what is a

majority

v.

2

;

Same

■«. Same, 8

vote, see Stanford v. Prentice,

28

Wis.,

id., 104,
358.

Dillon's Muu. Corp., § 229, and cases
Compare Tobin «. Morgan, 70 Penn. St., 229, and Steckert v. East Sag-

Such a provision is mandatory.

cited.

inaw, 22 Mich., 104.
the record stated that A., B., C, and others, justices of the county
court, were present, Tield not enough, as it did not affirmatively appear that a
majf)rity was present. Dudley's Ex'rs v. Oliver, 5 Ired., 227. Compare State
Co. ■».Sortwell, 8 Alien, 217; Lacey «. DaV. Mcintosh, 7 id., 68; Insurance
^ "Where

vis,

4

Mich.,

140.

■•Kichmond i\ Richmond, etc., E. R. Co., 21 Grat, 604; Tucker v. The Justices, 34 Ga., 370. A repeal of a law by .which a corporation was authorized
on vote of its electors to levy a tax in aid of a public work, takes awaj' the
power, even though a favorable vote has already been had. Covington, etc.,

R. R. Co., u. Kent&n Co. Court, 12 B. Monr., 144, 150. (The vote was in favor
of levying the tax, but the rate had not been determined upon at the time of
tlie repeal, and as this was a condition precedent, and had not been followed,
the county court had no power to levy the tax, at least none before determin-

ing the rate.)

'A

provision in a village charter that the village taxes shall be assessed
"
according to law," means, unless othupon the freeholders and inhabitants
Ontario Bank v.
erwise explained, according to the general law of the state.
a
tax
is authorized
194,
Ch.
J.
Kelson,
Whenever
per
186,
Wend.,
Bunnell, 10
the revwhich
is
made
the
from
provision
as
to
source
bv law, and no special
enue is to be derived, the law implies that the tax shall be levied

upon all
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by special charters, it is not
usual to modify them in this manner, and in doubtful cases we
should say the presumption was against an intent to do so.^
■where

the power to tax

is conferred

Exhausting authority.

The taxing power once conferred is

presumptively continuous, and to be exercised again and again
as often as may be required by the exigencies of government
and as often as may be consistent with the act of delegation.^
But custom has much to do with the construction of such powers,
and

sometimes a single exercise must be deemed to exhaust the

power for the time being, when tlie custom is to tax but once
within a certain period of time ; as for instance, within the year.
And this is the general custom in the case of local taxes.^ But
an abortive attempt

to make an assessment does not exbaust the

power, and if no other obstacle exists, the officers may disregard
the futile action and proceed anew.*
Hale v. Keproperty subject to general taxation, and collected as other taxes.
nosha, 29 Wis., 599 ; State v. Bremond, 38 Tex., 116. As to the effect of general legislation
3

upon special charters, see House

Withrow's Corp.
'

In Ohio it

corporations
constitutional

v. State,

41 Mass., 737;

S.

C,

Cas., 563.

that special acts, giving authority to municipal
taxes in aid of railroads, were not repealed by a
provision forbidding such legislation.
Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio,

was decided

to levy special

In Iowa it was held that
S., 607 ; Fosdick v. Perrysburg, 14 id., 472.
where a special law limits the power of a municipal corporation to levy taxes,
a subsequent general law will not give power beyond the prior limitation.
N.

Clarke o. Davenport, 14 Iowa, 494. Contra, Butz v. Muscatine, 8 Wall., 575.
See United States i). Burlington, 2 Am. Law Reg., N. S., 394.
A grant of power to a municipal corporation to lay a tax for a particular purpose is a repDal,
pro tanto, of all prior statutory restrictions on the power of taxation. Commonwealth v. Common Council of Pittsburgh, 34 Penn. St., 496.
-

See

2

A

Municipality

v.

Dunn,

10 La.

An.,

57 ;

Williams

«. Detroit, 2

Mich.,

560.

school board having power to levy a tax not exceeding one per cent, in
one year, held that when they ordered a tax, though below the maximum,
they had exhausted their power for the year. Oliver v. Carsner, 39 Texas, 396.
So in Oregon it has been decided that after one assessment of all the taxable
property has been made and returned, and the tax levied thereon, there is no
power to make a new assessment in order to reach property which has been

brought within the district since the regular assessment.
Oregon Steam Nav.
Co. V. Portland, 3 Ore., 81. But an omission of the county court to exact
license taxes when making the general levy does not preclude requiring them
State v. Maguire, 52 Mo., 420.
afterwards.
^Himmelmau

v. Cofran, 36

Cal., 411, citing Pond v. Negus,

8

Mass., 230;
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is also

a

familiar rule that

in the execution of the power to tax, the municipalities must confine themselves closely within the power conferred.^ Many illustrations of this rule will be given further on, as the successive
steps, which are to be taken to render taxation effectual, are enu-

merated and explained.
Libby v. Burnham,

15

Mass., 144

;

Bangor

subject see also Woodruff v. Fisher,
512 ;

People

v.

Haines, 49 id., 587

;

17

».

Lancy,

Barb., 224

Lappin

;

21

Me., 472. On the general

Howell

v. Nemaha

■».Buffalo, 15

County,

6

Kans.,

N. Y.,
403.

' That the provisions of the statute must be strictly pursued, see Henderson.

Baltimore, 8 Md., 352; Sharp v. Johnson, 4 Hill, 92; State v. Davenport, 13
Iowa, 835 ; In re Trufler, 44 Barb., 46 ; Howell v. Buffalo, 15 IST. Y., 512 ; Bennett
v. Buffalo, 17 id., 383 ; Smith v. Davis, 30 Cal., 536 ; Taylor v. Downer, 31
id., 480; Smith ii. Cofran, 34 id., 310; Montgomery v. State, 38 Ala., 103; St.
Joseph V. Anthony, 30 Mo., 537 ; McComb i>. Bell, 3 Minn,, 295 ; State v. Jersey
City, 26 N. J., 444; Municipality No. 1 v. Millandon, 12 La. An., 769; Kyle i).
Malin, 8 Ind., 34; Chicago v. "Wright, 32 111., 193; Scammon v. Chicago, 40 id.,
146 ; Doughty ». Hope, 3 Deniq, 594 ; Tallman v. White, 3 N. Y., 66 ; Cruger v.
V.

Dougherty,
17

43 id., 107.
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CHAPTEE XII.
THE ASSESSMENT OF PROPERTY FOR TA5ATI0K.
When taxes have been properly decided upon, an assessment
may become

au indispensable proceeding in the establishment of

This is
any individual charge against either person or property.
always requisite when the taxes are to be levied in proportion to
an estimate, either of values, of

benefits

or the results of busi-

It

is of an assessment by the value of property that we
shall speak in this place.
It is proper to remark, that it is usual to provide by law that one
assessment shall be made use of for the levy of both state
and local taxes, for the year or other period for which assessments
nesK.

are made, instead of directing a separate assessment for each des-

cription of tax.

This is

a matter

as

well of economy

as

of con-

one assessment answers all purposes.

Independent
assessments are sometimes provided for in the case of school taxes
and some others, but they raise no peculiar questions, and require
venience,

as

no special consideration.

An assessment, strictly

is an official estimate of the
sums which are to constitute the basis of an apportionment of a
tax between the individual subjects of taxation within the district.

As

speaking,

the word is more commonly employed,

an assessment consists in

the two processes of listing the persons, property, etc., to be taxed,

and of estimating the sums which are to be the guide in an apportionment of the tax between them.
When this listing and estimate are completed in such form as the law may have prescribed,
nothing remains to be done in order to determine the individual
liability, but the mere arithmetical process of dividing the sum to
be raised among the several subjects of taxation, in proportion to
the amounts which they are respectively assessed.
Sometimes the
■word

assessment is used as

implying the completed tax list; that

is to say, the list of persons or property to be taxed, with the estimates with which they are chargeable, and the tax duly apportioned and extended upon it

;

but this employment of the word

CH.

XEI.]

THE ASSESSIIEXT OF PEOPEBTT FOE TASATIOIT.

259

is unusual except in the cases in -o-hicli the levy is apportioned by
benefits ; and in those cases the act of determining the amou nt of the
benefits is of itself, under most statutes, a determination of the

individual liability, and its entry upon the roll is an extension of
the tax.^

Xecessity for an assessment.
ment, no question can be made.

Of the necessity of an assessTaxes by valuation cannot be

Moreover, it is the first step in the proceedings against individual subjects of taxation, and is the foundation of all which follow it.
Without an assessment they have
no support, and are nullities.^
It therefore, not only indispensis,

apportioned without it.

is

it

tax levied without any list and valuation
void. Thurston v. Little,
Pick., 482; McCall v. Lorimer, Watts, 351;
v. Stearns,

3

1

Mass., 429; Thayer

4

A

is

^

'

said " by tlie terms of the law the taxaWfe or his
property is assessed when the assessor has returned his list of property and
valuation thereupon, and the commissioners have apportioned the rate per cent,
upon the several townships."
Wells v. Smyth, 55 Penn. St., 159, 162.

In Pennsylvania

a

is

a

a

;

it

;

>

a

5

2

;

a

;

Miller v. Hale, 26 Penn. St., 433; Matter of Nichols, 54 N. T., 62. A statute
which cures in'egularities cannot cure this defect of jurisdiction. McReynolds B, Longenherger, 57 Penn. St., 18. See Brady v. Oflfutt, 19 La. An., 184
McCready v. Sexton, 29 Iowa, 356. In California
tax, in order to he valid,
an
an
assessment
made
assessor
chosen by the people
must rest ujion
by
duly
of the district assessed. People o. Hastings, 29 Cal., 449. See Ferris v. Coover,
A school or other township assessment by county assessors is
10 id., 589.
void. People v. Hastings, 29 Cal., 449; People v. Sargeant, 44 id., 480; Williams v. Corcoran, 46 id., 553 Reiley v. Lancaster, 39 id., 854. See Granger v.
Pick., 892. But in Massachusetts, school district taxes may be on
Parsons,
the town valuation, the statute providing for no other. Waldron v. Lee,
Pick., 323. In Weber c. Reinhard, 73 Penn. St., 870, 375, the act under consideration provided "that in addition to the taxes collectible under existing laws,
the owner or owners of ore beds, situated in Upper Saucon township, Lehigh
county, shall, from and and after the passage of this act, pay to the supervishalf cents for each and every ton
ors of the roads in said township, one and
of ore mined and carried away with teams over the public road, in said township, which said payments shall be made at the end of every six months after
the passage of this act and in default of payment, the same to be collected
as debts of like amount are collectible by law; provided, that the said supervisors shall appropriate to the same purpose, and render an account in the
same manner for the funds coming in their hands under this act, as they are
required by law with respect to other funds coming to their hands by vu-tue
of their office." Agnew, J., was of opinion that the act was void, because
provided for no assessment but the other judges sustained the law. Shars" He can save himself from the costs of
suit
wood, J., says of the tax payer:
avalwhere
case
not
by tender, in time, of the amount actually due. It
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the provisions of the statute

if

is

it

ia making

it,

under which
If this
to be made, must be observed with particularity.
were not compulsor}^,
the officers were to be at liberty to disregard important provisions of the statute in this initiatory step,
able, but

the chief protection which the law has intended for individuals

in

if

the proceedings which the
For
would be removed.
law has prescribed to insure uniformity and equality in the contributions which are demanded for the public service can be set
difficult to suggest any reason why all
aside with impunity,
and the distincothers may not be set aside with like impunity
;

is

cases

it

tax

regular taxation and arbitrary exaction will then
It the prescribed course of law for the one,
wholly disappear.
and the absence of
in the case of the other, which distinguishes
course suggested but
the two, and the prescribed course
only

if
it

not required,
But
followed.

a

is

it

is

tion between

remains upon the statute book, but need not be

manifest.^

Bate of the assessment.

Assessments

The customary regulation
certain day,
This fixes the lia-

or that

shall be made

as of

a

that the assessment shall be made or completed on

it

is

and in many of the states every year.

are made periodically,

certain day.

a

ments

is

a

it

is

it is

prescribed in orunquestionably
the citizen
subder that
shall be followed, and as without
stantially without protection from unequal and unjust demands,
the necessity for
strict compliance with all important requireas the course

bility of persons and property to taxation for the year.

There are

some inconveniences and inequalities resulting from this, but some
is

regulation of the kind
indispensable. A force of tax officers cannot be kept employed for the year in watching the transfers of
property, the movements of persons, and vicissitudes of business, in

;

a

a

is

is

is

uation of property
It
fixed rate upon the number of tons
required.
and that the owner may be presumed to know, or to have the means of asoerlandlord or himself the actual occupant.
taining, whether lie
It is not,

it

a

indeed, expressly provided that the supervisors shall ascertain and assess the
amount. But they must do so in order to maintain their suit and recover
judgment; and they must do more; they must prove
by competent evidence."

;

1

a

•

Where the law provides for an annual assessment, copying the roll of
Pick., 140 People v.
year does not make one. Nason «. Whitney,
449.
See
Cal.,
29
v.
Fulton
Greenough
Coal
Co., 74 Penn. St., 486.
Hastings,
former
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order to equalize the charges upon them ; periodical assessments,
if they produce injustice in one case, may correct them in the

At any rate, they
next, and on the whole are likely to be fair.
" In the imconstitute the best regulation the law can establish.

different individuals

who owned

it

a

a

it,

position of taxes, exact and critical justice and equality are absowe might have to divide
lutely unattainable. If we attempt
one year's tax upon
dozen
given article of property among
at different times during the

year, and then be almost as far from the desired end as when we

The proposition
The legislature must adopt
Utopian.
some practicable system;"' and this practical system
found to
be the one which has been indicated.
therefore
Every person
is is

is

started.

to be taxed for the year upon his personalty, estimated as of the
time of the assessment, and every parcel of land according to its
value at that time.
Subsequent changes cannot be noticed until
another

assessment.^

Tax payers' lists.

It

in some of

has been deemed advisable

eral taxing districts shall, by

a

the states to provide by law that persons resident within the sevspecified time, deliver to the asses-

a

written exhibit of their property or business for the purpose
In some cases the list has been required to be made
of taxation.

sor

State V.

Hardin,

34

N. J.,

79.

One

is

2

is

5

1

Gilm., 505, 518. A mortgage not in existence at the time
Shaw ■».Dennis,
flxed by law for the mailing of the assessment cannot be taxed, though the asmade later. People v. Kohl, 40 Cal., 127.
sessment
to be taxed where he resides, on the

day fixed by statute for taking the assessment,

though

off into another

set

9

is
v.

First Parish,

etc.,

Cush., 267.

In

Vermont,

a

563; Ware

8

Y.,

it

Harmon v. New Marlborough, Cush., 525. But
completed.
if he moves out of the town before the day fixed for its completion, he cannot
be taxed for his personalty in it. People v. Supervisors of Chenango, 11 N.
town before

person resi-

school

9

it,

a

is

is

a

a

it

a

district at the time of listing, and properly listed there, recontinues in force, notwithstanding he has
mains liable on the list while
Woodward v. French, 31 Vt., 337;
subsequently removed from the district.
Walker D. Miner, 33 id., 769; Ovitt v. Chase, 37 id., 196. Where plaintiff had
place of business in Boston every year from 1st of December to 1st of March,
but none on 1st of May when assessment was to be made, Jield, that he was not
Field v. Boston, 10 Cush., 65. The fact that debt
taxable in Boston.
conan inhabitant, does not justify
tracted while one
personal tax upon him
after he has ceased to be such. Dow v. First Parish in Sudin respect of
Met., 73. An illustration of the resorts to avoid taxation will be found
bury,
in Mitchell v. Leavenworth County,
Kans., 344.
dent in
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The failure to hand it in is made to subject the person to some specified liability ; sometimes to the doubliTig for taxation such estimate as the assessor shall make of his property ;
sometimes to a definite penalty ; sometimes to deprivation of any
under oath.

right to appeal against what he may regard as an unjust assessment.
The right to discriminate in some manner against those
When the
■who fail to hand in lists has been often recognized.^
discrimination consists merely in submitting the party to the
" doom " of the assessor, and depriving him of any appeal, it
seem that there could be no

would

valid objection to

it.'^

But

it goes further and subjects the party to penalties of any
kind, to be inflicted by a ministerial officer withoiit a hearing, for
where

a neglect that may have been

it is not

ble,

so

unintentional and perfectly excusa-

clear on what principle

it can be defended.'

It

is certainly not consistent with the genius of the common law
that penalties for neglect of duty should be inflicted without judicial investigation.*
It has been decided in Kentucky that penal provisions of this
must be strictly construed ;'

character

State

State v.

E. R. Co.
8

-o.

Donovan

^

v.

V. State,

25

id., 177.

Porter

See

id., 509;

Nev.,

decision that is in har-

Bell, 1 Pliil. (N. C), 76 ; Winiiimisset Co. v. Chelsea, 6 Cush.,
Insurance Co., 30 Md., 155; State u. Welch, 38 Mo., 600;
Leavell, 3 Blackt'., 117; State v. Hamilton, 5 Ind., 310; Louisville, etc.,

' See
477;

a

v. County Commissioners,
5 Gray, 365; Otis Company b. Ware,
State v. Apgar, 31 N. J., 358; States. Board of Equalization, 7

88.

^ In Minnesota it has been decided that where the
constitution requires all
taxation to be by value, it is incompetent to provide by law for increasing the
assessed valuation by a sum to be added as a penalty for not handing in a list.

Fitch, 14 Minn., 253. And see Stale v. Allen, 2 McCord, 55.
A contrary ruling in Indiana was made in the case of Boyer ?).'Jones, 14 Ind.,
354, where a party had refused to list property which he claimed was not taxable, and was subjected to a penalty of fifty per cent, on the valuation, for the

McCormick

v.

refusal.
»

Some statutes make provision for enforcing by suit the penalties for negSee Drexel v. Commonwealth, 46 Penn. St., 31.

lect to hand in lists.

"Alexander v. Commonwealth, 1 Bibb, 515; McCall d. The Justices, 1 id.,
516; Olds V. Commonwealth, 3 A. K. Marsh., 465; Chiles b. Commonwealth,
4
J. Marsh., 577. The point was made in Drexel v. Commonwealth, 46 Penn.
In Connecticut it is held that a list sufficient as to
St., 31, but not decided.
the personal estate cannot be rejected as to that because not sufficient as to the
ISTew Canaan v. Hoyt, 23 Conn.. 148.
In Alabama a statute requiring
realty.

J.
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iBony with the general rules of construction.
But when the construction is clear, they are generally enforced.
The Massachusetts
statute (1835) took away all right to abatement of an excessive assessment on appeal to the county commissioners,

when the appellist of his estate to the assessors, un-

lant had failed to bring in a
less he could show good cause for the failure ; and also when he
had failed to make oath to the truth of the list if required by the
assessors to do so.
Under thie statute it was held that the assessors ,could not waive the bringing in of the list

; that corporations
natural persons must comply with it ; that an exhibition to the assessors of a plan of the tax payer's real estate, or re-

as

well

as

ferring them to the list of a preceding year, would not be a compliance with the statute ;^ that the list must be handed in before
the tax is actually assessed,^

and that

"

if not

handed in, the tax-

payer submits himself to the "doom of the assessors.'
It has also been held on a construction of the statute, that no
abatement would be made before a list was

brought in, though
a sufficient excuse for not bringing it in at the proper time was
shown.^ Handing in a list which, by mistake of the lister's rights,
" who is liable to pay taxes " to render " a list of his
every person in the state
"
taxable property
to the assessors, and providing that if he does not, they may
call at his residence for a list of his taxables or for the amount of taxes due
from him, held applicable to one liable only to a poll tax.
Ala., 556. As to what is a sufficient listing in Vermont,
brook, 39 Vt., 330.

Carter

d.

Mercer,

see Blodgett

v.

9

Hol-

iWiunimissel Co., d. Chelsea, 6 Cush., 477. And see Otis Co. b. Ware, 8
The statute required the assessors to notify the inhabitants, at the
town meeting or otherwise, to bring in lists. It was held in the first of these
cases that if a failure to give notice was relied upon, it devolved on the tax
payer to show it. Corporations may be required to furnish for taxation lists
of their stockholders to all the local authorities where they severally reside.
Donovan v. Insurance Co., 80 Md., 155.
Gray, 509.

2 Porter v.

County Commissioners,

5

Gray, 365

;

Otis Co.

«. Ware, 8 id., 809,

v. Worcester, 8 Cush., 55, 63. But where a list was not brought in
until after the time limited for it had expired, but the delay was chargeable to
the assesors themselves, who expressly told the party's agent nothing should
be lost by the delay, it was held that the right to apply for an abatement was
not lost. Lowell v. County Commissioners, 3 Allen, 546.
2 Lincoln

County Commissioners, 101 Mass., 87. In abating a tax
■which has been paid, the county commissioners have no right to allow interest ;
the statute not providing for it. Lowell «. County Commissioners, 3 Allen, 550.
Nor costs, for the same reason. Same v. Same, id, 556. Successors of asses*

Charlestown

v.
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is made to embrace property not liable to taxation, will not estop
him from claiming an abatement as to sucb exempt property;

policy why it should.
But while this is true, it is also true that the tax payer cannot
complain of any mere irregularity in the action of the assessors into which they have been led by an error or imperfection in his
there being no reason of justice or public

These references
own list, not affecting his substantial rights.*
will perhaps sufficiently indicate the views which have been
taken by the courts of statutes of this nature.'
sors who have levied a tax may ahate it if application therefor is made within
the statutory time. Hibbard v. Garfield, 102 Mass., 73 ; Carleton v. Ashburnham, 102 id., 348. One who has handed in no list and is overtaxed, cannot
pay his tax, and then recover back on showina; a mistake in the assessors : a
mistake not rendering the tax illegal. Lott «. Etubbard, 44 Ala., 593.
' Charlestown
v. County Commissioners,
109 Mass., 270, citing Dunnell
Manuf. Co, v. Pawtucket, 7 Gray, 377, where the point was substautiall}' the

In Illinois it

same.

has been decided that

if one voluntarily

lists for taxation

corporate stocks which are not taxable, and they are taxed accordingly, he
cannot complain, as it is his own fault. Republic Life Ins. Co. v. PoUak, 7

6

it,

is

a

'•'

Chicago Legal News, 357, Sup. Gt. 111., 1875.
As where, the party's agent being called upon for list, he furnished
but
omitted one parcel of land whicli was taxed as nonresident in consequence.
Kinsworthy v. Mitchell, 21 Ark., 145. To the same effect
Nelson v. Pierce,

N.

The tax payer giving an erroneous description of his lands
estopped from complaining of it. Hubbard v. Windsor,

H., 194.

Mich.,

to

is

the assessor

15

146.

a

a

fusal.

Parker,

State ?;.

Parker,

33

N. J.,

See

192.

a

a

it

3

(a

a

is

a

required under
penalty cannot excuse himself by showbilliard table), that another person
ing as to an article he should have listed
A. K. Marsh., 465. Where one exhad listed it. Olds v. Commonwealth,
list, saying
cused himself from making
was unnecessary, held to be
refrom whom

list

6

it

a

is

a

2

list is required to be given in under oath,
refusal to swear to
Where
in. Lee v. Commonwealth,
refusal to give
Dana, 311. The person
list

Staie ii. Bishop, 34 id., 45; State

«.

The list
not conclusive
on the assessors. Thompson d. Tinkoom, 15 Minn., 295. But
hasbeensaid
they ought to adopt the valuation of the lister in the absence of any evidence
of its incorrectness.
People v. Reddy, 43 Barb., 539 People ». Assessors of
Albany, 40 N. Y., 154: though they are not liable for any bona fide exercise of
of their power in this regard. Vose v. Willard, 47 Barb., 320 Bell v. Pierce,
Stearns ». Miller, 25 Vt., 30 Wilson v. Marsh, 34 id., 352. But for
48 id., 51
failure to perform ministerial duties to the lister's prejudice the officers may
Kellogg v. Higgius, 11 id., 340; Fairbanks v. Kittredge, 34 id.,
be liable.
In Nevada, tax payer who fails to hand in his list, is allowed no standing
State b. Board of Equalization,
before the board of equalization.
Nev., 83.
In New Jersey he loses his right to appeal. State v. Apgar, 81 N. J., 858. An
34 id., 63.

a

7

a

9.

;

;

;

;

it

State v. McChesney,

is

;

34 id., 49

CH.

XII.]

THE

Right to

OP

ASSESSMESTT

PROPERTY FOR TAXATION.

265

The summary nature of tax proceedings
has been remarked upon. Every inhabitant of the state is liable to
have

a

hearing.

against him on the judgment of others

a demand established

regarding the sum which he should justly and equitably contribute
to the public revenues. Every property owner in the state, whether
an inhabitant or not, is liable to have a lien in like manner estabhis property.
Moreover, the persons who make
the assessment lighten the burden upon themselves in proportion
lished

against

as they increase it upon others.
In such proceedings, therefore, it
must be a matter of the utmost importance to the person assessed that he should have some opportunity to be heard before

the charge is

fully established against him

;

and it would seem to

be a dictate of strict justice that the law should make reasonable

provision to secure him
or oppression.

as

far

as

may be against partiality, malice

The obligation to make provision for this purpose is recognized
by the statutes of the several states. By some the person assessed
is allowed to reduce what he claims to be an excessive assessment

by his own oath ; by others he is allowed an appeal to some board
of review, and in all, perhaps, some method is provided by which
he may have a hearing before the assessment becomes

fixed and

Thus the statutes

have taken precautions
against oppression and injustice, and perhaps made all the provision that is needful, if their directions are fully observed.
final against him.

It

that statutory provisions are
not strictly observed, and that either the public or individuals
The question presented may then
must suffer in consequence.
is too often the

case, however,

be, whether the provisions which have not been obeyed are man-

datory to the officers, or it may arise on the provisions of some
In substance
curative statute which proposes to heal the defects.
the question
a

will be, whether the right to be heard in tax cases is

right which is indefeasibla

"
"
early statute in South Carolina provided that a tax of ten thousand dollars
should he imposed upon every person keeping open an oifice for the sale of
"
lottery tickets, and that it shall be the duty of the tax collector in the dis-

trict where such lottery oflBces are opened, in default of the person or persons
keeping such offices to return the same and pay the tax imposed by this law,
The court held this,
to issue his execution as in other cases of defaulters."
a
a
to
be
which
it
was
not
tax,
competent to aureally
penalty,
though called
55,
State v. Allen, 3 McCord,
thorize the collector to impose.
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"We should say that notice of ijroceedings in such cases, and an
opportunity for a hearing of some description, were matters of con-

stitutional right.1 It has been customary to provide for them as
"
a part of what is " due process of law
for these cases ; and it is
not to be assumed that constitutional provisions, carefully framed
for the protection of property, were intended or could be construed
under which officers might secretly assess
one for any amount in their discretion, without giving him an opIt has often
portunity to contest the justice of the assessment.
been very pointedly and emphatically declared that it is contrary
to sanction legislation

to the first principles of justice that one should be condemned unheard; and it has also been justly observed of taxing officers, that
"it would be a dangerous precedent to hold that any absolute
power resides in them to tax

It

any notice to the owner.

as

they may choose without giving

is a power liable to great abuse," and it

might safely have been added, it is a power that under such circum" The
stances would be certain to be abused.
general principles
of law applicable to such tribunals oppose the exercise of any
such power."

This being the

^

case,

it is not to be supposed that

the legislature in any doubtful language has undertaken to confer

All

it.

reasonable

presumptions in construction should favor jus-

tice and right.

It

is not customary to provide that the taxpayer shall be heard
before the assessment is made, but a hearing is given afterwards,
either before the assessors themselves, or before some court or
board of review.

And

of the meeting of that court or board the

tax payer must in some manner be informed ; -either by personal
notice, or by some general notice which is reasonably certain to
reach him, — or, which is equivalent — by some general law which
fixes the time and place of meeting, and of which he must take
The last is a common method of enabling him to be
notice.
heard.'
" Notice," it is said by Agnew, J., in Pliiladelpliia v. Miller, 49 Peun.
" or at least the means of knowledge, is an essential element of
440, 448,
'

St.,

every

just proceeding which aflfects rights of persons or property."
And see Darling V. Gunu, 50 111., 424; State v. Drake, 33 N. J., 194; Butler v. Supervisors ot
Saginaw, 26 Mich., 22.
^Baldwin,
tjewaite, 43
5 There

J., in

Patten

v.

Green,

13

Cal., 325, 329.

See also

Cleghoru

v. Pos-

111., 428.

being no jurisdiction to assess a personal tax upon a nonresident,

All
er,
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these provisions, being of vital importance to the tax pay-

must be regarded

as

compulsory, and

a

compliance with them

as conditions precedent to any further step to charge him with

a

tax.i

fix

certain time for the meeting of a board of review, and the board fails to meet ; or a certain time for the return
and filing of the assessment for inspection before the meeting of
"When they

a

the board, and it is not filed, whereby opportunity for inspection
is lost ; the tax proceedings must be regarded as having failed to
become effectual, because of the failure of the officers properly to

follow them up as required, by law. No argument can be admissible in such a case which proposes the acceptance of something
else as a substitute for the securities the statute has provided.
To
substitute anything would require legislation ; and even legislation for the purpose would be of doubtful validity if it failed to
Such
provide what would, fully accomplish the same purpose.
regulations for the protection of individual rights are reasonable,
On
and they are demanded by justice and general convenience.
principles they must be regarded as mandatory,^ and
strict observance of their provisions held to be essential.^

general

a

ho is not chargeable Trith constructive notice of tlie action of assessors, and is
under no obligation to ajipear before them. St. Paul v. Merritt, 7 Minn., 258.
The determination of the tax to be paid by a corporation is not void because

of being made without notice, ■where the statute provides for a subsequent
Comnion'wealth i>. Runk,
notice — ■which ■was duly given — and an appeal.
26 Penn. St., 235.

Manuf. Co.

■Thames

Cush., 221

;

o.

Lathrop,

7

Kansas Pacific R. R. Co.

; Lowell
Kans., 558.

Conn., 550, 555
w.

Russell,

8

v. Wentworth,

6

Manuf. Co. v. Lathrop, 7 Conn., 550, 555; Marsh r. Chestnut, 14
111., 223 ; Cleghorn v. Postlewait, 48 id., 428 ; Nashville v. Weiser, 54 id., 245 ;
Mix V. People, Sup. Court, 111., June term, 1874; Philips v. Stevens Point, 29
Wis., 594; Walker v. Chapman, 23 Ala., 116; Insurance Co. v. Yard, 17 Penn.
St., 831, 338; French ». Edwards, 13 Wall., 50G, 511. In the ease In 7 Conn.,
550, the assessment was held void because an abstract thereof which the law
required should be filed by the first of December, was actually not filed till
the 20th, though this was ten days before the meeting of the board of review.
That the tax payer must take notice of the general law fixing the time and
place of hearing, see Methodist Pr. Church ®. Baltimore, 6 Gill, 391; O'Neal
V. Bridge Co., 18 Md., 1, 36.
' When one has by city charter the right to appear " and be heard " before
the common council, it is not competent for the council to limit the objections
State v. Jersey City, 25 N. J., 309. But
to such as may be made in writing.
» Thames
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The courts have been particularly careful to see that revisory
tax tribunals^ did not change assessments to the prejudice of taxpayers who, under the circumstances, had no reason to look for or
If the tax-payer himself does not
anticipate any such change.
appeal, he has a right to suppose that the assessment against him

will

If

authority is conferred upon
the board of review to change assessments under any specified
circumstances, the existence of those circumstances is a condition
An illustration is afforded by a case in
precedent to their action.
be allowed to stand as made.

A

New York.

city council had authority to correct descriptions
of lands returned for nonpayment of taxes or assessments; but

it was held, gave them no right to put to

this,

a

description of

that of the owner, when the effect, if valid,
would be to make the tax a personal charge against him.
Such
land

a new name, as

in the assessment, if it could be supported, would deprive the person assessed of the statutory right to notice, and of
the opportunity to apply for correction secured to those named in
a change

the original

roll'

And in

several states

after the assessment has been completed,

it has been decided that
no increase in valuation

can legally be made, without

notice to the tax-payer, either express or implied, with the opportunity for hearing.^
in writing, nor those
Jersey City, 38 id., 500. And as
to the right to be heard in general the following cases may also be referred to.
Lorimer v. McCall, 4 W. & S., 133 ; Stewart v. Trevor, 56 Penn. St., 374. And
that there must be opportunity aflbrded for it at the time and place fixed by
law, see Sioux City, etc., R. R. Co. v. Washington County, 3 Neb., 30.
neitlier one who has made objection
wlio do not appear at all, can object.

1

Courts, in reviewing assessments,

Hand, J., in WoodruflF

tion.

v.

to the assessment

Stale

v.

exercise a special and limited jurisdic-

Fisher,

17

Barb., 224, 232.

17 N. Y., 383.
Compare Overing ». Foote, 43 N. T.,
is said to be a " close case." Where the revisory board
orders a change made in the assessment, the assessor, it seems, may be compelled to make it in a certiorari proceeding.
Keck «. Keokuk County, 37

^Bennett

d.

Buffalo,

290, 294, where this

Iowa,
3

547.

Philips

B.Stevens

Point,

Wis.,

594; Matherson
«. Mazomanie, 20 id.,
428; Darling v. Gunn, 50 id., 424; Griswold V. School District, 24 Mich., 262; Patten v. Green, 13 Cal., 325; Sioux
City, etc., R. R. Co. v. Wasliington County, 3 Neb., 30; Leavenworth County
V. Lang, 8 Kans., 284 ; Kansas Pacific R. R. Co. v. Russell, 8 id., 558.
Where a
191;

Cleghorn

v.

25

Postlewaite, 43

III,

it,

party liable to taxation makes out and delivers to the assessor a list of his
taxable property, which is accepted by the assessor without question, the latter has no power afterwards, of his own motion, to alter
without giving
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Little need be said of poll taxes, as
likely

they are seldom levied, and when they are, the case is not

to raise any other question than that of the jurisdiction of the
assessors in the particular case.
And this will generally be a
question only of whether the person taxed has> his domicile within
the district.
Such a question is usually one more of fact than of,
law.^

A

tax assessed against the person

for personal estate is to be

McConkey v. Smith, Sup. Ct. 111., 1875, 7 Chicago Legal
Where, on appeal from assessment, the appellate board has power
to increase valuations on giving ten days' notice to the tax-payer, notice to
notice to the party.

News,

310.

his tenant is not suiHcient. State v. Drake, 33 N. J., 194. "Where, after valuation by assessors, the party taxed is permitted by law to make affidavit of the
actual value of his property, this is only evidence to be considered, and not
conclusive, unless made so by statute.
People v. Barker, 48 N. Y., 70. In
Oregon, the decisions of the' assessors and county clerk, constituting a board
of review, are made reviewable in the supreme court. Rhea ii. Umatilla
'
County, 3 Ore., 298, 300 ; Shumway v. Baker County, 3 id., 246.

'A

poll tax can only

be

assessed

On the question, what

Me., 497.

on residents.

constitutes

Herriman

®.

Stowers, 43

residence, the following cases

will throw light.
1

Harvard College v. Gore, 5 Pick., 369, 373; Sears «. Boston,
Met., 250; Thorndike v. Boston, id., 343, 345; Lyman v. Fiske, 17 Pick., 331,

334; Otis v. Boston,

13

Cush., 44; Cabot

v.

Boston,

id., 53; Lee v. Boston,

3

Bulkley -D.Williamstown, 3 id., 493 ; Carnoe -o. Freetown, 9 id., 357 ;
Briggs V. Rochester, 16 id., 337; Warren v. Thomaston, 43 Me., 406, 413; Parsou 11. Bangor, 61 id., 457; Poster v. Hall, 4 Humph., 346, 348; State v. Ross,'
33 N. J., 517; Daniel v. Sullivan, 46 Geo., 377; Bell v. Pierce, 51 N. Y., 13;
Matter of Nichols, 54 id., 63 ; Fry's Election Case, 71 Penn. St., 303 ; S. C, 10
Am. liep., 698 ; Arnold v. Davis, 8 R. I., 341 ; Tripp v. Crown, 9 id., 240. One
living on lands, subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, is
Opinions of Judges, 1 Met., 580. One who
not subject to taxation on polls.
has left the town of his residence, without the intention of returaing, is nevertheless taxable there while he remains in the commonwealth, until he has
Bulkley v. Williamstown, 3 Gray, 493. Resiacquired another residence.
dence is presumed to continue where it has been until a change is affirmatively shown, or at least until there is satisfactory evidence of abandonment.
Matter of Nichols, 54 N. Y., 63. If a line runs through one's house, he
must be taxed in the town which includes the most necessary and indispenHe cannot be taxed in both. Judkins ». Reed, 48 Me., 386 ;
sable portion.
Chenery v. Waltham, 8 Cush., 337. If he is assessed in two towns, his election
to pay in one rather than the other is not conclusive, but he is liable in the
one of his actual inhabitancy. Lyman v. Fiske, 17 Pick., 331 ; Chenery v.
Waltham, 8 Cush., 337. See also Hardy v. Yarmouth, 6 Allen, 277, 384. His
being taxed in one is not evidence that his residence and proper place of taxMead v. Roxborough, 11 Cush., 363.
ation is not in another.
Gray, 484

;
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I

in contem-

assessed to him at the place of his residence, because

irrespective of ownership,

if

is,

plation of law his movable property accompanies him wherever
he goes.
This is the general rule, though, as has been shown
elsewhere, tangible personal property may be taxed where it
the statute shall so provide.'

Property

'

Ante, p. 14. A vessel registered in New York, plying between Panama
and San Francisco, held not taxable in California.
Hays v. Pacific Mail
Steamship Co., 17 How., 596. See also, State v. Haight, 30 N. J., 438; People

of Taxes, N. T. Ct. of Appeals (1875), 11 Albany Law JourFerry boats running to
city, but owned in another state, are not
taxable to the city as property " within " it. St. Louis v. Ferry Co., 11 Wall.,
433.
See also Morgan v. Parham, 16 id., 471.
statute for the taxSo under
ation of " all lands and personal estates within this state," one cannot be assessed on capital invested in business in another state, or on chattels upon
farm
in another state. People v. Commissioners of Taxes, 38 N. Y., 234. A bond
is to be taxed where the owner resides, though the obligor resides elsewhere.
McCnrd, 374; &.ugusta v. Dunbar, 50 Geo., 387. But
Hayne ». Deliesseline,
would be compeboth obligor and obligee reside within the state,
perhaps
tent to provide by statute for collecting the tax from the former.
See Harper
what
said
id.,
Griffin,
23
33
113.
See
•D. Commissioners,
Geo., 566 Bridges v.
of this last case in Augusta «. Dunbar, 50 id., 387. The personalty owned by
citizen out of the state
taxable where lie resides. Commonwealth i). Hays,
B. Monr.,
MoSo are stocks he may hold in
foreign corporation.
Keen V. Northampton Co., 49 Penn. St., 519; Whitsell v. Same, id., 536. The
statute provided that nonresidents "doing business " in the state should he
taxed on sums invested " in said business."
Ileld not to apply to manu«. Commissioners

a

a

8.

b

1,

a

is

;

is

it

if

3

a

a

a

nal, 401.

factured article merely sent into the state for sale by an agent, who sold and rethe price.
Parker Mills v. Commissioners of Taxes, 23 N. Y., 343.

mitted

a

That money due on a land contract in the hands of an agent of
nonresident is taxable, see People v. Ogdensburg, 48 id., 390.
Compare SuThat nonresidents of
state or disin respect to property there situate or business
there carried on, see Corfield v. Coryell,
Wash. C. C, 371, 380; State v.
City Council,
Speers, 623 Harrison v. Vicksburg,
& M., 581 Worth
■B. Fayetteville,
Winston's L. & Eq., 70; Padleford v. Mayor, 14 Geo., 438;
Peace b. Augusta, 37 id., 597 Shirver v. Pittsburg, 66 Penn. St., 446 compare
Bennett v. Birmingham, 31 id., 15. Personalty received by distributee in the
state from the estate of one abroad
liable to taxation in the state under astat\ite taxing property distributed " to or among the next of kin " of an intestate.
Alvany ?). Powell,
Jones Eq., 51. The personal property belonging to the
estate of
deceased person
held in Connecticut to be taxable at his last
domicile the representatives of the estate not being trustees in the sense of the
statute which makes personal property in the hands of trustee taxable in the
town where the trustee resides. Cornwall ». Todd, 38 Conn., 448. A town
man as resident takes the burden of showing that he
which taxes
such, if
the right
Hurlburt v. Green, 41 Vt., 490 Same v. Same, 43
questioned.
i>.

trict may

Davenport,

40 111., 197.

a

pervisors

is

a

;

is

a

a

;

a

is

3

is

a

:

;

3

S.

;

;

3

4

be taxed therein
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held in trust sliould be assessed to the trustee where he resides,'
except where the trust is under the direction of a court, in which
case

A

it would be taxable in the jurisdiction

partnership being only

a business

having control of it.^
association of individuals,

the members are severally taxable

for their interests where they
But a prireside,^ unless the statute lays down a different rule.''
vate banker living in one place, and having a bank in another, is
for the pui-poses of taxation to be regarded as resident where the
bank is located.'

The principles upon which personal assessments are made' are
different under different statutes.
The most common method is
to

assess the

id., 316.

owner

Consent

give jurisdiction

a sum

which is supposed to represent the value

by a person to be taxed where he does not reside does not
and would not bind him. Blood v. Sayre, 17 id., 609.

' State V. Mathews,

Ohio St., 431, 437 ; Hardy d. Yarmouth, 6 Allen, 277,
152; Baltimore v. Stirling, 39 Md., 48; Carlisle v.
Marshall, 36 Penn. St., 397 ; People «. Assessors of Albany, 40 N. Y., 154. If
there are two trustees, one half may be assessed to each. State «. Mathews,
supra ; Baltimore v. Stirling, 29 Md., 48. Eesidence of cestui que trust immaterial. People t). Assessors of Albany, supra.
' Lewis V. Chester County, 60 Penn. St., 335. But it is said in this case that if
285; Catlin

e.

Hull,

10

21

Vt,

the trustee invests money on mortgage in another state, he may be taxed upon it
at the place of investment.
And see Supervisors v. Davenport, 40 111., 197.
An executor may be assessed personally for taxes against the estate, and have

Williams
them collected from his own property.
it is competent by statute to make the tax on
Payson v. Tufts,
charge against his guardian.
Bemis v. Boston, 14 Allen,
body v. County Commissioners,
V. Kittredge, 34 Vt., 9.
5

^

Hoadley

' Miner

v.

v.
a
13

Holdeu,
minor's

4 Wend., 333.
estate

So

a personal

Mass., 493.

citing Dwight v. Boston, 13 id, 316 ; PeaGrey, 97. To the same effect is Fairbanks

366,
10

County Commissioners,

105 Mass., 519.

N. Y., 155. And see Gardiner, etc. Co. v. Gardiner,
Mobile,
46 Ala., 158.
But it has been held that the
5 Greenl., 133 ;
v.
furniture of an inn is only taxable to the innkeeper at the place of his residence.
Charlestown v. County Commissioners, 109 Mass., 270. An army officer held
taxable on his furniture where he was temporarily stationed in the service. Finley V. Philadelphia, 33 Penn. St., 381. Under a statute in California, personal
property is to bo assessed and taxed in the county where it is situated, except
money and gold dust, which may, at the option of the owner, be taxed at the
place of his domicile. But to authorize the assessment of any jiroperty in
another county from the one in which he resides, it must appear that the
property is kept and maintained there, and is not there temporarily or in
People v. Niles, 35 Cal., 383 ; City of Oakland v. Whipple, 39 id.,
transitu.
v.

Fredonia,
Bates

113.

27
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of his personal property in bulk ; though an enumeration of certain articles is sometimes provided for.^ The statute may or may
not designate what shall be included by the assessors in their estimate ; but the taxable property will be indicated in some form,
by an enumeration of what shall be considered taxable
property, or by some general provision that all property shall be
taxed except what is specifically exempt.^
either

Compare Falkner v. Hunt, 16 Cal., 167, and People v. Sneath, 28 id., 613.
Every article specified in an assessment list must on the face of the list be so
described as to appear to be taxable. Adam v. Litchfield, 10 Conn., 127 ; Whittlesey V. Clinton, 14 id., 72.
' Taxable property does not necessarily include all subjects of taxation : e.
" When the word-s
g. polls may be taxable, gross sales by merchants, etc.
'-

'

taxable property ' occur in an independent act, it would seem that they should
be understood in the sense of things taxed which are susceptible of ownership or possession, unless there is something in the context which affixes to
them a dilTerent meaning, or unless the plain object cf the law will be deif they are not held to cover subjects of taxation which are not property

feated

sense."
R. W. Walker, J. in Lott v. Ross, 38 Ala., 156, 160,
citing Mosely v. Tift, 4 Fla., 402 ; De Witt v. Hays, 2 Cal., 468. " Property "
in a statute authorizing the imposition of taxes, without further explanation,
would not include a mere right to wharfage fees, though that as a franchise
has property value. De Witt v. Hays, 2 Cal., 468. It will include solvent
debts. Savings and Loan Association v. Austin, 46 id., 415. See People ii. Park,
23 id., 138; Catlin ». Hull, 21 Vt., 153.
Damages to which a land owner is entitled for the taking of his land for a
highway are not taxable as a " debt " before they have become fixed and receivable.
(A suit was pending.) Lowell d. Boston, 106 Mass., 540. Astowhat
is included in taxable i^roperty, see further, Louisville v. Hennlng, 1 Bush, 381.
Where " certifimtes of deposit " are taxable, an entry on a pass book is held to
be one.
Oulton v. Savings Institution, 17 Wall., 109 ; S. C, 1 Sawyer, 695.
The word macldnery held to include gas pipes laid under the streets, and
gas meters. Commonwealth v. Lowell Gas Light Co., 13 Allen, 75. See
Providence G-as Co. «. Thurber, 2 R.
15.
As to meaning of " inoyme " when that is taxable, see People v. Supervisors
of New York, 18 Wend., 605 Matter of Western Railway,
Met., 596 Commonwealth V. Ocean Oil Co., 59 Penn. St., 61. Where dividends are taxed, the
tax may be laid though tlie dividends are declared in stock.
Commonwealth
V. Cleveland, etc., R. R. Co., 29 Penn. St., 370.
If dividends are applied to in;

;

5

I.,

ia the ordinary

;

;

1

7

6

5

crease capital, they are taxable the same as if paid over.
State v. Farmers'
Bank, 11 Ohio, 94; Lehigh Crane Iron Co. ii. Commonwealth, 55 Penn. St., 448
As to tax on dividends in general, see State v. Charleston,
Rich., 561 Haight
Wall., 15; Railroad Co. ». Jackson,
V. Railroad Co.,
id., 262; United
States «. Railroad Co., 17 id., 332; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Page,
Bissell,
i61 Phoenix Iron Co. ■».Commonwealth, 59 Penn. St., 104.

CH.

THE ASSESSMENT OF PROPEETY FOR TAXATION.

SII.]

Assessment of corporations.

273

As regards corporations,

special rules are generally made. It has been decided, that
corporations are to be regarded as inhabitants, under a statute
which makes the personalty of inhabitants taxable.*
But this
is matter of construction, and must depend on the intent to be

All

gathered from the context.^

corporations are taxable when
the right to tax by a

has not expressly relinquished

the state

stipulation in the charter,^ and the method of taxation, and what
shall be taken as the measure of the tax, are in the discretion of

It

the legislature.

has been shown elsewhere, that sometimes the

franchise is specifically taxed,
sometimes

stock,*

sometimes

the capital,

the tangible property, and so on.

road property is taxed

or capital
Where rail-

is,

other property
the personalty should
be assessed to the company at the place of its business office
that being the legal situs of its personalty,' and for the purposes
Baldwin

includes

v. Trustees, etc., 37 Me., 369.

Louisville,

corporations.

etc.,

The word " persons " in the tax law
R. R. Co. v. Commonwealth,
Bush,
1

'

;

as

250.

1

;

3

'The word held not to include corporations.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
Hartford,
Conn., 15 Cherokee, etc., Ins. Co. v. The Justices, 28 Geo., 131.
Compare British Commercial Life Ins. Co. «. Com'rs of Taxes,
Keyes, 303.
^Bank of Pennsylvania
1).

Apthorp,

13

».

Mass., 353.

Commonwealth,

And

19

Penn. St., 144; Portland Bank

see ante, pp. 15, 35.

a

*

"Where
mutual insurance company was authorized to accumulate from
its profits a fund to continue liable for its losses during the term of its existence, held that this accumulation was capital, and liable to taxation as such.
16

id., 424.

monwealth

V.

N. Y., 241 People ». Supervisors
New York,
peculiar question on taxation of capital

For

;

8

v.

a

Sun Mut. Ins. Co.,

York,

Penn Gas Coal Co.,

63

of New
see Com-

Penn. St., 341.

is

is

a

a

is

it

a

is

;

;

;

5

Portland, etc., R. R. Co. v. Saco, 60 Me., 196 State -o. Person, 33 N. J., 134
Pacific R. R. Co. -o. Cass County, 53 Mo., 17 Orange and Alexandria R. R. Co.
so held of the rolling stock of
It
railroad,
■u.Alexandria, 17 Grat., 176.
to
distribute the taxation of rolling
has also been held competent
though
Kansas City, etc.,
stock through the various counties where the road rung.
R. R. Co. B. Severance, 55 Mo., 378. But on the point, whether the rolling
to be regarded as real or personal estate, there
railroad
great
stock of
See Randall ®. Blwell, 53 N. Y., 531.
Other corporadiversity in decisions.
tions are also to be taxed on personalty at the place of their principal ofiice.
Western Transportation Co. o. Scheu, 19 N. Y., 408. Where manufacturing
required to be assessed in the town " where the operations of
corporation
are to be carried on," this means the manufactory, and not the
Oswego Starch Factory v. Dolloway, 21 N. Y.,
place of financial operations.
As to assessment of railroad beds, see ante, 114.
449.
the company

18
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of taxation, it is sometimes provided thiit all railroad propertyshall be considered personal and taxable accordingly ; a provision
legislature is supposed to be entirely competent to
make.'
The corporation
of course, taxable on corporate
taxed on their
the individual corporators,
property only
shares of stock, are to be taxed where they respectivel}'- reside,"
;

if

is,

■wbich the

separately

assessed,^

'

in others the line in each

and in still others the whole

is

is

county

unit

;

the road and property as

a

is

though they may be, and sometimes are taxed at the place where
the corporate business
carried on, and the corporation made
the collector.
In some states railroad companies are taxed upon

assessed, and then the assessment apportioned between the several

A

company may be assessed

is

it

property not occupied and

held,

cannot be

being applied to
The track of
local railway

used.^

a

assessed as

railroad track,
"nonresident" lands; that term
as real estate,

highway where the company has no

though laid down in

a

counties and towns.

title.^

it

it

a

a

a

it
is

a

^

Held, under such provision, that
was not competent to tax
as real.
Bangor and Piscataqua R. R. Co. v. Harris, 31 Me., 533. See Cumberland Marine IVy.v. Portland, 37 id., 444, where
said that statute which would have
difl'erent
decision was overlooked in the previous case.
required
The right
to treit the rolling stock of
railroad as personal estate for the jjurposes of
taxation aiBrmed. Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. «. State, 25 Ind., 177. See Maus
V. Logansport,
etc., R. R. Co., 37 111., 77; Sangamon, etc., R. R. Co. v. Morgan
County,

14

id., 163,

5

a

;

^

Cornwell «. Connersville, 15 Ind., 150; Madison b. -Whitney, 21 id., 261.
Compare -Whitney v. Madison, 23 Ind., 831 Cumberland Marine R'y «. Portland, 37 Me., 444.
The word " stock " in statuf* authorizing the taxation
of stock in corporations, means not only the stock subscriptions, but the
actual tangible property of the corporation.
Ind., 310;
State v. Hamilton,

s

;

Auditor of Floyd County v. New Albany and Salem R. R., 11 id., 570; Mich.
Cent. R. R. Co. v. Porter, 17 id., 380 "Whitsell v. Northampton County, 49 Penn.
St., 526; McKeen v. Same, 49 id., 519; State v. Branin, 23 N. J., 484.
See

Toledo and Wabash R. R. Co.

■».Lafayette,

23

Ind.,

363.

5

3

*See Albany, etc., R. R. Co. v. Osborn, 13 Barb., 223; Albany, etc., R. R. Co
c. Canaan, 16 id., 344; Th3 Tax Cases, 13 Gill & J., 117; State v. 111. Cent. R.R.
Co., 27 111., 61; Sangamon, etc., R. R. Co. c. Morgan County, 14 id., 163; ProvR. I„ 459.
idence, etc., R. R. Co. i). Wright,
People

V.

Barker,

visors of Erie,

"People

48

48

N. Y.,

11. Cassity, 46

38 Conn., 423.

N. Y.,

70; Buflfalo and State Line R. R. Co.

v.

Super-

93.

N. Y-, 46; New Haven t. Fair Haven,

etc.,

R. R. Co.,
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Taxes on real property. In regard to the assessment of real
estate it is customary, and is certainly extremely proper, to give
These directions
very careful and specific directions by statute.^
for the most part have in view the protection of persons taxed.
Very simple proceedings might be all that would be requisite to
enable the state to collect its revenues if its interests alone were
to be regarded ; but so many circumstances are liable to leave
the owner of property in ignorance that proceedings are being
taken for that purpose, and possibly in ignorance or forgetfulness
that any duty on his part remains undischarged, that a govern-

individual citizens will not fail
will be reasonably certain to notify

ment careful of the interests of its
to make such provisions as

him of any default, and give him ample opportunity to protect
his property from sacrifice or forfeiture. And this is seen to be
specially important in tax cases when it is remembered that property sold for taxes, — particularly real estate — seldom brings
more than a small fraction of its value.

Seated

and unseated

lands.

Among the most

useful of

for the protection of persons taxed is one that
unoccupied lands, unseated lands, or nonresident lands shall be
assessed on a different list from the occupied or seated lands ; or

these provisions

if not on

different list, then on a different part of the same list.
The purpose is that the two distinct classes of land shall be asa

sessed separately,

so that the owner of

any parcel, knowing its
to look for his, and shall

shall know exactly where
thus be more certain to discover any claim made upon him by
reason of its ownership, and be enabled to discharge it before
any thing shall be lost to him in consequence of a default.^
character,

'

That a possession of and claim to public lands is taxable to the claimant,
People v. Shearer, 30 Cal., 656 ; People v. Prisbie, 31 id., 146 ; People v.
Cohen, id., 210; People v. Mining Co., 37 id., 54. That in Massachussetts, a
house built by one man on the land of another and owned by a nonresident
nor as realty, separate
is not taxable as personalty in the town whore it
from the land, see Flanders v. Cross, 10 Cush., 514. As to assessment of Indian lands after the Indian title
extinguished by treaty, see Fellows v. Denniston, 23 N. Y., 420. It has been decided in Connecticut that in the assessment of " mills," the machinery contained therein should be included, even
was personalty, and the owner
v. Ramsey,

&

Burd

S.

See

9

2

80 Conn., 18.

K.,

109.

a

though

it

is

is,

see

nonresident.

Sprague v. Lisbon,
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"
The terms " seated," " re.sideat," and " occupied lands may not
convey precisely the same idea as they are employed in the several

nof

They will in general, howThe
ever, be found sufficiently explained in the several statutes.

state statutes, and probably do

lands for taxation is, that
those which are cultivated or occupied, so that some one within
the taxing district is personally liable for taxation in respect to

general idea of the statutes classifying

them, shall be taxed in a list by themselves.

There are very esin considering the

sential distinctions, however, to be observed
The custom in most of the states is that, when
several statutes.
the periodical assessments are made, the lands are examined or
their condition inquired into, and they are classed irrespective of
any former assessment ; while in Pennsylvania the rule is that
lands once seated are presumed to continue so, and nothing but
by the occupier, without the intention of returning, will warrant their being changed to the unseated list.^
And the abandonment of part of an entire tract while
an unequivocal abandonment

the occupation of the remainder continues

will not prevent the

what are to be regarded as " seated " lands in Pennsylvania, see Wilson ji. Waterson, 4 Penn. St., 214, in Tvliicli it is lield tliat lands having a
house upon them and some improvements, though not occupied, are not to be
■As to

regarded as unseated without unequivocal marks of the abandonment of the
improvement, and its permissive return to its natural state. The improvement of part of a tract makes the whole

seated, though divided by a county
Hall, 19 Penn. St., 293. Where a number of unoccupied tracts
are to be used in the supplying a mill with timber to cut, this does not laake
Heft «. Gephart, 65 id., 510. Lands are seated when occupied,
them seated.
even though the occupant is an intruder.
Campbell v. Wilson, 1 Watts, 503;
Lorimer v. McCall, 4 W. & S., 133. And the occupation and cultivation of part
of a warrant fixes the character of the whole. Biddle ii. Noble, C8 Penn. St.,
279.
Residence without cultivation, or cultivation without residence, will
preclude land being sold as unseated. George «. Messenger, 73 id., 418. As
to what will constitute seated lands in general, see Campbell c. Wilson, 1
Watts, 503 ; Sheafer ». McCabe, 2 id., 431 ; Fish v. Brown, 5 id., 441 ; Kennedy i>. Dailey, 6 id., 369 ; Wallace v. Scott, 7 W. & S., 247 ; Lorimer v. McCall, 4 id., 133; Michell v. Bratton, 5 id., 451; Millikin v. Benedict, 8 Penn.
St., 169; Jackson «. Sassaman, 29 id., 106; Hathaway i). Ellsbree, 54 id., 498;
Lackawana Iron, etc., Co. D. Pales, 55 id., 90; Stewart ■!).Trevor, 56 id., 374;
Green «. Watson, 34 id., 333 ; Holfmau ij. Bell, 61 id., 444; George «. Messen-

line.

Ellis

v.

ger, 73 id., 418.
'"Harbeson

Negley
Trevor,

v.

Jack,

o. Breading,
56

id., 374.

3

Watts,

33 id., 335;

124;

Millikin

Arthurs

v.

v.

Benedict,

8

Penn. St., 169;

Smathers, 38 id., 40, 44; Stewart

v.
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So again, the general rule is
being regarded as seated.^
that while the owner or occupant is taxed personally for the land
"wliole

he owns or occupies, the tax is also made a lien upon the land,

will be sold for its satisfaction in case it is not collected of the person.
In Pennsylvania, on the other hand, while
and the land

the tax on seated lands is a personal charge, that on the unseated

lands alone has until recently been made a lien to be enforced by
sale.
And even since the recent law which makes seated lands
Kable to sale for taxes, the proceedings are different
notice to the owner being required.^

Under all the statutes, however, the requirement of
tion of lands

as seated and unseated,

personal

;

a classifica-

resident or nonresident,

etc.,

is probably to be considered imperative.' It has been so held in
Maine,* Massachusetts,' New York,^ Pennsylvania,' and in so
many other states that any question that might once have been
an open one must now be regarded as finally settled.*
'

Patterson

v.

Blackmore,

9

Watts, 104.

'

See Broughton v. Journeay, 51 Penn.
' Possibly Connecticut is an exception.

See

Ellis

St., 31 ;

«.

Hall,

Lovejoy

v.

19

Penn. St., 293.

Lunt,

48 Me., 377.

See Adams v. Seymour, 30 Conn., 403.

■"The law required improved
lands to be assessed to the owner. Held, that
an assessment to person unknown was void. Brown v. Veazie, 25 Me., 359 ;
Barker v. Hesseltine, 87 id., 354. To same eflFeot are Carmichael u. Aiken, 18

La. All., 205; Bidleman

v.

Brooks,

An

38 Cal., 72.

assessment

of

a

whole lot

to a person, and a sale of the whole is void if a part was never owned or possessedby him. Barker v. Blake, 36 Me., 433. Por a case of resident land assessed as nonresident,

' Rising
«
V.

V.

Whitney

see

Granger,
v. Thomas,

1

Lunt

v.

Wormell,

19

Me., 100.

Mass., 48.
33

N. Y.,

381 ; Crooke v.

Andrews,

40 id., 547;

Newell

Wheeler, 48 id., 486.

' Milliken v. Benedict, 8 Penn. St., 169. As to effect of consent to land being assessed in the wrong list, see Lorimer v. McCall, 4 W. & S., 133 ; M^illi'kenv. Benedict, supra; Negley b. Breading, 32 Penn. St., 335; Hathaway ■!).
Ellsbree, 54 id., 498. And as to erroneous listing in general, see Commercial
Bank v. Woodside, 14 Penn. St., 404; Stewart v. Trevor, 56 id., 374. Lands
assessed as seated cannot be transferred to the unseated list without notice to
Lorimer v. McCall, 4 W. & S., 133 ; Milliken v.
the owner where practicable.
Benedict, 8 Penn. St., 169; Commercial Bank, a. Woodside, 14 id., 404; Stewart V. Trevor, 56 id., 374 ; Bechdle ®. Lingle, 66 id., 38. But if a parcel has
Beohdie ®.
been on no list for several years, the owner has no such right.
Laird v.
it
in
case
of
abandonment.
seems,
Lingle, supra. Nor generally,
Hiestcr, 24 Penn. St., 453.'
* See

Messenger

v.

Germain,

1

Gilm.,

631 : Green v. Craft, 28 Miss., 70 ;

Ray-
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There has been the

of resident lands.

Assessment
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same

strictness of ruling under statutes which require the assessment
of resident or seated property to be made to the owner personally,
or to the occupant.^ Such an assessment is intended to establish
liabilitj-, and it is very manifest that assessors can have
no power to charge one class of persons, when the statute specifies a
a personal

Thus if the statute says the owndifferent class for the purpose.
ers shall be assessed, the assessors cannot lawfully charge occupants who are not owners,^ though if the statute only requires the
nor

V.

Lee, 20 Mich., 384

assessed

;

Milwaukee Iron Co.

v.

Hubbard,

29

Wis.,

51, 56 ;

Where the law requires the land to be
to the patentee when the owner is unknown, any other assessment

Wasliington
is invalid.

v.

Pratt,

Yeuda

8

Wheat., 081.

v. Wheeler,

9

Texas, 408.

of nonresident lands the name of a former owner,
held immaterial.
Alvord v. Collin, 20 Pick., 418. See Miller v. Hale, 36
Penn. St., 432 ; Philadelphia v. Miller, 49 id., 440; O'Grady v. Barnhisel, 23
Cal., 287 ; O'Neal v. Virginia, etc., Co., 18 Md., 1. If one is owner when proceedings are commenced, an assessment to him is not rendered invalid by a
change in ownership, before they are confirmed, of whicli the assessors have
no notice. Morange v. Mix, 44 N. Y., 315.
Putting

'

It

to an assessment

assessed unless the statute requires it.
Thompson v.
How., 422; Witherspoou v. Duncan, 4 Wall., 210, 219. The
rule has been applied with great strictness in Wisconsin in holding that an
assessment of the wife's separate estate to the husband, he living with her
was void under
statute requiring lands to bo assessed to the owner
upou
or occupant.
Hamilton v. Pond du Lac, 25 Wis., 496. Listing of land belonging to an estate to " widow and heirs," of the deceased person, held suflisting to the widow
ficient.
Wheeler v. Anthony, 10 Wend., 346. But
Munf., 419. A listing to " estate
alone was held void in Yancey v. Hopkins,
of J. B. Coles," held good. State «. Jersey City, 24 N. J., 108. Compare Cruger V. Dougherty, 43 N. Y., 107.
They have statute in Arkansas that " no sale of any lands or town lots for
the i^ayment of taxes shall be considered invalid on account of its having been
charged on the tax book in any other name than that of the rightful owner, if
such land be in other respects sufliciently described in the tax book, and the
taxes for which the same
sold be due and unpaid at the time of such sale."
This statute enforced in Mei-riok v. Hutt, 15 Ark., 331. And see Kinsworthy
V. Mitchell, 21 id., 145; Garabaldi v. Jenkins, 27 id., 453, 456.
Compare the
Missouri cases of Abbott v. Lindenbower, 42 Mo., 162;
C.,46 id., 291;
Hume V. Wainscott, 46 id., 145. Mistakes in names, not calculated to mislead
will not vitiate. Van Voorhis v. Budd, 39 Barb., 479 Pierce v. Richardson,
37 N. H., 306.
need not be

so

22

;

S.

is

a

1

a

a

it,

Carroll's Lessee,

a

3

^

Mass., 419. But the assessment of the lands of
Mansfield i). Martin,
company to one member who was in possession as* agent was held sufl3cient,
"
"
and the addition of agent to his name treated as surplusage.
Wells v. Bat-
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in the names of the owners respectively, ifhnoicv,
if they omit the name in the list, or set down the lands as belonging to persons unknown, the presumption that they performed
assessors to list

their duty in endeavoring to ascertain the owner may support the
assessment, until evidence that the officers did know the owner
overcomes

this presumption.^

Separate tracts to be separately assessed. It is also generally made a requirement that separate and distinct parcels of land
shall be assessed separately.
This is certainly essential where the
lands are resident or seated, and owned by different persons, each
of whom has a right to know exactly what demand the government makes upon him.^
And a failure to do this is not a mere
"omission, defect or irregularity," which can be overlooked, under
a statute which provides that assessments for taxation shall be
valid " notwithstanding any omission, defect or irregularity " in
; Knox i>. HuideWis., 537; Cardigan «. Page, 6 N. H., 182; Ainsworth c. Dean, 21
id., 400; Kelsey «. Abbott, 13.Cal., 609; Abbott v. Lindenbower, 43 Mc, 162;
S. C, 46 id., 391 ; Hume tj. Wainscott, 46 id., 145 ; Johnson v. Mclntire, 1 Bibb,

telle,

koper,

11

Mass., 477. See further, Coombs ». Warren, 34 Me., 89

21

295.
'

Blackwell on Tax Titles, 145, citing Cardigan v. Page, 6 N. H., 183 ; Smith
V. Messer, 17 id., 430; Nelson ii. Pierce, 6 id., 194; Ainsworth «. Dean, 21 id.,
400; Brown v. Veazie, 25 Me., 359; Merritt v. Thompson, 13 111., 716; Shimmin V. Inman, 26 Me., 228 ; Jaquith v. Putney, 48 N". H., 138.
The statute provided that the assessment should show " the owner of each
lot or portion of a lot (if known to the superintendent), if unknown, the word
'
Held, that
unknown ' shall be written opposite the number of the lot," etc.
when the assessment was returned with the word " unknown " thus placed,
" it amounted to an ofBcial certificate, by the proper ofBcer, that in point of
fact the owner of the particular lot designated was unknown to him," and
this was conclusive of the fact certified, and could not be collaterally called
in question in an action brought to recover the tax. Chambers «. Satterlee,
40 Cal., 497, 518, per Wallace,

J.

The assessment to S. M. Whipple of property belonging 1o S. B. Whipple,
held void. People v. Whipple, 47 Cal., 591. That where laud required to be
assessed to the owner is assessed to another, the proceedings are void, see
Dunn B. Winston, 31 Miss., 135; Abbotts. Lindenbower, 42 Mo., 163; Hume
V. Wainscott, 46 id., 145; People v. Castro, 39 Cal., 65; Himmelmanu. Steiner,
38 id., 175; Bidleman tj. Brooks, 28 id., 72; Kelsey «. Abbott, 13 id., 609;
Yenda

v. Wheeler,

cago, 48

Iowa,

111., 130;

135 ;

9

Texas, 408.

Blake, 36 Me., 433; State ». Williston,
People ■». Shimmins, 42 Cal., 131
Ware v. Thompson, 29 id., 65.

= Barker v.

20
;

Wis., 328; Eoby». Chi-

Boardman

v. Bourne,

30
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The like separate assessment is also essential

the proceedings.^

in other cases if the statute requires it.

If

ciently manifest.

separate parcels

The reasons are suffi-

of land belonging to diflier-

presumably of different values, can be
assessed together, neither of the owners has any means of determining the amount of tax which is properly chargeable to his
property, and consequently no means of discharging his own land
ent

individ.uals,

and

from the lien, and of protecting his title, except by paying the
■whole
of a demand some undefined and unde^lnable portion of
which is neither in equity nor in law a proper charge against him.^
Nay, when the two parcels are owned by the same person, if the
statute requires a separate

assessment, obedience

to the require-

ment is essential to the validity of the proceedings.
It cannot be
held in any case that it is unimportant to the tax payer whether
this requirement is complied with or not.
Indeed it is made
solely for his benefit; it being wholly immaterial, so far as the
interest of the state is concerned, whether separate estates are or
are not separately assessed.
And where .a requirement has for its
sole object the benefit

of the tax payer, the necessity for a com-

pliance with it cannot be made to depend upon the circumstances
of a particular case, and the opinion of a court or jury regarding
the importance of obedience to it in that instance.
That method
of construing statutes would abolish all certainty.^
Fond du Lac, 25 Wis., 490. Compare Stewart v. Slioenfelt, 13
Mitcliell, 1 W. & S., 310; Mitcliell v. Brattou, 5 id.,
S.
451 ; Russell v. Werntz, 24 Penn. St., 387; Miller v. Hale, 26 id., 432; McReynolds V. Lougenberger, 57 id., 13; Dietrich ». Mason, id., 40; Rogers «. John'

Hamilton

&R.,

son,

67

v.

3G0; Bratton J).

id., 43; Sargeant

».

Bean,

7

Gray, 125.

5 See

Shimmin v. luman, 26 Me., 238 ; Baker v. Blake, 36 id., 433 ; Hayden
V. Foster, 13 Pick., 492; Jennings v. Collins, 99 Mass., 29 ; Crane v. Janesville,
20 Wis., 305; Orton «. Noonan, 25 id., 673, 677; Siegel d. Outagamie Co., 36
id., 70; Willey v. Scoville's Lessee, 9 Ohio, 44; Douglass d. Dangerfield, 10
id., 152, 156 ; Cooley i>. Waterman, 16 Mich., 466 ; Hanscom v. Hinman, 30 id.,
419; McLaughlin v. Kain, 45 Penn. St., 113; Dunn ». Winston, 31 Miss., 135;

Terrill

«.

= See

Groves,

18

Cal., 149.

Ins. Co. v. Yard, 17 Penn. St., 331, 338; French v. Edwards, 13 Wall.,
Walker v. Chapman, 22 Ala., X16; Martin v. Cole, 38 Iowa, 141, 1.53;
Sandwich i). Fish, 2 Gray, 298, 301. But the grouping of two or more parcels
owned by the same person was held in Russell v. WerntZ) 24 Penn, St., 337, to
he only an irregularity, and therefore cured under a statute which provided
that " no irregularity in the assessment, or in the process or otherwise, shall
506, 511;
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Assessors are sometimes

em-

bouse

so

occupied,

a

a

it,

barrassed by the necessity for determining what is to be regarded
" A
a separate parcel for the purposes of taxation.
dwelling
bouse with the land and appurtenances occupied with
warefarm or other parcel of real estate let to the

same tenant by one and

the same lease, parcels detached

each other, and used and occupied for different purposes,

from

may re-

spectively be regarded as separate and distinct estates. When
this can be done, they must be deemed to be separate and distinct
estates, to be distinctly valued and assessed."-'

But in the

case

of

unimproved lands, the general understanding appears to be, that
an assessment as one parcel of that which

owner

as such

was purchased by the

it

is

it

is

parcel,^

contained four distinct eighty acre lots.
still owned as one
on the assumption that the whole
or at least that
not known to the assessors to have

it

This

is

been held good, though

section has
'^

of the whole south half of

Thus, an assessment

a

is

though by the government survey
was subdivided, for the purpose of being offered for sale, into
several parcels, each of which might have been sold separately.
sufficient,

to the un-

8

ment of unseated land on the seated list, and then transferring
Millilien v. Benedict,
Penn. St., 169.
seated -without notice.

it

be construed or taken to aflfect the title of the purchaser, but the same shall
be declared to be good and legal." But this -would not validate the assess-

^SJiMW, Ch.

J., Hayden

v.

Foster,

13

Pick.,

492, 497.

«.

Hinman,

2

'

Gilm., 437, 443. And see Spellman v. Curtenius, 12
the two halves of a half section -were separately described, but
The assessment and sale of -whole section together -was
assessed together.
good deal of discussion,
sustained in Martin «. Cole, 38 Iowa, 141. There
Atkins

to be regarded as

a

in this case as to what
of assessment and sale.

is

a

is

a

111., 409, -n-here

separate parcel for the purposes

In Jennings

;

if

a

a

a

a

a

2

v. Collins, 09 Mass., 29, 31, several lots were assessed together
part of them only.
Wells, J., says " If
Packard,
who was owner of
to one
the lots had all been the property of Packard at the time the tax was laid, the
mere fact that he had divided the land into small lots for the purposes of sale,
separate valuation of each lot. But
would not require the assessors to make
where lands are separated, either by the use or purpose to which tliey are devoted, or by the mode of their occupation, or are disconnected in location,
lien upon each
tax laid generally upon an entire valuation cannot be made
the same perare
all
and
when
owned
they
occupied
even
by
separate parcel,
are
in
the
decisions
that
blocks
of
land
city may be asIn California
son."
they have been subdisessed by blocks when assessed to the owner, even
vided into lots. People v. Culverwell, 44 Cal., 620 People v. Morse, 43 id., 534.

LAW OF TAXATION,

282
been divided by sale.'

[CH.

XII.

But an assessment which divides such

a

parcel into the lowest legal subdivisions can not prejudice the
owner where the land is unoccupied and unimproved,^ and would

water power, it has
been held, cannot be taxed independently of the land on which
the power is obtained,' and the authorities in general are imperative in holding that an unauthorized division of a tract in the
seem to be unobjectionable.

Unimproved

assessment, which tract has no known legal subdivisions, is as fatal
as an

unauthorized grouping of distinct parcels would

Description.

In listing

the land,

be.^

it must be described with

particularity sufficient to afiord the owner the means of identification, and not to mislead him.' A description that would be suffi-

It

is proper to assess partnership

vidual partners.
'

Hubbard

lauds to the partnership,

■».Winsor, 15

Mich.,

instead of the indi-

146.

It

is usual to provide by statute for the case of lands where diflEerent persons claim distinct interests in different portions; allowing each to pay the tax
on any portion he will distinctly define; the amount being ascertained by the

proportion in quantity which that tax bears
' See Jennings v. Collins, 99 Mass., 39, 31.

to the whole.

If

two town lots are occupied and
used as one lot, the buildings thereon being partly on each, they may be sold
for taxes together as one lot, their use and nature determining that they are to
be regarded as one lot. Weaver v. Grant, Sup. Ct. Iowa, 8 Western .Jurist, 587.

' Boston Manuf. Co.

v. Newton, 23 Pick., 33. It was held in Stein v. Mobile,
Ala., 234, that where one holds real estate within a city, and in connection
thei'ewith an exclusive right to supply the city with water, this intangible right
17

is subject to valuation and taxation like tangible property.

In Brown v. Hays, 66 id., 229, it apFinney, 73 Penn. St., 467.
peared that warrant No. 4033 containing 1036 acres, all but 16 of which was
in Polk township, was assessed in Polk by the number, and the taxes paid for
several years. Afterwards it was assessed by number in Polk as 720 acres,
< Beading v.

and the remaining 300 acres in the other township. The owner paid the taxes
in Polk, and the remainder was sold. Held, that the payment by the number
of the warrant was payment in full, and the sale of the 300 acres was wholly
void. The assessor had no right to divide the tract in Polk into two parcels
when not divided by the owner ; and the assessment with a wrong specification
of quantity would not be notice to the owner that the remainder was assessed

And see Willistont). Colkett, 9 Penn. St., 38, where an assessment
of a tract as 200 acres was held good, though it contained 600; the remainder
of the description sufficiently identifying it.
elsewhere.

Blackwell, in his Treatise on Tax Titles, p. ]24, says: "A description
certain to convey land between man and man which, if contained
in an agreement to convey, would authorize a court of equity to decree a specific execution, will not answer in the proceedings to enforce collection of a
6 Mr.

sufficiently
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individuals would generally be
nevertheless, possible for cases to arise in

It

which such

a

sufficient here.

criterion would be an unsafe

particular
errors of description occur, they may well

be rejected and the deed sustained

if,

if

deed which one executes for the purpose of conveying

description of land,

In

one to apply.

a

conveyance between

a

after rejecting them,

suffi-

a

cient in
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a

;

cient description remains to identify the land intended
the erroneous circumstances which were added could not have misled the party conveying, who, all the time, had in mind particular
because

a

But the same
parcel which the erroneous particulars did not fit.
errors in
description prepared by another, might very likely

a

If

is

tax. In the case of private transactions, tlie courts, in construing tlie document, endeavor to collect the intention of the parties, and give that intention
latent ambiguity exists in the description, parol evidence
effect.
re-

a

;

is

it,

sorted to for the purpose of explaining
and giving to the intention of the
parties complete oj)eration and where the estate to be conveyed
sutEciently
circumstance, false
described in the deed, or other writing, the addition of
or mistaken,
into effect.

will be rejected as
In tax proceedings

surplusage, in order to carry that intention
the owner of the estate has nothing to do —

If

a

a

is

he intends nothing; the government
acting, through its agents, in hostility
view of enforcing the collection of tax from him.
tlie
to him, and with

a

is

officers undertake to list for him lands lying in one place for those which lie
in another, or have no existence at all, they intend to do what the law, under
laid down that listwhich they profess to act, does not permit. The rule

;

a

a

a

is

is

it

a

is

a

it

ing is fatally defective and void, if contain such falsity in the designation
or description of the land listed as might probably mislead the owner, and
to be sold or
prevent him from ascertaining by the notices that his land
mistake or falsity defeats one of the obvious and just
Such
redeemed.
purposes of the law) — that of giving the owner an opportunity of preventing
the sale by paying the tax." With deference
may be suggested that quite
sometimes attached to the idea that "the government,
too much importance
acting in hostility to " the tax payer, " and with
through its agents,
view
the
collection
of
tax
from
him." The proceedings in the
to enforcing
tax, are not, in any proper sense, hostile to the citizen
assessment of
they
are, on the other hand, proceedings

necessary and indispensable

to the deter-

a

a

mination of the exact share which each resident, or property owner, ought to
take, and may and ought to be supposed desirous of taking in meeting the
revenue; — proceedings which the willingness of the
public necessity for
with, and which only become hostile when the
dispense
cannot
tax payer
fails
to be performed by payment.
duty to pay, once fixed,
Then, and then
only, do the steps taken by the government assume compulsory form; until
is

that government and taxpayer will act
presumption
together in harmony, and that the latter will meet his obligation to pay as
soon as the former has performed its duty in determining the share to be paid.
then the reasonable
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mislead the owner who would be informed of no error, and who
must, from the description alone, discover what land was intended.
The same may be said of any imperfection in the description ; the
owner, if it has been prepared by himself, will read it in connection with his own knowledge of those surrounding circumstances,
ill the light of which he has framed it; but an equally imperfect
by another and unaccompanied by any such
circumstances, would fail to convey to his mind any idea that his
own land was intended.
It certainly would be much less likely
to do so than where he had prepared it himself.
description,

prepared

The purposes in describing the land are, first, that the owrner
may have information of the claim made upon him or his property''; second, that the public, in case the tax is not paid, may
be notified what land is to be offered for sale for the nonpayment

;

and third, that the purchaser may be enabled to obtain a sufficient
conveyance.

If

it will ordinarily

the description is sufficient for the first purpose,
be sufficient for the others

Several at-

also.

tempts have been made to lay down some general rule as to what

" Nois sufficient, and what not, for a description in the listing.
tice," it is well said, "or at least the means of knowledge, is an
essential element of every just proceeding which affects rights of

But how can the duty of the payment

persons or of property.

?

it,

of taxes be performed without the identity'- of the subject matter
of the duty being made known to him who is to perform
A thing, whether land or chattel, to be
by name or description
the subject of legal action, must be proceeded
or by description,

but

by name

it

is

has
descriptive only because
become associated with the person or thing named.
A name,
therefore, which has never become connected in any manner with
a

name

against

a

a

;

a

is

any title or possession of land, clearly infers no means of its identification. So the mathematical contents expressed in figures
mark of identity peculiar to the land but like common
not
noun, has no immediate or cognate relation to
particular tract.

*

*

is

a

is

is

;

is

said to be
matter for the jury.
Identity
Certainly this
but from its very nature, the fact of identity
dependent
on circumstances which attach themselves to the land.
It beso

answers to the circumstances of descrip-

tion, we are able to identify it.

The evidence of identity

record which contains the description and fixes the dutj-.

is

cause the thing described

the

As-
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is,

from its legal requirement, and the necessity of prewritten entry, and must depend upon the
serving its evidence,
records of the commissioner's office, and not upon parol testia

sessment

whole

is,

".

:

is

it

^

And after an
mony, or the private duplicate of the assessor."
examination of cases decided,
added
The result of the
wholly fails to lead to identi-

that where the assessment

is

is

^

is

fication, so that neither the owner nor the officer can tell that his
land
taxed, the duty of payment cannot be performed, and the
assessment
void."
The rule thus given
quite as liberal in

is

is

it

is

if

a

a

is

it

support of imperfect or inaccurate descriptions as would be applied to conveyances inter paries.
In another case in the same
state,
said sale " will pass the title, although assessed in
wrong name or by a wrong number,
otherwise designated and
the recognized princapable of identification. The reason for this
the land, and not the owner, which
ciple, that
chargeable,

and to be charged with the tax. It must, however, be susceptible of identification as the land assessed, otherwise the sale would
a

;

a

void."

^

But identification may possibly be made out to the
satisfaction of
jury by
description that would be extremely
likely to mislead the owner himself the jury having their attenbe

tion called to the errors or defects which exist, and the owner not

;

4

;

1

a

8

6

;

3

;

4

;

2

9

6

S.

upon

4

'

v. Miller, 49 Penn. St., 440,448, per Agnew, J., citing and comC, W. & S., 133
McCall v. Lorrimer,
"Watts, 351, 355
W. & S., 475; Stewart v. Shoenfelt, 13 S. & R, 360; LuffDunn V. Belyea,
liorougli V. Parker, 16 id., 351; Morton ii. Harris, Watts, 319, 325; Hubley v.
P. & Watts, 496 Strauch d. Shoemaker,
W. & S., 166: Burns «.
Ke3-sei-,
McKeelian,
W. & S., 238 Russel ».Werntz, 24
Lyon, Watts. 363 Harper v.
Penn. St., 337; Laird «. Heister, id., 452; Miller ». Hale, 26 id,, 432; Cooper
W. & S., 520; Dunden
Watts, 162, 165; Thompson v. Pisher,
V. Brockway,
These cases
«. Snodgrass, 18 Penn. St., 151; Woodside v. Wilson, 32 id., 52.
great variety of descriptions, some of which are held sufficient,
pass upon

Philadelpliia

menting

and some are not.
v.

;

2

Miller, 49 Penn. St., 440, 455 Harris v. Tyson, 24 id., 347.
the return of the tract by the assesGilbert, 58 id., 266. It
Brown v. Hayes, 66
sors which fixes its identity and liability to taxation.
made
however,
provision
some
states,
by law for a corIn
229.
St.,
Penn.
the
board.
descriptions
by
the
county
rection of
Philadelphia

is

is

See also Glass v.

assessed,

as preceding

cases show.

it

it

5

Thompson, J., in Woodside v. Wilson, 32 Penn. St., fi2, 54. This statement
would, of course, be inapplicable to the case of an assessment of resident
must be so
to be assessed to the owner,
land.
When the law requires
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being aware that there are any, but having a right to assume, until
notified to the contrary, that all descriptions in the list have
accurate application to some particular pieces of property, and fit

A more satisfactory
"
the designation of the land will be
rule would seem to be that
sufficient if it afford the means of identification, and do not posi' or be calculated to mislead him.'
tively mislead the owner,"
It is thus expressed in a New York case : " An assessment of
nonresident land is fatally defective and void if it contain such a
some others when not appearing to fit his.

falsityin the designation or description of the parcel

assessed,

as

might probably mislead the owner and prevent him from ascertaining by the notices that his land was to be sold or redeemed.
mistake or falsity defeats one of the obvious and just purposes of the statute — that of giving to the owner an opportunity
of preventing the sale by paying the tax."^ Under this rule
Such

a

each case must depend so much upon its own special

facts that

little service could be done by giving the decided eases in detail
here.
'

'

Several are given in the note, and others are referred

Thompson,

J., in

Woodside

».

Wilson,

to.*

33 Penn. St., 52, 55.

Curtis v. Supervisors of Brown County, 22 "Wis., 167, in wliicli it is
tliat a description sutHcient as between parties will be sufficient always in an assessment, or that particulars in it wliicli are erroneous can be
To the same point is Dike o. Lewis, 4 Denio, 237;
rejected as surplusage.
See

denied

Ortoa v. Noouan, 23 Wis., 102, in which it is said words cannot be supplied by intendment.
It is to be observed of this case, however, that the
words it was proposed to supply would have wholly changed the apparent
see also

meaning.

J., in Tallman v. White, 2 N. Y., 66, 71. See also LaflFerty v. ByOhio, 458; Turney u. Yeoman, 16 id., 24; Parnum v. Buffum, 4 Cush.,
260: Amberg •<;.Rogers, 9 Mich., 332; Green k. Lunt, 58 Me., 15; States.
Union, 36 N. J.,309. In Hill «. Mowry, 6 Gray, 551, the rule is laid down
that a lax deed, taking effect only as the execution of a statute power, should
be construed with some strictness, so as to enable the grantee to identify the
^Buggies,

ers, 5

land, and to enable the owner to redeem it. And it was held that a deed
which bounds the laud correctly on two sides, bounds it on the third by land
on which in fact it is bounded in part only, and on the fourth by land from
which it is separated by the land of a third person, is void for uncertainty.
the only description was " William Bush's heirs, 2560 acres," held
Bush s. Williams, Cooke (Tenn.), 274. So where the description
insufficient.
was " Moses Buffum, house and land," Buffum not being the occupant.
< Where

Farnum

v.

Buffum, 4 Cush., 260.

So where the description

Compare Coombs v. Warren, 34 Me., 89.
is part of a lot without showing how much, or giv-

CH.

THE ASSESSMENT

XII.]

OF

PEOPERTY FOR TAXJiTION.

287

Taluation.

Where the grouping of lands for assessment is
inadmissible, the valuation of several parcels in gross is equally

No valuable purpose could be subserved by separate descriptions if the parcels, though separately described, were to be
grouped in valuation. ^
so.

ing boundaries.
Detroit Young Men's Society v. Detroit, 3 Mich., 172;
Massie
v. Long, 3 Oliio, 337, 289 ; Green v. Lunt, 58 Me., 518.
But
as "tliat part of private claim 61, lying east of the nortli
of the river Ecorse," in a township named, is sufficient.
Gilman 1). Riopelle, 18 Mich., 145. Error in stating the quantitj-- of the land,
however great, will not vitiate.
Brown v. Hays, 66 Penn. St., 229 ; Williston
ti. Colkett,
9 id., 38; Gilman d. Riopelle, 18 Mich., 145.
Omission of the
number of a town lot, or the name of the owner, is fatal where the law requires them to be given. Thacher ex parte, S Snend, 344. Description in the
notice of tax sale, as " Tract No. 8, S. D., advertised, 4197," hold wholly insufficient.
Griffin e. Crippen, 60 Me., 270. Compare Glass v. Gilbert, 58 Penn.
St., 366, 290. An assessment as definite as the grant under which the land is
held, is sufficient.
People d. Crockett, 33 Cal., 150. A description, " one
hundred varas square," with definite boundaries on three sides, is sufficient.
Garwood v. Hastings, 38 Cal., 216. An assessment of a large tract of land,
which describes it by metes and bounds, and then excepts from the tract parcels of the same which have been previously conveyed, but does not describe
the excepted portions by metes and bounds, nor in any manner but by a reference to recorded deeds, is «)ot'(Z on its face. People u. Cone, 48 Cal., 427;
People V. Hyde, id., 431 ; see also People v. Hancock, id., 631. A description
of the land by well understood abbreviations is sufficient, thus: " E. J^, s. w.
Sibley v. Smith, 3 Mioh., 486,
}^, sec. 24, town 3 south, of range 7 west," etc.
503 ; see also Long v. Long, 2 Blackf , 293 ; Jordan, etc.. Association, etc., v.
Wagoner, 33 Ind., 50; Atkins v. Hinman, 3 Gilm., 437; Olcott c. State, 5 id.,
481; Blakely «. Bestor, 13 111., 714; Stevens «. Hollister, 18Vt., 294; Goodell
Further, as to what is a sufficient description, the
V. Harrison, 2 Mo., 124.
Ronkendorf v. Taylor, 4 Pet., 319; Lafferty's
are
instructive.
following cases
Lessee v. Byers, 5 Ohio, 458 ; Trevor v. Emerick, 6 id., 391 ; Larrabee «. Hodgkins, 58 Me., 412; Griffin v. Crippin, 60 id., 370; Orono i). Veazie, 61 id., 431 ;
Currie ii. Fowler, 5 J. J. Marsh, 145 ; Le Fever i). Detroit, 3 Mich., 586 ; "Wright
V. Dunham, 13 id., 414; Atwell v. Zeluff, 36 id., 118, 131; Jaques v. Kopman,
v. Fonbene, 15 id., 15; Latchman v. Clark, 14 Cal.,
6 La. An., 543; Woolfolk
131; High ». Shoemaker, 33 id., 363; Bosworth i). Danzien, 35 id., 396; People V. Flint, 39 id., 670; Ainsworth v. Dean, 31 N. H., 400; Bidwell i). Webb,
10 Minn., 59; Bidwell v. Coleman, 11 id., 78; St. Peters Church ». Scott County, 13 id., 395; Shaw i). Orr, 30 Iowa, 353. A falsity in the description which
might mislead, runs through and invalidates all the subsequent proceedings.
a description,

branch

Yenda
'

v. Wheeler,

People

1).

9

Mining

Texas, 408.
Co., 39 Cal., 511

;

People

v.

Hollister,

47 id., 408.

In

this last case there was a separate valuation of each parcel in the column with
" Value," it is
the descriptions, but not carried into the appropriate column.
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is elsewhere shown ^ that valuation is in its nature a Judicial
act, and the assessors in making it are entitled to the customary
protection which the law accords to officers exercising corresponding judicial functions. The party injured by their errors, committed without fraud or malice, has in general only such remedy
as the statute may afford him.
And in no proceeding is one to
be heard who complains of a valuation which, however erroneous,
charges him only with a just proportion of the tax.
assessment is not out of proportion, as compared

generally on the same roll,
bor is

assessed

If

his own

with valuations

it is immaterial that some one neigh-

little and another too much.'

too

The legislature cannot make the valuations of property for taxation.'

The nearest approach to the exercise of such an authority
by the legislature is where it definitely fixes the basis for a local
But in such cases the
assessment, by the acre, by frontage, etc.
considerations which affect benefits are matters, of notoriety, and
may well be taken notice of by the legislative body when prescribing a rule which, at least in the particular case, is to operate

In a majority of the states the
generally and with uniformity.
rule prescribed by the statutes is that lands and other real estate
shall be valued as such, irrespective of the separate estates that individuals may have in them.

Under such

a practice, he who,

time being, enjoys the possession of the real estate,

for the

and the per-

nancy of the profits may be charged with the tax.* The practice, however, has not been universal ; in some states, and partiosaid, " can ooly be cletei-mined by the ordinary selling and buying prices, for
cash, at the time."
Caruihers, J., in Brown v. Greer, 3 Head, 695, 697. This
is a criterion which, it is safe to say, is very seldom applied.
'See Chapter

XXIV.

v. County Commissioners,
'^Chicopee
16
Gray, 38. As to actual value,
and how it is to be got at, see State v. Ferris, 23 N. J., 546 ; State v. Kandolph,
25 id., 437; Oswego Starch Factory v. Dolloway, 21 N. Y., 449; People v. Dolan, 36 id., 59, 62; People v. Ferguson, 38 id., 89; People v. Barker, 48 id., 70.
3

Hastings, 29 Cal.,449.
Of course the assessment is fatally delacks the valuation.
Garwood v. Hastings, 38 id., 216. As to the
valuation of railroad property, see State v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 27 111., 64.
People

fective

«.

if it

■<
Turner

Smith,

Wall.,

553; Atkins v. Hinman, 2 Gilm., 437, 449;
Gray, 185; WiOard v. Blonnt, 11 Ired., 624; Brown v.
Parker v. Braxton,
Austin, 41 Vt., 262 ; Merrick v. Hutt, 15 Ark., 331 ; Briscoe v. Coulter, 18 Ark.,
423 ; Blackwell on Tax Titles, ch. 38 and notes.
i).

2

14
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have required
separate interests to be separately assessed.' When the whole is assessed as an entirety, provision is usually made under which the
respective owners may pay their proportions of the tax, and have
their respective interests discharged of the lien.^

Authentication

proceedings,

the statutes

of the assessment.

The result of the action
of the assessors is embodied in an assessment roll or list. The
statutes provide how this shall be authenticated,

and compliance

with their provisions is essential.^
The methods are different in
the different states, and are sometimes changed in the same state.
But the rule of law is clear. Where the law required the roll to
' Separate
interests

in Pennsylvania assessed and sold separatelj'. See McLaughlin ■».Kain, 45 Penn. St., 113. As to Mississippi, see Dunn v. Winston,
31 Miss., 135.
As to Kentucky, see Oldhams v. Jones, 5 B. Monr., 464. In
the case of special assessments it has been more usual to assess distinct interests separately, sometimes, however, providing for a sale of the fee.
See Jackson V. Babcock, 16 N. Y., 246 ; Matter of De Graw St., 18 Wend., 5G8.
And
see further Williams v. Brace, 5 Conn., 190.
The case of Jackson v. Babcock,
16 N. Y., 246, was this:
The statute provided for proceedings in court under which, in street opening cases, where there were distinct interests in lands
which were subject to a lien for the assessment, one owner of an interest
might proceed in the supreme court against all the others, including unknown
owners, for an equitable apportionment of the assessment, and after advertising for the appearance of the unknown owners, obtain an order for an absolute sale of the fee ; the proceeds to be applied, so far as necessary, to the disThis statute was held to be valid, and effectual to
charge of the assessment.
cut off all contingent as well as vested rights.
are some cases in which it has been held that the omission of the
dollar mark as a prefix to the figures which represent the value of the property in the assessment roll will render the assessment nugatory; there being
Branothing in its absence by which to determine what the figures indicate.
Union,
81
And
id.,
».
132.
see
Seaman,
People
30
610;
Cal.,
Savings
«.
ley
has
been
held
in
171.
The
New
contrary
People V. Empire, etc. Co., 38 id.,
Hampshire. Cahoon v. Coe, 53 N. H., 518, 524. And see State v. Eureka, etc.,
Co., 8 Nev., 15; Chickering ». Faile, 38 111., 342; Elston «. Kennicott, 46 id.,
In Illinois it is decided that a judgment for taxes in which the sums
187, 202.
are expre.ssed in figures without a dollar mark prefixed, is void for want of
Lawrence v. Fast, 20 111., 338 ; Lane ». Bommelmann, 21 id., 143 ;
certainty.
Epinger v. Kirby, 23 id., 521, 533; Dukes v. Kowley, 24 id., 210; Chickering b.
Faile, 38 id., 343; Cook i,. Norton, 43 id., 391; Potwin v. Oudes, 45 id., 366;
Elston V. Kennicott, 46 id., 187 ; Pittsburg, etc., R. K. Co. v. Chicago, 53 id., 80.
These decisions were followed in Woods v. Freeman, 1 Wall., 398; and Ran^ There

dolph

V.

Metcalf,

3 Warner v.

6

Cold., 400, 408.

Grand Haven,

19

30

Mich.,

34.
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tbe signing of tbe cer-

be signed, and a certificate to be attacbed,

tificate was held not to dispense with a signing of the roll, and if
that was not signed, no proceedings could be taken upon it.'
Where the statute required the assessors to certify that they had
value, according to the best of
certificate that they had assessed it
"
declared

assessed the property at its true

their knowledge and belief, a
"
was
void.^
according to the usual way of assesssing
The same was held of a certificate that the assessors had estimated
the real estate " at a sum which, for the
of the

assessment,

purposes

In

these cases the asses-

certificates

correspond to the

we believe to be the true value thereof."
sors had endeavored

to make the

^

it being notorious that whatever they may certify, they are
not in the practice of estimating property at its true value.
A
failure, however, to comply literally with a statutory form will
not vitiate if there is a substantial compliance.^
fact,

In

Equalization.

some states, when assessment rolls are com-

pleted and signed, they are subject to review by a higher authority, for the purpose of an equalization, in case the assessment of
one district is found to be relatively higher or lower than that of
Sibley v. Smith, 2 Mich., 486. The statute was afterwards changed. See
Lacy V. Davis, 4 Mich., 140. See further Colby v. llussel, 3 Greenl., 327; Foxcroft u. Nevens, 4 id., 72 ; Kclley v. Craig, 5 Ired., 129 ; Johnson v. Elwood, 53
A similar defect held a mere irregularity and cured as such
N. Y., 431,435.
by a statute that no irregularity should defeat the tax title. Townsen v. Wil'

son, 9 Peun. St., 370.
=

id.,

Van Rensselaer

».

Whitbeck,

5

Mich.,

7

N. Y.,

517 : compare

Parish

d.

Golden,

35

4G3.

' Clark
Foxcroft

Crane,

1).
D.

Nevens, 41d., 72;

151.

See

Johnsons

also Colby v. Russell,
Goodridge,

15

3

Greenl., 227;

Me., 39; Kelar

u. Sav-

age, 20 id., 199.

Y., 462; Buflalo, etc., E. R. Co. v. Supervisors of
Bradford v. Randall, 5 Pick., 496; People v. Mining Co.,
See Bangor ii. Lancey, 21 Me., 473.
39 Cal., 511.
In this case it appeared that
statute
required the list to have the official sanction of a majority of the asthe
sessors, evidenced by their signatures.
The original list was not signed, but
a supplementary list referring to it as containing the assessment for the year
was duly signed. Held sufficient.
As to what irregularities will defeat an assessment the following cases may- be consulted.
Willey v. Scoville's Lessees,
9 Ohio, 44; Shimmin «. Inman, 26 Me., 228; Smith v. Davis, 30 Cal., 536, cited
in Huntingdon v. Central Pacific R. B. Co., 2 Sawyer, 503. What will not
avoid : Gulf R. B. Co.. v. Morris, 7 Kansas, 310 ; Smith v. Leavenworth Co., 9
■"Parish

Erie,

48 N".

id., 296.

v.

Golden, 35 N.

Y.,

93;

,

XII. J

another

;
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if the general taxes were to be assessed upon

so that,

the district would pay more or less than its due proportion.^

it,

CH.

Thus,

a

is

town assessment rolls are equalized by county boards of supervisors or commissioners, and the aggregate of the county assessThis
not
ments by
state board, established for the purpose.
done

by changing individual assessments, but by fixing the agdistricts at what, in the opinion of

gregate sums for the several

the board, they should be, so that general taxes may be levied ac-

is

is

cording to this determination, instead of on the assessor's footThese boards act judicially in equalizing, and their deings.
cision
The boards are composed of popular repreconclusive.
sentatives, and they act upon their own judgment of what

They cannot release

strued.*

pressly empowered

a

is

a

a

But such board has
equal and just.^
special and limited jurisdiction, and any unauthorized action
void.' And their
powers, like those of all similar boards, are to be strictly contax, or its lien, when not ex-

to do so.'

As

'See Tweed
Gray, 51

4

«.

N. Y.,

Metcalf,

4

;

;

7

'

to the equalization and tlie necessity therefor, see County CommissionParker,
ers V.
Minn., 207; Tweed v. Metcalf,
Mich., 579; Tallmadge v. Supervisors of Kensselaer, 21 Barb., 611 State «. Allen, 43 111., 456 People ».
Nichols, 49 id., 517. The members of a state board of equalization are really
assessors, and, where all assessors are required to be elected by the people,
this board cannot be created by appointment.
Houghton c. Austin, 47 Cal.,
646; People v. Kaymond, 37 N. Y.,428.

Mich., 579; Case

ii. Dean, 16 id., 12;

Bellinger

v.

610.

State V. Central

R. R. Co.

v. "Washington County,

Pacific R. R. Co.,

9

etc.,

Nev., 79.

3

it

a

■<

5

Sioux City,

is

3

is

;

sSee State ». Allen, 43 111,456; Peoples. Nichols, 49 id., 517; Darlings.
Gunn, 50 id., 424 McKee v. Supervisors of Champaign, 53 id., 477. Thp.t the
valuation of assessors
conclusive on the county board, excei^t when the
Yeates, 465. In raisstatute otherwise provides, see Respublica v. Deaves,
sufficient if the board desiging or reducing the assessment of district,
Hubbard o. Winsor, 15 Mich., 146.
nate the percentage increase or reduction.
Neb., 30.

Where the board has au-

7

7

a

thority tJ equalize, and also to discharge assessments, they do not exhaust
State v. Ormsby
their authority by hearing and decision on equalization.
Nev., 392.
County Com'rs,
A board, having authority to equalize assessments as between townships,
cannot, of their own motion, increase an individual assessment above that reChicago Legal
McConkey o. Smith, Sup. Ct. 111.,
turned by the assessor.
News,

210.
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CHAPTEE

THE COLLECTOR'S "WARRANT.
Before the collector is authorized to proceed in the collection
of the taxes, he must have his warrant for the purpose, in due
This, in different states, may be the assessment
or
roll or list, with the tax extended upon
may be
dupliof
either
be
cate of the list with
these,
like extension, or
may
with
formal warrant attached, particularly indicating what are
his duties under

it,

a

it

a

a

it it,

form of law.

Whatever

and commanding their performance.-'

collector must have,
to compulsory action with-

if

he proceeds

case arising under

required that

statute which

a

Upon this point the decisions are numerous and uniform.

it.''

a

In

trespasser

a

out

a

and he

is

the statute provides for, in this regard, the

warrant

to the tax duplicate, the following remarks
"
collector of taxes to colThe authority of
have been made
his warrant.
but
meraoranduna of the
lect
The duplicate
to collect from the parties therein named respectively.

warrant, the collector becomes

a

Without

a

amount he

is

a

is

is

:

a

should be attached

trespasser as soon as

the issue of

warrant, and some per-

must conform to the law author-

no protection to

a

is

it,

it

by the proper person

it

izing
or

and be issued

There must

No question

collector."^

by law,

designated

is

and

a

law authorizing

son appointed to issue

it,

also be

a

he intermeddles with the property of the tax payer.

made any-

if

made out before the tax

voted.

Gale

v.

Mead,

4

void

is

The tax roll

Hill,

is

'

where of the correctness of this doctrine.
Whatever may be the requisites of the warrant under the statute,
care must be taken that they be observed.
One of the most im-

109.

^Blackwell

Hilbish

on Tax Titles, 168, and cases cited.

Homer,

ernor,

Dev., 365;

3

Wilkins,

St., 93,

3

58 Penn.

a

v.

6

;

Vt.,

97.

«.

Stephens

Kelly

v.

Craig,

5

^

id., 81.

citing Pearce «). Torrence,
Giant's
Penn. St., 360. And see Chalker v. Ives, 55
The same doctrine is declared under
difl'ereut law, in Slade v. Gov-

Cases, 83

Ired.,

139.

And

see

Brown

v.

Wright,

17
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If it is directed to one officer
portant of these is the direction.
when under the statute it should be to another, the process is fatally defective.^ It has been decided in Maine, under a statute
■which gives a

"in

form to be followed

substance,"

that the omis-

sion of that part of the form which directs the treasurer to levy
distress in default of payment renders the warrant nugatory, and
the treasurer may refuse to execute it.''' Bat variances in immateri-

will not vitiate

al matters
statute

Thus under the Maine

the warrant.

it is held that the omission in the warrant,

"

In

the name

the date

will not avoid it*

is

it

but if it

pensable part of the warrant,

is,

of the state of Maine," which is a part of the form, is immaterial.'
In Vermont the question is made whether the date is an indisheld that an error in

The decisions in the same state are

if

is

a

very liberal in holding that other accidental errors and defects
In Massachusetts where the statute
shall not vitiate the process.'
"
the assessors shall commit the tax list, with the
provides that
failure
warrant under their hands, to the collector for collection,"
immaterito attach -them,
both are delivered to the collector,

And in

al.^

the same state an error in the command

of the war-

rant, by which the collector was directed to arrest the person taxed

if

it

within twelve days, instead of fourteen, as
should have been,
after demand of the tax,
the same should not be paid, etc., will

In New York

acted upon.'

Penn. St., 360

;

Stephens v. Wilkins,

6

'

to arrest

is

not vitiate the warrant, nor become material,

Cannell

unless the direction

a warrant issued and
«.

Crawford County,

59

id.,

196.

'

it

Bachelder ». Thompson, 41 Me., 539. In Wilson v. Seavey, 38 Vt., 221,
was held that naming the collector's predecessor in the address of the warrant, instead of naming him, did not invalidate it.
3

^

Green]., 290. A constitutional provision that all proMussey «. White,
shall run " in the name of the people," etc., held not applicable to colMich., 579; Wisner v. Davenport,
Tweed ». Metcalf,
id.,
lector's warrant.

Birchard,

1

501; Curry

Goodwin

11

111.,

420; Scarritt

». Chapman, 11 id., 443;

States.

Weeks, 41 Vt., 590.

v.

Perkins,

39

Vt.,

598.

See Spear c. Braintree, 24 id., 414; Chand-

Spear, 22 id., 388.

Connecticut

v. Graves, 13

held that

Met., 85, citing

if the

warrant

King

ii.

Whitcomb,

1

Barnard

v. Graves, 13 Met., 85.

is

Barnard

is

«

V.

'

ler

V.

it

5

^Bellows

Ilimnan,
Wis., 457.
®.

5

4

a

cess

id., 338.

In

not attached to the list, and the of-
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signed by the supervisors as required by law, is good, though they
fail to add to their signatures the official title.^ An error in the

direction to the collector by which he is commanded to account
to the wrong officer is immaterial ; this being a matter that does
not concern the tax payers.' The same is true of a failure to limit
by the warrant the time within which the treasurer shall collect
the tax.^

Different rolls for different taxes.

It

is

not always the

practice to have one assessment and tax roll for the state' taxes

On the contrary, for what may
be called the general taxes of the municipality, it is customary to
provide that, when voted, they shall be certified to such state
and another for the local taxes.

or county officer or board as is authorized to issue the tax warrant
for state or county taxes, and by such officer or board shall be
spread upon the same roll or list, though in a separate column,
and be collected by authority of the same warrant.
The regulation
maybe the opposite of this ; that the state taxes shall be certified
to county or town officers, and by them spread upon the roll.
Such provisions do not give the state or county functionaries any
power to review, revise or set aside, the local action, but they
must levy what has been voted, and may be compelled to do so.'
ficer is commanded by liia warrant " to collect of the persons named in the
annexed list," etc., there is' nothing to which these words can apply; the
command in the warrant is nugatory, and he can take the property of no in-

dividual.

Picket

'

Sheldon

=

Clemens

'Walker

v.
».

v.

Allen,

10

Van Buskirk,
Lewis,

3G

3

Conn., 145.

N. T.,

Vt., 673.

473.

Compare Tweed v. Metcalf, 4 Mich., 579.

!

32 Vt., 769.
Such a warrant may be defective as between
and the public he acts for, but the defect does not invalidate any
action taken to collect the tax under it. Id. In Iowa it seems that the auv. W\d&v,

the collector

thority
Parker
■*

to sell lands comes from the statute and not from a tax warrant.

See

v. Sexton, 29 Iowa, 421 ; Rhodes v. Sexton, 33 id., 540.

Where the law gives

a

city full authority

the poor, etc., and requires the supervisors

for the support of
"
to
cause the same to be raised, asto vote money

and collected," the supervisors have no discretion to refuse on the
ground that funds for the like purposes have previously been misapplied. Ex
parte Common Council of Albany, 3 Cow., 358. Compare Williams «. School
District, 21 Pick., 75. Sometimes the auditing of accounts is made by law
sessed

equivalent to the vote of a tax.
195.

See

People

v. Supervisors

of Queens,

1

Hill,
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A

Belirery of the warrant.

provision of statute that the officer or board making out the warrant shall deliver it to the collector by a day named is only directory.'' But any such delay as

would leave the collector insufficient time for cumpulsory proceedings under the statute, would of course preclude their being taken.

Exhansting authority. The issue of a void tax warrant
would not exhaust the authority to issue a valid one. In some
states by statute, or by a customary
one

when

course of precedure,

valid process does not result in the collection of all the tax,

For personal

another may issue.^
suits are sometimes

taxes which remain uncollested

provided for, especially where the failure to
collect is in consequence of a removal of the party taxed from the
treasurer's jurisdiction.

A

Slending taxes.

is,

very common provision of statute, where
several taxes are to be spread upon the same roll
that they shall
be kept separate and placed

in distinct columns on the roll.

This

advises the tax payer of the nature of the several demands that
are made upon him, and enables him to pay or tender the amount
of any one the justice and legality of which he concedes, and to

A

enforced.^

it

if

is

if

decline to pay any other
unwarranted.
he considers
Such
not obeyed, the taxes cannot be
mandatory, and
provision
custom to blend them cannot make the roll valid.*

;

it

will
But separating the taxes when the statute does not require
not afEect the roll as this deprives no one of any right whatever.^

V.

Collins,

v. Crittenden,

20

16 id., 152.

Pick., 418; Hubbard v. Winsor, 15 Mich., 146; Smith
contra.
The case of Cardigan v. Page, X. H., 182,
is

Alvord

6

1

is

is is

ly

Excessive taxes. All statutes are mandatory which expressor by implication limit the amount of taxes which may be
levied. When these are exceeded by a sum which
spread upoa
in excess of
The
whole
void.
the
levy
the whole roll,
levy
the jurisdiction of the officers, and will be as deficient in the legal

Wilson, 43 Vt., 362. The warrant is sometimes extended or
Eddy
See Griswold «. School District,
renewed, under statutes providing therefor.
24 Mich., 263.
v. Stearns,

State v.

Faikinburge,

Pick., 482; Case
1-5

X. J.,

320

;

2

Thayer

1

*

See

^

v.

v.

Bean,

16

Mich.,

13.

Camden & Amboy R. K. Co.

v.

Hille-

gas, 18 id., 11.

'Wall

V.

Trumbull,

16

Mich.,

238:

compare Torrey c.

Milbuiy,

21

Pick.,

64.
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to make out a valid

cliarge, as

XIII.

if made without any

This would not defeat a separate tax placed
authority whatever.
in a separate column on the roll, but it would invalidate whatever
is blended with the excessive levy, and incapable of being separated.

Excess in

levy may happen from a sum which has been voted
for an unauthorized purpose being included with others that are
authorized, or from imposing more than is permitted for lawful purposes, or from the addition of unauthorized charges, or from
a

of the officers, by which either the aggregate is made too
In
large, or individuals are charged more than their proportion.
the latter case the individual taxes which were unjustly increased
errors

would alone be void

;

in the others the whole

levy.-*

Some

dis-

to save the taxes when the excess

position has been manifested

was comparatively insignificant, on

the maxim,

de

minimis

lex

" The authority to impose taxes, while it is an inlierent and essential power
of government, which is fully recognized in our constitution and conferred on
the legislature in clear and comprehensive terms, is nevertheless a delicate
trust, nearly atfecting the rights and interests of the citizens, and to be exercised carefully, and within the exact limits which are prescribed by that
clause in the frame of government which creates the power and defines the
extent to which the legislature may go in its exercise.
If they have exceeded
if the constitutional boundary has been overstepped, there can be no doubt
of the right of the citizens to resist such unauthorized exercise of power, and
of the duty of this court to declare such legislative action void, and to protect
all persons against its unlawful exactions."
Bigelow, Ch. J., Commonwealth
Allen, 438, 430. See Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass., 272
•B. Savings Bank,
Libby v. Burnham, 15 Mass., 144. In Joyner b. School District,
Cush., 567,
" Each mem573, where an excessive school tax was levied, Dewey, J., says
ber of school district has
right to insist that no more than his proportional
amount be demanded of him,, to pay the debts of the school district, that the
assessments shall be in
form that will also compel the
legal form, and in
other members of the district to pay their proportionate share of the corporate
debts."
See also School District u. Merrills, 13 Conn., 437; Hubbard v.
Braiuard. 35 id., 563; First Ecclesiastical Society B.Hartford, 38 id., 374;
Elwell V. Shaw,
Greenl., 339
Huse v. Merriam, id., 375 Lacy -c. Davis,
Mich., 140; Gerry v. Stoneham,
Allen, 319; Goodrich v. Lunenburg, Gra}',
38,41; Stone •<;.Bean, 15 id., 42; Kemper ti. McClelland, 19 Ohio, 308 iU;
Blackf., 98; Hutchins ». Doe,
Mason «. Roe,
Ind., 538; Drew v. Davis, 10
Vt., 506; Johnson v. Colburn, 36 id., 693; Wells v. Burbank, 17 N H., 393;
Kinsworthy v. Mitchell, 31 Ark., 145; Bucknall v. Story, 86 Cal, 67, 73;
Tucker s. The Justices, 34 Geo., 370. As to levy of excessive fees, see Mosher
Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass., 273; Buell v. Irwin, 24
V. Robie, 11 Me., 135;
Mich.. 345 Prindlo ». Campbell,
Minn., 213.

4

9

;

3

a

3

9

;

5

1

;

1

a

a

a

:

3

;

5

it,

'
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Of this maxim it has been said in a case where a tax
" The maxim is so
was but slightly in excess of authority :
vague in itself as to form a very unsafe ground of proceeding or
judging ; and it may be almost as dif&cult to apply it as a rule in
non curat.

pecuniary concerns as to the interest which a witness has in the
event of a cause ; and in such case it cannot apply. Any interest
excludes him.
The assessment was therefore unauthorized and
void.

If

the line which the legislature has established be once

passed, we know of no boundary to the discretion of the assess-

ors."''

The like rule has been adopted in another

case,

has held that any excess which perceptibly increases an

tax avoids

individual

it.^

I Mellen, Oh.

' Case

which

J., in

Huse

■».Merriam, 2

Greenl., 375, 376.

V. Deao, 10 Mich., 12.
But an unintentional error may not have this
Kelley v. Corson, 8 Wis., 183 ; O'Grady v. Barnhisel, 23 Cal., 287, 296.
In Iowa there is a statute that a tax sale
See State v. Newark, 25 N. J., 399.
shall be upheld if any portion of the tax for whicli the sale was made was
See Parker «. Sexton, 29 Iowa, 431.
"Where part is legal and part is
legal.
are
capable of being distinguished.
illegal the former will be sustained if they
See O'Kane €. Treat, 25 111., 557; Briscoe v. Allison, 43 id., 291; State v. Allen,
43 id., 456 ; Allen v. Peoria, etc., K. B. Co., 44 id., 85 ; People v. Nichols, 49
id., 517; Mix v. People, Sup. Ct. 111. (1875), 7 Chicago Legal News, p. 2;
State 11.Plainfield, Sup. Ct. N. J. (1875), 12 Albany Law Journal, p. 172. And
as to sale on judgment for taxes, see Reeve ». Kennedy, 43 Cal., 643.
An excess inserted to cover possible contingencies in collecting, held not to render
assessors liable in trespass where they had acted in good faith, and only erred
in judgment.
Colman v. Anderson, 10 Mass., 105, 117, 120.

effect.
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CHAPTEE XIVTHE COLLECTION OF THE TAX.
Summary remedies necessary.

Very summary remedies

have been allowed, in every age and country, for the collection by

They have been considered a
Without them it might be possible for

the government of its revenues.

matter of state necessity.
defeated and dissatisfied parties to cripple and, possibly, to break
up the government, by depriving it of the resources for continuing
its existence until they could be gathered in by the slow pro-

It has been shown
which are available to private parties.
that
the
invaluable
in the preceding chapters,
principles of the
common law are not supposed to be violated by a resort to sumcesses

Summary processes are not
mary proceedings in these cases.
They would be so if they deprived the party
necessarily unjust.
of a hearing, or if they precluded the opportunity for a patient
and deliberate examination of the questions upon which his rights
depend, before such rights could be

finally concluded and cutoff.

But this it is not the design of legitimate tax legislation to acIt may reverse somewhat the course of
complish in any case.
ordinary proceedings to enforce rights at the common law, but it
finally and conclusively condemn without a hearing.
When a tax is duly and properly levied ' it is to be collected
after some method prescribed by law.
The several methods may
can never

as direct, when the taxes are demanded from the parties taxed in person, or enforced against the property on which they
are laid ; and indirect when, for convenience, they are collected of

be classified

others
rest.

than the persons upon whom the burden is in the end to
All such taxation as comes in this second class, seems

to require no special mention.
But provision is sometimes
law
under
made by
which other taxes are, for the convenience of
the government, indirectly collected.
A government which taxes
"
"ZsBy," as applied to a tax, imports the ascertainment of the amount to
be raised, and the performance of such acts as would authorize the tax collector to proceed to collect." Handy, J., in Moore v. Foote, 33 Miss., 489, 479.
■
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the salaries of its officers might be its own collector ; first deducting the tax and then paying over the remainder ; and the like
might be provided for in any case where moneys were to be paid
So a convenient method of colover by the government itself.^
lecting taxes on the dividends or other receipts of shareholders
from the profits of corporations, or on payments to creditors, may
be to make the corporation itself the collector, and require it to
deduct the tax, and pay it to the government before paying over
to the parties thus taxed.^

The methods of collecting taxes which have been provided for
under various statutes are

:

"

1.

By suit.

2.

By the arrest of the person taxed.
By distress of goods and chattels.
By taking possession of goods and chattels and retaining

8.
4.

them until the taxes are paid, or selling them for the payment.
5. By the sale of lands.
6.
7.

By imposing penalties for nonpayment.
By forfeiting to the government the property upon or in

]"espect
8.

to which the tax is payable.

By making the payment

a

condition to the exercise of some

lawful right.
'^So a

court, where a fund is in its charge, may order the taxes paid out of

it before the fund is paid over.
Heading R. E. Co., .53 Penn. St., 140; Haight v. Kailroad Co.,
National Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 id., 353 ; United States v.
Railroad Co., 17 id., 332 ; Minot v. Railroad Co., 18 id., 206, 330.
^Maltby

6

"Wall.,

v.

15 ;

An important principle of

the common law may also be called an assisof
taxes.
It is this: Tliat all contracts and arrangein
tlie
collection
tant
ments made for the defeat or evasion of the revenue laws of a country are
illegal, and the courts will give the parties no remedy in respect to them.
Clugas V. Penaluna, 4 T. R., 466 ; Waymell v. Reed, 5 id., 599 ; Cope «. Rowlands, 3 M. & W., 149; Smith v. Mawhood, 14 id., 453; Favor v. Philbrick, 7
N. H., 326, 340; Harris v. Runnels, 12 IIow., 79. See, also, Bancroft v. Dumas,
31 Vt, 456; Alexander v. O'Donnell, 13 Kan., 608; Howard «. First Independent Church, 18 Md., 451. It is necessary, perhaps, that both parties
should have knowledge of the intent to violate the law; for if one be innocent there is no reason why the guilty intent of the other shall cause him to
suffer. See Briggs v. Lawrence, 8 T. R., 454; Lightfoot «. Tenant, 1 B. & P.,
8 Barb., 489 ;
551, 556 ; Clugas v. Penaluna, 4 T. R., 466 ; Kreiss v. Seligman,
M.,
&
6
G.
Smith,
Scott, 463; Pellecat v. Angell, 3 Cromp. M. & R.,
Ritchie v.
*
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will be briefly considered in their order.'

Collection by suit. It has been shown that taxes. are not
debts in the ordinary acceptation of that term, and that the
1.

statutory

measures

Generally no others

are to

be resorted

are admissible.^

to for their collection.
But the remedy by suit-

If
may be given by statute either directly or by implication.
no specific remedy is expressly given, or only an imperfect or inadequate one, the presumption that a remedy by suit was intended is but reasonable.^
Nothing need be said regarding
in such suits beyond this : that they would take
the ordinary course prescribed by law for the collection of money
demands, except as the statute may have otherwise provided.*

the proceedings

Thurston, 11 Cush., 322; Webster v. Hunger, 8 Gray, 584;
Maffitt, 2 Wash. C. C, 98; Armstrong i>. Toler, 11 Wheat., 258.
The principle does not apply to contracts made in evasion of the laws of a
foreign country, but it does apply to all contracts made abroad to be performed here. See cases above cited. Also Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp., 341.
And compare Dater v. Earl, 8 Gray, 482, -with Cambioso v. Maffitt, 2 Wash. C.
Foster

311;

Cambioso

C,

v.

».

98.

'

Farming

out the revenue for collection,

has been a favorite method in some

It

consists in putting the collection into the hands of contractors,
who are to return to the treasury a certain net result, having the remainder
for their own compensation.
Such a system, by making it the personal intercountries.

of those who are to administer the tax laws to render them as productive
might increase the public revenues both by inducing a more vigilant search for subjects of taxation, and by ensuring more strict enforcement
of collections; and Bentham has defended it on these grounds.
Works,
Edinb. cd.. Vol. 2, p. 241-251.
But it is so much liable t® abuse and oppresBefore the Revolution in France it was
sion as to be generally condemned.
estimated that of the taxes extorted from the people, not more than one fifth
was paid into the public treasury !
The farming of the revenue would not
be even proposed in America; much less tolerated.
' Ante, page 13. It is no defense to a suit to collect a tax that the relative
" If an assessment can be set
valuations between individuals are unequal.
est

as possible,

aside and the right to collect taxes defeated by proof of this kind, there never
was and there never will be a valid assessment in the state, for it is impossible

will concur in all respects in their estimate of a particular piece of property, and of its value compared to another piece." Rich'xrdson, J., in Potosi v. Casey, 27 Mo., 372, 373.
A fraud in the valuation,
to find two persons who

may, however, constitute a defense.
99; Western

State v. Central Pacific R. R. Co.,
Co. v. Nolan, 48]Sr. Y., 513.

7

Dillon Mun. Corp., § 653. See Territory v. Reyburn, McCahon, 134;
Williams, 8 Texas, 384; Houston, etc., R. R. Co. ii. State, 39 id, 148.

2
1).

E. R.

<

Nev.,

State

Where action is given for taxes, interest is not recoverable, unless tlie statute

OH.

THE

XIV.J
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tke ordinary proceeding,
for a penalty or forfeiture.
as
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refer here to arrest

and not in the course of prosecution
The early state laws authorized pro-

the body of the person taxed, as an ordinary process
for all personal taxes.^
It
They have generally been repealed.
is only needful to say of such proceedings, that the officer must
be sure of his process and follow its command.
What is
said under the next subdivision regarding process is applicable
cess against

here.

3.

By distress.

To authorize distress, the collector must have

gives it. Danforth v. 'Williams, 9 Mass., 324.
Tax assessed against a person
by name after his death. This is no debt against the administrator on whioli
suit can be brought.
The assessment should have been against the heirs or

Cook v. Lelaud, 5 Pick., 236.
The statute
suit for taxes against anyone who should remove out of the precinct after
assessment.
This applied to the case of one who left, but with the intention
of returning after six months. Houghton v. Davenport, 23 Pick., 235. Where
by statute the personalty of an estate was to be assessed to the executor or
administrator, if it is taxed to " the estate " of the deceased, a suit will not
lie against the administrator for the tax. Wood «. Torrey, 97 Mass., 321.
One cannot be made liable for a tax assessed after he has removed from the
municipality, even though the vote granting the money was had while he was
a resident.
Wade c. First Parish, 8 Gush., 267. A collector who pays over a
tax without having collected
Mcmay recover by suit of the taxpayer.
Cracken v. Elder, 34 Penn. St., 339.
Compare Wallace's Estate, 59 id.,
401. That taxes must be demanded before suit can be brought, see Thompson
«. Gardner, 10 Johns., 404; St. Anthony, etc., Co. v. Greely, 11 Minn., 321, 335.
It may be otherwise under statute of Arkansas.
Kinsworthy v. Mitchell,
Garbaldi v. Jenkins, 27 id., 456. The words " ordinary process
21 Ark., 145
of law," in the Missouri tax laws, do not mean an ordinary judgment and exlien or specific charge
ecution, but such proc3ss as
adapted to enforce
Neenan v. Six ith, 50 Mo., 525.
Contractors for
upon the property assessed.
municipal improvements are under some statutes allowed to bring suit in
their own names for the collection of the assessments made to cover the cost
The case last cited was one of this kind.
of such improvements.
whoever else was in possession.

8,

4

3

13

5.

a

is

'

allowed usually only after
failure to find property. Lothrop v.
Allen,
Arrest after return day sustained.
Gray, 93; Hall v. Hall,
Cush., 487. As to relief from arrest, see Aldrich v. Aldrich,
Bassett ■».Porter,
Met, 103. It is competent to provide for enforcing license taxes, by imprisCommonwealth tj. Byrne, 20 Grat., 165 (citing
onment of the delinquent.
Ide,

Arrest

a

is

;

a

it,

gave a

3

Rich.,

37).

Porter,

Cusli., 487; Daggett v. Everett, 19 Me., 373;
Mass., 47; Appleton v. HopkinSfS Gray, 530; Kingman

And

4

v.
1

Barrett
Granger,

see post. Chapter
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».
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Of this, sufficient has been said in the

the iDi-oper legal warrant.^

preceding chapter.
Collection by distress has been objected to, as a process which
condemned
the party before he had been heard, and proceeded
trial.

to execution without

In

a very

important

sense,

the

The process, in the
objection states the case with accuracy.
nature of an execution, does issue, at least, under some tax laws,
before the liability of the party has been finally and conclusively
But, as has already been said, this does not deprive
determined.
It only makes his remedy
a party aggrieved of his remedy.

It has
wait the superior iirgency of government necessities.
been well said of collection by distress: "This method of collecting taxes is as well established by custom and usage as any
A similar practice prevailed in
principle of the common law.
all the colonies from the first dawn of their existence

;

been continued by all the states since their independence,

had existed in England

from time immemorial.

it has
and

Indeed, it is

of every government, and is based
* * *
think, thereupon the principle of self preservation.
fore, that any legal process that was founded on necessity, has

necessary

to the

existence

J

by time, and approved and acquiesced in by
universal consent, must be an exception to the right of trial by
jury, and is embraced in the alternative — the law of the land.
Such
consider to be the summary proceedings allowed in the
been consecrated

I

collection of taxes."
the point

^

No judge, and no writer ever presented

with more terseness, more precision or more accuracy.

But it has sometimes been deemed necessary, after giving the
ordinary remedy by distress, to go further.
That remedy will
not justify any invasion of the rights or any interference with the
property of others than the very persons upon whom the tax is
If the property of another is distrained, the officer may
imposed.
be sued in trespass, or the property may be taken from him on

writ of replevin.^

Under pretense of this right, it has been found

A municipal corporation cannot provide for sucli a warrant by ordinance,
witliout statutory authority for tlic purpose. Bergen v. Clarltson, 6 N. J., 353.
'

^Nott, J., in State v. Allen, 3 McCord, 55, 60.
See also Harris «. Wood, 6
T. B. Monr., 641, 643 ; McCarrol v. Weeks, 5 Hayw., 246 ; Willis «. Wetlierbee,
4 N. H. 118; New Orleans v. Cannon, 10 La. An., 764.

'A

chattel

belonging

to

A. cannot

be taken

for

a

tax' against B., even
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possible seriously to embarrass tbe officer in tbe performance of
liis duties, by means of unfounded claims, or those the officer

To preclude this, statutes have, in some

believes to be such.

cases, been passed, taking away the ordinary remedies against the

Some
collector, and leaving the claimant to some other remedy.
of these statutes, which merely prohibit replevin being brought

The New York
against the officer, are referred to elsewhere.
revised statutes authorized the collector to seize and sell not only
goods and chattels of the party taxed, but any goods and chattels

in his possession, and declared that "no claim of property made
by any other person shall be available to prevent a sale." This
statute was enforced without question of its validity.'

A

similar

statute in Michigan was strongly contested as not being due
In Pennsylprocess of law, and was upheld by a divided court.^
vania a statute has been enforced which empowered the collector
to distrain the property of an occupier of land wherever found,
tax assessed in respect to the laud against
by law to make a
of
enters
into
who
land,
purchaser
possession, chargeable perwith
the
tax
assessed.^
These are illustrations
previously
sonally
for the satisfaction of
the owner.*

a

So it has been held competent

of the stringent rules which
taxation.
though it formerly belongecl
Nelson, 41 Vt., 161.

are sometimes

to B., and is

Sheldon «. Van Buskirk, 2 N. Y., 473.
tutional competency of such legislation.
'

=Sears v.

Cottrell,

5

Mich.,

applied in cases of

still in his possession.

No point

Daniels

v.

was made of the consti-

251.

McGregor v. Montgomery, 4 Penn. St., 237. The warrant is no lien upon
Moore v. Marsh, 00 Penn. St., 46.
personalty until actual seizure.
^

v. Horstick, 9 Watts, 412. See also Smeich v. York County, 68 Penn.
But an express statute would be requisite to create such a liability.
Atlantic, etc., R. K. Co. v. Cleino, 2 Dillon, 175. Where property, after alienanation is allowed by the vendor to remain on the tax books of the county, and
he fails to avail himself of the means provided by law to have the assessment
corrected, he is liable for such taxes, and they may be recovered by suit.
County Commissioners v. Clagett, 31 Md., 210. Where, on a tax warrant issued
by assessors having jurisdiction, and fair on its face, bank shares are sold, the
cashier of the bank is justified in issuing new certificates to the purchaser,
who, thereby, becomes entitled to the dividends, whether the tax was rightfully
assessed or not.
Smith v. Northhampton Bank, 4 Cush., 1.
*

Henry

St., 439.
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It

is very proper that a demand of the tax should be made a
^
prerequisite to the levy by distress ; and it is not often that statutes are passed which are so

little regardful of the rights of the

authorize distress without the persons taxed being
at least called upon, and given the opportunity to pay without the
A requirement by statute of
expense and annoyance of a levy.
demand or personal notification is imperative, and distress withcitizen,

as to

out it would be illegal.^ Statutes regarding notice, and limiting
the time within which sale of the distrained property shall be
made, are also imperative, and the officer becomes a trespasser ab

initio, if he proceeds to
'

a sale

in disregard of

them.^

Such a demand is not essential before levy of distress unless the statute

requires

it.

Ives

v.

Lynn,

7

Conn., 504.

Wilson, 14 Ind., 465, 466.
The collector's authority must be
strictly pursued. Bishop v. Lovan, 4 B. Monr., 116. Where the sheriff
was to distrain for taxes, If on presenting an account of the taxes and offering
Hoozer v.
a receipt they were not paid, a distress without these was illegal.
Buckner, 11 B. Monr., 183, 184. See to the same point Johnson v. Mclntire, 1
Bibb, 295; Atkinson ». Amick, 35 Mo., 404; Thompson v. Rogers, 4 La., 9;
Burd V. Ramsey, 9 S. & R., 109; St. Anthony, etc., Co. v. Greely, 11 Minn.,
321; Bonnell «. Roane, 20 Ark., 114; Moulton d. Blaisdell, 34Me., 383; Ives s.
Lynn, 7 Conn., 504 ; Harrington ». Worcester, 6 Allen, 576. A demand at the
last and usual place of abode of a nonresident in the tuwn, if he has no agent
there, is sufficient to justify a subsequent seizure and sale of his goods under
the statute which requires that "the collector shall, before distraining the
goods of anj' person for his tax, demand payment thereof of such person,
to be found within his precinct." King v. Whitcomb,
Met., 328. Where
the law required supervisors, before issuing duplicate and warrant for the collection of road taxes, to give notice to all persons rated for such taxes, by
v.

1

if,

= Cones

advertisement or otherwise, to attend at such times and places as such supermay direct, so as to give such persons full opportunity to work out

visors

tlicir respective taxes; Jield
ler

V.

to be mandatory

and a condition precedent.

Mil-

Gorhara, 38 Penn. St., 309.

when called upon expresses

a

a

is

a

;

a

it,

is

a

it

'

The statute required property seized for taxes to be sold within four days.
Keeping
longer held to make the officer
trespasser ab initio. Brackett v.
Vining, 49 Me., 356. Sale void which
made after the time thus limited.
Pierce «. Benjamin, 14 Pick., 356; Noyes v. Haverhill, 11 Cush., 338. As to
notice of sale that do not avoid
defects in
see Barnard v. Graves, 13 Met.,
85 Scott V. Watkins, 22 Ark., 556.
Where the statute provides for notice, the
party cannot bo in default until he has received it. Smith -u. State, 43 Ala.,
A prematui'e levy by collector without suflBcient cause, renders him
344.
required
liable in trespass. Veit «. Graff, 37 Ind., 53. Where the collector
time and place to receive payment of the tax, if the tax payer
to appoint
purpose not to pay at all, the collector need not
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4. By the detention of goods and chattels.
We refer here,
not to the proceedings in which goods are distrained or seized for
forfeitures or penalties, but to those under which goods, in respect
to which the tax is demanded, are required to pass through the
hands of government officers, who are to exact the tax before the
owner or consignee is entitled to their custody. Cases of this nature arise under the laws for the collection of customs duties, but
do not require special mention.

By sale of lands.

5.

Taxes
lands, unless made so by express
petent by legislation to declare
and as such take precedence of
ever.^

And

are not commonly

a

lien upon
It is com-

legislative authority.^
that they shall constitute a lien,
all other liens and claims what-

where the tax is assessed upon the land itself

— not

upon any particular interest in it — and when all the legal remedies, if any, for collection of the tax without resort to the land are

leaving the land liable to sale, the assessment acquires
the full force of a lien, overriding all other claims,' since a sale
exhausted,

Downer v. WoodVt., 329 ; Wheelock v. Archer, 36 id., 380 ; Hurlburt v. Green, 42 id.,
316.
In Vermont it is decided tliat provisions in a statute requiring the collector to keep a distress four days before advertising, and to advertise six days,
do not restrict him to this exact time, though he may not sell in less,
demons V. Lewis, 36 Vt., 673. That a levy on personalty is prima facie a satisfaction of a tax, see Henry ii. Gregory, 29 Mich., 68. In Indiana there seems
to be a lien for taxes on personalty from the time when the duplicate comes
to the collector's hands. Barber v. Morton, 19 Ind., 146. And this would not
be divested in favor of an execution subsequently issued. Evans v. Bradford,
35 Ind., 527 ; McNeil v. Farneman, 37 id., 203.
name time and place for the purpose, but may levy at once.

bury,

'

19

Hine

Commissioners,

v. Levee

19

Wall.,

655.

In

ary tax warraut, lands cannot be sold. Kirkwood
That is the general rule throughout the country.
ii Wallace's

Kansas under the ordinv.

Magill,

Kansas, 540.

6

Estate, 59 Penn. St., 401, 404; Durgan's Appeal, 68 id., 204.

A

provision that a tax shall be preferred to all judgments, executions, incumbrances and liens of any description whatsoever, and shall be a lien on the
real estate, does not make it a lien on the personal estate also. Anderson i>.
State, 23 Miss., 459 ; Bailey v. Fuqua, 24 id., 497. In Indiana, lands are liable
for the poll tax, and tax on personal property assessed against the owner, notwithstanding his title is afterwards extinguished by the foreclosure of a mortgage of older date than his purchase.

' See Hutchins

v.

Moody,

30

Vt, 655 ;

Isaac

v.

Decker,

41

Ind.,

410.

Same «. Same, 34 id.. 433

;

Post

v. Leet,

8 Paige, 337; Kern v. Towsley, 45 Barb, 150; Dowdney v. New York, 54 N. Y.,
Compare Holmes v. Taber, 9 Allen, 246.
186 ; Cochran e. Guild, 106 Mass , 29.

20
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paid, must take place in
law, and extinguish other liens and incum-

of the lands, unless the tax is voluntarily
the ordinary course

A

brances.*

change

o£

in the ownership would not

afEect

such

a

Where, as is
lien, the law taking no notice of such change.^
often the case with the lien for special assessments, provision is
made for its enforcement by judicial proceedings, mere delay in
taking steps for the purpose will not extinguish it' Sometimes
by statute a particular day is named, from which a tax shall be
deemed a lien upon lands, and this, it is held, will determine, as
between vendor and vendee, which should pay the tax in the
absence of any stipulation on the subject^

In California

a

lien for taxes relates to the time of the assessment.

Reeve

v.

Kennedy, 43 Cal., 643.

'Parker

v.

Baxter,

3

Gray, 185.

See Dale

v.

McEvers,

3

Cow., 118; Bris-

Wliere separate interests are taxed, previous
coe V. Coulter, 18 Ark., 423.
lions would not be reached by the lax unless the statute should so declare.
See Appeal of Pittsburgh, 40 Penn. St., 455 ; Alleghany City's Appeal, 41 id.,
CO ; Cadmus v. Jackson, 53 id., 395.
11. Jones, 5 B. Monr., 458, 465; Covington v. Boyle, 6 Bush, 204.
' Swan 11. Knoxville, 11 Humph., 130, 133. An act of congress made a tax
lien on land for two years. Held that this did not preclude the land being
2 Oldham

a

sold for the tax after the two years had expired, the title not having changed.

a

is

9;

i_f

Hoklen v. Eaton, 7 Pick., 15. Where by law taxes are a lien on land, but subject to be divested by a subsequent judicial sale, except as to any sum which the
proceeds of the sale should be insufficient to pay, a sale sufficient prima facie
to pay all taxes, and the bringing the money into court, divests the tax lien,
Smith v.
though tlie money is not applied to the satisfaction of the taxes.
168.
A
personal action brought for a tax docs not divest
Simpson, 60 Penn. St.,
the lien.
Eschbach v. Pitts, 6 Md., 71. If a time is limited by statute for
proceedings to enforce a lien, it is sufficient
they are begun within the time,
and they may proceed to judgment afterwards.
Randolph b. Bajme, 44 Cal.,
366; Dougherty -b. Henarie, 47 id.,
Himmelman ii. Carpenter, 47 id., 42.
That statute giving a lien to be strictly construed, see Creighton v. Manson,
■>

27 id., 613.

Harrington

513; Gromley's

■!).Hilliard,

27

Mich.,

371.

See

Rundell

v.

Lakey,

40

N. Y.,

Penn. St., 49; Densmore v. Haggarty, 59 id., 189.
As to the liability as between tenant for life, and remainder man, see Plympton D. Boston Dispensary, 106 Mass., 544.
The following are decisions as to the liability to taxes under special agreeAppeal,

27

a

ments: A clause in
mortgage that the mortgage moneys should be paid
" without any deduction, defalcation or abatement
to be made of any thing
for or in respect to any taxes," Jield to refer to taxes on the land and not on
Clopton v. Phil a., etc., R. R. Co., 54 Penn. St., 356. A
mortgage security.
"
covenant to pay all assessments for which the premises shall be liable," will
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Municipal corporations, of course, have no authority to create
liens, by ordinance or otherwise, when none has been expressly
conferred upon them.^
Return of "JVb Goods,"

etc.

Where

a

tax against

lands is

assessed to a resident, and is a personal charge against him, the
statutes, with almost unvarying

uniformity, have made the personal property of the person taxed the primary fund for the payment, and have given a remedy for enforcing payment from it.

Until that remedy

has been exhausted,

It

no authority exists to go

is also customary to allow a certain time after the
levy of a tax on nonresident or unseated lands, before any proTo authorize further proceedings are taken against the land.
further.

ceedings in either case, there must be the proper official evidence

that in the one

case the

remedy again-st the personalty is exhausted,

and in both that the taxes are still unpaid.^ This evidence will
consist of such official return, affidavit, or other document by the

This document will be
and it will be void, also, if it fails to

may indicate.

collector, as the statute

void if made prematurely

;

^

"by a law passed after the covenant.
One who conveys by warranty after an assessment is completed, is liable on his covenant for a tax laid in pursuance of this

embrace an assessment only authorized

Post

v.

Kearney,

assessment.

2 JST.

Y.,

394.

Held, therefore, the vendee who had paid it might recover the
an agreement of the latter to repay "in case he was

amount of the vendor'on

legally liable to pay it."

Kundell

v.

Lakey,

40

N. Y.,

513.

Philadelphia v. Greble, 88 Penn. St., 839. As to what will give the power,
see Eschbach v. Pitts, 6 Md., 71. The lieu cannot exist where the statutory
steps have not been taken, and a simple allegation in a proceeding to enforce
a lien that the taxes are dueand unpaid, is not sufficient to show a lien. Louisville n. Bank of Kentucky, 3 Met., K}'., 148. As to the liability of land for
personal assessments in Indiana, see Bodertha v. Spencer, 40 Ind., 353.
'

Powell, 6 Wheat., 119; Jones v. McLain, 23 Ark., 429;
Ala., 617; Francis b. Russell, 5 Hayw., 294; Schseffer •o.
People, 00 111., 179 ; St. Anthony, etc., Co. t. Greely, 11 Minn., 331 ; Kelley «.
Craig, 5 Ired., 129 ; Harrington -o. Worcester, 6 Allen, 576 ; Huntington -o.
Brantley, 33 Miss., 451; Sharp v. Johnson, 4 Hill, 92; Ring d. Ewing, 47 Ind.,
246.
No title can be made to lands on a sale for taxes if personalty is not
sought for. Catterlin v. Douglass, 17 Ind., 213.
2 See

Scales

Thatcher

T>. Alvis,

«.

13

' Ronkendorlf

v. Taylor's Lessee, 4 Pet., 340.
Where the law gave a nonowner nine months to pay taxes in, before they were to be returned
by the collector as delinquent, a return one day before the nine months were
fully completed, was held to make void the proceedings. Flint v. Sawyer, 30

resident

Me., 226.

A similar ruling

was made in Hobbs v. Clements, 33 id., 67.

A
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set forth all the facts that the statute requires shall be shown by

If

it.

the collector is required to demand

the tax, his return,

it

if he is required
to make collection by distress and sale of goods, if any can be
■would seem,

should show that he has done so

;

found to levy upon, there should be such a showing of diligent
search for goods, and failure to find them, as would be required
In
of officers to whom executions are committed for service.
other words, the return should show full and complete compliance with all the conditions which, under the statute, are to precede a resort to the land.*

Such is unquestionably the general
the statute should prescribe the tor.-n

though doubtless if
of a return, it would be sufficient for the officer to follow that.^
But the decisions are justly very rigid in requiring conformity to
rule

;

^

The return,

the statute in the substantial matters of the return.*

if in conformity to
proceedings,
sale

fore,

the law, is not only a support to subsequent

but is evidence, also, in favor of the officer himself.'

to be made where the taxpayer is not in default.
Therehe tenders the tax, his land is not subject to sale, even though at the

of land is not

if

time, the collection of the tax is enjoined in a suit to which the taxpayer is
not a party. Jones v. Burford, 36 Miss., 194. For a decision that, under the
statute in question, resort might be had, either to the land or to chattels, see
Den V. Carron, 26 N. J., 228.

i-ecital in a collector's return that, " not knowing of any goods or chattels, etc.," is not equivalent to a return that none could be found.
Jones v.

'A

McLain,

23

Ark.,

429.

But it is sufficient to throw the burden of proof on

the

taxpayer, to show that there was enough of personalty to satisfy the tax.
- Wliere the statute
provided that "when the delinquent has no goods and
chattels within the county, then the lands and tenements of said deliuquent

may be sold," etc., held, that if the delinquent were shown to have such goods
and chattels it was fatal to a sale of the lands. The delinquent's knowlScales v. Alvis, 12 Ala.,
edge of the sale, and assent to it do not bind him.
617 ;

citing Jackson

2 Such

ple,

v. Sheppard, 7 Cow., 88.
has been the ruling of the supreme court of

Gilm.,

Job

«. Tibbetts,

Illinois.

5 id., 376, 382.

Taylor

v. Peo-

Judge
district judge, held otherwise. Mayhew u. Davis, 4 McLean, 213.
^ See Harmon ii. Stockwell, 9 Ohio, 93
; Harrington v. Worcester, 6 Allen,
576; Sharp v. Johnson, 4 Hill, 92; Spellman v. Curttnius, 12 111., 409; Homer
v. Cilley, 14 N. H., 85; Hannell v. Smith, 15 Ohio, 134; Tallman v. White, 2
A return not made in the time prescribed by statute, held not to
IS". T., 66.
2

349;

support subsequent proceedings

Miss., 668, 676.
' Bruce v. Holden,

21

cited, ante, p. 185, 186.

Pick.,

to forfeit the land.

187 ;

Brainerd

P<>pe, the

federal

Hopkins t. Sandidge,

v. Graves, 13

Met

, 85.

31

See cases
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Under some fax laws the same officer who collects the taxes is
empowered

to make sale of the lands of delinquents.

cases no return is required, though the

In such

filing of some official doc-

ument showing the delinquency is sometimes
provided for.
Such a document takes the place of a collector's return, and will
he governed by the rules above

by

laid down.

If

none is required

law, the collector is allowed to proceed and sell lands on his

own knowledge of the delinquency.
How far his proceedings
will be open to question afterwards, must depend, to some extent
at least, on the force given by statute to such rejDort or certificate
of sale as he is subsequently required to make, or to the official
conveyance.

The proceedings in making sale of lands for taxes, the privilege
of redemption, and the conveyance when redemption is not made,
require, and will receive, separate consideration.
6.

By the imposition of penalties.

In tax laws penalties

are

imposed for mere delinquencies, in order to hasten payment, and
they are also imposed as a punishment for frauds, evasions, and
In some cases, also, special inducements are
neglect of duty.
held out to prompt performance of duty, by making deductions
in case of early payment.^
Great use is made of penalties in the federal tax laws, especially
under the internal revenue laws, and the laws for the collection
The justification for this is the supposed
of customs duties.
necessity of the case, and the absolute impossibility of securing a
collection of the revenues without resort to these extreme measures.^
' Sprague v.

Bailey, 19 Pick., 436.
' A charge by District Judge Benedict, of the southern district of New
Yorlt, to the grand jury, and given in an appendix to 6 Blatchford's Reports,
is deserving of being copied here, for the reasons it gives for stringent measures in revenue cases :
" The war, which decided the question whether a government framed like
ours had the ability to quell by force of arms a great rebellion, raised another
question, which is now in process of solution, namely, whether such a government can surely provide for the payment of the interest upon a great debt.
The interest upon the public debt must be obtained by taxation, and this tax-

ation, under the most favorable circumstances, must be heavy. It will become
odious and intolerable, if it is to be borne by the honest and well disposed
classes alone, and avoided by those willing to grow rich at the expense of
their fellow citizens, through fraudulent evasions of the law. This latter

SIO
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by the taxing officers, in others
by suit, or indictment. Under the state laws

some cases they are imposed

they are recovered

and powerful, both socially and politically, has, from the
the government in its efforts to collect the revenue.
confronted
beginning,
At first, the government attempted to compel their obedience by seizure of
their property, and large quantities of merchandise detected in the act of
escaping taxation was forfeited and sold. But the attempt was a failure ; the
frauds increased both in number and in magnitude, and the government was
class, numerous

compelled to turn to its last resort — the criminal jurisdiction of its courts.
It is now, therefore, here and elsewhere, engaged In the effort to check these
frauds by means of criminal prosecutions — the indictment, trial, conviction
and imprisonment of defrauders of the revenue. Inasmuch then, as no man
can be tried until accused by a grand jury, the government and the community, of which the government is but the representative, now turns to the
grand juries of the land, and asks the indictment of every man, whether high
or low, rich or poor, who is found to be engaged in fraudulent evasions of
Time would fail me to describe to you the various forms which
legal taxes.

I

; but it is my duty to put you in possession of what
have understood to be the facts in regard to some transactions which must
come before you, and to allude in general terms to others which your own

these frauds assume

inquiries will expose.
" I begin with what have been designated the drawback cases. These cases
have been the subject of examination in the adjoining district, and are tran.sferred to this district because most of the transactions took place here. They
are frauds perpetrated under cover of the provisions of law which enable a
person who has paid taxes upon manufactures which he aftersvards exports,
to receive back the taxes which he has paid, upon proving actual exportation of
the goods. To obtain this drawback, a set of papers is necessary in every
case, consisting first of an internal revenue collector's certificate, that the tax
on the goods has been paid ; second, a certificate of the collector of cuslomg,
that such goods appear on a ship's manifest, on file in the custom house, as
actually exported; third, an affidavit by the shipper as to the identity of the
goods upon the manifest and the goods upon the tax receipt; fourth, a certifi
cate of an internal revenue collector, that a proper bond to secure the government against any relanding of the goods has been filed with him. These
pajjers must be certified to at the custom house, and then go to the department

If

be examined there.
found correct, a check for the
amount of tax, drawn to the order of the shipper, upon the treasury, is re>;umerou3 sets of such papers, representing sums of from
turned.
$300 to
$7,000 each, all false, no such goods having been exported, there being no
at Wa-shington, to

such shipper, and no such manifest on file, the bonds being fraudulent,
the signatures forgeries, and the affidavits perjuries, have, within a space of
six months time, passed through the custom house here and been certified;
have then passed through the department at "Washington and been there approved, and corresponding checks have been drawn and paid, every one, or
nearly every one, upon a forged Indorsement, until the total probably exceeds
The fraud, which am thus enabled to describe because
the sum of $700,000.

I
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Where lists or statements are required
they are not so common.
to be famished as a basis for taxation, the privilege of being
it

has already been the subject of examination in the adjoining district, is cot
and the money is gone. It will be your duty to say v.ho shall be
accused before this court as criminally responsible for the transaction.
Some
disput<xi,

is to any very great extent exceptional.
extend your inquiries into other departments of the custom house,
Tou wiU find
find that similar frauds have been there committed.

" If you

you will

and not because

it

gard to

it,

of the parlies supposed to haTe been engaged in this affair are already under
bail. One has been brought from Florida; for the arm of the goTemment is
Others hare escaped beyond the seas. It will be your duty, however,
long.
to indict all who appear to have been connected in the design, whether
present or absent. In your examination of this case, you will hare occasion
to see with what looseness the public business is sometimes conducted, for it
will appear that great numbers of bonds required by law have been accepted
as good, without any identification of signatures or of persons, and without
any inquiry as to the sufficiency or even existence of the sureties, the greater
part being, in fact, executed in fictitious names, or by persons entirely worthless. It will also appear that the genuine seal of an internal revenue collector
can constantly appear upon certificates now claimed to be forged, and that
part of the files of the collectors office, being bonds requii-ed by law, can be
removed and taken to a neighboring city by persons having no connection
whatever with the government, there to be dealt with as unknown parties ma^dtsire, and then be returned without objection or remark. I have exjjlained
the features of this case to you fully, because you will be called on to act in re-

a

it

has been possible for certain parties to
that in the warehouse department,
withdraw dutiable goods without payment of any duty, until the loss from
single warehouse has equalled |400,000, according to the estimate of an of-

;

I

I

is

a

ficial. The parties who committed this fraud walk the streets to-day, well
known, but unprosecuted and unpunished, unless the repayment of part of
Xor
the case to which am
their great gains is to be called punishment.
now alluding, and which you will find fully disclosed upon the files of this
court, the only one of this class which has occurred, and with a similar ream correctly informed.
Tou may think proper to inquire into them
sult, if
all. Frauds like these are, of course, not to be accomplished without connivand you will have occasir^n, no doubt, to conance on the part of officials
sider what persons shall be accused before this court, for giving or accepting
bribes.

'

:

S.

4,

g

*

*

3,

it

I

I

" There is also an abuse at the custom house, proper to be spoken of in this
notice, by the public prints, is now attracting some attenconnection, which
tion, and of the evil effects of which the drawback cases will give you painrefer to the custom of giving and taking gratuities for the perful proof.
Strengthen the hands of the collector, gentlemen,
formance of official duties.
reads
in any effort to stop this steady flow. The law lies at your hands, and
Stat, at Large, 793;
12 U.
If an.y officer
1863,
thus (Act of March
shall knowingly accept, from any person engaged
of the revenue *
in the impoilation of goods, wares or merchandise into the United States, or
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heard in abatement

of the tax is sometimes

alty upon the tax payer for not furnishing

taken away
it.

as a pen-

Perhaps it would

or in the eninterested, as principal clerk or agent, in any such importation
emolument
or
try of any goods, wares, or merchandise, any fee, gratuity
office and
from
whatever, such oflacer shall, on conviction thereof, be removed
imprisor
be
dollars,
shall be fined in any sum not exceeding five thousand
6th
secThe
oned not exceeding two years at the discretion of the court.'
'
any person who shall be engaged in
tion of the same act is as follows :
States, or
the importation of goods, wares or merchandise, into the United
of
tlie
any
goods,
in
entry
or
clerk
ageni,
principal,
as
interested,
shall be
officer
to
make,
to
any
or
ofl"er
make,
time
any
wares or merchandise,

If

sliall^at
the revenue any gratuity or present

of any money or other thing of value,
such person shall, on conviction thereof, be fined in any sum not exceeding
of

five thousand dollars, or be imprisoned not exceeding two j-ears, at the discretion of the court.'
" The market price of whisky is still less than the first cost of manufacture,
with taxes added. From the tobacco trade, honest dealers are fast being
The fraudulent
driven out. Much of the income tax remains uncollected.
bond-maker

still plies his busy trade.

Men known to have grown ricli by ilof fraud, and flaunt their wealth

legal means have escaped even the accusation

before the public eye. Honest_offlcials have been compelled to leave the service for want of due support in the performance of their duty, while other
officers of the revenue who have remained and dared to endeavor to protect
the government have found the very government they sought to serve turned
against them and used with effect to accomplish their destruction and disgrace. In view of a demoralization such as these facts disclose, do you wonder that some men query whether the proper enforcement of revenue laws is
possible for such a government as ours, with such a civil service as it has
hitherto had ? These remarks will have failed of their intended effect, if they
rests on you,
have not served to deepen your sense of the responsibility^which
and to strengthen your determination to discharge yourselves of that responsi-

bility in such a manner as to satisfy the proper demands of the community
in which you live. To enable you to do this, great powers are given you.
No matter within the jurisdiction of the court is exempt from your scrutiny.
No man, of whatever degree, can refuse to obey your summons or decline to
answer your proper interrogatories.
No compromise of a department can
hand.
Within your extended sphere you are supreme.
have effect to stay your
Use, then, these great powers freely, examine diligently and inquire widely,
but accuse with all due care, mindful always, that the mere examination of a
transaction in open court, is often of great public benefit, but, also, mindful
that such an examination is often, of itself, a great punishment.
It is not
your province to try the cases which you may consider.
That duty devolves
upon the petit jury and the court; but you are diligently to inquire and true
presentment make of every offense arising under the laws of the United
States which shall be made to appear by reasonable prima facie profif
This
duty I charge you to perform, and if to its performance you shall bring that
patience, that intelligence and that good courage which the occasion demands,
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be more proper to say that his right to be heard Is made to de-

pend upon this, not unreasonable condition.* A more common
provision is one that adds a penalty to the assessed taxes for neglect to pay them in due season.
There are some cases in which the right to impose any penalty
except on a judicial investigation by a competent court has been
denied,

as

being

the imposition of punishment

without

a

trial.'

you will render an important service to your fellow citizens, as well as to the
government which protects you and under which it is your good fortune to
live."
' See

Winnisimmet Co.

509; Lincoln
Gray, 365;
V.

Parker,

LMv.

33

v.

«. Worcester,

8

6

Cush., 477;

Cush., 55; Porter

yj.

Otis Co.
County

v. Ware, 8 Gray,

Commissioners,

5

Ala., 593: States. Apgar, 31 N". J., 358; Young
Compare McCormick v. Fitch, 14 Minn., 252.

Hubbard,

id., 193.

Chelsea,
44

In Scammon v. Chicago, 44 111 , 209, 278, the court held a provision of a
statute imposing a penalty of five per centum for delay in making payment
of an assessment beyond a certain day to be void. On application for a rehearing on this point, the following opinion was given by Breese, J.: " On
this application for a rehearing, we are referred to the case of Bristol n. The
2

City of Chicago, 32 111., 587, as controlling the question of imposing five per
cent, on the amount of taxes not paid on or before the 1st day of January in
each year. In that case the law authorized the collection of ten per cent, on
the amount of the special assessment, in case the owner refused to pay it before the collector

filed the delinquent list, on an application for an order of
That the legislature may provide for the recovery
of reasonable costs, either by a percentage on the amount of the recovery, or
by fixing specific sums in a bill of items, there can be no doubt. In that case
sale, as additional costs.

the law was sustained, as it gave that per cent, as additional cost, which was
manifestly designed to cover the expense of making and advertising the de-

linquent list, together with other expenses and outlays incurred
cation.
" The per cent, imposed

by the appli-

in that case was upon a special assessment levied
in the city. In such cases, after the levy has
wharf
for the improvement of
been made, labor is performed and expenses incurred by the city in completing the improvement, on the faith of the collection of the assessment to
meet the outlay ; and it is therefore but reasonable, that the person failing or
refusing to pay his assessment, should contribute to the payment of interest
which may have accumulated, by delay in paying for labor and material proOne of the obcured by the city for the construction of the improvement.
jects in giving costs is to cover expenses Incurred in prosecuting a suit for
Hence it is reasonable that the delinquent tax
the recovery of the demand.
mode
be
required to meet the^expense incurred in prosein
some
payer should
of
the amount which remains delinquent, and
the
for
recovery
a
suit
cuting
unpaid
of
true
special assessments.
the same is equally
" That the legislature may authorize the court to impose and render a judga

314

LAW OF TAXATIOls'.

[CH. XIV.

the penalty is imposed in the course of the proceedings to assess, and by officers who, for that purpose, exercise a
the oppor([uasi judicial authority, and where the party is given
tunity to be heard and to contest his delinquency, either before

But

-when

the assessing

officer, or in some form of appeal, the imposition of

ment for such a penalty, we have no doubt ; but we do not believe that such a
power can be conferred upon a mere ministerial ofScer, without any opportunity
to be heard by the taxpayer.
It will be observed that in Bristol's case the law
did not authorize the collector to impose the additional per cent, until he
filed his reijort on the application for the order of sale of the property, and it
upon by the court ; while in this case the officer was authorized to impose it long before the term of the court at which he is required
to file his report of the delinquent list, which is at the term at which he ap-

was then adjudicated

plies for judgment.
Had the ordinance in this case only provided for the
imposition of this five per cent, at the time of passing the order for the sale
of the lands, thus affording the taxpayer an opportunity until that time to
pay his tax, and to be heard in the court whether he was liable to the forfeiture, this case would then have come within the principle of Bristol's.
" The facts in this case afford an illustration of the hardship that is liable to
occur, from accident or otherwise, by imposing a penalty at a previous time.
It appears that there was a mistake of a large amount in the case of the
Chamber of Commerce, and before it could be corrected, the first of January
had arrived and the penalty was claimed and attempted to be imposed without
To impose such a penalty under these circumany fault on their part.
If, however, the
stances, would be, to say the least, a hardship and a wrong.
penalty should not be imposed until after the collector's report is filed on the
application for the judgment, then all have a fair opportunity to pay their
taxes or to be heard against a forfeiture.
We are aware of no case where a
forfeiture may be imposed and enforced except by a judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction.
the collector may impose this per cent., he can enforce it by distress and sale of property, without the taxpayer having been
legally adjudicated to have incurred a penalty.
When a per cent, is imposed

If

for taking an appeal for delay, or for faiLng to pay a note due to the school
fund, the penalty is imposed by the judgment of the court and not by the
creditor or a ministerial ofiicer.
It is believed to be a general rule, without
an exception, that forfeiture cannot be enforced except through the judgment
of a court of competent jurisdiction, and this is true whether it be called
costs, damages, or a penalty.
A judgment must be first had before satisfaction can be enforced.

"We do not, therefore, regard Bristol's case as governing this, as it is materially different both in the facts and principles involved." See also Claj^ton
«. Chicago, 44 III., 286 ; Burger v. Caster, 1 McMulleu L., 410, 420 ; Blackwell on Tax Titles, 30. In Wauwatosa ». Gunyon, 25 Wis., 271, 270, Judge
Dixon, referring

to an objection

that a provision authorizing the clerk of the

board of supervisors to impose a penalty of fifty per cent, of the assessment
for the refusal of the person assessed to swear, was void because, " being a
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the general

spirit or general course of tax proceedings, and perhaps may be
sustained on the same principles that support tax laws in general.
But we- should doubt the right to make any finding by any such
tribunal conclusive; and there may be reason to question whether,
for delay in the payment of a tax, it is competent for the government to authorize any merely ministerial officer to impose
alty, though

a reasonable

interest,

and

the

expenses

and

a pen-

costs

by the delay, might doubtless be demanded and collected.^
The point is not left in a very satisfactory state on the
authorities.
occasioned

7. By

in some

forfeiture of property taxed. It is provided by law
states, that if the taxes assessed against lands shall not

punisliment for the violation of public law, it cannot, under our constitution,
"
be legally imposed except by prosecution in tlie courts of justice," says : this
proposition is nnt without some well considered authorities in its favor, and
none that we are aware of against it;" and on rehearing, he says (p. 283):
" We think that the fifty per centum mentioned is a penalty which can be imposed only in the due course of judicial prosecution, and consequently that
the clerk had no lawful or constitutional
authority to add it to the value of
In Lacey v. Davis, 4 Mich., 140, a penalty of ten per
the property returned."
centum added to taxes remaining unpaid after a certain day, was sustained as
not being unreasonable ; and in Scott ». "Watkins, 22 Ark., 556, a penalty of
twenty -five per centum on nonresidents who should fail to pay their taxes iu
due season, was sustained against the objection which was deemed insuperable in Illmois and Wisconsin. See also Craig v. Flanagin, 21 Ark., 319 ; Pope
•B. Macon, 23 id., 644; High v. Shoemaker, 22 Cal., 363; Peoples. Todd, 23 id.,
In Butler v. Bailey, 2 Bay, 244, it
181; Mulligan ■!).Hintrager, 18 Iowa, 171.
was held competent to impose double taxes as a penalty for failure to make
due return of property to be taxed.
Bristol V. Chicago, 22 111., 587. For cases of penalties imposed in Pennsylvania by the taxing oflacers, under laws which gave an appeal to the courts,
reference may be made to Drexel o. Commonwealth, 46 Penn. St., 87; Commonwealth V. Wyoming Valley Canal Co., 50 id., 410. As to penalties collected
by prosecution, see State «. Welch, 28 Mo., 600 ; Olds v. Commonwealth, 3 A.
K. Marsh., 465 ; Lee v. Commonwealth, 6 Dana, 311 ; Alexander v. Commonwealth, 1 Bibb, 515; McCall v. Justices, id., 516; Chiles v. Commonwealth, 4
J. J. Marsh., 578 ; State v. Manz, 6 Cold well, 557 ; Elam v. State, 25 Ala., 53 ;
Smith V. State, 43 id., 344. These cases, as well as that of Delaware Division
50 Penn. St., 399, recognize the rule that all
Canal Co. v. Commonwealth,
must
nature
be
construed strictly. A municipal corporation
of
this
statutes
for
neglect to pay taxes promptly, unless expressly
cannot impose a penalty
authorized by law to do so. Augusta v. Dunbar, 50 Geo., 387.
'
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he paid by a certain

time, and, after

land shall be forfeited to the

state.

may be taken as an illustration.

some prescribed notice, tbe
The Virginia statute of 1790

After making provision for the

that the sheriff should make to the auditor of
public accounts a return, under oath, of all those, the taxes tipon
which he could find no effects for the satisfaction of ; that certain
prescribed steps should be taken for collection the following year,
taxation of lands

and,

if

;

should be published

these failed, there

in the Virginia

Gazette, for three weeks, the names of delinquents, the quantity

of land, the situation thereof and the taxes due thereon, and that
in case the tax on any part should not be paid for the space of
three years, " the right to such lands shall be lost, forfeited and
vested in the commonwealth," etc.
ute, in the time

This was

a more

liberal stat-

it allowed for payment, than those usually are

which provide for such
tics of all are alike.

a

forfeiture, but the general

characteris-

Serious question has been made of the right of the government to take to itself title to lands, under a forfeiture based on a
personal default, without a

judicial finding that such

a

default

The question was made in the early cases arising under
these statutes, and has continued to be made ever since, without
having yet reached conclusive settlement. One of the most learned
exists.

Virginia judges declared his opinion, under

and able of the early

the act of 1790, that the forfeiture could not be perfected so as to

divest the title of the former owner without inquest of office.-'
This view was accepted in Kentucky,'' and has recently been assented to in an elaborate opinion by the supreine court of Mississippi.'

But the settled doctrine in Virginia is now the other

way,* and the decisions are supported by those of Maine."
' Tucker, J., in Kinuey
no opinion on tliis point.

v.

Beverley, 2 H. & M., 318.

The other judges

gave

« Barbour v.

Nelson, 1 Litt., 60; Eohinson v. HuflF, 3 id., 88. And see Currie
Fowler, 5 J. J. Marsh., 145; Harlan's Heirs v. Beaton's Heirs, 18 B. Monr.,
312.
The decisions in Minnesota favor the same doctrine. See St. Anthony
Co. V. Greely, 11 Minn., 321 ; Baker v. Kelley, id., 480 ; Hill v. Lund, 13 id., 451.

B.

^Griffin v. Mixon, 88 Miss., 414.
case by Handy,
*

Wild's Lessee

gan v. Grimmet,
5

Hodgdon

V.

There is an able dissenting

J.

v. Serpell, 10 Grat., 405; Hale v. Branscum,
id., 421; Usher v. Pride, 15 id., 190.

Wight,

36

Me., 326

;

Adams

v.

opinion in this
id., 418; Flana-

Larrabee, 46 id., 516, 519.
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Some ground we may safely occupy here without liability to conIt is conceded on all sides that an intent to transfer
troversy.
title to the government by forfeiture will not be inferred in any

The

case from language capable of any milder construction.^

courts of Ohio acted upon this view when they held that a statute
which declared, that after due record of the default, the land
"shall be considered as forfeited to the state of Ohio, and be subject to be disposed of in such manner as any future legislature
may direct," did not work an absolute forfeiture, and the owner
But this was partly, at least, on the
might redeem afterwards.
ground that the legislature had never treated this forfeiture as
vesting a title in the state for any other purpose than as security
for taxes due and owing. '^ That statutes of forfeiture are strictly
is an elementary principle,' and there are no cases in
the rule requiring a substantial compliance with all the

construed,

which

important provisions of the statute will more rigidly be insisted
upon.*

Where the power of legislation ipso facto to work a forfeiture
is in question, it is important that there be a clear and precise
understanding of what is intended in the use of this word for-

The usual method of enforcing the payment of taxes
upon property is by putting the property up to a public sale. ISTo

feiture.

right to do this, and no one doubts that the
sale, if fair and made in compliance with the law, and after all
the necessary preliminary steps have been taken, vests a perfect
one questions the

'

1

Fairfax's Devisee ■».Hunter's Lessee, 7 Cranch,
Dillon, 267 ; Bennett v. Hunter, 18 Grat., 100 ; S.

603, 625 ; Schenok «. Peay,
C.

in error,

9

Wall.,

B26,

336.

' Tbevenin o. Slocum's Lessee, 16 Ohio, 519, 532. This case Is cited and relied upon in St. Anthony, etc., Co. v. Greely, 11 Minn., 331.3 See

Schenok «. Peay,

1

Dill.

C.

C,

367;

Twiggs

v.

Chevallie, 4 W. Va., 463.

Lohrs

v.

Miller's Lesssee,

A

13

Grat.,

subsequent taxing of lands by
the stale, and the receipt thereof from the former owner, was held in Hodgdon
The same decision
■BWight, 36 Me., 336, to be no waiver of the forfeiture.
453 ;

was made in Crane

v.

Reeder,

25

Mich.,

303,

which was

a case

of escheat.

In

J.,

discusses at length the question of necessity of inquest
that case Campbell,
of office, and concludes that it is not necessary.

Miss., 668, 676, in which the delay of a few
days after the time fixed by statute for the return of the list was held to defeat
See also Kinney «. Beverley, 2 H. & M., 318, 331 ; Dentler v.
the forfeiture.
State, 4 Blackf., 258; Williams v. State, 6 id., 86.
'^See

Hopkins

v.

Sandige,

31
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title ill the purchaser to the full extent that the statute shall declare.
No judicial proceedings are required to perfect the title,
and if the purchaser have need of a resort to them, in order to
obtain possession, it is only what might occur to any owner of

In what important parproperty under any undisputed title.
ticular does this differ from the case of forfeitures, except that to
the proceedings which are to work the forfeiture there is added
But there are in the sale
the one requirement of a public sale?
no elements of an adjudication; it does not stand in the place of
one ; its purpose is only to bring to the public treasury the tax
for which the sale is made.
Incidentally in the proceedings a
purpose is kept in view, not to sacrifice any farther than shall be
necessary the interests of the owner ; and to this end notice of
with a view to invite competition among
But we are not aware of any constitutional principle
bidders.
that entitles a party to have his duty coerced by a public sale of
the sale is required

property, rather than by a forfeiture of it. A sale by a ministerial
officer which, as the closing step in administrative action, is to divest the owner of his title, is as much obnoxious to the charge
that it deprives him of his freehold without a hearing, as is the
"Whatever there is of the nature of judilegislative forfeiture.
cial inquiry lies back of these proceedings in the action of the
assessing officers, and, as has already been stated, is the same in
both

If

cases.

the owner is condemned without a hearing

in the

one case, he is in the other.

It

may be that

a

public sale would

be most

advantageous

to

taxed, because it might leave to him some portion of
his property after the tax was satisfied.
In the vast majority of
cases, however, the sale is of the whole land, and the possible
the person

benefit is not had.

But there is no imperative principle of gov-

ernment which requires the legislature in prescribing rules of, administration, to fix upon those which would be most for the advantage of a negligent or defaulting

citizen.

We suppose, on

the other hand, that the legislature has very ample discretion to
determine the rule on its own view of public policy.
If it deems
a sale more

advantageous

provide for it

;

otherwise

to the state thaa a forfeiture,

it will

not.

But if by forfeiture is understood the vesting ia the state
title which shall be absolute

and beyond dispute,

a

the question

CH.
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It

is impossible that there can be any
forfeiture, except as the result of an adju-

is different.

right to declare such a
dication to which the owner was

party, which has determined
that the default, upon which the forfeiture was based, exists ia
fact, and that the requisite steps which were to precede the fora

In some judicial tribunal, the
feiture have actually been taken.
party whose freehold is seized has a right to a hearing on these
questions : a constitutional right, if constitutional protections to
property are of any avail. But if by forfeiture is understood
only that without sale there shall pass to the state such title as a
purchaser would acquire if a sale were to take place, the declaration of forfeiture can, of itself, work no absolute deprivation of
right. If the default existed and the tax proceedings are regular,
the state has the title

And in

;

if

not,

it remains 'in the person taxed.

the absence of any statute changing the burden of proof,

it would devolve on the state to prove the regularity of the proceedings, precisely as it would on the purchaser when demanding
the land made under the deed.^

8.

By conditions on the exercise of

stances

statutes

have

attached

a

right.

In

some in-

to the privilege of exercising the

elective franchise, the condition that taxes should have been
paid for the current year, or within some short period preceding.

In

some states this is a matter of constitutional requirement.

If

his duty to the government, he may reasonably be
denied the privilege of participating in the direction of its affairs ;
and these constitutional provisions appear to assume that he, who,
one evades

in his own business, acquires nothing upon which he can be
taxed, must lack the wisdom and discretion to take part in the
business of the state.^ In some instances the payment of a tax
I See

Kinney

668, 676.

«. Beverly,

2

H. & M.,

See, also, post, Chapter

318, 331 ;

XVII.

Hopkins

v.

Sandige,

81

Miss.,

The proceedings for forfeiture, where a judicial prosecution Is required, it
An intent to defraud is made a ground of
seems unnecessary to consider.
forfeiture under some of the federal revenue laws. See United States v. Hogs3 Bond, 137 ; United Slates v. Caddies of Tobacco, 2 id.,
14 Wall., 44. The statute imposing tlie penalty of
Spirits,
305; Henderson's
forfeiture of land and buildings employed in violation of a revenue law, susUnited States v. McKinley, 4 Brewster, 246. See
tained as constitutional.
United States B. Spreckens, 1 Sawyer 84; Qnantity of Tobacco, 5 Ben., 407.
' Constitutional, provisions of the kind exist in Dcleware, Georgia, Massa-

heads of Tobacco,
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assessed against one in respect to a cliose in action owned by him
has been made a condition to the maintenance of a suit upon it^

In

some instances the right to maintain a suit to recover property,
•which the party claims has illegally been taken from him, has
to the condition that he should

been subjected

first pay the tax

for which the property was sold, and perhaps all subsequent taxes ;
but this, we think, has been pushed beyond the constitutional
power of the legislature, as we shall endeavor to show hereafter.^
Stamp taxes are collected by requiring them to be affixed to
some commodity before

it can be sold, some written instrument

before it can be made use of, and the like.

An early law of

con-

gress provided for such taxes, and they were imposed again dur-

ing and since the rebellion.

No reasonable objection in principle

can be opposed to such taxes, and except where they were so made
use of

a.s

to invade the province of state authority,

their validity

was not seriously questioned.'
chusetts and Pennsj'lvania.
As to liability of assessors for depriving one of
his riglit to vote by not assessing lum, see Griffin v. Rising, 11 Met., 339:
And see Tie Dufly, 4 Brewster, 531 ; Balterson v. Bavlow, 60 Penn. St., 54.

Lott ». Dysart, i") Geo., 355; Redwine v. Hancock, id., 364; Scruggs ii.
Gibson, id., 509 ; Green v. Lovvrey, 46 id., 55 ; and many other cases in the sub' See

sequent Georgia

reports.

11 Leigh, 334, in which it was decided to be competent to require evidence of the payment of the taxes as a condition precedent t(i maintaining a suit for the recovery of the lands taxed. See, also,

'See Taylor

Hart,

v.

Burdett,

But such a provision is to be strictly construed,
and will not be applied to the case of special assessments, unless made applicable in terms. Glass v. White, 5 Sneed, 475. See Williamsburg -e. Lord, 51
Me., 599. In Maine, in a contest between the original owner of land and a
tax purchasei-, it is held that the former is not required to tender taxes until
the latter has made out a prima facie case.
Orono d. Veazie, 57 Me., 517 ; S.
C, 61 id., 431. Nor need he make a tender where several parcels have been
sold together, so that it cannot be determined how much he should pay.
Phillipps V. Sherman, 61 Me., 548, 551. In Weller i>. St. Paul, 5 Minn., 95, the
right to enact such laws was denied as being inconsistent with the constitutional right of eveiy citizen to "obtain justice freely and without purchase."
Similar rulings have been made in Illinois. Wilson jj. McKenna, 53 III., 48;
Reed v. Tyler, 56 id., 288. A requirement that no person shall be pcj-mitted
to question a tax title, without showing payment of all taxes due upon the
land will only be applied to plaintiffs, and not to parties in possession defending against a tax deed. Curry v. Hinman, 11 111., 420. Power denied to
Tharp

v.

2 Sueed,

make it applicable.
s

For

Conway

cases under the

be referred to.

The

569.

v.

Cable,

37

id., 82.

Virginia Stamp Act of

1812,

Mumford's Reports may

cases, however, are not very important.
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It is competent in the case of such taxes on business as cannot
be collected in advance, to require security for their payment before the business is entered upon.''

Collection as between the state and its municipalities.
Where state levies are collected through the agency of county,
city or township of&cers, it is competent for the state to make the
county or other district liable as principal debtor for the quota of
the state tax assessed within it.^ Provisions to this eSect are
common in the statutes.
And where the county treasurer is required to give bond to the state for the state taxes to be received
by him, the failure to give a sufBcient bond will not excuse the
The state is not to suffer from the laches of its agents
county.
in such matters.^
' Mason

v.

EoUins,

3 Biss., 99 ;

United States

».

Mathoit,

1

Sawyer, 143.

'^

Schuylkill County ij. Commonwealth, 36 Penn. St., 524; People v. Supervi31 Micli.
When the state treasurer charges over to a county
its proportion of the state tax, the county becomes debtor, and cannot burden
the state with any drawback of percentage.
Multnomah Co. i). State, 1 Oresors of St. Clair,

gon, 358.
cases cited in the preceding note. A county is liable to towns for
Potter County v. Oswayo, 47
money collected by a defaulting county treasurer.
But it is not liable to the town for its quota until the amount
Penn. St., 1G3.
^ See

has been actually collected.
31

Guittard

v.

Marshall County,

4

Kans.,

888.

322

[CH. XV.

LAW OF T^ViATION.

CHAPTEE XV.
THE SALE OF LANDS FOR UNPAID TAXES.
When made. Lands are sold by the government for taxes,
either because the assessments made upon them are not paid within the time allowed by law for their voluntary satisfaction by the
owner, or because a personal assessment against the owner remains
uncollected by the ordinary process.
Whether the sale is to be
will

made for the one reason or for the other, the same principles
it,

govern

though in some particulars the proceedings will differ.

As government

The land must be liable.

has no inherent

a

if

a

right to deprive the citizen of his property except in pursuance of
sale
regular and lawful proceedings, and for lawful demand,
If by law
of lands will be void
they were not liable for the tax.
a

if

;*

it

a

a

sale will be void though for
they were exempt from taxation,
tax actually assessed and so
will be
made for
tax legally
assessed but which in some lawful manner has been discharged.

Payment of the tax by the owner, or by any one entitled to
is

and termination of any statutory
The persons who, besides the owner, are entitled
to make payment, are those who are assessed for the tax, and any
it,

make

an absolute defeat

power to sell.^

would

interests

be

injuriously • affected by

a

others whose

sale,

Hobson

v. Dutton,

9

'

;

is

it

f

either because of liens they may have, or of contract relations and
any one having the right may depute another to make
for him.
Whether any third person may make payment
not so clear but
Kans., 477.

22

Gray,

Ark.,

29

Iowa,

118;

'See Bennett v. Hunter,
V. Irwin, 18 id., 549.

cey

Sprague

440;

Bennett
18

d.

Hunter,

rat., 100;

3

v.

Coenan, 30 Wis.,

Wall.,

2094

Wallace

ii.

326.

Same case in error,

9

B.

G

Walton
Brown,

9

;

3
;

;

;

;

;

3

4

'Dougherty v. Dickey, W. & S., 146; Hunter v. Cochran,
Penn. St., 105;
v. Meredith, 17 id., 42 Ankeny v. Albright, 20 id., 157 Laird v.
Montgomery
Heister, 24 id., 452 Jackson v. Morse, 18 Johns., 441 Den «. Terrell, Hawks,
283; Rowland «. Doty, Har. Ch.,
Johnson v. Scott, 11 Mich., 232; Raynor v.
Lee, 20 id., 384; Curry v. Hinman, 11 111., 420 Morrison v. Kelley, 22 111., 610;

Wall., 336; Ta-
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as the state is only interested in obtaining the revenue
for,

it would

seem

S23

it has called

that, before any sale, and consequently before

any rights of third parties have intervened, any mere volunteer
may pay the tax if he chooses ;' and certainly if the proper officer
should receive payment, any question concerning the right to
make it would be precluded. Payment is an act in pais, which
may be proved not only by the record, but by the original receipt ;" and it may also be made out by any other evidence which
satisfies a jury of the fact.'
But payment cannot be shown in opposition to a judicial finding;
thereto and their privies.*

at least as between

Tender of the tax by any one who has

the parties

right to make payment, is effectual to prevent a sale, whether the tender is accepted
or not.^ But a tender, in order to be effectual, must be of the

full amount of the tax

a

it can not be of any thing less, unless the

;

statute makes provision for payment of a part by itself, as

it

does

sometimes for the benefit of tenants in common or owners of dis-

tinct portions of the premises taxed.
Necessity

for regular proceedings.

' See Reading
v.

■o.Finney, 73 Penn.
Austin, 23 Ark., 375.

*

Johnstone D.Scott,
St , 13; Been v. Wills,
'Dennett «.
Kandt). Schofield,43
Iowa, 61.

Crocker,

11
21
8

III.,

To the validity of any

it is imperatively necessary that there shall

sale of lands for taxes,

Kinswortliy

^

Mich.,
Texas,

Martin

v.

McKeynolds

283;

d.

Snowden,

Grat,

18

Longenberger,

100 ;

57 Penn.

G43.

Greenl.,
167;

St., 467 ;

Hanniu, 21 Mich., 374;
id., 285; Adams «. Beale, 19

Hammond

239;

Cook B.Norton,

61

u.

Gay lord ®. Scarff, 6 Iowa, 179; Cadmus?). Jackson, 52 Penn. St., 295; Wallace 1). Brown, 22 Ark., 118. In this last case it is strongly intimated that if
^

the collector, after the tax has been paid to him, proceeds to a sale of the land,
and then obtains a judicial confirmation of the sale under a statute providing
" a complete bar
therefor, and which makes the confirmation
against any and
all persons who may thereafter claim said land in consequence of informality
or illegality in the proceedings," the sale might and ought, in a direct pro-

for the purpose, to be

ceeding

set aside

for fraud, though it could not

be at-

tacked collaterally.
^Schenck v. Peay,

worthy

V.

'Hunt
V.

Burke,

Austin,
«.

23

1

McFadgen,

25 id., 377.

Dill.

C.

C,

269;

Ark., 375; Tacey
20

Ark.,

277;

Loomis

b.

Irwin,

18

v.

Heft

v.

Pingroe, 43 Me.,
Wall., 540.

Gebhart,

65

299;

Penn. St., 510;

KinsCrum
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have been a substantial compliance with the law in

which have led to

proceedings

all the official

it.^

The
statutory power.
officer who makes them sells something he does not own, and
which he can have no authority to sell except as he is made the
But he is made such agent
agent of the law for the purpose.

Tax sales are made exclusively under

a

only by certain steps which are to precede his action, and which
If these fail, the
under the law are conditions to his authority.
If one of them fails, it is as fatal as if
power is never created.

all failed.

Defects in the conditions to a statutory authority can-

by the courts ; if they have not been observed, the
courts cannot dispense with them, and thus bring into existence
not be aided

which the statute only permits when the conditions have
IST either,
been fully complied with.
as a general rule, can the
a power

courts aid the defective

execution of

statutory power ; they may
do this when the power has been created by the owner himself,
and when such action would presumptively be in furtherance of
his purpose

in creating

it; but

a

a

statutory power must be exe-

cuted according to the statutory directions,

and presumptively any

other execution is opposed to the legislative will, instead of in
furtherance of it. It is therefore accepted as an axiom when tax
that a fundamental condition to
sales are under consideration,
■

their validity is that there should have been a substantial compliance with the law in all the proceedings of which the sale was
This would be the general rule in all cases in
the culmination.
which

is to be divested of his freehold by adversary probut special reasons make it peculiarly applicable to the

a man

ceedings

;

case of tax sales.

These reasons are thus summarized by the su" Sales of real estate for the
:
nonpayment

preme court of Maine

of taxes must be regarded in a great measure as an ex parte proThe owner is to be deprived of his land thereby ; and
ceeding.
a series of acts preliminary to the sale are to be performed to authorize it on the part of the assessors and collector, to which his
attention may never have been particularly called ; and experience and observation render it notorious that the amount paid by
'

Tliere must be express statutory authority for selling lands for taxes. A
power to tax does not include the power to cause lands to be sold for nonpaySee Mclnery v. Reed, 23 Iowa, 410 ; Sibley v. Smith, 2
ment of the taxes.
Mich.,

48G; Sharp v. Spier, 4

Hill,

76.
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purchasers at such sales is uniformly trifling, in comparison with
It has therefore been held, with
the value of the property sold.
make
out
a valid title under such sales,
great propriety, that to
great strictness is to be required ; and it must appear that the
provisions of law preparatory to^and authorizing such sales, have
^

punctiliously complied with."
In Virginia, somewhat stronger language has been employed.
" founded on forfeitures,
" These sales and
purchases," it is said,
been

deserve

no indulgence from the court.

It

is therefore the well

settled law that he who claims under a forfeiture, must show that

tlie law has been exactly complied with."^ This language, if
strictly taken, is unquestionably more exacting in its requireIt is not necesments than the authorities generally will justify.
in any proceedings so complicated as those
in which lands are sold for taxes, that there should be shown an
exact and punctilious compliance with all the provisions of law
sary, we apprehend,

•

With many of these provisions,
before they can be supported.
as we have endeavered to show in a preceding chapter, the party
interested in defeating such a sale could have no concern whatever. They are not made for his protection or benefit, and whether

A failure to obobserved or not, they do not .afiect his interest.
serve them, can, therefore, furnish no ground of complaint on his
behalf ; and it is not perceived that it can constitute for liim any

just or equitable protection against the demands of the state for
It is sufficient for his case if the provisions
its lawful revenues.
which do concern him have been observed ; and if others which are
made in the interest of the public are overlooked or disregarded,
the

public,

through

its proper authorities, must be the proper

Ch. J., in Brown v. Veazie, 25 Me., 359, 363. See also Keene v.
Houghton, 19 id., 368; Smith v. Bodfish, 37 id., 289; Flint i). Sawyer, 30 id.,
226; Paysoa i). Hall, 30 id., 319; Matthews «. Light, 33 id., 305; Howe v. Eussel, 36 id., 115; Stevens t). jVtcNamara, 36 id., 176; Loomis v. Pingree, 43 Me.,
299; Lovejoy v. Lunt, 48 id., 377; "Williamsburg v. Lord, 5i id., 599; French v.
' WJiitman,

Patterson,

61

id,, 203.

' Oarr, J., in "Wilson v. Bell., 7 Leigh, 22, 24. And see Yancey v. Hopkins,
1 Munf., 419; Christy v. Minor, 4 id., 431; Nalle v. Fenwick, 4 Rand., 585;
Allen V. Smith, 1 Leigh, 231, 254; Chapman i). Doe, 2 id., 329, 357; Jesse v.
Preston, 5 Grat., 120; Martin i). Snowden, 18 id., 100. In California it has
in these cases are strictissimi juris. Ferris v
been said that the proceedings
Coover, 10 Cal., 589, 633; Kelsey v. Abbott, 13 id., 609.
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party to complain. This''is reasonable, and this is the rule that
is laid down by the authorities.
Onus

At

of proof.

the common law

it was necessary that one

who claimed to have obtained title to property of another, under
proceedings based upon a neglect of public duty, should take upon
himself the burden of showing that the law had been complied
with by those who had had the proceedings in charge. Especially
if the proceedings would operate with severity'-, and be in their

in the nature of

effects something

a

forfeiture, the law was strict

in its requirement that his evidence should exhibit the proceedings from step to step, and show that each of the safeguards with
which the statute

had

surrounded the delinquent for his protec-

tion in this very emergency, had been duly observed.
And this
tenderness for his interests appeared but reasonable.
Of what
service could it be that safeguards were provided, if observance
was not essential

if

or incompetent officer might overlook or disregard them with impunity, and deal with the property
of the citizen as if his position as an officer of the government
vested him with a dispensing authority over legislation, and
;

a careless

authorized him to make, in his discretion,
proceeded

a

law for the case

as he

?

This rule of the common law has not been modified by decisions,
and is still recognized and enforced, where statutes have not

It

may consequently be said to be the general rule,
that the party claiming lands under a sale for taxes, must show
affirmatively that the law under which the sale was made, has
changed

it.

been substantially complied with, not only in the sale itself, but
in all the anterior proceedings.^ But although the authorities
' Stead's

Ex'rs v. Course, 4 Cranch, 403; Parker u. Rule's Lessee, 9 id., 64;
Williams v. Peyton's Lessee, 4 Wheat., 77 ; McCliing v. Ross, .1 id., 116 ; Thatcher «. Powell, 6 id., 119; Games v. Stiles, 14 Pet., 332; Pillow v. Roberts, 13
How., 472 ; Moore v. Bro wu, 1 1 id., 414 ; Ilarly v. Doe,»16 id., 610 ; Parker v. Overman, 18 id., 142 ; Little v. Herndon, 10 Wall., 26 ; Hughey's Lessee v. Horrell, 3
Ohio, 233 ; Holt's Heirs v. Hemphill's Heirs, 3 id., 332 ; Lafferty's Lessee v. Byers,
5 id., 458; Thomson's
Heirs v. Gotham, 9 id., 170; Kellogg «. McLaughlin, 8

id., 114; Polk «. Rose, 25 Md., 153; Pope v. Headen.o Ala., 483; Elliott v. Eddins, 34 id., 503; Garrett «. Wiggins, 1 Scam., 335; Pitch v. Pinckard, 4 id.,
69; Doe v. Leonard, 4 id., 140; Wiley v Bean, 1 Gilm., 303; Irving v. Brownell,
234;

11 111., 403;

Gcevveyt).

Spellman

Urig,

18

v. Curtenius,

13

id., 409; Marsh

id., 343; Lane

b.

Bommelmann,

v.

Chestnut,

21 id.. 143;

14

id.,

Charles
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concur in this rule with great unanimity, they are not so entirely
in accord when the question regards the strictness required in the
showing that shall be made. On this point some of the cases,
particularly those which were decided at a very early day, have
used language importing a strictness greater than in most cases

would be possible, and greater than is demanded

by any considerations of policy or of justice to the party whose estate is in question.
The later cases lay down a more just and reasonable
rule, and warrant us in saying, that the requirement of a compliance with the law, when the question arises as one of title, is satisfied by obedience to those provisions of the law which are in
the nature of conditions to the power to sell, and are not merely
To I'Cdirectory under the rules laid down in another chapter.^
quire more than this would be needless for any beneficial purpose,
and would greatly embarass, and in innumerable cases, defeat the
collection of the revenue.
The requirement that the claimant under

a

tax sale should show

the proceedings to have been regular, was entirely according to the
The original owner would show a
natural order of evidence.
prima facie right by producing the documents and evidence which

To overcome this, there
his original ownership.
must be evidence of a title overriding or extinguishing it ; and
such a title would not appear in the tax purchaser until the successive steps, taken in compliance with the tax law, and ending in
To prove merely a sale,
a sale and conveyance, had been shown.

demonstrated

would be futile, unless the power to make the sale was established

;

and to prove merely an instrument purporting to be

a

conveyance, would be even more idle.
Waugh, 35 id., 315; Norris i). Russell, 5 Cal., 250; Keane v. Caunovan, 21
id., 291 ; O'Brien v. Coulter, 3 Blackf., 431 ; Williams v. State, 6 id., 36 ; Wiggins
». Holley, 11 Ind.,3; Gavins. Sherman, 23 id., 33; Ellis ». Kenyon, 25 id., 134;
Jackson v. Shepard, 7 Cow., 88; Atkins v. Kinman, 20 Wend., 341; Sharp v.
Spier, 4 Hill, 76; Sharp v. Johnson, 4 id., 93; Newell «. Wheeler, 48 N. Y.,
486; Westfall v. Preston, 49 id., 349; Hall v. Collins, 4 Vt., 316; Bellows v. Elliott, 12 id., ■'j69; Brown ii. Wright, 17 id., 97 ; Waldron v. Tuttle, 3 N. H., 340 ;
Cass V. Bellows, 31 id., 501 ; Hawley ii. Mitchell, 31 id., 575 ; Annan v. Baker,
49 id., 161; Scott ■». Young Men's Society, 1 Doug. Mich., 119; Latimer v.
Loyett, 3 id., 204; Scott v. Babcock, 3 Green, Iowa, 133; Uaylord v. Scarff, 6
Iowa, 179: McGahen v. Carr, 6 Iowa, 331; Morton v. Reads, 6 Mo., 64; S. 0.
9 id., 878; Nelson v. Grebel, 17 id., 161; Kelly v. Medlin, 26 Texas, 38
V.
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N"or was there any special injustice or hardship in the rule of
the law, which required the tax purchaser to prove the regularity

of the proceedings under which he claimed.
Whether the interest of the state might not be best subserved by casting the onus
of showing defects in the title on the adverse claimant, and
whether,

therefore, on grounds of public policy

it might not be

advisable to change the rule accordingly, are questions that stand
quite apart from any which concern the claims or rights of the
purchaser ; but regarding his position only, there was no hardship
in calling upon him to give proof of his title by showing a sale
made with due authority.

A

tax sale is the culmination of proceedings which are matters of record ; and it is a reasonable presumption of law that, where one acquires rights which depend
npon matters of record, he first makes search of the record in order to ascertain whether anything shown thereby would diminish
the value of such rights, or tend in any contingency to defeat

A

tax purcliaser consequently cannot be, in any strict
technical sense, a bona fide purchaser, as that term is underthem.^

'

That

on which tax sales depend are to be proved by tlie
records, or by the originals from which tlie records should be made up ; the
following cases are autliority, if indeed any is necessary : Job v. Tebbetts, 5
the proceedings

Schuyler e. Hull, 11 id.,
463,465; Boston «. Weymouth, 4 Cush., 538; Bucksport ». Spoflibrd, 13 Me.,
487; Adams v. Mack, 3 N. H., 493, 499; Blake v. Sturtevant, 13 id., 567; Pittsfield «. Barnstead, 40 id., 477 493; McCrory v. Manes, 47 Geo., 90; Sheldon,
Lessee v. Coats, 10 Ohio, S78"; Thevenin v. Slocum, 16 id., 519, 531; Blodgett
t). Holbrook, 39 Vt., 336;
Iverslie v. Spauldiag, 33 Wis., 394; GearhaVt «.
Dixon, 1 Penn. St., 234; Diamond Coal Co. ■».Fisher, 19 id., 267; Miner v. McLean, 4 McLean, 138 ; Games v. Stiles, 14 Pet., 333. But such records do not
import absolute verity like those of courts, and it may be shown in contradiction to their recitals that the facts were otherwise than as there stated. Diamond Coal Co., J). Fisher, 19 Penn. St., 367, 373 ; Boston v. Weymouth, 4 Cash.,
538, 541; Blake «. Sturtevant, 32N. H., 567; Graves ■„. Bruen, 11 111., 431,
448; Tebbetts D. Job, 11 id., 453; Schuyler v. Hull, 11 Id., 463 465. In Kellogg
u. McLaughlin, 8 Ohio, 114, 116, the record of tax proceedings was held to be
conclusive against the party claiming under a tax sale, but not against the
party contesti.ng it. In Miner ». McLean, 4 McLean, 138, 140, it is said that
" parol evidence is not admissible to supjily a defect in the record.
This well
established rule can admit of no exception."
In Coit v. Wells, 3 Vt, 318, it
was decided that the records of the advertisements in the case of road taxes
were not evidence at all unless they contained all the particulars required by
These cases, however, are not inconsistent with a resort to parol
the statute.
evidence as secondary to that of record when the latter is lost or destroyed.
Gilm.,

376, 380;

Graves

v.

Bruen,

11

111.,

431,443;
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honafide parchaser is one who buys
an apparently good title without notice of anything calculated
to impair or aflEect it ; but the tax purchaser is always deemed to
stood

a

lie cannot shut

have such notice when the record shows defects.

his eyes to what has been recorded for the information of all
concerned, and relying implicitly on the action of the officers,
assume what they have done is legal because they have done it.

It is

indeed

law

never

presumption of law that official duty is performed ;
and this presumption stands for evidence in many cases ; but the
a

assumes

the

of jurisdictional facts; and
the general rule
that the taking

existence

have been taken, that the

a

is

;

it

is

is,

throughout the tax proceedings
of any one important step
jurisdictional prerequisite to the
next and
cannot therefore be assumed, because one
shown to
officer performed his duty in

that which should have preceded

taking

it.^

is

Presumptions of regularity.

But while the tax purchaser
making his showing, the strictness required in the proof may

reasonably be made to depend, to some extent, upon the circumstances.
Presumptions are indulged in every class of proceedings; and in some cases presumptions may give an efficient sup-

a

a

port to evidence which, without them, would be insufficient to
establish the necessary facts. Indeed, in some cases, presumptions may supply links which appear to be missing in the testitax case, that
mony. It was once said by an eminent judge in
" full evidence of every minute circumstance ought not,
especially
distant day, to be required. From the establishment of some
at
^

is

it

possible that others may be presumed, and less than
Nothing, under some
positive testimony may establish facts."
facts

If

A

'

tax purchaser comes strictly ■within tlie rule caveat emptor.
his title
failed
to
notice
of sale, he has no remedy
give
fails because the collector
Hamilton v. Valiant, 30 Md., 139. Neither has he for
against the collector.
a

remedy against the town.
any error or irregularity which defeats his title
And see Jenks v. Wright, 61 Pean. St., 410,
v. Melrose, 10 Allen, 49.
authorized to refund the bids to
In Michigan the Auditor General
414.
is

Lynde

;

is

;

but his right to do
purchasers in some cases in which titles prove defective
to
the
cases
in
enumerated
the
statute
the state taking
limited strictly
so

4

no responsibility for the action of otBcers where the purchaser has the same
opportunity for knowing tlie facts that the state officers have. People ■».
Auditor General, 30 Mich., 13.
Cranch, 413. See, to the
''Marsliall-, Ch. J., in Stead's Executors v. Course,
33
Thayer,
v.
76.
Me.,
Freeman
same effect,
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But when that
could be more just or reasonable.
" distant
day arrives, when presumptions are relied upon, it will
be found necessary to observe, with some circumspection, what
circumstances,

has

"

the parties, relative to the property

the position of

been

from the time the sale was made.

claimed,

That position may
influence.

sometimes very reasonably have a controlling

If

the

has made no claim under his title, and has left the

and the weaker are all presumptions in its favor."

on the other hand, he has made claim in practical and

ive form by taking possession, and especially

if,

If,

the
'

weaker

is,

The older it is without any claim being made under
it

"

it,

tax purchaser
original owner to treat the property as his own, it is difficult to
understand on what ground any presumption can be built up in
aid of the tax title, deriving its force from the lapse of time.

effect-

after the posses-

it

sion was taken, the other party, with full knowledge thereof, has
neglected, for any considerable period, to assert his own rights,

it

must be conceded that the claim of the tax purchaser will come
before the courts under circumstances entitling
to much greater
indulgence.

If

The reasons for this are manifest.

one who claims to have

is a

is

it

is

if

is

it,

a

title to property shall lie by for
long term of years without
in the enjoyment of that which,
while another
asserting
the title
not
valid, should be enjoyed by himself,
ver-y

it

if

is

because he
well
violent presumption that his supineness
he were to
aware of some defect which would defeat his claim
in
The
he
the
assert
longer
delays
legal proceedings.
stronger

it

it

is

it

is

;

if

and
this presumption becomes
the time could ever arrive
could be presumed without dewhen, because the claim
old,
obvious that
could only be on an indulgence of prefects,
That he may lie by
sumptions that are opposed to reason.

until the time can arrive when, because of his
will
be
lying by,
presumed that no defects exist, and then be
in
the
law
inferable he did
by
possession of that which
put
before,

is

an absurdity so manifest that

time need not be wasted in the attempt to make

more so.

See, to the same eflFect, Eead v. Good-

Hole ». Rittenhouse, 19 Penn. St., 305; Worthing
Me., 270; Eichardson v. Dorr,
Vt.,
Townsend v. Downer,
9;

Webster, 45
id., 183.

46 Penn. St., 62.

5

'

Alexander v. Bush,
year, 17 S. & E., 350;

it

not venture to demand

is

it

it

because of defects,

■».
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It

is different when the tax purchaser has been ia possession.^
That fact is some evidence that he at least believes his title to
have validity ; and if those who might dispute it neglect to do so,
the inferences will be more or less strong, according to the circumstances, that their action is attributable

to the belief that

a con-

It

is doubted if in any case, on common
tax title could be presumed valid before the full

test must be ineffectual.

law principles, a
period allowed by the statute of limitations for bringing suit had
The court of appeals of Virginia decided at an early
expired.
day that it could not be,^ and no satisfactory reason has been suggested in any quarter to cast a doubt upon the correctness of this

Still, presumptions may be very forcible in some
cases, where, on the evidence, it is left in doubt whether the tax
proceedings have or have not been conducted in conformity to
conclusion.

If

law.

possession has been held under them for a considerable

period, though it may not have been for a length of time sufficient
to bar suits for the recovery of lands, there may reasonably spring
from such possession an inference in favor of its legality, of sufficient force to turn the scales on any point left in doubt on the
proofs, and to justify a jury, to whom the case is submitted, in
the

drawing

conclusion

which

supports the

possession.

The

longer the possession has continued, the stronger should be the
intendments in favor of the title under which it is held ; and
although - these cannot make valid that which in itself is void,
they may, and should, be allowed their weight whe.n a case is to

What their

be determined which the evidence has left in doubt.

weight should be must depend on the circumstances

;

there

can

Possession, recovery against tlie grantor of defendant in trespass, and payment of taxes, are evidence in favor of a tax deed thirty years old that a sui'plus bond, the cost of which is receipted in the deed, was given. Lackawana
'1

Iron

Co.

■wliere

B.

Failes,

55 Penn. St., 90.

there has been possession

As

of recitals in deeds generally,
them, see Worthing v. Webster, 45

to the force

under

Me., 370.

Allen

Leigh, 231, 355. The validity of a tax sale is] not to be
mere
deed of the collector, unaccompanied
presumed from the
by extrinsic
Nor, in an action of ejectevidence that the prior proceedings were regular.
ment, will any presumptions be made in favor of the validity of the deed,
merely because the party claiming it proves a possession adverse to the title
''

n.

South,

1

of another party, but for a period short of that prescribed
limitations. Towrisend v. Downer, 33 Vt., 183.

by the statute of
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be no definite rule of law on the subject which can be applied in

all cases.'
Presumptions could in no case supply the want o£ a record
when the law requires one, and it has never been made ; neither
can they help out a record which is so defective as not to answer

But when it has been once made

the requirements of the law.^

to appear that a record has existed which is now lost or destroyed,

presumptions may justly be allowed great weight in support of
the secondary evidence, in proof of the contents of the record,
and that it was in compliance with the

law.^

Five years' possession does not warrant a finding in favor of the regularity
of proceedings, wlien their correctness is not sliown by tlie evidence. Phillips V. Sherman, 61 Me., 548. See Pejepscut Proprietors v. Ransom, 14 Mass.,
As to what Tvill be overlooked in Pennsylvania, under their statute,
145.
which declares that no irregularities in the assessment, process, or otherwise,
shall be allowed to affect the title of the purchaser, see Laird d. Hiester, 24
Ponn. St., 453. As to the force of the presumption in favor of the correctness
of official action under that statute, see Cuttle i). Brockway, 24 Penn. St., 145 ;
Heft v. Gephart, 65 id., 518. In Schoff ». Gould, 53 N. H., 512, the tax proceedings depended on the vote of a meeting, and the question was made upon
proof of the warrant for holding it. The court say : " The meeting was held
in March, 1841 — more than thirty years ago — and officers were chosen who
'

acted as such, and the jury might have presumed that the warrant remained
posted the requisite time. Bishop v. Cone, 3 N. H., 513; Northwood v. Bar-

rington,

9

id.,

87.3 ;

Petersborough

!).

Lancaster, 14 id., 373

;

School District

«.

Bragdon, 33 id., 514. In Cavis v. Robertson, 9 N. H., 534, it was held that this
rule did not apply where the facts were recent, and the records might be
amended, but would apply where, from the lapse of time, it may be presumed
that the officers who made the records are no longer living, or have no recollection of the facts. It does not appear that the officers who made the record
are dead, but it is a fair presumption that they have lost recollection
fact that the notice remained posted."

of

the

The following cases are important, as showing what, under their varying
circumstances, was held sufficient evidence of an assessment: Bratton v. MitchW. & S., 259 ; Crum v. Burke, 25 Penn. St., 377, 381 ; Heft ii. Gephart, 65
id., 510 ; McDermott «. Hoffman, 70 id., 31 ; McReynolds v. Longenberger, 57
id., 13 ; Pittsfield v. Barnstead, 40 ST. H., 477. The sale book does not prove
Bratton d. Mitchell, 1 "W. ife S., 310. Neither do the recitals
an assessment.
in the tax warrant. Hoffer v. Matteson's Es'rs, 16 N. J. Eq., 382.
ell,

7

i'Coit a. Wells, 2 Vt., 318; Capron v. Raistrick,
Laughlin, 8 Ohio, 114; Porter ». Byrne, 10 Ind.,
82 Wis., 394 ; Moser v. White, 29 Mich., 59.

44 id., 515;
146;

Iverslie

Kellogg
v.

«.

Mo-

Spaulding,

in the proper offlcs, and it is not shown that
in existence, there is no presumption that one was made.
Hall
In Cass ». Bellows, 31 N. II., 501, 510, Eastman, J.,
1). Kellogg, 16 Mich., 139.
'Where

a record is not found

one was ever
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Special authority to sell. The various proceedings which
usually are required to precede a sale of the lands have been sucWhether, when these have been taken, the
officer will require any special warrant or process as his authority
for proceeding to a sale, must depend upon whether something of
that nature is provided for by law.
In some of the states a list
cessively mentioned.

of delinquent

lands is made out and properly certified by the
officer of state, to whom

state auditor, or some other designated
the returns of delinquent taxes

have

been made, and

this list is

transmitted to the county or township official who by law is entrusted with the duty of making sales, and constitutes his warrant for doing so. In other states, the statutes make other special
Whatever list, certificate or wai-rant
provisions for the purpose.
is prescribed by the statute, it is to be looked upon as in the nature of process, and it is indispensible that the officer should
have it before taking any steps towards making a sale.^
And in
all his action he must keep within the command of his warrant
and of the law ; for his authority will fail to support him when
he fails to observe

it.^

uses the following language : " In Cavis B..Eobertson, 9 N. H., 524, it was held
that there are cases in which it may he submitted to a jury to presume, from
a defective record of the election of a town oificer, and from his having
acted under the appointment,

that the meeting was duly held, the proceedings
; but that this cannot be done

of the town regular and the officer duly sworn

where the proceedings are recent, and no cause is shown why the defective
record cannot be amended if the truth will warrant it." And, after comment-

ing upon Gibson v. Bailey, 9 N. H., 168, he adds : " In the case before us, the
town clerk had deceased before the suit was brought. The record was defective, but showed that the collector was evidently sworn in some way.
Nearly forty years had elapsed from the making of the record to the com^
mencement of the suit, and, from the authority of the cases cited, and the
principles therein stated, we think the evidence was competent to be submitted to a jury, as tending to show the collector to have been duly elected and
duly sworn. It can make no difference whether the demandant was the proThe
prietor of the lot at the time it was sold, or a subsequent purchaser.
'
'
was
sworn
into
office
was
to
all ; and, if he
open
record that the collector
purchased with that before him, he took the title, subject to the same rights
in regard to the record, as had existed with respect to former owners."
1 See

Horner

■u.Craig, 5

v.

Cilley,

Ired., 139;

14

N. H., 85; Hannel v. Smith, 15 Ohio, 134; Kelley
v. Kent, 19 Ai-k., 603; Miner v. McLean, 4 Mc-

Gossett

Lean, 138.
2
Where the statute requii-es the sale to be made within two years from the
Usher «. Taft, 33 Me., 199.
date of the warrant, a sale at a later day is void.
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Notice of sale.

is,

The first proceeding usually required of the
oflacer who is to make sale
that he shall give public notice of
his intention to do so. Under different statutes notices in various forms are required, as may be thought most suitable l,o the

If

case.

the statute fails to specify the

character of the notice,

is

;

a

^

but
provision so
doubtless one in writing must be intended
Unusual care
indefinite will not often be met with.
required

in obeying the directions of the statute regarding notice,

as no

a

is

a

is

sale which has
entitled to notice can be bound by
no constitutional provision entibeen made without it.
There
tling one to notice in particular mode: what the statute has
one who

the case of residents, per-

in a newspaper

Sometimes

the published notice

a

^

;

all that

is

is

published

is

In

but for nonresidents,
notice
provided for.'
generally all that

sometimes required

is

sonal notice

is

made sufficient must be deemed so.

made requisite even

346.

Yerg.,

A

307.

v. Kose,

Dev., 549; Doe

of course void.
preceding the day
See Orr v. Travacier, 31 Iowa, 68.

sale

is

C,

principle, Avery

must be complied with
v.

Allen,

Conrad

i).

67

N.

Darden,

4

See, for the same

it

Whatever the provision

4

tain period.

is,

a

;

in the case of residents
while other statutes direct that the tax
list shall be kept posted in some public place or places for cer-

It

'

Pearson

v.

15

Ark., 331 Kiusworthy v. Mitchell,
Garabaldi v. Jenkins, id., 453.
;

Merrick v. Hutt,
■u.Skully, 27 id.,

21

id.,

145

;

has been decided that where, by the statute, the proceedings are different
in the case of nonresidents from what they are in the case of residents, the
subsequent proceedings will be invalid unless they follow the assessment.

McDermo't

226;

Lovejoy,

53 Barb., 407.

it,

citing Comstock v. Beardsley, 15 Wend., 348; Bush D.Davison,
In North Carolina seems that the mortgagee
regarded as
is

550.

it

286,

5

a

it

a

it,

a

it

^

Where the statute required notice to be given to the occupant, if the land
was occupied,
was held that one having a paper title to
lot of 169 acres,
and who, though not on
cultivated
small piece of
was entitled to nosale made without giving
tice, and
was void.
Leland v. Bennett, Hill,
16

Wend.,

the owner

=

;

of land mortgaged, so as to be entitled to the notice required to be given to
Whitehurst v. Gaskill, 69 N. C, 449 S. C, 12 Am. Kep., 655.
the owner.
The owner of unseated lands is only entitled to such notice as the statute

Case, 11 id., 338.

is

;

is

a

is

it

shall provide for, and he must take notice of the tax proceedings at his peril.
Cuttle V. Brockway, 32 Penn. St., 45. It is said in Louisiana that
in the
power of the legislature to determine what shall be sufflcient to bring parties
published notice
into court in tax cases, and if
provided for and given,
New Orleans v. Cordeviolle, 10 La. An., 732 Draining, Co.
suflaoient.
that
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This is one of the most important of all the safeguards

stric%.

"which has been deemed

necessary to protect the interests of par-

ties taxed

be a substitute for it or excuse the
; aud nothing can
failure to give it.^ The notice being a prerequisite to the officer's
authority, the fact that in the particular case it can be shown that
the party concerned

was

fully

will be

aware of the proceedings,

of no avail in supporting them.
He is under no obligation to
take notice of the proceedings unless duly notified.
Mere informalities or unimportant variances in an attempt to comply with the
law may not be fatal, but variance in substance cannot be overlooked.

It

may be useful to notice some of the cases on the subject.
the statute required the notice to contain a particular
statement of the taxes on each lot, a notice not containing it was
held void.^ So where the notice was for less than the statutorj'
"Where

time, though but for a single day, the proceeding was held to be
as

fatally defective

as

if no notice at all had been given.'

So

where the notice was required to be published for a certain time
in the paper of the state printer, and the publication was duly
begun, but before completion
state printer,

the paper ceased to be that of the

it was held insufficient*

So

a

notice is defective if

>

Washington D. Pratt, 8 Wheat., G81; Early «. Doe, 16 How., 610; Moulton
Blaisdell, 24 Me., 283; Flint v. Sawyer, 30 id., 226; Hill v. Mason, 38 id.,
461 ; Bush v. Davison, 16 Wend., 550 ; Alexander v. Pitts, 7 Cush., 508 ; Blalock V. Gaddes, 33 Miss., 452; Reed b. Morton, 9 Mo., 878; Priudle i>. Campbell, 9 Minn., 212; Jeuks v. Wright, 61 Penn. St., 410. A written notice will
not answer where a j)rinted notice is required by S'tatute.
Lagrone v. Rains,
48 Mo., 536.
Nor can posting the list be omitted when required by statute.
Yenda i). Wheeler, 9 Texas, 408: see Pitts v. Booth, 15 id., 453.V.

''Washington

d.

Pratt,

8

Wheat.,

681 : see

Jenks

v.

Wright,

61

Penn. St., 410.

Newark, 36 N. J., 288. A similar ruling was made in Pope v.
Ala., 433. And see Elliott «. Eddins, 24 id., 508 ; Flint v. Sawyer,
30 Me., 226 ; Hobbs ». Clements, 32 Me., 67. Twelve weeks' notice of sale requires eighty-four full days. Early v. Doe, 16 How., 610. Where notice is
required to be for ten days, Sundaj's excepted, and it is omitted two days, not
Haskell v. Bartlett, 34 Cal., 281. See further as to time
Sundaj's, it is void.
<if publication, Kellogg d. McLaughlin, 8 Ohio, 114; Cass «. Bellows, 31 N.
H., 501 ; Moore v. Brown, 4 McLean, 211 ; S. C, in error, 11 How., 414; Westbrook V. Wiley, 47 N. Y., 457 ; Dubuque v. Wooton, 28 Iowa, 571.
^ State V.

Headon,

5

^Bussey

Lyon

».

v.

Hunt,

Leavitt,
11

13

Me., 378.

id., 395; Sharp

v.

Compare

Johnson,

4

Pope

Hill,

».

Headou,

5

Ala., 433;

92; Cambridge

v.

Chan-
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the collector in appending his name fails to add his name of office,
so that it does not appear to be official ; ^ or if given before the
^
person has in fact been sworn into office ; or if delayed after the

And the notice is
prescribed by law for its publication.^
bad if it differs from the assessment in giving the name of the
person to whom the land is taxed ;^ or iE it fails to give the name
^
of the person taxed when the statute requires it ; or if the detime

scription of the land is insufficient." As regards all such cases,
the law is well summed up in a case in which the statute required
the notice to state the "amount of taxes assessed," and the notice

" The advertisement did
given was incorrect in this particular.
not state the amount of the tax assessed on the land, but stated a
wholly different amount, and for all legal purposes might as well
have contained no statement whatever of the amount of the tax.
To comply with the statute the exact amount must be given. A
deviation, however small, must be fatal, because

a

rule of law

cannot be made to fluctuate according to the degree or extent of
its violation."''
The most important of the usual requisites of notice of sale,
are that it shall give a proper description of the land to be sold,
and a statement of the time and place when and where the sale
A change in the name of the paper in which the notice is
6 N. H., 371.
Isaac «. Sliattuok, 12 Vt.,
required to be published will not affect the notice.
Where a city common council is required to give notice in a paper to
668.
dlcr,

be designated, the designation
ers, 29
'

Spear

°

Langdon

3

Hill

Kelly
V.

Mich.,

V.

v.

Ditty,

9

Craig,

^Bettison

SUimmin v.
' Sargeant

Vt.,

Poor,

v.

«. Mason,

Benjamin,

must be made by the council. Appeal of Pow-

504.

5

14

283.

20

38

Vt.,

7

Compare

Journeay,

Brackett

v.

Commonwealth,

356;

Noyes

u.

Haverhill,

11

citing Wait
And see Alvord

578,

51 Penn. St., 31.

v. Smith, 15 Ohio, 134.

Magee

Eudd, 21 Ark.,
Inman, 26 Me., 233.
Beau,

Hannell

v.

;

v.

v.

See

13.

Me., 461.

Ii'ed., 129

Pick.,

Broughton

See

».

Vining,

49

Me., 356;

46 Penn. St., 358 ; Pierce

Cush., 338.
v.
v.

Gilmore, 2 Yeates,
Collin, 20 Pick., 418.

330;

Gray, 125.

' Such a defect could not be aided by any information imparted by tlie auctioneer to the bidders at the sale. Koukendorf v. Taylor, 4 Pet., 349.

J., in Alexander

v. Pitts, 7 Cush., 503.
The amount of the tax
in the notice was $4.12. Compare Clarke u. Strickland, 2 Curt. C. C, 439. That an immaterial variation in the notice from that
required by the statute maybe (overlooked, see Ogden «." Harrington, 6 McLean, 418; Scott V. Watkins, 33 Ark., 556.
■>

Bigelow,

■was 13.30;

that stated
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will be made. The requisites for a descriptii)n in the assessment
roll have been heretofore given. In the notice as in the assessis precisely the same necessity that the description
shall be sufficiently definite to identify the land, in order that the
ment, there

owner may be apprised of the peril to which his interests are
What has been said regarding the description under
exposed.^
the head of assessment, is consequently applicable here. The cases
referred to in the margin discuss other defects, or alleged defects,
reference.^
Consent of the

in notices of sale, and may be useful for
owner of land to

a

defective

held, would not bind him,

as

publication of notice, it has been
he cannot, in that manner, confer an

authority upon an officer of the law, nor can he pass a title to
his freehold by mere waiver.^ Proof of giving the notice should

duly made of record, and it ought to show what the facts are,

be

so that any one inspecting

the record may know that the statute

An affidavit, or

has been complied with.

takes to state merely the legal conclusion,

a I'eturn, which under"
that " due notice was

" notice as
given, or "legal notice," or
required by the statute,"
or to make any other general allegation of a similar nature, ought
not to be received as sufficient evidence that the law has been com-

Bidwell

v.

Little,

5

v.

Webb, 10 Minn.,

59

JST.

;

4

;

Cush., 260; Eastman

H., 290; Wil-

Bidvvell v. Cole-

id., 78.

Porter

Whitney,

v.

Greenl., 306 Shimmin v. Inman, 26 Me., 228 Hobba
Greene d, Lunt, 58 id., 518 Smith v. Messer, 17 N. H.^

83 id., 67

;

■B.Clements,

;

11

BufFum,

Sneed, 333

opinion

;

-

v.

;

man,

rarnum
Harris,

V.

1

See

liams

4

1

is,

in fact, evidence only of the officer's
It
plied with.
that he has performed his duty.*

;

Alvis,

v.

13

Ala.,

Turnpike Co.,
23

617.

Johns. Cas.,

107;

Cheatham

v.

Howell,

6

Gilbert

V.

3

3

Scales

*

4

a

is

a

is

;

is

it

a

is

:

5

;

it

a

is

it,

;

;

3

;

;

Pierce v. Richardson, 37 id., 306, 314 Langdon v. Poor, 20 Vt., 13 Hughey
Oliio, 231 Styles v. Weir, 36 Miss., 187 Sutton v. Calhoun, 14 La.
Horrell,
V.
sufficient to follow
form for a notice, it
the statute gives
If
An., 209.
of
sale
that being otherwise
name
the
place
specially
does not
even though
" Where the
Mich.,
Mr.
Blackwell
562.
says
Clark v. Mowyer,
fixed.
prescribed by the statute, that form must be strictly and literally folform
lowed; the court will not admit the substitution of different one." Blackw.
different in substance but to say that the
on Tax Titles, 233. True, if
more strict rule of complifollowed,
literally
stating
be
statute form must
The
publication of notice, not
to
justify.
authorities
ance than we can find
insufficient, unless these
iu the reo-ular issue of paper, but in extra sheets,
Bibb, 465.
Davis v. Simms,
are sent to all the subscribers.
420

Yerg.,
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The sale must be made at the very

Time and place of sale.

In this retime and place provided by law for that purpose.
gard, the utmost strictness is required, since otherwise the whole
purpose of the notice, both as regards information to the public
A
and protection to the owner of the land, will be defeated.
it to be at the outer

sale inside a building, when the law requires
door, has been held to be void.^

So

a sale

either before or after

for the purpose, is wholly with-

If,

the time which has been named

is

however, an
out warrant of law, and cannot be sustained.''
authorized, in order to complete
adjournment from day to day
reasonable

begun, perhaps

a

has been

a

it

a

presumption
that the sale was begun in season, and adjourned .as thus prosale appearing to have been made'aftervided, should uphold
sale after

wardSj in the absence of any showing to the contrary.'

K

Jesse

«.

Preston,

Grat., 120.

Ruby V. Huntsman, 32 Mo., 501 Vassar v. George, 47 Miss.,
Rollins, 29 Mo., 267; McISTair v. Jenson, 33 Mo., 312.
;

'

done.

5

is

2

a

4

7

7

6

H., 194; Wells ».
id., 143; Nelson v. Pierce,
Burbank, 17 id., 393; Lovejoy ii. Lent, 48 Me., 377; Briggs«. Whipple, Vt.,
Cush., 260; People ». Highway Commissioners, 14
18; Farnum ®. Bufl'um,
Mich., 528; Games v. Stiles, 14 Pt., 323. As to the strictness of proof required
ia showing notice, see County Commissioners v. Clarke, 36 Md., 206; Jarvis
V. Sillimaii, 21 Wis., 607; Iverslie v. Spaulding, 32 id., 394; Piercer. Sweetzer,
sale was made in
Ind., 649. Evidence of the officer, in general terms, that
exact pursuance of the statute,
not sufficient without specifying what was
311; GwinB. Van Zant,

713, 721.

See

State V.

is
;

;

9

9

is

a

a

;

is

;

'

Wilkins' Heirs v. Huse, 10 Oliio, 139; Hope». Sawyer, 14 111., 254. The
sheriff has no general power to sell for taxes, but only to sell at the time and
place fi.ted by law. Hogins ». Brashears, 13 Ark., 243 Merrick v. Hutt, 15 id.,
the first
331 Bonnell v. Roane, 20 id., 114.
Where the regular time for sale
Monday of March, but a, sale at another time may be ordered by tlie county
deed reciting
court,
sale at another time, but reciting no order,
void on
McDermott v. Skully, 27 Ark., 226. A sale not begun on the day
its face.
void on its face. Prindle v. Campbell,
fl.\ed by law,
Minn., 212 Park v.
Kan., 615 Entrekin v. Chambers, 11 id., 368.
Tinkham,
Burns v. Lyon,
Watts, 363
Mich., 140 Harley v. Street,

;

2

Powell,
;

v.

it

a

;

4

;

4

a

Bestor

29

a

a

it

8

it

it

2

Gilm., 197 Lacy v.
Iowa, 429 Love «. Welch, 33 id., 192.
Where collector's sale was advertised at particular time and place, and the
to have been held in the town and on '.he day desigcollector's return states
will be presumed, in absence of proof to the contrary, that
nated,
was
held at the precise time and place specified.
Vt, 419. In
Spear v. Ditty,
tax collector need not specify in his return the day
seems,
Connecticut,
Picket v. Allen, 10 Conn., 146. In Iowa tax
on which the sale was made.
deed showing that the land was sold at an adjourned sale, without reciting
See

Davis,
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Competition at tlie sale.

The sale must be a public sale, with
This is a universal requireopportunity for open competition.'
ment ; and it may seriously be questioned whether the legislature
possesses the power to provide for the extinguishment of the owner's title by a secret or private sale.
The sale itself is a proceedto
ing
perfect a statutory forfeiture.
The legislature has proba-

bly authority to declare

a forfeiture of property taxed, for delinin
quency
making payment ; but in such an act the sovereign
power of the state is pushed to the very limit, and it is believed

that

which comes short of such a declaration, and leaves
the title still in the owner, could not provide for divesting him of
it by means of administrative proceedings secretly taken, and of
which neither actual nor constructive notice was to be given him.

A

a statute

public sale is the usual and proper course

;

and this, in order

to constitute any protection to the owner, must be so made as to

competition. And, as having an important influence on
this subject, the courts have been compelled to take notice of
fraudulent practices, which are almost as common as tax sales
themselves.
"lam aware," says one learned judge, " that there
is much management and fraudulent perversion of the law about
invite

purchasing at treasurer's sales. It is our duty to discountenance
it.'' ^ " Over a sale of this description,'' says another, " the owner
has no control

he cannot refuse a bid, or adjourn the sale, or

;

fix

sum below which the property shall not be struck down.
The
The owner is not consale is managed by the agent of the state.
a

The highest bidder becomes the purchaser, although the

sulted.

a hundredth part of the value of the propis the rule; the purchasers who congrefor
cents
Acres

sum bid be less than
erty."

^

gate at the sale are usually

speculators anticipating enormous
and competition in purchases is usu-

profits on their investments ;
ally the last thing they desire. The persons in default will, in
many cases, be poor and friendless ; at any rate they will not be
present; and the officer will commonly be found sufficiently dis-

a

it,
Is

at least prima facie evidence tliat the sale was propthe causes justifying
that
proper cause for adjournment existed. Lorain v. Smith,
erly held, and

».

Wright,

61 Penn. St., 410.

Jenks

Bumside,

J., in Donnel

Dudley

Little,

v.

3

'

67.

2

Iowa,

3

37

Ohio,

«. Bellas, 11 Penn. St., 341, 351.
504.

340
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posed to be complaisant to the interests of those who are at hand.
It is not surprising, therefore, if in some instances it is discovered

that he has accommodated
cludes all competition.*

in

them to an extent that practically exIt is still more common, perhaps, that

friendly way arrange among themselves, that no
competition shall take place, and that the harvest shall be equitAll such arrangements are a
ably apportioned between them.
fraud upon the law, and upon those whose protection is had in
purchasers

a

"It is essential to the
public sale is provided for.
validity of tax sales, not merely that they should be conducted
in conformity with the requirements of the law, but that they
view when

a

should be conducted with entire fairness.

Perfect freedom from

all influences likely to prevent competition in the sale should be
The owner is seldom present, and is
in all cases strictly exacted.
generally ignorant of the proceeding until too late to prevent it.

The tax usually bears
the property

;

a

very slight proportion to the value of

and thus a great temptation is presented to parties

to exclude competition at the sale, and to prevent the owner from

The proceeding, therefore,
should be closely scrutinized, and whenever it has been characterredeeming

when the sale is made.

ized by fraud or unfairness,

should be set aside, or the purchaser
be required to hold the title in trust for the owner."
Such is the
of
the
court
of
the
in
a
in which
case
Union,
language
supreme
the purchaser of land at a tax sale had contrived to prevent competition, by the representation

that the owner would

defeat the

The court, very properly and justly, held

Bale by redemption.

ihe sale to be void as a fraud,^ following

in this regard an early
combination betvveen bidders to preclude
held
was
also
fatal to the sale.^
competition
case in Ohio, where

a

As in Brown v. Hogle, 30 111., 119, -svhere the treasurer in proceeding to
make sale, permitted favored persons to go through his list and select out in
advance the lands they would purchase.
'

' Field, J., in Slater
31 Iowa, 578.

v.

Maxwell,

6

Wall., 268, 276.

See also

Kcrwer

v,

Allen,

2 Ohio, 504.
In Case v. Dean, 10 Mich., 13, it was decided
between
a
comhination
such
bidders would not defeat the title of a purthat
a
nor
to,
was
nor
party
who
shown to be aware of it. See also Martin
chaser
In
Reeve
d. Kennedy, 43 Cal., 643, it is held that a sale
V. Cole, 38 Iowa, 141.
3

Dudley v Little,

cannot be attacked collaterally for fraud in obtaining it.
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Officer not to buy. In order that there may be free competition, it is essential that the officer who maizes the sale should act
only, and not become interested in the purchases.
He cannot be allowed to occupy the inconsistent positions of purchaser and seller, in which his cupidity would draw him in one
as salesman

The law cannot safely intrust
direction and his duty in another.
the securities provided for private parties to the care of those who
are interested to prevent their accomplishing the purpose for
which the securities are provided.
No provision of law, it is assumed, would ever be made which would subject official integrity
to the trial of such conflicts between interest and duty, as would
be sure to arise if the officer were allowed to bid at a sale where
his duty would be to obtain the highest practicable bid in the interest of another.
To put himself in that position is regarded as
a fraud in the officer upon the law ; and on general principles of
public polic}', the sale which he makes to himself is void.^ On

no other principle can integrity and good faith be secured in proceedings of this ex parte character.

Sale in separate parcels.

The sale should also be made of

the parcels of land as they appear in the list.

This is the general

Exceptions are made by statutes for various reasons.
Where a tract is capable of subdivision, the statute may authorize the owner of a part to relieve such part from liability by payrule.

proportionate part of the tax.^ Under some statutes, any
one who will distinctly define any portion of an unimproved
tract of land, may pay the tax upon that portion.
So statutes
of
an
or
claimant
undivided
interest
the
owner
to pay
permit
ing

a

upon that by itself.'

lu

any of these cases the part of the land,

Pierce ». Benjamin, 14 Pick., 356; Clute 'e. Barron, 3 Midi., 193; Payson v.
Hall, 30 Me., 319; Taylor «. Stringer, 1 Grat, 158; Chandler ». Moulton, 33
Vt., 345. In Pox ». Cash, 11 Penn. St., 307, it is decided that this principle
will not preclude a clerk in the treasurer's ofDco from becoming a purchaser.
To the same effect is Wells v. Jackson Manuf. Co., 47 N. H., 335. The officer
selling cannot act as agent for others in buying; though if he does so, and
'

the purchase is afterwards set aside on that ground, the owner must refund to
tlie purchaser what he has paid. Everett b. Bebe, 37 Iowa, 453.

Fellows ». Denniston, 23 N. Y., 420.
' Without express statutory authority, undivided interests cannot
2 See

be

sold

Roberts v. Chan Tin Pen,
separately when the tract is assessed as an entirety.
In Vermont, it appears that a collector's deed of land sold for
33 Cal., 359.
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in the land, upon which the tax is not paid, reBut in other
mains subject to sale and may be sold by itself.
respects the listing is to be followed in the sale.^ To group lands
or the interest

in the sale which are

assessed

as separate

interests, is incompe-

Each
though they be owned by the same person.^
parcel is chargeable with its own taxes, and is to be redeemed by
paying them; but such a joint sale charges it with the tax upon
tent, even

like issuing one execution upon several
judgments, and selling jointly the lands which are charged with
the other also, and is

separate liens.^

It

may or may not be important

to the owner

taxes, -n-hich describes tlie land simply as so many acres of a large lot, passes
an undivided interest in such lot equal to the proportion which the number of
acres sold bears to (he whole number

Vt.,

of acres in

the

lot.

Sheafe

i>. Wait, 30

735.

llow., 18; V^^alkcr v. Monre, 3 Dill. 0. C, 356; MorWoodburn v. Wireman, 37 Penn. St., 18; Hayden
■u.Foster, 13 Pick., 493; Willey «. Scoville, 9 Ohio, 43; Atkins i>. Hinman, 3
Gilm., 437; Spcllman v. Curtenius, 13 111., 409; Pitkin v. Yaw, 13 id., 351 ;
Penn v. Clomans, 19 Iowa, 373 ; Ware v Thompson, 29 id., 65 ; Martin v. Cole,
38 id., 141; Moulton v. Bla'.sdell, 34 Me., 383; Wallingford v. Fiske, id., 38C;
Andrews J). Sentor, 32 id., 394; State v. Kichardson, 21 Mo., 430; Baskins i).
Winston, 34 Miss., 431. Though a sale together of several lots which really
constitute one tract may be good, yet this can only be so when they were assessed together, or when lliey constitute a definite portion or fraction of what
was assessed, so tliat, by mere division or subtraction, the amount of ta.x
chargeable on the property sold can be determined from the assessment roll.
McQuesten v. Swope, 13 Kans., 33. In Pennsylvania, the sale of seated lands
with unseated is void for want of jurisdiction. Dietrick v. Mason, 57 Penn.
St., 40. Unseated lands are sold without regard to ownership.
Heading v.
Finney, 73 Penn. St., 467. See Cuttle v. Brockway, 33 id., 45. In New York,
it is held competent, where distinct interests are held subject to a lien for
taxes, to provide by statute for a judicial sale of the whole fee, on the application of one party, after publication of notice to unknown owners. Jackson
1). Babcock, 16 N. Y., 346.
■Ballance

ton

V.

Forsyth,

v.

Harris,

13

9 "Watts, 319;

= Andrews v.

Bcnter, 32 Me., 394; Woodburn ■».Wireman, 37 Penn. St., 18;
Hayden v. Foster, 13 Pick., 493. In Minnesota, when an assessment is of a
whole block, the treasurer cannot sell in parcels. Moulton v. Doran, 10 Minn.,
67.

To sell one's " right, title and interest " in land is not equivalent to a sale
of the land Itself. Clarke v. Strickland, 2 (Jurt. C. C, 439. Where the sale
was of an undivided interest when all was assessed together, the sale was held
void. Roberts «. Chan Tin Pen, 23 Cal., 359. It would be otherwise if the
statute provided for the sale of undivided interests after the tax on other in3

terests had been paid.
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that he have the opportunity of a separate redemption, but the
fact that it possibly may be so is sufficient reason why the lawshould protect the right.

Surplus bond.

Various

methods

are

if that shall
is,

states to save something to the owner,
■when

One of these

his land is sold.

will bring, and

adopted

in different
be possible,

to have the land put up

if

it

with
interest and expenses, require the surplus to be deposited in the
for sale for what

the bid exceed the tax,

Another

to require

a

show his right.

is

state or county treasury for the benefit of the party who shall

bond to be given by the

a

is

purchaser to account for the excess over the taxes and charges,
to require
which bond shall be lien on the land.^ Still another
so much of the land to be sold as may be requisite to satisfy the
a

a

tax and charges, either prescribing
general rule as to where the
discretion to the offiparcel sold shall be taken off, or allowing

in that regard.

cer

Excessive sale. It has been said that in the absence of any
statute limiting the officer's right to sell, to so much as would be
is

is

a

restriction to this extent
requisite to pay the tax and charges,
would be intended by the law.^ Whether this so or not
per-

'

tax

is

strictly obeyed.
void,^

and

sale of the whole when less would pay the
sale of the remainder after the tax had been

Peters v. Heasley, 10 Watts, 308; Loud

v.

Penninan,

19

Pick., 539; People

8

a

is

conDoug., Mich., 276. The giving of "the surplus bond
the
to
the
of
title
to
the
at
the
tax
sale.
passing
purchaser
dition precedent
"Watts, 364; Donnel
Sutton V. Nelson, 10 S. & R., 238; McDonald v. Maus,
1

1}. Hammond,

a

is

A

a

it

not for
moment to be supposed
haps not very material, as
without
this or some equivalent
that any statute would be adopted
And such a provision must be
provision for the owner's benefit.

Bellas, 10 Penn. St., 341 Cuttle v. Brockway, 24 id., 145. As to suit upon
That there
no presumption
see Crawford v. Stewart, 38 Penn. St., 34.

such

pay

is

a

it,

;

V.

bond was given, where the tax purchaser does not take possession or
see Alexander v. Bush, 46 Penn. St., 63.

taxes,

3

^

Blackf., 431. The power to provide by law that the
O'Brien v. Coulter,
whole should be sold, when not necessary to pay the tax, was denied in Martin V. Snowden, 18 Grrat., 100; Downey v. Nutt, 19 id., 59.
'LoomisD. Pingree,

Lunt, 48 id., 377; French v.
Patterson,
N". H., 400; Lyford v. Dunn,
Dev., 554; Love v.
33 id., 81; Jaquith v. Putney, 48 id., 138; Avery v. Rose,
Ired., 347 Baskins b. Winston 34 Miss., 481 Crowell v. Good-.
Welbourn,
43 Me.,

399; Lovejoy

Ainsworth

d.

«. Dean, 31

;

,

;

5

4

id., 303, 310;
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by the sale of a part would also be void, for the very
plain reason that the power to sell would be exhausted the moment the tax was collected.^
It has been shown in a preceding chapter that an excessive levy
is void, whether it is made excessive by including with lawful
satisfied

ttixes those which are unlawful, or in any other manner.

If

the

levy would be void, there would of course be nothing to uphold

And if

valid levy were to be increased afterwards by
A sale for
■unlawful additions, the sale would be equally bad.
anything more than is lawfully chargeable is a sale without jurisdiction, and therefore void.^
a sale.

a

Sale to highest bidder and

for cash.

The sale must be to
that method is

the highest bidder, or, which is equivalent, when

to the person who offers to pay the tax and charges
And as the conveyance must be
for the smallest parcel of land.^
prescribed,

actually made, if the sale is made to one
man, and by arrangement the deed is made to another, such deed
The
The sale must be for cash.
can convey no title whatever.*

in execution of

can give no credit where

officer
win,

a sale

the statute

provides for

none.*

Allen, 535; Stead's Executors v. Course, 4 Cranch, 403; Mason d. FearHow., 248 ; French v. Edwards, 13 Wall., 506. Under the Massachusetts
statute providing that if an estate is capable of division the collector may sell
so much thereof as would be sufficient to discharge the taxes and intervening
3

son, 9

charges, it must appear by the collector's deed or otherwise, that the land was
so divided that no greater portion was sold than was necessary to satisfy the
tax and charges, or that it could not be conveniently divided to that extent.

Crowell
» See

When
tract,

V.

Goodwin,

3

Allen,

535.

8 AVheat, 681 ; Mason u. Fearson,
9 How., 248.
consists of several distinct parcels constituting one
the several parcels are offered separately and no bids obtained, the

"Washington

■>].Pratt,

the land as assessed

if

whole may then be offered together. State v. Maxwell, 6 Wall., 268. Whore a
quarter section contained several village lots, it was held incompetent to sell
off an acre from one side for the tax on the whole. Ballance v. Forsyth, 13

How.,

18.

B. Doe, S Blackf., 581 ; Hutchens
«. Doe, 3 Ind., 538; HardenKidd, 10 Cal., 403 ; McQuesten v. Swope, 13 Kans., 33. Sale void
where an illegal percentage is added. Bucknall v. Story, 36 Cal., 67. And
=

McQuilkin

burgh

V.

see ante pp. 295-397.

sSee Cardigan

B.

Page,

6

N. H.,

183;

' Keene v. Houghton, 19 Me., 368.
' Cashing v. Longfellow, 26 Me.,

Bean v. Thompson,

306.

In Longfellow

19

v.

id., 290.

Quimby,

29

id.,
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It

must not be for more bhaii is due, as this would be a plain
excess' of jurisdiction.'
Observing the statutory directions and

precautions,

and the principles of the common law and of

public

policy, to which reference has been made, the officer may transfer to the purchaser the full interest in the land which has been
assessed, and may convey a complete and perfect title, if such is the
provision of law on the subject.'* And inadequacy of price does
not defeat such a sale ; if it did, the power to collect revenue by
this method would be futile.^

Who may acquire tax titles.

Some persons, from their rela-

tion to the land or to the tax, are precluded from becoming purThe title to be transferred on such a sale is one based
chasers.
on the default of the person who owes to the government the

But one person may owe this duty to the
government, and another may owe it to the owner of the land.
duty to pay the tax.

may exist where the land is occupied by a tenant,
Where
who, by his lease, has obligated himself to pay taxes.
the
it
would
cause
to
a
land,
this is the relation of the parties
Such

a case

shock to the moi-al sense if the law were to permit this tenant
to neglect his duty and cut ofi" his lessor's title by buying in the
land at a tax sale. So the mortgagor, remaining in possession of
the land, owes

it to the mortgagee to keep down the taxes

;

and

196 it was decided, tliat wliere the sale was for casla, tlie giving of credit to
In Donnel v. Bellas, 34 Penn.
tlie purcliaser afterwards would not defeat it.
St., 157, the treasurer took a note from the purchaser instead of cash. The

sale was held void, and incapable of being aiSrmed by the treasurer by
receiving payment after leaving office. See the same case, 10 Penn. St., 341 ;
id., 341.

11

Peters v. Heasely, 10 Watts, 208 ; Loud a. Penniman, 19 Pick., 589. A sale
for the taxes of several j-ears, one of which has been paid, is void. Kinsworthy V. Mitchell, 21 Ark., 145. And see Douglass^. Short, 3 Dev., 433. Sale of
Gardner ■».Brown, Meigs, 354.
lands for the tax of the wrong party is void.
which
is
also
void. Elvvell v. Shaw, 1 Greenl.,
illegal,
Sale for two taxes, one of
830 ; Hardenburgh ■!;.Kidd, 10 Cal., 403.
' It has already been stated, that the separate interests of different owners
'

In such a case, a sale of the land
are, under some laws, assessed separately.
for a tax assessed against one does not cut ofi the interests of others. Irwin
Where the whole title is sold, it
D. Bank of United States, 1 Penn. St., 349.
cuts ofi' back taxes, unless other provision is made. Trego n. Huzzard, 19
Penn. St., 441 ; Irwin v. Trego, 23 id., 368 ; Same v. Same, 35 id., 9.
s

Sec State v. Maxwell,

6

Wall.,

208.
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justly be chargeable with connivance at fraud and

allow the taxes to become
delinquent, and then discharge them by a purchase which would
at the same time cut off his mortgage.
There is a general priaciple applicable to such cases ; that a purchase made by one
dishonesty,

a

mortgagor might

duty it was to pay the taxes shall operate as payment
only ; he shall acquire no rights as against a third party, by a
neglect of the duty which he owed to such party. This principle
is universal, and is so entirely reasonable as scarcely to need the
whose

Show the existence of the duty, and the
support of authority.
is
made
out in every instance.-'
disqualification
The cases to which attention is called in the margin, and many
others to which they refer, will show the application of the rule

It has been applied to
variety of circumstances.
cases where the default was only in part that of the purchaser;
as where he was tenant in common with others,^ or where his
under

a great

own land was taxed

as one parcel

with that of another,

and

the

'Varney «. Stevens, 32 Me., 331; Gardiner v. Gerrish, 23 id., 46; Fuller o.
Ilodgdon, 25 id., 243; Mathews ii. Light, 33 id., 305; Coombs «. Warren, 34
id., 89; Williams v. Hilton, 35 id., 547; Haskell v. Putnam, 42 id., 244; Coxe
V. Wolcott, 27 Penn. St., 154; Coxe v. Gibson, id., 160; Oldhams v. Jones, 5 B.
Mom-., 458, 467; Blake «. Howe, 1 Aikens, 306; Willard v. Strong, 14 Vt., 532;
Lacey v. Davis, 4 Mich., 140; Taylor ■».Snyder, "Wal. Ch., 493; Frye v. Bank of
Illinois, 11 111., 367; Prettyman v. Walston, 34 id., 175; Higgins v. Crosby, 40
id., 260; Smith D.Lewis, 20 Wis., 369; Avery d. Judd, 21 id., 262; Barretts.
Welch, 23 id., 175; Phelan v. Boylan, 25 id., 679; Edgarton v. Schneider, 26
id., 38.") ; Brown v. Simons, 44 N. H., 475 ; McLaughlin o. Green, 48 Miss., 175,
207; Carithers v. Weaver, 7 Kans., 110; Krutz v. Fisher, 8 id., 90; Kelseys.
Abbott, 13 Cal., 609; Barrett ij. Amerein, 36 id., 322; McMinn v. Whelan, 27
id., 300; Cofflnger v. Rice, 33 id., 408; Garwood
Savings and Loan Society v. Ordway, 38 id., 679.
2

v. Hastings,

38 id., 216;

Lloyd V. Lynch, 28 Penn. St., 419 ; Maul «. Rider, 51 id., 377 ; Piatt v.
Clair's Heirs, 6 Ohio, 327; Page ii. Webster, 8 Mich., 263; Butler v. Porter,
13 id., 263; Dubois «. Campau, 24 id., 360; Clioteau v. Jones, 11 111., 300, 322;
Brown «. Hogle, .'^O id., 119; Chickering d. Faile, 38 id., 342; State «. Williston, 20 Wis., 240; Phelan d. Boylan, 25 id., 679; Baker ti. Whiting, 3 Sum.,
475, Downer's Adm'r «. Smith, 38 Vt., 464.
That payment by one tenant in
common enures to the benefit of all, see Chickering v. Faile, 38 111., .343 ;
McConnel v. Konepel, 46 id., 519. As to what right one might have to buy
the interest of his cotenant after paying his own tax, there is some discussion
in Butler v. Porter, 13 Mich., 263. As to the right of one tenant in common
to buy in a matured tax title, see Kirkpatrick v. Mathiot, 4 W. & S., 251 ;
Rcinboth v. Zerbe Run Co., 29 Penn. St., 139; Frentz v. Klotsch, 28 Wis., 313.
St.
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was sold together; ' and

taxes made

to a case where an agent

347
to pay

purchase of his principal's lands, assuming to justify himself on the ground that his principal had neglected to
supply him with the means of making payment.^ In all such
a

and all to which the like reasons apply, the purchase, as
between the parties, is in law a payment only ; or, if made at second hand, from another who was purchaser at the public sale, it
is allowed to operate, for the purposes of justice, only as a redempcases,

it may have

remedy over for the
money paid, or for any portion thereof, if in equity any other
person who is benefited by the purchase ought to have paid it ;
otherwise not.
tion,^ and

the party making

a

Some other cases are not so plain, because the duty as between
the parties is not so definitely determined by their contract, or by
their legal relation. While a mortgagor in general cannot be
allowed to cut off his mortgage, by buying in the land at tax
sale, yet if the mortgagee were in possession, receiving the issues
and profits, and bound to pay the taxes himself, it might not be
so clear that the mortgagor should

be precluded from taking ad-

If it were to be so held,
vantage of the mortgagee's neglect.
there would seem to be reason for holding that the mortgagee
also, by reason of his relation to the title, was precluded from
becoming purchaser of the mortgagor's interest at a tax sale, and
that his remedy would be confined to a payment for the protection of his lien, with a remedy over for the amoupt paid.
It
cannot be said in such
is under no obligation
'

Cooley

i>. "Waterman, 16

that either mortgagor or mortgagee
to the government to pay the tax.
On

a case,

Mich.,

366.

' McMahon

v. McGraw, 26 Wis., 614.
As to the disqualification of the agent
his principal's land at tax sale, see further Oldhams «. Jones, 5
B. Monr., 458 ; Bartholomew v. Leach, 7 Watts, 473 ; Matthews v. Light, 32
Me., 305 ; Lindsley i). Sinclair, 24 Mich., 380 ; Krutz «. Fisher, 8 Kans., 90 ;
Schedda v. Sawyer, 4 McLean, 181 ; Kelsey i). Abbott, 13 Cal., 609 ; Bernal v.
Lynch, 86 id., 135, 146 ; Barton v. Moss, 32 111., 50. One who has bargained
for the land, and is in possession under an agreement to purchase, occupies a
similar position. Haskell c. Putnam, 42 Me., 244; Voris «. Thomas, 12 111.,
442; Olivers. Croswell, 43 id., 41. See Coxe d. Wolcott, 37 Penn. St., 154;
Quin V. Quin, 27 Wis., 168.

to purchase

3 See

Shepardson

Oarithers v. Weaver,

v.
7

Elmore, 19 Wis., 424; Coxe v. Wolcott, 37 Penn.
Kan., 110; Bernal v. Lynch, 36 Cal., 135, 146.

St., 154;
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the contran-, the tax being one that purposely is made
ride the lien of the one as well as the title of the other,

to over-

it might

it seems to us, be held that neither mortgagor nor mortgagee was at liberty to neglect the payment, as one step in bet■well, as

tering his condition at the expense of the other, but that the presumption of law should be that the party purchasing did so for
And so are some of
the protection of his own interest merely.
the authorities.''

in no contract or fiduciary relations,

a

he stands

is

a

it,

Whether one should be precluded by the naked fact that he
from making
claims title to the land, or that he has possession of
with whom
another
purchase in extinguishment of the right of
question often

title on his own default,

clear and well founded in equity.

owes no duty to any other in respect to the land,

But when one
is

is

the principle

build up

it

son, to pay the taxes, shall not

a

touched by the discussions of courts without having as yet been
So far as the cases
very fully or comprehensively examined.
hold that one who ought, as between himself and some third per-

not

so clear

is

to set
upon what principle of equity or of estoppel such other
up, as against him, his neglect to perform in due season his duty
has been distinctly held that

assessed,

fixed upon the possessor

30 Wis., 103.
In this case the mortgagee held tlie legal
certain sense,
trustee.
spoken of in the opinion as being, in
delivering the opinion, makes no mention of the earlier case of
a

Dixon, Ch.

J.,

Sturdevant

t>. Mather,

20

Wis.,

576, 585,

in which he had referred

a

Fiski). Brunette,

title, and he

is

'

possession, when the tax was

it

to the government.
There are some cases in which

to the same

a

a

6

it

a

question, and to the decision in Williams v. Townsend, 31 N. Y., 411, 415, in
manner understood by the reporter to imply an approval.
In the same
connection he also referred " to Walthall v. Rives, 34 Ala., 91, and Harrison v.
Fla., 711, in which
Roberts,
was held that
mortgagee may purchase and
hold paramount title under older judgment liens, and to Chapman v. Mull,

Ired. Eq.,

a

a

2

7

observations of Sir Tliomas Plummer, M. K., in
Cholmondely ®. Clinton, Jac. & Wal., 181, et seq., upon the general question
how far the principles applicable to dealings between trustee and cestui que
trust apply to the case of mortgagor and mortgagee."
The Illinois cases are
mortgagee, like
very emphatic, that
trustee, cannot affect the rights of the
292, and the

a

a

is is

4

a

sale for delinquent taxes accruing
mortgagor by purchasing the property at
Chickering d. Faile, 26 111., 507; Moore ■».Titman, 44 id.,
on the premises.
In Brown -d. Simons, N. H., 475,
367.
like decision, in a case in which
in
was
possession.
It
not
the mortgagee
very clear how far Williams «.
Townsend, supra, was designed to lay down
contrarv defence.

j
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to pay, and precluded his becoming a purchaser at a sale

for the taxes when they became delinquent.

In the leading
the occupant had gone into possession under an invalid tax title,
by the decision he was precluded from relying upon a second
which acccrued while he was in the occupancy of the land.^

case
and

title

The

subject is dismissed with very brief mention, the court appearing
to regard the claim as inequitable and unjust, but for what reason
is not very clearly explained. Other cases treat the point as
equally plain.^
'Douglas

But it seems to us that it is deserving of more

■».Dangerfield,

10

Ohio, lfi2.

III,

300, 333, per Treat, Ch. J. " The purchase of a
portion of the land by George "W. Jones, at a sale for taxes, did not stregthen
his title. That purchase was made prior to the sale by the administrator.
He
was ilien one of the owners of the land, and as such bound to pay the taxes
assessed upon it.
The purchase was but a mode of jjaying the taxes legal!}'chargeable against him." " He admits in his answer that he suffered the land
fo be sold, and bid it in for the pm-pose of defeating an older tax title, and not
with a view of acquiring any new title." This doctrine is affirmed in Lacej^o.
Davis, 4 Mich., 140, 153, where it is said by Martin, J., to be of no importance
whether a party claiming title to land is assessed personally for the tax or not.
" It is the possession which creates the disability in the purchaser."
The case
holds that if one acquires the possession while the tax is a lieu on the land, he
is bound to discharge the lien, and cannot buy at tax sale.
But see Jjy brand v.
Hauey, 31 Wis,, 230; Blackwood v. Van Vleet, 30 Mich., 118. In Tweed v.
Metcalf, 4 id., 579, it was decided that one who had bought at a tax sale might
buy the same land at a subsequent sale made at any time before redemption
The doctrine of Choteau v. Jones, mpra, was
from the first had expired.
affirmed in Voris ». Thomas, 13 111., 443, and the same general doctrine is asserted in Smith v. Lewis, 30 "Wis., 350, 354, though there the case was between
mortgagee and the assignee of the mortgage, and the relation of the parties
The same remark may be made of Dubois v. Campau,
precluded a purchase.
Bassett v. Welch, 23 Wis., 175, goes the full length of deciding
34 Mich., 368.
that the mere fact of possession when the taxes are assessed is a disqualification to buy. Jones ». Davis, 34 Wis., 329, was a case where one in possession
of land had endeavored to cut off a judgment lien by a purchase at tax sale,
corresponding to the case of purchase by a mortgagor.
Whitney «. Gunderson, 31 Wis., 359, 379, asserts the broad doctrine that if one was in possession
when the tax was assessed, "it then became his duty to pay the taxes, and he
could not permit the lands to be sold for such taxes, and obtain a tax deed for
the pui-pose of destroying an outstanding title." And see McMinn ■;'.Whelan,
In Blakely ?;. Bestor, 13 111.,
37 Cal., SOU; Burrett «. Amerein, 36 Cal., 333.
the
case
TrumhuU,3.,
on
the ground of an obligation
apparently
puts
708, 714,
"
" tliat the defendant is
It is insisted," ho
as between parties.
or
''

Choteau v. Jones,

11

says,
duty
not in a position to avail himself of an outstanding tax title, be it ever so regular, for the reason that he is shown by the record to have been in the poss es-
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consideration whether, where parties stand to each other in the
position of adverse claimants to land, either of them can insist
that the other shall discharge a duty to the government for his
protection. There being nothing in the relation of the parties to
each other upon which an estoppel can be raised, it is necessary

look elsewhere for the disqualification insisted upon ; and this
can only be found in some general rule of public policy.
It is

to

certainly an imperative requirement of public policy that the revenues of the state shall be collected, and that no one shall be allowed to defraud the treasury of his due proportion ; but in the
case where a tax sale

has been

there is no fraud, and the

made

No wrong
upon the land has been received.
has consequently been done to the state.
There has been delay
in payment, but it is one for which the state makes ample provision, and for which it charges the party concerned with all costs,
revenue chargeable

and an interest sufficient

is not perceived that the state can then have

any complaint to make,

as the

duty owing to

it,

It

convenience.

for any public in-

fully to compensate

though performed
The state, then, not being

objects to

ticular

it

it

tardily, has been performed at last.
would seem that whatever individual
wronged in the purchase,
ought to be able to point out how and in what par-

is

is

is

it

wrongs him.
It difficult to dispute the truth of what said by the supreme
court of Pennsylvania, that " there
nothing in reason or law to

it

it
is

sion of tbe premises at the time the taxes accrued and the sale look jjlace,
wherefore
said that
was his duty to have paid the taxes, and that he
not
to
be
to
permitted
avail himself of a tax title acquired through his
ought

This may or may not be so. It does not necessarily follow that beperson is in possession of premises he
bound to pay the taxes assessed upon them he may occupy them as
tenant under an agreement that
;

a

a

cause

is

default.

his landlord shall pay the

if,

taxes, and in such case there would be no obligation on the tenant to pay them, particularly
in pursuance of the agreement,
they were listed for taxation in the landlord's name."
In Swift v. Agnes, 33

is

a

a

a

it

it
is

decided that where one owning land, and bound to pay taxes
Wis., 228,
tliereon, permits them to be sold and deeded for such taxes, and then purchases
to be conveyed to
the tax title, and causes
third person for his benefit, he
defense in ejectment against one who has purcannot set up such title as
sale on execution against him since the execution of the tax deed.
chased at
nothing in the fact that the owner of land has become the purchaser
Tliere
at tax sale which can estop him from claiming the surplus moneys.
Russell
V.

Reed, 27 Peun. St., 166.
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who holds a defective
sale for taxes." ^

title from purchasing a betAs between himself and any
adverse claimant it is an unimportant consideration whether the
one or the other was in possession.
If the state, in taxing land,
takes any notice of ownership, it is either for the convenience of
ter at

a man

a treasurer's

in making collections, or for information to parties
concerned.
The tax is upon every possible interest in the land ;
and all parties having interests are equally under obligation to
the officers

the state to make payment.
The penalty for failure is a forfeiture or
sale which will cut them all off ; and while, without doubt, any one

may defeat such

who can give satisfactory reasons for an
assertion that it would be unjust to him for the purchaser to be
allowed to rely upon
not perceived that any other person
is

it

it,

a sale

;

is

;

a

is

can well insist upon
aside
right to do so.
This, of course,
from any question of irregularities or defects in general, any person may rely upon those when the tax title
made use of against
him
as they go, or may go, to the power of the officer to sell
at all.2

the state or county.

'

a

a

it

if

Iby

is

It not an uncommon provision that,
no bidders offer to take the land and pay the tax,
shall be bid in for the state or for the county. A purchase on
such bid would give the state or county the usual rights of
Bids

Woodward,

wood

V.

J., in

Van Vleet,

Coxe

30

«. Gribson,

Mich.,

27

Peiin. St.,

160, 1G5.

And

see

Black,

118.

is

is

a

a

is

is

is

it

it

a

a

6

it
is

is

is

2

It lield in California that one in possession of lands, if under no legal cr
moral obligation to pay the tax, may buy in the lands at tax sale. Moss v.
made in Kansas.
Bowman v. CockShear, 25 Cal., 38. The same ruling
rill,
Kans., 311, 332.
In Blackwood v. Van Vleot, 30 Mich., 118,
said
that "to preclude any person from making and relying upon
purchase of
lands at tax sale, there must be something in the circumstances of the case
■which imposes upon him
duty to the state to pay the tax, or something
which renders
inequitable, as between himself and the holder of the existAnd
denied that the mere
ing title, that he should make the purchase."
in possession of the land when the tax
levied, should prefact, that one
when
the
land
not
assessed to him, and ho
clude his becoming purchaser
bound by no contract relations to pay the tax. The person taxed cannot
Garwood v. Hastings, 38 Cal., 216; McMinn o.Whelaa,
title at tax sale.
get
A collusive purchase, made to cut off mortgage, may be set
27 id., 300.
aside. Savings and Loan Society b. Ordway, 38 Cal., 679; Stears «). HoUenbcck, 38 Iowa, 550.
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purchaser,

and no more.

carry into eSect such

"Whether a deed would

a purchase

must depend

Different sales at the same time.

be requisite to

upon the statute.*

"Where the taxes of several

are delinquent at the same time, sales are sometimes perSuch sales
mitted to be made separately for each year's tax.
might raise serious questions as between purchasers, if two or
more should severally buy the land at sales bearing the same date,
years

and subject to the same redemption.
separate sales are unauthorized.''

In Iowa it
Such

seems that such

questions might

and

should be settled by statute.

Certificate of sale.

The sale is usually accompanied or followed by the issue to the purchaser of a certificate, which recites
the fact of sale, and states the time when the purchaser will become entitled to a conveyance.'
' Commissioners

if

No title passes until the time

authorized to bid the amount of the tax on behalf of the

tliey bid more, may have the land left on their hands unless the
county see fit to take it. The bid cuts off the jirior title. Russell ». Keed, 27
count}',

Pcnu.

And see Cuttle v. Brockway, 33 id., 45. Commissioners auoff
land for the United States, unless some person will bid twobid
thirds the appraised value, are not compelled to do so, and a sale to another
St., 160.

thorhed to
bidder

for less

is not invalid.

Turner

v.

Smith, 14 Wall., 553, 562.

Where

lands are bid in by a county at a tax sale, and the law 2Drovides for their being
subsequently sold after a specified notice, a private sale without the notice is
void. The provision for such a sale is to be regarded as a proceeding to col-

Jenks «. Wright, 61 Ponn. St., 410.
lect taxes, and must be followed.
In Kansas, the county treasurer holds a certifijate of sale to the county
until it can be sold to an individual, and then assigns the certificate. The
county

commissioners

Magill,

4

Kan.,

cannot control

his action in this regard.

State

e.

415.

^Preston

v. Van ©order, 31 Iowa, 250 ; Shoemaker v. Lacey, 38 id., 277. In
Iowa, where the treasurer, on the same day, made difierent sales of the same
land for the taxes of different years, and the owner, being aware of but one
sale, had redeemed therefrom in good faith, he was held entitled to redeem from
the other after the statutory time, by paying the amount for which the land
was sold, with legal interest and penalty.
Shoemaker v. Lacey, 38 Iowa, 277,
citing Noble «. Bullis, 33 id., 559. In California, it is held that a sale for a
city tax of one year will not cnt off the tax for the preceding year. Cowell v.
Washburn, 22 Cal., 510.

' The certificate is evidence of the sale, but the record of sale is better evidence. McCready «. Sexton, 29 Iowa, 356; Henderson v. Oliver, 83 id., 513;

Clark

V.

Thompson,

37

id., 536.
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allowed for redemption, if any, has expired,^ nor until the proper
Until then the purchaser has an
conveyance has been executed.
inchoate right, which he might perhaps protect as a purchaser on
execution might ;^ but he has no title.^

The deed.

The requirements of a deed are not uniform in the
different states. In general it should recite enough to show an
authority to sell, but it need not set out all the prior proceedings.*
The tax deed as evidence.

It

has been shown that, according

to the principles of the common law, the purchaser at a tax sale
when he attempts to enforce rights under his purchase, is under
the necessity of taking upon himself the burden of showing that
the purchase was made pursuant to law.
To do this he must show
the substantial regularity of all the proceedings.
'

In

The deed of

Kansas it seems to be held that title passes at the sale, subject to be deStebbins v. Guthrie, 4 Kans., 353.

feated by redemption.

' See Ferguson v. Miles, 3 Gilm., 358 ; Stout v. Keyes, 2 Doug., Mich., 184.
Under the Mi.ssouri statute it has been held that the tax deed does not relate
back to the sale, where redemption was allowed afterwards. Donohoe ». Veal,
19 Mo., 331.
Thompson, 10 Pick., 859; Higlitown «. Freedle, 5 Sneed, 312;
Bush, 46 Penn. St., 62; Stephens v. Holmes, 36 Ark., 48. A deed
Hoffman v. Bell, 61 Penn.
executed after the officer's term has expired is void.
But it is no objection that it was executed after the taxpaj'er's death.
St., 444.
^Tilson

B.

Alexander

Curry

v.

v.

Fowler,

3

A. K. Marsh.,

504.

Little •«. Herndon, 10 Wall., 26; Sibley v. Smith, 3 Mich., 486; Elstoa
Kennicott,
46 HI., 187 ; Wetherbee v. Dunn, 32 Cal., 106 ; Large v. Fisher, 49
V.
Mo., 307. Where a statute authorized a sale of real estate after fourteen days
demand of payment, but required the deed to "state the cause of sale," etc.
and also the particulars of the proceedings preparatory to a sale : Seld, that a
deed was void which did not state that the taxes were not paid within fourteen
days after demand. Harrington v. Worcester, 6 Allen, 576. Where notice is
required by law to be given to the owner before a deed is made, the requirement must be strictly complied with. Denike b. Rourke, 3 Biss., 39. A tax
deed is not void for slight irregularities or variances from the statutory form
Bowman i>. Cockrill, 6 Kans., 311 ; Haynes v. Heller, 12 id., 381. The recitals
in a tax deed are in Kansas prima facie evidence of the facts recited. Hobson
The deed shows no title without acknowledgment.
V. Button, 9 Kans., 477.
Tilson v. Thompson, 10 Pick., 359 ; Stierliu v. Daley, 37 Mo., 483 ; Dalton v.
In New York it seems that if the deed purports to be given
Fenn, 40 id., 109.
as nonresident, when in fact they were assessed to a
lands
the
of
on a sale
Ratler o. Worth, N. Y. Court of Appeals, 11 Albany
void.
former owner, it is
<See

Law Journal,

401.

23
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It -would prove
would not stand for tliis evidence.
its own execution ; nothing more. The power to execute it must
be shown before the deed itself could have any force ; for no ofconveyance

ficer can make out his own jurisdiction to act by the mere fact of

In all administrative

acting.

proceedings

the facts

upon which

jurisdiction depends must always be shown by him who claims
This principle is undisputed. It
anything under its exercise.
leads us inevitably to this conclusion ; that whoever claims lands
under a sale for delinquent taxes, must take upon himself the burden of proving that taxes were duly assessed, which were a charge
upon the land, and that the successive steps were taken which led
to a lawful sale therefor, at which he or some one under whom he
claims became the purchaser.'
The difficulty of making the complete showing in these cases
has been thought to be so great as to render some modification of
the rule reasonable,

and

statutes

have

from time to time been

made in that direction.

The early statutes were probably not as
in their terms as their authors intended ; at least,

comprehensive
'

Stead's Lessee

v.

Course, 4 Cranch, 403

;

"Williams

v.

Peyton, 4 "Wheat., 77;

McClung «. lioss, 5 id., 116; Thatcher v. Powell, 6 id., 119; Rondendorff v.
Taylor, 4 Pet., 349 ; Clarke v. Strickland, 3 Curt. C. C, 439 ; Minor i). McLean,
4McLean,138; Moore ». Brown, 4 id., 211; same case in error, 11 How., 414;
Mahew «. Davis, 4 McLean, 213; Parker t). Overman, 18 How., 137; Browns.
Veazie, 25 Me., 359 ; Payson v. Hall, 30 id., 319 ; Loomis v. Pingree, 43 id., 399 ;
Lovejoy v. Lunt, 48 id., 377; "Will iamsburghs. Lord, 51 id., 599; French «. Patterson, Gl id,. 303 ; Doe v. Roe, 2 Hawks, 17 ; Avery «. Rose, 4 Dev., 549 ; Love
V. Gates, 4 Dev. & Bat., 353 ; Garrett v "White, 3 Ired. Bq., 131 ; Jordan d. Rouse,
1 Jones, L., 119 ; Yancey v. Hopkins, 1 Munf., 419 ; Christy c. Minor, 4 id., 431 ;
jSTalle V. Fenwick, 4 Rand., 585 ; Allen v. Smith, 1 Leigh, 231 ; Chapman v. Doe,
id., 329

Polk

Md., 153 ; Beatty v. Mason, 30 id., 409 ; Dyer v.
Doe v .Insurance Co., 8 S. & M., 197 ; Natchez v. Minor, 10
id., 246; Rule«. Parker, Cooke, 278; Hamilton v. Burum, 3 Yerg.,355; Pope

3

Boswell,

;

39

•0. Headen, 5

v. Rose, 35

id., 465

Ala.,

;

Lyons

Hunt,
Penn

; Blakeney v. Ferguson, 8 Ark.,
McReynolds v. Longenberger,
57 id., 13; Bucknall v. Story, 36 Cal., 67; Richardson v. Dorr, 5 Vt., 9; Fitch
V. Casey, 3 Greene, Iowa, 300; Eellog v. McLaughlin, 8 Ohio, 114; McMillan
v. State, 6 Blackf., 36; Doe «. Flagler, 1 Ind.,
D. Robbins, 5 id., 31; "Williams
543 ; Doe v. Sweetzer, 3 id., 649 ; Barnes v. Doe, 4 id., 133 ; Kyle ®. Malin, 8 id., 34 ;
Atkins V. Kinman, 20 Wend., 241 ; Doughty v. Hope, 3 Denio, 595 ; Waldron
-0. McComb, 1 Hill, 107; Sharp v. Spier, 4 id., 76; Tallman v. White, 2 N.Y.,

273;

66;

Shearer

Bennett

B.

»..

11. "Wright, 33

433 ;

Woodburn,

Buffalo,

III,

193 ;

17

v.

10

11

id., 395

St.,

511;

id., 383; Cruger

Scammon

v.

d. Doughertj^ 43 id., 107
Chicago, 40 id., 146.

;

Chicago

CH.
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by the courts, they did not change to any considera-

ble extent the former rule. Thus, a statute which declared that
the deed should be evidence of the regularity of the sale, was held
to prove only the regularity of the proceedings at the sale, leaving
the purchaser

still under the necessity of showing the regularity

of the prior proceedings.^
Where the statute makes the

prima facie evidence that the
requirements of the sale have been complied with, it is necessary
die&di

first that the holder of the tax title should prove the performance
by the assessor and collector of the several acts which are conditions precedent to the power to sell ; and then the contestant is
put to proof that the requirements of the law, as to time and manner of sale, were not complied with.^ So a statute which makes
the deed evidence of a title in fee simple in the owner, is held to
be evidence only of such a title
has been shown

it*

In later

by

after the right to give the deed

that support
language has been chosen with more care,

the proof of anterior proceedings

statutes

and the tax deed, given by a competent officer, has been declared
frima facie evidence not only of the regularity of the sale, but of
all prior proceedings,

and of title

in the purchaser.

This, it

will

wholly the burden of proof, which before rested
upon the purchaser, and casts it upon the party who would conThe purchaser is no longer under the necessity to
test the sale.
be seen, changes

show the correctness of the proceedings, but the contestant must
show in what particular he claims them to be incorrect. The
power to enact such laws has been denied in argument, but the
decisions sustain them.*

These decisions

are that the

statutes

'Tallman d. White, 3 N. T., 66; Striker v. Kelly, 3 Denio, 323; Doughty v.
Hope, 3 id., 594; Beekman «. Bigham, 5 N. Y., 366 ; Westbrook v. Wiiley, 47
id., 457 ; Rowland v. Doty, Har. (Jh., 3 ; Scott ». Young Men's Society, 1 Doug.,
Mich., 119; Latimer v. Lovett, 3 id., 204; Ives v. Kimball, 1 Mich., 308; Yenda
■B."Wheeler, 9 Texas, 408 ; Wilson v. Lemon, 33 Ind., 433.
2Robson

V.

^See cases

Osborn, 13 Texas, 398.
above cited.

Also Merrick

v.
'•

Hutt,

15

Ark.,

331.

A

declaration

law that the tax deed should be good and effectual both at law and
in equity," gives no special sanction to the conveyance beyond that derived
from the general principles of law. The purchaser must show that all prerequisites were complied with. Hadley v. Tankersley, 8 Texas, 12.
In

a tax

^Pillow.B.
Freeman

d.

Roberts, 13 How., 472; Williams v. Kirtland, 13 Wall., 306, 310;
Thayer, 33 Me., 76; Orono v. Veazie, 57 Me., 517; Hand v. Ballou,

■
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take away no substantial rights ; they only regulate the order of
proceeding in the legal tribunals, in exhibiting the evidence of substantial rights; and they rest on the solid foundation of the
authority of the legislature over the whole subject of
evidence ; an authority, however, which has this very plain limit;
that it cannot deprive one of his property by making his adverwhatever that claim may be, conclusive of its
sary's claim to
it,

supreme

It

own validity.

cannot, therefore, make the tax deed conclusive

peculiar effect to conveyances on sales made

for taxes, unless in express terms declared
Forbes

Francis,

v.

Bank,

Halsey,

Ark

26

424; Briscoe

«.

case

v. El wood, 53 id., 435 SteedCoiilter, 18 Ark., 423; Butts v.

id., 52 Johnson
;

541

Planter's

,

V.

7

N. T.,

man

;

12

applicable to the
;

Statutes giving

a

evidence of the holder's title to the land.''

S.

4

v. Murdock, 36 Miss., 693; Belcher v. Mhoon, 47
Lindenbower, 43 Mo., 163;
C.,46 id., 291; Cooks. Hackleman, 45 id., 817; Huffman v. Bell, 61 Penn. St., 444; Delaplaine v. Cook,
Wis., 44; Stewart v. McSweeney, 14 id., 408; Whitney v. Marshall, 17 id., 174;
Smith V. Cleveland, 17 id., 556; Lumsdeu -b. Cross, 10 id., 282; Allen v. Armstrong, 16 Iowa, 508; Adams v. Beale, 19 id., 61; Eldridge b. Kurhl, 27 id.,
160; Clark v. Connor, 28 id., 311, 315; Hurley i). Woodruff, 30 id., 260; Genther V. Fuller, 36 id., 604; Sprague v. Pitt, McCahon, 312; Sibley v. Smith,
id., 140 Amberg v. Rogers,
id., 383 Wright
Mich., 486 Lacey v. Davis,
«. 'Seeley, id., 339;
■». Dunham,
13 id., 414; Groesbeck
Stanbery ». Sillon,
Yeoman,
Ohio,
307;
18 Ohio (N. S.), 571; Turney v.
14
Smith v. Chapman, 10
Grat., 445. It
competent to make certificate of city engineer prima facie
evidence of the validity of
charge against owners of property for special
St. Louis v. Coons, 37 Mo., 44; St. Louis v. Armstrong, 38 id., 29.
assessment.

Conn., 424; Ray
t).

;

9

;

a

is

;

i

2

7

id., 613; Abbott

;

it

'

In Iowa statutes are sustained which make tax deeds conclusive evidence
that the property was regularly listed and assessed, and that
was regularly
advertised and sold. Allen v. Armstrong 16 Iowa, 508 McCready v. Sexton,
29 id., 356; Rima v. Cowan, 31 id., 135; Clark v. Thompson, 37 id., 536;

is

it

Madison v. Sexton, id., 563; Smith i). Easton, id., 584; Easton •o. Perry, id., 681.
The original owner may still contest the liability of the land to any tax; and
said in general terms by the court that on all jurisdictional questions the

a

a

;

is

it

is

is

deed cannot be made conclusive.
See Martin i). Cole, 38 Iowa, 141.
It
manifest, however, that this word jurisdictional
not employed in the same
often
in tax cases
sense here as
sense that makes each necessary step
jurisdictional requisite to the next; for in Iowa some of the most important
steps in the proceedings are held to be conclusively established by the deed.

On the question what shall be sufficient to rebut the prima facie case made for
the tax purchaser by his deed, and cast upon him the onus of showing regular
4

:

proceedings, the following cases are instructive
Bidleman v. Brooks, 38 Cal.,
73; Rayburns. Kuhl, 10 Iowa, 93; Lacey ». Davis,
Mich., 140; Wrights.
Dunham, 13 i(}., 414; Case «. Dean, 16 id., 12; Hall v. Kellogg, id., 139.
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of local and special assessments, such as those for paving streets,
etc, do not apply to them at all, and the purchaser under proceedings of that nature will be compelled to rely upon the common
law rule, and prove regularity.^

Judicial

sales

for taxes.

In

some of the states

it has been

advisable to provide that, before sales shall be made of
lands for the satisfaction of delinquent taxes, a judicial determination of the delinquency shall be had.' A judicial hearing in such
deemed

fairly be understood to have in view, first, the protection of the parties taxed, by giving them the opportunity to
inspect the proceedings and make their objections before the
final steps are taken which might conclude their rights forever;
a case may

and, second, the greater security of purchasers

at the .sales, which

may reasonably be supposed to follow a judicial determination
that the proceedings are such as, under the law, will justify a
sale being made. It has not been deemed advisable, in a work so
general in its plan as the present,

ination

of the proceedings

to enter at large into an examfor which provision is made under

The same general principles apply
In some cases ■— usually cases of street or other
to them. all.
special assessments — the judicial proceedings begin when the
statutes of different states.

assessors have completed

their work, and the assessment is ex-

amined and confirmed before process for^collection is issued ; or,
if the assessment is found to be defective, or is believed to be unjust, it is set aside at that stage, and the case sent back to the
assessors for new action

or the proceedings are simply quashed,
leaving the authorities to begin anew if they shall think it advisable to do so.^ The local statutes differ so much in the authority
'

Sharp

V.

26 Tex., 48 ;

Spier, 4

Stierlin

Hill,
b.

;

76 ;

Bucknall

v.

Daley, 37 Mo., 483

;

Story, 36 Cal., 67 ; Kelly v. Medlin,
Glass ti. Wkite, 5 Sneed, 475.

^The present constitution of Illinois requires tlie legislature to provide, in
cases where it is necessary to sell real estate for the nonpayment of faxes or
assessments, for state, county or municipal purposes, that a return shall be

all

made to some general officer of the county having authority to receive state
and county taxes ; and such officer alone, upon the order or judgment of some
court of record, is to have the power to sell.
■D.Chicago, 63 id., 299; Webster v. Chicago,

Hills
62

s. Chicago,

60 111., 86; Otis

id., 303.

^The following are cases of confirmation of special assessments under New
York statutes: Matter of Harman Street, 16 Johns., 231; Matter of Dover
Street, 1 Cow., 74; Matter of fourth Avenue, 3 Wend., 453; Matter of Twenty-
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they confer upon the courts, that the decisions made in one state
are commonly of little service as affording a guide to the action

of courts in other states.

Under some statutes the action of the
assessing boards is allowed to be reviewed on the facts as well as
on the law; under others, only questions of the regularity and
legality of the proceedings are submitted to the court. More
generally the court takes up the case at the point were the collector has demonstrated his inability to collect the tax from resiand sale of goods and chattels, and when the
tax upon nonresident or unseated lands has remained unpaid, for
the period allowed by law for making voluntary payment, before
dents by distress

compulsory proceedings

are suffered to be resorted to.

In any judicial proceeding

the court which assumes to act must

have that authority of law for the purpose which is called jurisdic
This consists in first, authority over the subject matter, and
tion.

The first comes
authority over the parties concerned.
from the statutory law, which designates the particular proceeding as one of which the court may take cognizance when the par-

second,

ties are properly before it

stitution of proceedings,

the second comes from the proper inand the service of process upon the par;

ties concerned, or something which is equivalent to such service.

Concerning jurisdiction of the subject matter, it is only necessary
to observe that it must come wholly from the coustitution or statutes of the state ; the common law giving to the courts no author-

ity in such

cases.

Moreover that which

and limited jurisdiction.

is conferred

is a special

The importance of this fact appears in

that familiar principle that nothing is taken by intendment in favSixth

Street,

ingstou

Pearl

12

Street,

id., 203

Street, 19 id., 651;

ter of William

;

Matter of Furman Street, 17 id., 649 ; Matter of LirMatter of De Graw Street, 18 id., 568; Matter of
Matter of Jolm and Clierry Streets, 19 id., 659; Mat-

18 id., 556;

and Anthony Streets,

19 id., 678 ; Matter of Soutli Seventli
of Bushwicli Avenue, 48 id., 9 ; Matter of Central
Parli, 51 id., 277, 303 ; In re Sliarp, 56 N. Y., 257 ; In re Van Antwerp, 56 id.,
261; Striker v. Kelley, 7 Hill, 9; S. C, 3 Denio, 333; Embury v. Connor, 3 N.
T., 511, 533; Matter of Canal and Walker Streets, 13 id., 406; King v.
Mayor, etc., of New York., 36 id., 183 ; Matter of Broadway, 49 id., 150. Tiiat
the court in passing upon the assessment cannot review political action, such
as the determination of the necessity or propriety of opening the street, or the
proper limits of an assessment district, see Matter of Albany Sti-eet, 11 Wend.,
149 ; Matter of William and Anthony Streets, 19 id., 676 ; Matter of John and
Cherry Streets, 19 id., 659 ; Matter of Livingston Street, 18 id., 556.

Street, 48 Barb.. 13 ; Matter
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court of special and limited jurisdiction, but
it must appear, by the recitals of the record itself, that the facts
oxisted which authorized the court to act, and that in acting the
a

court has kept within the limits of its lawful authority.
this principle is applicable to the case of a court of general

And

jurisdiction, which in the particular case is exercising a special and limited authority, as well as to the case of special courts created for

the making by the collector or some proper officer, of

is,

taken

a

such special and limited authority only.^
Taking up the case after a failure to make collection is supposed to have occurred, the first step commonly required to be
report to the court showing that the supposed delinquency actuThis being the document that calls into activity an
ally exists.
must conform to the law

it it

authority of the court before latent,
in every substantial requirement, or

will fail

entirely to have

any efficiency for the purpose.^
The next step will perhaps be, the giving of notice which shall
stand in the place of the process which in ordinary cases brings

«. Koss,

"Wheat, 116; Thatcher

v.

proceedings

Powell,

G

'McClung

5

the parties before the court.
Proceedings of this nature are not usually

against

id., 119; Francis'

4

6

5

5

5

Hayw., 294; Tift i). Griffin, Geo., 185; Daliin v. HudLessee v. Washburn,
Cow., 221; Deming b. Corwin, 11 Wend., 647; Sheldon n. Wright,
son,
N. Y., 497; Bridge v. Ford, Mass., 641; Smith e. Eice, 11 id., 511; Barrett

Ired., 404; Harshaw v. Taylor,
Vt., 246; Jennings v. Stafford,
J.,
22
Farr,
v.
N.
356 Piatt v. Stewart, 10 Mich.,
Perrine
C),
513
Jones (N.
in
these
cases
are
governed
by the same principles which
Proceedings
260.
Gillis,
«.
45
Gal., 541; Eitel b. Foote, 39
Jones
govern other judicial sales.
In all the proceedings, includCertain lands were sold for taxes.
Cal., 439.
ing the order of sale, the lands were described as in A. county. In point of
Held, thut a.s to these at least the
fact two-thirds thereof were in B. county.
Harris,
Sneed,
v.
332.
The confirmation of an asWilliams
void.
was
sale
fixes
the
character
of
the
as resident or nonresthe
court
property
sessment by
16

;

3

1

Crane,

if

still proceed

resident becomes nonresident

as against

a

ident, and

a

4

;

V.

resident.

afterwards, the collector

Gossett v. Kent,

19

Ark.,

will

601.

Sup. Ct.
111., 414.

111. (1875),

is

7

evidence of delinquency, and

is

7

;

«See Marsh v. Chestnut, 14 111., 223; Charles v. Waugh, 35 id., 315; Morrill
v. Olin, Sup. Ct. El.,
■V.Swartz, 39 id., 108; Fox v. Turtle, 55 id., 377; People
323.
The
News,
collector's
report
only prima facie
Chicago Legal
(1875)
subject to be disproved.

Chicago Legal News,

322.

See

Andrews

Denham

v.

v.

Eumsey,

People,

67

[^H. XV.

LAW OF TAXATION.

360

parties/ nor, in tlie case oi lands or interests in lands belonging to
persons unknown, can they be.
They are proceedings which have
regard to the land itself rather than to the owners of the land,
and if the owners are named in the proceedings, and personal notice is provided for, it is rather from tenderness to their interests,

and in order to make sure that the opportunity for a hearing shall
not be lost to them, than from any necessity that the case shall
assume that form.
As in all other cases of proceedings in rem,
if the law makes provision for publication of notice in a form and
manner reasonably calculated to bring the proceedings to the
knowledge of the parties who exercise ordinary diligence in looking after their interests in the lands, it is all that can be required.

We refer to

a few cases

illustrative

as

of

the

general

In

prin-

ciples on which the judicial action must be supported.
ing case in the federal supreme court, it appeared that the statute
under which the proceeding was had, required the sheriff, in the
a lead-

of nonpayment of taxes by a specified time, to levy the
same by distress and sale of the goods and chattels of the person
in default. Failing thus to collect, he was to report the failure
event

to the county court, whose duty it then was to direct its clerk to
for the taxes, together

make out a certificate of the lands liable

with the amount of the taxes and

charges

due thereon, and to

publish the same, and if the taxes and charges were not then paid
within thirty days, judgment was to be entered for the amount
due, and execution to issue upon which the land might be sold
and conveyed.

The sheriff made no such report as the statute
it was held that the court never

provided for, and for want of this

obtained jurisdiction to proceed in the case.^
Moreover the clerk
never made publication of the list, and this failure would have
'

Parks V. Miller, 48 III., 360 ; Schaeffer v. People, 60 id., 179. Where a sale
is to be confirmed by a court, no one is to be heard to oppose it who is not adversely interested. One describing himself simply as " tenant in possession "
shows no right to be heard.
^Thatcher

see

u.

v.

Percifield,

1

Ark.,

473.

Powell, 6 "Wheat., 119, following with approval Francis' Les5 Hayw., 294.
To the same effect is McClung ?>. Ross, 5
And see Thacher ex parte, 3 Sneed, 344; Spellmani). Curteuius,

v.

Washbrn-n,

Wheat., 116.
13 111., 409;

«. Kuggles,
477.

Black

Morrill

v.

Swartz,

39

id., 108;

Fox

v.

Turtle, 55 id., 377; Fortmau
Mayo v. Ah Loy, 33 Cal.,

58 id., 307 ; Schseffer v. People, 60 id., 79 ;
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if the proper report had been

been fatal to the proceedings

In other

made.^

have been

and imperfections

cases the following errors
held to render the judicial proceedings void : Proceeding tg judgment before the time limited for voluntary payment of the taxes
had expired
rendering the judgment in a proceeding not taken
" all owners and
claimants," and by service on the land,
against
'
as the statute required ; rendering judgment upon a collector's

f

report which failed to show,

required, whether the
delinquent taxes were state taxes or county taxes
applying for
at which
and obtaining judgment at
from
that
different term
the statute required the application to be made.^ And
judgment
void which
given in figures merely, with neither words

will

what de-

referred

to,

it

if
it

is

nor signs to indicate that money
intended, or
nomination of money the figures stand for."
The defects which were held fatal in the cases

is,

is

is

a

a

;''

as the statute

with one exception in which the judgment was
all
defects
which went to the power of the court to
meaningless,
act at all.
an ulterior
The proceeding to judgment and sale
is

be seen, were

''

proceeding which, under the law, must have for its antecedents
the proper showing that an attempt to collect has proved ineffectual, and that the case has been brought before the court by

Thatcher

111.,

409;

v. Po-svell,

Charles

6

'

proper time.

a

proper notice and at

Wheat., 119.

i. Waugh,

But when those facts ap-

See also Spellman

r. Curtenius,

13

McKee v. Champaign County, 53
id., 207; Abbott ». Lindenbower, 43 Mo.,

35 id., 315;

id., 477; Fortman

'Williams
s

Hartsock,
Maj'o

u.

Gleason,

5

6

?;. Ruggles, 58
Iowa, 381.
103; McGahen «. Case,

Iowa,

284.

For

the same

principle,

see

Hartsock,

15

Pickett

b.

15 111., 279.

Ah Loy,

V.

Swartz, 39

i'.

»

Hogle,

Brown

«

•"Morrill

Lawrence

v.

33 Cal., 477.

i'.

See also

111., 108.

Pickett

v.

id., 379.

30 111., 119.

Fast, 20

111.,

338; Lane ». Bommelmann,

21

id., 143; Eppin-

Bailey

v.

Doolittle,

24

1

;

gcr r. Kirby, 23 id., 531 Dukes v. Rowley, 24 id., 310;
Wall., 398.
id., 577; Woods v. Freeman,

'It

a

can be no objection to
judgment against the land for taxes, that
the collector did not make ilie tax out of the personalty, when the collector did distrain the personalty, and the objector replevied the same out of tlie
Deerham v. People, 67 111., 414.
It is no objection to an
collector's hands.
6

application for judgmentagainst lands that the valuation is excessive.
Chicago Legal News, 215.
V. People, Sup. Ct. 111. (1874),

cer

Spen-

LAW

862

[CH. XV.

TAXATION.

OF

has been ren-

pear by the record of the court, and the judgment

of regularity in the prior proceedings are forenot only that, but irregular action of the court it-

dered, all questions

And

closed..^

self

will not render its judgment invalid, though it might author-

ize a reversal in an appellate court

It

if

a review is allowed

by

principle of general application, that while a judgment which has been rendered without competent -jurisdiction
may be treated as a mere nullity everywhere, yet that for mere
irregularities it can be assailed only in a direct proceeding for that
purpose ; that is to say, by motion or petition in the same case, or
statute.

is

a

by some proceeding in the nature of

In

a

review in

error.^

subsequent to judgment the rules which

the proceedings

The deed given
govern ordinary judicial sales are applicable.^
by the officer who sells by virtue of such a judgment should
by its recitals, an authority presumptively sufficient to
authorize
and indeed this
usually required by the statute,
which prescribes

a

is

it,

show,

form reciting the judgment

and

The

sale.^

deed cannot be evidence of the regularity of the proceedings un-

'

less made so by statute.^
Foley,

See Mayo «.

Gillis,

Reeve «. Kenaody, 43 id., 643; Jones

40 Cal., 281;

».

id., 541.

45

v.

tax sale under

a

it

;

,

6

4

2

2

8

6

9

Atkins

;

13 111., 173,

See also

3

Marsh,

a

B.

is

'

leading case in tax matters illustrative
Hinman, Gilm., 437 Merritt v. Thompson, 14 id., 716; Wilkins' Lessee v. Huse,
Ohio, 154; Eitel v. Foote, 39 Cal,,
439; Ex parte Kellogg, Vt., 509; Edgarton v. Hart,
id., 207; Wall D.Trumbull, 16 Mich., 228; Daily s. Newman, 14 La. An., 580; Cadmus v. Jackson,
53Penn. St., 295; "Wallace v. Brown, 22 Ark., 118; Carter v. Walker,
Ohio
As
to
the
recitals
in
S.),339.
such
cases
see
Atkins
v.
necessary
Hinman,
(N.
Gilm., 437; Young v. Thompson, 14 111., 380; Dukes v. Rowley, 24 id., 310;
Bailey v. Doolittlo, 24 id., 577; Dentler d. State,
Blackf., 258; Williams a.
id 36. In Cadmus v. Jackson, 53 Penn. St., 295
State,
was held that
Chestnut

of this principle.

2

Curry
Jones

*

See

As

v.
B.

a

judgment could not be defeated by showing that the tax was
This showing is sometimes permitted under statutes.
paid before judgment.

Hinman,
Gillis,

15

11 111., 420;

to the necessary recitals

226; Brown

v.

Conway v. Cable,

37

id., 83.

Cal., 541.

Hogle, 30

in the

111., 119;

deeds, see

Wetherbee

v.

McDermotl

b.

Scullj',

27

Ark.,

Dunn, 32 Cal., 106.

a

5

SeeElston v. Kennicott, 46 111., 187; Little v. Herndon, 10 Wall., 26. In
California where lands are assessed as an entirety to several, part of whom
pay portions of the tax, the court in rendering judgment should ascertain
what interests are delinquent, and exonerate the rest.
43 Cal., 121.

People

v.

Shimmins,

CH.
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CHAPTEE XVI.
REDEMPTION OF LANDS FROM TAX SALES.

It

is not the policy of the law that any man should forfeit his
estate because from inability, or even from negligence, he has
failed to meet his engagements or to perform his duties by some
exact day which has been prescribed by statute. On the contrary,

it is for

the welfare of every community, that the law should
favor the citizen in all reasonable measures for the preservation

of his

estate,

against

losses which might result from his misfor-

tunes or his faults, extending to him

sistent with justice to others and

all the liberality that is con-

proper regard to the interest of
the state.
The principle is recognized in the liberality shown to
those desirous to redeem from the forfeiture of mortgages, and in
a

the provisions made for redemption from

judicial sales.

It

is also

recognized in the laws providing for redemption from tax sales.
The statutes on this subject have little uniformity, but certain
general rules govern the right to redeem under them all ; and it
may be sufficient for our purposes to refer to these.
The statutes which give the right are to be regarded favoraAbundant reason for this is
bly and construed with liberality.
which
the
cases
in
recognize the rule. It has been justly
assigned
remarked that the right of the government to sell lands for taxes,'
it is accustomed to do, can only be maintained on " the abso1.

as

lute sovereignty of the state in the exercise of its taxing power.
But it is a severe exercise of power. To divest ownership, without
personal notice and without direct compensation, is the instance

in which a constitutional government approaches

most near to an

tends to modify this right is

Whatever
unrestrained tj^ranny.
the
citizen, and ought to be liberally construed, on
favorable to
the principle that remedial statutes are to be beneficially expounded. Eedemption is the last chance of the citizen to recover
his right of property."^
1 Woodward,

Heptiurn,

10

J., in

Gault's Appeal, 33 Penn. St., 94, 97.

Pet., 1; Corbett v. Nutt,

18

See

also Dubois v.

Grat., 074, and 10 Wall., 464; Patter.
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But while the statutes are to be favorably regarded, it is

at

the same time to be borne in mind that the right to redeem comes
from the statute exclusively, and is to be asserted only in the

under the circumstances which are there prescribed.
The courts can grant no extension of the statutory time ; they
can make no exceptions from general provisions of the statutes to
meet the circumstances of hard cases ; and if the statutes fail to
cases

and

provide for the cases of disability, like those of infancy, coverture
or absence from the country, the courts are without authority to
The statutes of some states make special provisions for
do so.'
the cases of infants, and sometimes for other classes, permitting
redemption by them after the time allowed to owners generally
And where
has expired ; but such statutes are far from general.'^
Brindle, 9 Watts, 98 ; Masterson v. Boasley, 3 Ohio, 301 ; Jones v. Collins, 16 Wis., 594 ; Winchester v. Cain, 1 Kob., La., 431 ; Rice v. Nel.-on, 37
Iowa, 148 ; Sohenck v. Peay, 1 Dillon, 267. Where the deed was required to
lie twelve months in the town clerk's office, during which the party might redeem, it was held that it should be deposited with all convenient speed.
Four years after the sale was too late. Ives v. Lyon, 7 Conu., 504. Statutes
have sometimes provided for judicial proceedings to foreclose or cut off the
right to redeem, not only in cases where lands were to be forfeited for delinIn the latter case the proceedings will
quent t-^xes, but also in case of sales.
bo taken by the purchaser, who will be held to great strictness in complying
with the statute.
See Dentler v. State, 4 Blackf., 258; Gaylord v. Scarff, 6
Iowa, 179; Abell «. Cross, 17 id., 171. Such proceedings are not applicable
to sales for municipal taxes unless expressly made so.
Grimmer v. Sumner,
21 Wis., 179.
son

V.

'

ilcCormack v. Russell, 25 Penn. St., 185; Smith v. Macon, 20 Ark., 17;
Heard v. Walton, 39 Miss., 388. Redemption cannot be had in equity. Mitchell V. Green, 10 Met., 101. Except as it may be permitted by statute, and then
it must be under such conditions as the statute may attach. Craig v. Klanagin, 21 Ai-k., 319. Where the owner neglected to pay taxes or to redeem his
lands after sale, under a belief that the taxes had been paid, the mistake does
not entitle him to relief against the consequences of the omission.
Playter d.
Cochran, 37 Iowa, 258. A purchaser of lands which had been sold for taxes
prior to his purchase is not entitled to redeem because of having, after the

purchase, inquired of the treasurer if there were unpaid taxes, and been told
there were not ; at the same time making no inquiry for tax sales.
Moore?).
Hamlin, 38 Iowa, 482. Compare Van Benthuysen o. Sawyer, 36 N. Y., 150.

The pendency of the civil war, and the fact that the owner resided in a state
in rebellion, cannot enlarge his statutory right to redeem. Finley v. Brown,
22 Iowa, 638.
5

An infant

Merrill,

35

who has a right to redeem may sell it with the land.
Stout v.
47. As to redemption by infants and married women under

Iowa,
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tlie statute makes no provision for the redemption of an undivided
interest, the party owning such an interest can only redeem by
paying the whole redemption money.^
3. Whatever the statute may make provision for, subsequent
to the sale, in order to the protection of the interest of the parties
having the right to redeem, must be strictly performed. The
reasons which require this are the same that render imperative a

a

the publication

the right to

it

;

'

a

is

is

it

by the officers

no-

personal service upon the

resident.
owner in case he
known, and
of this nature must be strictly complied with.

substituted for

of

a

Perhaps the most usual requirement
tice to the tax payer, with sometimes

is,

strict compliance with all those provisions which are to be observed in the interest of the tax payer before the sale is made.

All

provisions

Nothing can be
cannot be waived
it,

by one who chances to be in possession of the land but who has
and
no interest in it,' and the owner may rely on his right to
statutes making exceptiona in their favor, see Jones v. Collins,
Lynch v. Brudie, 63 Penn. St., 206.

16

Wis., 594;

Wtiere

a

2

8

;

;

'

Quinn d. Kenney, 47 Cal., 147 People v. McE wen, 23 id., 54 Curl u.Watson,
Iowa,
35.
Where the statute permits redemption of an undivided interest,
25
the right may be enforced by mandamus. People v. Treasurer of Detroit,
Mich., 14. That rents and profits received by the tax purchaser cannot be
applied by way of equitable redemption, see Spengin v. Forry, 37 Iowa, 242.
As to the right of one tenant in common who redeems for all to retain the
land until the others repay their share, see Watkins v. Eaton, 30 Me., 529.
leasehold

interest was sold and was to be conveyed at the ex-

;

;

;

7

3

a

piration of two years from the sale, but the statute required the corporation, at
least six months before the expiration of two years from the sale, to cause an
advertisement to be published at least twice in each week, for six weeks succertain day they would be
cessively, that unless the lands were redeemed by
and
that
the six weeks must be comconveyed, held, that this was imperative,
pleted six months before the expiration of two years. Doughty v. Hope,
Denio, 594. See Jackson v. Estey, Wend., 148; Comstock b. Beardsley, 15
id., 348 Westbrook v. Willey, 47 N. Y., 457 Jenks v. Wright, 61 Penn. St.,
Wilson v. McKenna, 52 111., 43. And compare Wright v. Sperry, 21 Wis.,
410
If lands are improperly grouped and sold, this does not aflFect the right
331.
Penn v. Clemans, 19 Iowa, 372.
to redeem in parcels.

to

16

that at the time notice

;

is

v.

in possession, see Comstock v. BeardsThe occupation intended by
Hand
v. Ballou, 12 N. Y., 541.
given.

to be deemed

Davison,

ley, 15 Wend., 348
the statute

who
Bush

is

As

is

Wend., 148.

7

it

it

'

So held under the New York statute. The statute required notice to be given
was held that an occupant who had
to the party in possession if an}'; but
could not waive the right to the notice. Jackson v. Estey,
no interest in
id., 550.
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wait until he receives it before taking proceedings to redeem.*
Notice, when to be given bj an officer, is an official act, and
should be put in writing; but whether in writing or not, must be
distinct and full, and the evidence

in the proper

served

it should be pre-

of giving

office.^

As

to the persons who may redeem, something may depend
that any
The general rule
upon the phraseology of the statute.
is,

4.

one may redeem who has in the land an interest which would be

by the tax conveyance.^ A statute giving the right to
redeem to the " owner,'' will be construed to embrace the case of
the original owner, notwithstanding there
an outstanding tax
is

affected

It

law notice

4

mortgage

*"
;

a

;

or the assignee of

Penn. St., 40; Poughty v. Hope,
Denio, 594;
In Illinois has been decided that where hy

38

Blackf.,

husband who claims in

3

v. Smatliers,

v. State,

dowress

so may

358.

it

'Arthurs
Dentler

or

a

;

^

right of his wife

'

And

no title in the occupant'

a

a

's

a

;

a

a

may also embrace any one who has substantial interest
in the premises even wife having homestead right in her husband's lands,' or
lien creditor.*
A purchaser at sheriff sale
of the right of one in possession, may redeem, though he shows
title.*

to redeem was required

to be served on the

sessed, and the notice was not given, the tax deed was

person who was aseven though the

void

a

person assessed had no interest in the land, and though the purchaser had published notice in
newspaper three months before the time to redeem had expired, describing the land, stating his purchase, and also when the redemption

would expire.

Penn. St., 31.
Schenck v. Peay,

Dillon,

261

;

Pet.,

McBride

v.

County Auditor,

Schenck

19

Peay,

v.

1

Beale,

v.

Iowa,

3

Watts, 436.

Adams

«

10

51

1

Hepburn,

v.

v.

Dillon,

478.

61.

Dillon,

269.

And

see as lessees, etc.,

Byington

v. Rider,

Iowa, 506.

Dubois
Rice

Ti.

" Faxon

v.
V.

Woodburn,
Hepburn,

Nelson,

27

10 Penn. St., 511.

10 Pet.

Iowa,

1.

Shearer

148.

The statute gave the right to the " mortwas held the assignee was included.
The redemption is for

v. Wallace, 101 Mass., 444.

gagee," and

it

'

*

■"

9

Journeay,

Lancaster

'

*

Hoey,

2

Dubois

v.

1
;

Broughton

s

'

9

Barnard v. Hoyt, 63 111., 341. In Missouri the statute required
the certificate of purchase to be recorded, and gave the owner two years after the sale in which to redeem. It was held that recording the certificate
■was essential.
Morton v. Keeds, Mo., 878.
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party claiming the land by executory contract.^ And one
interested in lands sold in solido may redeem for all.'
Probably
none of the statutes are so restricted in the terras in which they
or

a

grant the right to redeem as to fail in protecting all interests like
those which have been mentioned, and all others of a beneficial
cbnracter.

A

u.

stranger to the title cannot defeat a tax purchase by re-

The purchaser has acquired

demption.

a

title which is subject

; and no payment
only to the right of those interested
of the amount by a stranger, and no acceptance of it by any
official from a stranger, can affect this right.* Probably the acceptance of the redemption money by the purchaser himself would

to redeem

preclude his afterwards claiming rights under his purchase ; but
nothing short of his own recognition of the unauthorized act of
one who,

if he had no interest, would be

could conclude him in such

a mere

intermeddler,

a case.'*

Although redemption is

statutory right, yet a party attempting in good faith to make it may be relieved against the
mistakes or frauds of the officer or of the purchaser.
If he has
6.

a

attempted to redeem, and done all he was required to do by those
entitled to receive the money, the sale is discharged even though,
in consequence of the mistake of the officer, he has paid less than
the proper amount.^

But where one claims to have discharged

the benefit of the owner as well as the holder

Smith,

31

N. J.,

of the mortgage.

Duncan

v.

325.

' One who has bought the land by executory contract

may compel the purof
the
to
him
on
receipt
redemption
taxes
to
money. Rogers
assign
chaser for
v. Butter,

11

Gray, 410.

Pingree, 43 Me., 299. It appears to be the rule in Iowa that one
must redeem all he has a right to redeem, and cannot compel the purchaser
Curl v. Watson, 25 Iowa, 135 ; Jacobs v. Porter, 34 id., 343,
to accept less.
v. McEwen, 23 Cal., 54.
People
See
345.
' Loomis

3 See

V.

Eaton

v.

North,

25

Wis.,

514 ; Cousins v.

Allen,

28 id., 233.

Byington v. Bookwalter, 7 Iowa, 513 ; Penn v. Clemens, 19 id., 372. The
officer to whom redemption is made need have no proof that the person offering to make it is authorized to do so, unless the statute requires this. Chapin
*

V.

Curtenius,

15 111., 427.

it was decided that the reall of the
demption was elfeotual, though by mistake of the county treasurer
Mott, 53
i>.
taxes were not included which should have been. And see Price
Iowa, 559.
St., 315; Dietrick ». Mason, 57 id , 40; Nobles. BulHs, 33
5

Thus, in Budd,

Penn.

v.

Tompkins,

47 Penn, St., 359,
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by the payment of all taxes demanded of
him, which was less than the whole, it must appear that no reIf when he applied to
sponsibility for the error rests upon him.
the treasurer to redeem, that officer was left to understand that

lands from

a

tax

sale,

only a certain sale was inquired for, and received the money upon
that alone, this will not discharge any other sale.''
7. The purchaser may waive strict compliance with the statutes.
This he will do if he receives payment after the day.^ But such
a transaction
a purchase

;

^

is to be regarded purely as a redemption, and not as
as would be also an assignment made by the pur-

chaser to the original owner, on a claim being made by the latter

of

a

right to redeem.*

Eedemption gives no new title ; it simply relieves the land
And this is true whether
from the sale which had been made.
is
made
before the statutory time had expired, or by
redemption
8.

consent of the purchaser afterwards.^

If

the purchaser had any

other title or interest in the land besides that redeemed

from,

it

entirely unaffected ; his acceptance of the redemption
money cannot estop him from setting it up and relying upon it.'
9. The purchaser has no title to the land until tbe time for reHe has consequently no constructive posdemption has expired.
remains

If

'

Lamb v. Irwia, G9 Penn. St., 436.
redemption is prevented by tlie oflBcer
refusing to give a statement and receive tlie amount, tbe title is not cut oflf.
Van Bentliuysen
-

Co.\e

V.

v.

Wolcott,

Sawyer,
27

36

N. T.,

150.

Penn. St., 154; Philadelphia v. Miller, 40 id., 440.

Coxe V. Wolcott, 27 Penn. St., 154. In Rogers v. Johnson, 70 id., 234, a
written agreement given by the purchaser to the owner, agreeing to convey
on being paid the amount of the bid with twenty-flve per cent, additional, was
So is a tender to the purchaser sufficient,
regarded as a good redemption.
under
the
law
is to be made to the treasurer.
redemption
though,
Brougliton
3

Price -o. Mott, 53 id., 815. In Massachusetts one entitled to redeem should make tender to the purchaser, notwithstanding he has while disseized made conveyance to another. Faxon c.
Wallace, 98 Mass., 44. See Same v. Same, 101 id., 444. A tender, accepted
or not, is equivalent to redemption. Sperry v. Gibson, 3 W. Va., 523; Brooks
V.

0.

Journeay,

Hardwick,
^ Coxe V.

51

5

Penn.

St.,

31.

And

see

La. An., 675.

Sartell,

31

Penn. St., 480.

See Steiner i). Coxe, 4 id., 13.

Wolcott, 37 Penn. St., 154. For the general rule, see
Improvement Co., 35 id., 56 ; Cuttle v. Brockway, 32 id., 45 ; Jenks
61 id., 410; Gray v. Coan, 30 Iowa, 536.
5 Coxe V.

«

Cooper

V.

Bushley, 73 Penn. St., 353.

Phillips
v.

v.

Wright,
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right to go upon and make
"use of them than any stranger to the title would have.
His entry
iipon the premises would be a tre.'^pass upon the possession, actual or constructive, of the owner, who might recover against him
and no more

for any injury committed.*
10. Neither the purchaser

nor the of&cer can add conditions to

A

direct attempt to do this would so manifestly be an attempt to legislate to the prejudice of the owner,
that nothing could be said in justification of it. But peculiar
cases, which would amount to this in legal effect, sometimes rethe right to redeem.

Thus, where the
quire to be tested by the general principle.
land of one person was irregularly sold with that of others, but
the infirmity in the sale was afterwards cured by a healing act, it
was held, that the owner could not be required, as a condition to
redemption, to pay any more than the proportion of the bid that
this being all that he could
have been charged with had the sale been regular.^ So if the
purchaser has paid taxes, subsequently assessed upon the land,
he cannot demand these as a condition to redemption, unless this
was

to his land

fairly chargeable

;

And, if a resident's lands have
is the provision of the statute.^
been assessed and sold as nonresident, their character has been
fixed for all the purposes of that proceeding, and the owner cannot be required to redeem on any different terms from a nonresident.*

In

it is important to understand
what authority the legislature retains over them, especially in
view of the very fr'equent and radical changes which are made in
the law, and which in terms if not in intent apply to inchoate
11.

the matter of tax sales,

transactions previously had, as well as to those which are to take
place under the new law. The question, for instance, whether
a statute
'
St.,

extending the right to redeem can be applied to pre-

Shalemiller v. McCarty,
94; Lightner v. Mooney,

55 Penn.

See Ganlt's Appeal, 33 Penn.
This may possibly be otherwise

St., 186.

Watts, 407.

10

under some statutes, but there can be no question that the general
stated in the text.
counties in Kansas, see Parr
3 Stephens v.
*

As to the right
Haughey, 5 Kan., 035.

«. Mason, 57 Penn. St., 40.

= Dietrich

Garabaldi

Holmes,

v.

34

Jenkins,

30
37

v.

Ark.,
Ark.,

48.
458.

rule

is

to redeem from the
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vious sales, is one constantly liable to arise, and vrtich, in fact,
has arisen in several cases.

If

the time to redeem

before the passage
the statute can have no effect upon

has already expired

of the statute, it is manifest
the sale.
The title has now become absolute, and the legislature
can no more create rights in the land in favor of the former owner
But if the time has not exthan in favor of any other person.
pired, and redemption is

still open to the owners, the want of

piower is not so entirely beyond dispute.

In one case it has been decided that the time for redemption
might lawfully be extended from one year to two, after the sale
had taken place.
The decision is reasoned on the liberal construction which should be put upon redemption laws ; and the conclusion was just, if no other considerations need be taken into the
account.^
Other cases have held the contrary, and, as we believe,
on reasons that are conclusive.

They plant themselves upon the
Now the
principle that the obligation of contracts is inviolable.
It is made under the
purchase at a tax sale is clearly a contract.
as
it
law
then exists, and upon the terms prescribed by the law.

No subsequent statute can import new terms into the contract, or
add to those before expressed.
If it could be changed in one
particular, it could be in all ; if subject to legislative control at
The same rule ought in morals to
all, it is wholly at its mercy.^
apply to a statute shortening the time to redeem ; as it is equally
unjust to legislate against the owner of the land in such circumstances as in his favor.
But with him there is no contract when
the sale is made, and perhaps the remedy by redemption which
the statute gives him, like remedies in general, is subject to legislative discretion.^
'

Gault's Appeal,

« Robinson c.

33

Penn. St., 94.

Howe, 13 Wis., 341; Dilcemau v. Dikoman,
Goeneu s. Schroeder, 8 Minn., 387. And see Cargill ». Power,

'It

11
1

Paige, 484;

Midi.,

309.

was so intimated in Robinson u. Howe, 13 Wis., 341, and Smitli v. Packard, 13 id., 371. The riglit to shorten the time to redeem from a mortgage
sale was affirmed in Butler v. Palmer, 1 Hill, 324, but denied in Cargill v.

Power, 1 Midi., 369, on tlie ground that the right pertained to the contract itself which the parties had made ; that is to say, to the mortgage.
And see
State V. Commissioners of School, etc.. Lands, 4 Wis., 414.
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CHAPTER XVII.
PROCEEDINGS AT LAW TO RECOVER LANDS SOLD FOR TAXES.

Where lands have been sold and conveyed in satisfaction of
delinquent taxes, the purchaser, if he finds the land occupied,
may bring ejectment in the common law courts to obtain possession. If, on the other hand, he finds the land unoccupied and takes
without suit, the original owner may have the like
remedy against him.
It has in some cases been thought proper, with a view to a
possession

of all questions concerning the validity of tax
to
titles,
establish, by statute, some special rules regarding the
These rules are to be classed under
proceedings to contest them.
speedy settlement

Those which make it

condition to any recovery by
the original owner of lands sold for taxes, that he should do
equity in the premises ; and those which require him to bring his
two heads

:

a

very short time, specially limited for the purpose.
Under the first head may be ranged those provisions which
require, as a condition to maintaining any suit, that the owner of
the title adverse to the tax title shall pay the taxes for which the
suit in

a

1.

land was sold, and those which, in the event of his establishing
his title to the land, require him to pay for any betterments that
have been made by the tax purchaser or his assignees in reliance
upon the purchase.

The requirement,

that the party recovering in ejectment, shall
pay the fair value of betterments which an adverse claimant has
made in good faith upon the land, and which the party making
them must now lose, is one that, under ordinary circumstances,
No serious question of the right
is eminently just and proper.
of the legislature to make such requirements can well arise, and
if it could, it must now be considered as conclusively settled by
There is more difficulty with the
the decisions in its favor.^
requirement of payment of taxes.
1

-Brown

strong

V.

v.

Storm, 4 Vt.,

Jackson,

1

37 ;

Blackf.,

Whitney v. Richardson, 31 id., 300, 306 ; ArmFowler v. Halbert, 4 Bibb, 52, 54; Brack ett

375;
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ha? been decided in one state that an act which provided
that " no person shall be permitted to institute any proceedings
to set aside any assessment or special tax, hereafter levied or

It

upon any lot or tract of land, or to set aside any deed
executed in consequence of nonpayment of such taxes, and the
sale of the premises therefor, unless such person shall first pay
or tender to the proper party, or deposit for his use with the treasassessed

Withington d. Corey, 3 N. H., 115 ; Hunt's Lessee
1). McMahan, 5 Ohio, 133; Longwortli v. Wortliington, 6 id., 9, 10; Baoou v.
Callender, 6 Mass., 303; Jones v. Carter, 13 id., 314; Scott i). Mather, 14 Texas,
235 ; Saunders «. "Wilson, 19 id., 194 ; Childs v. Shower, 18 Iowa, 261 ; Pacquette
V. Pickness, 19 Wis., 219; Coney i). Owen, 6 Watts, 435; Steele v. Spinance, 23
Penn. St., 256; Lynch v. Brudie, 63 id,, 206; Dothage «. Stuart, 30 Mo., 251;
Fenwick v. Gill, 38 id., 510; Craig v. Flanagin, 31 Ark., 319; Pope v. Macon,
23 id., 644; Marlow ». Adams, 24 id., 109; King ». Harrington, 18 Mich., 213;
Howard o. Zeyer, 18 La. An., 407; Love v. Shartzer, 31 Cal., 487; Stebbins 11
Some of the statutes give the value of the improveGuthrie, 4 Kans., 353.
have been in possession, claiming title in good faith.
who
ments to those only
V.

Norcross,

1

Greenl.,

89, 93 ;

In

Texas it has been held, that the tax purchaser is not a possessor in good
faith, and, consequently, not entitled to compensation for improvements, if
his deed was void for want of authority in the officer to sell, and by proper
diligence
307.

he might have known the fact. Robson v. Osboru, 13 Texas, 298,
the claimant must have had at least color of title.
Cain

In Indiana

■V.Hunt, 41

Ind., 466. But in Pennsylvania, and, perhaps, in most of the states,
tlie O'.vner, recovering his lands, may have judgment against him for improvements, though the tax proceedings were wholly void. Gilmore v. Thompson, 3 Watts, 106, (where the tax had been paid before sale) ; Coney v. Owen, 6 id.,
435, (where the land was exempt from taxation) ; Lynch v. Brudie, 63 Penn. St.,
206. But it would be otherwise if the lands were seated so that the sale would
be void, not because

jurisdiction

of defective proceedings, but because of the

to proceed at all.

See Lambertson

v.

Hogan,

3

absence

of

Penn. St., 22, and

cases cited.
In Rogers v. Johnson, 67 id., 43, 47, Agnew, J., gives the explanation of the difference: "The distinction between a sale absolutely void,
from want of jurisdiction to sell, and one merely void because of a fatal defect
in the proceeJings, is palpable. Thus in McKee v. Lamberton, 2 W. & S.,
107, 114, and Cramer v. Hall, 4 id., 36, where the land was seated and the

treasurer had no authority to sell, it was held, that the purchaser was not
entitled to be compensated for his Improvements; while in Coney ». Owen,
6 Watts, 435, and Gilmore v. Thompson,
3 id., 106, where the lands were
unseated and the treasurer had general jurisdiction, but the sales were void
because, in the first place, of exemption from taxation, and in the second,
because of a prior payment of the taxes, the purchaser was held to be entitled

Tliere are other cases, even where the irregularity has
his improvements.
deprived the owner of his surplus bond, where the sales have been sustained.
Thus, the sales were supported in Gibson v. Robbins, 9 Watts, 156, where
the treasurer charged too much costs, and appropriated the whole bid, where
to
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urer, the amount of all state, county and city taxes that may remain

upon such lot or tract, together with the interest and
charges thereon," was void as being inconsistent with that clause
in the constitution that declares that every person "ought to obtain justice freely, and without purchase."'
If this statute were
UDpaid

confined to the requirement of a payment or tender of legal taxes
and costs for which the sale may have been made, the soundness
of the conclusion might well be made a question.
No one is denied a remedy in the courts, when he is merely required to sub-

mit to

condition which, under the circumstances, is reasonable.
Conditions to the assertion of a right in court are imposed in many
a

to work to the detriment of
justice. The requirement of security from a plaintiff in replevin
or attachment are instances, and the payment of taxes upon the
cases,

none of which are supposed

legal process or upon the entry of the suit is another.^ Courts
of equity on general principles of right are in the frequent habit
of imposing conditions where one seeks in equity to restrain a tax,

The authority of the legislature
only a part of which is illegal.
over the whole subject of legal remedies is very ample^ and it is
not to be supposed that any general declaration of the right of the
a surplus

would have existed for whicli

in Peters

«. Heasley,

10 Watts,

a bond should

208, and

Kussell

have been taken;

and

Penn. St., 160,
where the commissioners of the county bid more than the taxes and costs,
and the owner was thereby deprived of his security for the surplus.
So also
ii. Reed,

27

the sale was supported in Frick v. Sterrett (4 W. & S., 269), where the treasurer, by mistake, took the bond for less tlian the true surplus.
To these cases
may be added Bayard v. luglis (5 W. & S., 463), and Bard v. Patterson (33
Penn. St., 2191, where no bonds were given when the sale was made and deed

In the former the bond was not given until nearly two years afterdelivered.
wards, and it was never filed."
' See ante,

p. 320, note

2.

' The validity of a tax on the unsuccessful party to a lawsuit was questioned
in Harrison v. Willis, 7 Heis., 35, as " the imposition of a burthen upon the
right of the citizen to go into the courts to have his wrongs redressed, and his
rights vindicated," and as an infraction of that section of the bill cf rights
which declares that "all courts shall be open, and every man for an injury
done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due
course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial, or delay." The court sustained the law, remarking that such laws had long existed,
and this clause, taken from magna charta, was not to be understood as prohibiting such a tax, but to be interpreted in the light of the history of the
times when adopted.
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citizen to his day in court was intended to preclude tlie legislature from exercising its authority to require him to do equity
•when he did come.
Other cases have distinctly affirnied the right
to require payment of the taxes, as a condition precedent to a
recovery of the land from the tax purchaser, when it was proposed
to do so on the ground of the invalidity of the tax proceedings.'
These decisions, if limited in their application to cases in which
upon the land, and only
failed to become a legal charge by reason of the negligence or
mistakes of officers in the discharge of their duties under the tax
law, may fairly be said to rest upon sound grounds of broad equity,
and to be supported on the same reasons which support remedial
laws in general.
If the tax purchaser has, by his purchase, paid a
taxes were

justly and equitably

a charge

charge which the state might fairly and justly make a legal one
upon the land, and which the owner of the land ought himself to
have paid to the state, there is no reason why the state should
not give to the purchaser, when he loses the expected benefit of
the purchase, a remedy to recover the amount of the tax from the
party who ought to have paid it. This is the province of remedial
laws ; to give new remedies where none at all or only inadequate
remedies existed before.
And so favorably are such laws regarded
that they always receive at the hands of the courts a benign and
favorable construction.
'

Tliarp V. Harl, 3 Sneed, 569 ; Glass
Ark., 319; Pope v. Macon, 23 Arli.,

i).

Wliite,

5

id., 475

;

Craig

v.

Flanagin,

"Wakely «. Nichols, 16
In Henderson v. Staritt, 4 Sneed, 470, it was decided that the
Wis., 558.
plaintiff in ejectment to recover land sold for taxes may show that any neces21

644.

Compare

sary proceeding subsequent to the judgment and order of sale, such as the advertisement of the sale itself, was irregular and void, without first being
required to show that the taxes had been jiaid anterior to such judgment and
order of sale.
A constitutional provision that "appeals and writs of error
allowed
from the final determination of county courts as may be proshall be
vided by law," is not violated by a statute which, in tax cases, requires the
appellant to deposit with the county treasury the amount of the judgment.
Andrews v. Rumsay, Sup. Ct. 111. (1875), 7 Chicago Legal News, 321 ; citing
1). Wallace, in same court, same term. A statute precluding the owner
from contesting a tax sale, unles.s he has paid or tendered the taxes, cannot
be extended by contstruction to embrace the case of lands forfeited to the

Peopli!

Williamsburg v. Lord, 51 Me., 599.
decree settling the title to laud in the original holder, as against a tax
purchaser, does not bar an action to recover for taxes paid by the latter iu
state.

A

good faith upon the land in controversy.

Stewart v. Corbin, 38 Iowa, 571.
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But if the tax itself were vioious ; if it were laid for a private,
and not a public purpose ; if it were a special and arbitrary exaction from one person while the rest of community equally interested was not taxed at all, or if for any similar reason the charge
was not just and equitable as against the owner of the land or the
land itself, so that the legislature could not have validated it retrospectively by a direct enactment, it is not perceived on what
grounds an authorit}' to validate it by this indirect and circuitous
method can be supported.
The legislature can have no more authority to compel the land owner to pay a lawless exaction to a
third person than it has to compel a like payment to the state

The one as much as the other would be robbery.
If
directly.
the land owner performs all his duty to the state, nothing which
the tax officers can do without his consent, and in the direction of
depriving him of his freehold, can raise against him any equity
requiring him to do more. The rule caveat emptor applies to the

He takes all the risks of his purchase, and if he finds

purchaser.

in any

that he has secured neither the title he bid for nor any
equitable claim against the owner, the state may, if it see fit, make
reparation itself, but it has no more authority to compel the owner
case

of the land to do so than to exercise the

like compulsion against

any other person.*
'

This is the substance of the decision in Harts. Henderson, 17 Mich., 218. Howfar it may be just, and therefore competent, to compel the land owner, in cases
where the tax was just but the proceedings to make it acharge.ou person or
property void, to pay the cost of such void proceedings, is a question that will
be very likely at some time to come up for determination.
It is certainly difficult to perceive how any equitable claim can exist against any one for the
The Illinois statute of 1839 provided that " no
cost of void proceedings.
person shall be permitted to question the title acquired by a sheriff's deed without first showing that he or she, or the person under whom he or she claims
title, had title to the laud at the time of the sale, or that the title was obtained
from the United States or this state after the sale, and that all taxes due upon
the land have been paid by such person or the person under whom he claims
It has been decided that notwitstanding this statute, tlie partitle aforesaid."

ty defendant may contest the tax title, if the taxes due to the state have been
Curry ». Hinman, 11 111., 490. See Conway v. Capaid, no matter by whom.

ble, 37 id., 83. Also that if one was in possession of the land claiming title
when the sale was made, that is sufficient evidence of title. Lusk v. Harber,
8

v. Hinman, 11 111., 420.
The following cases throw light
of this statute: Hinman «. Pope, 1 Gilm., 131, 138; Bestor
id., 119 ; Atkins v. Hinman, 2 id., 437, 453 ; Spellman v. Curtenius,

Grilm., 158; Curry

on the construction
«.

Powell,

2

S76
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short time within which the owner of

the original title shall contest

the tax claim, are supposed

to be

enacted in pursuance of a sovereign authority in the legislature
to fix a reasonable time within which a party shall be allowed to
assert his rights by suit, or be debarred.

The policy of such laws

is unquestionable, and the power to enact them is undisputed.
But like all other powers in government, this has its limits, and it
is probable that some of the statutes to which we have referred,
construed, would be found to be unwarranted.

if literally

The most common

limitation

of actions

for the recovery of
action accrued.
But

lands is twenty years after the right of
whenever the legislative wisdom shall determine that a shorter
limitation for all cases or for any class of cases would be wise, it
is unouestionably competent to prescribe it.

Advantage has been
taken of this power in some instances, by parties interested in tax
titles, and laws have been secured which, in tax cases, limit the
time to five years, or to three

years.

But in some of these laws

will be found besides the short period that is
They do not on their
prescribed for contesting the tax claim.
face purport to be statutes which limit the time in which a party
another peculiarity

may bring suit against one in possession, claiming by tax title,
but they fix a time after which the tax title shall not be questioned.
The short period of limitation it is entirely competent

is,

for the legislature to prescribe,-' but it may be questioned whether
an act which merely limits a time within which a bad title may
either in spirit, purpose or effect, an act
ripen into a good one
in the nature of

an act

of limitations.

3.

is

2.

:

1.

Three different classes of cases may be affected by such statutes
Those in which the owner of the original title remains
in possession after the tax sale.
Those in which the land
then and remains afterward unoccupied.
Those in which the
tax purchaser enters and holds possession claiming title.
In the third class of cases there can be no sufficient reason why
HI.,

Hill,

409;
15

Hope

id., 130

;

13
•v.

v.

Sawyer, 14 id., 254; Billings v. Detten, 15 id., 218: Polk
v. Curtenius, 15 id., 427, 433.
And see ante, p. 337,

Chapin

v.

Stickle, 33 Iowa,

Kuehl,

id.,

Bird,

Wis., 537, 533;

6

v.

37

71 (citing Henderson v. Oliver, 38 id., 30; ElShiek v. McElroy, 20 Peun. St., 35 Edgerton v.
Sprecker v. Wakely, 11 id., 433.
160)

;

Thomas

dridge

;

1

et seq.
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title should not be required to bring

time less than twenty years.
By the adverse possession
he is excluded from the enjoyment of any right he may claim,
suit in

a

public policy no less than justice to the tax purchaser requires that he should bring his suit within a reasonable time, in
and

questions may be put at rest while the
facts are recent and presumably susceptible of proof.
In the first
class of cases it would be manifest and most gross injustice to
order that all contested

make lapse of time alone extinguish the owner's title.
He is in
full possession of his rights, and it is the adverse claimant and not
himself who is negligent in not bringing suit.
And it seems to
ns very clear that, under such circumstances, it is not competent
to limit

period at the expiration of which the tax title shall become a perfect title and not open to controversy or dispute.^
In the second class of cases the proper rule is not so clear. If
a

by statute under which ejectment can be
of a vacant possession, it would seem that
neither claimant could be considered in law negligent, so as to
render his claim the proper subject of a statute of repose, until
no provision

is made

brought in the

case

but if ejectment is allowed in such cases, then it may possibly be within the power of
the legislature to declare that the title of that one of the parties
who, constructively, is to be regarded as in possession, shall become absolute if not questioned by suit within the time by the
was taken by his adversary

possession

;

statute limited for that purpose.

The Pennsylvania statute of 1804 declared

that no action for

recovery of lands sold under the act should lie, unless
But this the courts
brouo-ht within five years after the sale.
refused to apply literally, because, in the ease of a vacant possesthe

sion,

it would cut off the original owner without giving him the

riglit to contest the title ; there being no statute permitting ejectThey consequently held that the statute
ment in such cases.
beo'an to run, not from the sale, but from the time of posession
taken under it.^ Subsequently, when the right to maintain eject-

ment for an unoccupied tenement had been conferred
1 Groesbeck
V.

Dean,

16

Mich., 329. See Conway
Wain v. Shearman, 8 S. & R.,

v. Seeley, 13

Micli.,

13;

Wain V. Shearman, 8 S. & E.,
also Baker v. Kelly, 11 Minn., 480.
s

357 ; Cranmer v.

by the stat-

». Cable, 37 111., 83; Case
357.

Hall,

4

W. &

S., 36.

See

378
ute,
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it was held that the statute began to run in favor of the tax

by deed, he being
constructively in possession of the unoccupied premises from that
time.^
These decisions have perhaps given effect to the statute as
near as was possible, consistent with fundamental rules of right.'
purchaser

at the time the sale was perfected

The Wisconsin statute provides that " any suit or proceeding for'
the recovery of land sold for taxes, except in cases where the taxes
have been paid or the lands redeemed as provided by law, shall be
commenced within three years from the time of recording the tax
deed of sale, and not thereafter."
That this statute is valid does

That it ap-

not seem to have been very seriously questioned.^
'

'•

It was

argued that the limitation in the act of 1804 does not apply to a
in possession. That is true, as was determined in
Bigler v. Karnes, 4 W. & S., 137, and Shearer «. Woodburn, 10 Penn. St., 511.
But that is where the pos&Pssion is actual, and_ the owner is thus daily and
hourly challenging the validity of the tax title. It is -not so, however, in any
case where the owner is

other case, and it is settled that in all other cases the limitation runs from the
time of the sale, and not from the time when possession is taken by the purchaser. Parish i). Stevens, 3 S. & R, 298, the first case decided under the act

of 1804, on this point, was overruled by Wain v. Shearman, 8 S. & R., 357, on
the ground tliat an ejectment would not lie against a vacant possession. But
the act of 29th March, 1824, having provided a remedy for the owner in the
case of a vacant possession, this court returned to the doctrine of Parish v.
and it is now held that the limitation runs from the time of the sale,

Stevens,

and not of possession.

id,

Robb

v.

Bowen,

9

Penn. St., 71; Sheik

v.

McElroy,

20

Burd ^. Patterson, 22 id., 219; Stewart ». Trevor, 56 id., 385. In the
Justice Strong summing up the cases, says: "Since the act of
29th March, 1824, the limitation is perfect at the end of five years from the
Agnew,
deliver}' of the deed to the purchaser, without regard to possession."
J., in Rogers v. Johnson, 67 Penn. St., 48. See also to same effect, Johnston v.
Jackson, 70 id., 164.
25;

last case,

A statute jjroviding that no action for the recovery of laud sold for taxes
shall lie, " unless brought within five years after the sale thereof for taxes, as
aforesaid," will not benefit the holder of the tax title when suing as plaintift;
and if he sues after five years he must show a valid title. Bigler v. Karnes, 4
2

S., l'!7; Shearers. Woodburn, 10 Penn. St., 511; Holes. Rittenhouse,
305; McReynolds v. Longenberger, 57 id., 13.
id.,
19
It has been decided in
Pennsylvania that as against a mere intruder, the tax deed, with evidence of

W. &

title out of commonwealth,

is sutBcient.
Crum v. Burke, 25 Penn. St., 371,
citing Foust v. Ross, 1 W. & S., 501 ; Poster v. McDivitt, 9 Watts, 341,
344; Dikeman v. Parrish, 6 Penn. St., 210.
And see Shearer s. Woodburn, 10
Penn. St, 512; Troutman s. May, 33 id., 455; Wheeler s. Winn, 53 id., 132;
Hess V. Herrington, 73 id., 438.
381,
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plies against the holder of the tax title as well as in his favor has
been the conclusion of the courts, and it therefore cuts off either
the original owner or the tax purchaser,

if the adverse

claimant

has been in the occupation of the land for the period named.^

It

is also decided that, when the land is unoccupied, the holder of the
tax title has constructive possession, and if the owner of the original title does not bring ejectment (which the statute permits in
such case) within the three years, he is barred,^ but that if the tax
deed is void on its face, the grantee in it has no constructive possession, and in such case the statute

does not run

though it would do

void deed,

so, even

under

a

in his favor,

^

if his possession

were actual, open and notorious.*

Pillow

How., 473; Vancleave i). Milliken, 13
v. Brooks, 20 Ark., 542;
Sprague v. Pitt, MoCahon, 212; Bowman e. Cockrill,6 Kans., 311. See DeGraw
1). Taylor, 37 Mo., 310 ; Pease v. Lawson, 33 id,, 35 ; MoNamara ii. Estes, 23
Iowa, 246; Eldredge v. Kuehl, 27 id., 160; Henderson i). Oliver, 28 id., 20;
Case of Albee, 38 id., 377; McCready v. Sexton, 29 id., 356; Henley v.
Street, 29 id., 429; Thomas i). Stickle, 32 id., 71; Douglass d. Tullook, 34 id.,
263 ; Jeffrey v. Brokaw, 35 id., 505.
possession, see
Ind., 105; Doe

v. Roberts,

Hearick,

v.

14

13

id., 341, 345; Cofer

Wis., 537; Sprecker «. Wakeley, 11 id., 432; Knox
v. Collins, 16 id., 594; Parisli i). Eager, 15 id.,
553; Whitney -b. Marshall, 17 id., 174. These decisions held applicable to the
Iowa statute. Brown v. Painter, 88 Iowa., 456.
' Gunnison v. Hoehn, 18 Wis., 268; Lawrence v. Kenney, 33 id., 381. See

V.

'Edgarton

«.

Clevelaad,

13

Hill

-B.

Kricke,

^ Lain ».

Kans.,

Bird,

6

id., 345; Jones

11

Shepai-dson,

Early,

;

Dean

-o.

18

Wis.,

59.

id., 442

498 ; Shoat 11. Walker, 6 id., 65.

15

id., 100.

To the same effect are Taylor v. Miles, 5
See Leffingwell v. Warren, 3 Black, 599.

Wis., 460. On this point, see also Cofer v. Brooks, 30
Harrington, 38 Mich., 90 ; Washburn^. Cutter, 17 Minn.,
The statute does not apply to a tax title fraudulently obtained, as for ex361.
ample, by an agent who bought in his principal's land when he should have
paid the tax. McMahon v. McGraw, 36 Wis., 614. And see Carithers v.
Weaver, 7 Kans., 110. The Michigan statute has been held not to apply in
favor of one who was in possession under another claim at the time of acquiring the tax title. Oilman d. Riopelle, 18 Mich., 143, 163. Neither the fact
that one is assessed for the land, or that he has paid faxes for a series of years
thereon is sufficient proof that he is in the adverse possession of it. McDermott 1-. Hoffman, 70 Penn. St., 31, 54; Chapman d. Templetcn, 53 Mo., 463.
And merely cutting timber without actual possession, cultivation or inclosure,
^Lindsay!). Pay,

Ark.,

543;

35

Hoffman

ii.

is not adverse possession, but a mere trespass on the constructive possession
v. Cutter, 17 Minn., 301 ; Safford v. Basto, 4 Mich.,

of the owner. Washburn
406 j Rivers v. Thompson,

46

Ala.,

335.
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There is serious objection in point of policy to making ttie tax
deed give constructive possession of the land, with the consequences that have been made to follow, whether there are, or are
The principal hardships perhaps under
Bot, any in point of law.

any system of tax sales spring from the fact that, in a considerable portion of the cases in which valuable lands are lost to the
owners from delinquency, it is not so much in consequence of
culpable neglect of the owners themselves, as through the negligence of agents, or through circumstances which have cast the
ownership upon children, or other persons unaccustomed to business, who are found to be in default before they have fully become possessed of a knowledge of either their rights or their
In all these cases the tax purchaser knows that he has
duties.
bought a title which, if legal, is to dispossess some title previously
valid ; while the adverse claimant frequently does not know or
suspect that he or his land has been proceeded against for delinquency, and he may, for a series of years thereafter, continue to
pay taxes without any suspicion that he is paying upon the land
No man thinks of making periodical visits to the
of another.
in
order to see that his land is clear of liens, when he is
records,
not conscious of any default ; and to allow the tax purchaser to
lie by under such circumstances, without asserting a claim by
entry or notice, until, by the lapse of a few years, his deed shall
ripen into an indisputable title, is to encourage him to commit

And

the fraud is

still more gross and palpable

if,

what, in morals at least, is a fraud upon the original owner.

in point of fact, the

a

is

original owner was not at all in default, and his land has been
sold and conveyed in consequence of the carelessness, incompetency or fraud of public officers.
another difficulty with those cases which bar right
There

the same propriety as to make the

it

a

it

by constructive adverse possession of the tax claimant. If they
proceed upon the statute alone, which bars an action unless
certain number of years after
brought within
accrued, then
would seem they might have held the tax purchaser barred with

like holding against the origi-

is

nal owner; since either might have brought the suit, and, thereas much within the words of the statute as the
fore, the one

'

other.^

If,

on the other hand, they attach importance to adverse

The Wisconsin statute authorizes

an action for the recovery

of lands

to be
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possession as by implication limiting the application of the statute

to one only of the two classes of persons, who equally might have
brought suit, then they import new principles into the law ; for
the law, unless by the force of these decisions, has no knowledge
or recognition of such a thing as an adverse possession that is
merely constructive.
Possession of a vacant tenement is and must be purely a matter
of fiction. Constructive possession is recognized for some purposes, because, under our peculiar forms of action, it is found
in order to the protection of the rights of the owner
The fiction is accepted, as all fictions in the
trespassers.

necessary
against

for the sake of justice ; never to do injustice.'' But if
one's freehold has been illegally sold under adverse proceedings,
there is no justice in resorting to a fiction of law in order to suslaw

are,

What equity could exist in such a case, if one has
honestly paid all that was demanded of him, or all that he has

tain the

sale.

any reason to believe he owed?^
" some
brought, ■whon the iDremises are unoccupied, against
person exercising
acts of ownership on tlie premises claimed, or claiming title thereto, or some
interest therein, at the commencement of the action."
R. S., 1858, p. 838.

This would

seem to apply as

well

if both are liable to suit,
divided between them.
and

the

to the tax claimant

obligation

to sue

original owner,
would seem to be fairly
as to the

'Truett V. The Justices, 20 Geo., 104; Low v. Little, 17 Johns., 346; Johnson
1). Ballou, 28 Mich., 379, 396.
In Taylor v. Miles, 5 Kans., 498, in which it is
held that the recording of a void tax deed cannot be made the date from
which the statute of limitations shall run, Valentine, J. says (p. 515): "First.
A statute of limitations can only be applied where one person has received or
It must
suflFered some injury from another person, cither in contract or tort.
operate to bar a cause of action, for it seems absurd to say that a cause of
Every
action can be barred, if no cause of action has ever accrued. Second.
injured
the
a
reasonable
time
in
which
must
of
limitation
give
party
statute
to commence his action, or the statute itself is void, tending to disturb vested
rights. Third. When the statute has run its full time, the effect is to leave
the parties in possession of just what they had before, nothing more and
nothing less; and neither party has a right of action against the other; the
injured party has lost his remedy." Compare Bowman v. Cockrill, 6 Kans., 311.

'We

employ here the language oi Agnew, J., in Brown d. Hays, C6 Penn. St.,
The case was one in which a single warrant of 1036 acres had been

229, 236.

of 726 and 300, respectively, and the owner had paid the
Seld, that the assessment of the
the
warrant by the number.
on
assessment
was
implication,
acres
notice to him that the 300 acres
not,
by
at
726
warrant
assessed

as two

were assessed separately.
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ligbt in which his equities may be viewed,

they are at the least equal to those of the purchaser ; and to make
a fiction the instrument by which he is to be debarred of his
rights

is a very

severe,

if not

excessive,

exercise of authority,

already put him quite sufficiently at
Eules of evidence are subject to legislative condisadvantage.
trol ; and therefore the legislature may make the tax deed evidence of title.
Rules of limitation are also subject to its control,
where the legislature had

and therefore the statute may quiet an open and public

exercise

right which remains unchallenged ; but a purely nominal and
fictitious exercise of a right by means of the record of a paper, or
of

a

if the legislature shall think proper to dispense
conclusive muniment
unsubstantial
basis for
very
of title to land.
would
Constructive possession in any case
a

it

a

it,
is

even without that,

with

leave questions

and this would

;

seem should be in the party having the legal title

of title open so long as actual possession was had

by no one.^
Peculiar questions arise under some statutes
nature of the claim under which possession

is

regarding the
held.
The

Illinois statute of 1839 declared the person in possession of land

" under claim and color of title," who should continue in
possession for seven years, and pay all taxes, should be held and ad-

a

a

judged the legal owner, "to the extent and according to the purHere was distinct requirement of
port of his or her paper title."
paper

title of some kind, and of one also that should give
title.
Where the tax deed
made prima facie eviis

"color" of

of

whole township.

a

;

it

it

The same decisions hold, however,

Possession and cultivation of

a

'

conveyance.^

required by the statute was sufficient with such

that the deed

few acres cannot be constructive possession
Chandler v. Spear, 33 Vt., 388.
a

cumstances

is

plain that
gives color of title and the decisions liave been that the seven years possession under the cirdence of title,

;

;

;

'Dawley v. Van Court, 31 111., 460; Fell v. Cessford,26 id., 523, .525; Halloway «. Clark, 37 id., 483 Bride v. Watt, 23 id., 507 Webster v. Webster, 55
id., 335; Worthy v. Bowman, 47 id., 17; Morrison b. Norman, 47 id., 477;
Dickerson v. Breeden, 30 id., 279, 325 Hardin v. Crate, 60 id., 215. To constiis

it

only necessary that the deed purports to convey title,
tute color of title
in
received
good faith. Winstanlay v. Meacham, 58 111., 97. See
has
been
and
id.,
Clark,
37
483, 486, per Walker, Z.; Dalton ii. Lucas, 63 id.,
D.
Halloway
into
possession and continues to hold the laud and
But where he goes
337.

xvil]
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must be one, not by reason of defects, or of its recitals, void on its
face.''
In Iowa the statutes are different, and protect the occu"
"
pant who has been in possession under claim of title for the
requisite period ; and this may be with or without a deed or other

It is
documentary evidence giving color of right to the claim.^
a principle of the law that where the statute of limitations has
run in favor of any party, this perfects his right, and he may make
it the ground of affirmative proceedings

This princi-

thereafter.

ple applies in favor of the tax title, and dispenses with any necessit}'' for proof of the proceedings when the title is subsequently
brought in question, and precludes its being attacked.^
pay taxes for seven years, he will he protected, although the deed is void oa
its face ; and good faith will be presumed, but the contrary may be shown.
Dalton V. Lucas, 63 111., 337. An instrument which merely purports to contain

it,

it,

an agreement to convey title at a future time, cannot constitute color of title.
Osterman v. Baldwin, 6 Wall., 116. " What is meant by color of title ? It may
be defined to be a writing, upon its face professing to pass title, but which does
not do
either from want of title in the person making
or from the defectis

it

a

is

ive conveyance that
used —
title that
imperfect, but not so obviously
that
would be apparent to one not skilled in the law: " per Lumpkin, J., in

Illinois
;

£3 Texas, 36

A

6

tax dec-d which does not show that the land

;

8

;

Keuna,
466.

cases above referred to, Shoat v. AYalkor,
Kansas,
id., 677 Wofford ®. Mcid., 110 Sapp «. Morrill,
Kilpatrick o. Sisneras, id., 114; Cain ». Hunt, 41 lud.,

Carithere «. Weaver,

7

'

See besides the

65

Geo., 440, 443.

it

Burke,

;

v.

9

Beyerly

purports to convey was

void on its face; and where the holder of such
deed has not been in actual possession of the property, the statute of limitations will not run so as to bar the right to bring an action in two years, to
Kans., 632.
have the deed declared void. Hubbard v. Johnson,
taxes, is

9

sold for delinquent

is

2

a

13

3Sprecker«. Wakeley,
Pleasants v. Rohrer,

;

S.

id., 473.

17

11

Wis., 483;

Knox

id., 557; Lawrence

-o.

v.

Cleveland,

13

;

3

3

;

2

8

Blackf,
Sharkey, McCahon, 113; McKenney v. Springer,
Greenl., 326 Atkinson
Brown, Ind., 647 Lewis u. Wsbb,
Mc, 111 Thompson «. Caldwell, Lit., 137; Couch v. McKee,
Ileisk., 280; S. C, Am. Rep.,
484, 495; Girdner b. Stephens,
Am. Rep., 339; Holden
«. Shine's Adm'r, 13 Fla., 393; S. C,
v.
Met.,
400
Oakley,
Woart v. Winnick,
Wright
596
[Mass.,
;

5

;

7

3

1

;

id., 245, 249;

Kenney, 33 id., 281;

Morton v.

Slipp v.
v. Duulap, 50
Eng. (Ark.),
700; Bradford
v. James, 11
N. H., 473
606;

;

Roberts,

1

J).

3

Pillow

;

4

;

3

'

u. Wright, 30 Iowa, 485.
And see Taylor v. Buckner,
A. K.
73.
That
tax
deed
in
Watts,
McCall
v.
due
form
Marsh., 18;
69,
Neeley,
color of title, see also Dillingham d. Brown, 38 Ala., 311 Rives v. Thompson, 43 id., 633, 641; Cofer «. Brooks, 20 Ark., 542; Pleasants v. Scott, 21 id.,
370, 374; Chapman v. Templeton, 53 Mo., 463: King v. Harrington, 18 Mich.,
McLean, 21
C. in error, 11 How., 414
See further, Moore v. Brown,
213.

Hamilton
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CHAPTER XVIII.
TAXATION OF BUSINESS.

It

The general right.

has been seen that government may,

in the discretion of its legislature, levy

tax on every species of
property within its jurisdiction, or, on the other hand, that it may
select any particular species of property, and tax that only.
The
same is true of occupations ; government may tax one, or it may
a

tax all.

There is no restriction upon its power in this regard unless one is expressly imposed by the constitution.'
The government of the United States has
general power to levy taxes on all the subjects of taxation within
the several states and territories, and in the District of Columbia.'
The exceptions to this general power have been mentioned in

Federal taxation.

^
But although it has
preceding pages and need not be repeated.
this general power, its exercise is commonly limited to compara-

tively few subjects, and the government revenues are collected
in the main from taxes levied in various forms upon business.
Customs duties are levied exclusively by the United States,
but internal taxes on business may be laid by the United States
; and what is said in this chapter
to
taxation
plicable
by the one as by the other, where

and the states as well

is

as ap-

the con-

trary is not indicated.

The methods in which business shall be taxed are also in the
The taxes which are most customary
legislative discretion.
are:

On the privilege of carrying on the business.
2. On
the amount of business done.
3. On the gross profits of the bus1.

Martin

Mai-tin, 35 Ala., 560 ; Briggs v. Hubbard, 19 Vt., 86 ; Wires v. Farr,
Davis c. Minor, 1 How. (Miss.), 183 ; Moore «. Luce, 39 Penn. St.,
363; Hincliman d. Wlietstone, 23 111., 185; Chiles v. Davis, 58 id., 411.
25

id.,

V.

-11 ;

1 Butler's

Appeal,

Appeal,

73

Penn.

63 Penn. St., 491.

St., 448, 451, per

As

to equality

5

Wheat., 317.

Corp., § 593 et seq.
5

LoughborouglL

v.

Blake,

' See Index, tit. United States.

Mercur,

J., citing Duracli's

in such taxation,
"■

see

Dillon, Mun.
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But the tax may

On the net profits or profits divided.

be measured by other standards_ prescribed for the purpose as well
as by these.

It

it is no conclusive objection to any such tax
that it duplicates the burden to the person who pays it. To tax
a

has been seen that

merchant upon his stock

as

sales, may seem burdensome,

property, and also upon his gross
but it is not unconstitutional when

not expressly forbidden by the constitution.^
The two taxes are
not identical, and though they may operate unjustly in particu-

lar

cases, they are supposed
result is equal and just.

to be imposed

the general

because

A

Taxes on priyileges.

tax on the privilege of following any
particular employment, is usually confined to those which in some
particular are exceptional, either because supposed to be specially profitable, or because they require special regulations, or be-

in the nature of

cause the privilege is

supply

a general

a franchise,

or because they

will

so that the burden imposed

demand,

be

But no employment is absolutely exempt
from the liability to be taxed. The necessities of the government

generally distributed.^

may require that the lowest employment as well as the most lucrative shall contribute to its support, and if any is exempted,
motives of policy will govern the discrimination.

When the tax takes the form of a tax on the privilege of following an employment, convenience in collection will commonly
dictate the requirement of
compelled to pay the tax
the business at all.'

a license,

will

and the person taxed

be

condition to the right to carry on
such a ease the business carried on

as a

In

without a license will be illegal, and no recovery can be had upon
This distinguishes such a
contracts made in the course of it.*
one of neglect

case from
' See

to

pay taxes in general

stable, is not to be regarded as a

lumbia

employment,

e. g., that

" privilege " unless made

635;

of keeping

a

Ma-

livery

so by statute.

Co-

«. Guest, 3 Head, 413.

' License Tax
u.

As to the nature of licenses
Cases, 5 Wall., 473.
Lottery Commissioners, 11 Gill. & J., 490.

•i Bancroft «.

Page

for except

Washington v. State, 13 Ark., 753; Straub «. Gordon, 37 id.,
Tarver, 1 Humph., 94; Lewellen ii. Lockharts, 31 Grat., 570.

Ijry v.
' The following of an oi-dicary

Lucas

;

Dumas,

11. State, 11

25

Ala.,

31

Vt.,

849.

456 ;

Alexanders. O'Donnell,

as taxes, see

13 Kans.,

608. See
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payment is tlius made a condition to the right to transact
business, a default therein cannot affect the validity of business
transactions.' But license and tax do not necessaril}'- go together ;
a license may be required when no tax is imposed, and an unconditional license does not exempt the licensee from being taxed
■wliere

upon the privilege it gives him.

In this particular all valuable

privileges stand upon the same footing ; they are all liable to taxation at the will of the state, unless the state has bargained to
" There is a clear distincexempt them. As is said in one case,
tion recognized between a license granted or required as a condition precedent,

before a certain thing can be done,

sessed on the business

A

engage in.

and

a

tax

as-

which that license may authorize one to

license is a right granted by some competent

au-

thority to do an act which, without such authority, would be ille-

A

or sum of money assessed upon the person,
"'*
The privilege obtained by the liproperty, etc., of the citizen.
cense piay therefore be taxed in consideration of the property value
gal.

tax is

a rate

it possesses,' and this not only by the state directly, but by the
county and town also, if proper authority has been conferred upon
them for the purpose.^
'

Larnecl

■».Andrews,

106 Mass., 435,

citing Smitli

-e.

MawhoocI, 14 M. &.

"W.

452.

' Trippe, J., in Home Ins. Co. v.
Augusta, 50 Geo., 530, 537. And see Savannali ». Ciiarlton, 36 id., 460; Burch v. Savannah, 42 id., 596; Robinsons.
Tlie Mayor, etc., of Franklin, 1 Humph., 156; Ottld v. Richmond, 23 Grat,
464; Drexel

v.

Commonwealth,

46

Penn. St.,

31 ;

Reed v. Beall, 42 Miss., 472.

^ See

authorities cited in last note.
Also Couleon ». Harris, 43 Miss., 728, in
which a license for which a large sum was paid was held taxable as property.
Also Drysdale v. Pradai, 45 id., 445.
^

"Where one is licensed by the state to carry on any particular business, a
county, citjr, or town cannot compel him to take out a further license as a condition of doing business within it. Durham v. Rochester, 5 Cow., 462; Ould

11.Richmond, 23

Grat,, 464; Napier v. Hoge, 31 Texas, 287; Floyd v. Edenton,
Cuthbert v. Conly, 32 id., 211 ; Savannah v. Charlton, 36 id,, 460;
Burch !). Savannah, 43 id., 596 ; Ordinary v. Retailers of Liquors, 43 id., 325 ;
Home Ins. Co. v. Augusta, 50 id,, 580. So a town cannot defeat a county li14 Geo,, 354:

cense by

Rome

requiring

11. Lumpkin,

in addition.
Dunh.im v. Rochester, supra;
But these several cases recognize the right
the municipalities the authority to tax occupations

a town license
5 Geo.,

447.

of the state to give to
licensed by the state.
In Heise v. Columbia, 6 Rich., 404, it was decided that
a license granted by the state could not be forfeited by a municipal corporation for breach ' f condition, any more than could any other thing of value.
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The general

rule that

the powers of a municipal corporation are to be construed with
strictness, is peculiarly applicable to the case of taxes on occuIt is presumed the legislature has granted in plain terms
pations.

If

all it has intended to grant at all.

it is not manifest that there

has been a purpose by the legislature to give authority for col-

lecting a revenue by taxes on specified occupations, any exaction
for that purpose will be illegal.^ If a minimum tax is prescribed
by statute, one measured by the business, and which may exceed
the sum named, is unauthorized and void ; ^ but where a discretionary power is conferred, its exercise will not be interfered with,
unless it clearly appears to have been abused.^

If taxes were levied on any well
matured or intelligible sj^stem, it might be practicable to classify
those which are levied upon business, with reference to the special
reasons which have induced the selection of particular branches
Kinds of business taxed.

of business

for taxation, and the exemption of others.

But this

is wholly impracticable.
Many impolitic taxes are laid, and
taxes,
without any purpose to do what is not for the
many unjust
A vast number
public interest, or what is unfair and unequal.
1 See

Kip

v.

Patterson, 20 N.

J.,

in

298,

■which the requirement

of a fee of five

cents from eveiy person selling hay or other produce within the city was held
unauthorized, the power to tax in that manner not having been conferred, and.
not appearing to be made as a police regulation.
For the
principle, see Robinson v. Franklin, 1 Humph., 156; St. Louis v.
Laughlin, 49 3Io., 559; Dubuque i\ Life Ins. Co., 29 Iowa, 9.

the requirement
general

^Kniper v. Louisville, 7 Bush, 599. On the principle of a strict construction of powers, it was held in Butler's Appeal, 73 Penn. St., 418, that the authority to impose a license fee did not carry with it authority to punish the
failure to pay the fee by fine and imprisonment.
3

Burlington

i-.

Putnam Ins. Co.,

599; citing Mason
named

,

J).

31

Iowa,

Lancaster, 4 id., 406.

102;

It

Kniper

v.

was decided

Louisville, 7 Bush,
in the case first

that the city might graduate the rate of licenses when

not restricted

Authority " to
make such assessment on the inhabitants of Augusta, or those who hold taxable property within the same, as may seem expedient," will warrant a tax on
a foreign insurance company doing business within the city.
Home Ins. Co.
See Commonwealth
B. Augusta, 50 Geo., 530.
o. Milton, 12 B. Monr., 212.
That special powers conferred upon towns to charge license fees are valid,
though the like licenses are not allowed by the general laws of the state, si;e
Woodward v. Turnbull, 3 Scam., 1 ; Ottawa v. La Salle, 12 111., 339 ; Byers v.
in that regard.

Olney,

16

And

id., 35

see

East

St.

Louis

c. "Wehrung, 46 111., 892.
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it,

of subjects are sometimes selected for taxation, because it :s supwhen, had the same burden been laid
posed justice requires
would have been quite as just, quite as equally disClassificatributed, and the tax collected with greater economy.
tion will, therefore, not be attempted, but some reference may be
made to those occupations which are most often selected for taxafew,

it

a

■upon

tion.

There are various methods of taxing the business
carried on under corporate powers, the
of bankers.
When
but taxes are
franchise
sometimes subjected to
specific tax
is

;

a

also imposed which are measured by the business

posits received, the profits made,
similar standards.^

of

Curriers

Goods and Persons.

are taxed after

Brokers

etc.

done, the de-

While railway corporations

are generally taxed upon their property, they are also
states they are taxed

some

rate on their capital, in others

the franchise

the business or

is

In

taxed in other modes.

sometimes

taxed,

a

is

it

Bankers.

in

specific
others

means of which the busi-

The vehicle, by
profits.^
carried on may also be taxed, whea the tax does not
amount to regulation of inter-state commerce.^
Practitioners

and

These

Medicine.

are frequently
a

not

is

tax
Such
year or other specified time.
therefore
be
when
taxes
levied
poll
may
a

a

for

Law and

specific sum upon the privilege of pursuing their calling

a

taxed

of

a

is

ness

poll tax,

are forbidden.*

S.

;

3

3

;

S.

'

As to definitions of banljers and broilers under the federal revenue laws,
Northrup v. Shook, 10 Blatch., 243 U.
v. Cutting,
v.
Wall., 441 U.
Fisk, id., 445. Of cattle brokers, see IT. S. ». Kenton, Bond, 97. Of brokers,
State 11. Field, 49 Mo., 370. A statute of Tennessee required those buying
see

a

it

a

a

a

a

notes at
stategreater shave than six per cent, to take out
license, make
ment of the amount employed in the business the preceding year, and pay
thereon
tax of five cents on each $100.
The penalty for failure to comply
Tvith
was $500. This act enforced. Youngs. The Governor, 11 Humph.,
147.

Bankers

whose whole capital is invested in government

not taxable as such.
-

See State

Chicago

a.

Luut,

Tax on Gross Receipts,

See ante.^ pp. 61-64.

securities are

53 111., 414.

15

Wall.,

284.

A wharfage

®.

County Court,

H. & McH.,

pations and professions," does not authorize
Orleans v. Bienvenu, 23 La. An., 710.

a

a

169.

" trades, occutax on notaries public. New

Authority
a

Egan

3

*

'

tax may be levied by
ciiy as tax on all
ressels touching at its wharves. 3Iar,shall v. Vicksburgh, 15 Wall., 146. As to
duties on tonage, see ante, p. 61.
to tax

CH.

TAXATION OF BUSINESS.

XVIII.]

the tax is graduated by
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the supposed value of the

privilege.^

and Commission

Auctioneers

taxed either

These are commonly

Dealers.

sum measured by
" on
the extent of their dealings.' It has been held that a tax
the gross amount of auction sales made in and during the tax
"
year is to be assessed against and paid by the auctioneer, and
a specific

periodically, or

sum

a

not by the owner of property sold.' This is doubtless correct,
though in the end such a tax is paid by the employer.

This class of persons is often selected for taxaThe fact that they pay taxes on their stock in trade as

Merchants.
tion.^

property, does not preclude their occupation being specially taxed.'

A
v. State, 13 Mo., 368 ; Ould v. Eichmond, 23 Grat., 464.
tax on the " privilege " of a lawyer maybe enforced (under proper legislation),
Stewart v. Potts, 49 Miss., 749. See Jones v. Page, 44
by levy on the body.
' See Simmons

Ala.,

Where the charter of

657.

a

city enumerated certain classes that should

be compelled to take out a license before exercising their vocation in the city,
and then followed with these words : " and all other business, trades, avoca"
"
tions, or professions whatever," it was held that if the profession of law
was not specifically enumerated in the section, that the city had no power to
is,

where general words follow particlay a license tax on lawyers. The rule
ular ones, to construe them as applicable only to persons or things of the same
City of St. Louis o. Laughlin, 49 Mo., 559.
general character or class.

Fla., 403; Paddleford

37

id., 597,

was decided

See

Savannah,

14

See

Geo., 438.

In

a

or privilege tax, the amount

being

was held

property
regulated by the

is

a

v.

general authority to levy
tax on the amount of gross sales
that

taxes on taxable property would support
In Lott «. Boss, 38 Ala., 156,
and on the commissions received.
not
that
tax on" the gross amount of sales of merchandise "
tax, but an occupation

Miller

Union County

it

Tift,

tax.

a

».

Augusta,

an occupation

a

v.

to

So are college professors.

4

2

Moseley

Pearce

subjected

St., 236.

v

are sometimes

it

Clergymen

Kirkpatrick, 39 Penn.
V. James, 21 Id., 525.

8

;

a

;

4

;

2

9

4

(Citing Moseley v. Tift, Fla.,
extent to which the privilege has been enjoyed.
Texas, 137 State «. Bock, id., 369 Do Witt v. Hays,
State ?). Stephens,
How., 80). Such
tax would therefore not
Cal., 468; Nathan v. Louisiana,

403

a

a

tax "not exceeding twenty cents upon
power to levy
"
Id.
each hundred dollars of taxable proiiert3' within the county.
be leviable under

constitutes

State v. West, 34 id., 424.

33 Mo., 457;
i>. State,

44

29.

9

;

4

;

'

2

Texas, 137
State
Swan, 353
State v. Stephens,
Woolman v. State,
v.
to
such
taxes
in
Koby,
369.
As
see
Bock,
Wilmington
general,
id.,

».

8

Ala.,

"merchant," see State v. Whittaker,
"dealer in tobacco," Carter
What
a

^As to what

a

^StatcB. Lee, 38 Ala., 233.
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Other dealers are taxed under proper designations.
But where a
municipal corporation is enapowered to tax a particular occupation, it cannot, by definition, bring persons within the power who
do not in fact follow the occupation.*
But a merchant, paying a
tax

if he adds to that occupation another though kindred

as such,

which is separately taxed, is not by his license as a
merchant excused from paying the tax on such other occupation.'
business

transient dealers are commonly taxed a specific
sum by the year, because they are likely to escape any other.'
Peddlers

and

Manufacturers and Dealers id Liquors.

This is a class of dealers
Their occupation is
commonly selected for exceptional taxation.
sometimes taxed for federal, state and municipal purposes,

their stocks are taxed

ported has paid a heavy duty.
taxes has almost

though

as property, and whatever has been im-

The right to levy these several
Regulation is gener-

ceased to be contested.*

ally had in view in such taxes, and they will be referred to again
Ired.,

250;

Commissioners

v.

Patterson,

French

8

Jones' L.,

183;

Cousins «. Common-

A

statute required a
license to be obtained by every person selling goods by sample who was not
Held, that, as a man may be a resident citizen and
a "resident merchant."
wealth,

19

Grat., 807

;

v. Barber, 4 Sneed, 193.

merchant, and the reverse, there was no discrimination in
of citizens of the state, and therefore the statute was constitutional.
8uch a statute is not a regulation of commerce between the states.
Speer v.
Commonwealth, 23 Grat., 935 ; S. C, 14 Am. Kep., 104.
not a resident

favor

'

ilays

v.

'Ilirsh

Cincinnati,

1

Ohio, N.

v. Commonwealth,

21

8 , 268.

Grat., 785.

Case of a tax on " hucksters."

'

Case of a merchant taxed as junk

dealer also.

For

of ""peddler," see State v. Hodgdon, 41 Vt., 139. The folof such taxes : Wyne v. Wright, 1 Dev. & Bat., 19 ; Cowles
2 Hawks, 204; ■'Wilmington v. Roby, 8 Ired., 250; Whitfield v.
C
268 ; Plymouth v. Pettijohn, 4 Dev., 591 ; State v. City Council,
id.,
Longest,
Rich.,
240;
State «. Pinckney, 10 id., 474; City Council v. Ahrens, 4 Strob.,
10
241 ; Keller ■».State, 11 Md., 525.
For case of a tax on those canvassing to
buy or actually buying means of subsistance, see Sledd «. Commonwealth, 19
3

definition

lowing are
?!. Brittain,

cases

Grat., 813.

Durach's Appeal, 62 Penn. St., 491 ; Aulanier v. The Governor, 1 Texas,
653 ; Baker v. Panola County, 30 id., 86 ; Kitson v. Ann Arbor, 26 Mich., 325 ;
Block B. Jacksonville, 36 111., 301. Such taxes when laid by municipalities
are not void because of their discriminating as between different localities
therein. East St. Louis v. Wehrung, 46 111., 392. As to tne difference between
* See

a manufacturer

and a dealer, see State v. Campbell,

33 Penn. St , 380.

taxatiok of
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in the next chapter.
Some of the cases which have considered
taxes of this nature are referred to in the note.^
Theatrical Exhibitions and Shows.
These are a very proper
subject for special taxation, and are commonly charged either a
specific tax by the year or for single representations.
Such taxes
call for no special remark.^
"While these classes of persons are
.usually required to take out a license for purposes of regulation,
they are also sometimes charged a substantial sum for revenue
Draymen,

HacJcmen,

A

purposes.

etc.-

few cases are referred

to in which the license fee

was construed to be a tax.^
Taxes

For

on

a time,

These are generally excise taxes.
Manufactures.
during the civil war, nearly all manufactures were

taxed by the federal government, but only a few kinds are now
taxed, either by the nation or by the states. Any or all may be
taxed hy both.*
The United States may tax the salaries or
of
its
officers, and the states may tax those of the
compensation
Taxes on Offices.

It

'

;

;

1

it,

was once a question whether license to keep a tavern included authority
to sell liquors, and the following cases have considered
or points bearing
Ohio, N. S., 15 Page «. State, .11 Ala., 849 Commisupon it. Hirn v. State,

Jordan, 18 Pick., 228. Compare State v. Chamblyss,
Cheves,
of Roads v. Dennis, id., 229. As to tavern licenses, see
Harr., 570; Bonner «. Welborn,
further, State ■«.Pretty man,
Geo., 396;
Hannibal i). Guyott, 18 Mo., 515; St. Louis v. Siegrist, 46 id., 593; CommonHill,
Met., 346; Overseers of Crown Point v. Warner,
wealth V. Thayer,
That under the power to " tax " and also to " restrain " the liquor traffic,
150.
a town may license
see Mt. Uarmel ». Wabash County, 50 111., 69.
it,

3

5

7

Commissioners

3

;

V.

1

sioners, etc.,

320

Humph., 94,98; Trapp «. White, 35 Texas, 387;
J). Tarver,
Brown,
Miss.,
436; Germania b. State,
35
The business
Md.,
Orton x>.
trade. Speak «. Powell, L. R.,
Exch., 35. The
of traveling circus not
tax on property.
Orton v. Brown, supra.
See Baker t). Cinlicense fee not
cinati, 11 Ohio, N. S., 534.
1.

9

a

a

a

7

1

«Sec Mabry

Bennett v. Birmingham,

3

;

For

Mass., 183.

is

But an aqueduct company

;

a

^

;

8

;

:

^

31 Penn.
St., 15
Commonwealth
■». Stodder,
some special questions the following cases may be consulted
St. Charles v. Nolle, 51 Mo., 122 Gartside v. East St. Louis, 43 111., 47 SnyKans., 83 Cincinnati ». Bryson, 15 Ohio, 625.
der ®. North Lawrence,
" manuSee Commonwealth v. Byrne, 20 Grat., 165. A gas company is
Commonwealth «. Lowell Gas Light Co., 13 Allen, 75.
facturing company."

Cush., 563.

not.

Ditdley

«.

Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Co.,

100
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received

compensation

may authorize its
county or township offices if it shall be

And

other.^

state,

deemed proper to do

[CH.

the state

so."^

"Where "privileges" are taxed, any
^'Privilege'' Taxes.
occiipation which is not open to all, but can only be exercised
under license from some constituted authority, is to be reOther

And

garded as a privilege.^

succession to an inheritance may be_

privilege, notwithstanding the property of the estate is
taxed, and taxes on property are required by the constitution of
the state to be uniform.* Where a tax is laid on all " pursuing
taxed

as a

any occupation, trade or profession," one keeping a billiard table
for profit is included; though if he kept it for amusement merely
he would not be.^
It is no objection to a tax on a business that

it operates indirectly
haps

as a

That may per-

tax on the consumer.^

be the very reason why

it has been deemed desirable to

levy it.

A

should be laid where the business is car-

tax on a business

ried on

;

not where the party has his residence, if it is elsewhere.'

Taxes on corporations.
'

in

Collector

v.

Day,

11

Wall,

These are imposed in so many forms

113;

ante, p. 58.

a postofHce is taxable by the state.
-

Gilkeson

e.

^ CarutJiers,

The Frederick Justices,

J., in French

<Eyre «. Jacob,

14

13

The compensation
v.

Boston,

9

of a clerk

Met., 73.

Grat., 577.

v. Baker, 4 Sneed, 193, 195.

Grat., 423.

^Tarde v.

Benseman,

« Wiley V.

O^ens, 39 Ind., 429.

' Bates

Melcher

31

Texas, 277.

46 Ala., 158.
See Miner v. Fredonia, 27 N. T., 155 ; GarGardiner, 5 Greenl., 133. For other cases of business or occupation taxes, see Simmons u. State, 13 Mo., 268 ; St. Louis v. Laughlin, 49
id., 456; Carroll v. Tuscaloosa, 13 Ala., 173; Guuter v. Leckey, 30 id., 591,
V.

Mobile,

diner, etc., Co.

V.

Portland v. O'Niell, 1 Oregon, 218. As to meaning of profits or income when
a tax is laid on results by this designation, see Feople v. Supervisors of Niagara, 4 Hill, 20; Same «. Same, 7 id., 504; New Orleans ■c. Hart, 14 La. An.,
As to meaning of an insurance company's
803 ; Same ■».Fassman, id., 865.
Parker,
v.
34
N. J., 479; Same d. Same, 3S id., 574. A prosurplus, see State
vision in a city charter that its taxes should " be apportioned in the same
manner as the state ta?," would preclude its discriminating against an occu
patiou in a degree beyond that made against that occupation by the state,
^larshall

n.

Snediker, 25 Texas, 460.
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that an enumeration
tioned

:

1.

A

is difficult.

specific
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The following

tax on the franchise.

2.

may be menA tax on the

4. A
capital stock.
5. A tax on dividends or on profits.
Sometimes the franchise is taxed, and also the capital stock or the

property by valuation. 3.
tax on the business done.

A

tax on the

property; but to tax the capital stock and also the property in
which the capital is invested, would be imposing the same burden twice on the same property, and consequently unjust, if not
illegal.^

'The

legislature

has power to require corporations organized in the state
of the state, a tax on the excess of the market value of

to pay to the treasurer

all their capital stock, over the value of their real estate and machinery otherwise taxable. Commonwealth v. Lowell Gas Light Co., 13 Allen, 75 ; Commonwealth B. Hamilton Manuf. Co., id., 298. Such a tax cannot be supported
as a tax on property, because not " proportional ; " "that is, it is not laid

a

is,

it

;

;

6,

it,

according to any rule of proportion whatever, hut is imposed only on the
corporations
designated in the act, without any reference to the amount
required to be raised by taxation for public purposes, or to the actual property held by such corporation subject to taxation, or to the whole amount of
property in the commonwealth liable to be assessed for the public service.
Commonwealth v. Peoples' Savings Bank, 5 Allen, 438, 431 ; Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 id., 368, 374." Fei Bigelow, Ch. J., in Commonwealth v. Hamilton Manuf. Co., 13 id., 398, 300. It is " in the nature of an excise or duty
on the franchise or privilege of each of the corporations designated, to be
estimated and measured by ascertaining the excess of the market value of
Ihe capital stock or aggregate of the shares, over the value of the real estate
and machinery for which each corporation was assessed, in the town or city
in which it was established and carried on its business." Bigelow, Ch. J., in
In 12 Allen, 301,
v. Lowell Gas Light Co., 13 Allen, 75, 76.
Commonwealth
the judge shows that this is not equivalent to a tax on property, as the value
of the shares may not coi-respond at all to that. See also Manuf. Ins. Co. v.
Loud, 99 Mass., 146 ; Provident Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall., 611 ; Hamilton Co. ■». Massachusetts, id., 633; Illinois Mut. Fire Ins. Co. «. Peoria, 39
111., 180 ; Coite v. Society for Savings, 32 Conn., 173 ; Society for Savings v.
Coite, 6 Wall., 594; Coite v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 36 Conn., 512. That
an excise tax may be imposed on corporations chartered in other states, but
see Attorney General n. Bay State
doing business in the state imposing
Mining Co., 99 Mass., 148. The subject of taxes on foreign insurance companies was much considered in People v. Thurber, 13 111., 554, per Oaton, J., and
per Graves, J. It was objected in
in People ®. State Treasurer, 31 Mich.,
tax
was
void
because
because not uniform that
People v. Thurber, that the
was well
the same sum was not imposed upon each company or agent but
replied that there was no impropriety or injustice in requiring each to contribute to the state revenues in proportion to the amount of business done or
That tax on the market value of the stock of corporations,
money received.
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the act ot congress of

June

of stock held by any person or body corporate in any of the national banks, are allowed to be incladed ia the
valuation of personal property "in the assessment of taxes imsuch bank
posed by or under state authority, at the place where
3, 1864, the shares

is -not applicable to the guaranty stock of a mutual life insurance company,
which is rodeemaWe from its earnings, such stock being rather in the nature
of a debt of the corporation than stock as generally understood, see CommonAs to the taxation of the cap■wealth V. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 98 Mass., 25.

ital of mutual life insurance companies,

see Coite v. Uonn.

Mut. Life Ins.

Co.,

36 Conn., 512.

An English joint stock insurance company, clothed with the right of acting independently of the i-ules that govern an ordinary partnership, is taxable
Oliver v. Liverpool, etc., Co., 100
as a "company incorporated or associated."
Mass, 531; Liverpool, etc., Co. v. Massachusetts, iO Wall., 566.
In Coite v. Society for Savings, 32 Conn., 173, 184, in which a tax on a savings institution measured by the amount of its deposits, was contested on the
ground that, in effect, it was a tax on United States securities in which the
funds of the corporation had been invested, McCurdy, J., speaking of the various methods of taxation, says: " Most commonly the tax is laid upon property. But this is not always the most convenient, expedient or just mode. A
large portion of the national revenues accrues from a tax on incomes, diviIn this state,
dends, licenses, legacies, stamps, etc., irrespective of property.
for manj- j-ears, and until very latelj', the form of taxing lawyers, physicians,
traders, tavern keepers, manufacturers and mechanics, was to assess them,
either at a tixed sum for each respective class, or at the discretion of the

In familiar

'
language, this was called an assessment on the faculty.'
The present statutes are not free from similar provisions. A capitation tax
still remains. The agent, in this state, of an insurance company existing out
'

listers.'

of the state, is required, in consequence of being allowed to conduct business
here, to pay a certain per centage on the amount of his premiums and collections. Auctioneers and express companies are assessed in a like manner.
In
the case of quarry, mine and ore bed companies (joint stock or incorporated),
not only the stock itself, but the franchise is expressly made subject to assessBy a law of 1862, it is enacted that, for the purposes of taxation, no
stock of any railroad company shall be estimated in the list at less than ten
per cent, of its par value, although it was then notorious that much of the

ment.

stock so to be valued was utterly worthless.
These examples show that the
state has ever adopted, at its own will, different bases of taxation as applied
to different subjects, and there is no occasion for surprise that the legislature,

in the matter before us, thought proper to impose a tax directly and specifically on these corporations as such, without reference to their assets. There is
no reason why they should not contribute their full share to support the government through which they exist and flourish."
As to the ta-xation of savings societies in general, see Savings Bank v. New
London, 20 Conn., 111.
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and not elsewhere, but not at a greater

rate than is as-

sessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual
citizens of such state," and not exceeding "the rate imposed upon
the shares of any of the banks organized under the authority of
the state " where the bank is located ; and nothing in the act is to
"
exempt the real estate of such banks from either state, county
or municipal taxes, to the same extent, according to its value, as

Under this act, if no tax is imposed
by the state on shares in state banks, the shares in the national
banks are not taxed at all.-' This difficulty -was met with in states
other real estate is taxed."

whose laws taxed the capital of banks, but not the shares thereof.'
The act of congress does not allow of taxation of the capital,^
nor will it admit of municipal taxation of national bank shares,
when the state banks are exempt therefrom.^ But the fact that
two banks, by their charter, are specially taxed, will not preclude
the taxation of the shares in the national banks by general law,'
neither are the shares to be excluded from taxation, because some
other classes of moneyed capital are exempt from taxation by
It is competent to require that the
law of limited application.^
tax on the shares shall be paid by the bank.''
Van Allen

v.

The Assessors,

i*

Bradley ij. People,
seli, 17 Mich., 479.
2 Smith V.

'Craft

v.
V.

Wall.,

Wall.,

459 ;

First National Bank of

u.

Bradley

v.

17

.

Mich., 479 ; Collins «. ChiFirst National Bank of

11

Minn.,

i}.

Stiltz, id., 338.

«. Rouse, 43 Mo., 67; S. C.

People, 4 id., 459.

Pirst National Bank of Tecum-

Tecumseh,

See

Tuttle, 37 Ind., 332; Wright

'Lionberger

573 ;

Smith

Smith v. Webb,
Meredith, 44. Mo., 500.

cago, 4 Biss., 472.

Hannibal

4

3

500 ;

in error,

9

Wall.,

468.

AjDpeal, 71 Penn. St., 219. The whole subject of taxation under
this law received careful examination in Provident Institution v. Boston, 101
Mass., 575. And see Tappan v. Merchants' National Bank, 19 Wall., 490, opinion by Waite, Ch. J.
* Everett's

'National Bank a. Commonwealth, 9 Wall., 353; Lionberger v. Rouse, id.,
468; First National Bank ■B.Douglass Co., 1 Cent. Law Jour., 584, per Dillon, J. As the federal decisions referred to seem now to have covered the
ground of taxation of national banks, we abstain from reference to many state
decisions.
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CHATTEE XIX.
TAXES TJNDEE THE POWER OP POLICE.
There are
Difference between taxation and regulation.
under
the
some cases in which levies are made and collected
designation of taxes, or under some name employed in
revenue laws, to indicate a particular class of taxes, where the
imposition of the burden may fairly be referred to some other
general

is,

authority than to that branch of the sovereign power of the
state under which the public revenues are apportioned and collected.
The reason
that the imposition has not for its object
but looks rather to the regulation of relative rights, privileges and duties, as between individuals, to the
conservation of order in the political society, to the encouragement of industry, and the discouragement of pernicious employments.'
would seem proper to
Legislation for these purposes,

it

the raising of revenue,

is

look upon

in the exercise of that authority which
inherent in every sovereignty, to make all such rules and regu-

lations

as being made

as are

needful to secure and preserve

the public

order,

individual in the enjoyment of his own
rights and privileges by requiring the observance of rules of
and

to protect each

manifestation of the sovereign authority

is

order, fairness and good neighborhood, by all around him.

This

usually spoken of

as

demand of money,

power, and one made under the power to tax,
as

of substance.

The proceedings may be the same in

is

the two cases, though the purpose
one

made for regulation

under the police
not so much one

The
essentially different.
and the other for revenue.
If, thereis

of form

is

The distinction between

a

the police power.

it

is

evident in any particular instance, there can
in
to the
be no difficulty
classifying the case and referring

fore, the purpose

is

:

'

Mr. Walker, in his Science ofWealtli, adds this to Adam Smith's four car.
dinal rules of taxation " V. The heaviest taxes should be imposed on those
commodities the consumption of which
especially prejudicial to the interests
of the people."
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XI5.]

TAXES UNDER THE POWER OF POLICE.

397

But in what has been said regarding the apporproper power.
tionment of taxes, it has been seen that other considerations than
those which regard

the production of a revenue are admissible,

and that regulation may be kept in view when revenue is the
main and primary purpose.
The right of any sovereignty to
look beyond the immediate purpose to the general effect, neither
is nor can be disputed ; the government has general authority to
raise a revenue and to choose the methods of doing so ; it has also
general authority in the regulation of relative rights, privileges
and duties ; and there is no rule of reason, policy or government
which

can require

the legislature, when making laws with the

in view, to exclude carefully from its attention the
Nevertheless, cases of this nature are to be regarded as

one object
other.

cases of taxation.

Revenue is the primary purpose, and the regulation results from the methods of apportionment that are resorted
to in obtaining the revenue.
Only those cases, where regulation
is the primary purpose, can be specially referred to the police
power.

Custom has much to do in determining whether certain classes
of exactions are to be regarded as taxes or as duties imposed for
regulation. If by the common understanding and general custom
of the country, a particular duty is regarded as being imposed
upon certain individuals, not as their proportionate share in the
burdens of government, but because of some special relation to
property peculiarly located, or to business peculiarly troublesome
or dangerous, so that a requirement that the duty shall be performed by such individuals is usually regarded as only in the
nature of regulation of relative obligations and duties through
the neighborhood or the municipality, there is no sufficient reason

why this may not be considered

police regulation, though
the proceedings assume the form of taxation, and are even designated by that name. The summoning of the people once a year
a mere

to put the highways of their neighborhood in order, has sometimes been looked upon as a case of this description ; to some
extent, at least, in the nature of a police regulation,* notwithstandino- that, on a failure to obey the summons, the value of the
State v. Halifax, 4 Dev. Law, 345; Sawyer v. Alton, 3 Scam., 127, 130;
Pleasant «. Kost, 290 111., 49; Overseers of Amenia v. Stamford, 6 Johns,, 92;
1 See

Draining Company

Case,

11

La. An.,

388, 873.
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TAXATION.

A

public purpose, such as is usually accomplished by an expenditure of public moneys, is indeed
bad in view in such a case ; but the custom of requiring highway
labor seems to have come down to us from a period when regular
taxes were unknown or only collected in kind, and when it was
labor is collected in money.

neighborhood duty to keep the roads in order,
as it was to prevent riots and arrest criminals, or make compenA like practice, based upon a similar
sation for their offenses.

looked upon

as a

idea, has prevailed

in other countries.

The cases of assessments for the conSidewalk assessments.
struction of walks by. the side of the streets, in cities and other
populous places, are more distinctly referable to the power of poThese foot walks are not only required, as a rule, to be put
lice.
and kept in proper condition for use by the adjacent proprietors,
but it is quite customary to confer by the municipal charters full
authority upon the municipalities, to order the walks of a kind
and quality by them prescribed, to be constructed by the owners
of adjacent lots at their own expense, within a time limited by
the order for the purpose, and that in case of their failure so to
construct them, it shall be done by the public authorities, and the
from such owners, or made a lien upon their propWhen this is done the duty must be looked upon as being
erty.
enjoined as a regulation of police, made because of the peculiar

cost collected

have in the walks, and because their situa-

interest such owners
tion gives

them peculiar

promptness

and convenience,

state, and of afterwards
use.

fitness

and

ability for performing, with

the duty of putting them in proper

keeping them in

a

condition suitable for

Upon these grounds the authority to establish such regula-

tions has frequently been supported.'
' The leading case is that

of Goclard, Petitioner, 16 Picli., 504, 509, in which
speaking of a by-law imposing such an assessment, answers the
and explains its nature as follows:
principal objections to
" Another, and perhaps the most important objection is, that the by-law
tax or duty upon the citizens, and
one imposing
violation of the con-

J.,

a

is

a

it

is

it,

Shaw, Ch.

a

is,

a

it

is

is

in this, that
partial, and unequal, and contravenes that fundaof
our
social
system, that all burdens and taxes laid on the
maxim
mental
shall
be equal.
But tlie court are all of the opinion
people for the public good
is
not obnoxious to this objection.
that the by-law in question
" It
not speaking strictly to characterize this city ordinance as
law levying tax, the direct or principal object of which
the raising of revenue.
stitution
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Sewer assessments.
to

a

There seems to be no legal impediment
requirement under the police power that lot owners in cities

It

imposes a duly upon a large clabs of persons, the performance of whicli
requires some labor and expense, and therefore indirectly operates as a law
creating a burden; but we think it is rather to be regarded as a police regula-

tion, requiring

a

it

it,

a duty to be performed, highly salutary and advantageous
to the citizens of a populous and closely built city, and which is imposed
upon them because they are so situated as that they can most promptly and
numerous
and
is laid, not upon a few, but upon
conveniently perform
class, all those who are so situated, and equally upon all who are within the

a

it

singles
description composing the class. It is said to be unequal, because
particular class of citizens, to wit, the owners and occupiers of real estate,

out

If

and imposes the duty exclusively upon them.
this were an arbitrary seleca class of citizens, without reference to their peculiar litness and ability
to perform the dutj^, the objection would have great weight; as for instance,
if the expense of clearing the streets of snow were imposed upon the mechan-

tion of

ics, or merchants, or any other distinct class cf citizens, between whose convenience and accommodation, and the labor to be done, there is no natural
a

a

is

But suppose there
class of citizens who will themselves comi-elation.
benefit from the performance of some public dutj"^, we can see
monly derive
no inequality in requiring that all those who will derive such benefit, shall
a

it

a

is

is

it

a

it,

it,

is

it,

is

is

it

it

it,

a

it,

a

I

a

a

a

t

a

a

by-law should
by a general and equal law be required to do it. Suppose
coach or
cart, ruck or other team, or
require every inhabitant who keeps
other carriage, to turn out himself, or send man, with one or more horses,
after
heavy fall of snow, to assist in leveling it. Although other citizens
benefit, yet as these derive some peculiar benefit, accompanied
would derive
can at present perceive no valid objection to
with the ability,
by-law reon the gi-onnd of inequality. Supposing
general regulation, that
quiring
at certain seasons of the year, every ishopkeeper should sprinkle the sidewalk in front of his own shop, or sweep
inasmuch as he has a peculiar
benefit, and as the duty is equal upon all who come within the description,
seems to us to be equal, in the sense in which the law requires all such burappears to us that the case before us
dens to be equal. And
similar.
part of the public street, and the public have an
Although the sidewalk
easement in
often the owner of the fee, and
yet the adjacent occupant
some
jieculiar interest in
and benefit from
distinct from
generally has
that which he enjoys in common with the rest of the community.
He has
this interest and benefit, often in accommodating his cellar door and steps,
To
passage for fuel, and the passage to and from his own house to the street.
denominated his sidewalk.
Tor his own acsome purposes, therefore,
commodation, he would have an interest in clearing the snow from his own
door. The owners and occupiers of house lots and other real estate, therefore,
have an interest in the performance of this duty, peculiar and somewhat distinct from that of the rest of the community.
Besides, from their situation,
they have power and ability to perform this duty, with the promptness which
divided, distributed
the benefit of the community requires; and the duty
number, that
can be done promptly and
and apportioned upon so large
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and villages shall be at the expense of constructing that portion
It is
of the public sewer in front of their respective premises.
effectually, and without imposing a very severe burden upon any one. Supposing a bj'-law should require, what is often done, in practice, that upon an
alarm of fire in the night, all householders, on streets leading to and near the
Or that all
fire, should exhibit a light. This would seem to be reasonable.
the owners or occupiers of dwelling houses, having a well and pump, should
keep them in repair at their own expense, to be used in case of fire. It would
operate partially, but it seems to us not unequal, in the sense in which we are
using that term. The city might keep persons ready in every street to light
torches and flambeaux in case of fire, and the expense to be paid from the
treasury; still it appears to me, that as householders would derive a benefit
from the operation of this general regulation, as their local situation puts it
peculiarly within their power and ability to perform it without great expense,
and as it is equal in its terms, it would not be obnoxious to the charge of
being invalid for partiality and inequality.
" In all these cases the answer to the objection of partiality and inequality

a

is

it

a

it

it
is

is

:

8

4

,

7

I.,

is, that the duty required is a duty upon the person in respect to the property
which he holds, occupies and enjoys, under the protection and benefit of
the laws ; that it operates on each and all in their turns, as they become owners and occupiers of such estates, and it ceases to be required of them, when
they cease to be such holders and occupiers of the estate, in respect to which
the duty is required.
In this respect it is like a land tax, or house tax, it does
not bear upon all citizens alike, but it is not on that account unequal or partial, in the sense contemplated by the declaration of rights, requiring all
taxes and burdens to be equal and impartial."
The following cases support
the same view. Lowell v. Hadley, 8 Met., 180; Paxson v. Sweet, 13 N. J.,
19G; Washington «. Nashville, 1 Swan, 177; Whyte v. Nashville, 3 id., 304;
Franklin v. j\Iayberry, 6 Humph., 368 ; Bonsall v. Lebanon, 19 Ohio, 418 ; Deblois V. Barker, 4 R.
445; O'Learya. Sloo,
La. An., 25; Hart «. Brooklyn,
86 Barb 220: Buflalo City Cemetery Co., v. Bufialo, 46 N. Y., 503; Greensburg V. Young, 53 Penn. St., 280; Hydes v. Joyes,
Bush, 464. Aud see Hudler V. Golden, 36 N. Y., 446 Woodbridge v. Detroit,
Mich., 374, 309, per
Christiancy, J. The case of Ottowa v. Spencer, 40 111., 211, 217,
contra. In
held that the assessment for an improvement on the adNew Jersey, where
joining land owners, must not exceed the actual benefit conferred by such imis also held that the whole expense of
provement,
sidewalk may be
assessed upon the lot in front of which
constructed, regardless of absolute benefits. Tan Tassel v. Jersey City, 14 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.), 258. In
Twycross v. Fitchburg R. R. Co., 10 Gray, 293, 295, lessee's covenant to pay
".all taxes or duties," levied or to be levied on the premises during the term
was held not to apply to an assessment for paving the sidewalk in front; that

Challiss,

no objection

to

a

J. It

v.

is

Per Thomas,
Parker

not graded.

9

street

is

a

permanently command."

tax that

it

a

is

a

tax or duty levied or to be levied on the premises demised. " It
is
permanent improvement of the estate, the benefit of which
to be found
in the increased value of the estate, and in the increased rent which
would
not being

sidewalk

Kans., 155; Challiss v.

OH.
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true, that the levies for the purpose of constructing sewers and of

keeping them in repair are commonly spoken of as taxes ; ^ but,
as has been justly remarked, there is as much reason to subject
the owners of land abutting to contribution to their expenditure,
as there is to oblige them to pave the footways

in front of their

grounds, or to keep the same in repair, when the city shall pave
the streets adjoining.
It should be a charge on the land, just as
is the requisition on the owners of land abiitting on the streets to
clear away the snow at their own expense, which has been determined to be a reasonable provision. It is a charge upon real
estate thus situated, and requisite for the comfort and convenience
of all the citizens.

^

By this is not

meant

sewers may not be borne by general tax, as

that the expense of
indeed is often done :

what is meant is only this, that the purpose to be accomplished
is of that peculiar nature that the duty to provide for it seems
intimately associated with the ownei'ship of adjacent property,
means thereof

;

will

and the use facilitated by
and it is therefore within the competency of the

the value of which

be increased

legislature to impose upon the owners of such property the

duty

to make provision for it.
Levee assessments.

Assessments for the construction of em

bankments or levees, to protect from overflow and destruction
Parker, 11 id., 384. Even wlien once graded, the grade may be changed at
the discretion of the municipal authorities, without affording any legal
ground for complaint to the parties affected. Pontiac t>. Carter, Sup. Ct.
Mich. (1875) ; 3 Am. L. Times, — ; 12 Albany L. Jour., p. 88. As a matter of
construction, the following cases are important; In Williams v. Bruce, 5
Conn., 190, it was decided that the building of a railing on the inner side of a
sidewalk could not be compelled under a general authority to require the
sidewalk to be constructed. In Wright v. Briggs, 2 Hill, 77, it was held that
authority to a village council to require adjoining owners to construct sidewalks in front of their premises, would not warrant imposing upon them a
A power in a municipal charter to " regulate
tax for improving the street.
"
sidewalks, does not authorize an assessment for their construcand improve
Fairfield v. Katcliffe, 20 Iowa, 396.
tion.
Philadelphia v. Tryon, 35 Penn.St., 401; Stroud ». Philadelphia, 01 id.,
255; Bostons. Shaw, 1 Met., 130; Hildreth b. Lowell, 11 Gray, 845; Cones.
Hartford, 28 Conn., 363; State v. Jersey City, 29 N. J., 441.
' See

Putnam, J., in Boston v. Shaw, 1 Met., 130, 138. In this case it is decided
that the levy of a sewer rate by the value of estates is void, as it could not be
equal or just.
-
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large tracts of country, are commonly levied on the owners
of iands bordering on or lying near the streams or bodies of
water from which the danger is anticipated, and are generally
looked upon as a species of local tax.^ But if it should be imposed as a duty upon residents or property owners in the neigh-

borhood of such a danger, that they should turn out periodically,
or in emergencies, and give personal attention and labor to the
construction of the necessary defenses against overflow and inundation, it is not perceived that there could be any difficulty in
supporting such a requirement as one of police, or of resting it
upon the same grounds which sustain the regulations in cities, by
which duties are imposed on the occupants of buildings, to take
certain precautions against fires, not for their own benefit exclusively, but for the protection of the public.^

Drainage laws.

Similar considerations apply in the case of
drainage laws, which are enacted in order to relieve swamp?,
marshes and other low lands of the excessive waters which detract
from their value for occupation and cultivation, and perhaps render
them worthless for

use, and are

likely at the same time to diffuse

through the neighborhood a dangerous

nuisance.

If

these may

be drained at the expense of the owner, by special tax, there can
be no doubt of the right of the state to make
them, as

a,

matter of police regulation

to perform the duty at his expense,

;

it his duty to drain

the state coming forward

in case of its not being suit-

ably or expeditiously performed.'
' Crowley

v. Ciopley, 2 La. An., 329.
Sec- Sessions a. Cronklinton, 20 Ohio,
Egyptian Levee Co. i>. Hardin, 27 3Io., 49.5; Yeatman v. Crandall,
11 La. An., 220; Wallace v. Slielton, 14 id., 498; Bishops. Marks, U id., 147;
Richardson v. Morgan, 16 id., 429; McGehee ». Mathis, 21 Ark., 40; Jones

X.

S., 349;

■B.Boston, 104

Mass., 461.

'It

is said by Elmer, J., in State v. Xcwark, 27 X. .J., ia!5, 104, that "laws for
the drainage and embanking of low grounds, and to provide for the expense
for the mere benefit of the proprietors, without reference to the public good,
are to be classed, not

ment

;

' In

under the taxing, but the police power of the governand so ajso the regulation of fences and party walls."

City Ojuncil of Charleston,

12 Rich., 702, 733, the power to reto be constractcd by the owners of the
property adjacent, is plainly referred to the police power.
"From a very
early period sewers and pavements have constituted exceptional subjects in

quire

State v.

sewers^ drains

and sidewallis

referenee to assessments.

Statutes of drains and sewers were known before

CIL
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not to be doubted t'aat other cases which n:av have not
the subject ot ; liicial cor.sideratijn, would iall withia

yet been

but it niight be pres jmptuojs to attempt an eniiii2ierat:on of them, es'jiecially as there can be li:tle o: no occasion for doing so, when the taxing power is commonZv suScient
to meet ali their requirements.
A safer ground will be oceapie'd
thjse
cases, so often the 5ic;e:t of judicial
in the coasiierationoi

the sarce reasons

:

review, in which b-:irden5 in

th^e

shai^e

of license

fee=i

have been

imposed upon business, trades or otciuations.

License fees in general.
1.

For re2~:'ation.

2.

License fees may be imposed:
3. To give monopolies.
Forreveane.
-L

The third rirrose is inadmissible iu any free
government, and has not avowe<iiy been had in view ar any rime
in this conntry. nor in En;:land, since the period imnaeiiatelv treceding the revolarion of 16SS. so fraitfal of arbitrary exactions
For rrohibition.

of every available nature.^
The fonrch pirrose is entirely admissible in the case oi pa.rs~;its or indulgencies which in their
general enect are believed to be more harrafal than beneSeial to
and which, cons-e:inen:ly. the public interest requires
shonld be nnt an end to. A case of this nature is that or heavy

scoiety.

the nme of

Heniy \

ill, when

the general sratntes on the subject were enactIn^ like manner the act of l~&i,
ed, and the mode of assessment prescribed,
provided : :r assessmea is for drains or se-vers and sidewalks. Virions rei^jiis
Among others, it has been plainly
Xka~e Ijeen assiinel for these exceptions.

Tirred that, as a sanitiry rer^ilation, and tinder th; power to abate nuisances,
the corporation mi At require eveiy citizen to drain his own lot, or in case of
neslect, exact
penalty; and so ty the old act r.f 169^ 7 .Stat. 12i. eTtzy in-

i

Charleston was required to mend and raise the sidewalk in front
ci his hotise in the t. -'.-.-. -t and to tiie dimensions therein prescribed, on penco';lected tinder the warrant
alt^- of forfeiting for each house a p>ena;iy to be

habitant

of

. ; a jnstice of the peace. In order the better to carry into effect these objects,
and to do what each individaal mi^ht be ret; ttired to do for himself, the act
r,f 17ii4 authorized the c ruLissioners of streets to constrtict drains and level

atid pave the fO'orvays. etc^ and to assess the prr.prietors of lands and honS'-s
frontins on the street, etc" Ihxnkin, Chancellor, p. 733.
' Taxation for the benefit of Lndividnals is compared to monopolies by
L'y.jzrk. Ch. .!., in Philadelphia Ass-tciaiion, etc. r. Ay'iod. 39 Petin. St.. 67, S2.
The verv heaw liccns e fees exacted from pawnbrokers in Dublin are said to owe
their origin to a paq; ose to give a monopoly of the btisiness to a few favored

Of cotu^ethe weight of such fees rests finally on the
retainers of the court.
make them the pawnbroker's ctistoEiers.
necessities
whose
persoiLs
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When,

onthekeeperj of implements of gaming.^

is the object, the end may generally be
more directly accomplished by legislation which in its terms is
prohibitory, than by the circuitous method of imposing a burden
however,

prohibition

difficult or impossible to

borne

be

;

and the direct method is con-

But it is often found that
sequently the one usually adopted.
the prohibition of an occupation which excites or gratifies the vices
or passions of large numbers of people, is met b^^ a resistance so
steady and powerful

as

to render the law

wholly ineffectual,

when a heavy tax might lessen the evils and

possibly in the end
belief that this might be

make the occupation unprofitable.
A
has
the result,
influenced many persons

to favor a repeal of the
and
the
substitution
therefor of laws for
prohibitory liquor laws,
'^
the regulation and taxation of the traffic.
But it may safely be
1 State V.

Doon, R. M. Cliarlt.,

Tlie

1.

fee

in this

cage was

of

$1,000, and it

it,

was sustained, althougli it was manifestly imposed for the purposes of prohibition, and its payment would not give to the owner of the table the privilege
which was illegal under another statute.
The constituof making use of

§

tion of Arkansas of 1868 provided that " the general assembly shall tax all
privileges, pursuits and occupations that are of no real use to society; all
others shall be exempt."
Art. 10, 17.

a

it

a

a

'

The constitution of Michigan forbids the grant of licenses for the sale of
liquors, and for twenty years statute was in force making the sale, except
for medicinal ormechauical purposes illegal, and all contracts connected with
such
sale void.
The statute did not answer the expectations of those who
was repealed, and
procured its passage, and in 1875
license tax imposed
on the dealers in liquors. The law unquestionably
had both revenue and
it

was contested as unconstitutional.
regulation in view, but
Many objections
were made, but the only one important to our present purpose was considered

a

a

a

a

a

is is

;

it

a

*

*

7.

is

a

in Youngblood t. Sexton, Sup. Ct. Mich., Uct. 1875, and the importance of the
principle involved seems to justify quoting at some length from the opinion:
" The objection which appears to be
principally relied upon is, that tax
on the trafBc in liquors under this law
equivalent to
license of the traiBc,
and. therefore comes directly in cimflictwith that provision of the constitution A-hich declares that 'the legislature shall not pass any act authorizing
the grant of license for the sale of ardent spirits, or other intoxicating
liquors.' Const. Art. IV. sec.
" The popular understanding of the word license
undoubtedly is
permission to do something which, without the license, would not be allowable.
This, we are to suppose, was the sense in which
was made use of in the
also the legal meaning. The object of license, says
but this
constitution
Mr, Justice Manning, to confer right that does not exist without license.
Chilvers v. People, 11 Mich., 43, 49. Within this definition
mere tax upon

CH.
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afErmed that prohibition is seldom the parpose of such burdens,
and that revenue or regulation — one or both — are the purposes
aimed at in the imposition of license

fees.

the traffic cannot be a license of the traffic, unless the tax confers some right
to canyon the traffic wliich otherwise would not have existed. We do not

The very act which imposed tliis tax
repealed the previous law which forbade the traffic and declared it illegal.
The trade then became lawful whether taxed or not; and tliis law in imposing
understand that such is the case here.

the tax did not declare the trade illegal in case the tax was not paid.
So far
as we can perceive, a failure to psty the tax no more renders the trade illegal
than would a lilie failure of a farmer, to pay the tax on his farm, render its

a

it,

cultivation illegal. The state has imposed the tax in each case, and made
such provision as has been deemed needful to insure its payment ; but it has
not seen fit to make the failure to pay a forfeiture of the right to pursue the
calling. If the tax is paid the traffic is lawful, but if not paid the traffic is
equally lawful. There is consequently nothing in the case that appears to be
in the nature of a license. The state has provided for the taxation of a business which was found in existence, and the carrying on of which it no longer
prohibits ; and that is all.
"
But it is urged that by taxing the business the state recognizes its lawful
character, sanctions its existence and jjarticipates in its profits, all of which
is within the real intent of the prohibition of license. The lawfulness of the
business, if by that we understand it is no longer punishable, and is capable
of constituting the basis of contracts, was undoubtedly recognized when tha
prohibitory law was repealed ; but as the illegality of the traffic depended on
the law, so its lawfulness now depends upon its repeal. The tax has nothing
Now it is not claimed, so far as we are aware, that
to do with it whatever.
the
prohibitory law was incompetent; and, if not, mere recogthe repeal of
nition of the lawfulness of the traffic cannot make the tax law or any other
law invalid. It is only the recognition of an existing and a conceded fact;
and the courts could not refuse to recognize it if they would.
"The idea that the state lends its countenance to any particular traffic by
very transparent fallacy. It certainly overlooks
seems to rest upon
taxing
is

it

Taxes are not
or disregards some ideas that must always underlie taxation.
true, to the existence of
favors; they are burdens.
They are necessary,
government; but they are not the less burdens, and are only submitted to be-

an extent that

will

be ruinous to individuals.

It would

it

be

a

;

is

deemed advisable to make careful provision to
cause of the necessity. It
but
is conceded
preclude these burdens becoming needlessly oppressive
by all the authorities that under some circumstances they ma}' be carried to
remarkable

it

is

it,

is

a

is

sanctioned and counthing
proi^osition, under such circumstances, that
tenanced by the government, when this burden, which may prove disastrous,
while on the other hand
frowned upon and conimposed upon
is

is

withheld. It
safe to predict that if such were
demned when the burden
the legal doctrine, any citizen would prefer to be visited with the untaxed
frowns of government rather than with testimonials of approval, which are
represented by the demands of the tax-gatherer.
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privilege granted by the state, usually on pay-

be supposed that some idea

of special protection is involved when

If

the tax upon
being reciprocal.
to
the owner in
any particular thing was the consideration for the thing given
taxation has
in
but the maxim of reciprocity
this might be so
respect to

If

;

it,

a business is taxed ; taxation and protection

;

it

a

it

it

it

protects.
No government ever undertakes to tax all
no such meaning.
would not be on the idea that
government were to levy only poll taxes,
was to protect only the persons of its citizens, leaving their property open to
In this state our taxes are derived mainly from real esrapine and plunder.
been suggested that real estate was entitled to special
has
never
tate
but
relatively
in consequence. In Great Britain, real estate pays
state
political
and
in
the
social
of
the
taxes,
although
insignificant portion
the
fact
United
As
general
is more important than any other property.
States hag not taxed real property, and, tliough during the recent rebellion
taxed most kinds of business for war purposes, the number of subjects taxed

it

a

it

a

consideration

bounties are as much protected as either.

All this

is

;

is

has been several times reduced by legislation since, and may reasonably be
no more
expected to be further reduced hereafter. But the business taxed
protected than the business not taxed and the fisheries which are favored by

only an apportionment
a

is

it

of taxation by the selection of subjects wliioh, under all the circumstances,
person in
"Whether
deemed wise and politic to subject to tlie burden.
the
of
taxables
category
respect to his property or his occupation falls within
immaterial

It

is

is

is

as affecting his claim to jDrotection from the governenough for him that the government has selected for itself its
own subjects for taxation, and prescribed its own rules. It
his liability to
taxation at the will of the government that entitles him to protection, and not

or not,

ment.

;

*

*

is

a

;

a

the circumstance of his being actually taxed and the taxation of thing may
means of expressing
be, and often is, when police purposes are had in view,
taxed.
disapproval instead of approbation of what
" Taxes upon business are usually collected in the form of license fees and

this may possibly have led to the idea that seems
tax implied
license. But there
quarters, that

to have prevailed

in

some

a

a

it

is

a

a

no necessaiy connection
whatever between them. A business may be licensed and yet not taxed, or
And so far is the tax from being necesmay be taxed and yet not licensed.
sarily license, that provision is frequently made by law for the taxation of
is

a

is

carried on tmder
license existing independent of the tax.
business that
" Such
the case where cities under proper legislative authority tax occuOuld v. Richmond,
pations that are carried on under licenses from the state.
23 Grat., 464;
211;

Napier

Wendover

v.

Hodges,

«. Lexington,

15

Texas, 287; Cuthbert v. Conley, 33 Geo.,
B. Monr., 2.58.
The license confers the

31

5

it

any protection whatever,
without undertaking to give
387;
Purvcar
Wall.,
v. Commonwealth,
monwealth,

it

it

a

a

is

it

not perceived why
privilege, but
privilege thus conferred should
much
as any other.
not be taxed as
The federal laws give us illustration of the taxation of illegal traffic. A case in point was that of the taxation of the liquor traflic in the state previous to the repeal of the prohibbusiness in existence, and
taxed
itory law; the federal law found

McGuire v. ComWall, 47.'). What
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ment of a valuable consideration,^ thougli this is not essential.
To constitute a privilege the grant must confer authority to do
something which without the grant would be illegal ; for if what
it,

is to be done under the license is open to every one without
the grant would be merely idle and nugatory, conferring no privi-

This

license.'

is

always the case where that which
was not unlawful at the common law.

is

a

is

;

But the thing to be done may be something lawlege whatever.*
ful in itself, and only prohibited for the "purposes of the license
that
to say, prohibited in order to compel the taking out of

licensed

it

would have prevented the state from taxing the same traffic at the same
time? Is
any more restricted in the selection of subjects of taxation

If

a

it

?

?

is

than the general government
one may tax and at the same time refuse
to protect, may not the other do the same
The only reason suggested for
was the state itself, not the United
negative reply to these questions is, that

it

it

States, that made the business illegal, and
would be inconsistent and absurd
illegal and at the same time tax it. But how the inconsistency

to declare

it

a

is

is

is

it

;

a

is

would appear in one case rather than the other,
not apparent. The illegality was declared by competent authority, and yet the federal government
taxed the trade, at the same time refusing or being unable to protect it. If
protection because of the tax was due to the very thing upon which the tax
was imposed, there would be an inconsistency in taxing
prohibited trade
fall,
but treating taxation, however and wherever
as
the return for the
may
—
benefits
of
for
the
protection to life, liberty, the social
general
government
and family relations, as well as to business and property — which
the only
no inconsistency whatever in
legal and proper idea of taxation, there
not protected one of the measures or standards
thing which
making
ought to
by which to determine how much the party owning or supporting
pay to the government.
and cost by keeping up

If

one puts the government to special inconvenience
a

a

a

is

is

is

prohibited traffic, or maintaining nuisance, the
reason for discriminating in taxation against him; and if the tax is
fact
imposed on the thing which is prohibited or which constitutes the nuisance,
the tax law, instead of being inconsistent with the law declaring the illegalin entire harmony with its general purpose, and sometimes may be even
ity,
Certainly, whatever discriminations are made in taxation
more eflFectual.
ought to be in the direction of making the heaviest burdens fall upon those
practithings which are obnoxious to the public interests, whenever that

43, 49

cartman to take out

Home Ins. Co.

license under

o. Augusta, 50 Geo., -530.

penalty

is

'Bequiring

Mich.,

404.
;

v. People, 11

Rich.,

a

Columbia,

6

Chilvers

v.

a

'

Heise

'

cable."

not void as be-

cannot be said that the ordinance was more than

a

to decide, and

it

a

" The wisdom and
expediency of granting such
ing in restraint of trade.
power to the city were within the legislative power of the state government

proper

408

LAW OF TAXATION.

[CH.

XIS.

The grant of a license may be 'made by tlie state directly
or it may be made indirectly through one of the municipal corporations of the state.
Of the indirect grant it is to be observed,
that

municipal corporation as such has no inherent power to
grant licenses or exact license fees ; it must derive all its authority
in this regard from the state, and the power must come by direct
a

grant and cannot be taken by implication.

Fees, when a tax.

The terms in which

powered to grant licenses

will

be expected

,

municipality is emto indicate with suf-

a

ficient precision whether the grant is conferred for the purposes of
revenue, or whether, on the other hand, it is given for regulation
It is perhaps impossible to lay down any rule for the
merely.
construction of such grants, that shall be general and at the same
time safe ; but as all delegated powers to tax are to be closely
scanned and strictly construed, it would seem that when a power
is given, the intendment must be that regulation is the
object, unless there is something in the language of the grant, or
in the circumstances under which it is made, indicating with sufto license

ficient certainty that the raising of revenue by means thereof
was contemplated.
If a revenue authority is what seems to be
conferred, the extent of the tax, when not limited by the grant itself, must be understood to be left to the judgment and discretion

of the municipal government, to be determined in the usual mode
in which its legislative authority is exercised ; but the grant of
authority to impose fees for the purposes of revenue would not
warrant their being made so heavy as to be prohibitory, thereby
defeating

the purpose.^

Where the grant is not made for revenue, but for regulation
A fee
merely, a much narrower construction is to be applied.
for the license may still be exacted ; but it must be such a fee
only as will legitimately assist in the regulation ; and it should
not exceed the necessary or probable expense of issuing the license, and of inspecting and regulating the business which

it cov-

regulation of a particular braucli of business, for tlie good order of the city,
and the protection of the persons and property of its citizens and the advancement of its prosperity."
Brooklyn v. Breslin, 57 N. Y., 591, 596, perio«, Com.
>Ux
parte Burnett, 30 Ala., 432; Craig v. Burnett, 33 id., 728; Burlington
Insurance Co., 31 Iowa, 103; Kitson ?;. Ann Arbor, 26 Mich., 335; Mason
Lancaster, 4 Bush, 406 ; Kniper v. Louisville, 7 id., 601.

«.
v.

XIS.j
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it is a reasonable inference that it will do so in unequivocal terms. But the limitation of the license fee to the necessary expenses will still
ers.^

the state intends to give broader authority,

leave a considerable

amount of the

fee

field for the exercise

is to be determined.

of discretion, when the
The fee, of course, must

it cannot be determined with
any accuracy what the cost of regulation is to be : it must therefore be based upon the estimates, with more or less probability
that the result will fail to come anything near a verification of the
calculations.
Moreover, in fixing upon the fee, it is proper and
be prescribed in advance, and when

reasonable

to take into the account, not the expense merely of di-

rect regulation, but all the incidental

consequences

that may be

likely to subject the public to cost in consequence of the business
licensed.
^

In

some cases

the incidental

consequences

the most important, and indeed are what are

are much

principally had in

view when the fee is decided upon.
The regulation of the business of huckster, for instance, could seldom be troublesome or
expensive, but that of the manufacture and sale of intoxicating
drinks could not be measured by anything like the same standard.
The business is one that affects the public interest in many ways,
and leads to many disorders.
It has a powerful tendency to increase pauperism and crime.

It

renders a large force of peace of-

ficers essential, and it adds to the expenses of the courts, and of nearI Freeholders v. Barber, 7 N. J., 64 ; Kip d. Patterson, 26 K. J., 298 ; State v.
Hoboken, 33 id., 280 ; State v. Eoberts, 11 Gill & J., 506 ; Boston v. Schaflfer, 9
Pick., 415 ; Commonwealth v. Stodder, 2 Cush., 5C3 ; Mobile v. Miller, 3 Ala.,
137; Bennett b. Birmingham, 81 Penn. St., 15; Cincinnati «. Bryson, 15 Ohio,
625; Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio, N. S., 268; Baker v. Cincinnati, 11 id., 534;
Cincinnati Gas Light Co. v. State, 18 id., 243 ; Chilvers v. People, 11 Mich.,
43; Ash ». People, id., 347; Collins u. Louisville, 2 B. Monr., 134; St. Louis
». Boatmans' Ins. & Trust Co.,, 47 Mo., 150 ; State v. Herod, 29 Iowa, 133 ; Burlington V. Insurance Co., 31 id., 102; Ward «. Maryland, 12 Wall., 429; Dillon,
Mun. Corp., § 609. The fact that the license fee is payable into the treasury
of the municipality, provided the fee bo a reasonable one, does not impress it
Frankford, etc. R. R. Co., i). Philadelphia,
with the character of a tax.
58 Penn. St., 119; Johnson D.Philadelphia, 60 id., 445; State B.Herod, 29
Iowa, 123. Upon the question when a license fee imposed on the cars of street
railways is a tax and when not, the followingjcases may be consulted with
profit in connection with the Pennsylvania cases above cited : New York v.
Second Avenue R. R. Co., 32 N. Y., 361 ; Louisville City R. R. Co. «. Louis-

ville,

4 Bush, 478; S.

C,

3

Withrow's Corp.

Cases, 358.
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ly all

civil administration.

It

cannot be questioned,
therefore, if it is to be licensed by the public authorities, that it is
legitimate and proper to take into the account all the probable
consequences, or that the paj'ment to be exacted should be suffibranches of

cient to cover all the incidental expenses to which the public are
likely to be put by means of the business being carried on. And

all reasonable intendments must favor the fairness and justice of
a fee thus fixed ; it will not be held excessive unless it is manifestly something more than a fee for regulation."-

What may

licensed.

be

Upon this subject it would not be

safe to venture upon laying

down any rule whatever, as one of
Where revenue is the purpose, enough has been said
in other parts of the present work to show that there is practically
no limitation whatever.
When the license is for regulation
limitation.

is,

merely, the limitation

is one of discretion and policy, and the
whether the business or occupation
one
is

question presented
rendering special regulation important for any purpose of protection to the public, or to guard individuals against frauds and imEmployments

positions.

the most

necessary and commendable

may sometimes need regulations for one or the other of these purposes, and so may the most dearly prized and most essential of
fundamental rights or privileges.
On this point no illustration
could be more appropriate than that of the marriage

relation.

v.

;

are

not assessed

according

Mich. Sup. Ct., Oct.

1875.

it

is

it

a

5

;

;

is

a

is

a

is

it

it

a

is

v.

is

'

Philadelphia, CO Penn. St., 445 Ash v. People, 11 Mich.,
Ins. Co., 31 Iowa, 102. In Burch v. Savannah, 42 Ueo.,
" The license fee for
596, 598, the follo-sviug remarks are made by McKay, J.
in no proper sense
tax. Its object
not to raise revenue.
retailing liquors
has
for
been
that
this
It
business -was one dangerous to
many years
thought
the public peace and public morals, and ithas been the uniform practice of the
to regulation, require license from some public functioncountry to subject
engaged in, and to punish as
crime the pursuit of -without
ary before
part of the public regulations of the country, and
license. The license
intended rather to prevent the indiscriminate opening of such
the fee
establishments than to raise the revenue by taxation."
And see Thompson v.
State, 15 Ind., 449 Commonwealth v. Byrne, 20 Grat., 165 Straub ii. Gordon,
Bush, 660. An objection to
37 Ark., 625; Falmouth b. "Watson,
license
of
saloon
keepers,
exacted
that
etc.,
fee
unequal and invidious, because
the rest of the community are not required to pay similar fees, has no force.
Duraoh's Appeal, 62 Penn. St., 491. Neither has an objection that those taxed
Johnson
Burlington

See

347;

to the business done.

Youngblood

v. Sexton,

XI2.J
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MaiTiage, between persons of suitable age and discretion, and under proper circumstances, should be esteemed a natural right ;
but what are suitable age and discretion, and what are the circumstances which should allow or forbid

in which it is

it?

There are some cases

manifestly unfit and pernicious as in others it is
In
proper and suitable ; and obviously legislation is essential.
most countries the relation has always been subjected to regulaas

tions more or less stringent, among which has been the requirement of a license.
Such a license has commonly for its purpose
to prevent marriages between persons disqualified by immaturity
or mental infirmity, or against the will of those standing in such
relation to the parties as to render it proper and reasonable that
they should be consulted.

Public amusements may also be forbidden with entire propriety
except when .licensed, inasmuch as everything of that nature has
some tendency to disorder and to increased necessity for police
Perhaps those private amusements in which chance
supervision.^
is one of the elements of interest, and which for that reason may
beget a desire for gaming, and thus lead to disorders, might also
The whole subject
be subjected to regulations of a like nature.
must be one which presents questions of legislative policy, rather
than of strict law.^
Lotteries, where permitted, are usually licensed, and sometimes
the state which grants the permission and receives a fee therefor,
permits its municipalities to exact a license fee also. This it has
an undoubted right to do, unless the privilege was obtained frona
the state on the payment of a bonus, and under legislation which,

in terms or by fair construction, would preclude any municipal
regulations or exactions.'

Games of chance

or hazard of every

' See Seara
«.

Brown,

3 id., 61 ;
*

In

v. "West, 1 Murphy, 891 ; The Germania i>. State, 7 Md., 1 ; Orton
Miss., 426; Mabry «. Tarber, 1 Humph. 94; Hodgos v. Nashville,
Eldridge v. Heneger, 5 Sneed, 257.

85

Stevens

v. State,

2

Ark.,

291,

it was held that the keeper of

a

billiard

table could not be required to pay a fee as for a privilege. But this was put
on the wholly untenable ground that it was unequal, because he was taxed on
the table as property; and it was overruled by Washington v. State, 13 Ark.,
And see Straub v. Gordon, 27 id., 625.
572.

Wend over

v.

Lexington,

15

B. Monr., 258.

Where

one holds a license

from
it,

2

a

a

a

be
the state or county, he cannot, without legislation expressly permitting
condition of doing business
city as
compelled to take out license in
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description, when made lawful at all, are usually made so under
licensed regulations.^
And thousrh a tax is sometimes levied for
revenue upon the keepers of dogs, it is more usual to require the
keeping to be licensed ; the principal object being to have so.Tie
person responsible for every animal of the

kind that is protected

by the law.^
Of the occupations upon which license fees are usually imposed,
the most conspicuous has already been mentioned ; that, namely,
of the manufacture and vending of spirituous an.d malt liquors.^

Few persons dispute the necessity for the regulation by law of
when the legislation has gone to the extent of the
entire prohibition, the judiciary has not deemed itself competent

this business

;

to interfere.^

Illustrations of other occupations which are commonly supposed
to require special regulations, are those of hackmen, draymen,

A license

hawkers, auctioneers, etc'

fee imposed upon

"all

tran-

city limits. Robinson v. Franklin, 1 Humph., 156 ; Hannibal ti.
But where the state law permits
cr where at the time
of granting the county or state license
valid city ordinance required
city
license,
may be exacted. See Napier v. Hodges, 31 Texas, 287; Independence V. Noland, 31 Mo., 394.
See Washington i). State, 13 Ark., 753 Lewellen v. Lockharts, 21 Grat., 570
Hill, 131 State v. Hay, 39 Me., 457 State v. Freeman, 38
Tanner v. Albion,
N. H., 436 Commonwealth v. Colton, Gray, 488.
sSee Carter v. Dow, 16 Wis., 299; Tenney v. Lenz, id., 567; Blair d. Forehand, 100 Mass., 136; Morey v. Brown, 43 N. H., 373; Mitchell v. Williams,
37 Ind., 63.
^In Keller v. State, 11 Md., 535, an act requiring manufacturers of beer to
take out
license for retailing, was objected to as compelling them to pay
more than their fair proportion towards the expense of the government; but
the court say " the system of legislation to which this act belongs may be vindicated on the plainest grounds of public policy." As to the right in general,
see Perdue v. Ellis, 18 Geo., 586 Thomasson v. State, 15 Ind., 449 Aulainer«.
Governor,
Texas, 653 Smith v. Adrian,
Mich., 495 Gardner ?;. People, 20
III., 43; License Cases, How., 504; License Tax Cases, Wall., 473.
Mo., 575.

18

;

;

;

1

5

5

;

1

;

a

;

8

;

;

5

;

'

it

a

a

Guyott,

it,

■within the

o

;

;

;

a

^

It has been held in Illinois that the corporate authorities of towns, when
empowered by their charters to suppress the sale of intoxicating liquors, might
declare the unlicensed selling
nuisance.
Goddard -o. Jacksonville, 15 111.,
588 Byers v. Olney, 16 id., 35
Jacksonville v. Holland, 19 id., 275 Pekin

id., 4C4; Block v. Jacksonville, 36 id., 301. In Texas
fee of $250
retailers of liquors has been sustained as only
of
required
regulation of police, and not tax. Baker ». Panola County, 30 Texas, 86.
a

21

a

a

Smelzil,

'Cincinnati

«.

Bryson,

15

Ohio,

625;

Nightingale's

Case,

11

Pick.,

168;
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a

a

keeping stores

persons

it,

in the town imposing
has been
sustained as
tax in the legispolice regulation, though called
lation which permitted it* The license of street railway cars has
sient

been supported under the police power;' and so has been the licens-

ing of insurance.^

Inspection fees are to be referred to the same

authority, and are not taxes.*

Issuing the license.

This

if

a

is

it

is

usually done by some administrative officer or board under general regulations. It has been
of
entitled to
held in Georgia that one applying for license
But this canhe complies with the statutory conditions.^
right
a

is

;

is

not be universally true.
In some cases the purpose of the legislation
discretion will be allowed
to limit the number and then
to grant or refuse, just as
done in England in the case of appli-

In others the regulations are ofexceedingly stringent. In addition to the payment of

cants for license to sell liquors.
ten made

is

id., 400

Ohio, N.
Buffalo

;

Crawford,

11

S., 550

Adams v. Somerville,

v. "Webster,

10 "W.eud.,

99

Head, 363

;

a

Kent,

3

V.

;

"White

bond for good behaviour
often required, and somesatisfactory showing of good moral character.^
;

times

a

the tax

Brooklyn

v.

State v.

Breslin,

57

K. Y., 591.

Clarkstou

8

R. R. Co.

etc.,

;

60 id., 445

Departments.
v.

Rogers,

State

Philadelphia, 58 Penn.
i>. Herod, 29 Iowa, 123.

i).

Helfenstein,
2

3

Fire

*

=

Frankford,
Philadelphia,

;

6

a

8

Ired., 250. See "Wilmington v. Patterson,
Jones,
■"Wilmington v. Eoby,
Law, 183. A statute forbidding sales by sample in the city of Louisville
without license, was sustained against an objection on constitutional grounds
in Commonwealth v. Smith, Bush, 303 Mork v, Commonwealth, id., 397.

McCord,

St.,

119;

Johnson

b.

16 "Wis., 136.

495.

It

was decided in East St. Louis v.

a

a

license fee required of merchants could not be distender of evidences of indebtedness of the police commissioners,
charged by
though that indebtedness was made receivable for taxes.
"Wider, 46 111., 351, that

«

§

On the general
Corp.,

State

subject of licenses as police regulations see Dillon, Mun.
Cooloy, Const. Lim., 695 to 697.

313 to 318, and cases cited;
D.

Justices,

15 Geo.,

408;

Hill

In

v.

Decatur, 22 id., 203.
a

a

;

a

«

"Whitten v. Milledgeville, 43 Geo., 431, requirement that the applicant
license to sell liquor should produce the recommendation of four of his
requirement not always possible to be comnearest neighbors was sustained

for

a

plied with.
The order of county court to its clerk to issue license to retail spirituous
liquors to an applicant, does not, of itself, authorize the applicant to retail, but
only authorizes the issuance of the license to do so after the applicant has
complied with all the prerequisites of the law. Brown v. State, 27 Texas, 333.
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Recalling licenses.

Under some statutes licenses are permitted to be recalled or revoked for the misbehavior of those who
They
hold them.
This in some cases is a very salutary power.
are subject also,

like all other statutory privileges, to be termina-

ted by changes in the laws

is terminated by

a

;

as

a retailer's license,

law totally prohibiting

Collection of license fees.

for instance,

sales.^

What has already been said re-

garding the collection of taxes, will preclude the necessity for
As
any extended remarks regarding the collection of these fees.
has been remarked, the payment is usually required in advance.

If they

are not paid, and the privilege is nevertheless

exercised, the

or ordinance imposing the fee will determine what the
It
consequence shall be, and what proceedings shall be taken.
statute

has

been

that

decided

a municipal corporation

empowered

to

grant licenses and to impose a fee therefor, may lawfully make the
failure to take out a license and pay the fee subject the offender to
the penalty of fine and imprisonment*

Federal licenses.

The licenses issued by the federal govern-

ment for revenue purposes do not supersede state regulations, and

consequently must be received subject to all
of license fees as the state may have seen fit to
' Oa this subject, see Calder

v.

Kirby,

5

such,

requirements

impose.^

The fed-

Gray, 597; Brimmer v. Boston,

Baker

103

Pick.,
183,194; Brick Presb. Cliurcb v. New York, 5 Cow., 538; Vanderbilt j).
Adams, 7 id., 585 ; People v. Morris, 13 "Wend., 325 ; Board of Excise v. Barrie,
34 N. Y., 657; State t). Holmes, 38 N". H., 235; Hirns. State, 1 Ohio, N. S., 15;
Freleigh v. State, 8 Mo., 606; State v. Sterling, 8 id., 697; Gatzweller v. People,
14111., 142; Phalen c. Virginia, 8 How., 163; Baxter v. Pennsylvania,
10 id.,
416.
Some courts have been inclined to hold that a license, unless for misconduct, carmol be revoked except on a return of the fee. See Adams «. Hackett, 7 Post., 289, 294; State v. Phalen, 8 Harr., 441; Boyd v. State, 46 Ala., 329:
and certainly repayment would generally be equitable.
Mass.,

19 ;

Commonwealth

v. Brennan,

103 id., 70 ;

v. Boston, 13

^See

Cincinnati®. Buckingham, 10 Ohio, 257 ; White v. Kent, 11 Ohio, N. S.,
Vandine, Petitioner, 6 Pick., 187; Nightingale, Petitioner, 11 id., 167;
Slielton c. Mobile, 3 Ala., 540; Chilvers «. People, 11 Mich., 43; Brooklyn s.
Cloves, Lalor, 231 ; Buffalo v. Webster, 10 Wend., 99. Contra, Butler's Appeal,
73 Penn. St., 448.
550;

s

ilcGruire

». Commonwealth,

72; Commonwealth
10

id., 300;

36 111., 301;

-v.

Wall., 387 ; Purvear v. Commonwealth, 5 id.,
6 Allen, 445; Common wealth . i). Holbrook,
Keenan, 11 id., 263; Black ti. Jeffersonville,
Iowa, 83; State v. Stutz, 30 id., 488.
3

Thornily,

Commonwealth

v.

State v. Carney, 30
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eral government does not issue licenses under the police power, but
may do so in some cases under the power to regulate commerce,
and in the exercise of other federal powers
to call for no special remark.

;

but such cases seem

[CH. XX.
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CHAPTER

XX.

TAXATION BY SPECIAL ASSESSMENT.
One very important species of taxation is that which is exerThe system under
cised in the form of special assessments.
which they are levied has been adopted in this country with the
general features of that which has prevailed for a long period in
England.

The subject of special assessments may be considered
the following heads
1.

2.
3.
4.

under

:

The principles which underlie them.
The cases in which it is customary to levy them.
The objections which are made to them in point of policy.
The objections which constitutional principles or provisions

are sometimes thought to oppose.
5.
6.

The principles of apportionment.
The proceedings in levying and collecting them.

1. The principles undei'lying tliem. Special assessments are
a peculiar species of taxation, standing apart from the general
burdens imposed for state and municipal purposes, and governed

by principles that do not apply generally.
taxes is understood to exact contributions

The general levy of
in return for the gen-

eral benefits of government, and it promises nothing to the persons taxed, beyond what may be anticipated from an administration of the laws for individual protection and the general public
Special assessments, on the other hand, are made
assumption that a portion of the community is to be
and peculiarly benefited, in the enhancement of the
property peculiarly situated as regards a contemplated

good.

upon the
specially
value of
expendi-

ture of public funds ; and, in addition to the general levy, they
demand that special contributions, in consideration of the special
benefit, shall be made by the persons receiving it.

The justice of
in

the fact that the persons who are to make

it,

demanding the special contribution is supposed to be evident

while they are made
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to bear the cost of a public work, are at the same time to suffer
no pecuniary loss thereby ; their property being increased in
value by the expenditure to an amount at least equal to the sum

This is the idea that underlies all these
they are required to pay.
levies.
As in the case of all other taxation, it may sometimes
that
the expenditure will fail to realize the expectation
happen
on which the levy is made ; and it may thus appear that a special
laid when justice would have required the
general tax ; but the liability of a principle to errone-

assessment has been

levy of

a

ous or defective application cannot demonstrate the unsoundness
of the principle itself; and that which supports special assessments is believed to be firmly based

in reason and justice.

"^

" The principle upon which rests that
numerous class of statutes which charge lots of ground with the expense of
grading and jjaving the streets in front of them is, that the value of the lots
is enhanced by the public expenditure."
Strong, J., in Schenley v. Commonwealth, 36 Penn. St., 29, 57. The principle, is that, " when certain persons are
so placed as to have a common interest amongst themselves, but in common
with the rest of the community, laws may be justly made providing that, under suitable and equitable regulations, those common interests shall be so
managed that those who enjoy the benefits shall equally bear the burden."
Shaw, Ch. J., in Wright i). Boston, 9 Cush., 233, 241 — a drain ease. " All these
municipal taxes for improvement of streets rest for their final reason upon the
enhancement of private properties."
Woodward, J., in McGonigle v. Alleghany City, 44 Penn. St., 118, 121. And see, per Coulter, J., in Pray v. Northern
Liberties, 31 Penn. St., 69. The principle is " that the territory subjected
thereto would be benefited by the work and charge in question."
Grover, J.,
in Litchfield v. Vernon, 41 N. T., 123, 183. " That principle of local taxation
which is undisputed, which assesses on the property benefited, or its owner, a
tax in proportion to the superadded value of the property caused by the local
improvement, of which this property has a peculiar advantage beyond that of
Ac/new, J., in the case of Washington
others not in like circumstances."
Avenue, 69 Penn. St., 360. See also Lockwood v. St. Louis, 24 Mo., 20 ; Matter
of Opening of Streets, 20 La. An., 497; Allen v. Drew, 44 Vt., 174, 187. " To
pay for the opening of a street in the ratio to the benefit or advantage derived
from it is no burthen." Green, Ch. J., in Patterson v. Society, etc., 24 N. J.,
It is said
400, quoting with approval, Matter of Mayor, etc., 11 Johns., 80.
by SecJc, J., in Morrison v. Hershire, 32 Iowa, 271, 276, that " the power of
the city to perform the work does not depend upon the benefits to be derived
[Citing Warren v. Henley, 31 Iowa, 31.] The work is
by property owners.
of
the public ; the assessment for its payment is levied
benefit
done for the
not because of any special benefit their owners derive
lots,
upon the abutting
from the improvement, but because the public good demands it, and the law
In contrast with this, may be
authorizes special taxation for such objects."
'

Kirby

v.

Shaw,

27

19

Penn. St., 258.
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peculiar species of taxation, there must
The ordinarybe special authority of law for imposing them.
grant to a municipal corporation of power to levy taxes for
municipal purposes, will not justify any other than the ordinary
Assessments

being

a

This would follow from the general rule which requires
a strict construction of all such grants ; but the principle has

taxes.

peculiar force when applied to powers in themselves exceptional'
And it is always held, that such a power, when plainly granted,
is to be construed with strictness,^ and as strictly pursued by the
authorities who are to levy the tax.*
2. Cases

for assessments.

No decision has ever undertaken

in which special assessments are admissible.
The reserve in this regard is wise, as it is obviously
impossible to anticipate all the cases in which it might be
equitable and proper to levy them ; and it is consequently better
to enumerate

the cases

cited Lodi Water Co. v. Costav, 18

N.

J.

Eq., 519, cited with approval iu Matin wliicli it was decided tliat wliere
upon lauds without reference to tlie fact
wlicther they are benefited to tliat extent or not, tliis constitutes an appropria*
tion of private property to public uses. The same principle underlies the decisions in Matter of Albany Street, 11 Wend., 149, and Louisville v. Rolling
Mill Co., 3 Bush, 416. And see Van Tassel v. Jersey City, Sup. Ct. N. J., 14
Am. Law Keg., N. S., 358. In Illinois, to assess without reference to actual
St. John ». East St. Louis, 50 111., 92.
benefits, is held to be unconstitutional.
427;
id.,
63
111.
Cent. R. R. Co. ti. Bloomington, 7
Lee
v.
And see
Ruggles,
Palmer
v.
Sturaph, 39 Ind., 339, an assessment
Chicago Legal News, 379. In
is spoken of as being the adjustment of the shares of a contribution to be
ter of Drainage of Lands, 35 N.
tlie cost of drainage is assessed

J.,

497,

made by several towards a common object, according to the benefit received.
Taxes, it is said, are impositions for purposes of general revenue ; assessments
are special and local impositions upon property in the immediate vicinity of
an improvement, laid with reference to the special benefit which such propIn Hale v. Kenosha, 39 Wis., 599, an aserty derives from the expenditure.
sessment, as distinguished from other kinds of taxation, is defined in similar

And see Bridgeport v.N.Y. & N. H. R. R. Co., 36 Conn.,
language.
5 Gill, 383.
Baltimore,
exander 1).

355 ;

Al-

4 Hill, 76; Fii-st Presbyterian Church v. Fort
Wayne,
of
Ind.,
Appeal
338;
Powers, 29 Mich., 504; Hitchcock?). Galveston, U. S.
36
Circuit, Eastern Dist. of Texas, 3 Central Law Journal, 331.

'See Sharps. Spier,

-

Reed i\ Toledo,

18

Ohio,

161 ;

Allentown

v.

Henry,

73

Peuu. St., 404.

If

Cal., 536; Taylor v. Downer, 31 id., 480.
the statute
shall be given, city authorities cannot substitute one of
notice
how
prescribes
Chambers v, Satterloe, 40 Cal., 497.
another character.
2

Smith

V.

Davis,

30

CH.

XX.]

TAXATION BY SPECIAL ASSESSMENT.

419

and safer that special cases, as they present themselves, be judged
The following public purposes
upon their special circumstances.
have been held to justify special burdens in return for special
benefits

:

Court House and other Public Buildings.

The general rule would

require, that these be constructed by the political community
that is to own and make use of them.
It has, nevertheless, been
held in several

that

municipality may be permitted to
contribute specially, in addition to its share in the general burden,
in consideration of the benefits it may I'eceive from having a state
cases,

a

And while, in the adjudigenerally, if not always, been divided

or county building located within
cated cases, the expense has

it.^

between the state or county and municipality

principle

would

seem

to

admit of

specially taxed, the
the whole burden being

peculiarly benefited if the advantages
to be reasonably anticipated were sufficient to warrant it.
It is proper to remark of these cases, that they are referred

assumed

by the locality

to here only because of the principle that supports them, and not
because,

in other respects, they differ from the customary taxa-

Such an exceptional burden is not laid in the form of a
special assessment, but, on the contrary, the municipality which
contributes specially to the erection of a public building for the

*tion.

will do so by voting and raising for the purpose
the general taxes for the year.
of
In principle it
a sum as part
seems to be special, but in the method of levy and collection it
state or county,

takes its place with the ordinary taxes, and is mingled with
them on the same roll.
The custom of the country, adopted
and Highways.
from England, is to have the ordinary highways, though made
for and belonging to the state at large, made, improved and kept
Streets

in repair by the districts in or through which they are made,
except where, for special reasons, the legislature shall otherwise
But as these districts are usually the towns — or, where
direct.
there are no towns, the counties — the expense of the public highways is usually provided for by the general town or county levy,
except in the case of important thoroughfares, which are sometimes constructed by the state at large, and except also where
' See cases

cited ante, pp. 114-117.
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As tbese
in Jabor are demanded for the purpose.
contributions are usually based on a valuation of propert}', and
if not made, an equivalent in money is collected, the general
result, when they are called for, is the same as it would have
contributions

been had the expense been estimated

it been made

and an assessment

to meet

part of the general town or county charges.
As to village or city streets, a different practice has prevailed.
No doubt, it is entirely competent to put them upon the footing
as a

of common

highways, and require them to be constructed and
'
in
kept
repair by a general levy on the city or village ; and such
must be the course in the absence of any legislation permitting
the municipal corporation to levy street taxes on some different

But the opening or improvement of

city or village street
almost invariablj'' brings to the property in its immediate vicinity
an enhancement of value, in which the people of the municipality

basis.^

at large

can participate but slightly.

It

a

is not surprising that

the parties who are to receive the benefit of this enhanced
are usually the ones who are active

value,

in pressing upon the public

authorities the importance of these improvements ; and while in
this there is nothing that is censurable, or that could justify
their being singled out for invidious discrimination, yet their
relation to the improvement, which induces this action, may very
justly be considered when the burden comes to be imposed.

That they should pay the cost, or at least some exceptional portion of the cost, in return for special benefits secured, is a belief
that has found very general expression in the legislation on this
subject.

Special assessments are therefore made for the cost of land required to be taken in opening streets ; ' and when this is done, it
>See

bury,

People

41

'Sharp

v.

Wliyler,

-11

Cal., 351, 354, per EJwads, Cli.

J. ;

Sinton

v.

Ash-

Cal., 525.
t).

Spier, 4

Hill,

76.

Matter of 36th Street, 12 Wend., 303; Matter of DeGraw Street, 18 id., 568.
In these cases, a basis for an assessment under peculiar circumstances was
laid down. Dorgan ii. Boston, 13 Allen, 233 ; Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23 Conn.,
189, and many others are cases of this description.
In Sutton's Heirs v. Lous

5 Dana, 28, it was held not competent to open a street through
the
grounds of nonassenting parties, offset benefits against the value of land, and
render judgment against the owners for the iireponderance of benefits. The
case, it will be seen, did not take the form of taxation, but of a judicial in-

isville,
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is not uncommon to provide that one commission or jury shall
estimate the value of the lands taken, and the incidental damages,

if any, and

with the costs of the proceeding,
upon the lands peculiarly benefited.'- They are also made for the
cost of grading streets,^ for paving, planking, or otherwise improvassess these, together

quisition. For the general principle, see Matter of Pittsburgh District, 3 W.
& S., 320; McMasters «. Commonwealth, 3 Watts, 293; Pittsburgh «. Scott, 1
Penu. St., 309; Alexander v. Baltimore, 5 Gill, 383; Powers' Appeal, 29
Mich., 504. In the case last named the whole subject is fully and carefully
considered by Campbell, J., who points out that, in such cases, where in the
same proceeding land is taken for the public use and the cost of the improvement assessed upon adjacent land, the principles which underlie the law of
eminent domain must be carefully observed, as well as those which apply to
taxation.
"Where the benetits to the land remaining are equal to the value of
the land takfen, the owner has no ground for claiming damages. Trinity College B. Hartford, 32 Conn., 452 ; and where they exceed the damages, he may
Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23 Conn., 189 ; Holton ■».Milbe taxed for the excess.
waukee, 31 Wis., 27. As to the effect of a constitutional provision in Ohio
which entitles the owners of land taken to full compensation without deduction of benefits, see Cleveland v. Wick, 18 Ohio, N. S., 303. "It was decided
in McMasters v. Commonwealth, 3 Watts, 292, that in the opening of streets
in a town or city, the damage occasioned to some of the lots might be apportioned and assessed upon others in the neighborhood improved in value thereby. It is there assumed as a well settled principle, employing the words of
Chancellor Walworth, in Livingston «. New York, 8 Wend., 85, that wlaeu any
particular county, district or neighborliood is exclusively benefited by a public improvement, the inhabitants of that district may be taxed for the whole
expense of the improvement, and in proportion to the benefit received by
each. The conclusion seemed logically to follov/; for if a county, district or
town can be assessed for a public improvement, on the ground that they are
particularly benefited, there can be no constitutional reason to exempt an individual from assessment on the same principle. It becomes a mere question
of expediency, of which the legislature are the competent and exclusive
judges, and not of right." Sharswood, J., Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Penu.
St., 150.

for the general principle the important case of Litchfield v. Vernon, 41
Also Goodrich v. Turnpike Co., 26 lud., 119; Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Penn. St.. 146, and Livingston i: New York, 8 Wend., 85, there
It has been held competent, where land owners dedicate a street
quoted.
graded and made fit for travel at their exthrough their property, to order
23
335
Holmes v. Jersey City,
J.,
Beasl., 399.
N.
Dean,
V.
State
pense.
1 See

123.

Wray

v.

Pittsburgh,

46 Penn. St., 365.

It

is

5

;

1

il.

N. Y.,

competent to change the grade

and assess the expense against adjoining owners.

Ind.,

140.

La

Fayette

«.

Fowler,

34
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ing streets/ as well as for altering, widening and extending
The power to assess the expense of repaying or replanking

them.^
a street

on the adjacent proprietors, who were subjected to the expense of
the first construction, has been denied by the supreme court of

Pennsylvania ; ' but the authorities in general sustain the right,''
" if the first
and it has been well remarked in Louisiana that :
paving of a street is a special benefit to the front proprietor, justifying the imposition upon him of a portion of the expense, while
the city pays for the residue as having been incurred for a matter
so the removal of a dilapidated or insufficient

of general utility,
'

People

V.

Brooklyu,

annpolis v. Mansur,

15

4

N. Y.,

Ind.,

113;

Williams v. Detroit, 3 Mich., 560; IncliLa Fayette «. Fowler, .34 id., 140; Cleveland

419;

Wick, 18 Ohio, IST. S., 303; Chambers b. Satlerlee, 40 Cal., 497; People v.
Austin, 47 id., 358 ; State v. Christopher, 13 Wis., 637 ; In re Dugro, 50 N. Y.,
513; Morrison 0. Hershire, 33 Iowa, 371; Gozzler v. Georgetown, 9 Wheat.,
593; Willard v. Presbury, 14 Wall., 076. The authority to assess the expense
of paving includes all that is necessary, 'usual or fit in paving, including
curbing. Schenlcy v. Commonwealth, 36 Penn. St., 39.
«.

°

Jones

V.

Boston, 104 Mass., 461

;

Hancock Street E.xtension,

18

Penn. St,,

26.

' Hammett

In this case, Sharswood, J. (p.
v. Philadelphia, C5 Penn. St., 146.
says: "The original paving of a street brings the property bounding
upon it into the market as building lots. Before that, it is a road, not a street.
It is therefore a local improvement, with benefits almost exclusively peculiar
15.5),

Such a case is clearly within the principle of asthe
cost
on
the
lots
lying upon it. Perhaps no fairer rule can be
sessing
proportion
than
the
of feet front, although there must be some ineadopted
qualities if the lots differ in situation and depth. Appraising their market
to the

adjoining properties.

values, and fixing the proportion according

to these, is a plan open to favorit-

ism or coiTuption, and other objections.
No system of taxation which the wit
of man ever devised has been found perfectly equal. But when a street is

a

is

it,

once opened and paved, thus assimulated with the rest of the city and made a
all the particular benefits to the locality, derived from the improvepart of
ments, have been received and enjoyed.
as much
Kepairing streets
part

of the ordinary duties of the municipality, for the general good, as cleaning,
watching and lighting. It would lead to monstrous injustice and inequality
should such general expenses be provided for by local assessments." The
able dissenting opinion of Read, J., contains an interesting review of Pennsylvania legislation on the subject of special assessments, as well as of the adjudications in that and other states.
v. Presbury,

14

3

111., 165;

7

Guraee v. Chicago, 40

8

*

Wall., 676; McCormack «. Patchin, 53 Mo., 33;
Williams v. Detroit,
Mich., 560; Municipality «. Dunn, 10 La. An., 57; Bradley v. McAtee,
Bush, 667; Broadway Baptist Church V. McAtee, id., 508.
Willard
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pavement, and the making of a new and sufficient one io its stead,
is a matter of special benefit to the front proprietor, as well as of

The equity is the same in both

general utility.

*

cases.

*

It

seems to me that the power to pave the streets is a permanent

when the public good may
and that the power to levy
contribution on the
require
property benefited by the paving in front of
equally durable and continuing."*
The cost of curb stones
usually provided for in the same method, and often of sidewalks, though as
continuing

is

shown in

is is

it,

a

it,

power, to be exercised

it

a

preceding chapter, those conveniences are usually
ordered under the police power.^
And
may be said that,
in general, for any improvement whatsoever that tends to make
the street more suitable and convenient for the use of the general

public,^ an assessment may be laid.

The expense of constructing drains in order
to relieve swamps, marshes and other low lands of their stagnant
The
"water,
usually provided for by special assessments.
Sewers,

etc.

is

Drains,

is

is

done are not alwaj's very clearly indicagrounds on which this
ted in the statutes.
Sometimes the ground indicated
that the
;

XIX.

N. J.,

And

Dunn,

10

La. An., 57.

as to special assessments

for sidewalks,

see State

227.

held in Dean

».

Carron,

an assessment for improving

26

N. J.,

street

228, that

not competent to defeat

by showing irregularities in laying

it

is

2

It

34

v.

it

See Cliapter

Fuller,

!).

J., in Municipality

is

^

S

Udell, Ch.

a

^

is

important to the public health and in such cases the
right to levy assessments for the purpose cannot plausibly be disThe special benefits from the enhancement of values
puted.*
drainage

out.
8

v. Treasurer

is

of Wood Co., Ohio, IST. S., 333, the subject
conand the right to levy an assessment affirmed, though
does not distinctly appear that sanitary objects were had in view.
In
WoodrufF «. Fisher, 17 Barb., 22i, an assessment made ostensibly for the pub<In Reeves

J.,

it

sidered by Brinkerhoof,

with some hesitation.
Other cases are Anderson
Ind.,
199
Sessions
«.
Crunklinton,
14
Co.,
30 Ohio, N.
Draining
V. Kerns
An.,
11
La.
338;
Hagar
».
Case,
Supervisors of Yolo, 47
349; Draining Co.
Cal., 323; O'Reiley !). Kankakee Valley Draining Co., 33 Ind., 169. The following were draining cases, in which for the most part only questions of the
Jordan Association v. Wagoner, 33
regularity of assessments were involved
Ind., 50; Thompson u. Draining Co., id., 268; Kinyon «. Duchene, 21 Mich.,
498; Bench u. Otis, 25 id., 29; Atwood v. Zeluff, 36 id., 118; Etchinson Association V. Bresenback, 39 Ind., 363; Slusser v. Ilawson, id., 506; Kevins, etc.,
S

health was maintained

:

,

;

lic
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mast accrue raaial v to the owners of the lands drained, who onght,
therefore, to bear the expense.
But the anthoritv to levy ass^sments for draining lands, upon no other consideration than such
pertain to the improvement of the land as property, mast, it
"would seem, be confined within limited bounds.
It has been said
'■
that a tax cannot be levied tipon any portion of the public for
as

the construction of a drain in which the public are not concernedEven the owner of the land benefited cannot be taxed to improve
it, unless public considerations are involved ; but he must be
left to improve it or not as he may choose." * But whore any
considerable tract of land, owned by different persons, is in a condition precluding cultivation, by reason of excessive moisture
which drains would relieve, it may well be said that the public
have such an ir.terest in the improvement, and the consequent advancement of the genexal interest of the locality, as will justify
the levy of assessments upon the owners for drainage purposes.
Such a case would seem to stand upon the same solid ground
with assessments for levee purposes, which have for their object
to protect lands from falling into a like condition of uselessn^s.Draining Co. t. Alkire,
136; People c. H.^ines,

36 id., ISO : People r.
49

X. T..

Jefferson County Court,

56 Barl).,

oST.

Supervisors of S:igin:\w. 26 ilicli., ilO. 29. That the taking; of
l:inds for drains is a taking under the eminent domain, see this case ■ also
People r. Xearing, 27 X. T^ 306.
' The power to le\^" assessments for the mere purpose of improving large
bodies of lands, is assumed by Chancellor TT.i.'u-.'rfA, in French r. Kirkland. 1
Paige, 117. and in Philips r. '^ickUam. id., 560. The statutes in question seem
to have conferral upon the proprii-tors of huids quasi corporate powers for
the purpose. And see Draining Co. Case, 11 La. An,, 33S. The statute which
came under consideration in People r. bearing, 27 X. T , 306, appears to hare
The Massachusetts statute of 1$47, for
had no reference to the public hejilth.
the construction of drains in towns, is considered in Wright r. Boston, 9 Cusb..
233, It is s;udby .S.^air, Ch. J., that while the public have some interest in the
draining, on the grounds of health and general convenience, it is not mainly
with these views that the statutes are framed, but with reference to the beneAnd see Springfield r. Gay, 12 Allen, 612 ; Brewer r.
fits to estates tsised.
Mass.,
152.
97
Springfield,
In Hager e. Sujiervisors of Tolo, i~ Cal., 222, 2S3, Crf>ci:ett, J., answers the objections to such assessments as follews: "It is said, however, thai it is not
within the constitutional power of the legislature to compel the petitioner to
recltiini his lands at his own expense and against his consent. But we think
the power of the legislature to compel local improvements, which, in its judg» People r.
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ia cities and villages, it is to

they are often provided for by special
assessments, there is no uniformity of practice in this regard, and
be remarked that while
perhaps,

considering the different offices which sewers perform,

being sometimes
others

matters of imperative

conveniences

for

a

few tenements

public

necessity, and at

only, there ought to be

will promote the healtli of the people, and advance the public good, is
In the exercise of this power it may abate nuisances, conunquestionable.
struct and repair highways, open canals for irrigating arid districts, and perform many other similar acts for the public good, and all at the expense of
ment,

those who are to be chiefly and more immediately benefited by the improve,
ment. The constitution of the state is not a grant, but a limitation of power;
and when
stitution,

an act of legislation is called in question as repugnant to the conthose who assail it on this ground must specify the particular pro-

vision of that instrument which is violated. The clauses of the constitution
which, or some of which, are alleged to have been violated by the act under
'
consideration are : 1st. That which secures to the citizen the right to acquire,
2d. That whiih secures to him the right of
possess and protect property.'
trial by jury. 3d. That which provides that 'no person shall be deprived of
4th. That which prolife, liberty or propei'ty, without due process of law.'
hibits 'the taking of private property for public use without just compensa5th. The provision that taxation .shall bo equal and uniform, and that
tion.'
property shall be taxed on the ad valorem principle. In my opinion the act
in question violates none of the.se provisions, and the authority to compel local
improvements at the expense of those to be immediately benefited, is not taxIt has never been held that taxation, though referable to the taxing power.
ation for general purposes, or for local improvements, is an infringement nf
that clause of the constitution relating to the acquisition and enjoyment of
property; and the right of trial by jury, has no application to proceedings for
Nor does the enforcement of a valid tax, by whatever
the collection of taxes.
of jiroperty without due process of law, in the
a
taking
constitute
method,
sense of the constitution ; nor is it a taking of private property for public use,
People v. Mayor, etc., of Brooklyn,
within the perview of that instrument.
4 Comst., 419; Emery v. S. F. Gas Co., 38 Cal., 345; Soars ■».Cottrell, 5 Mich.,
251; Murray's Lessee c. Hoboken Land Imp. Co., 18 How. (U. S.), 272. It is
equally clear that those clauses which provide that taxation shall be equal
and uniform throughout the state, and which prescribe the mode of assessment and the persons by whom it shall be made, and that all property shall be
levied for local improvements. Burtaxed, have no application to assessments
nett V. Sacramentfl, 12 Cal., 76 ; Emery v. S. F. Gas Co., supra, and cases there
cited ; Egyptian Levee Co. v. Hardin, 27 Mo., 495 ; Yeatman v. Crandall, 11 La.
An., 220; Wallace v. Shelton, 14 id., 498. ' But we need not rest our decision
On the conon the narrow ground that this is strictly a local improvement.
trary, the reclamation of the vast bodies of swamp and overflowed land in this
state may justly be regarded as a public improvement of great magnitude, and
of the utmost importance to the community.
If left wholly to individual en-
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the diversity that now prevails.

That the cost may be assessed

under proper legislation, has been
often held.^
And in Connecticut it has been decided that this
may be done under a general power to make and maintain highways and streets by special assessments ; the sewers which carry
upon the adjacent

ofE the surface

premises

water from the streets, and

the

filth that would

terprise, it would iDrobably never bo accomplished ; and in inaugurating so great
a work the legislature has pursued, substantially, the same system adopted in
other states for the reclamation of similar lands, to wit : by dividing the ter-

reclsimed into districts, and assessing the cost of the improvement
on the lands t(i be benefited. This plan has been adopted in the states o£
Louisiana, Mississippi and Arkansas, to prevent the annual overflow of the
Mississippi by means of levees or embankments, constructed at the expense
of the adjacent property. The 'Black Swamp,' in Ohio, has been wholly or
partiallj' reclaimed by the same method. A large body of land in Missouri is
protected from inundation by similar means. In Massachusetts and Connecticut, swamps and low lands are drained by means of assessments on the property benefited; and in New Jersey the salt marshes have been reclaimed in
the same way.
In this state, the city of Sacramento, including the ground on
which the capitol stands, has been i^rotected from inundation by means of
levees, erected at the expense of the inhabitants, in the shape of a tax on the
property within the district benefited. In none of these states, so far as we
are aware, has the power of the legislature to cause such improvements to be
made in this method ever been denied ; nor do we see any tenable ground on
which it can be questioned."
In England, the sower assessments are laid with reference to benefits, but they
are not necessarily based on sanitary considerations.
See Eooke's Case, 5
id.,
Eep., 99,b; Keighley's Case, 10
139, a; Case of Isle of Ely, 10 id., 142,b;
Dore V. Gray, 2 T. R., 358 ; Masters v. Scroggs, 3 M. & S., 447 ; Netherton v.
"Ward, 3 B. & Aid., 21 ; Stafford v. Hamston, 2 B. & B., 691 ; Rex v. Tower
Hamlets, 9 E. «& C, 517; Soady v. Wilson, 3 Ad. & E., 247; St. Catharine
Dock Co. u. Higgs, 10 Q. B., 641; Metropolitan Board of Works s. Vauxhall
Bridge Co., 7 El. & Bl., 964; Hammersmith Bridge Co. ». Overseers of Hammersmith, L. R., 6 Q. B., 230. A sewer rate cannot there be laid upon a whole
Emmerson v. Saltmarshe, 7 Ad.
town, but must be against particular estates.
156.
& El.,
ritory

to be

Boston, 9 Gush., 233 ; Philadelphia v. Tryon, 35 Penn. St., 401 ; Lipps
S.Philadelphia, 38 id., 503; Commonwealth i;. Woods, 44 id., 113; Stroud «.
Philadelphia, 61 id., 255 ; Mauch Chunk b. Sliortz, 01 id., 397 ; People v. Brooklyn, 23 Barb., 166 ; Cone v. Hartford, 28 Conn., 363 ; St. Louis v. Oeters, 36 Mo.,
For rules for making the assessment, see Clapp v. Hartford, 35 Conn.,
456.
66. That notwithstanding the whole cost is assessed on adjoining propertj',
1 Wright ».

the sewer may bo made more capacious

provision for future extensions,
285.

see

than present needs require, as a

Hungerford

v.

Hartford,

39 Conn., 379,
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otherwise accumulate, being regarded rather as improvements of
the public highway than as independent works.'
The construction of embankments to protect low lands,
bordering upon rivers, from overflow, is a public object of the
highest importance to the communities immediately concerned.
Levees.

No doubt

taxation is admissible for this purpose, but the
legislation which authorizes special assessments for the construction of embankments, and imposes the cost upon those who, withgeneral

out them, would be the principal sxifferers, is probably in most
cases wiser and better than would be any provision for general
levies. The practice of making local assessments for this purpose
has prevailed for many years in the states bordering on the lower
Mississippi, and has been sustained against all the objections
which have been made to such assessments for other purposes.^
Of these it has been said that " the
Water Pipes in Streets.
benefits are local, as the use of the water must necessarily be
mostly restricted to the benefit of the property on [the] lines, both
The effect
for domestic purposes and the extinguishment of fires.
of supplying [the] streets with water is to enhance the value of
The maintenance of the pipes, and
the dwelling houses thereon.
the supplying of water are necessarily a continuing expense," and
for these reasons the assessment of the cost upon adjacent property is within the general principle of local assessments.'
' Cone V.
ii

Williams

Swope,

V.

Hartford,

28 Conn., 363.

Alcorn v. Hamer, 38 id., 6f)2; Daily
Levee
Egyptian
Co. v. Hardin, 27 Mo., 495. In Peo-

v. Cammack,

47 id., 367;

27 Miss., 209;

V. Wliyler, 41 Cal., 351, a levy for snch a purpose made upon part of a
county on the same basis as the ordinary taxes, was held to be a tax, not an
assessment. But the basis of apportionment ought not to be very conclusive
It is one peculiarity of assessments, that the measure of supon this point.

ple

posed benefits may be whatever appears to the legislature most just under the
See Lockwood «. St. Louis, 24 Mo., 20, where a levy made in
circumstances.
the same way was sustained as being an assessment,
sense a tax.

and not in the ordinary

Henry, 73 Penn. St., 404, 400, per Mercur, J. And see Northern Liberties v. Swain, 13 id., 113; Northern Liberties ». St. John's Church,
id., 104. In Allen v. Drew, 44 Vt., 174, 187, Sedfleld, J., explains the principle of such assessments, and says: "It is not easy to see any distinction between an assessment for building a sewer or sidewalk and an aqueduct. They
are each in degree a general benefit to the public, and a special benefit to the
local property, both in the uses and in the enhanced value of the property.
2 Allcntown

c.
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Liglding Streets with Gas. "While lighting the streets is usually
provided for by general tax, no reason is perceived why it may not
be done by special assessments.
Legislation for special assessments exists in several of the states.''
Other Special

Cases.

No doubt the legislature has power to

provide for special assessments to meet the expenses of other improvements ; and this power is sometimes spoken of, as if it was

But other cases sanction
practically one that was unrestricted.^
no such broad doctrine, and justify us, as we think, in saying
that, to warrant the levy of local assessments, there must not only
exist in the case the ordinary elements of taxation, but the object
must also be one productive of special local benefits, so as to
make applicable the principles upon which special assessments
A clear case of abuse of legislative
have hitherto been upheld.
authority, in imposing the burden of a public improvement on
persons or property not specially benefited, would undoubtedly
be treated as an excess of power and void.'

3. Objections

If

in point of policy and justice.

the design

of the present work embraced the discussion of legislative policy,
it would be interesting to give, with some degree of fullness, the
views which various judges have expressed regarding the justice
of assessing the cost of public improvements upon property supposed to be specially benefited.
the.se assessments as

to have

regarded

Some

judges have spoken of

eminently equitable and proper

others seem

;

the power to lay them as an extreme

power,

The proprietor may, indeed, leave liis house fenantless, and his vacant lots
unvisited,
are
'

but the assessment is not for that reason void.

The subject was somewhat discussed in Jonas

and Creighton o. Scott, 14 Ohio,

'
Y.,

Such assessments

justified on the ground that the subject of the tax receives

See

N.

v.

an equivalent."

Cincinnati,

18

Ohio, 318,

S., 438.

particularly the remarks of Orover, J., in Litchfield

v. Vernon,

41

N.

133, 134.

'See Washington Avenue, 69 Penn. St., 352, approving Hammett v. Phila"
delphia, 65 id., 146. In Allen u. Drew, 44 Vt., 174, 188, Redfield, .J., says : We
have no doubt that a local assessment may so far transcend the limits of
equality and reason that its exaction would cease to be a tax, or contribution

and confiscation.
In that case it
court
to
protect the citizen from robbery under color
would be the duty of the
of a better name." Remarks equally decided are made in Louisville v. Rollto a common burden, and become extortion

ing

Mill

Co.,

3

Bush, 416, 423.
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generally operated oppressively, while still others have
undertaken to indicate some line of division of expense, which
should be drawn in such cases, between the public and the parties
■which

to be specially assessed

putting, for instance, one-half the exBut, in truth,
pense on the former and one-half upon the latter.
there is no universal rule of justice upon which such assessments
can be made.
few.

;

Sometimes

almost the whole benefit accrues to a

the benefit is distributed

Sometimes

with something like
apportionment of the

An
regularity through the community.
cost that would be just in one case would be unfair and opFor this very reason the power to determine
pressive in another.

special assessment should be made, and on what basis it
shall be apportioned, is wisely confided to the legislature, and
could not, without the introduction of some new principle in repwhen

a

resentative

government,

be placed elsewhere.

We dismiss this

question, therefore, with the single remark, that with the wisdom
or unwisdom of special assessments, when ordered in cases in
which they are admissible at all, the courts have no concern,
unless there is plainly and manifestly such an abuse of power as
takes the case beyond the just limits of legislative discretion.^

i.

principles and provis-

Objections under constitutional

ions.

These have been made to special

assessments on various

grounds.

Thai
'

they talce

properly luilhout

due

'process

of law.

If

these

Expressions on the subject by judges have been very numerous, but they

have been too often general remarks called out by special and somewhat exWe refrain from collecting them for the reason expressed in
ceptional cases.
the text ; if the matter is of legislative cognizance, the courts and the profession as such have no concern with it. We may, nevertheless, copy what has
been said in one case, because it probably expresses the general views which
have prevailed in legislation. "Their intrinsic justice strikes every one.
an improvement is to be made, the benefit of which is local, it is but just that
While the few ought not to
the property benefited should bear the burthen.
wholfj
the
the
whole,
of
ought
benefit
be taxed for the
[not] to be taxed for

If

A

in

a county ought not to bear the whole

county
a
benefit
of
single
expense ; neither ought the whole county to be taxed for the
township ; and the same principle requires that taxation for a local object,
beneficial only to a portion of a town or city, should be upon that part only.
General taxation for a mere local purpose is unjust; it burdens those who are
the few.

single

township

not benefited, and benefits those who are exempt from the burden."
J., in Lockwood v. St. Louis, 31 Mo., 30, 33.

Leonard,
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assessments are made in an exercise of the sovereign taxing power,

what has already been said on the subject is equally applicable
here.^
The taxing power proceeds on its own methods, and the

That these

rules of the common law bend and conform to them.

of the taxing power, has over and

assessments are an exercise

over again been affirmed, until the controversy must be regarded
as closed.^

That

i.

they take property,

and appropriate it to the
This objection would seem to

e., money,

public use icithout compensation.
fall with the last. If special assessments are taxes, the compensation is conclusively presumed to be received by those who pay
them.
It is only on the assumption that they are laid in the exercise of the power of eminent domain that the objection could

But the distinction between the two
have any force whatever.
"
cases is very clear.
Taxation exacts money or services from
individuals

for their respective shares of contribution to
any pubh"c burden. Private property taken for any public- use,
by right of eminent domain, is taken, not as the owner's share of
contribution to a public burden, but as so much beyond his share.
as and

Special compensation is therefore to be made in the latter case,
because the government is a debtor for the property so taken ; but
not in the former, because the payment of taxes is a duty, and
creates no obligation to repay otherwise than in the proper appli-

Taxation operates upon a community, or upon
a class of persons in a community, and by some rule of apportionThe exercise of the right of eminent domain operates upon
ment.
cation of the tax.

and without

an individual,

acted from any other
^Ante, Chapter

'

reference to the amount or value ex-

individual or class of individuals."

^

III.

Pennock v. Hoover,
Pray ®. Northera Liberties,
See

5
31

Rawle,

291 ;

id., G9;

Pennell'g Appeal,

2

Penn. St., 216

Ganlt's Appeal, 33 id., 94;

;

Common-

; People v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y., 419 ; N. Y. Protestid., 574; Howell ■«.Buffalo, 37 id., 267; Dorgan v.
Boston, 13 Allen, 223; Baltimore v. Hughes, 1 Gill & J., 480; Baltimore v.
Cemetery Co., 7 Md., 517 ; Howard v. Independent Church, 18 id., 451 ; Matter

wealth

V.

Woods, 44 id., 113

ant Episcopal

School,

31

230

;

People

v.

Brooklyn,

N. Y.,

419, 434.

And

see

Litchfield

o

2

;

J., in

4

^Buggies.

;

1

;

&

7

;

9

Miss., 209

;

R.

;

St., 4

I.,

Hoj't v. East Saginaw, 19 Mich., 39 Williams v.
v. McQuillan's Heirs,
Lexington
Dana, 518 Bradley
Cammack, 27
Scoville
v.
Bush, 667
Cleveland,
Ohio, N. S., 126 Bridgeport
1). McAtee,
N. H. R. R. Co., 36 Conn., 255 King «. Portland, Ore., 146.
«. N. Y.

of Dorrance
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Attention to the distinction here pointed out will make clear the

then received in every instance.

It

not,

it

compensation

is

full

is

is,

fact that special assessments are not an exercise of the eminent
domain. It is certain that when they are levied according to
that
The theory of the law
benefits received, they cannot be.

;

;

;

;

7

a

a

it

a

it

if

a

a

'

it

;

it

:

a

3

is

is

a

a

8

8

5

;

;

8

5

:

4

1

Vernon, 41 id., 123, 133, per Oro'oer,3.; People «. Lawrence, 41 id., 140, per
Ohio, N. S., 126, 135, per Ranney, J.; MatMason,}.; Scoville v. Cleveland,
ter of Dorrance St.,
E. I., 230, per Avies, Ch. J.; Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23
Conn., 189, 205, per Hinmaii, J.; Washington Avenue, 69 Peun. St., 355,361,
Allen v. Drew, 44 Vt.,
per Agnew, J. The foUovring cases are also in point
Ohio, N. S., 243; Reeves ». Treasurer of Wood Co.,
174, 187; Hill V. Higdon,
id., 333
Malloy v. Marietta, 11 id., 636 Peoria i). Kidder, 26 111., 351 Garrett d. St. Louis, 25 Mo., 505; Uhrig v. St. Louis, 44 id., 458; Jones v. Boston,
104 Mass., 461
State d. Puller, 34 N. J., 237 State v. Newark, 35 id., 168, 171
Sutton's Heirs «. Louisville,
Dana, 28; Lexington «. McQuillan's Heirs,
Dana, 513; Howell ». Bristol,
Bush, 493; Holton «. Milwaukee, 31 Wis., 27;
Mich., 278; Baltimore «. Cemetery Co., Md., 517;
Woodbridge ti. Detroit,
Griffin ». Dogan, 48 Miss., 11. That to tax one exempt from military service
in order to procure volunteers, and then exempt others who are liable, is not
taking of private property for public use, see State v. Demarest, 32
N. J., 538.
The following case, in which special assessment was held to be taking
believed to be of sufficient importof private property for the public use,
The case
ance to be quoted from at some length.
Louisville v. Kolling
the
defendants were assessed the expense
Mill Co., Bush, 416, 423, in which
of filling up the street in front of their property to an extent that greatly diminished its value, and required the erection of high wall to protect their
" Whether the
buildings. Williams, J., states the question to be
city has or
can have, under our constitutional form of government, the unlimited, absolute, uncontrollable right to order such improvements of the streets as
may
deem necessary or beneficial, at the expense of the property holders, and in
for
utter disregard of their interest, and without compensation
sometimes
not
only render the property owned
does happen that such improvements will
entirely valueless to the owner, but more — take from him to pay for its own
improvement, besides destroj-ing his business, and sometimes cause him to
If cities may exercise
contribute from his other means to its destruction.
then
the declaration in our
uncontrollable,
power,
omnipotent
unlimited,
this
over
the
absolute,
lives,
arbitrary
that
power
liberty and propbill of rights,
republic, not even in the largest majorerty of freemen exists nowhere in
If the filling up the plaintiffs' lot
ity,' becomes meaningless if not absurd.
of the street may have
sure base upon
be done so that the improvement
which to rest, their machinery and building must be removed at enormous
would not then have
removed,
costs, else buried under the filling; and
of such ponderfor
the
foundation
this
filled
area
newly
sure, sound basis in
erected
by which
If perpendicular wall be
ous erections and machinery.
to confine the filling of the street, then light and air are so essentially ex-
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is true, a compensation made in money, but as in every other
ease of taxation, tbe person taxed is to receive a benefit from the
expenditure of the moneys collected.
The benefit which one
receives in the enhanced

value of his propert}', from the public

eluded as to prevent its practical -n-orking for several of the warmest months
of the year; nor can this, by possibility, he remedied by culverts and apertures through the street, for the very potent reason that the lot on the opposite
side of the street is also required to he filled correspondingly; and oven if it
■were sure that the owner thereof would erect a perpendicular wall instead of
filling, yet he would be entitled to cover his lot with buildings, which would
as eflectually exclude both light aud air, and appellee's passway through
their gate would be destroyed. Besides, if all the surrounding streets were
so as to correspond
improved
with this contemplated improvement of
Brook, this lot a^d machinery would be so far below the lc\el of the streets
as to render it whollj' useless for its present purposes; and the same power
that authorizes Hiis improvement of Brook will authorize the improvement
of the other streets, and thus, without compensation, plaintifls' business, not
in itself a nuisance, would be broken up, be compelled to remove elsewhere,
at enormous expense, lose the profits of their business in the meantime, and
then be enormously taxed to paj- for the iraprovomeuts which would he so
disastrous to their business. Verily, if tliis cau be done without compensation, private property and private pursuits are held bj' the slender tenirre of
the will of others.
"The right of eminent domain — the right to take private property for the
public use — is a power almost without limit; hut this essential safeguard is
thrown around the owner, that the public who wants or needs his property
must compensate him for it. Nor does this in any wise impair or conflict
with the essential right and power of local government over communities,
such as towns and cities, iu ordinary cases, to have the streets improved at
the expense of the property holders thereon ; for, ordinarily, they are most
benefited, and it is only requiring them to keep their propertj' in such condition as not to obstruct or injuriously hinder the public; for, legally speaking,
each lot owner holds the legal title to one-half the street in his front, subject,
il is true, to the public easement; besides, it may ordinarily be, aud generally
is, only a fair portion of the tax which ma}- justly and legally be laid on him
to keep up the streets and public passways, which are so peculiarly beneficial
to the realt}- of all towns and cities; and, moreover, each proprietor may be
of the power iu the local aupresumed to have purchased in contemplation
thorities, to direct him to erect such improvements as are ordinary and usual.
But when, owing to extraordinary facts, none of these presumptions and principles apply, and when, to force the owner to make these improvements is
virtually to confiscate his property, or even to permit it to be done, without
it
is

is,

is to destroy his property, the question then
whether
of
exercise
or
legitimate
legislative
power
legislative spolithe constitutional
compensation,

" In Keasy

v.

Louisville,

4

ation.

Dana, 154, this court recognized

the

full exteat
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expenditure, is as real and as substantial as that which he receives in the protection afforded to his person and his estate.
The difficulty, if any, in the case, must lie back of the nature of
and must apply, rather, to the basis of assessment.
taxation were necessarily, under all circumstances, by values,

compensation,

If

and legal rights of city councils to grade and pave, or
regrade and repave streets ; but it is also guarded as to the abuses of which
such powers might be productive, or to which they might be perverted.

of the constitutional

In

that case the street had been graded under the old charter of 1828, a small
house had been erected on the lot according to this grade, when,
shortly before the suit was brought, the city authorities had caused the grade

wooden

*

is

injury afforded by law.
" In this case now under

*

is

it

a

it,

of the street to be raised about three feet, which necessitated a filling up of
Keasy's lot and the raising and reconstructing his house; and for these damThe court said: ' But the public right to regulate the
ages he sued the city.
common highways of the city, is of course not arbitrary and unlimited; far
from it. Private rights must he regarded. The public, like a common person,
It cannot take primust so use its own as not to injure another's property.
vate property for public use without paying a just equivalent, nor can it disturb any personal right of enjoyment. But, without touching the plaintiffs' lot,
or in any way encroaching upon
or interfering with any prescriptive right
to light, or to private way, the city had
clear and perfect authority to raise
its street higher or sink
lower than the level of his lot, as he would undoubtedly have had to elevate or sink his ground, without touching or otherwise injuring or interfering with the public street.'
"And we think this well expresses the true and furthest extent of constitutional and legal power. As the legal right to the public easement of the streets
was in the city council, to be made useful to the public, and held for the comno doubt but so long as they confined
mon use of all the citizens, there
to
the
of
the street, and interfered with no private
boundary
the improvement
right of light, air, or private passwaj-, the incidental injury to the lot owners
would be of that class of misfortune to them for which no remedy for Uie
advisement, so far from using its own as not to in-

is

a

jure the property of another, and confining the improvement wholly to the
street boundary, the general council has ordered the Rolling Mill Co. to fill
up its lot so as to support this additional embankment on the street, or to
perpendicular wall. We are then brought to the inquiry, whether,
build
such an ordinary improvement as every lot
under the circumstances, this
owner must be presumed to assent to when he purchases, or, in other words,
may and likely will
as the law contemplates the proper authorities
must
be
purchase
therefore
to be subordinate to
every
presumed
and
make
;

such

this public right."
(And, after examining the facts and showing that the improvements

were

pany would cause irreparable
28

injury,

the court proceed

:)

made with reference to the grade previously established by the city, that they
were expensive, and the proposed improvement instead of benefiting the com-
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it would be conceded that an apportionment by benefits must be
inadmissible.
But it has already been shown that value is only
one of many standards

of apportionment

and when others

;

are

admissible, it would seem to devolve upon those who deny the
right of assessing by benefits, to point out the element of taxaIf
tion, if any, which is absent when that basis is fixed upon.
apportionment is reallj^ made in view of actual benefits in the
increased value of property, it is presumptively as fair and equal,
and therefore as well supported by the advantages the taxpayer
receives from the government,

as

It

any other.

ly be equally admissible with any other.

It

must consequent-

cannot

be said that

the taxpayer has been required to surrender for the public use
something beyond his just proportion, when the demand has been
made under a rule expressly named to reach that very proportion
and no more
perhaps,

;

a

rule, too, that in its basis is so fair that it ought,
to all others, if fairly and honestly ap-

to be preferred

plied.''
" Our conclusion is, tliat tliis improvement is of sucli an extraordinary
character, and so peculiarly injurious to the proprietors of the rolling mill
that, so far from making them, at their own expense, damage their property
*
*
so greatly, it should not at all be done without compensation to them.
Private property is too sacred, and the individual rights of the citizen are too
well guarded, under our constitutional form of government, to he sacrificed at
the public behest, without compensation or some overruling public necessity,
in cases of emergency, such as vast conflagrations," etc.
'

is

is,

The whole argument is briefly summarized in the following extract from
an opinion in the Street Case : " But what objection is there to the exertion of
such a power ? It is said that it takes the property of individuals ; that
their money, for public use, without any compensation therefor. This
not
If the assessment has been truly and justly
so, either in theory or in fact.
made, the fact must be regularly ascertained, to be what the theory of the
is

is

it

to be, viz: that the party whose money
proceeding supposes
taken
locally aud peculiarly beuetited, over and beyond the ordinary benefit which,
as one of the communitj', he receives in all public improvements, to the pre-

a

is

it

it

is

is

is

It no answer to this, to say that the power
cise extent of the assessment.
abused;
that
be
true
of
may
every power; and whether this particular
so liable to be abused, as to make
power
improper that
should be
matter of which the legislature must be
vested in the city corporations,

'

it

The legislature saw fit to authorize the cily authorities to lay
the sole judge.
out new streets and public avenues, and instead of throwing the expense on the
whole city, to -be raised by a general tax, authorises the expense of the several
new improvements to be assessed upon those who, owning or interested in
lands, or buildings in said city, will be specially benefited by such lay out, al-
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That ihey violate express constitutional provisions securing uniformThese objections have been made under a numity in taxation.
ber of the state constitutions, and require examination separately/
teration or designation, and to apportion among, and to assess to be paid, by
sucli person or persons respectively, the whole, or such part as they shall judge
reasonable, of the damages caused by such lay out, alteration or designation.'
Now, unless there is some inherent difficulty in ascertaining who are the persons thus specially benefited, we sec no more objection to this mode of taxa-

tion for a public improvement, than there is in all other modes. From the
very nature of the subject, the power of taxation is an arbitrary power, which,
when exercised by the government itself, is limited only by the discretion of
the legislature, and when exercised by subordinate bodies, is limited by the
objects for which the legislature has seen fit to authorize it to be exercised,
and by such restrictions as the legislature has seen fit to prescribe, unless, indeed, it is further limited by some constitutional
But the only
provision.
provision that can be found at all, bearing upon this subject, in our constitution, ig the one already alluded to, that 'the property of no person shall be
taken for public use, without just compensation therefor,' and this has respect to property taken by the right of eminent domain, as where the land itself is taken for a highway or other public work, or where property is diI'ectly taken for the use of the government; and has no reference to the collection of taxes where money is taken as the contributive shares of individuals
to the public burdens.
The rule of taxation authorized by the charter, and
which in this particular case, the authorities of Bridgeport adopted, is certainly as equitable as any other. It attempts to apportion each man's tax to
the benefit which he is to receive from the improvement for which it is expended. Most of our highways are laid out by the selectmen of the towns,
and the expense is borne by the town in which the highway is located,
though in regard to many of them, the inhabitants of the towns have a much
less interest than the public beyond the local limits of the town; and in regard to many others, they are principally for the accommodation of some,
But the towns bear the
perhaps a small portion of the town's inhabitants.
it
upon them. It might, with the
burden, because the legislature has thrown

same propriety, have thrown it upon the counties, or oven upon the lesser terrf-

torial corporations ; and although injustice may occasionally be done, by compelling a small town to construct an expensive bridge, for the benefit principally of persons outside of its limits, yet the general operation of the law is,
perhaps, as equitable as any system that could bo devised. At any rate, we
have never heard it agitated, as a debatable point, that the system was so unjust
Per Hinman, J., in Nichols v. Bridgeas to be unconstitutional or illegal."
port, 23 Conn., 189, 303.-

provisions in the constitutions of the following states, requirhig
to be in proportion to the value:
Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisana, Maine, Mary,
land, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina,
Min
Oregon, South Carolina, Tennesse, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia.
1 There

are

taxes levied on property

[CH. XS.
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Alabama. In this state, under a constitutional provision that
" all taxes
levied on property in this state shall be assessed in exact proportion to the value of such property," it has been decided that assessments for the improvement of a street could only
be laid according to value, and that a provision in the city charter, granted before the constitution was adopted, and which authorized such an assessment to be laid on the abutting property was
by it.*

repealed

The constitution provides that " all property shall

Arkansas.

be taxed according to its value, the manner of ascertaining which
to be as the general assembly shall direct, making the same equal

and uniform throughout the state. No one species of property
shall be taxed higher than another species of property of equal
value.
The general assembly shall have power to tax merchants,
peddlers and privileges in such manner as may be preThis provision applies to the state revenue, and
scribed by law."
not to taxes levied for local purposes,^ and does not preclude the
assessment of a levee tax on the lands specially benefited.^
"
There are provisions in the constitution that all
California.
property in the state shall be tax-ed in profiortion to its value,"
and that " taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the
state."
The constitution also makes provision for conferring the
"
power of taxation and assessment on municipal corporations."
An act of the legislature providing that the expense of a street imbankers,

provement shall be assessed on property fronting on the street, in
proportion to its frontage, has invariably been held not to be in
violation of the provisions regarding valuation, equality and uniformity, but as being properly referable to the power of assessment, which had acquired a distinct meaning in other states before
being introduced into the constitution of this state.*
Illinois specially provide by their constitutions for the levy of ason the property benefited by or fronting on improvements.

nesota and
sessments
'

Mobile V. Dargan, 45 Ala., 310 ; Mobile
' "Washington v. State, 13 Ark., 752.
°

MoGehee v. Mathis,

21

Sacramento,

Ark.,

v.

Street Railway Co., 45 id., 323.

40.

Cal., 76; Blanding v. Burr, 13 id., 343; Emery ??.
Emery
345
v.
id.,
;
28
Gas Co.,
Bradford, 29 id., 75 ; Walsh v. Mathews, id., 123 ;
Taylor «. Palmer, 31 id., 240; Crosby «. Lyon, 37 id., 242; Chambers i). Satter^Burnett

}ee, 40

-o.

id., 497.

13

The fact that

an assessment is called

a tax

in the statute will
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Illinois.

The former constitution of this state contained this
"
section :
That the corporate authorities of counties, townships,
school districts, cities, towns and villages may be vested with
power to assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes ; such
taxes to be uniform in respect to persons and property within the
jurisdiction of the body imposing the same."
This, it was held,
forbade an assessment of the cost of improving a street upon the
real estate fronting thereon in proportion to frontage ; the principle of equality and uniformity applying to local as well as general taxes, and such a special assessment being neither equal nor
uniform within the meaning of the constitution.
But the opinion
time expressed, that to assess to each lot the
special benefit it would derive from the improvement, charging
such benefit upon the lot, leaving the repidue of the cost to be
was at the same

paid by equal and uniform taxation, would be constitutional.'^
But to make the improvement at the expense of lot owners, without regard to the acfwaZ benefit received, would not be equal and

And so would
uniform, and consequently would be forbidden.''
be an assessment which exempted improvements from its operation.^

Indiana.
that " the

One section of the constitution of this state declares

assembly shall provide by law for a uniform
and equal rate of assessment and taxation, and shall prescribe
such rules and regulations as shall secure a just valuation for
general

People «. Austin, 47 Cal.,
not preclude its being sustained as an assessment.
and
issued
bonds
therefor, and to pay tlic
city
A
was
improved
sti-eet
353.
-was
made
on
the
benefited.
Held an assessproperty
same an annual levy
ment.

Id.

Chicago V. Larned, 34 111., 203. And see Ottowa
Chicago V. Baer, 41 id., 306 ; Bedard ■e.Hall, 44 id., 91.
'

2 St.

John

1].

East

St.

Louis,

50 111., 93.

See Lee v.

v.

Spencer, 40 id.,

Buggies,

211 ;

63 id., 427.

'Primm v. Belleville, 59 111., 143. Since the foregoing decisions were made
the constitution of 1870 has come into operation, one section of -which provides that "the general assembly may vest the corporate authorities of cities,
towns and villages with power to make local improvements by special assessFor all
ment or by special taxation of contiguous property or otherwise.
municipal
all
be
vested
with
aucorporations
may
purposes,
other corporate
but
such
taxes
in
collect
shall
be
uniform
taxes,
respect
and
thority to assess
to persons and property within the jurisdiction of the body imposing the
same." Art. IX, § 9.

[CH. XX.

LAW OF TAXATION.

^38

taxation of all property, both real and personal, excepting such
only for municipal, educational, literary, scientific, religious or
charitable purposes as may be specially exempted by law."
Another forbids the passing of local or special laws " for the assessment and collection of taxes for state, county, township or
road purposes."
These provisions do not preclude street and
other local improvements being made, and the expense borne by
means of an assessment upon property specially benefited.^
is,

that "the legislature shall provide for
uniform and equal rate of assessment
and taxation," and another that " provision shall be made by genOne provision of the constitution
a

Kansas.

eral laws for the organization

of cities, towns and villages, and
their power of taxation and assessment, etc., shall be so restricted
These do not deprive the
as to prevent abuse of such power."
legislature of power to authorize local improvements of streets at
the cost of the adjacent property."^

The provision of the constitution that " taxation
shall be equal and uniform throughout the state," does not preclude special assessments on property benefited by local improveLouisiana.

ments.'

The constitution gives full power and authority

Massachusetts.

other things, " to impose

the said commonwealth."

town, in which the

This

not violated by authorizing

is

court, among

a

and levy
rates
and
taxes
and
reasonable
assessments,
upon all
proportional
the inhabitants of, and persons resident and estates lying within
to the general

is

s

located, to raise
college
Nor
by tax and pay an exceptional portion of the expense.^
tate agricultural

Hines

v.

Leavenworth,

3

^

;

;

'

Goodrich v. Turnpike Co., 26 Ind., 119 Bright jj. MoCuIlough, 27 id., 223
Palmer v. Stumph, 29 id., 329. And see La Fayette b. Jen ners, 10 id., 70;
Bank of the State v. New Albany, 11 id., 139; Anderson v. Draining Co., 14
id., 199; Turpmt;. Eagle Creek, etc., Co., 48 id., 45.
Kans., 186.

Dunn,

;

v.

Crandall,

11

is

v.

;

3

10 La. An., 57
New Orleans v. Elliott, 10 id., 59
id., 220; Draining Co. Case, id., 388; Municipality i).
Guillotte, 14 id., 297; "Wallace v. Shelton, id., 498; Bishop i,. Marks, 15 id.,
To divide the expense of an
147; Matter of Opening of Streets, 30 id., 497.
improvement between the city and the property specially benefited
no vio-

Municipality

Teatman

^

lation of the rule of uniformity.
Merrick

v. Amherst,

13

Allen,

State v.
500.

New Orleans,

15

La. An.,

354.
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it preclude local, street or drain assessments being laid on
the property benefited.
This is so well shown by an opinion of
does

the supreme

court of Massachusetts, and the opinion itself is of
application, that we consider it advisable to copy

such general
liberally from it :

"It remains

a

that this

is

The broad position assumed by the plaintiff

is,

for us to consider that branch of the plaintiff's case
which involves an inquiry into the validity of the assessment or
mode of taxation prescribed by the statute, by means of which
the expenses of the proposed improvement are to be defrayed.
pal1,

is

2,

ch.
pable violation of that provision of the constitution, part
§1, art. IV, by which the power
given to the legislature to im-

"VVe have already
pose only proportional and reasonable taxes.
had occasion to consider the force and effect of these words, in

connection with other portions of the same article in the constitu-

a

tion, as applied to the imposition of taxes for the public charges
of government.
As to this class of taxation, the intent seems to
restraint on the legislative authority, and to rebe clear to put
quire that taxes levied for general purposes shall belaid on property, so that, taking all estates, real and personal, within the commonwealth, as one of the elements of proportion, each person subject to taxation shall be obliged to pay only such portion of the
taxes as tiie property owned by him bears to the whole sum to

But this conclusion

taxation for general purposes
drawn mainly from the clause in the constitution which provides that, in order that assessments for such purposes may be
as to

made with equality,

a

is

be raised.

valuation of estates shall be taken anew

in ten years.
This requirement seems
to indicate very clearly that such taxation, in order to be proportional, shall be laid according to the property owned by each
as often, at least, as once

;

is

But this
person liable to assessment within the commonwealth.
in terms limited to the public charges of government
provision

the chai-ges for carrying on the several

departments

ernment, for the support of

a

the whole people of the commonwealth

;

is

is

it

a

is,

to expenditures incurred for those objects of
public nathe duty of the government to provide, and
ture for which
to be distributed among
the burden of which properly rests and
that

such,

system of general

for example,

as

of the gov-

education, and

for the common protection and defense of the people and govern-
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merit of the state.
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like expenditures, whether

These and other

incurred by the immediate agents and officers of the state or
through the instrumentality of counties or towns, are to be defraylaid with equality and in proportion to the
property held by each person liable to taxation.
" But there is another
large class of expenditures for objects of
a public nature, for which it is the proper province of the governed by assessments

ment to provide, which cannot be deemed to come within the des-

ignation of public

of government, or be held to be a
proper subject of general assessment on the whole people of the
commonwealth. Take the case of money expended in effecting
charges

an improvement of a local

character,

which, although

it may

enure, to a certain extent, to the benefit of the public, is nevertheless especially necessary for, and beneficial to, private property
in the immediate vicinity.
It certainly would not be equitable

or just, or tend to an equalization of public burdens, that the
cost of such a work should be laid on the whole people, or upon
those living remote from the locality, having no property connected

with

the

or no benefit

improvement, and who could derive but little
or advantage from its construction. The duty of

the government to make provision to carry into effect works of
such character is clear and

unquestionable.

Indeed, it is often

indispensable for police or sanitary purposes, or the convenience
and accommodation of persons living within a certain town or
municipality, or a district or section thereof, that money should
be expended for purposes of a public nature, but essentially
local in their operation and effect.

Nor can there be any doubt

that ample power to procure the accomplishment of such objects

in the legislature, in the exercise of their authority to
all
manner
of wholesome and reasonable laws, for the good
pass
and welfare of the commonwealth and the subjects thereof.
This
is vested

attribute of sovereignty would be greatly
abridged, if it should be held that the legislature are restricted in
their authority to provide means by the levying of taxes for those
objects only which would form a proper subject of a general charge
great

and

essential

on the whole people of the commonwealth, and

have no power

to authorize assessments for objects of a local character, the execution of which is required by the convenience and necessities of a

town or district or neighborhood. "We

see no reason

for construing
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the provision in the constitution, giving to the legislature the power

of imposing proportional and reasonable assessments, rates and
taxes, as an inhibition on the levy of a tax for local purposes of a
public nature, upon those who will reap the benefit on their estates
Such is not the natural or
expenditure of money.
reasonable interpretation of the clause, standing as it does in relation to this class or species of taxation, without other words to
of

a proposed

qualify or restrict its meaning.

As

has been already said,

it is in

regard to the public charges of government that the mode of raising money by the imposition of taxes is specially pointed out,
and it is as to these only that a restriction is found on the meaning of the preceding clause, by which the power to levy proporAs to all other assessments
tional and reasonable taxes is given.
which may be required by the enactment and execution of wholesome and reasonable laws, no limitation of authority is expressed,
and none can be implied except that which arises from the natural and proper import of the words used.
It certainly cannot be
said that all taxes laid for local purposes of a public nature, on
those who would be chiefly and directly benefited by the execu-

worii, and in proportion to the degree of benefit or profit which each will receive therefrom, are necessarily
Nor can it be contended
either unreasonable or unproportional.
that the constitution, in regard to this species of taxation, furtion of

a proposed

nishes any fixed rules of proportion, or gives any absolute stand-

ard by which to determine whether a particular tax is within the
Undoubtlimits of the legitimate exercise of the power granted.
very wide discretion was intended to be left to the legislaas to the subjects and method of executing the authority
conferred on them, of imposing taxes for purposes other than
edly
ture

a

those of a general nature; and yet the power is not

out limit.
reasonable,

wholly withthat
taxes should be proportional and
In requiring
the framers of the constitution intended to erect a bar-

a

a

If,

rier against an arbitrary, unjust, unequal or oppressive exercise of
for instance, the legislature should arbitrarily desigthe power.^
certain class of persons on whom to impose
nate
tax, either for

■

Citing Oliver

v.

Washington Mills,

a

a

public nature, without
general purposes, or for local object of
any reference to any rule of proportion whatever, having no regard
to the share of public charges which each ought to pay relatively
11

Allen,

368.
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to that borne by all others, or to any sapposed peculiar benefit or
profit which would accrue to those made subject to the tax which

would not enure to others, so that in effect the burden would
fall on those who had been selected only for the reason that they
might be made subject to the tax, we cannot doubt that the imposition of it would be an unlawful exercise of power not warI'anted by the constitution, against the exercise of which a person

But no such case is made by
aggrieved might sue for protection.
the present bill.
This part of the plaintiff's case rests on the
broad proposition, that the legislature have no power to authorize
the assessment of the cost of a work of a public nature, but the con-

struction of which will be of special and peculiar benefit to adjacent
property, on the abutting estates in proportion to their value.
For the reasons already given, we are of the opinion that such a
tax is neither unreasonable, nor unproportional, and that it was
competent for the legislature to impose
the statute." '

it in the mode prescribed

by

The provision that "the legislature shall provide
Michigan.
a uniform rule of taxation, except on property paying specific
taxes, and taxes shall be levied on such property as shall be prescribed by law," and that "all assessments hereafter authorized
shall be on property at its cash value," only relates to the valuation, assessment and taxation of property for general purposes, and
consistent with them local assessments may be laid for local improvements,

either in proportion to benefits

or in proportion to

frontage.^

Minnesota.

Under

a

"
provision that all taxes to be raised in

nearly equal as maybe, and all property on
which taxes are to be levied shall have a cash valuation, and be
equal and uniform throughout the state," a special assessment on
lands in proportion to the benefits received from the construction
of a public road was held inadmissible.^
this state shall be

,

1

Bigelow, Ch.

as

J., in Dorgan

d.

Boston, 13 Allen, 223, 334.

Mich., 495 ; Hoyt v. East Saginaw, 19 id., 39 : see Le
Williams v. Detroit, 2 id., 568; Woodbridge v. Dev.
Grand
id.,
274;
Haven, 30 id., 24. As to wliat are specific
Warner
8
troit,
17
Mich.,
«.
68; Kitson B.Ann Arbor, 26 id., 325.
People,
taxes, see Walcott
2 Motz

Fever

v.

V.

Detroit,

Detroit,

' Stinson

2

18

id., 586;

D. Smith, 8 Minn., 366.
Subsequently the clause in the constituof
the following : " Provided that the legisthe
addition
amended
hy
tion was
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The constitution requires that " taxation shall be
Mississippi.
All property shall be
equal and uniform throughout the state.
taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as directed by
law."
There is nothing in this which takes from the legislature
the

power to impose

a

special district for a local imcorporations may be authorized to

tax on

and

a

An

Missouri.

assessment for street improvements on

benefits does not contravene

The same

basis of

the provision of the constitution that

to taxation shall be taxed

is

"all property subject
its value."'

levee tax on

a

is,

therefore, competent to lay
improvements, and it
lands by the acre instead of by valuation.^

a

municipal
assess the expense of a street improvement on the lots fronting on
the street.^
The provision has no application to taxes for local
provement,

in proportion to

true of assessments for levee purposes,

which need not be made on the basis of valuation.*
The provision of the constitution that " laws shall be
*
*
* all real and peruniform rule,
passed taxing by
sonal property according to its true value in money," will not
preclude the levy and collection of assessments on the basis of
a

Ohio.

benefits

in the cases in which they are usually

Oregon.

laid.^

The provision in the constitution that " all taxation

shall be equal and uniform," does not preclude an improvement
of city streets by means of assessments levied on those to whose
benefit the improvements specially inure.'
may, by general law or special act, authorize municipal corporations
to levy assessments for local improvements upon tlie property fronting upon
sucli improvements, or upon the property to be benefited by such improvements, without regard to cash valuation, and in such manner as the legislature
lature

may prescribe."

5

;

;

8

5

5

*

3

2

;

:

'

Williams ®. Cammack, 37 Miss., 209 see Smith v. Aberdeen, 25 id., 458
Alcorn v. Hamer, 38 id., 652.
Daily v. Swope, 47 Miss., 367.
Garrett v. St. Louis, 35 Mo., 505; Uhrig v. St. Louis, 44 id., 458: see Neenan V. Smith, 50 id., 525.
Egyptian Levee Co. v. Hardin, 27 Mo., 495.
Ohio, N. S., 243; Marion «. Epler, id., 250; Ernst v.
Hill !). Higdon,
Kunkle, id., 530 Keeves v. Treasurer of Wood Co., id., 333 Nor. Ind. K. R.
Co. «. Connelly, 10 id., 159. This provision, however, applies as much to the
local taxes, properly so called, as to the state taxes. Richards v. Zanesville,

King

S., 589.
11. Portland,

3

«

Ohio, N.

Ore., 146.
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"
provision, that the burdens of
the state ought to be fairly distributed among its citizens," is not
inconsistent with an act which provides for the laying out of a
Rhode Island.

A constitutional

street, and the assessment

by commissioners

of one-half the ex-

pense on adjoining proprietors, in proportion to benefits
the assessment to any one not to exceed the benefits.''

received

;

The constitution requires that " the rule of taxation shall be uniform."
Also, that "it shall be the duty of the
legislature, and they are hereby empowered, to provide for the
Wisconsin.

organization of cities and incorporated villages, and to restrict
their power of taxation and assessment," etc. It has been doubted

if special

assessments on a basis of benefits could be upheld un-

der the provision first quoted ; but it has been decided
may be, when properly authorized under the other.^

that they

These are the cases in which the constitutional objections have
been most distinctly presented; but many other cases occupy,

with more or less fullness, the same ground.

The fact very

clearly appears that, while there is not such a concurrence of judicial opinion as would be desirable, the overwhelming weight of
authority is in favor of the position, that all such provisions for
equality and uniformity in taxation, and for taxation by value,
have no application to these special assessments.
The reasons

in different

but they are no where set forth
more clearly or strongly than in the leading case in New York.
In that case, speaking of provisions made by the people in their
assigned vary

cases,

constitutions, it is said : "They have not ordained that taxation
shall be general, so as to embrace all persons or all taxable persons within the state, or within any district or territorial division
nor that it must be in the ratio of the value of each
man's land, or of his goods, or of both combined ; nor that a tax
'
must be coextensive with the district, or upon all the property
of the state

;

a

is

it

Matter of Dorrance St., 4 R.
is

act

I.,

230. In the same case
said that such aa
not invalid by reason of allowing the local authorities
discretion to
in
the
method
tax
or
adopted,
some other. And as to assessing by
levy the
benefits, Ames, Ch. J., gives instances of assessments for payment for houses
•

'

pulled down in populous towns to check the spread of conflagrations,
the expense of watchmen in compact portions of cities.
Weeks

Kenosha,

«.
17

Milwaukee,
id., 284.

10 Wis., 243;

Lumsden

v. Cross,

and for

id., 282; Bond

v.
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district which has the character of and is known to the law
as a local sovereignty.'
Nor have they ordained or forbidden
that a tax shall be apportioned according to the benefit which
a

each tax payer is supposed to receive
the tax is expended.

tion is unrestrained.
" The
application
apportionment to

all

In

from the object on which
all these particulars the power of taxa-

of any one of these rules or principles of
and
cases, would be manifestly oppressive

Either may be rightfully and wisely applied to the particular exigency to which it is best adapted.
" Taxation is sometimes
regulated by one of these principles,
and sometimes by another ; and very often it has been appor■unjust.

tioned without

to the locality or to the tax payer's
ability to contribute, or to any proportion between the burden
and the benefit.
The excise laws, and taxes on carriages and
reference

many examples of this description of
All
taxation.
Some taxes affect classes of inhabitants only.
duties on imported goods are taxes on the class of consumers.
watches

are among the

The tax on one imported article falls on

large class of consumers,
while the tax on another affects comparatively a few individuals.
The duty on one article consumed by one class of inhabitants is
a

twenty per cent, of its value, while on another, consumed by a
The duty on one foreign
different class, it is forty per cent.
commodity is laid for the purposes of revenue mainly, without

ability of its consumers to pay ; as in the case of
The duty on another is laid for the purpose of
the duty on salt.

reference to the

encouraging domestic

manufactures

of

the same article;

thus

compelling the community to pay a higher price to one man than
he could otherwise have bought the article for from another.
These discriminations may be impolitic, and in some cases unjust ;
but if the power of taxation upon importations had not been
transferred by -the people of this state to the federal government,
there could have been no pretense for declaring them unconstitutional in state legislation.
property tax for the general purposes of the government,
either of the state at large, or of a county, city or other district,
The reason is obvious.
is regarded as a just and equitable tax.

"A

It

apportions the burden according to the benefit more nearly
A rich man
than any other inflexible rule of general taxation.
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in the protection and improve-

derives more benefit from taxation,

ment of his property, than a poor man, and ought therefore

to

pay more. But the amount of each man's benefit in general taxation cannot be ascertained and estimated with any degree of
certainty, and, for that reason a property tax is adopted instead of
an estimate of benefits.
In local taxation, however, for special
the local benefits

purposes,

may,

and estimated to a reasonable

in many

cases, be seen, traced

At

certainty.

least, this has been

supposed and assumed to be true by the legislature, whose duty
it is to prescribe the rules on which taxation is to be apportioned ;

determination of this matter, being within the scope
of its lawful power, is conclusive." ^
Some of the cases assume the narrow ground, that the constitutional provisions refer solely to state J;axation, or that, if
and whose

is,

they go further, to the general taxation for state, county and
that
municipal purposes ; but the view generally expressed

in our constitutions

and

is

it

a

a

though assessments are laid under the taxing power, and are in
certain sense taxes, yet that they are
peculiar class of taxes,
and not within the meaning of that term as
usually employed
Others are rested

statutes.^

on both

Suggles,

J., in

People

Brooklyn,

v.

4

'

reasons.
N. Y.,

419, 427.

of Mayor, etc. of New York, 11 Johns., 77 Sharp
Wend., 85 Matter of Furmaa
Livingston v. New York,
St., 17 Wend., 649; Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23 Conn., 189; Northern Liberties v.
St. John's Church, 13 Penn. St., 107; Sclrenley v. Allegheny City, 25 id., 128;
Wray vi. Pittsburg, 46 id., 365; Hammett i>. Philadelphia, 66 id., 146
Daaa,
Washington Avenue, 69 id., 353; Lexington v. McQuillan's Heirs,
Kans., 454; St. Joseph v. O'Donohue,
31 Mo.,
513; Barnes v. Atchison,
v. White,
345; St. Joseph «. Anthony, 80 id., 437 Municipality No.
La,
An., 446; Cummings ii. Police Jury,
id., 503; Richardson i;. Morgan, 16
C, in Withrow's Corp.
id., 429; Matter of Opening of Streets, 20 id., 497;
Cases, 375 Maloy v. Marietta, 11 Ohio St., 636 State ». Dean, 23 N, J., 335
State v. Jersey City, 24 id., 662 Vasser v. George, 47 Miss., 713 Fairfield v.
Batcliife, 20 Iowa, 396; Jones v. Boston, 104 Mass., 461; Woodbridge v. DeMich., 274; Alexander v. Baltimore,
Gill, 383, 397; Baltimore ».
troit,
517
Hale
v.
Md.,
29
Kenosha,
Wis.,
599. An agreement to
Co.,
Cemetery
;

see Matter

8

76

9

3

:

5

;

;

;

;,

S.

9

;

;

7

8

"
Oswald
pav all taxes and assessments," Jwld to embrace street assessments.
Codman v. Johnson, 104 Mass., 491. One who buys
V. Gilbert, 11 Johns., 443
land subject to assessments which by his deed he assumes to pay may never;

■

3

9

;■

;

Hill,

;

On this point

11. Spier,

4

-

theless contest them.

State v.

Jersey City,

35

N. J.,

331.
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of apportionment.

Sufficient, perhaps, has
been said regarding the principles on which special assessments
are levied.''
The methods which are chosen for giving those
principles effect may now receive brief attention.

Although complaint is often made that special assessment operates oppressively and unjustly, and it cannot be denied that in
individual cases the complaint is perfectly just, yet on the whole
it has a decided advantage over other taxation in the fact that its
methods are

flexible, and

easily adapted to the special equity
and justice of the several classes of cases.
This is shown in the
modes of apportionment which are selected under different circumso

so

stances.

The major part of the cost of a local work is sometimes
collected by general tax, while a smaller portion is levied upon
1.

the estates specially benefited.
2. The major part is sometimes

assessed on estates benefited,

while the general public is taxed a smaller portion in consideration of a smaller participation in the benefits.

The whole cost in other cases is levied on lands in the imvicinity of the work.
In a constitutional point of view either ofthese methods is ad8.

mediate

'_In Alexander v. Baltimore, 5 Gill, 388, the general principle underlying
these assessments is justly said to ho the same with that on which highway
taxes are laid. In Nichols ii. Bridgeport, 36 Conn., 235, 263, Butler, J., in
considering the question whether a certain act subjecting railroad property to
a general tax, and exempting it from all other taxes, would exempt it from
" It is doubtless true that
special assessments, makes the following remarks:
such an assessment of benefits is an exercise of the taxing power, and in a
general sense a tax. It was so regarded by this court in Nichols «. BridgeBut it is never spoken
port, 28 Conn., 207, to which we have been referred.
or
in
the
and
of
cities
boroughs,
general law, or in popular
of in the charters
intercourse, as a tax. And although this strictly in a general sense is a tax,
it is one of a peculiar nature. It is a local assessment imposed occasionally
as required, upon a limited class of persons interested in a local improvement,
and who are assumed to be benefited by the improvement to the extent of the
assessment; and it is [imposed and collected as an equivalent for that benefit,
It has consequently never been regarded as
and to pay for the improvement.
in
such
legislative proceedings, in our public or private
a tax, or termed
In all these it is known only and distinctlaws, or in popular intercourse.
"
ively as an assessment for benefits," and it cannot safely be assumed that
the legislature had such assessments in contemplation when they passed the
act of 1864."
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misible, and one may be sometimes just, and another at other
times.
In other cases it may be deemed reasonable to make the
whole cost a general charge, and levy no special assessment whatever.i
The question is legislative, and like all legislative questions
may be decided erroneously, but it is reasonable to expect that, with
such latitude of choice, the tax will be more just and equal than
it would be were the legislature required to levy it^by one inflexible and arbitrary rule.''
Even after it has been determined how the cost shall be borne,
as between the public and the estates benefited, much liberty is
allowed in fixing upon the basis of apportionment as between inThe two methods between which

dividuals.

ly

made are
1.

An

a choice

is common-

:

assessment made

by assessors or commissioners,

appoint-

ed for the purpose under legislative authority, and who are to

view the estates, and levy the expense in proportion to the benefits which in their opinion the estates respectively will receive
from the work proposed.
2. An assessment by some definite standard fixed upon by the
legislature itself, and which is applied to estates by a measure
ment of length, quantity or value.

An

by the first method would seem to be most
equal and just, because it would be made on actual examination
The legislature, in such cases, makes the
of the lands assessed.
rule, and the proper officers give effect to it in a manner correassessment

sponding to the ordinary assessment for a taxation by values.
The right thus to assess by benefits has been often affirmed, and
can no longer be regarded as a controverted question.^
'

As

'"

to the diverse metliods, see

Wallace

v. Shelton, 14 La.

An.,

498.

General taxation implies a distribution of the burden upon some general
So a local assessment, or tax for a local benefit, should be distributed among and imposed upon all equally, standing in like relation."

rule of equality.
Bedfield,

J., in Allen

v.

Drew, 44 Vt.,

174,

186.

The question

always

is, or

should be, what is equal under the circumstances.

' McMasters v. Commonwealth, 3 Watts, 292 ; Fenelon's Petition, 7 Penn.
; Hancock Street Extension, 18 id., 26 ; Schenley «. Commonwealth, 36
id., 29 ; Commonwealth v. Woods, 44 id., 113 ; Wray «. Pittsburg, 46 id., 365 ;
Greensburg v. Young, 53 id., 280; Allentown v. Henry, 73 id., 404; Weber v.
E_einhard, 73 id., 373 ; Livingston v. New York, 8 Wend., 86 ; Matter of Twenty-sixth Street, 13 id., 203; Owners of Ground v. Albany, 15 id., 374; Matter
St., 173
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When benefits are assessed after this method, the district, within which the tax shall be laid, may be determined in either of
two modes
1.

:

The legislative authority, either of the state, or, when prop-

erly authorized, of the municipality, may determine over what
territory the benefits are so far diffused as to render it proper to
make all lands contribute to the cost ; or,
2.

The assessors or commissioners who, under the law, are to

make the assessment, may have the whole matter submitted to
their judgment, to assess such lands as in their opinion are spe-

cially benefited, and ought therefore

to contribute to the cost of

the work.

When the first method is adopted, the legislature exercises directly an undoubted and necessary power, which pertains to it in
all matters of taxation ; and which is inseparable from the power
of apportionment.
The whole subject of taxing districts belongs
to the legislature ; so much is unquestionable.^
The authority
may be exercised directly, or, in the case of local taxes, it may
be left to local boards or bodies

mination will be by

a

;

^

but in the latter case the deter-

body possessing for the purpose legislative

;

is

;

;

;

;

;

;

I.,

of Furman Street, 17 id., 649 ; Matter of De Graw Street, 18 id., 568 ; People i).
Brooklyn, 4 N. Y., 419 ; Wriglit v. Boston, 9 Cusli., 233 ; Dorgon ■».Boston, 12
Allen, 223 ; Brewer j). Springfield, 97 Mass., 152 ; Jones v. Boston, 104 id., 461 ;
Nichols «. Bridgeport, 23 Conn., 189; Cone ». Hartford, 28 id., 363; Raid v.
Toledo, 18 Oliio, 161; Scoville v. Cleveland, 1 Oliio N. S., 126; Hill v. Higdon, 5 id., 243; Marion ■».Epler, 5 id., 250; Alexander ». Baltimore, 5 Gill,
383; Moale v. Baltimore, 5 Md., 314; Baltimore v. Cemetery Company, 7 Md.,
517; Howard v. The Church, 18 id., 457; Bradley ». McAtee, 7 Bush, 667;
Howell V. Bristol, 8 id., 493; State v. Newark, 27 N. J., 155; State v. Fuller, 84
id., 227 ; Holtou «. Milwaukee, 31 Wis., 27 ; Hoyt ». East Saginaw, 19 Mich.,
39; SteckertD. East Saginaw, 22 id., 104; Brevoort «. Detroit, 24 id., 322 ; Morrison «. Hershire, 32 Iowa, 271; Chicago v. Larned, 34 111., 203; Ottawa v.
Spencer, 40 id., 211 ; Chicago v. Baer, 41 id., 306; Matter of Dorrance Street, 4
230 Garrett v. St. Louis, 25 Mo., 505 St. Joseph v. O'Donohue, 31 id.,
E.
St. Louis v. Clemens, 36 id., 467 St. Louis v. Armstrong, 38 id., 29
345
Uhrig V. St. Louis, 44 id., 458 Burnett v. Sacramento, 12 Cal., 76 Emery v.
Gas Company, 28 id., 345; La Fayette ». Fowler, 34 Ind., 140. In State ».
Charleston, 12 Rich., 702, the right to assess by benefits
denied. The point
receives but little consideration, and the decisions to the contrary are not referred to.

Piper's Appeal,

v.

29

41

Cal., 525

32 Cal., 530.

;

'
s

Ashbury,

Sinton

and see ante, Chapter

VII.
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power, and whose action must be as conclusive as

if taken by the

legislature itself. It has been repeatedly decided that the legislative act of assigning districts for special taxation on the basis of
benefits, cannot be attacked on the ground of error in judgment
regarding the special benefits, and defeated by satisfying a court
If the legislathat no special and peculiar benefits are received.
tion has fixed the district, and laid the tax for the reason that, in
the opinion of the legislative body, such district is peculiarly benefited, that is conclusive.*
The only exceptions which have been
recognized to this rule are those cases in which, under pretense of
apportionment, a work of general benefit has been treated as a
work of merely local consequence, and the cost imposed on some
local community in disregard of the general rules which control
The authority is sometimes
legislation in matters of taxation.^
exercised by making several districts for a single work, as indeed

is often done in the case of street improvements ; it being equally
within the power of the legislature to prescribe one district
over which the whole cost of the improvement shall be spread,
or to make
several

for the improvement along the
has even been held that the improvement

separate

blocks.'

It

districts

of several streets may be treated as one work for the purposes
of a special assessment, and the whole cost apportioned by uniform rule throughout one district,^ and this may perhaps be
equally competent with the general assessment throughout a
city of the cost of such improvements.
Baltimore v. Hughes, 1 Gill & J., 480, 493, per Buchanan, Cli. J. ; Litch1). Vernon, 41 jS". Y., 123, 133, per Orover, J. ; People ». Lawrence, 41 id.,
140 ; St. Louis v. Oeters, 36 Mo., 456 ; Shaw v. Dennis, 5 Gilm., 416 ; Philadelphia ». Field, 58 Peun. St., 320. Compare Wright -b. Boston, 9 Gush., 233.
'

field

"■
Baltimore b.

ton Avenue,

69

Hughes, 1 Gill &
Penu. St., 352.

J.,

480, 492, per JBuchanan,Ch.

J.;

Washing-

aScoville 4). Cleveland, 1 Ohio, N. S., 126; Creighton v. Scott, 14 id., 438;
Brevoort «. Detroit, 24 Mich., 323; Schenley b. Commonwealth, 36 Penn. St., 29.
p. 112. In Arnold v. Cambridge, 106 Mass., 353, the expense of
sidewalks on two streets was levied by one assessment, and apportioned among the lots abutting on the two streets.
The only authority under
which this could be done was the statute which empowered the mayor and
aldermen, whenever they should deem it expedient to construct sidewalks
" in any street," to assess the expense on the abutters in just
proportions.
By
" it was
evidently intended by the legislature that the
this the court thought
be considered separately, and with a view to its
CL\ae of each .street should
* See ante,

constructing
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limits to the taxing district,

but authorizes an assessment on such property as shall appear to
be benefited, the report of the assessors or commissioners can
alone determine what the district shall
to them

The subject is referred

be.

depending on judgment, after actual inspection ; but as they only pass upon the question of fact, the district
is to be considered as prescribed by the legislature, when the
as a matter

principle is settled which is to determine
Assessments by

the

it.''

In many

Foot Front.

instances where streets

were to be opened or improved, sewers constructed, water pipes
laid, or other improvements entered upon, the benefits of which
might be expected to diffuse themselves along the line of the improvement in a degree bearing some proportion to the frontage,
the legislature has deemed

it right and proper to take the line of

frontage as the most practicable and reasonable measure of probable benefits; and making that the standard, to apportion the
Such a measure of apportionment seems at
benefits accordingly.
first blush to be perfectly arbitrary, and likely to operate in some
cases with great injustice;

but it cannot be denied

that in the

case of some improvements, frontage is a very reasonable

measure

of benefits; much more just than value could be; and perhaps
approaching equality as nearly as any estimate of benefits made
by the judgment of men. However this may be, the authorities
are

well united in the conclusion that frontage may lawfully be

made the basis of apportionment.

■^

" the power to treat two
own special circumstances ;" and that, consequently,
sidewalks in two distinct streets as one for the purposes of assessment [was]
In England it is held that separate lines of sewers
not given by the statute."
in
one district, when they are on a different level,
included
not
to
be
ought
and no one is of benefit to the district drained by the other.
Hamlets,

9

B. & C,

Kex

v.

Tower

517.

'As to districts depending on the estimates of commissioners,
of Powers, 39 Mich., 504; Matter of "Ward, 53 N. T., 395.

see

Appeal

«. Alleghany City, 44 Penn.
Garden v. Wistar, 18
Spring
St. 118 ;
id., 195; Stroud v. Philadelphia, 61 id., 355; Covington v. Boyle, 6 Bush, 304;
Fuller, 34
State V. Elizabeth, 30 N. J., 365 ; Same v. Same, 31 id., 547 ; State r.
id., 333;
34
Oviatt,
v.
Upiagton
.'iSO;
Ohio
St.,
5
Kunkle,
v.
id., 337; Ernst
v.
Challis,
Joseph
9
St.
155;
id.,
Parker
v.
455;
Kans.,
Atchison,
3
Barnes c.
d.
Smith
50
Neenan
338;
37
id.,
Mo.,
Joseph,
537; Fowler v. St.
Anthony, SO
id. 535; Chambers v. Satterlee, 40 Cal., 497; Palmer i). Stumpf, 39 Ind., 329;

^Pennock

v. Hoover,

5

Rawle,

391 ;

Magee •». Commonwealth,

McGonigle

46 id., 308 ;
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Occasional hardships must inevitably result from the adoption
of such a basis, but the question is fairly a debatable one, whether
they are likely to be more serious or more frequent than those
-which are to be anticipated from the selection of some other rule ;
must be deemed settled by the statute.^
The principle of these statutes is the same with that which supports assessments made through the intervention of assessors or

and this question

The benefits, actually or presumptively received,
Apportioning the cost by the frontage on the
support the tax.
improvement is adopted by the legislature as constituting, in the
commissioners.

judgment of its members, an apportionment in proportion to benThis we understand
efits as nearly as is reasonably practicable.
to be substantially the view taken by the authorities.^
Allen

V.

Drew,

id., 495

18

ii.

448-9, recognize the
'

In Terry

v.

Williams v. Detroit, 3 Mich., 560; Motz «. Detroit,
Portland, 3 Ore., 146. Many of the cases cited, ante, pp.
same right.

44 Vt., 174;

King

;

Hartford,

39

Conn., 286, the opening of the street for which a

special assessment was made left a narrow strip of land on each side belonging to Terry ; so narrow as to be incapable of use, except in connection with
It was nevertheless assessed heavily for benefits. Tlie
tlie adjacent lands.
case showed that both this and the adjacent

land would be largely benefited

" when we consider that here is land that
used together. The court say,
would be benefited to an amount of more than thirty-six hundred dollars by
the laying out of this street, should the annexation be made, and the land Sid-

if

be benefited to a large amount under the like circumstances, and that no benefit would be conferred on either tract so long as they
remain the property of diflEerent proprietors, is it reasonable to suppose that

joining would likewise

there can be any serious obstacle to prevent the one owner from selling and the
other from buying, when so great an advantage would result to both from such
sale and purchase? A consideration of this character, no doubt, had its proper
etfect in the determination of the question, whether the land was benefited or
See, also. Same s. Same, 39 Conn., 391.
not, and the extent of that benefit."
The following cases are important: "Bounding or abutting" on a street

will include

the soil of a private

road opening into the street.
Pound v.
of Works, Law Rep., 7 Q. B., 183. "Adjoining " means,
touching or contiguous, as distinguished from lying near or adjacent. Matter of Ward, 53 N. Y., 395, citing Rex ii. Hodge, 1 M. & M., 371 ; Peverelly
" In front " of
■».People, 3 Park. C. R., 59 ; Holmes v. Carley, 31 N. Y., 289.
in
case of a corner lot, not only the front, coma lot construed to embrace,
monly so called, but the line of the lot on the side street also. Des Mcines v.
Door, 31 Iowa, 89; Morrison ii. Ilershire, 33 id., 271. A lot is not "fronting"
Philadelphia v.
on a street when it is separated from it by a narrow strip.
■Eastwick, 35 Penn. St., 75.
Plumstead

- See

Board

State

v.

Fuller,

34

N. J.,

327, 333, per Bedle,

J. ;

Sshenley

v. Common-
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In

some

instances

a

different

somewhat
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method

has

been

Instead of establishadopted for levying the cost of local works.
ing a taxing district, and apportioning the cost throughout it by
some standard of benefit, actual or presumptive, the case of each

individual lot fronting on the improvement has been taken by itself, and that lot has been assessed with the cost of the improve-

ment along its front ; or perhaps with one-half the cost, leaving
the opposite lot to be assessed for the other half. If such a regulation constitutes the apportionment of a tax, it must be supported
when properly ordered by or under the authority of the legislature.
Bat it has been denied on what seem the most conclusive
grounds that this is permissible. It is not legitimate taxation
It conbecause it is lacking in one of its indispensible elements.
siders each lot by itself, compelling
it,

the improvement in front of

each to bear the burden of

without reference to any contribu-

tion to be made to the improvement by any other property, and

;

a

is

it

consequently without any apportionment. From accidental
circumstances, the major part of the cost of an important public
work may be expended in front of
single lot those circumnot at all contributing to make the improvement more
valuable to the lot thus specially burdened, perhaps even having
stances

But whatever might be the result in

the opposite consequence.

a

is

it

is

that
provides for
particular cases, the fatal vice in the system
It
as arbitrary in principle, and
no taxing districts whatever.
■would sometimes be as unequal in operation, as
regulation that

it,

a

state officer chanced to be chosen should
the town from which
pay his salary, or that that locality in which the standing army,
should be stationed for the time being should
or any portion of

been held admissible, but

cases

is

legitimate taxation the
regulation of the kind has

has been

justified

as

a

In sidewalk

be.

it

other would

one
a

If

be charged with its support.

regulation of

is

not supported on the taxing power exclusively. As
police, and
has been well said, to compel individuals to contribute money or

to

lay

forced contribution, not

wealth, 36 Penn. St., 29, 57, per Strong,
Connelly,

10

Ohio, N.

S., 159, 165, per Peck,

a

another,

J.
;

b}'

a

paid

is

property to the use of the public, without reference to any common
ratio, and without requiring the sum paid by one piece or kind of
property, or by one person, to bear any relation whatever to that
tax, within

Northern Indiana E. R. Co.

J.

v.
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of powers by

any enlightened or responsible government.^

Although,

has been stated,

as

an assessment

by frontage is

really based upon the idea that the estates taxed receive a benefit in proportion to frontage, yet when the legislature have made
benefits the rule of assessment, and provided for assessors or commissioners to ascertain and apportion them, it is not arbitrarily
to be assumed that the benefits to any particular lot are in fact
in proportion to its front on the improvement. In such cases the
assessors or commissioners have a duty to perform, on inspection
and examination of the several estates

they have

and a report by them that

by the foot front, without saying

the expense

assessed

;

that they find the benefits in that proportion, does not affirmatively show a performance of their duty.'^
hy the Acre, as a basis

ApjKrtionment

quently been adopted in levee
may be taken as an illustration.

cases.

It

for an assessment has freA statute in Mississippi

provided for

scribed the district of assessment, and directed

a levee tax, pre-

the tax to be laid

by the acre according to an arbitrary standard of value fixed by
the

act, as

follows

dollars per acre
■

;

J.,

Unimproved lands in a part of the district, five
in the remainder of the district three dollars per
:

in Woodbridge

Mich.,

The case of
274, 301.
Lexington v. McQuillan's Heirs, 9 Dana, 51:5, is a decision that the improvement of a street cannot be compelled on any such basis. To the same point
is Motz V. Detroit, 18 Mich., 495. And see St. Louis v. Clemens, 49 Mo., 552;
Neenan v. Smith, 50 id., 525, 531. The case of Warren v. Henley, 31 Iowa, 38,
Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis., 258, which also seems to be contra,
is contra.
to
be based upon a practice in that state before the constitution was
appears
adopted. In the subsequent case of State v. Portage, 12 Wis., 562, it was held,
under a charter which permitted the expense of an improvement on the abutting lots, in proportion to the front or size of such lots respectively, an ordinance directing that eacli lot should be charged with the cost ot the improve" Tliis," says Paine, J.,
ment in front of it was void.
si^eaking of the provis"
ion of the charter, it is obvious is an entirely different principle of assessment from that which charges each lot with the entire expense of the
and serves to avoid much of the inequality and
improvement in front of
of
the
latter
As to the reasonableness and justice of an
system."
injustice
the
foot
front, compare the remarks of Carpenter, J., in Clapp
assessment by
V. Hartford, 35 Conn., 66; Mead, J., in Magee v. Commonwealth,
46 Penn. St.,
Orozier, J., in Hines v. Leavenworth,
Kans., 186.
358
v.

Detroit,

8

State

V.

Hudson,

27 JST.

J.,

214;

State v.

Hudson,

29 iu., 104, 115;

Bergen, id., 266; Warner v. Grand Haven, 30 Mich., 24.

State

«

=

;

3

it,

Christiancy,
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improved lands in a part of the district twenty dollars per
acre, and in the remainder thirty dollars per acre. The act was susStreet imtained/ as was also a similar statute in Missouri.^
acre

;

' Daily

v. Swope, 47 Miss., 367.
See the previous cases of Smitli v. Aberdeen, 25 id., 458; Williams v. Cammaok, 37 id., 209; Alcorn v. Hamer,88id.,

653.
^

Egj'ptian Levee Co. v. Hardin, 27 Mo., 495. See also the Louisiana and ArkanCrowley «. Copley, 3 La. An., 339 ; Yeatman v. Crandall, 11 id., 320 ;
Wallace v. Shelton, 14 id., 498 ; Bishop ». Marks, 15 id., 147 ; Richardson u. Mor.
gan, 16 id,, 439 ; McQ-ehee v. Mathis, 31 Ark., 40. In Wallace d. Shelton, si^pra,
the levee tax was a specific tax by the acre.
Merrick, Ch. J., says ; " In the case
of Layton v. The City of New Orleans, 13 La. An., 515, we said that nothing
prevented the legislature from adopting different principles as the bases of its
legislation. When the different municipalities were consolidated into one
city, the legislature adopted the principle, that each municipality ought to
pay its own debts; subsequently the legislature adopted the principle that it
was equal and just that the city at large should pay the very unequal debts of
the different municipalities. It was not in the power of this court to say that
the legislation was unconstitutional.
" So here the legislature has established, at different periods, different principles, in regard to the assessments made for the levee district for these parish1st. That it was right, equal and just to levy an ad valorem assesses, viz:
ment upon the lands alone ; that the property receiving the advantage should
2d. That in order to protect the people from inundation, it
bear the burden.
was just and equal that they should pay an ad iialorem assessment upon all
of their taxable projierty in the levee district. 3d. That it costs (as in the
Draining Case) as miich to protect one acre of land from inundation as it does
another ; that every acre of land in the district of land subject to overflow will
be benefited to a much greater amount than the assessment, and that, therefore, it is just and equal that every acre should pay into the hands of the agents
charged with protecting it the same sum as every other acre; and now, by a
statute, since this litigation arose; and fourthly, that the second and third
sas cases.

to be combined, and that t7ie land ought to be subject to a
It is easy to perceive,
all
other property to an ad Taloremtax.
and
tax,
specific
can
none
of
these
theories
attain
absolute
that
examination,
equality, or
by
the
different
individuals
composing a combring about exact justice among

principles ought

The first and second theories operated harshly
munitj' subject to assessment.
upon those persons who occupied high tracts of land, and had already protected
themselves by sufficient levees at their own expense ; and there may be cases of
But
individual hardships under the third and fourth theories of legislation.

it is not pretended but that the plaintiff is benefited to the full amount of his
assessment. The money he pays to the agents appointed to protect his property,
is restored to him in the increased value of his lands, and their security from
The argument that he may not wish to sell or cultivate his lands,
overflow.
and that he may prefer that the soil be raised by the overflow
not be admitted.

Salus

popuU suprema lex.

each year, can-

The obstinacy of

a

proprietor
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provements in towns are sometimes made at the cost of abutting
lots in proportion to their area, in the belief that this is an equally
reasonable and just standard of apportionment with any other.^

of Lois. This has sometimes been ordered
In
and also in the case of street improvements.

Assessment by Value

in levee

cases,

upon the lands are sometimes excluded from the valuation, and very justly so, as the
improvements, while increasing largely the market value of land
the latter case, the buildings

as such,

do not usually

buildings erected upon

erected

increase

perceptibly the value of the

it.'^

It has been shown in another
Properly Subject to Assessment.
place, that while these local assessments are laid tinder a taxing
power, they are not taxes in the ordinary understanding of that
term, and that, consequently, the usual exemptions from taxation

will not preclude the property exempted being subjected to them.^
But this statement can only be applicable when the assessment
is really made on the basis of special benefits which are supposed
to be equivalent; for, if it is laid for a work of general utility,
in the advantages of which the person assessed participates only
as one of the general public, and not as receiving special benefits,
it must be considered a general tax, and is improperly designated
Such has been the conclusion where an

an assessment.

assess-

ment was laid upon a railroad company which, by its charter, was
exempt from taxation, for the expense of widening a street along
of the capitalist wlio holds by a speculation in another,
cannot he permitted to stand in the way of the safety of a whole community.
Courts of justice cannot look to these wishes of parties, but must judge of
their liability to assessment and taxation by reference to their property. The
argument which would relieve them from the assessment in this case, would
relieve them from taxation in every other."
in

one case, or the wishes

' See

Clapp

«.

Hartford,

35

Conn.,

66 ;

Hines

ii. Leavenworth,

3

Kans., 186.

Downer ii. Boston, 7 Cush., 277; Brewer e. Springiield, 97 Mass., 153;
Creighton v. Scott, 14 Ohio, N. S., 438. The levee tax sustained in Williams
I'. Cammack 27 Miss., 209, was laid under an act which provided for a uniform tax of not exceeding ten cents per acre on all lands lying on or within
ten miles of the river within a specified county, and of five cents per acre on
lands lying ten miles or more from the river.
The court say, the act rests
upon the same basis with all other taxation.
In some cases the assessments
have been laid on the value of lots as assessed for ordinary taxes. See People
Lockwood v. St. Louis, 24 Mo., 20.
4). Whyln, 41 Cal., 851.
^ See

3^«e, pp.

147-8.
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which

its track was laid

being

of

"

such

portion

;

the

of the

assessment
expense

as
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upon the company
the commissioners

equitable and just," and not being measured by benefits.
In what respect," it is asked, " does this differ in principle from an ordinary case of taxation ? The assessment is not
required to be made with any regard to the benefit the improvedeemed

"

ment may confer upon the companj-.
From all that appears the
assessment may have been graduated by a regard to the ability
of the compan}^ to pay, to the value of its stock, or to the amount
of travel that passed through the street upon the railroad. It does
not appear that the improvement added any value to the road
*
*
itself, or to the stock of the company.
In M'bat mode
is the corporation specially benefited over any other inhabitant
of the city or traveler through its streets?
If the assessment
upon the railroad company may be sustained upon the ground of
special benefits to the corporation from the increased facilities of
travel afforded by widening

the street,

an assessment

may be

upon the same ground against the owner of every
express wagon or stage coach that travels the street. The assessIt is
ment in this case is a clear exercise of the taxing power.
made for a public purpose, and confers no special benefits upon
sustained

the property of the company." ^ These reasons take the levy out
of the category of assessments properly so called, and to which all
property specially benefited is liable to be subjected.
The reason
Personal property is not commonly thus assessed.
accrue
almost
that
benefits
generail}special
is manifest in the fact
exclusively to lands. When, however, an exceptional assessment
is levied upon a municipality, for the special benefits its people
receive from a public building, or other work of the state or of
some larger subdivision of the state, the benefits are usually quite
as much to business as to real property, and the burden would
not be equally distributed if the assessment were not laid on all
jiroperty subject to ordinary taxation, this course has generally
been adopted ; though in the case of works commonly classed
' State r. Xe-svark, 27 IN^. J., 185, 191, per Crreen,

Cli.

J. In

the same case, an

assessment upon houses and lots owned liy the company, on the basis of benefits, was supported.

'Thomas f.Leland, 24 "^end., 68; Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Penn. St., 258; Merrick r. Amherst, 12 Allen, 500; Marks c. Pardue University, 37 Ind., 155;
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under the head of "internal improvements,"

[CH.
a

5X

different course has

been sometimes taken, and real estate alone been taxed.

It

is no objection to an assessment for a local work that the
property assessed is used for a purpose that will not be speciallyadvanced by the improvement; as for instance, that it is dedicated to the purposes of sepulture,^ or is occupied by a building
erected for the purposes of public worship,^ or is devoted to school

or charitable purposes,' or constitutes the track of a railroad,* or
is put to any use to which the market value of the property is
There is nothing necessarily permanent in any
unimportant.
present use ; not sufficiently so, at least, to give it a controlling
influence in determining principles of taxation.

Even public

property is often subjected to these special'assessments
ing no more
Gordon

v.

Cornes, 47

Sheb03-gan,

2

to excuse

reason

Black,

N. Y.,

608;

;

there be-

the public from paying

for such

People

«.

Whyler,

41

Cal., 351;

Oilman

v.

510.

'

In this case the special objection
Baltimore v. Cemetery Co., 7 Md., 517.
made was, that to subject the propertyjto liability for paving would endanger
its perpetuity as a cemetery ; but the force of this, says the court, " whatever it
may be, equally applies to all the engagements and liabilities of the corporation. The building of a wall, of a church, or the improvement of the grounds,
may superinduce debt and with it disastrous consequences. Although fully

spirit which, with pious zeal and watchfulrepose of the dead, we nevertheless
feel ourselves bound to declare that we see nothing in the legislation of the
state, nor in the nature of the demand itself to exempt the appellees from
See to the same effect Buffalo City Cemetery v. Buffalo, 40 N. Y.,
liability."
sympathizing with

the laudable

ness, seeks to preserve

the undisturbed

50G.

' Matter of Mayor, etc., of New York, 11 Johns., 80; Northern Liberties v.
St. Johns Church, 13 Penn. St., 104 ; Second Universalist Society ». Providence,

6R. I.,
McAtee,

335;
8

Le Fever ». Detroit; 2 Mich., 586; Broadway Baptist Church
; Trustees of Church v. Ellis, 38 Ind., 3.

v.

Bush, 508

Cincinnati College v. State, 19 Ohio, 110; Lafayette v. Orphan Asylum, 4
La. An.,1; St. Louis Public Schools v. St. Louis, 26 Mo., 468; Sheehan v.
Good Samaritan Hospital, 50 id., 155.
•'

' Northern Indiana R. R.. Co. ii. Connelly, 10 Ohio, N. S., 159 ; New Haven
tc, R. R. Co., 38 Conn., 423; Bridgeport v. N. Y. & H. R. R.
V. Fair Haven, (
Co., 3C ill., 3o5 ; Railroad. Company v. Spearman, 12 Iowa, 112.
A street rail-

in a street where the track is laid as may
benefits
for
for
widening the street.
Appeal of North
be specially
Beiich, etc., R. R. Co., 33 Cal., 499; Chicago v. Baer, 41 111., 306. Compare
wiiy compmy

has such an interest

assessed

this with State

v.

Newark,

27

N. J.,

185.
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benefits than there would be to excuse from payment when property is taken under the eminent domain.^
6. Proceedings in levying and collecting
These will now require some consideration.

assessments.

Estimating Benefits. It has been said that, in assessing benefits,
the only safe and practicable course, and the one which will do
equal justice to all parties, is to consider what will be the influence of the proposed

improvement on the market value of the
what
the
property ;
property is now fairly worth in the market,
and what will be its value when the improvement is made.^ A
test of this character should be applied by the legislature before
establishing any arbitrary rule of assessment, such for instance, as
one which measures benefits by the length of frontage.
There
can be no justification for any proceeding which charges the land
with an assessment greater than the benefits ; it is a plain case of
appropriating private property to public uses without compensation.' It is conceded that the legislative judgment, that a certain
district is or will be so far specially benefited by an improvement
as to justify a special assessment, is conclusive, and that its determination as to what shall be the basis of the assessment is equally

To invoke the intervention of a court for relief
against the results of its conclusion, is to invoke the judicial auconclusive.

give its judgment controlling effect over that of the
legislature, in a matter of the apportionment of a tax, which by
thority to

' See Baltimore

i>. Cemetery Co., 7 Md., 517, 536, per Le Grand, Ch. J., St.
Louis Public Scliools v. St. Louis, 36 Mo., 468. But exempting public property from the assessment does not render it illegal. People «. Austin, 47 Cal.,

353.

J., in matter of Furman St., 17 Wend., 668, cited with approval
Newark,
35 N. J., 157, 167.
It is held in Massachusetts that an
in State v.
assessment for the alteration of a street will date from the order for the alteration. Jones V. Boston, 104 Mass., 461, citing Parks v. Boston, 15 Pick., 198 ;
Meacham «. Pitchburg, etc., R. R. Co., 4 Cush., 291 ; Whitman v. Boston, etc.,
R. R. Co., 7 Allen. 313.
"^Branson,

3 Tide

Water Co.

Wend., 244

;

v. Costar,

18

Matter of Canal St.,

11

K J.

Eq., 518; Canal Bank v. Alban}^ 9
155 ; Matter of Drainage of Lands,
La, An., 229; New Orleans v. Drainan assessment of benefits, that it is

Wend.,

N. J., 497; Yeatman v. Crandall, 11
ing Co., id., 338. It is no objection to
made in proportion to value ; that may be a proper basis
think it just. Piper's Appeal, 88 Cal., 530.
35

if the

commissioners
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This is
matter of legislation.
confessedly inadmissible in any case where the legislative power
has not been exceeded by an apportionment merely colorable.
An assessment so grossly and palpably unjust and oppressive, as
to give demonstration that the legislative judgment had never
determined the case on the principles of taxation, must always be
concession on

all sides is purely

A

''a

property is not to be taken from
him with impunity, and without redress, by simply calling the
appropriation an assessment, when it is not such in its elements.
open

to correction.

man's

When the estimate of benefits is referred to assessors, by whatever name they may be called, the same rule of conclusiveness

must apply.

The remedy of one who considers

himself unfairly

assessed is to apply for redress to the statutory tribunal,

provided with the power to review.

In all collateral

if one

is

proceedings,

the benefits assessed are conclusively presumed to be received, and
the assessment is not open to revisal or review.-'
•Baltimore v. Huglies, 1 Gill. & J., 480; Nor. Indiana E. E. Co. v. Connolly
N. S., 159, 165; Commonwealth i). Woods, 44Tenn. St., 113; Wray s.
Pittsburg, 46 Penn. St. 365, 369. Counterclaims of parties for damages cannot he set off against the assessment.
Whitney d. Boston, 106 Mass., 89. The
English sewer cases allow great latitude to the commissioners in the assessment of benefits. They are largely collated in Soady v. Wilson, 3 Ad. & El.,
348, and it is said by Lord Denman, Ch. J., " from Keighley's Case, 10 Eep.,
142 b. to Eex v. Commissioners of Sewers_for the Tower Hamlets, 9 B. & C,
517, the doctrine laid down in them all is uniform and undisputed, as applicable to the present question.
It rests on the principle, that every one whoso
property derives benefit from the works of the commissioners, may be assessed
to the rates they impose.
The benefit is not required to be immediate, nor do
10 Ohio,

the cases, or the commission

itself, or the statutes, say anything of the nature
Possibly that benefit may be so extremely small,
that a jury would not have found the fact stated in the case. But on the other
hand the benefit may be of high, value, as if a house were inaccessible because surrounded by marshes, and the work of sewerage had made them hard
and passable. * * If the commissioners had jurisdiction, this court would
not inquire whether they had correctly exercised their judgment, in an action
of trespass for levying the rate. But as the jurisdiction results from the fact
of benefit being derived, and the case expressly states that some benefit was
derived, we think ourselves bound by the finding to say that the defendant had
or amount of the benefit.

authority to levy the rate, and is consequently entitled to our judgment."
It
is nevertheless held competent to show, in opposition to the assessment, that
no benefit was received. This is on the ground that jurisdiction to make any
assessment against a party, depends on his premises being benefited, and the
commissioners cannot determine the question of jurisdiction in their own
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The broad latitude of legislative and administrative discretion in these cases, uadoubtedly opens the door to many
abuses, and it may be a reason for carefully criticising the proin order to

that the law has been strictly observed ;
but it can constitute no reason for the judiciary taking upon itself the correction of legislative mistakes and errors of judgment.
When a judicial review is given of the proceedings of
ceedings,

see

may be aSorded for laying down the
proper controlling principles ; but in other cases it must be assumed that the assessors have had the proper rules in view for
assessors, an opportunity

It

their own direction.

is clear that any assessment is wrong
■which charges lands with a sum beyond the special benefits received.
If the cost of any improvement exceeds the local and
peculiar benefits, the improvement should either not be made at
all, or the excess should be assumed by the public, and become a
part of the general levy. In making an assessment of actual
benefits,

it may undoubtedly be proper to take into consideration

the fact of the property being devoted to a permanent use, which
for the time being at least, renders the market value of little or
no moment.
It has already been stated that this does not pre-

As has been justclude the property being assessed for benefits.
ly remarked of some cases of this nature which have been conwhen lands were devoted to church or

sidered by the courts,

"objections to the assessment proceed on
the ground that the owner cannot apply the property to any
new or different use.
When the owner has the unrestrained
power of alienation, and the property may be converted to any
cemetery

purposes,^

new use at his pleasure,

it is difficult to

see how,

upon any prin-

ciple, an exception can be made to the rule regarding only the
market value. After the owner has escaped what would otherwise be a great burden, on the ground that he dotis not intend to
property in a way which will make the improvement
beneficial, he may change his mind, throw the property into the
use

the

favor conclusively. Masters v. Scroggs, 3 M. & S., 447; Stafford v. Hamston,
The American doctrine
See Neave v. Weather, 3 Q. B., 984.
2 B. & B., GDI.
once established, no
in
And
England,
ratability
is clearly the other way.
Regina v. Head,
question of the amount of benefit is permitted to be raised.
9

Jur., N.

S., 871.

' Matter of Mayor, etc.,

11

Johns., 77; Matter of Albany Street, llWcnd.,

150.
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and realize advantages for which others have been made
to pay." 1 And the remark is as applicable to those temporarily
appropriated to church or other special purposes as to any others.
market,

The fact is only

a

circumstance to be considered by the

assessors

in making up their estimate.*
The fact that a railroad company, or a plankroad or turnpike
company has an easement in a public street of a permanent nature,
and the right to occupy

it for the corporate

purposes,

does not

preclude the street being improved at the expense of adjoining
property. It still remains a public street, and subject to the same
right of control as before, except as the right is qualified by the
easement granted to the private corporation.^

Although the assessment for

local improvement must be
limited to the cost,* yet there is no reason in the nature of things
why it should not be made before the work is actually done,
and before the cost shall be finally and conclusively determined.
a

It

is usually desirable that the collection of the assessment should
proceed as the work progresses, that the contractor or workmen
may be paid when it is completed.

Indeed the charters

of very

J., in State v. Newark, 35 N. J., 157, 167.
' The assessment in Nor. Ind. R. R. Co. v. Connelly, 10 Ohio, N. S., 159, was
by frontage on the land appropriated by the railroad company for its track,
and was sustained, the court holding that the question of actual benefit was
In Bridgeport v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co., 36
not open for consideration.
Conn., 255, it was denied that the easement of the railroad company in the
land occupied for its track could he assessed for benefits for laying out a
In New Haven v. Fair Haven, etc., R. R. Co., 38 Conn.,
street along its side.
422, the rails, sleepers, ties and spikes of a street railway company, so laid
into and attached to the soil of the street as to become part of the realty, were
held properly assessable as real estate for paving the street. The same decision was previously made in Appeal of North Beach, etc.., R. R. Co., 32 Cal.,
499, where an able opinion was delivered by Sawyer, J., who reviews the case
of State V. Newark, 27 N. J., 186, and points out the diflFerence in the benefits
likely to be received by a street railway when the street in which its track is
laid is improved, and those which a railway between distant points might be
The assessment
suijposcd to derive from a like improvement along its track.
in Burlington, etc., R. R. Co. ii. Spearman, 12 Iowa, 112, was on the depot
grounds of the company, for a sidewalk, and seems to have been laid irrespective of the special use.
' Woodhull,

V. Detroit, 5 Mich., 336; State
New Brunswick, 34 id., 395.

^Bagg
State D.
■■

SoUenely

v.

Commonwealth,

v.

Atlantic City,

36 Penu. St , 9.

34

N. J.,

99.

And

see
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many cities forbid tbat any payments shall be made by the corporation, for any street or other local work, except from a fund to
be provided by a special assessment made for the purpose ; and it
is obvious that such works would only be constructed at very serious disadvantage, and at much greater expense, if no payment
could be made as the work progressed.
It has been said, that in

The work

pect to these improvements.

is

is

it,
a

assessing benefits under statutes permitting
city common
"
council
the agent and instrument of the land owners in res-

to be conducted and

But

it

Its authority must be strictly pursued."

^

is

it

;

is

to ascertain how much cercompleted under its direction. It
tain owners are to pay and others receive
to collect the money
and see that
applied to the purposes of the improvement.

must also, in or-

is

it

if

der to be enabled to perform its agency to advantage, be allowed
to make the assessment, and even the collection
shall be
deemed proper, in advance.
It has been repeatedly held that this
The assessment must of course be made upon an

admissible.^

estimate which may be more or less incorrect, as all estimates for

If

a

a

public works are likely to be, but the liability to error ought not
to defeat
general levy for future purspecial any more than
is

it

it

it

not fatal,^ though the excess
prove too large
properly belongs to the lot owners, who would be entitled to have
returned to them.
In assessing benefits the cost of the whole work distributed
poses.

;

is

the assessors
to be kept in view
through the whole district
can not restrict themselves in the case of any particular lot to the
cost of the improvement in front of it.* But at the same time

4

76.
v. Baltimore,

Md., 853;

Scoville

V.

Cleveland,

1

3

1

8

2

N. Y., 130; Henderson
Manice d. New York,
Ohio, N. S-, 139.
Scoville V. Cleveland,

8

Hill,

;

;

4

'

Brown, J., in Howell v. Buflfalo, 15 N. Y., 513, citing McCullougli v. BrookDenio, 530 Sharp «. Spier,
lyn, 23 Wend., 458 Lake v. Williamsburgh,

Ohio, N.

S., 136.

is

if

a

*

Ex parte Mayor of Albany, 23 Wend., 377. See State v. Portage, 13 Wis.,
street improvement, squares formed by the intersec
When in making
567.
the object in
tion of other streets are crossed and improved, the city may,
the improvement of the street, assess the whole eximproving the squares,
pense upon the same property on which the other expenses of the improveCreighton J). Scott, 14 Ohio, N. S., 438. See Motz D.Dements are assessed.
troit, 18 Mich., 495.
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they must carefully keep within

tive
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As

[CH.

the district

;

this is

as

XS.

impera-

it is in ordinary taxation.^

in the case of ordinary taxes, assessments

against the land as such, or against

separate

interests which

shall presufficient descriptior of

have in the land, according as the statute

individuals

In either

scribe.

the

are made either

case, there

should be

a

of identification,^ and in the latter oaje,
it is imperative that the separate interests be taken notice of in

the land for the purpose
the assessment.^
Proceedings

in

Assessment.

These differ too much in different

in detail.

Some general

principles may
The statute authority must be strictly
nevertheless be stated.
This rule is fundamental and imperative. Not that it
pursued.
must be literally followed, but the observance of every one of its
states to be considered

substantial requirements must be regarded as a condition precedent to the validity of any assessment.* A common requirement
'Jlatter of Liviagslon Street, 18 Wend., 556; Turpia b. Eagle Creek, etc.,
Gravel Road Co., 48 lud., 45. A statute provided for viewers to decide upon
tlie expediency of a proposed street extension and to " ascertain, and determine what lots in the vicinity of said extension, will probably be benefited by
the opening of the said street, and divide and apportion, on equitable principles, the amount that each shall separately contribute to defray the damage
incurred," etc. Held, that the term "vicinity" is not a matter of eye sight
only, but for the judgment also.
Penn. St., 26, 32.

-Sharp

V.

Johnson,

' Matter of

4

Hill,

Bogers,

J., in Extension of Hancock

St., 18

92.

De Graw Street,
occupants " for benefits is not

18 "Wend.,

568.

An

assessment to " owners and

the same thing as an assessment on the lands.
"
Spier, 4 Hill, 76. Where the assessment Is to be of the benefits beyond that general advantage which all real ijroperty in the city may receive
therefrom," and the adjudication is that the estates have been benefited cer-

Sharp

v.

tain amounts, this is presumed to have been made as the ordinance contemplates. Jones V. Boston, 104 Mass., 461. Where, by the statute, the assessupon "the enhanced value of the land," the improvement
must be excluded from consideration.
People v. Austin, 47

ment is authorized
upon the land
Cal., 353.

etc.. Draining Co. v. Alkire, 36 Ind., 189; In re Astor, 50 N. T.,
re Cameron, id., 502; Sharp v. Spier, 4 Hill, 76; Covington ». Casey, 3
Bush, 698; Warner v. Grand Haven, 30 Mich., 24; Henderson v. Baltimore, 8
Md., 352; Jones «. Boston, 104 Mass., 461. A contract for a local improvement ncpd not include the whole work embraced in the resolution providing

*Nevins,

363;

In

for it; this is matter of discretion.

Emery

v.

San Praucisco Gas Co.,

31

Cal,
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is that the improvement shall be asked for or assented to by a
majority or some other proportion of those who would be taxed.
The want of a compliance with this requirement is fatal in any

And any decision or certificate of

stage of the proceedings.^

the

proper authorities that the requisite application or consent had
been made, would not be conclusive, but might be disproved.^
Collection

of

These are made

Assessments.

as the statute

shall

prescribe; and what has been said regarding the collection of the
ordinary taxes is applicable here.^

A

resolution

456.
o.

Baltimore,

Hill,

Md., 500

Henderson

v.

Baltimore,

id., 352

;

Steuart

8

'

47

providing that a street shall be improved "where necesEichardson n. Heydenfeldt, 46 Cal., 68 ; People v. Clark,

;

id.,

sary," is nugatory.

7

240.

Sharp

;

;

Hill, 76, where the village authorities had deSo held in Sharp v. Spier,
And
that the proper authorities had petitioned for the improvement.
4

'

;

2

4

;

8

4

v. Spier,
76 Howard v. First Independent Church, 17 Md., 451 HowBush, 493 Hitchcock v. Galveston, IT. S. Circuit, Eastern
ard V. Bristol,
District of Texa'?,
Central Law Journal, 331, citing Jennings c. Moss,
Texas, 453 Frazier v. Todd, id., 461.

cided

is

a

no defense to an assessment for improving
30

a

It

is

2

6

;

9

is

5

it

3

a

a

a

a

it

a

;

it

a

8

Md., 352, where the statute required the assent
in Henderson v. Baltimore,
in writing of majority of proprietors of land fronting on the street, before
the paving of the street could be ordered,
was held that the assent must apof the commissioners that
in
fact
to
that
the
certificate
have been given
pear
had
prima facie
the requisite number of proprietors
assented, was only
would do so at their
warrant of authority, and those who should act under
peril. See also People s. Batchellor, 53 N. Y., 128, and cases referred to, ante,
of street and an as"Where the statute permitted the improvement
p. 254.
petition therefor in
sessment of expense on the owners fronting thereon, on
writing, by the owners of the larger part of the ground between the points to
vote of all the members elect,
be improved, provided that the council, by
might order such improvement without such petition. Held, that an ordipetition, was innance not passed by the vote of all, in the absence of such
valid. Covington v. Casey, Bush, 698. "Whore the ordinance was required
"
to be passed with the unanimous consent of the mayor and councilmen in
"
purported to be passed by the mayor and board of councilcouncil," and
men," held that unanimous consent was to be understood, nothing to the conBush, 508. (The record
trary appearing of record. Lexington v. Headley,
showed an affirmative vote of all the aldermen, but was silent as to the mayor,
though he signed the proceedings.) Compare Hoyt v. East Saginaw, 19 Mich.,
sufficient ordering of the work, see "Wright v.
On the point, what
39.
Cush., 233 State v. New Brunswick, 30 N. J., 395. There
no
Boston,
the
where
the
expense
public
at
of
has
not
right
to
been
obway
grade
power
Kan., 274. And see ante, p. 97.
Leavenworth v. Laing,
tained.
street that certain

city
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is customary to declare
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XX

by statute that the assessment shall

be a lien on the real estate assessed, and
ofBcers were interested

[CH.

in the contract.

that the lien shall be

Schenley

v. Commonwealth,

36

St., 29.

It

has become a common provision in city charters that, in contracting for
city improvements, the contractor shall look solely to an assessment against
The following decislot owners to he laid for the cost of the improvement.
ions have been made under such provisions.
Illinois. Under a contract to look only to the special assessment, the contractor has no other remedy, providing the city is in good faith, and with
reasonable diligence, proceeding to make collections by means of such assessments. Chicago v. People, 48 111., 416. But if the city has no power to make
such an assessment, and the improvement has been made without any express
contract, the city is liable, upon an implied contract, to pay in the usual way,
it was understood the contractor should rely on an assessnotwithstanding

Maher v. Chicago, 38 111., 366. See, also, Chicago v. People, 56 id., 327.
Louisiana. When the contractor for a public work loses his remedy against
the land, b}' reason of the neglect of the authorities to give the proper notice
to the owner, or of other fault on their part, an action may be maintained
Bouligny v. Dormenon, 2
against the municipality for the contract price.
Mart. La., N. S., 455 ; Newcomb v. Police Jury, 4 Rob. La., 233 ; O'Brien v.
Police Jury, 2 La. An., 355 ; Michel v. Police Svaj, 3 id., 123 ; Same v. Same,
9 id., 67.
If the municipality contracts with a paver that lot proprietors shall
paj' a certain portion of the cost of the pavement, and they refuse or neglect
to do so, the municipality is liable.
Cronan v. Municipality No. 1, 5 La. An.,
537.
So, if by contract the municipality is to pay one-third the cost of a
work and the lot owners two-thirds, but, by suit, it is determined that the lot
owners can be charged one-third only, the municipality is liable for the twothirds.
Fournier e. Municipality No. 1, 5 La. An., 298. As to suits in the
name of the corporation for the benefit of the contractor, see New Orleans ».
Wire, 20 La. An., 500.
Wisconsin.
When the contractor is to be paid by certificates, showing the
amount chargeable to each lot, which are to be collected as a tax, he cannot
maintain an action against the citj"-, but must depend on the collection of the
certificates.
Whaleu v. La Crosse, 16 Wis., 271 ; Finney v. Oshkosh, 18 id.,
209; Fletcher v. Oshkosh, 18 id., 232.
ment.

Kentucky. When the contractor has agreed to take and collect the assessments as his pay, he cannot hold the city liable, unless it may be in cases
where the whole proceedings are void, or the city neglects its duty; as where

it fails

of the charter necessary to make the lot
Kearney
Covington, 1 Met. (Ky.), 339. For a case of very
contract,
see Louisville v. Henderson, 5 Bush, 515.
peculiar
Where artesian wells were ordered on a petition, the order
llaryland.
reciting: " the petitioners to be responsible for all expenses that may occur
in sinking said artesian wells, if a failure should take place in the attempt to
procure water,'- it was held, the contractors must look to the petitioners, and
not to the city. Kuppert «, Baltimore, 23 Md., 184.
to observe the requirements

owners liable.

i).

CH.

TAXATION BY SPECIAL ASSESSMENT.

XS.J

467

enforced by a sale, or by means of some other remedy whicli the
statute prescribes.'
Kansas. Wlien, before ordering an improvement, it was necessary tliat a
petition should be presented by a majority of the resident property owners
to be affected thereby; and that there should be a stipulation in the contract
tliat the contractor should look to the property owners benefited for his pay,
and that the city would not be liable, a contract was let without such petition

being presented, and not containing the above stipulation; it was held,i\mt
the contractor, after failing to collect the amount from the property holders,
could not make" the city liable for the amount. Leavenworth v. Rankin, 2
Kans., 357. But in Kansas, the city is primarily liable to a contractor for
grading, and, unless it levies a valid tax and provides some means for enforcing it against the lot owners, it will remain liable. Leavenworth v. Mills, 6
Kans., 388.

Indiana. Where the charter provides that the city shall be liable for the
paving of so much of the street as is occupied by streets or alleys crossing the
same, and that the contractor must look to the owners of the bordering lands
for the remainder; luld, that if the contractor failed to collect from these proprietors, he could not recover the amount from the city.
Kew Albany o.
Sweeney, 13 Ind., 345. See, also, Johnson «. Indianapolis, 16 id., 227.
See Lucas v. San Francisco, 7 Cal,, 463, 474, for a doctrine corCalifornia.
responding to that in the case cited above from Indiana.
Massachusetts. When the contractor for a dike was to be paid from assessments, and after their payment the town was, by statute, liable, it was held,
there was no liability until such payment.
Hendrick v. West Springfield, 107
Mass., 541.

When by law, and by his contract, the contractor is to look only
fund raised by assessment for his compensation, he cannot hold
the city liable in the absence of any negligence in levying or collecting the
assessment. See Goodrich v. Detroit, 13 Mich., 279 ; Second National Bank
Michigan.

to a special

But the city is liable if it misappropriates the special
25 id., 207.
Chaffee v. Granger, 6 Mich., 51 ; Lansing c. Van Gorder, 24 id., 456.
New York. Where, by city charter, the contractor for a city work is to be
paid from an assessment levied for the purpose, ho cannot maintain a suit
Lansing,

V.

fund.

against the city before the assessment is collected, in the absence of default
Hunt «. Utica, 18 N. Y., 443.
on the part of the oflicers to proceed therewith.

Brooklyn, 31 Barb., 143; Swift v. Williamsburg, 24 id., 437.
Where the contractor binds himself to look to the property
Minnesota.
owners for his pay, but fails to do so, the city is not liable even though it has
Lovell
taken ineffectual steps to make collections from the property owners.
V. St. Paul, 10 Minn., 390.
Iowa. If a city agrees to collect the assessment, and fails to do so, it is
Morgan v. Dubuque, 38 Iowa, 575.
liable.
Ohio. If the contractor takes an assignment of the assessment in payment,
he cannot look to the city to make up any deficiency in consequence of assessments exceeding the value of lots. Creighton «. Toledo, 18 Ohio, N. S., 447.
See Beard v.

'

In

People

v.

Brooklyn,

4

N. Y.,

419, the assessment was made upon

" the
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is no defense to an assessment that the contract for the work

The proper authoriaccording to its terms.
ties must decide upon this, and if they accept the work, the
And even
acoeptance, in the absence of frauds, is conclusive.
•was

not performed

fraud, it would seem, could not be accepted as a defense to an
assessment, but should be determined in some direct proceeding
instituted for the purpose.*
On this point the following remarks
have been made in one case

struction of

in which an assessment for the con-

a sewer was contested.

"It

is needless to observe

owners and occupants of all the lands benefited thereby, in proportion to the
amount of such benefit."
It was made a lien on the land, but was to be collected of the personal property of the owner, and if none, then of the land.

As to lien, see also Walsh v. Mathews, 29 Cal., 133 ; Emery v. Bradford, id., 75 ;
McMasters v. Commonwealth, 3 Watts, 393 ; Philadelphia ■».Tiyon, 35 Penn.
When the assessment is on
St., 401; Schenley ■».Commonwealth, 36 id., 39.
land, irrespective of the value of buildings, the lien nevertheless affects the
buildings. Wright ». Boston, 9 Cush., 233. When an assessment for widening
a street is made a lien on the lot in the nature of mortgage, with authority in
the city to sell for its satisfaction, and a sale is made which is void, and money
refunded, the lien remains, and the sale is no bar to further proceedings to
collect.
New York v. Colgate, 13 N. Y., 149. Held, in the same case, that a
lien is not barred sooner than a mortgage would be.
■

Municipality ». Guillotte, 14 La. An., 297 ; Dougherty ii. Miller, 36 Cal., 83 ;
Taylor v. Palmer, 31 id., 240; Cochran i). Collins, 29 id., 129: Emery v. Bradford, 29 id., 75. In the case last cited, Sawyer, J., says: " In this case the
contract is admitted by the pleadings to have been performed to the satisfaction of the superintendent.
It was a duty devolved upon that officer to deter-

mine that question of fact, and he did determine it. There is no fraud charged
— nothing but an error in judgment.
The law afforded the defendant a
remedy in the regular course of the proceeding itself, by which he might have

had the error reviewed, and the defect, if any, remedied.
He did not avail
himself of the remedy, but declined to appeal, and now seeks to review the
determination of the superintendent collaterally.
We think, by this neglect
to appeal, he has acquiesced

in

the approval of the work by the superintendent,
is conclusive.
The principles applicable to the
review of assessments of other taxes would apply here, and such would be the
result in respect to ordinary taxes for state, county and municipal purposes.
Conlin ». Seaman, 22 Cal., 549; Peoria «. Kidder, 26 111., 358; Aldrich v.

and that his determination

R Co., 1 Poster, 361; Hughes v. Kline, 30 Penn. St., 230, 231;
New York, 33 Barb., 150; Lowell v. Hadley, 8 Met., 194; Williams v. Holden, 4 Wend., 237, 228; Boulon v. Neilson, 3 Johns., 475, 476;
Windsor v. Field, 1 Conu., 384. It was decided in Nolan v. Reese, 33 Cal.,
484, that fraud in letting the contract was no defense to an assessment.
It
might doubtless be a reason for enjoining the execution of the contract, on a
bill filed in due season.
Cheshire

E.

Bandford

c.
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that no miscoastraction or malconstruction of the work, arising
from the incapacity, the honest mistake, or the fraud of the contractor, would

invalidate

the

assessment, or relieve the parties

In this

the property owners, assessed under the provisions of the law for the cost
of a sewer, must stand upon the same footing with parties assessed
for taxes for the public benefit.
They take the hazard incident
to all public improvements, of their being faulty or useless,
assessed from the obligation to pay it.

respect

The pretext
through the incapacity or fraud of public servants.
behis
assessment
that the tax payer shall avoid the payment of
cause the funds are injudiciously applied, is the worst form of
repudiation."

^

cannot be sold for such
assesments without specific legislation for the purpose.
The ordinary authority to sell lands for taxes is not applicable to the case.
Collection hy Sale

of Lands.

Lands

The reasons for this conclusion are well given in a New York
case, from which a quotation is given in the note.^
But any fail' Green,

Chancellor,

in State

v.

Jersey City,

29

N. J.,

441, 449.

' " But it is said that the power to sell lands for these assessments may be
found in the seventh section of the act which provides ' that whenever any
tax of any description on lands or tenements in the said village shall remain
unpaid,' and the collector shall make afSdavit

'

that the owner or owners of the

'

cannot he found, or that he has not
premises on wMch the same is imposed
suflBcient personal estate in the village whereon the tax can be levied, the
trustees may take order for advertising in a newspaper, for the space of three
'

requiring the owners of such lands and tenements respectin case of default, ' such lands and tenements '
notwithstanding such notice,' the tax shall not be paid,
will be sold, ' and
then
shall and may be lawful for the said trustees to cause such lands and
tenements to be sold at auction for term of years.' Now the first remark
only authorizes the sale of lands for the payment
upon this section is, that
inextends to
tax of any description,' still
of a tax and although
tax of some kind. Our laws have made
plain distinccludes nothing but
tion between taxes which are burdens or charges imposed upon persons or
property, to raise money for public purposes, and assessments for city and village improvements, which are not regarded as burdens, but as an equivalent
or compensation for the enhanced value which the property of the person
assessed has derived from the improvement.
This distinction has been made
in several statutes, long before Brooklyn was incorporated, and was fully
exemplified in the Matter of the Mayor of New York (11 Johns., 77). There,
several churches in the city of New York had been assessed for the sup'posed
benefit v/hich they would derive from the enlarging of Nassau street, and
months

thereby

to pay the tax, and that

it

'

a

a

a

it it

a

it

;

'

if,

ively,'
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ure to give express authority for this purpose must be exceptional and accidental ; it is usually conferred with a lien and specific
directions for the enforcement.
Under some statutes the assessment or list when completed is handed over to the contractor for
to enforce the lien in his own favor.^
When this is done, it is generally under provisions of law which
impose upon the contractor all responsibility for the collection.

the work, who proceeds

It is customary not only to
Personal Liability for Assessments.
make the assessment a lien on the land, but also to make it a perThere is some difficulty in prinsonal charge against the owner.
ciple in doing this ; a difficulty which in two states has been
found insurmountable, the courts holding that in principle, at

least,

it is not permissible.^
they denied the legality of the assessment, because it had been expressly enacted that ' no church or place of public worship shall be taxed by any law
of this state.' But the objection was overruled, and the exemption claimed
by the churches denied, on the ground that the assessment could not properly
be regarded as a tax. This case apparently goes the whole length of deciding
the one now before us. The authority is to sell for a tax, and the defendant

In Bleecker i>.
shows nothing but an assessment for a village improvement.
Ballon, 3 Wend., 263, the question was upon an assessment for pitching and
paving a street, and Savage, Ch. J., said : ' there is no doubt that the assessment in question was not a tax, that being a sum imposed as, is supposed, for
some public object.' " Per Branson, J., in Sharp v. Spier, 4 Hill, 76, 83. To
the same point are Mclnery v. Reid, 23 Iowa, 410 ; Merriam i). Moody's Exectors, 25 id., 163 ; Paine v. Spratley, 5 Kans., 525 : Leavenworth v. Laing, 6 id.,
274.
In some of the states these assessments are by statute made collectible
in the same manner as the ordinary taxes. See Morrison v. Hershire 32
Iowa, 371.
Northern Indiana B. R. Co. v. Connelly, 10 Ohio, N.
Palmer, 31 Cal., 240; Chambers v. Satterlee, 40 id., 497.
' See
V.

S., 159;

Taylor

' The cases referred to are Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal., 240, 254, opinion by
J., and Neenan v. Smith, 50 Mo., 525, opinion by Bliss, J., afterwards approved in Carlin v. Cavender, 56 id., 286, and St. Louis v. Brester,
Sanderson,
id., 350.
a broad distinction, and one of universal recognition, between the
upon which is based the right of general taxation for governmental purposes, and that which supports the right of local assessments.
The
authority to impose either is referred to the taxing power; but the object of

"There is

foundation

one, as giving the authority, widely differs from that of the other. All taxation is supposed to be for the benefit of the person taxed. That for raising a
general revenue is imposed primarily for his protection as a member of society, both in his person and his property in general, and hence the amount as-
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the case of the ordinary taxes no sufficient reason exists why

those ou lands should not be made

personal charge against the
owner, if he is a resident and has the usual opportunity to be
heard.
The taxes are not so much assessed in respect to the particular lands, as the value of the particular lands is taken as the
He is not taxed in conmeasure of the owner's duty to the state.
a

sideration of state protection to that particular item of property,
but he is taxed for the general protection which the state affords
to his life, his liberty, his family and social relations, his property,

If a tax measand the various privileges the law grants to him.
ured by the property should, in its enforcement, take from him
more than that property is worth, it would not follow that the
state had taken beyond the equivalent

Indeed, the
is different in the

rendered.

contrary "would be almost certainly the fact. It
case of an assessment made upon the basis of benefits.

Such an

liim, to be cliarged upon his property, and may be collected
of him personally.
But, on the other hand, local taxes for local improvements
sessed is against

are merely assessments upon the property benefited by such improvements, and
to pay for the benefits -which they art! supposed to confer ; the lots are increased

in value,

or better adapted to the uses of town lots, by the improvement. Upon
Other propno other ground will such partial taxation for a moment stand.
erty held by the owner is affected by this improvement precisely and only as
is the property of all other members of the community, and there is no reason
it should be made to contribute, that does not equally apply to that of all
others. The sole object, then, of a local tax being to benefit local property;

■why

it should

be a charge upon that property only, and not a general one upon the
The latter, indeed, is not what is understood by local or special asowner.
sessment, but the very term would confine it to the property in the locality ;
for, if the owner be personally liable, it is not only a local assessment, but also

The reasonableness of this restriction
the owner.
appear when we reflect that there is no call for a general execution until
that is all sold to pay the assessment,
the property charged is exhausted.
we should have the legal amonaly
otherwise,
collected
to
be
a
balance
leaving
a general one as against

will

If

the monstrous injustice — of not only wholly absorbing the property supposed to be benefited and rendered more valuable by the improvement, but
the loss of his other property.
also of entailing upon the owner
oreatly doubt whether the legislature has the power to authorize a genfor its
eral charge upon the owner of local property which may be assessed
the municiesDecial benefit, unless the owners of all taxable property within
benefitspecially
to
so
not
be
property
to
all
As
charged.
are equally

I

pality

footing with others ; he has precisely the same inand should be subject to no greater burdens." Per Bliss, J., in NeeSmith, 50 Mo., 535, 538.

ed, he staud.^ on the same
terests,

nan
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assessment regards nothing but the benefit that is to be conferred
The levy is made on the supposition
upon the particular estate.

having received the benefit of a public improvement, ought to relieve the public from the expense of making
In such case, the owner can have his land taken from him for
sold for the
the land
supposed benefit to the land, which,
estate,

is

a

if

a

if

it.

that that

is

a

is

a

is

it

thus conclusively shown he has not received, and he
tax,
then be held liable for
deficiency in the assessment, the injusBut such case
manifest.
tice — not to say the' tyranny —

sale of lands for the

drain or

levee, the whole

a

special assessment for

a

payment of

a

inflict, are certain to occur.
The cases are not uncommon in which, on

a

it

;

a

if

assessments are made
liable to occur
personal charge and
in principle, though less extreme in the injury they
cases like

a

a

is

Such instances may
sold and lost to the owner.
If
the
statute allows
in
occur
the case of other improvements.
sale to the highest bidder, the land may be lost to the owner, leaving balance of the assessment still uncollected. The loss of his
estate assessed

;

incident to

a

is

proper exercise of the power of the government, and though severe, can give him no ground for complaint.
The assessors have perhaps erred in their judgment but this may
lands

a

The estate was lawfully charged
occur in any tax proceeding.
with the supposed benefit, and the charge has been enforced.
But where and what are the benefits to the individual, for which
sale of the
he can be called upon to pay any deficiency after
Unless the whole legal basis of these assessments has
would seem that there are
been misunderstood by the courts,
But the practice of making these assessments
none whatever.

a

it

estate?

this nature have been enforced in

a

of

a

personal charge against resident owners, has been almost universal.
The English statutes go so far as to make them
personal charge
"
" the
or
future
owner
of
the
any
present
property asagainst
In the United States, personal assessments
sessed until paid.^
great numbei- of

How

cases.^

;

;

8

6

'

Vestiy of Bermondsey v. Ramsey, Law Rep., C. P., 247 Plumstead Board
Exch., 63 affirmed, id., 174.
of Works V. Ingoldsby, Law Rep.,
2

;

8

;

2

;

4

]
1

'

New York d. Colgate, 12 N. Y., 141
Sand.,
Gilbert v. Havermeyer,
N. Y., 120: People s. Hearing, 27 id., 308; Sharp
v. New York,
Hill, 76 Cuming v. Brooklyn,
V. Johnson,
Paige, 600 McCuUoch v.
Gouverneur
v. New York,
Brooklyn, 23 Wend., 459;
Paige, 437; Doughty s.
See

508; Manice

OH.
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mucli of this may be due to the fact that the right to make a personal assessment was not contested, can only be matter of conjecture ; but at present it must be conceded that the overwhelming
weight of authority is in favor of the right.
Hope,

3

Denio,

253 ; Bennett v.

Buffalo,

17

N. Y.,

People b. Brooklyn, 4
Ballou, 3 Wend., 263
Howard, 6 H. & J., 383

383 ;

id., 420; Brewster «. Syracuse, 19 id., 118; Bleecker

«.

Litchfield v. McComber, 42 Barb., 288 ; Baltimore v.
Eschbacks. Pitts, 6 Md., 71; Clemens «. Baltimore, 16 id., 208; Patterson v
Society, etc., 24 N. J., 385; Nor. Lib. «, St. Johns Church, 13 Ponn. St., 104
New Orleans v. Wire, 20 La. An., 500 ; Nichols «. Bridgeport, 23 Conn., 190
Lowell V. French, 6 Cush., 223; Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio, N. S., 243; Ernst v.
Kunkle, id., 529 ; Creighton v. Scott, 14 id., 439 ; Beeves v. Treasurer of Wood
Co., 8 id., 333 ; Le Fever v. Detroit, 2 Mich., 586 ; Lovell v. St. Paul, 10 Minn.,
290 ; Hazzard v. Heacock, 39 Ind., 172.
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CHAPTEE XXI.
LOCAL TAXATION UNDER LEGISLATIVE COMPULSION.

The general doctrine.

In our discussions hitherto, it has

been

assumed as a fundamental idea in republican government, that the

people who are to pay the taxes must vote them, either directly
or by their proper representatives.
State taxes must be levied
under laws passed by the legislature of the state, and local taxes
under the votes of the people concerned or their officers or agents

duly authorized.

It

that all local powers must have
their origin in a grant by the state, which is the source and fountain of authority.
The power to tax is no exception to this genhas also been

eral rule.

assumed

Every municipal corporation, and every political divis-

ion of the stale which

demands

taxes from the people must be

able to show due authority from the state to make the demand.

The authority in some cases is conferred by the state constitution,
but if not found there, it must be given by legislative enactment.
No person is compellable to pay taxes for imposing which the
authorities are unable to show

legislative grant of power.
If local powers of taxation must come from the state, it might
seem to follow as a corollary that the state might at pleasure withhold the grant and exercise the power itself. But in the general
framework of our republican governments, nothing is more distinct
a

and unquestionable than that they recognize the
self government,

and

contemplate

existence

its permanency.

of local

Some

state

constitutions do this in express terms, others by necessary implication ; and probably in no one of the states has the legislature
with a power which would enable it to abolish the
local governments.
It has usuallj^ a large authority in determining the extent of local powers, and the framework of local governbeen entrusted

ment, but while

it may shape the local institutions, it cannot

abolish them, and, without substituting others, take all authority
to itself.
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Local power to tax.

the exercise of such

power
Indeed local taxation
so
a

state has the power to withhold

it,

Of all the customary local powers, tliat
of taxation is the chief and most valuable.
To give local government without this would be a mockery and a cheat.
If any

By local taxation

here, we do not mean that which

for state purposes.

So far

as

local officers

is

a

it

is

would justly be regarded as tyranny.
inseparable an incident to republican institutions, that to abolish
would be nothing short of
revolution.
exercised

or local boards are

use of for the levy

and collection of state taxes, they
cannot be left at liberty to exercise their own discretion in determining whether they will act or abstain from acting. If the state,
instead of issuing
separate warrant for the collection of the
a

made

fit to apportion the whole tax among the several townships, leaving the township authorities to collect their
several proportions under the same warrants which are issued for
state taxes, shall see

no reason why the collection
should not be made compul-

is

the collection of local taxes, there

it

of this proportion of the state ta!x
No local community has any inherent right to decide for
sory.
itself whether
will or will not bear its share of the state burdens, and obviously the state could not afford to confer the right.

To do so would leave the state in the same precarious condition
a

;

it

that the federal union was found to occupy before the right to
tax had been conferred upon
by the constitution
government without the means of enforcing respect, securing obedience,
performing its obligations or perpetuating its existence.*

is

'

De Tooqueville, who studied American institutions with so much care, and
commented upon them with such wisdom, has the following remarks,
" In the nations
which bear directly upon the subject now under discussion:
recognized, every individual has
by which the sovereignty of the people
and
in the government of the
of
participates
share
power,
equally
an equal

Why, then, does he obey the government, and what are the natural
always supposed to be as well
limits of this obedience? Every individual
He obeys
informed, as virtuous and as strong as any of his fellow citizens.
or because
the government, not because he is inferior to those who conduct
less capable than any other of governing himself, but because he ache
knowledges the utility of an association with his fellow men, and he knows
subject
that no such association can exist without regulating force. He
and
is
free
responthe
duties
of
citizens
to
each
other
he
concerns
in all that
Hence arises the maxim
sible to God alone for all that concerns himself.
the best and sole judge of his own private interest and that
that every one
is

;

a

a

is

is

it,

is

state.
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Compulsory local taxation.

But aside from cases of state

taxation proper, there are some to which the same principles
apply.
They are cases in which taxation is usually entrusted to
the judgment and discretion of the people to be taxed, but where
is really general, and referring the cases to the local
community is merely a politic provision for the apportionment of
state burdens.
Mention of one or two of these cases will suffi-

the interest

ciently illustrate the principle.
One of the first and highest of all the duties devolving upon
the state is to preserve the public peace.
For this purpose,
society has no riglit to control a man's actions, unless they are prejudicial to
the common weal, or unless the common weal demands his help. This doctrine is universally admitted in the United States.
shall hereafter examine

I

I

the general influence which it exercises on the ordinary actions of life.
am
now speaking of the municipal bodies. The township, taken as a whole and
in relation to the central government, is only an individual like any other,

I have

just described is applicable.

Municipal indepenconsequence of this very
All the American republics
principle of the sovereignty of the people.
recognize it more or less; but circumstances have peculiarly favored its
growth in New England.
" In this
part of the union, political life had its origin in the townships, and
it may almost be said that each of them originally formed an independent
nation.
When the kings of England afterwards asserted their supremacy,
they were content to assume the central power of the state.
They left the
to whom the theory

dence in the United States

is, therefore, a natural

townships where they were before, and, although they are now subject to the
state, they were not at first, or were hardly so.
They did not receive their
powers from the central authority, but, on the contrary, they gave up a portion
of their independence to the state. This is an important consideration, and
one which the reader must constantly recollect. The townships are generally

I

subordinate to the state only in those interests which
shall term social, as
they are common to all the others. They are independent in all that concerns
themselves alone; and amongst the inhabitants of New England,
believe
that not a man is to be found who would acknowledge that the state has any
right to interfere in their town affairs.
" The towns of New England buy and sell,
prosecute, or are indicted,
augment or diminish their rates, and no administrative authority ever thinks
of oflfering any opposition.
"There are certain social duties, however, which they are bound to fulfill.

I

If

in need of money, a town cannot withhold the supplies; if the
projects a road, the township cannot refuse to let it cross the territory;
if a police regulation is made by the state, it must be enforced by the town;
if a uniform system of public instruction is enacted, every town is bound to
establish the schools whic'.i the law ordains."
Democracy, ch. v.
the state is

state
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militia organized,

and the executive armed with very high powers to meet the conIn some cases, a state police force
tingencies of riot and disorder.
has been established

as assistant

to, and in some degree to super-

but in general, the belief has pi-evailed that the public peace and good order were better preserved
by apportioning the duty among the several municipal divisions,
retaining only a state supervision over all. This apportionment
sede

the ordinary officers;

is made by general laws, under which counties, towns, etc., choose
their own peace officers, and levy the necessary taxes to meet thi
expense of a local administration of police laws ; and by municipal charters which confer large police powers upon the bodies
incorporated.

But if

the local authorities were allowed unlimited discretion

levy or refuse to levy the necessary taxes for the support of
the local police force, it might possibly happen, that from neglect
to

or refusal to do so, one part of the state might be left a prey to
disorder and violence, to the general detriment of the state at

Of course, no state could safely, for

a single day, tolerate
or
A city
such a condition of affairs.
township could no more
taxation
for
at
to
decline
left
be
liberty
police purposes, when the
police laws and police force, and the tax which supports them,

large.

The police
by law local, than if all were general.
organization of the state is really general, however it may vary
in dift'erent localities, and the obligation to support it is general,
are made

To this effect are the decisions.^
however it may be apportioned.
And within the reason of these decisions would fall all cases in
which the municipal corporations or subdivisions of the state are
called upon to tax their people for the erection and repair of court
houses and jails, by means of which the police laws are rendered
effectual.

Such calls must, of course, be responded

to.

'People V. Draper, 15 N. Y., 533; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md., 476; People u.
Malianey, 13 Mich., 481; People v. Common Council of Detroit, 28 Mich., 228,
It was declfled in Taylor
386 ; People v. Common Council of Chicago, 51 111., 17.
V. Board of Health, 31 Penn. St., 73, that a board of health for a city district
was a state functionary, and that a tax allowed to be levied by such a board on
" not a legitimate tax for mere local purposes, and it was
immigraticm was
such;
for the guarding of the frontiers of a state against imnot applied to
The whole regulation was
portation of pestilence is not a local purpose.
general in its purposed benefits, though necessarily local in its execution."
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Elsewhere, in this work, the public highways have been spoken
of as matters of general concern to the people of the whole

In

a certain sense they are of local concern, because the
local organizations construct and support them, but they are constate.

structed for the general benefit and use of all the people, and
only turned over to the localities as a matter of apportionment.
This being the case, any township, city or county, that neglects
its duty in this regard, may be compelled by the interference of
This doctrine
the state, and on state account, to perform it.^
applies to the common highways ; whether it can be extended to
exceptional means of passage and transportation will be considered further on.

Wherever

public instruction is established by law,
to be administered by local boards, who levy taxes, build school
houses, and employ teachers for the purpose, it can hardly be
a system of

questioned that the state, in establishing the system, reserves to
itself the means of giving it complete effect and full efficiency in
every township and district of the state, even though a majority
of the people of such township or district, in a want of a proper
appreciation of its advantages, should refuse to take upon themselves the expense necessary to give them
benefits.

judicial proceedings

Possibly

participation in its
might be available in
a

some such cases, where a state law for the levy of local taxes for

educational purposes had been disobeyed; but the legislature
would be at liberty to choose its own method for compelling the
performance of the local duty.^
'That

in laying out a road through several towns, has aubetween them the expense of construction, see Harwich
County Commissioners, 13 Pick., 60 ; Hingham and Quincy Company «. Nor-

thority
V.

the legislature,

to apportion

folk County,

Allen,

Turnpike, etc., Corporation v. Essex County,
u. Newbury port, 103 id., 129; Waterville j).
Kennebeck County, 59 Me., 80; Shaw v. Dennis, 5 Gilm., 405. It has been
held that the legislature may order a reapportionment when justice requires
it. Cambridge v. Lexington, 17 Pick., 232 ; Attorney General v. Cambridge,
6

100 Mass., 283;

353; Salem

Commonwealth

Gray, 247.

16

It is noticeable that in those states in which a general system of public
instruction has longest prevailed, the municipalities have not been disposed
to find fault because they wore required to maintain schools; but the complaint, when there has been any, has come from single individuals, who have
complained that the local powers of taxation were exercised with unreason"
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Those cases in whic li the state interferes to compel a political
corporation or body, which exists and exercises authority by its
permission, to meet its contract obligations and pay its just debts,
may be defended on two grounds : First, that it is the right and
the duty of the state to see that the powers it confers are not abused,
Second, that
to the injury of those who have relied upon them.
when a political corporation has contracted a debt or incurred an
obligation, it has already taken the initiatory step in taxation, and
has, in effect, given its consent that the subsequent steps, so far
as they may be essential to the discharge of such debt or obligaXo matter, therefore, what the purpose of
tion, may be taken.
any lawful municipal contract ; the taxation to perform it must be
regarded as taxation by consent of the people who made it. And
while the general law usually makes provision for such cases, by
suits at law and perhaps executions, circumstances
sometimes render it entirely proper that more speedy remedies
be provided ; and of these the most speedy and effectual might

means

of

special tax upon the delinquent municipality, ordered
by the state, and perhaps levied through state agencies.^ Nor would
the power of the state in this regard be confined to obligations of a

possibly be

a

strictly legal nature ; for the difference between a legal and moral
obligation is frequently no more than this : that the one has a
remedy provided for its enforcement, and the other has not. No
question, for example, can fairly be raised of the right of the
state, after it has formed two municipal governments where one
existed before, and apportioned the debts and property of the old
organization between the two new ones, to require and compel the
payment of any balance found equitably due.^ Another case is
where the state requires one of its corporations to reimburse to
Tbe cases of Gushing v. Newburyport, 10
30 Mich., 69, and Horton ti. School Commissioners, 43 Ala., 598, may be referred to. The contest has been made on other
grounds in other states: see Kinney v. Zimpleman, 36 Texas, 554; Commissioners of Schools V. Alleghany Co., 20 Md., 439.
able liberality for this purpose.
Met., 508 ; Stewart v. Kalamazoo,

Dunovan v. Green, 57 111., 63; a case of the levy of
upon the municipality to provide for municipal obligations.
' See

2 Harrison

515;

People

176, note 3

d.

Bridgeton,

■c.Alameda,

16

Mass., 16; Layton

26 Cal., 641;

^

People

9.

■».New

Power,

a tax by the state

Orleans, 13 La. An.,
25

111., 187;

ante,

p.
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the officers expenses they have incurred in an honest, though mistaken effort to perform their official duty.* Another is where a

municipal corporation is compelled, by means of taxation, to
make compensation for losses sustained within its limits at the
hands of mobs and rioters.
It has been thought from very early
times that that political division of the county which failed to exert
its authority for the effectual suppression of disorder, by means
whereof innocent parties suffered from lawlessness and violence
within its boundaries, might justly be required to make good the
losses, and that its diligence in maintaining the empire of the laws
a

is,

in
Such legislation
would be quickened by the requirement.^
effect, only
part of the state police system, under which the

it

municipal divisions are severally looked to for the preservation of
And speaking
the public peace within their respective limits.^
generally,
may be affirmed that in any case in which compula

is

found necessary, in order to compel
municipal
sory taxation
of
the
state
to
or
division
political
perform properly
corporation
and justly any of its duties as an agency in state government, or

it

to fulfill any obligation legally or equitably resting upon
in
consequence of any corporate action, the state has ample power to

it

a

direct and levy such compulsory taxation, and the people to be
taxed have no absolute right to
voice in determining whether
shall be levied, except as they may be heard through their representatives

in the legislature of the

state.^

S.

;

'

of Guilfurd v. Supervisors of Chenango, 18 Barb., 615
in error, 13 N. Y., 143, questioned in People v. Tappan, 29 "Wis., 664,
G87.
In Sinton v. Ashbury, 41 Cal., 525, 530, Orockett, J., asserts in strong
terms the power of the legislature to compel
municipal corporation " to pay
demand, when properly established, which in good conscience
ought to
pay, even though there be no legal liability to pay it."
See the extreme case

a

it

a

C.

a

;

a

5

Darlington v. New York, 81 N. Y., 164. This case was decided under
law passed before the mischief was done but no reason is perceived why the
claim might not be recognized by legislation adopted afterequity of such
wards.

In re Pennsylvania Hall, Penn. St.,
Wider t. East St. Louis, 55 111., 133, 137;
An., 400; S. C, Withro.v's Corp. Cas., 374.
5

*See

People v. Chicago,
Fauria v. Kew Orleans,

204;

51

111.,

20 La.

2

17;

It

a

is

*

competent, by special statute, to compel one county to levy
tax in
t(> another county the fair proportion of the expenses which
have been incurred by the latter in trials concerning the distribution of the
order to refund
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county is divided and .property
are to be apportioned, political
considerations are

debts

involved,

TAXATION UNDER COMPULSION.
a

legislature must directly or indirectly pass
But when demands are asserted against municipal

and

upon them.

the

corporations, growing out of contracts, or upon such grounds as
might give rights of action against individuals, it is at least questionable whether the legislature may pass upon the facts, adjudge
the corporation liable, and proceed to enforce payment by taxation. Such action, as against a natural person, would be clearly

judicial, and therefore beyond the legislative competency

;

and

it

could only be sustained in the case of municipal corporations on
the doctrine that their powers and rights are wholly at the legislative disposal ; a doctrine dangerous in government, and, as we
think, unsound in constitutional law. The opinion has sometimes been expressed that these corporations were entitled to the
constitutional

in other

benefits of an ordinary trial.^

But this is denied

and perhaps a hearing before some court or board
But such
of audit might be all the corporation could demand."
cases,

if local municipal

government is a matter of subIt is not believed that the liastance, they must be entitled to.
bility of the corporation must be made to turn on legal ques-

a

hearing,

On the contrary, it is more consistent with the digtions purely.
and
honor
of government that all demands against the pubnity

lic shall be settled on broad grounds of equity, instead of being
tested by technical rules ; and auditing boards are generally, with
the utmost propriety, empowered

table considerations.

to govern their action by equi-

This only is maintained

;

that the legisla-

ture is not a proper auditing board as between the municipalities
and third persons, though it may undoubtedly prescribe the rule
of liability for all cases.
proceeds of sales of property lying in both.

Lycoming

v.

Union,

15

Penn.

37

Barb.,

St., 166.

'See Sanborn «. Rice County, 9 Minn., 373; People
440; Plimpton v. Somerset, 33 Yt., 283; Gage v. Graham,
Tappan, 29 Wis., 664.

In re

».

Haws,

57 111., 144; State v.

Pennsylvania Hall, 5 Pcim. St., 204; Borough of Dunmore's Appeal,
Compare Common; Layton «. New Orleans, 13 La. An., 515.
wealth V. Pittsburgh, 34 Penn. St., 496. In Vasser v. George, 47 Miss., 713,
720, £fmraZi, J., claims very broad authority for the legislature in adjusting
claims against municipalities.
^

53

id., 374

31
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Nature of municipal corporations. Before considering sonae
other cases, it may be well to refer briefly to the general nature of
municipal corporations.
Primarily these are public and their
powei-s governmental.
They are created for convenience, expediency and economy in government, and, in their public capacity,
are and must be at all times subject to the control of the state
which has imparted to them life, and may at any time deprive
them of it.
But they have or may have another side, in respect
to which the control is in reason, at least, not so extensive.

They
with peculiar powers and capacities for the benefit and convenience of their own citizens, and in the exercise of

may be endowed

which they seem not to differ in any substantial degree from the
They have thus
private corporations which the state charters.
their public or political character, in which they exercise a part of
the sovereign power of the state for governmental purposes, and
they have their private character in which, for the benefit or convenience of their own citizens,

they exercise powers not of a governmental nature, and in which the state at large has onl^'- an incidental concern, as it may have with the action of private corporations.

It

may not be possible to draw the exact

line between

the two, but provisions for local conveniences
water, liglit, public grounds for recreation,

for the citizens, like
and the like, are man-

ifestly matters which are not provided for by municipal corporations in their political or governmental capacity, but in that quasi
private capacity in which they act for the benefit of their corpoi-ators exclusively.^

In their public, political

no discretion but to act
within constitutional

as the state

capacity, they have

which has created them shall,

limits, command,

and the good government

This two-fold nature of municipal corporations has often been commented
upon and been made the ground of important decisions.
See Bailey v. New
'

3

Hill,

V.

New York,

Milhau ». Sharp, 15 Barb., 212, 213, -per Edwards, F. J.;
5 N. Y., 369, 375, per Jones, J. ; Storrs «. TJtica. 17 N. Y.
Batchellor,
53 id., 128, per Orover,J.;
104; People ?).
Western Savings Fund
Society v. Philadelphia, 31 Penn. St., 175; Touchard v. Touchard, 5 Cal.,306;
Holland «. San Francisco, 7 id., 361; San Francisco Gas Co. v. San Francisco,
9 id., 453; Western College v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio, N. S., 375, 377, per GlioUoii,
J.; Jones 13. New Haven, 34 Conn., 1, 12; Hewisou «. New Haven, 37 id., 475,
483; Detroit v. Corey, 9 Mich., 165; People v. Hurlbut, 24 id., 44; People i).
Common Council .of Deti'oit, 2S Mich., 228, 238; Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 13
Wis., 37; Atkins v. Randolph, 31 Vt., 226.
York,
Lloyd

531;
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of the state requires that the power should at all times be ample
to compel obedience, and that it should be capable of being
In the capacity in which they
promptly and efficiently exercised.
act for the benefit of their corporators merely, there would seem
to be no sufficient reason for a power in the state to make them
move and act at its will, any more than in -the case of any private
corporation. With ample authority in the state to mould, measure and limit their powers at discretion, and to prevent any abuse
thereof, their action within the prescribed limits, in matters of im-

portance to themselves only, it would naturally be supposed,
should be left to the judgment of their citizens and of their
chosen officers.

And this has been the view on which the several state legislatures have in general acted.
The largest liberty of action has
been permitted to municipal action in matters of local concern,
and very seldom has the disposition been evinced to interfere any
farther than was deemed necessary to prevent an oppressive exercise of local powers, and to confine them to proper local purposes.

And in

those cases in which

allowed to vote taxes

municipal corporations have been
foi' purposes not strictly local, but on the

grounds of special local benefit, the legislation has seldom gone
beyond giving permission to vote them if the electors of the

locality should elect to do

Whenever the legislation has gone
further than this, the courts have generally held that the legislaIn a leading case in
tive power of control had been exceeded:
so.

Vermont, the legislature provided for the appointment, by a county
commissioner, of a town agent, who should be empowered to purchase liquors on the credit of the town, and sell the same for such
admissible under what was known as the prohibitory liquor law, accounting to the town for the proceeds. The
" courts that have
act was held invalid ; the court declaring that
gone farthest in sustaining laws of state legislatures, against the
purposes

as were

restrictive provisions of state constitutions, repudiate entirely the
idea that a person, whether natural or artificial, can be compelled
by legislative enactment to become a party to, or to be subjected
'
A like doctrine has been strongly
to liability upon a contract."
'Atkins V. Randolph,
Just ce Black is quoted,

Vt, 326, 236, per Barrett, J. In tliis case, Chief
who, in that opinion of his in Sharpless». I'liiladel-

31

phia, 21 Peun. ft., 147, 165, which asserts legislative supremacy in matters

of
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asserted in Massachusetts,

wherein

a case

inwhicla the legislature

had taken steps looking to the establishment of a pecuniary demand against a municipal corporation, without its consent, the
court declared — having the municipal corporation in view as the
"
party to be charged — that it is not in the power of the legislature
debt from one person to another, without the consent,
express or implied, of the person to be charged," and that if the
" it would not be within the power of any
attempt were made,
judicial court to enforce such an act."* A similar ruling was
made in Maine in a similar case.^ In Wisconsin, the power of the
to create

a

legislature to force taxation upon the people for objects not within the customary grant of local powers for governmental purposes,
has been pointedly denied in cases in which the objects contemplated were presumptively of great local importance and value ;
one case, being that of an improvement of the city harbor,^ and
another that of a state normal school, to be located in the city,
whose money, collected for local school purposes, the state directed

In Michigan,

should be appropriated to its erection.''

the author-

taxation in very strong, if not extravagant language, nevertheless, interdo not say, however, that a contract between two
poses this caution:
That would
individuals, or two corporations, can he made by the legislature.
not he legislation. Besides it would he impossible, in the nature of things;

"I

for the

of

essence

'

Hampshire e.
land ■!).Lawrence,

'Brunswick

n.

a contract is the agreement

Franklin,

of the parties."

16 Mass., 76, 84, per

Parker, Ch.

J.

And

see

Rich,

12 111., 1, 8.

Litchfield,

3

Greenl., 28,33;

Bowdoinham

v.

Richmond,

6

id., 113.

' Hasbrouck

«. Milwaukee, 13 "Wis., 37.
In this case, Dixon, Ch. J., speakof
the
of
the
to
make
a contract for a municipal corporpower
legislature
ing
will,
ation against its
says : "It is certainly unnecessary at this day to enter
into an argument or to cite authorities to sliow that, under a constitutional
government like ours, the legislature has no such power." This decision is
defended in an able opinion by the same learned judge, in Mills «. Charlton,
See also Knapp «. Grant, 37 id., 147 ; State v. Tappan, 29 id.,
29 Wis., 413.
664.

Hahen, 33 Wis., 660, per Dixon, Ch. J. "Was it competent" it was
" for the legislature, without
case,
the assent of the city or its
inhabitants, thus to divert the funds raised and in the hands of the treasurer
for the purpose of erecting a suitable high school building, and to declai'e
•"State «.

inquired in this

that they should be appropriated, not for that purpose, but for the purpose of
purchasing a site for a state normal school in the city? We are clearly of
It is well settled as to all matters pertaining to
the opinion that it was not.
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ity of the state to appoint agents wlio, without the consent of a
city, might issue obligations binding upon it for the purchase and
embellishment of a public park for its citizens, was denied on like
grounds.^

In Kansas, where county

officers had issued to a cred-

itor of the county the county bonds, bearing

a rate

of interest

higher than was permitted by the law under which the debt was
contracted, it was decided that the legislature had no power to
"validate the bonds ; this being in effect the making of a new contract to which the county had not assented.'^ In Illinois, similar
decisions have been based upon a narrower ground. The constitution of the state provides that "the corporate authorities of
townships, school districts, cities, towns and villages,
may be vested with power to assess and collect taxes for corpoi-ate
"
and this, it is held, by implication precludes the levy
purposes ;
counties,

vested rights of property, whether real or personal, and to the obligation of
contracts, that municipal corporations are as much within the protection of

individuals are. The legislature cannot divest a municipal corporation of its property without the consent of its inhabitants, nor impair the obligation of a contract entered into with or in behalf
of such corporation."
the federal constitution

as private

'

People V. Common Council of Detroit, 28 Mich., 328. And see People v.
Hurlbut, 24 id., 44. In this last case, in answer to an objection that there was
no express saving of municipal rights in the state constitution, the following
" Some things are too plain to be written.
If this
remarks are made (p. 107) :
charter of state government which we call a constitution were all there was
command ; if the usages, the customs, the maxims, that have
of life, modes of thought, methods of trying facts by
the
habits
from
sprung
responsibility in neighborhood interests, the
mutual
and
the neighborhood,
precepts which have come from the revolutions which overturned tyrannies,

of constitutional

the sentiments of manly independence and self control which impelled our
ancestors to summon the local community to redress local evils, Instead of relying upon king or legislature at a distance to do so; if a recognition of all

these were to be stricken from the body of our constitutional law, a lifeless
skeleton might remain, but the living spirit, that which gives it force and attraction, which makes it valuable and draws to it the affections of the people,
it from the numberless constitutions, so called,
that which distinguishes
set up and thrown down within the last hundred
been
which in Europe have

years, many of which, in their expression, have seemed equally fair and to
possess equal promise with ours, and have only been wanting in the support
and vitality which these alone can give; this living and breathing spirit,
which supplies the interpretation of the words of the written charter, would
be utterly lost and gone."

' Shawnee County

v.

Carter,

3

Kans., 115.
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of local taxes, or the contracting of local debts, by agencies created
by the legislature, and not being the corporate authorities of the
locality to be taxed, or to be bound by the debts> While as has
been said, the ground chosen in those cases is narrow, the decis-

ions are nevertheless of very general application, for the terms in
which authority overthe municipal corporations is conferred by
other constitutions, though not the same, will generally be found
A similar decision has been made
open to similar implications.
in

Tennessee.^

In

one or two states an inclination has been manifested to accept, in its broadest signification, the language in which an unre-

stricted authority in the legislature over the whole subject of taxation is usually spoken of when there is no occasion for pointing
It has already been shown by the citation of a
the limitations.
large number of cases that no such unrestricted power exists, and
it may safely be asserted that it ought not to exist. It is not difficult to give the most reckless robbery for private purposes the
forms of constitutional action, and it is as easy to call it a tax as
it was in former periods to call those exactions which were enforced by prisons and physical suffering and the quartering of
a ruthless soldiery upon the people by the gentle name of benevTaxation is a fearful power, but, like other legislative
olences.
powers in representative
ances.

It

government,

is certainly limited

as

it has its checks and bal-

to purposes, and, as has been

'People V. Chicago, 51 111., 17; People v. Salomon, id., 37; Harward v.
Drainage Co., id., 130 ; Lovingston v. Wider, 53 id., 803 ; People ■».Canty, 55
id., 33 ; Wider •;>.East St. Louis, id., 133 ; Sleiglit v. People, Sup. Ct. 111., 1875,
7 Chicago Legal News, 292.
' Pope V. Phifer, 3 Helsk., 683, in ■which an able opinion is delivered by
Freeman,

J.

See also, State

The

v.

LetHngwell,

54 Mo., 458 ; People v. Hastings,

in Heiskell involved the validity of an act of the legislature appointing a state hoard for the levy of county taxes in a few counties
named. The court held the act invalid, as being inconsistent with the right
of local taxation which by implication was considered retained and intended
And after commenting upon the maxto be perpetuated by the constitution.
im that taxation and representation go together, the court query concerning
'■
Can it be believed for a moment that the power was
the board in question :
29 Cal., 449.

case

ever intended to be delegated by the people to the legislature to authorize such
a body, so appointed and constituted, to perform the functions assigned to
them in this act ? We think no reasonable man can come to such a conclusion."
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existing and

recognized.

recent case in Alabama is of importance as bearing upon
this question just mentioned.
An act of the legislature of that
state constituted a board, consisting of the president of the court
of county commissioners of revenue of Mobile county, the mayor

of Mobile, the president of the bank of Mobile, the president of
the Mobile chamber of commerce and one citizen of the county
of Mobile to be appointed by the governor, who, and their successors, were to be commissioners

for the purpose of improving
the river, harbor and bay of Mobile.
The county commissioners
of revenue were directed to issue to said board bonds to the
amount of $1,000,000, binding upon the county, to be made
payable as they should determine, and " to levy such tax as may
be deemed proper to pay such bonds."
The constitution pro"
vides that
No power to levy taxes shall be delegated to individuals or private corporations;" but the act was nevertheless
sustained in an opinion that does little more than to allude to the
very important question arising under the state constitution, and
avoids the discussion of general principles.*
A case which was more considered was decided a few years
since

in New York.

An

act of the legislature had named com-

authorized them to lay out and construct roads in two
townships named, at a cost per mile not exceeding $20,000, excluThe sum necessary to be raised to meet the exsive of bridges.
missioners,

pense was to be obtained by a sale of town bonds, to be issued

by the town officers on the requisition of the commissioners, and
The roads, it will be seen, were local roads, to
by the latter sold.
be constructed by state agents at the cost of the towns
'

President and Commissioners,

etc., v. State, 45

Ala.,

399.

The

;

case

neither
in whicli

tlie question arose was a proceeding in mandamus against tlie county commissioners of revenue, to compel tliem to issue bonds under the act to the harbor

In answer to the objection that here was a case of deleimprovement board.
gation of the power to tax, which by the constitution was forbidden, Safford,
J., delivering the opinion of the court, says : " even if it be a delegation of
the taxing power to individuals or private corporations, that portion of the act
only need be vitiated." "We should understand from this that the court did
not regard the conferring upon this board the power of making the improvement, and of demanding and making use of bonds binding upon the county,
for tJie purpose, as being equivalent to a delegation of the power to tax.
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local officers being consulted or
allowed any authority whatever in the premises, or even the priviThe work was exceptionally if not extravalege of being heard.
gantly expensive, and it is difficult to conceive of any justifiable
ground for forcing upon an unwilling people an expense of. this
the people of the towns nor the

description, when no corresponding burdens were imposed on other
localities. The court of appeals, however, felt constrained to uphold this legislation, basing their decision upon the ground of a
general power in the legislature over the subject of taxation, which

in this particular was not restricted by any express provision of
the state constitution.^

Conceding this to be sound doctrine, it must nevertheless he
called hard doctrine.
Such legislation stands wholly apart and
distinct from all the ordinary provisions for the construction and

The customary regulations are made on
support of highways.
some rule of apportionment, and this case had no rule but the
And it may well have been
special legislative determination.^
specially objectionable, be-

regarded by the

people concerned

cause depriving

them of one of the privileges intended to be se-

as

That instrument had
by the state constitution.
provided that local officers should be chosen by the voters of the
locality,' and it doubtless intended that they should be left to
cured to them

exercise the usual local powers.
missioners

While this appointment of com-

for roads in the two towns avoided

a

violation of the

words of the constitution, the violation of its spirit, unless the roads
were in importance something more than ordinary town highways,
is a well known principle, howwould seem to be undoubted.

If

ever, that a legislative violation of the spirit of the constitution

permit of judicial correction.
A case in Pennsylvania in which the legislature provided for
the construction of an exceptionally expensive road at the cost of
does not ordinarily

People V. Flagg, 46 N. Y., 401.
' In Goodrich v. Turnpike Co., 26 Ind., 119, an act "to allow county commissioners to organize turnpike companies," which permitted the cost of constructing the turnpike to be assessed upon the real estate within three-fourths
of a mile of the proposed road, was sustained. This was an exceptional
method, hut not unknown to the law, and it was neither oppressive nor was
the whole matter taken out of the hands of the local authorities.
'

3

Const, of

N. Y.,

art.

X,

§ 2.
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living on and near the same without their consent, and

the court found, for the local but for the general benefit,
must be regarded as opposed to the one in New York.
The court
held that, on the general principles governing taxation, the legislature had no such power.^
And this decision finds, as we think,
not, as

strong support in a recent decision of the court of appeals of
Kentucky ; a court whose decisions in matters of taxation are alThe case there was one of a city assessways able and strong.
ment.
It was denied that the legislature possessed the power to
require a certain portion of one street in a city to be improved in
a manner

exceptionally expensive, at the cost of abutting owners
and without their consent, when by the law as- to all the other
streets, the owners of the larger proportion of the frontage must
petition for such an improvement before it could be ordered.* The
assessment, as were those in Penn-

case was one of an invidious

"A law," it is said by the court, ''imsylvania and New York.
posing taxation on the general public, the evident intent and legitimate results of which are to equalize the burden so far as pracwill not

of the fundamental law,
But when,
merely because that desirable end may not be attained.
as in this case, the most probable if not the necessary consequence
of the law is to produce the most oppressive inequality, and to
compel a small minority of tax payers to provide, at their sole
ticable,

expense,

be held as violative

an improvement of general

utility and public interest,

the construction of which costs more than double as much as the

of such improvements in general use, and from which,
when constructed, the general public derives almost as much advantage as themselves, it assumes the character of an attempted
character

exercise of arbitrary power over the property of this minority ; it
becomes in a constitutional sense a taking and appropriation of

their private property to the public use without compensation, and
it cannot be sustained, so long as the safeguards placed around
the citizen by our fundamental law are respected and upheld. No
such power over the property of the citizen can be constitutionally exercised by any department of our state government; and
whenever it is attempted, it is the imperative duty of the judi1 Matter

' Howell

of Washington Avenue,
V.

Bristol,

8

Busli,

69 Penn. St., 352.

493, per

Lindsay,

J.
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constitutional rights
affected." Whatever may be

to interpose in behalf of those whose

are being thereby

prejudicially
thought of the relative soundness of these decisions in matters of
law, those which deny the power to levy such invidious burdens
are most likely to conduce to equality and fairness in matters of
local taxation, and with just purposes and purity in legislation.
It is difficult to conceive of a more corrupting power than that of
voting taxes by those who are not to feel them, especially when
the expenditure may be confided to those who have no interest,
personally or as corporators, and who will presumably be cononly to the extent that they can make
the taxes which others are to pay.
cerned

In

another recent case in New

a personal

profit of

York, it is decided that the legis-

lature may require a village to levy a trpecial tax to be expended
in the construction of a state educational institution at that lo-

This decision is based upon the sovereign power of the

cality.'

state to tax and apportion the public
unless

burdens

;

a

power which,

it is subject to implied limitations, would enable the legis-

require its capital town to construct the state
house, another town to construct the state prison, and so on, to the
It has been seen that a decision
entire relief of the state at large.
lature of

a state to

in Wisconsin is opposed to the one just cited, and that derives
strong support in more recent cases in Illinois.'
The New York cases which have been mentioned find abundant
justification in an earlier case in the same state, and could not well
have been decided otherwise without rejecting that as an authority.
The facts in that case were the following :
Certain citizens of Utica, in order to secure the connection of
the Chenango with the Erie at their place, entered into a bond,
conditioned to pay to the state some $38,000, the estimated increased expense in bringing the canal to that point, instead of to
another which had been proposed.
Having thereby secured the
location, the legislature then interfered for their relief, and required the amount of the obligation to be assessed as a tax upon
■Gordon

v.

Comes, 47

N. Y.,

COS.

' Livingston County
is commented

b. Weider, 64 111., 427, is specially referred to. This case
on and explained in Burr «. Carbondale, Sup. Ct. 111., 1874,

Chicago Legal News, 350, in which it was held competent to permit a locality
to vole special aid to a state building.

CH.

LOCAL

XXI.]

TAXATION UNDEK COMPULSION.

491

the real estate

o£ the

"Was this a constitutional
city of Utica.
" The
tax ? The supreme court of the state held that it was.
general purpose of raising the money by tax was to construct a
canal, a public highway, which the legislature believed would be
a benefit to the city of Utica as such ; and independently of the

bond, the

is the ordinary one of local taxation to make or

case

*
improve a highway."
How far the principle of this case can be carried beyond the
exact state of facts upon which it was decided, is a question of

for instance, have been within
Would
highest interest.
the power of the legislature to compel the city of New York to
or to construct at its own
bear the whole cost of the Erie canal
?

it,

the

Erie railroad

a

?

?

Or might the whole cost of the Hoosac
Or might Chicago or St. Louis
tunnel be thrown upon Boston
be compelled to construct
system of railways through the state,
on the ground, that in the opinion of the legislature the railways
cost the

'

a

a

?

a

terminus
If
would specially benefit the city which was made
power to require such expenditures can rest in the hands of any
legislature, restrained only by sense of the responsibility of its
of

Thomas

b.

Leland,

34 Wend., 65, 67, per Oowen,

J.

Under the principles

it

a

it

had the power
the
of
commutation
munipalities
moneys, or
to require the refunding by
moneys paid to procure substitutes, where the effect was to relieve the muniwent to aid
draft. The purpose of the payment, so far as
cipality from
this decision,

might, perhaps, be held that the legislature

a

;

the government by money or men, was public and yet as such payments are
law levying taxation to refund
made by parties for their own advantage,
"an
imperial rescript," rather than
declared
to
resemble
is
judicially
them

a

:

9,

Thompson, J., in Tyson v. School Directors, 51 Penn.
constitutional taxation.
Milford,
®.
59 Me., 315, 318, Appleton, Ch. J., in denying
23.
In Perkins
St.,
the authority to authorize the refunding of commutation moneys by towns,
" The money was voluntarily paid, and without expectation of repaysays
gift — so understood, so intended by all the parties subscribment. It was

ing.
ment.

It

was no advance or loan to the town, with the expectation of repay"Whether the gift was to the soldiers enlisting, or to the town, makes

The naked question recurs. Can the town raise money to give
gift as
not
gift to any public purpose. It
This
to individuals
If town can give to A., can give to B.
recompense for past generosity.
If can give little, can give much. If can give, then every man holds
his estate subject to the will of the majority, who can give away as much or
for public purposes, and for those the right
little as they please. Taxation
taxes
to
unlimited. Taxation
impose
imposed by the
of the government
But
taxes
to
plaintiff's
meet
the
its
claims would
exigencies.
state to meet
for
to
an
indivi.lual."
gift
be taxes for private purpose,
it

a

a

a

is

is

is

it

a

it

it

a

is

a

?

is

no difference.
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is always a possibility that
the members may at some time discover that a majority of the
constituencies would be pleased to see the power exercised.'
Another recent case in New York seemed to interpose a check
to the unlimited power of the legislature over the taxation of
members

to their constituents,

there

The point of the decision was, that
municipal corporations.
towns could not be compelled to give aid to railroad corporations
The decision was an able one, and
by subscribing to their stock.
But this decision, so far

made by the court of last resort.^

as

in

it would be possible, was shortly afterwards
qualified, and, as it would seem, overruled by the assistant court,
called the commission of appeals.
The case decided by this
court asserts a power in the legislature broader and more absothe nature of things

lute than has ever been applied in this country, by any court of
corresponding dignity, whose decisions have fallen under our no-

The point of the decision was, that where the legislature
had once empowered a commissioner, appointed for a town, but
not by it or by any town officer or authority, to subscribe for the
town to the stock of a railroad corporation, on the condition pretice.

cedent of obtaining

the assent of

majority of the resident taxpayers, the legislature had full power afterwards to remove the
condition and empower the commissioner to bind the town by a
a

''
As it is obvious," say the court, "that
subscription without it.
all the property of a town, as an artificial being, is public property, and must usually have proceeded from the exercise of the

power of taxation, and as the private rights of individuals residing in the town can only be affected through the exercise of
the power of taxation, it follows that the substantial power of the
'

In Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen, 570, 580, Bigelow, Cli. J., speaking of the
right of the state to apportion among the municipalities the expense of high" Perfect equality in the allotment of public
ways, etc., says:
burdens is unattainable.
If they are distributed on just principles, applicable alike to all on
■whom
they are imposed ; if no undue discrimination is made among those
on whom a charge or duty is laid; if no tax is assessed which Is disproportionate, or ' without, the assent of the people or their representatives,' substantial equality will be attained, and no legal or constitutional right or privilThis seems to us an admirable statement of
ege will be violated or evaded."
the principles governing the imposition by the state of burdens upon the
municipalities.
»

People

V.

Batchellor,

53

N. Y.,

13?,

opinion by Orover,

J.
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legislature, througli tlie power of taxation, is broad enough to
sustain the requirement to a town to aid in the construction of a
railroad, in the construction of which, in the judgment of the

And if it may do this dipublic interest.
rectly by the imposition of a tax, and the direct and immediate
employment of the money raised, it is not perceived how the
legislature, it has

a

issuing of bonds, with the only contingency of taxation to follow,
can be beyond the legislative power ; nor how the more remote
possibility of becoming chargeable
can alter the case." '

As

the commissioner who

town officer, nor

a

made

by reason of holding
the subscription

stock,

was not a

town agent with the town's consent, it is mani-

fest that he was able to accomplish what was said by the eminent

" imPennsylvania judge, whose views have been quoted, to be
"
possible in the nature of things — a contract without the consent

of the parties.''
It must, we should suppose, be conceded that the doctrine that
the legislature may do anything to which it gives the form of
taxation, and which is not expressly forbidden by the constituIt constitutes a standtion, is necessarily corrupting in practice.
ing invitation to corrupt classes of the state to flock to the state
capital with schemes for enriching themselves at the expense of
localities ; and it would be remarkable if they were not often sucPerhaps, if the state were owner of important public
works, a more tempting attraction might thereby be presented,
But even this might
and the municipalities be left unmolested.
cessful.

for the evils of vicious legislation are likely to
increase and multiply in every direction, when once it is admitted that they are subject to no legal restraints, and that the

prove otherwise,

central authority may legislate on local matters which concern
only the locality, and, concerning which, the members acting will

know nothing, except

as interested

parties may undertake to in-

form or misinform them.
' Johnson.

ion in tiie
Bockes,

Com., in Duanesburgh v. Jenkins, 57 N. Y., 177, 187. The decisreversei the decision in supreme court made by Judges James,

case

Bosecrans and Potter.

'Black, Ch. J., in Sharpless
also what is said by Mellen, Ch.
112, 114.

v.

Philadelphia,

21

J., in Bowdoinham

Penn.
v.

St.,

147,165.

Richmond,

6

See

Greenl.,
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All

the property of a municipal coporation may be assumed to
come from taxation.
If any of it comes from gift or grant, it is

not believed that the nature of its ownership is any different on
that account, unless the gift or grant was charged with a trust.
It is public property, but public for the purposes of the municiIf any of it has
pality, and not for the purposes of the state.
for special purposes, under state authority, the state
may compel its proper application. The state must have a power
of direction, also, in cases where municipal powers are so modified
as to preclude the contemplated purpose being followed ; but it is
been raised

believed to be an unsound doctrine that the legislature of the state
may, for that reason or any other, apply it to state uses, or even to
of the people concerned. Mr. Justice
Story early expressed the view that the legislature, changing, modifying, enlarging or restraining the local powers, must secure the
property for the uses of those for whom, and at whose expense, it
was originally purchased.^
There can be little doubt that this is
local

uses, against the consent

to say the least, less safe, either to the general interests of the

It

said, the fact that

very true, as has often been
liable to abuse,
no argument
is

state or of the municipalities.

is

is,

the view that has been generally acted upon, and that any other

a

it

;

a

is

power
reason which
would only constitute
against its existence
should influence the people to expressly withhold the grant of

is

a

inconsistent with any
substantial constitutional protection to local self-government —
that feature of the American representative system which has

cise such

power, and' that its existence

is

it

considpower when framing their constitution. But when
ered that the states in general have not been accustomed to exer-

it

4

9

'

Terrett ®. Taylor,
Cranch, 43, 52. " It maj' also be admitted," lie says,
in Dartmouth College v. "Woodward,
Wheat., 518, 594, "that corporations for
mere public government, such as towns, cities and counties, may, iu many
But
will hardly be contended
respects, be subject to legislative control.

it

is

that, even in respect to such corporations, the legislative power
so transcendent, tliat
may, at its will, take away the private property of the corporation, or change the uses of its private funds acquired under the public faith.
confiscate to its own use the private funds which
municipal corporation holds under its charter, without any default or consent of
the corporators?" And again, on p. 698, he says of the state: "it cannot
recall its own endowments granted to any hospital, or college, or city, or

town."

a

Can the legislature

.
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usually been looked upon as the corner stone of all, and must leave
the municipalities at the mercy of legislative majorities, it may
justly be questioned whether the recognition of the power is not
an innovation.

It

is not to be forgotten that the power

destroy'' — an

in ques-

"a power to
expression which loses none
of its force when applied to municipal corporations — and that
it is capable of being exercised in legitimate modes to the
tion is

destruction of private fortunes.
And the subject seems to invite
the remark, as bearing upon the question whether the early New
York decision, which has been referred to, was not a departure
from sound principle, that if the legislature of the state may vote
the local taxes, or take the moneys which have been raised by
taxation for local purposes, and appropriate them to other purposes in their discretion, on any assumption that, as they have
now become public funds, they must be at the state's disposal ;
then the maxim that taxation and representation go together,
would seem to be merely a glittering generality, promising much,
For any reliance upon responsibility to
but assuring nothing.
constituents, as a check upon extravagant- taxation and reckless
misappropriation, becomes useless, and indeed worse than useless,
because deceptive, if the constituency in general, instead of bearing the burden of evil legislation, may actually, in some cases,
have the general burden diminished by the selection of particular
communities for exceptional and invidious taxation. And any
principle in representative government may well be considered
obsolete when, as applied, it only removes the substantial respon-

sibility and restraining power from the constituency concerned to
a

distant central authority.^

' On this general subject, reference is made to the case of Sleight v. People,
Sup. Ct. 111. (1875), 7 Chicago Legal News, 392. The facts were, that a. rail—
way was built through four townships — Oxford, Clover, "Weller and G-alva

of Henry county. Two of these townships — Weller and Galva — subscribed
The
for capital stock and issued their bonds in payment of the subscription.
" the taxes to be collected from
that
provided
railroad
company
charter of the
said railroad company for county and township purposes, by the several
counties and townships through which said railroad runs, shall be paid to
and set apart by the county treasurer as a sinking fund to redeem the princiOn
pal of the bonds Issued by any township or townships in said county."
behalf of the railroad company, the claim was made that the entire tax collected from the railroad company, for county and township purposes, in the
several townships through which the railroad runs, should be paid to and set
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CHAPTEE XXII.
THE REMEDIES OF THE STATE AGAINST COLLECTOES OF
TAXES.
Remedies

in general. It has been

seen that the law sometimes

provides for very summary proceedings

for the enforcement

the duty to pay taxes, and that the legislative
so has been

very fully

sustained.

With much

competency

of

to do

greater reason may

the law

provide summary remedies against those who, having
collected taxes, neglect or refuse to pay them over to the proper auWhatever hardships there may be in forcing summary payment by the person who is simply negligent in paying his dues,
there can be none in requiring speedy accounting and settlement
thority.

by one who has, by his office, become custodian of the public
apart by the treasurer of the county as a sinking fund, to be applied pro rata,
redeeming the principal of the bonds issued by the towns of Weller and

ill

Oalva.

opinion of the court, by Scliofield, J., it is said : " A tax cannot be
levied for county or township purposes on property which is not subject to
tlie jurisdiction of the authority levying the tax; and the property of the railway companj' in the county and in each township must be subject to the
same taxation as other taxable property there situated, for county and township purposes; and no property can be held for the payment of a county or
township tax which is not levied for a corporate purpose.
" Without undertaking to define what is a corporate purpose, it is very certain that a tax imposed for the payment of a debt not incurred by the authority imposing the tax, and for the payment of which it is in no wise re-

In

the

sponsible, is not for a corporate purpose.
" Neither Henry county, nor the towns of Oxford or Clover, made
any subscription to the capital stock of this railway company, or incurred any indebtedness by issuing bonds or otherwise on account thereof. Nor are they
either indebted to the towns of Weller or Galva.
" Neither Henry county, nor the towns of Oxford or Clover, could therefore
levy and collect a tax in excess of the amount needed for their respective
corporate purposes, and equal to the amount claimed for this sinking fund,
because such a tax would not oe for a corporate purpose.
" But the claim here made is for the taxes actually levied and collected for
county and township
Oxford and Clover.

purposes, from the railway company, in the towns of
this amount shall be taken, then there must necessa-

If

-
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and wliatever evils may be anticipated in the case of individual neglects are likely to be multiplied many fold, if one
who has collected from numerous persons may then neglect or refunds

;

of,

fuse to pay over his collections until it shall suit his convenience
to do so.
The remedies which are at the service of the public authorities,
ing

are the follow-

:

and one or more of which are usually made use

The state, or any of its municipalities,
for whom moneys have actually been collected, may pursue its
under the cirdelinquent collector by .suit at the common law,
cumstances that remedy shall be deemed adequate and suitable.^
at

the

Common Law.

if

*S'ia'if

is

a

a

a

is

is

not important and the party
responsible,
this may be all that
essential.
Such
suit the collector can
defend only on such grounds as would constitute
defense to
like suit as between other parties who stand in the relation of
"Where expedition

;

It would be for money received by the
principal and agent.
and he would not be permitcollector for the use of the public
rily
will

a

a

a

deficiency to that extent in the county and townsliip revenues, whicli
liave to be supplied by additional taxation.
The property liable to taxation in one municipality will thus be compelled to bear burden of taxation
different municipality, and this, too^
imposed by the corporate authority of
be

is

is

32

45

Gray, 423; Helvcy «. Huntington Co.,

N. II.,

160

Spencer v. Perry,

18

Mich.,

6

15

;

;

'Adams n. Farnsworth,
817 Wentworth r. Gove,

;

;

,

a

a

it

it

a

it

it
is

without its consent, and in the absence of any firesumptive corresponding
benefits. The principle upon which alone this can be sustained is, that the
legislature may, in its pleasure, impose debts upon counties and townships,
and require their payment without regard to the wishes of the inhabitants and
evident that the practical
tax payers of such counties and townships; for
result is precisely the same, whether
said the taxes levied for county and
township purposes on the property of the railway company in the towns of
Oxford and Clover shall be set apart for the payment of the bonds issued by
the towns of Weller and Galva, or that the county and these townships shall
pay sum equal to the amount out of their revenues for the same purpose.
In either event,
talcing so much of the revenues of the county and of
of
Oxford
and
Clover to pay the debts of the towns of Weller and
the towns
But
has been repeatedly held by this court, that the legislature is
Galva.
debt upon
municipally against its consent; and
powerless to impose
those cases must be deemed conclusive on the questions involved here. The
People V. The Mayor, etc., 51 111 18; People ii. Salomon, id., 38; People v.
Chicago, id., 583 Madison Co. v. People, 58 id., 463 Hessler v. The Drainage
Commissioners, .53 id., 105; LovingsUm ». Wider, id., 302."
Blackf.,

390.
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ted to rely on technical objections

which might be made to the

If he receives the money to
right of the public to the money.
the use of the public, he should account for it ; and it is immaterial that those who have paid it might successfully have resisted
th e collection from them.
It has been elsewhere shown ^ that a
or even an intruder, will not be permitted to resist the demand of the state upon him for taxes collected, by
And it
showing that he collected them without due authority.
has been held that although a bond to perform the duties of an
collector

de facto,

office would

be void

if there were, by law, no such office in ex-

appointment of a person to an office
which is established by law is valid as a contract to perform the
duties of the office, and entitles the public to demand the fulfillistence,

yet an irregular

ment of the engagement.^

The principles here stated are appli-

cable not merely to the case of a defect in the official authority,
but to the case also in which defects, either technical or substantial, might have been urged to the tax the officer has enforced.'
The substantial fact is that he has received money for the state,
and having done so, it is not his privilege to pause and question
the right of the state to receive it ; but he should pay it over, and
leave those from whom it was received to present a claim to the
state for the refunding,

if they deny its right

an unconstitutional tax, once collected,
to retain, but should account

as

to retain it.*

the collector

in other

cases.^

Even

has no right

The action in

' Ante,
pp. 191, 192. Sec ia addition to tlic cases there cited, Ford v. Clongb,
Grceul.,
334; Jolmsot ». Goodridge, 15 Mo., 29; Orono «. Wedgewood, 44
8
Me., 49; Trcscott v. Moan, 50 Me., 347; State v. 'Woodside, 8 Ired., 104; Lyn-

don

V.

Miller,

30 Vt., 329.

-

United Stales

s

^Vmianls

v.

v.

Maurice,

Holdcn,

< Commonwealth

v.

2

Brock.,

4 Wend., 223 ;

Philadelphia,

98.

Moore

27

v.

Alleghany City, 18 Penu. St,

Pcnn. St.,

55.

497.

In Waters v. State, 1 Gill, 302, and Smyth ». Titcomb, 31 Me., 272, it was
decided not to be a good defense to a suit to recover taxes collected, that the
tax itself was unconstitutional.
In O'Neal v. School Commissioners, 37 Md.,
5

like ruling as to a tax claimed to have been unlawfully levied.
Baltimore and Ohio R. R. Co., 34 Md., 344, this doctrine was aprailroad company which, being required to pay to the state one-fifth

321, there was a

In

State v.

plied to a
of the fares on a certain branch, collected the fares, but declined to pay, alleging the unoonstitatio»ality of the tax. See also State v. Cunningham, 8
Blackf., 339. .
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to the use of

the

The like action will not lie for a mere neglect to perpublic.
form the official duty to collect ; but an action on the case would
be the appropriate remedy.^

Bond. It is a customary precaution to require of
collector
of public moneys that he shall give bond to secure
any
a proper accounting.
The form, or at least the requisites, of such
Collector'' s

a bond, are commonly prescribed by statute, and statute

reme-

dies cannot be had upon it unless it is a good bond under the
statute.
But it is always lawful for one who has a duty to perform to

third person or the public, to give sureties for the performance thereof ; and a bond by a public collector, which is not
in the statutory form, may nevertheless be a good bond at the
a

common law, upon which the usual common law remedies will be
On this ground suits have been sustained upon bonds
available.^
which were given to one body or official board, when the statute
required them to be given to another,^ and also upon those which
were so defective in any of their reqaisites as not to constitute a
Of course if the bond is given to an
sufficient statutory bond.
that
difEerent
from
named in the statute, suit upon it
obligee
must be brought in the name which appears in the obligation.'

What has been said of the liability of the collector, to account for
moneys received, is as applicable in
in a suit for money had and received

a
;

suit on any such bond, as
he cannot defend by show-

ing that those who voluntarily have paid to him could not legally
have been compelled to do
' Charleston
= Claasen «.

so.^

v. Stacey, 10 Vt., 562.
Shaw, 5 Watts, 468; Freeman

Lowder,

v.

Davis,

7

Mass., 300;

M

oore v.

2 Gray,
Hodsden, 5 id., 317; Burroughs
49; Horn v. Whiltier, 6 N. H., 88; Treasurer v. Bates, 2 Bailey, 362, 875; Governor V. Allen, 8 Humph., 176; Walker b. Chapman, 32 Ala., 116.

v.

8

id., 372; Sweetzei «. Hay,

Justices of Christian v. Smith, 2 J. J.
Supeixisors of St. Joseph v. Coffinhury, 1 Mich., 355;
People V. Johr, 23 Mich., 461, 462 ; Mallory v. Miller, 3 Yerg., 113. The rulings
in the federal courts are that a bond taken from a collector of taxes is good as
a common law bond, though not required by law, or though not in statutory
Dixon v. U. S., 1 Brock., 177; Postmasform when a bond is required.
ter General ». Rice, Gilpin, 554; United States v. Howell, 4 Wash., C. C, 630;
United States v. Tingey, 5 Pet., 115.
Stevens v. Hay, 6 Cush., 239. See Walker v. Chapman, 23 Ala., 116.
5 See cases cited, ante, p. 498.
Also Kelly v. Savage, 30 Me., 199.
*

Van Hook

Marsh., 472.

«. Barnett, 4 Dev., 368 ;

And

see
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The liability on the bond must, however, be governed by its

It

condition.

has been held that when sureties undertake for the

"
collection of all rates for which the collector shall have sufficient
■warrant under the hands of the assessors," a recovery cannot be
had upon the bond for taxes collected without such warrant ; the

But where

cases not being within the terms of the undertaking.''

" faithfully
the sureties undertake that the collector shall
perform
are
his duty, and pay over the moneys collected," they
liable
for the moneys collected by him, whether with warrant or without.2

It

is not the business of the collector to question the fairness or
propriety of any tax which has been committed to him for collec-

If the assessment is excessive, the party assessed must
tion.
make the objection, and not the assessor. His duty is to collect
the list committed to him, and he cannot excuse himself for any
failure to exhaust his authority in collecting, on the pretense that
the person taxed should not have been assessed at all, or should

have been

assessed

otherwise than

as he was.^

Nor is it

a suiScient

answer to a suit for neglect of duty, that the party taxed being
poor, any proceedings by distress would not have been available."

His duty in such a case is to exhaust his power in an effort to
collect ; and the legal evidence of the inability of the person taxed
to pay the amount will then be furnished by his return.

A

collector may always refuse to proceed in the collection of a
tax for the collection of which his authority is insufficient. While
he is bound to account for all sums voluntarily paid to him by
persons taxed, he is under no obligation to commit trespass in the
attempted exercise of a void authority ; and it is always a defense

to him and his sureties, that the process committed to him would
not have protected him in its execution.^ Undoubtedly, also, the
'

Foxcroft V. Nevens, 4 Greenl., 73.
' Johnson v. Goodridge, 15 Me., 29 ; State v.
Woodside, 8 Ired., 104. And
see Ford v. Clough, 8 Greenl., 334; Orono v. "Wedge wood, 44 Me., 49; Trescott
■B.Moan, 50 Me., 347; Williamstown b. Willis, 15 Gray, 427.
2 See

Williams

v. Holden,

4 Wend., 223;

Moore

v.

Alleghan}' City,

18

Pemi.

St., 55.

^Gorham

The

v.

Hall,

same doctrine

'Reynolds

v.

57 Me., 58, 62,

citing Colerain

is laid down in Treasurers

Lofton,

18

Geo., 47;

Barlow

v.
v.

d.

Bell,

Hilliard,

8

9

Met., 499,

Rich.,

The Ordinary,

503.

412.

47

id., 639;
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collector may dscline to proceed in the collection of a tax illegally
levied ; as any person may refuse to recognize any illegal authority, or to obey an unconstitutional law. But he takes upon himself a great responsibility when he assumes to question the validity
of a statute, or of the acts of his superiors.
In any case he ought
to be the last person to raise the question, and then only when
So long as the persons taxed
necessary to his own protection.
make
of
the
tax, it is his duty to proceed
voluntarily
payment

with the collection.
The collector should receive for the taxes money only, unless
the statute permits him to receive something different. Money
is always understood in tax laws when nothing else is mentioned.^

The collector is not at liberty to use his ofHce

as a means of spec-

ulation, and therefore cannot buy up demands
and turn them in when he comes to account.^

against the public

Even if such de-

mands are by law made receivable for taxes, they are not available to him in his settlement, unless he actually received them in
And what the collector receives he must, at his peril,
payment.^

a

very harsh rule, but it

without question,

a

This seems

is,

safely keep and account for. It is no defense, when he is sued
for a failure to account, that the moneys have been stolen from
him, or otherwise lost, without fault or negligence on his part."*
very

necessary one.

Liability

of

be sued at once, as soon as

In

Sureties.

a

;

a

is

When the time arrives for the collector to account and pay
over his collections, no demand
necessary in order to fix upon
liability for failure to do so but they may
him and his sureties
default has occurred.'

general

the liabilities

Chesliire v. Howland, 13 Gray, 331; Adams «. Farnsworth,
mer v. Bunbuiy, 30 Mich., 201.

'

Mason, 425; United
Jolinson v. United States,
Miltenberger v. Cooke, 18 Wall., 421.
5

'

See

How.,

of sureties
15

on

id., 423; Wei-

States v. Morgan,

11

15.4;

Frier

v. State,

11

Fla.,

and see Cheshire v. Howland,

300:

13

Gray, 331.

Miller,

8

5

3

T. B. Monr., 319. The collector has no right to
Commonwealth «. Rodes,
Elliott ii.
receive in payment of taxes the draft of his creditor upon himself.
Mich.,

132.

V.

Mcintosh,

Ired., 307;

State v. Woodsides,

9

State

9

6

1

3

*

How., 578; United States «. Morgan,
United States «. Prescott,
86;
Ind.,
38
State,
Denio, 233.
Muzzy v. Shattuck,
«.
154; Morbeck
id., 496.

11

id.,
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these official bonds are the same as those on other undertakings

The undertaking of a surety is always looked
upon as siridissimi juris, and cannot be extended beyond the exHis position is essentially different
act terms of his undertaking.
for third persons.

The latter, in accepting his position, has the obligation imposed upon him by law to perform its
duties ; but the former has only entered into a contract, and consented to be bound by the terms of that, but by nothing else.
from that of the officer himself.

A very imthis
from
fact
that
any alteraportant consequence resulting
tion
made in the contract of the suretj"- without his consent,
is

discharges him, because

it

it

is

if

is,

The law creates no obligation for him whatever.^

no longer his contract.^

And

this

;

it

would be the case even though the alteration tended to diminish
on the plain
the surety's responsibility, instead of to increase

it

a

party has made one conprinciple that the law cannot, where
tract, charge him with another, upon any such untenable ground
as that
would have been for his interest/ to have made the substituted contract instead of the

In

other.^

one very important particular,

however,

there may be an

a

;

to the principal for the performance of his obligation will discharge the surety but the rule, we should say, did not apply to
collector of taxes, at least, so far as the extension
the sureties of

,

:

important difference between this undertaking and the ordinary
contract of suretyship in general an extension of time granted

JSIiller

Leggett
"■

Bailie,

V.
10

V.

Stewart,

9

•

Humphreys,

Johns.,

;

is

concerned
such an extension being
of time to make collections
supposed beneficial to them, rather than the contrary. But whether
beneficial or not, such an undertaking ought to be regarded as
Wheat., 681, 703;
21

How.,

66;

United States «. Boyd, 15 Pet., 187;
v. Ball, Hempst., 39; Walsh v.

Swanson

180.
3

;

it

2

2

Sumn., 453 Smith «. United States,
Gass V. Stinson,
Wall., 319.
" The alteration of the bond, after
was executed by the defendants, and
without their consent, discharged them from all liability under it. It does

a

it

;

a

not now truly represent the obligation into which they entered. That obligation was that Jonathan Eldridge should act faithfully as collector of
tax of
12,572.83, which had been already assessed
by the alteration of the bond, the
purported to impose on the defendants was, that the said
obligation which
faithfully as collector of
should
act
Eldridge
tax of $3,490.01, which was
after the bond was executed. This obligation they never consented
to incur."
Metcalf, J., in Doane v. Eldridge, 16 Gray, 254.
assessed
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subject to any provisions of law that might influence the
obligation or the duties of the officer for which the sureties have
made

undertaken.'

But on this point there is some conflict of opinion.^

The repeal of the law under which the bond was given does
not affect the responsibility of the sureties, whose contract remains

in full force

In many

as before.^

cases

it is made the duty of some auditing board or

other authority to examine the collector's accounts periodically,
and come to a settlement with him for previous collections. Undoubtedly all such boards or authorities should perform their duty,
and give the sureties such benefit as might accrue to them therebut the legal view of provisions of law imposing such

from;

The point was made in State v. Cai-lton, 1 Gill, 249, 257. Stephen, J. -. " Tlie
condition of the bond
that the principal shall well and truly account for
and j)ay over to the treasurer the several sums of money which he shall receive, or be answerable for by law, at such times as the law shall direct.' The
extension of the time of payment, therefore, by the legislature was no change
or alteration of the terms of the contract, but was warranted and authorized
by the express language of the condition of the bond upon which the suit
was instituted.
The principle, therefore, that time given to the principal
debtor by the creditor, without the consent of the sureties, will operate their
discharge, cannot be applied in this case. The terms of the condition of the
bond reserved to the state
right to grant the indulgence by law, if she thought
lit to do so, without affecting in any manner the liability of the sureties.
not necessary to rely upon the condition of the bond alone, for the
But
reversal of the judgment of the court below.
A similar question was brought
before the court of appeals for the eastern shore from Worcester county, several
years ago, and the court then decided that the granting of indulgence by law
The law
to the principal collector did not operate to discharge his sureties.
was not considered as binding or obligatory upou the state, but alterable by
the legislature at their pleasure, whenever the interest or the convenience of
the state might require it."
it

'^

In

is

a

'

is,

'

Bennett

cided the other way.

®. The

Auditor,

3

3

a

recent decision the supreme court of Tennessee has decided that sureCentral
Johnson ■».Harker,
ties are discharged under such circumstances.
had
previously deLaw Journal, 625. The court of appeals of West Virginia

W. Va.,

441, per Brown, Prest.

is

a

a

a

a

6

3

2

for the security
S. &. M., 124. That
Tucker v. Stokes,
of the public only, and private citizens have no remedy upon it, see Brown
id., 51. A collector gave
general olHcial bond conditioned to
V. Phipps,
pay over all tax moneys collected by him. A statute afterwards provided for
furspecial tax, and authorized the county board to require of the collector
the
bond
on
general
to
do.
that
the
sureties
Held,
failed
bond,
which
they
ther
See also
were liable for the special tax. State ». Hathorn, 36 Miss., 491.
Stephenson v. Bay City, 36 Mich., 44.
collector's bond
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is,

that they are made, not for the protection of sureties, but
of the public.
The sureties undertake for the conduct of the prin-

duties

cipal, and cannot require the state to protect them against his
If, therefore, they suffer from neglects
misconduct or neglect.
which are not only his neglects, but also those of some other pub-

If
lic officer or board, the loss must be borne by themselves.
periodical settlements would tend to their advantage, they will be
expected to look after them in their own interest.'
Summary remedies.

So far, we have spoken of obligation-s
and remedies, in providing for which no serious question of legislative power could well arise. But in the case of collectors of
the public revenue,

has sometimes been

it

thought important to
under obligations and subject
themselves to liabilities not demanded in other cases.
Provisions
of the following import are often met with

:

compel them to place themselves

1.

That the statement of accounts by the state auditor or other
public accountant shall, as between the state and its collector, be
conclusive.
is

2.

in default, process in the nature
That, when the collector
of an execution may be issued against him by his superior officer,
without any judicial finding, or any hearing, and this process
shall be collected of the property of the collector and his sureties.
3.

That, on application to some specified court, summary judgment may be taken against the collector on motion, without other
process than short notice to show cause.
is

to be remarked, that the justification of such
Upon this
remedies must be found in the contract relations established between the state and the collector, by the acceptance of office by
the latter while such provisions are iu force, and between the
United States v. Kirkpatrick,
Wheat., 720
id., 184; United States s. Niclioll, 13 id., 505

;

;

1

S.

;

;

1

;

9

;

'

United States v. Van Zandt,
Dox v. Postmaster General,
Pet., 318; State «). Atherton, 40 Mo., 209; Christian, ^a; parte, 23 Ark., 641;
Christian v. Ashley County, 24 id., 143 State v. Bates, 3G Vt., 387, 398 Detroit
As to the liability of sureties in diflferent bonds
V. AVeber, 26 Mich,, 384.
where the collector was his own successor for several terms, and the sureties
in the several bonds were not the same, and defaults existed in each term, see
C, How., 250 Detroit v. "W eber, 29
United States v. Eckford, 17 Pet., 251
Mich., 24.
11
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obligors in the official bond, by their giving the
bond under the statute which provides this summary remedy.
The bond, in such a case, is to be read as if the provisions of the
statute were

set

forth at large in

express assent of the parties.'

it,

state and the

and had thereby received the

And this

removes

the difficulty

it

is

a

a

that would otherwise exist were the rights of
party to be concluded without giving him the opportunity of
judicial hearing.
It has been affirmed in Kentucky, that
competent to malce
the auditor's statement of the amount of taxes evidence against
collector of taxes, in
proceeding
against him for an accounting, and also in favor of the sheriff
and against his deputy, who received the list to collect and to
acted

as

;

a

the sheriff who

it

a

it

And, in another case,
summary remedy against both.^
was more distinctly decided that the auditor's statement must be
" We
conclusive where the statute so declares.
acknowledge,"
"
*
*
does curtail the privilege of defense to
that this
IS said,
give

a

it,

is

it

by

a

collector, and places him on
footing different
from that of other defendants in our courts, and we have no
doubt that
necessary to do so for the security of the revenue,
not only great confusion would be produced
and that, without
be made

in the finances of the state, but many frauds would be practiced

be the consequence?

this defense of tender and refusal, or disallowed, what will soon
may be called,
is

If

it

on the treasury.
count, or whatever

The collectors need never settle their ac-

it

if

;

for,
will only
they do,
counts with the proper department
[And, after suggesting the probable evil reacquit them of costs.

is

:

is

it

added] To prevent this, the state has selected its own
auditor, and required every claim to pass thi'ough his hands before
This rigor with
any can be allowed, or any debtor be released.
not new in the science of
regard to officers of the revenue
sults,

government."^
v. HobokenLand Co., 18 How., 272; People v. Van Eps,
Wend.,
Lewis o. Garrett's Adm'r, Miss., 434; Chaffee «. Thomas,
Mich.,
53 Pratt v. Donovan, 10 Wis., 378 Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 53 Penn.
St., 451 Whitehurst ». Cohen, 53 111., 247.
Bibb, 394. The point arose only incidentally in
Johnson v. Thompson,
4

'Murray

4

5

;

;

;

5

6

387, S90;

this

case.

Mills, J., in

5

^

v. Rodes,
T. B. Monr., 318, 324, citing, in
Commonwealth
of
the
action
federal
the
government in making tranviews,
his
support of
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similar statutes have been enforced without any

question being made of the competencj' to adopt them.
A summary distress warrant against the collector and his sureties can only be awarded where the bond is in accordance with
The
the statute, and where all the statutory conditions exist.
being extraordinary and in derogation of the common
law, the steps leading to it must all have been taken ; and if it is
issued under any other circumstances than those under which the
process

a

is

a

it

it,

The
will be trespasser.^
the officer issuing
gives
siriciissimi juris, and cannot be extended single step
liability
The same remark may be
beyond the statutory permission.
statute

made of the case of application for judgment on
ments

must be strictly pursued, as the ordinary legal intenddo not apply in aid of the proceedings in such case.^
a

statute

The

motion.

But where the statute has been strictly pursued, the summary
have been sustained by the courts without hesitation.
" The federal government,"
said by an able jurist of Georthe
collection of its revenue out of
gia, "may summarily enforce
is

it

remedies

defaulting receivers or other duly appointed agents.

Upon like

For simiscripts from the books of the treasury evidence of delinquencies.
Pick., 323; Smyth «. Titcomb, 31 Me.,
see Waldron v. Lee,
It was held, in Board of Justices v. Fennimore, Cox, 343, that com373.
a

5

lar expressions,

a

mittee of the county commissioners did not conclude the collector by their
settlement with him, but he might show errors on being sued for the balance.
suit
In Texas, the controller's statement of accounts is not evidence In

Weimer

v.

Johnson,

Bunbury,

v.

30

H. & J., 487; Billingsloy

Mich.,

301

S.

Am. Law Times,

37.

15.

Humph.,

have been to the governor, the summary remedy canv.

Miller,

Yerg.,

113.

And

see

Broughton

v. State,

7

should

Mallory

3

trustee when
not be had.

it

is

a

is

is

5

;

'

Stew. & Port.,

State, 14 Md., 369.

v.

And see Walker v. ChapNabors
Ala.,
116 Graham v. Keynolds, 45 id., 578.
As to the recitals in the
man, 23
record, see Hardaway v. The County Court,
Humph., 557. Where the statute authorizes summary judgment against the collector and his sureties, the
necessary party, and if ho be dead, the summary remedy
collector
taken to the county
gone. Governor v. Powell, 23 Ala,, 579. If the bond
v.

3

The Governor,

C,

3

Prather

3

See

;

«

'

it

Albright «. The Governor, 25 Texas, 687. This would
against the collector.
evidence.
be the rule anywhere in the absence of an express statute making

ver,

1

is

is

it

a

So

is

bond dated fourteen months after the collection
prima
bond, and motion for judgment on
the
statutory
not
should be denied.
facie
But the fact that the penalty of the
De Soto County v. Dixon, 34 Miss., 150.
no objection to it. Mabry v. Tarsmaller than the statute requires
bond
193.

Humph.,

94.
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immediately out of the
defaulting citizen ; for that purpose the tax collector is authorized to issue execution.
These powers of the government are
the state may collect

principles

taxes

founded in an imperious necessity.
They are necessary to the
preservation of the government, to the administration of the law,

If the
maintenance of all the rights of the people.
government were forced to submit the case of every defaulting
tax payer and tax gatherer and financial agent to a jury, with the
delays and uncertainties attending a judicial investigation, it could

indeed to

a

not command its revenue, it could not be administered." *
The necessity for a strict compliance with the statute in the
issue of such process is seen in the further fact that the officer
who issues it is usually a mere ministerial officer, without judicial power.
As has been said in a case from which quotation
has already been made, and in which by statute an inferior court

issued the process, " The inferior courts have judicial powers, but
apprehend that this is not one. They act as mere agents of the

I

They are instructed by the act to issue execution for the
There is no issue to try ; there
amount which appears to be due.
is no judgment to be pronounced. As auditors, it is their busistate.

the amount due, and then to issue execution.
treasurer
is the mere agent of the state.
His busiSo the state
ness is to state the collector's account, and if he is in arrear, to
ness to ascertain

issue execution."

^

Precisely the same reasons sustain those acts of the legislature
which forbid the courts interfering with the process which is isIf it is important that the party in default
sued in revenue cases.
should be precluded from a resort to dilatory proceedings of one
kind, it is equally important that the power to interpose others
' Lumpkin,

J., in Tift

v.

Griffin,

5

Tlie learned judge com-

Geo., 185, 191.

ments in tliis case upon the claim that the tax collector was entitled to a trial
by jury, and declares that the case is, and always has been, and must he an
exception
Smyth

B.

to the right of

Titcomb,

jury trial. And

31 Me., 273;

see Waldron ». Lee,
Bassetts.The Governor, 11 Geo.,

33 id., 566 ; Daggett

v. Commissioners,

i).

Everett,

19

Me., 373

5

Pick., 333 ;
Harper
Fremont v.

307;
;

School District, 33 id., 483 ; Cruikshanlis v. Charleston, 1 McCord, 360 ; Prather
V. Johnson, 3 H. & J., 487; Billingsley v. State, 14 Md., 369; Hobson v. Commonwealth, 1 Duv., 173; Weimer v. Bunbury, 30 Mich., 301.
»

Tift

V.

Griffin,

5

Geo., 185, 193.

It

is added that

if the

would make no diflference, because it is exceptional.

duty were judicial, it
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is a rule which

prescribe it do not go beyond those which have been sustained by the courts, in which
is taken away the right to maintain replevin for property taken
for taxes, or to take any other proceedings calculated to embarThe legal view of such statutes
rass the collector's action.
the statutes which

is,

seems severe, but

a

that while they take away specific remedy, they nevertheless
leave to the party other remedies which are adequate to do him
eventually full justice.^
Even as regards the summary proceedings, however, there are
some principles which will constitute protection to the collector
and his sureties.
One of these must be, that they can only be
against on notice with

Eve

D. State,

■will

J.,

is

"But

it

to say:

Geo., 50 Scnfielcl
after considering

21

case, Warner, Ch.

be remediless.

said

if

there

is

'

linquency.

a

hearing on the question of deWe say nothing here of the evidence which may be
;

proceeded

i).

Perkerson, 46 id., 350, 360.

In

this last

act in question, proceeds
not judicial interference, the complainants
the legislative

The 7th section of the act before cited points out

the

it

was to be by judicial interference.
remedy, -which negatives the idea that
The principle is, that the state must collect her revenue for the support of
government through the action of the executive department thereof, whether
derived from taxes or from her other sources of revenue, without any judicial interference therewith. The courts will not presume that the state, in
the exercise of her sovereign prerogative in the collection of her revenue,
will do injustice to any of her citizens for her own benefit. The complainants, at the time they signed the oflBcial bonds of their principal, must be
to have done so with
full knowledge of the law applicable to
their liability thereon, and as to the manner of its enforcement against them
for the default of their principal. The issuing the executions by the compa

presumed

troller general in this

case, being the act of the executive department of the
government having the exclusive jurisdiction over that subject matter, the
courts have no legal right, judicially, to interfere with the exercise of that
jurisdiction, for the reasons alleged, either in the original bills of the com-

plainants or in their amended bills, but on the contrary, are expressly prohibited from doing so."

it

is

it,

a

^It has been decided in Georgia that the governor may be authorized to
vacate the commission of
defaulting tax collector and fill the vacancy.
"The running of the state machinery is so intimately connected with its
and
treasury, and may be said to be so dependent upon
of such trans-

Hartley

b. State,

3

a

it

cendent importance to its citizens and the public, that
cannot be subjected
to the ordinary rules governing iu other cases." Trippe, J., in State i). Frazier, 48 Geo., 137. But the remedy by summary judgment for taxes collected
cannot be had against one who has been ousted on quo warranto as
usurper.

Kelley,

238, 237.
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received on the hearing ; of its quality or its conclusiveness; but
the principle, that one is not to be condemned unheard, should
inviolable.

be considered

The hearing will of course be sum-

substituted notice might be sufficient where, in proper
Another
that there shall be some
cases, the law so provides.
official showing of the delinquency something of an authoritative
a

;

is,

mary, and

upon documents, returns or records, which
show the facts.
It has been decided in one case that an officer
collector's default than
who could have no better evidence of
and

based

a

character,

it

was
the legal presumption that another officer, whose business
to deliver to the collector the proper tax rolls and warrant, had
performed that duty, could not be empowered to issue execution
a

presumption, since the like presumption would be
equally strong in favor of the collector, and should consequently
protect him.' It was also decided in the same case that any such
summary process — at least where the statute had prescribed no
form — should show on its face the existence of all the facts
on such

necessary to give jurisdiction to issue

it.^

a

3

Am. Law Times, 37. la
'Weimer e. Bunbury, 30 Mich., 201; S. C,
this case the supreme court of Michigan fully sustained tlie power to provide
for this summary process, hut held that
county treasurer, in whose office
there was no evidence that the collector had ever had the tax warrant, and no
evidence of delinquency, except the mere fact that the time for making return
of taxes collected and delinquent had expired, could not he authorized to
issue execution

Myers (Ky.),

against

the collector.

Compare

Commonwealth

v.

'Wilson,

137.

:

^

Weimer v. Bunbury, 30 Mich., 201. In this case, speaking of the statutory
"It was necessary in this case that the state and
provisions, the court say
county taxes should be properly apportioned to the city of Niles, and that the
city treasurer should have executed to the county treasurer the proper bond.
The supervisors must subsequently have delivered to the city treasurer, tax
rolls, witli state, county, city, school, and other taxes extended thereon, with
warrants annexed giving him proper legal authority to collect the same, and
directions as to what disposition he was to make of the several taxes he
should collect. All these were necessary prerequisites, without which the
city treasurer could not be subjected to this summary process. Treating the
to the county treasurer as an agreement that
default occurs, its terms cannot be exsummary execution may issue when
the
treasurer
and liis sureties to this extraordinary
to
subject
city
as
so
tended
on
the
of
another officer. The city treasurer
part
process, when the default

and though he may be liable

proper form of action for any tax moneys actually received by him,

is

never receives the tax roll

;

if he

it

in

not in default
a

is

is

a

a

city treasurer's ofBcial bond
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The conclusion to be drawn from the authorities appears to be,
that the officer, by accepting the public trust, submits himself to
the laws which provide remedies for the enforcement of his duties,
with this restriction, that final process is not to be issued against
Hm unless the officer issuing it has evidence that a default has
clear that he does not agree, hy his bond or otherwise, to 'become responsible
for all the moneys called for by the tax roll, if no warrant accompanies it empowering him to enforce payment. In other words, he must have in his
hands the statutory means for collection before he can be in default for not
And when summary process of this nature is issued against him,
collecting.
it must show on its face all the facts which are necessary to constitute a default; for nothing can be taken by intendment in favor of a proceeding like
this, which is in derogation of common law principles, and therefore must
depend for its validity upon a strict conformity to the statute. As in the case
of the process of all other inferior and special tribunals not proceeding according to the course of the common law, the county treasurer's warrant
must show the facts which presumptively would make out a case in which he
had jurisdiction to issue it. Nichols v. Walker, Cro. Car., 394; Rex v. Manning, 1 Burr., 377 ; Kex ». Mayor, etc., of Liverpool, id., 2344 ; Frary v. Dakin,
7 Johns., 75; Mills v. Martin, 19 id., 733; People v. Koeber, 7 Hill, 39; Dakin
e. Hudson, 6 Cow., 221 ; Bridge v. Ford, 4 Mass., 642; Barrett «. Crane, 16 Vt.,
346 ; Brewster v. Hyde, 7 N. H., 211 ; Chandler v. Nash, 5 Mich., 409 ; Piatt v.
Stewart, 10 id., 260; Hart ■».Newsom, 14 id., 233. In this case the county
treasurer has no record back of the warrant which shows the default, and
consequently any question which might be made regarding the support of
the warrant by such a record is not in the case.
" What does the
county treasurer's precept show in this case ? It begins
with a recital that the city treasurer is in default ' in the payment to the county
treasurer of the taxes apportioned to said city of Niles for the year 1872.'
Here is the statement of a legal conclusion without the recital of a single fact
to support it.
It is a judgment without preliminaiy accusation or finding.
It is difl&cult to conceive of a proceeding more defective in the statement of
jurisdictional facts. Nothing is said of any tax rolls, nothing of any tax
warrants

;

but upon the naked

fact that taxes have been apportioned to the

city of Niles, which have not been paid over

to the county treasurer, the
sherift is to proceed to levy and collect the same of the property of the city
treasurer aad his sureties. Nor do the subsequent recitals in the precept support this preliminary declaration of the city treasurer's default. The subse-

quent recitals show two facts only ; that certain persons became sureties on
the bond of the city treasurer to the county treasurer, and that ' there remains
now due and unaccounted for from the said Thomas A. Bunbury, as such city
treasurer as aforesaid, the sum of four thousand eight hundred and seventy-

Now the city treasurer might be in default
liable to this process, for, the taxes unpaid
might bs city, school, highway, or special taxes, with which the county treasIt may be doubtful, therefore, if this statement would
urer has no concern.
two dollars and sixty-two cents.'
for this amount without being
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occurred.

And

so far as the officer himself is concerned,

511
as

his

obligation does not spring from contract, but comes from the law
itself, he may perhaps be subjected to such change of remedies,
or provision for new remedies, as may be made by changes in the
statute after his appointment or election.
But summary remedies
cannot be given against sureties except as they have assented to
them, either expressly by their bond, or by implication in

giving

which provides for them.
And changes
in the statute law which, if applied to their contract, would subthe bond under

a statute

ject them to further responsibility, or to other remedies unknown
to the common law, could not be applied at all.

The same principle seems to apply here

remedy by
suit against the collector : while he cannot be compelled to make
an illegal collection, or be rendered liable for neglect to do so, yet
as to the

if he actually collects a tax, he cannot defeat the summary proceeding by showing that the tax was unauthorized.*
show a default, even if it were recited that tax rolls and warrants were duly
delivered ; but it is clear it could be of no service in the absence of such a
It follows that the county treasurer's precept was not fair on its face;
recital.
that is to say, it did not contain recitals suflBcient to show that it was lawfully
issued."
'

Palmer t. Craddock, Myers (Ky.),

183.

An

act authorizing the treasurer

to issue execution against persons making default in listing their property for
taxation was considered in State v. Allen, 3 McOord, 55. But this seems to be

going

a great way.
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CHAPTER XXIII.
ENFOECING OFFICIAL DUTY UNDER THE TAX LAWS.
Under any system of taxation, most careful provisions are essential to ensure obedience to the law on the part of those who
The serious consequences
are entrusted with its administration.
that ensue when any important provision of law is overlooked or
are sufficient to render such regulations prudent, and

disregarded

which invite officers to disobedience or
evasion of the law must admonish the government of their neIt is to be borne in mind aljo that tax laws, however
cessity.
the perpetual temptations

necessary, do not enlist the affections of the people, and that the
public sympathy does not accompany the officers in the perform-

On the contrary, the people submit to taxhard necessity ; and as every individual is likely to be

ance of their duties.

ation

as a

conviction that they seldom or never operate
with equality or justice, he is also likely to be entirely willing to
The tax
make his case one that shall escape the heavy burdens.
with

impressed

a

official is therefore expected to enforce the law against a community, the members of which excuse to themselves an evasion of
its provisions on the ground that even then they perform their
upon whom the like duty rests ;
and will feel, if compulsory steps are taken against them, someduties

as

nearly

thing like

as do the others

a sense of personal

wrong.

The difficulty

is- compli-

cated by the fact that the officers who make the assessments are
chosen by the people

assessed,

and

as

the local assessments are

usually made the basis for state taxation, their people will expect
them to make the valuations sufficiently low to protect them
The sense of official duty
against unfair assessments elsewhere.
must be strong and the firmness
■under

such

circumstances

the

considerable that can resist
pressure

for

some

departure

from the strict rule of law ; and the conclusive evidence that it is
not always resisted is found in the notorious fact, that men who
take solemn oath to perform to the best of their

ability the duty

CH.

ENFOECING OFFICIAL DUTY.

XXIII.J

513

of assessing property at its fair cash value are accustomed to assess it at from one-fourth to two-fifths only, justifying their disobedience

of the law on the general

disobedience

of others.

The

provision for a state equalization as a correction of this evil does
not appear to cure this demoralizing disregard of law and official
oaths, nor does any legal process seem adequate to the case.
Of the securities relied upon for the performance of duty by
tax ofiicials, besides those which may be found in the cliaracter of
the officials themselves, or that may rest in the power of removal,
the

following may be mentioned.

The Official Oath.
Upon this much less reliance is placed
than formerly, for the reason, perhaps, that the community has
1.

come to tolerate

— it may almost

be said

to demand- — a disre-

gard or evasion of its provisions, when the apparent interest of
the district seems to require it.
Moreover, as has been shown in
another place, an official oath is not absolutely essential, and if
The oath is conseneglected, the proceedings may still be valid.
quently of little or no importance, and probably might be abolished without detriment to the public service ; certainly without
detriment to the public

An Official

morals.^

This is usually

required of collectors
The value of this depends on the law, on its terms and on
only.
the sureties, and there is no occasion to add here to what has been
2.

Bond.

said in another place.
3.

Penalties

for

Neglect

of Duty.

Of these great use is made.

They are either penalties to be recovered in a civil action, or they
For the cases of various
are imposed as criminal punishments.
officers connected with the public revenue system, particularly
collectors, appraisers and other ofBcers or agents in the internal
revenue and customs service of the United States, it has been
found necessary to go further, and to make some criminal misconduct and delinquencies punishable
4.

Common

Lavj Remedies.

as felonies.

These lie back of those given by

of this is furnished too often by the further fact that
the
ranks of respectability to perform duties under the
from
appointed
men
tax laws are found in very many cases to pay not
other
and
revenue
internal
or official oaths, and use the position as
official
obligations
to
the least regard
' SufiScient evidence

one of vantage for the purposes of public plunder.
33
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Statute.
The most useful and efficient of them all is that which
is afforded bv the writ of mandamus.

Mandamus : its nature.

is

The writ of mandamus

a sum-

mary writ, issuing from the proper court, which commonly is the
highest court of common law jurisdiction of the state, commanding the officer or body to whom it is addressed to perform some
specific duty, which the party applying for the writ is entitled of
right to have performed.^ The award of the writ rests in the
discretion of the court, which will allow or deny it according as
in its opinion justice requires,'* and it is in general a sufficient
reason for denying

it that another adequate remedy exists.

Thus,

it has been refused when applied for to compel the board of supervisors to audit and allow to one wrongfully assessed the tax
he had paid ; he having, in that case, an adequate remedy by
suit against the assessors who had assessed him without jurisdiction.^
The writ is not awarded to control the exercise of a discretionary authority, and it is therefore usually said that a judicial duty cannot be enforced by means of it.
Such a statement
is not accurate ; a judicial duty is as susceptible of being enforced by the process as any other when the right is clear, and
when the judicial officer, if he obey the law, has no option, but
must do some specific thing which the law requires of him.
The
more accurate statement would

be,

that

a

judicial officer, or

one

exercising a judicial or discretionary authority, cannot be coerced
in his judgment or compelled to exercise his discretion in a particular manner by means of this writ. But when a judge or other
officer

and

has no discretion as regards

the particular

act to be done,

refusal to do some specific thing would be a wrongful denial of a right or a remedy, mandamus is a proper and suitable
process to compel him to perform his duty.*
' 3

a

Bl. Com.,

Strong,

J. ;

110;

Marathon

Nelson, 1 Cow., 417,
dies, ch. I.
^
V.

Weber

v.

Pittsburgh, 34 Penn. St., 496, 509, per
Oregon, 8 Mich., 372, 378, per Oampbell, J. ; Bx parte
433, per Savage, Ch. J. ; High on Extraordinary Reme-

Commonwealth

Zimmerman,

23

Judge of Wayne Circuit,

' People
* See

Ex

V.

ii.

v.

Md., 45 ; Stickney JEx parte,
Mich., 296.

Supervisors of Chenango,

parte Bradley,

Ex parte 'Ban;

9

Wheat.,

7

40

Ala.,

160 ;

People

19

Wall.,

539;

11

N. T.,

364 ; Stafford v.

Ex

563.

Union Bank,

parte Bradstreet,

7

Pet., 634.

17

How.,

A

275 ;

singular
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It

will not only lie, therefore, to compel an auditing board to
proceed to the consideration of an account, and to pass upon it in
some manner, but if the charges are legal, and it is the clear duty
case of overlooking this distinction is seen in Ex parte Ostrander, 1 Denio,
679 ; the more singular from the fact that it in effect overruled several pre-

vious

in the same state. The case was one in which the court of common pleas had wrongfully dismissed an appeal ; and the supreme court held
the reinstatement could not be compelled by inandamua, even though the party
wronged had no other remedy, because the common pleas had cognizance of
the matter. And this, too, though the court found the dismissal to have been
" in manifest violation of
the provisions of the statute on that subject," and
" an exercise of a power which the court did not
possess." The previous
of
cases
Bx parte Cuykendall, 6 Cow., 52 ; People v. Superior Court, 5 Wend.,
114, and People v. N. Y. Common Pleas, 19 Wend., 118, which are plainly opposed to this, are not noticed in the opinion ; but the case has often since been
cited as authority, probably because the general principle which it lays down
but misapplies — that a judicial discretion will not be controlled by this writ —
cases

is manifestly sound.
We say misapplied, because, as the supreme court found,
the common pleas had no discretion in the premises, and were clearly guilty
of abuse. Recent New York cases place the doctrine on safer ground. In

Howlaud V. Eldredge, 43 N. Y.,457, 461, Grover,!., says of judicial tribunals:
" They may, hj mandamus, be compelled to ijroceed and determine the matter,
but they cannot be compelled to decide in any particular way. If they could,
it would no longer be their judgment or discretion, but that of the court awarding the writ." Applying this rule to auditing boards, the court often compels
them to allow claims which are legal demands, after they have once decided
they will not do so. See People v. Supervisors of Delaware, 45 N. Y., 196, 300,
per Folger, J., who cites Hull v. Supervisors of Oneida, 19 Johns., 259; Wilson «. Supervisors of Albany, 13 id., 416. In the still later case of People v.
Supervisors of Otsego, 51 N. Y., 401, 407, Earl, Com., explains the rule more
fully, and shows how little foundation there is for the doctrine of Ex parte
Ostrander, that a judicial body cannot be compelled to undo wrongful action
by means of this writ. An extract from the decision in this case will be given
further on.

Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall., 364, is in striking contrast to Ostrander's case.
An attorney, as the court found, had been unlawfully disbarred by an inferior
court. "We agree," says Mr. Justice Nelson, "that this writ does not lie to
control the judicial discretion of the judge or court, and hence where the ac-

tion complained of rested in the exercise of this discretion, the remedy fails.
But this discretion is not unlimited, for if it be exercised with manifest injustice the Court of King's Bench will command its due exercise. Tapping on
Mandamus, 13, 14. It must be a sound discretion and according to law. As
said by Chief Justice Taney, in Ex parte Secomb, 19 How., 13: 'The power,
however, is not an arbitrary and despotic one, to be exercised at the pleasure
of the court, or from passion, prejudice or personal hostility.' And by Chief
Justice Marshall, in Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat., 530: 'The court is not inclined
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of the board under the statute to make the allowance, that duty
the members may be compelled to perform by means of this
writ.^

it were in a case wliere the conduct of tlie circuit or disti'ict court was irregular or was flagrantly improper.' " The judge who dissents in the case does so on other grounds.
The following cases may be referred to as supporting like views: Ex 'parU Couwaj^, 4 Ark., 303; Wright v.
to interpose unless

Johnson, 5 id., 687 ; Ex parte Pile, 9 id., 336 ; Day v. Justices of Fleming, 3
B. Monr., 198; Applegate i>. Applegate, 4 Met. (Ky.), 236; Castello u.St. Louis
County Court, 28 Mo., 259; Roberts v. Holsworth, 5 Halst., 57; Merced Mining Co. J). Fremont, 7 Cal., 130; Ortman v. Dixon, 9 id., 23 ; People d. Bacon,
18 Mich., 247 ; People v. Judge of Wayne Circuit Court, 33 id., 493 ; People ii.
Pearson, 1 Scam., 480; Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Rucker, 14 111., 353; Stephenson V. Mausony, 4 Ala., 317 ; Hudson ». Daily, 13 id., 733 ; Ex parte Lowe,
20 id., 330; Shadden v. Sterling, 23 id., 518; -^ic parte Thornton, 46 id., 384.
Other Alabama cases make a more liberal use of this writ than would be sanctioned in other states.
The whole doctrine may be thus summarized : If a
body having judicial powers shall refuse to proceed to do what the law requires, it may be compelled to do it by this writ. If it has done an act which
the law does not authorize, its dut}' is to undo it on request, and this duty may
be compelled by this writ. But if it has acted in a matter which by the law
was committed to its judgment or discretion, mandamus will not lie to correct
its errors, for judgment
this process.
'

Bright

Oneida,

Supervisors

V.

19

of Chenango,

id., 259; People

of Otsego,
Gunn's Adm'r

«. Supervisors

Mich.,

and discretion

v.
51

are not to be controlled

18

Johns.,

242 ;

Hull

v. Supervisors

Supervisors of New York, 33 N.
id., 401 ; People v. Supervisors

Ark.,

or coerced by

Y.,

473;

of

People

of Macomb,

3

v. Pulaski County, 3
427.
surveyor's report to be recorded " unless it see some objection to the report," the duty may be compelled by mandamus. Delancy «.
Goddin, 13 Grat., 366; Randolphs. Stalnoker, 13 id., 533. In People o. Su-

475;

court is to order

Where the county

a

pervisors of Otsego, supra, Earl, Com., considers the question somewhat
fully, and answers the objections usually made to the employment of the
writ in cases where the supervisors are to audit and allow accounts. The fol.
lowing is an extract from the opinion, p. 407 :
" But it is claimed on the part of the
appellant, that it has done all it can
to
do
compelled
that
by
mandam,us;
it
has heard the relator's claim, ami
be
determined it adversely to him. It is true that boards of supervisors have a
certain judicial discretion to exercise in reference to claims presented to them,
which cannot be controlled by mandamus. They are to investigate and deter-

a

it,

mine the facts as to any disputed claim, and if it is unliquidated, they are to
determine the amount to be paid. But the law is supposed to be plain, and
and they liave no right to reject
they are presumed to understand
claim
as illegal, which the law plainly requires them to allow.
they do, they can

If

be compelled

York,

11

to the allowance

Abb. Pr.,

114;

by mandamus. (People v. Supervisors of New
-b. Board of Supervisors
of New York, 33 N.

People

CH.
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it
in their judgment,

the application of these principles to the case of assessors
be manifest that they cannot be controlled

amount they shall assess against a person or his properThe doctrine is shortly stated by the supreme court of Masty,
sachusetts, in a case in which county commissioners had declined
to abate a tax on behalf of one who claimed to have been overas to the

Y., 47:^ ; People v. Board of Supervisors of New York, 21 How. Pr., 323; People B. Supervisors of St. Lawrence, 30 id., 178; Hill v. The Supervisors
of Oneida, 19 Johns., 259; People ■b.Supervisors of New York, 1 Hill, 363.)
"Where supervisors refuse to audit and allow a legal claim, on the ground that
it is illegal, they do not exercise the discretion which the law vests in them ;
and hence, in such case, they can be compelled by mandamus to exercise their
discretion upon the facts and the amount to be allowed.
" Now, let us see what was done in this case. The relator, in the
afBdavits
■upon which the order to show cause was based, showed clearly and particularly that it owned the United States stocks; that it was assessed upon them
and paid the taxes claimed.
These facts showed that it had a claim which,
under the special act of 1867, the board of supervisors was bound to determine; and if it found the facts to be true, then it had no discretion left, and
was bound to cause the money paid to be refunded.
These facts were not disIt
puted. When the claim was joresented, it was referred to a committee.
does not appear that the committee or the board of supervisors made any investigation whatever of the facts pertaining to the claim, although the statutes
furnish ample power to make such investigation (Laws of 184fi, ch. 180;
Laws of 1858, ch. 190). The committee, in their report, speak of the taxes
'
'
cannot, in
as collected and paid,' and then state that the county and towns
justice, refund said taxes,' thus substantially admitting that the taxes had
They do not report that they have examined and
been paid as claimed.
or
that any of the statements contained in the affidavit
facts,
the
into
inquired
untrue.
They simply report that they have examined
were
of complainant
unjust for the county and towns to refund the
would
be
the claims, and that it
Then the board of supervisors adopted a resolution reported by the
taxes.
There
committee, that the claim was invalid, and that the same be disallowed.
was no determination by the board of supervisors that the relator was not assessed just as alleged, and that it did not pay the taxes just as claimed by it.
The claim was evidently rejected simply because it was unjust and illegal.
The legislature had determined that the claim for taxes illegally exacted, as
mentioned in the act, was both just and legal; and the onlj^ questions to be
determined by the board of supervisors, in reference to which it had any discretion were, whether the complainant had such claims, and the amount of
them. This case is, therefore, brought within the rule laid down in Hill v.
'
Where the supervisors of a county refuse to
Supervisors of Onei'da (supra) :
as
a
county
charge, this court, if it be a legal charge,
services
for
allow a claim
the
supervisors in the execution of their duty by a writ
may instruct and guide
"
of mandamus, and compel them to admit the claim as a county charge.'
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"

If the commissioners," it is said, "had refused to hear
and determine upon the complaint, this court would have issued
a mandamus requiring them to do it.
But the question whether
the petitioner's taxes should be abated or not, was a judicial
And although it is within the province of this court to
question.
rated.

require the commissioners to decide the question, yet we have
no power to decide it for them, or to determine what decision

No judicial officer, in determining a matter lethey shall make.
gall}? submitted to his discretion, can ever be required to be governed by the dictates of any judgment but his own.
^Ye are
clearly of opinion that in refusing to abate the petitioner's taxes,
the commissioners acted judicially, upoa a subject of which they
had final jurisdiction, and in which the exercise of their discretion

cannot be revised by any other tribunal." ' A like view has been
expressed in Pennsylvania, in a case in which an inferior court
had issued the writ to compel school directors to exonerate a per"
This," it is said, " was an unprecedented application
son taxed.

It

is not the ordinary ofiicial duty of
school directors to exonerate taxes, but rather to levy and collect
them.
If they were backward in the exercise of this official funcof the writ of mandamus.

tion,

mandamus

might be used

they have set themselves

to stir them

up.

But when

in motion, and are proceeding to dis-

charge the duty imposed by law, they are no longer subject to
Exoneration is a discretionary power incidental to
inandamus.
their office, and in this instance would seem to have been exercised by a refusal to grant the relief asked

for.

We have no

power to control a discretion vested in them, and no appeal lies
from them to judicial tribunals." ^ This rule undoubtedly applies
to all classes of assessments, and to all other actions of assessors
■which

they are to perform according to the dictates of their own

In New York, where a statute made it the duty of
judgment.
town assessors when a majority of tax payers, owning more than
one-half the taxable property of the town had signed a certain
paper, to make affidavit of the fact for a certain purpose important
'

Gibbs

V.

r. Blackstone

County Commissioners of Hampden, 19 Pick., 298, citing Chase
Canal Co., 10 id., 244; United States «. Lawrence, 3 Dallas, 43.

' Woodward,
388. 390.

J., in

Schood

Directors

of Bedford

v.

Anderson, 45 Penn. St.,

OH.
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to the town, a mandamus to compel them to perform the duty was
" The affidavit of the assessors must be in
held unauthorized.
with what they believe to be the fact, otherwise they
incur the moral guilt of perjury, irrespective of any determination
accordance

the court may have made thereon.
By the seventeenth section
of the act, false swearing by the assessors is made perjury, and,
should it turn out that they are right and the court wrong in their
views, the only ground upon which they could escape conviction would be that the affidavit was not their voluntary act, but
the result of coercion, which they had no power to resist.
If this
upon the face of the affidavit, it is entirely clear that in
no legal sense would it be their affidavit at all, but a mere nullity.
It follows that there is no remedy provided by the act for the correction of errors into which the assessors may fall, in respect to the
appeared

matter referred to their determination.
clared it

to be

The statute having de-

their duty to make the affidavit when the fact exists,

the court have power, by mandamus,

to compel them to proceed

is

it

if,

from
and examine the evidence and determine the fact, and
their determination,
appears that the requisite consent has been
This
the
given, to make an affidavit in accordance therewith.
universal rule in respect to all- subordinate courts and tribunals
clothed with the exercise of judgment or discretion. They may
by mandamus be compelled to proceed and determine the matter,

but cannot be compelled to decide in any particular

way.

If

^

is

is

it

would no longer be their judgment or discretion, but
they could
conthat of the court awarding the writ. Their determination
provided."
clusive, unless some mode of review

For like reasons, operating with still greater force, the writ can-

a

a

not be employed to compel the performance of duties of politiSuch would be the duty of determining what taxes
cal nature.
should be levied by municipal corporation for the current needs
of the year, in respect to which no previous imperative duty was
fixed upon the municipality, in consequence of previous indebted-

If

this writ were to be employed for such purposes, the courts and not the people, would in effect exercise the
local political powers.*
■

ness or otherwise.

Howland

d.

Eldredge,

43

N. T.,

457.

'

Union County Court u. Robinson, 27 Ark., 116, where the endeavor -reas
the school levy which
made to compel school district authorities to increase
See
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On the other hand, the writ will lie to compel assessors to strike
from the assessment roll nonbaxable property which they have
included in it. Here is a clear case of excess of jurisdiction;
nothing is submitted to their discretion, because by the law the

it,

it,

subject matter of the controversy is put beyond their authority,
and they can lawfully neither list
nor value it.^ And the writ
will lie to compel the refunding of taxes charged upon exempt
property, where by statute the officers are directed to refund

exemption depends upon matters of fact which
The refunding in such
they are to inquire into and pass upon.
case
mere ministerial duty the officers are supposed to know
the law, and
to the facts as they find
their duty to apply

it

similar ruling has been made in the case of

a

A

them.''

is

it

;

a

is

a

even though the

state

;

officer who had the power by law to reject illegal taxes which
had been returned to him and he was required by this writ to
reject taxes on lands which were exempt from the levy, though
assessors
commanding it.' And
omit from the roll property which
taxable, they may be comon the roll on the application of the proper law
pelled to insert
statute

if

no specific

the people had voted for the year, on
support of proper schools.

showing that

it

The relief in all such cases
a

officer of the state.*

is

it

is

there was

based on the

was insufficient

for the

of Barton, 44 Barb., 148; People v. Olmsted, 45 id.,
C44.
Compare Miltenberger v. St. Louis County Court, 50 Mo., 172, which
possibly would appear contra if all the facts were given, but the statement of
The case cites Dunklin County v. District
somewhat imperfect.
the case
Court, 23 Mo., 449, and State v. La Payette County Court, 41 id.. 231, which
difl'erent nature.
are cases of
'People

Assessors

a

is

11.

^

of Otsego, 51 N. Y., 401. The case was one of taxawhich, under the law and the decisions of the
courts, were not within the jurisdiction of the assessors.
It was made the duty
to
refund
the
tax,
the
supervisors
of
which they could only do on
showing
of facts. The board adopted resolution that the claim was invalid, and that
manifest evasion of duty.
be disallowed, but this was
People

V.

Supervisors

securities,

a

it

a

a

tion of national

it

9

'

Mich., 134. The duty of the auditor general
People V. Auditor General,
this
depended
in
case,
taxes
reject
upon the date when the patents for the
to
to
a
fact
be
issued;
only
brought
to his knowledge by evidence, but
lands
clear
when
the
was proved.
duty
■which made
In that regard the case
*

resembled People
People

rights in

v.

Supervisors

•!). Shearer, 30

the

of Otsego,

Cal., 645.

public lands were held

The

51

case

N. Y.,

401.

was one in which possessory

to be taxable, and ordered to be placed

Enforcing official duty.
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clear legal right of the public or of a private party to have perlormed a certain act vfhich the officer refuses to perform ; and it
is immaterial what is the nature of the duty, if in the particular
Such cases are in pointed contrast to those in which the attempt is made to control the judgment or discretion of assessors, or of the appellate board of review,
after an appeal has been taken to it.' But the assessor, when he
case the officer has no disci-etion.

has a mere ministerial duty to perform, like that of the delivery
to the officer of a correct copy of the assessment roll in a case

where he has assumed

to make unauthorized

changes, may be

compelled on this writ to perform it.^
A suitable case for the employment of the writ is where it is
found necessary to compel county commissioners to proceed to
the hearing of an appeal from an assessment, where the hearing
is of right under the statute.' It will lie to compel the proper
to issue a distress warrant against a defaulting

officer

collector

;

though it is said that if it is manifest from an inspection of the
proceedings that the collector has no authority to collect the tax,
by reason of its illegality, or that the persons assessed, on being

Possibly private individual might have been relator in this
People 11. Halsey, 53 Barb., 547 S. C, on appeal, 37 N. Y., 344.
;

^

People

2

'

Gibbs 1}. County Commissioners,
Louis County Court, 50 Mo., 173.

This

V.

Ashbury,

And

see

Virginia,

Pick.,

398.

See

Miltenberger

v.

St.

44 Cal., 616.

seems to be recognized

where, however,

19

the party

in James

». Bucks County, 13 Penn. St., 73,
himself of the right to be heard.
County Commissioners,
Kev., 341.

had deprived

etc.. Company

v.

5

See

a

upon the roll.
case.

a

a

a

it,

would have
compelled to pay
remedy back for restitution,
the court will not grant
collection that
process, to enforce
So the remedy by this writ
would be fruitless and oppressive.''

"

Titcomb, 31 Me., 273, 381, per Roioard, J. See, also, Waldron v.
Smyth
Pick., 333, which covers all the same ground. A ruling like this in
Lee,
principle was made in People v. Halsey, 53 Barb., 547; S. C, on appeal, 37
county treasurer had assumed to
N. Y., 341. The case was one in which
question an assessment, as being unjust, and had refused to issue his warrant
for the collection of the tax. The court held that he had no discretion in the
mandamus to issue. It was also decided in the same
premises, and ordered
individual,
having common interest with the rest of the
private
case that
community in the collection of the tax, might be relator in the proceeding.
On this last point Fullerton, J., in 37 N. Y., 344, 348, says: "Inasmuch as the
not of
proceeding by mandamus,
people themselves are the plaintiff's in
is

it

a

a

a

a

a

5

V.
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may be had to compel a board of supervisors to assess upon the
county the amount due to it from the state, after it has been ad^
or to compel a
justed and settled by the competent authority;
county trustee to levy a tax to pay the damages awarded in a
proceeding for the construction of a county road ; it being his
duty under the law to do so.^
The purchaser at a tax sale may have mandamiLS to compel
the delivery to him of the proper certificate as evidence of his
purchase,' or of a proper deed, if the one delivered to him is

And

defective.*

the owner,

title has been cut off by a
to compel the payment to him of

whose

tax sale, may have mandamus

any surplus moneys received on the sale.^ But mandamus never
lies to coerce the performance of legislative duties, either by the
legislature of the state or by any infeiior and subordinate body ;
not only because legislation is foreign to judicial duties, but also
because,

in its nature, legislative action is discretionary.

But

action is required of a body, which also exercises legislative functions, its performance may be compelled by
■where

ministerial

vital importance wlio tlie relator should be, so long as lie does not officiously
The office which a
intermeddle in a matter with which he has no concern.
relator performs is merely the instituting a proceeding in the name of the
people, and for the general benefit. The rule, therefore, as it is sometimes
stated, that a relator in a writ of mandamus must show an individual right to
the thing asked must be taken to apply to cases where an individual interest
alone is involved,

and not to

the interest is common to the

where

cases

whole community.
This is the rule adopted in many of the states. Hamilton v. The State, 3 Ind., 453 ; State s. County Judge, 7 Iowa, 186 ; State ®. Bailey, id., 390; County of Pike b. State, 11 111., 203. The rule is different in
HeflEher v. The Commonwealth, 38 Penn. St., 108 ; The People d.
other states.
The Regents of the University, 4 Mich., 98; The People «. The Inspectors of
State Prison, id., 187; Arberry v. Beavers and others, 6 Texas, 457 ; Zebulon
Sanger ti. Commissioners of Kennebec, 25 Me., 291. But the practice wliich
has so long prevailed here, though never, so far as I can discover, passed
upon directly by the court of last resort, where the objection was raised,
seems to be a reasonable and convenient

one, and ought now to be considered

as settled."
'

People

V.

Supervisors

= Huntington -o.
= State
«

V.

Magill,

Clippinger

'People

».

Smith,

of Jackson,
35

Ind.,

4 Kans., 415.

Fuller,

«. Hammond,

10
1

24

Mich.,

337.

486.
See State «.

Bowker, id.,

Kans., 377.

Doug. (Mich.),

276.

114.
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this writ

as

vidual.

But the writ will not be awarded to the executive of the

well as

the act were to be performed by an indi-

such officer being an independent department of
much so as the judiciary itself.'

nation or state

;

the state, as
These references sufficiently indicate the general nature of the
cases in which the writ of mandamus
may afford the proper
It will be seen, that it is awarded as well on behalf of
remedy.
the public authorities, to compel performance of the successive
official duties, under the revenue laws, as on behalf of private
parties, whose rights have not been regarded in taxation or in
On
any of the proceedings which are to result in taxation.
behalf of the state, the writ may issue against officers of corporations where a duty is imposed upon them under the tax laws ;
that of furnishing a list of the stockholders
or of paying over a tax on dividends which have

such, for instance,

for

assessment,^

as

But it will never be issued
by the corporation.'
until the duty has become fixed ; and, therefore, it will not lie to
compel the levy of a tax for a balance of accounts which still
been declared

remains to be adjusted by the proper statutory authority.* The
writ cannot confer an authority to do an act which could not voluntarily have been done ; and, therefore, cannot require an official
act

by one after he has gone out of

office,^

nor by one who,

though elected, has never qualified and entered upon the performance of his duties.^ Nor will the writ issue in advance of
There are conflicting cases on this point -wliich are collected in High on
Extraordinary Remedies, §§ 118-134; and in Dillon on Mun. Corp., § 671 and
People v. Governor, 39
note. Also in the recent Michigan and Texas cases.
Mich., 330 ; Bledsoe v. International R. R. Co., 40 Texas, 537 ; Keuchler v
'

Wright,

40 id., 600.

2 Insurance

Co. v. Baltimore,

33

Md.,

396, 309.

3 Gill, 487.
See Person i>. Warren R. R. Co., 33 N. J.,
to
was
one
of
mandamus
the lessee of a road to compel the pay.
441, which
ment of a tax upon it.
s

State v. Mayhew,

estate

V.

Rice,

35

Wis.,

178.

Perrine, 34 N. J., 354. That where proceedings have been begun
board,
they may be continued against their successors, see Basselt
against a
But the levy of a tax cannot be compelled after
V. Barbin, 11 La. An., 673.
'State

V.

the time fixed by law, for the levy has expired.

Har. &

J.,

•State

V.

359.

Bcloit,

31

Wis.,

380.

Ellicott

v.

Levy Court,

1
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of a duty, on any assumption that

it will not be performed in due

season.^

writ of mandavxus

One of the most common cases in which the

muncipality which
levy of tax to pay

one has recovered

judgment against
taxation, the

a

if

Thus,

a

should pajr.

it

is,

is employed in tax matters
has become the clear duty
where
of the authorities to levy a tax for general purposes, or for the
payment of some demand, and they refuse to do so.* In such
cases the remedy may be had on behalf of the state or the muncipality concerned, or by any individual whose demand the tax
can only be paid by means of

is

cases be

may not be essential

of Schools v. County Commissioners,
La. An., 298. A mandamus will not be issued
tax on the roll in advance of the time when

Commissioners
22

20

that
Md.,

449

judgState v.

to compel the spread-

is

ing of

a

Burbant,

tax in

by charter or
a

But

it

law.*

it

'

b}' the general

a

cannot be compelled to levy

excess of the restrictions which are imposed upon

;

but

the muncipality has been clothed with

it

the requisite power

;

perhaps be equally plain

it if

it,

a

is

it

a

compelled.' It
customary to make express provision bj' statute for such cases,
clear.
and when the statute requires the levy of
tax, the case
the duty may
When the statute does not expressly require

in proper

may

to be done.

On the

of Schools «. County Commissioners, 20 Md., 449 Ex
Council of Albany,
Cow., 358; Whiteley v. Lansing, 37
Morgan v. Commonwealth, 55 Penn. St., 456; Robinson v. Super;

Comniissioncrs
Common

parte

Mich.,

131;

3

;

237

5

'^

5

it

will be assumed that the officer will perform his duty when the
contrary-,
Ohio, N. S., 989, 393.
time oincs. Richards v. Zanesville,
McCall,
Manor
B.
Beam
an d. Board of Police, 43 Miss.,
See
Geo., 522;

visors of Butte County, 43 Cal., 353.

;

2

;

,

;

;

<

;

5

;

1
;

9

7

6

;

4

4

5

Knox County «. Aspinwall, 24 How., 376; Supervisors ». United States,
Wall., 435 Van Hofiman v. Quincy,
id., 535 Galena v. Amy,
id., 705
id., 484; Riggs «. Johnson County, id., 166; Weber
Walkley «. Muscatine,
■0. Lee County, id., 210; United States n. Keokuk, id., 514; Benbow v. Iowa
id., 313; Mayor, etc., u. Lord,
City,
id., 409; Supervisors ». Durant. id.,
415; States. Madison, 15 Wis., 33; State «. Beloit, 20 id., 79; State v. Milwaukee, id., 87; Watertown c. Cady, id., 501; State x;. Racine, 23 id., 258; HasIjrouck V. Milwaukee, 25 id., 122; Whiteley «. Lansing, 37 Mich., 131; Coy b.
Boynton v. Newton, 34 id., 510 Huntington v. Smith,
Lyons City, 17 Iowa,
25 Ind., 486 Olney v. Harvey, 50 111., 453 Lutterloh v. Commissioners, C5
N. C, 403; Gooch v. Gregory, id., 142; Gorgas v. Blackburn, 14 Ohio, 253;
Frank «. San Francisco Co., 21 Cal., 668; Flagg t. Palmyra, 33 Mo., 440;
State t>.Hug, 44 id 116 Commonwealth v. Allegheny Co., 37 Penn. St., 377, 290.
Am. Law. Reg, N. S., 392, per Miller, J. of
United States v. Burlington,
And see note to same case by .Judge Dillon.
the Federal Supreme Court.
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ment sbould have been recovered, in order that the duty to levy
a tax may he imperative.
If the amount of the demand is abso-

lutely fixed and determined as it would be by judgment, and the
law makes it the duty of the proper officers to levy a tax for its
payment as a settled demand, this is sufficient, and mandamus
may issue if performance of the duty is neglected or refused.^
Indeed it has been held in the case of bounty bonds, which by the
law under which they were issued were " a valid and lawful claim
"
against the township," to be paid in the same manner as the
"
are paid, that is to say. by the levy
ordinary township expenses
of a tax by the-township officers, an action upon the bonds would
not lie; mandamus

being the appropriate and also the adequate

remedy.^

The federal courts have no general power to issue the writ of
mandamus

to compel the performance

of duties under the state

That belongs to the province of the state courts. It
has nevertheless been held in many cases, that they might issue
the writ in order to compel municipalities to levy taxes for the
satisfaction of judgments which had been rendered in such
tax laws.

local authorities neglected or refused to
provide for by taxation, though clothed by law with full authorcourts, and which the

' Schoolbred

v. Charleton, 2 Bay, 63 ; Wilkinson v. Cheatham, 43 Geo., 258 ;
Clark Co. Court v. Turnpike Co., IIB. Monr., T43 ; Rodman v. Justices of Larue,
of Columbia, 10 Wend., 363; Peoples.
3 Bush, 144; People v. Supervisors
Bennett, 54 Barb., 480; People v. Supervisors of Otsego, 51 N. Y., 401; Kobinson «. Supervisors of Butte, 43 Cal., 353; Tarvers. Commissioners, 17 Ala.,
64 N. C, 557 ; State v. Smith, 11 Wis., 65 ;
527 ; Pegram v. Commissioners,
State V. Clinton County, 6 Ohio, N. S., 280; Cass v. Dillon, 16 id., 38; State
V. Harris, 17 id., 608; Columbia County v. King, 13 Pla.,451; Commonwealth
V. Pittsburgh, 34 Penn. St., 496 ; United States v. Sterling, 2 Bissell, 408.

' Campbell, J. in Dayton v. Rounds, 27 Mich., 82, citing People v. Township
Board of La Grange, 3 Mich., 187; Marathon ii. Oregon, 8 id., 372; People v.
Auditors of Wayne, 5 id., 223; People v. Porter, 18 id., 101. See also Robinson v. Butte County, 43 Cal., 353. In this case it is said if the officers order a
levy which is not sufficient to pay what is due on such a demand, a relevy
may be compelled by mandamus. When the proper tax has been levied, so
that it has become the duty of the treasurer to make jjayment on presentation
of the obligations, it is not necessary for the holder to have an order from the
county commissioners for the purpose, and consequently they will not be
State v. McCrillis, 4 Kans., 250.
compelled to issue one.
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The extent of the federal jurisdiction in state tax

cases is pointed out in recent decisions of the federal supreme
court, and it is shown to be purely exceptional.''
In some cases,

under state laws, these courts have appointed commissioners to
levy a tax when the local officers have refused to provide for it.'
But for this purpose the proper statutory authority must exist*
■See

Knox County v. Aspinwall, 24 How., 376, and other cases cited in
And see High on Extraordinary Eemedies, § 393.

note

3, p. 524.

' Kees

V.

Watertown,

19

Wall.,

107,

opinion by Hunt, J. ; Heine v. Levee
J. The opinion of Mr. Justice

Commissioners,
id., 655, opinion hy Miller,
Bradley, in the case last named, is reported in
^

Supervisors «. Rogers,
town, IP .d., 107, 117.
*

Rees

V.

Watertown,

19

7

Wall.,

Wall.,

175, cited

107.

1

Woods' Reports, 246.

and explained

in Rees

v.

Water-
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CHAPTER XXIV.

THE KEMEDIES FOR EXCESSIVE AND ILLEGAL TAXATION.
Reference has already been made by tis to the principle which
in this country has been adopted from the Great Charter, that no
person shall be deprived of his property except by the law of the
land, or,

it

as

it is sometimes expressed, by due process of law

;

and

has been stated that this principle is as much applicable in the

case of taxation as

in any other

It

case.

has also been said that

it,

however summary and apparently arbitrary are the methods and
processes in tax cases, they cannot deprive the citizen, when his
property is taken in the course of their enforcement, of a trial of
before some impartial judicial tribunal to
right to take
which the public authorities must justify their proceedings.
What the tribunal shall be, and what the proper remedy to seek
in
may depend on the tax law itself, and on the stage which

remedy

is

the proceedings have reached before

a

it,

the

sought.

of taxes.

There are always methods in which one
who
wrongfully assessed for taxation, or unequally taxed, may
have abatement of the assessment or tax without resort to the
"While the assessor still has the list or
customary legal remedies.
is

Albatement

roll in his hands uncompleted, he may abate any assessment on
is

it

his own motion, or on application, when satisfied that
either
wholly or in part illegal or unjust ISTo statute could be necesBut when the assessment has passed from his
sary for this.

a

hands, the right to an abatement must in general depend upon
No doubt the legislature might abate taxes, and.
the statute.
municipality might
probably the proper legislative authority of
regards

municipal

provision was

tax, where

in the way

;

as

a

no legislative or
but
constitutional
taxing officers or
boards must have special authority to warrant their doing so. In
do the same

the absence of special authority, they are to accept the assessment

The remedy usually given

is

as legal and just, and levy and collect the taxes accordingl}'.

by

'

528
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Seviews and appeals.

The reviews may perhaps be directed

to be had by the assessors themselves ; the appeals will of course
be to some court or appellate board.
The abatement may be
total, -where one is unlawfully taxed, or taxed for exempt property or property he does not own,' or it may be partial, where
the complaint is only that the valuation is excessive.^ In either
case, one applying for an abatement must comply strictly with the
provisions of the statute which confers the right.^
When the tax is illegal, one is not obliged to apply for an
abatement, unless the statute makes that the sole remedy ; but
But
he may contest the tax when attempt is made to collect it.
merely excessive or unequal assessment, where no principle
of an error
and the complaint
of law is violated in making
an application for an abateof judgment only, the sole remedy
a

is

is

it,

for

or to such statutory board as has
I! fraud
charged, equity may
been provided for hearing it.
interfere, but equity has no jurisdiction under its general powers
is

ment, either to the assessors

to abate taxes for over-

v. Cochran,

that he

N. H.,

assessed for

166.

5

Walker

State V. Powers,

24

N. J.,

406;

3

property he does not own.

.392.

State V.

Parker,

34

N. J.,

49; State «. Bishop, id., 45; Otis Co.

Phillips

v. Stevens

Point,

25

Wis.,

594.
v.

Ware,

8

Authority

Nev.,

case where one complains

is

Ormsby County,
not embrace

will

8

V.

7

State

valuation

a

'

is

a

a

is

merely unequal or unjust assessment when there
applicable
statutory board that may do so.* And this principle
to correct

Gray, 509.

id,

;

7

Albany,

1
;

V.

Matter

is

a

is

is

is

a

;

;

;

7

8

2

209;

6

<

id., 541 Matter of Beekman
Johns.,
S. C,
of Canal St., 11 Wend., 134; MaUer of Mount Morris Square, Hill, 14; Matter of Canal and Walker Sts., 12 N. T., 406; Petition of Eager, 46 id., 100; Western R. R. Co.ti. Nolan, 48 id., 513; Kimber o.
Schuylkill Co., 20 Penn. St., 360; Hughes «. Kline, 30 id., 227; Wharton v.
Birmingham, 37 id., 371; Clinton School District's Appeal, 56 id., 315;
Stewart B. Maple, 70 id., 221; liveritt's Appeal, 71 id., 216; County Court «.
Humph., 634; Holton v. Bangor, 23 Maine, 264; Stickney v. Bangor,
Man-,
30 id., 404; Gilpatrick v. Saco, 57 id., 277; Gravel Road Co. v. Black, 32 lud.,
468; Richardson v. Scott, 47 Miss., 230. See Brook -o. Shelton, 47 id., 243;
Weaver v. State, 39 Ala., 535; Andrews ». Rumsay, Sup. Ct. 111. (1875),
Chicago Legal News, 321, citing Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Frary, 23
Munson v. Minor, 22 id., 594 Cook County v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co.,
111., 84
35 id., 460 Du Page County ». Jeffers, 65 id., 278.
When
person
liable
particular district, his sole remedy
to taxation in personal or real estate in
for excessive valuation, or for including in the assessment property of which
not liable to ta.xation,
not the owner, or for which he
he
by apolicatioc
StaflEoi-d

St., 20
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If

to the determination of boards of equalization.

they are properly constituted, there is no appeal from their determination in matters of judgment, where the statute gives none.^ For a merely irreg-

ular assessment the statutory remedy is also the exclusive remedy.

It

is supposed to be adequate to all the requirements of justice,
and it is the party's own folly if he fails to avail himself of it.^
And if he appeals to the statutory tribunal and is dissatisfied
with its judgment, he is nevertheless concluded by it.^
An assessment made without jurisdiction is of course illegal,
and may be disregarded on that ground.''
And the action of an
appellate board is held not to be binding where the board itself
has disobeyed the law, to the prejudice of parties.
If, by law, it
is to meet at one time, but meets at another, when parties have
to the assessors

Howe

for an abatement. Bourne v. Boston,
7 Cusli., 273 ; Lincoln v. Worcester,

3 Gray, 494, 496,

citing

compare Lee
■B.Templeton, 6 Gray, 579.
Tliis doctrine applied to one properly taxed for
real estate in a town, but improperly taxed for other real estate not in the town.
Sal-mond v. Hanover, 13 Allen, 119. But compare Bailly ii. Buoll, 59 Barb.,
v.

Boston,

8

id., 55

:

158.
J Rhodes v. Cushman, 45

Ind.,

85.

No

fraud was charged, but error only.

Windsor ®. Field, 1 Conn., 279 ; Hughes v. Kline, 30 Penn. St., 230 ; Aldrich
11. Railroad Co., 21 N. H., 359 ; Conlin ii. Seaman, 22 Cal., 546 ; Chambers ».
Satterlee, 40 id., 497, 519; Emery v. Bradford, 29 id., 75; Nolan «. Reese, 33
id., 484 ; Peoria v. Kidder, 36 111., 351 ; Deane ti. Todd, 33 Mo., 90. In Maryland, it is said if the party fails to avail himself of the remedy given by stat«

ute, he cannot come into equity

which is meant, doubtless,
Church «. Baltimore, 6 Gill,

unless he makes out a very clear case; by
within the ordinary jurisdiction of equity.

a case
391;

O'Neal

«.

Bridge Co.,

18

Md.,

1.

«. State, 39 Ala , 535.
Suit will not lie at law for the levy of an
which
assessment
might be corrected on review or apor
excessive
irregular
Bourne
v. Boston, 2 Gray, 494; Compeal. Wright J). Boston, 9 Cush., 333;
monwealth V. Cary, etc., Co., 98 Mass., 19. When special appeal to a subordinate court is given there can be no appeal thence to the supreme court unless
2

Weaver

given, but certiorari will lie to review regularity. Kimber
Schuylkill Co., 30 Penn. St., 366. Where the right is given to any person
appeal from a special assessment, the city against whom an assessment
Matter of Opening of" Streets, 30 La. An., 497.
made may appeal.
expressly

«.

to
is

v. Cary, etc., Co., 98 Mass., 19 ; Weller v. St. Paul, 5
Commonwealth
that
proceedings on the sale of land for local improveact
Minn., 95. An
ments shall not be questioned collaterally, but may, at any time, be reviewed
by certiorari, or other proper proceeding, in the supreme or circuit court, sus* See

tained.

Wis.,

State

556.
34

v.

Jersey City,

35

N. J.,

381.

And

see Smith

v. Cleveland,

17
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neither actual nor constructive notice to appear, its action is invalid ; and so it will be if the statute requires notice to be given
of its meetings, and the notice does not appear by the record of
the board to have been given.'

Refunding taxes.

This is only an abatement, made after the

tax has been paid or enforced.
A general right exists in the
state to refund any tax collected for its purposes, and a corresponding right probably exists in the common council, or other
proper boards, of cities,' villages, towns, etc., to refund to individuals any sums paid by them
to have

been wrongfully

as corporate

taxes, which

are found

exacted, or are believed to be for any

But no executive or ministerial officer could
have any such authority, unless expressly given by law.
reason inequitable.

Remedy

Iby

At

certiorari.

the common law the writ of

cer-

into the supreme court of judicature the
proceedings of inferior tribunals, in order that their errors may
be corrected when it is alleged that they have exceeded their
tiorari lies to remove

In some of the states, considerable use has been
jurisdiction.
made of this writ in tax cases, sometimes with, and somet imes

refuse to grant

in any

case,

and the court has

a

;

granted on the special facts

it

is

is

it

it

is,

When the writ is by statute, a
without, statutory regulations.
broader scope may be, and usually
than
has at
given to
the common law.^
The common law writ
not one of right, but
discretion

when great mischiefs might be likely
a

complained of.^
has been granted, without

in the opinion of the court,

it

eration of the merits,

if,

the writ after

it

to follow the setting aside the proceedings
even dismiss

to

It

may

consid-

was granted

a

a

1

Nixon V. Ruple, 30 N. J., 58. In Kelly s. Corson, 13 Wis., 610, the effect of
errors in the action of
board of equalization was considered by Gole, J., and
the conclusion reached, that errors committed by the board when acting in
good faith -will not invalidate their action, or give
right of action to one
who cannot show that he was injured thereby.

In Fractional

School District

it

v.

The Joint Board,

27

Mich.,

3,

3

it

a

^When the relief sought by the applicants would affect all other tax payers
town equally with themselves, in arresting the collection
and residents of
has been held that
of an alleged illegal tax,
should be denied unless applied for by all. Libby v. West St. Paul, 14 Minn., 248.
the

writ

was

a

refused when applied for to review the proceedings in establishing
school
district, fifteen months after the action had been taken; the district in the
meantime having organized and taken upon itself corporate functions.

CH.

EEMEDIES FOE ILLEGAL

XXIV.]

TAXATION.

531

If,

The writ must be applied for in due season, and
improvidently.'
before the proceeding, which it is desired to review, has passed
beyond the control of the tribunal in which it was taken.

it

is

therefore, the writ
issued to review the action of assessors,
after the assessment roll has passed from their hands into the
hands of the supervisor,
will be dismissed for that reason.^ The

writ

is

a

is

not awarded to review political action, and, therefore, the
action of town or any other municipality, or of any of the local
boards, in determining upon the purposes for which taxes shall
be levied, or the time and manner of levying them, when that
committed to their judgment, or of causing the sums to be levied,

party from
'Magee

a

which

words,

is

is

a

is

or the objects of expenditure, or anything of
like nature,
not
to
review by means of it.^ The writ will be refused where
subject
an appeal
given which affords an adequate remedy, or, in other
not so restricted in its scope as to preclude the

review of the errors of which he complains.^

It will

of Allegany, 15
239; People v. Supervisors
Bank v. Supervisors of Broome, 2.5 X. Y., 812;
Matter of Lantis,
Mich., 324. The writ should not be allowed where the
purpose is merely to enable
party to recover back taxes paid, by procuring
a reversal of the proceedins;s.
People v. Commissioners of Taxes, 43 Barb.,
494; People v. Reddy, id., 539.
Wend.,

v. COtler,

43 Barb.,

Susquehanna

a

9

198;

Delaney, 49

N. Y.,

655.

See People

v. Supervisors

of Queens,

195, 199.

388.

V.

of Allegany,

Supervisors

See

Dwight

v.

Spring-field,

15 "Wend.,

198

Gray, 107;

Benton d. Taylor, 46
Dillon, Mun. Corp., g§

;

^People

Ala.,

V.

4

1

'People

Hill,

739-743.

is

it

it

a

it

,

:

a

*

The New York decisions on the subject of the remedy of certiorari are
very numerous, and In People v. Belts, 55 N. Y., 600, 602, they are reviewed
"
The oflBoe of
common law cerby Folger, J., in the following language
tiorari is, in strictness, merely to bring up the record of the proceedings of
an inferior court or tribunal, to enable the court of review to determine
whether the former has proceeded within its jurisdiction; and not to correct
mere errors in its proceedings. People «. Commissioners of Highways, etc 30
has been sometimes intimated, and sometimes held, that in
N. Y., 72. True,
failure of justice, the party
the absence of any other remedy, and to prevent
not
the
naked
up,
question of jurisdiction,
only
bring
to
by
suffered
will be
on which the inferior
principles
or
as
the
ground
well
as
evidence,
but the
relies. Susquehanlaw
on
which
the
relator
of
body acted, and the questions
Buflalo,
35 id., 380;
Baldwin
v.
Y.,
25
N.
312;
na Bank v. Supervisors, etc.,
in
the
People ii. AsSwift V. Poughkeepsie, 37 id., 511. Many cases are cited
there held that the office of the writ extends to
sessors, 39 N". Y., 81, and
jurisdiction, power and authority of inferior
of
all
questions
of
review
the
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it,

^
not lie to review any merely discretionary action of any tribunal ;
nor is it within the proper scope of the writ to review the decisThe court awarding
ions of inferior tribunals on the merits.
therefore, will not look into the evidence on which the inferior

may have acted, except so far as may be necessary to
the determination of any jurisdictional question that may depend
to ascertain whether
upon it.^ The proper office of the writ
is

tribunal

Board, etc., 39 N. Y., 506
Hamilton, 39 id., 107; Western

ple

V.

v.

Freeman

;

also People

R

R. Co.

v.

v.

Ogden, 40 id., 105 Peo48 id., 513.
In Peo;

:

a

a

a

is

is

it

tribunals to do the acts complained of, and to all questions of regularity of
held that the
their proceedings.
In People v. Assessors, 40 N. Y., 154,
not
writ may bring up for review, the decision that given state of facts
board of assessors to the conclusion that (jertain
legally sufficient to compel
decision of law. See
property was not liable to assessment in other words,
Nolan,

rari

to review

a

of inferior boards where

the determinations

a

it

it

V.

a

it

dewas held that
Delaney, 49 N. Y., 655, inclining the other way,
the
value
of
parture by assessors from the statutory standard for estimating
In People
property on the assessment roll cannot be corrected on certiorari.
was the office of
certiowas held that
v. Supervisors, etc., 51 N. Y., 442,

ple

claim

was re-

thus seen that the office of

a

It

is

a

a

ceriiarari
jected, as not just or legal. And in People v. Allen, 52 N. Y., 538,
question of law.
brought up for review the decision of the defendants upon
common

in

somewhat

law writ of certiorari has been
30 N. Y., supra.
But will also
it

is

it

enlarged since the decision
in cases where the relator has no other available remedy, and
where injustice would be done if the writ was not permitted to do its work.
be seen that

a
;

;

is

7

is

a

a

;

;

8

2

2

is

Tlie rule still remains unimpaired, at least in principle, that where there
remedj' by appeal, the writ will be confined to its original and more approWend., 287. See also Tn re Mt. Morris Square,
priate office. Storm ». Odell,
Hill, 14, 27." To the foregoing may be added People v. Nearing, 27 N. Y.,
306.
That certiorari does not lie where there is an adequate remedy -by apN"ev.,
peal, see Withowski v. Skalowski, 46 Geo., 41 Peacock v. Leonard,
Iowa,
».
17
379
J.,
Davenport,
247
State
v.
31
N.
358
Macklot
84, 157,
Apgar,
J.,
532.
When in assessing upon abutting lots the exState V. Bentley, 23 N.
local improvement,
allowed on their demand to parties
jury
pense of
dissatisfied with the assessment, the demand for a, jury
the proper remedy
for an excessive assessment and not certiorari.
Jones v. Boston, 104 Mass.,
461, citing North Reading -u. County Commissioners,
Gray, 109: and see
Whitney «. Boston, 106 Mass., 89.
it,

a

'The action of the auditor general in charging back certain taxes to
being within his official discretion, cannot be
county in his settlement with
Supervisors of Midland v. Auditor General, 37 Mich.,
reviewed on certiorari.

1042;
v.

2

Ill;

6

Burr., 1040,
And see Jackson

9

41.

Hill, 14, 27, per Gowen, J., citing Rex v.
Philadelphia and Trenton R. R.Co., Whart., 25,
Mich.,
Low «. Galena, etc., E. R. Co.,
People,

Matter of Mount Morris Square,

Moreley,

2

'

165.
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the inferior tribunal has acted in a case of wliich it had jurisdic-

tion, and has lawfully exercised its jurisdiction in what it has assumed to do: to keep the inferior tribunal within the limits of
the law, and not to make its judgments conform to the opinion of
the superior tribunal on the facts.

The following conclusions are deduced by the authorities from
these general principles : That the writ does not lie to the collector of taxes or any other mere ministerial officer to review eiiher
his action, or any of the prior actions on whick his own was based ; '^
that assessments cannot be revised and set aside on this writ on
'^
merely that they are excessive or unequal ; or that
the assessors have erred in any matter of judgment, or have been

the ground

guilty of irregularities in the exercise of their authority, not being
of

to deprive them of jurisdiction or to take from the
The discretionary acparty complaining any substantial right.^
a nature

18 III., 324; Commissioners
«. Supervisors
of Carthage, 27 111., 140; Central
Pacific R. R. Co. v. Placer Co., 43 Cal., 365; Swift v. Poughkeepsie, 37 N. Y.,
511 ; People v. Assessors of Brooklyn, 39 id., 81.
See the general subject considered : Carson v. Martin, 26 N. J., 594 ; Gaertner v Fond du Lad, 34 "Wis.,
497; People v. Assessors of Brooklyn, 39 N. Y., 81, 88; People d. Assessors of
Albany, 40 N. Y., 754. While valuations are not subject to review on certiorari, if the assessors enter on the roll property not subject to taxation, and refuse on application to strike it out, the action, it is held, may be reviewed in
this mode. People v. Ogdensburg, 48 N. Y., 390. Mandamus would seem,
however, to be a more appropriate remedy. The writ will lie in the case of a
warrant issued by a justice of the peace to collect militia iienalties. State v.

Kirby,

6

N. J.,

143.

' People B. Supervisors of Queens, 1 Hill, 195.
This was a case in which
" or some other writ,
counsel moved for a certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
instrument, process, order or proceeding," to review the action of town auditors in allowing a large sum against the town, for the expense of certain suits

which it was claimed were not a proper charge against it. The errors comThe tax roll was at the time in
plained of all originated in this allowance.
the collector's hands, and the court held that no relief could be given in any
of the modes proposed.
''Owners of Ground v. Albany, 15 Wend., 374; People v. Ogdensburgh, 48
390; Jones v. Boston, 104 Mass., 461; Randle v. Williams, 18 Ark., 380;
State ». Kingsland 23 N. J., 85; State ■!).Ross, id., 517; States. Danser, id.,
552; State v. Powers, 24 id., 400; State v. Manchester, 25 id., 531.

N. Y.,

People ®. Fredricks, 48 Barb., 173 ; NewMatter of Mount
v. Newark, id., 491;
ark ads. State, 33
a
street and assessin
If
a
Hill,
corporation,
opening
14.
Morris Square, 3
and
in"- the expense, act within the scope of the authority conferred upon
Jones

V.

Boston, 104 Mass., 461

N. J.,

;

4.58; State

it,

3
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county board in equalizing the assessments of the county,
like the assessments themselves, is not subject to review on this
tion of

a

In

may be set aside on certiorari: Where the assessment is erroneous in point of law, either
because the assessors have adopted some inadmissible basis in
process.^

the following

cases action

is

;

a

^

a

it,

or because they have disregarded any of the mandatory
making
right to
provisions of statute on which parties assessed have
where errors of like character are comrely for their protection
mitted by any appellate jurisdiction which
empowered by stat-

'

and where muni-

;

ute to review, revise or equalize the assessments

statute, the proceedings will not be
its own by-laws may have been disregarded.
Mayor, etc., of Albany, 23 "Wend., 276. But where there are ques-

comply with the forms prescribed by the
reversed on certiorari,

Hx

parte
tions of jurisdiction

though

of commissioners to make the asPatchin
v.
Brooklyn, 13 Wend., 6fi4 An assesssessment,
ment will not be set aside because of its including property not taxable with
that which is, if the whole valuation
not excessive for that which
taxable.
State V. Haight, 35 N. J., 178.

in

the

ill

lie.

'vf

appointment

^

15

of Jones Co.,

Supervisors
Wend.,

198

People

30

is

Iowa,

531

People v. Supervisors of

of Queens,

Supervisors

v.

1

Allegany,

D.

;

Smith

;

'

is

certiorari

Hill,

195.

County Commissioners, 12 Met, 211 (where the question
was whether the commissioners were not legally bound to assess at the valuation which the tax payer had given in the list which he had furnished as reSee Newburyportw.

Clothier,

v.

30

N. J.,

Bank

376; People

351 (where

it

burgh, 48 id., 390; State

etc.,

Genesee,

T.,

is

;

;

quired by law) Heywood v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y., 534
ingston Co., 53 Barb., 223; Hatch v. Buffalo, 38 N.

v.

v.

Liv-

Ogdens-

held that cer-

hadl;
set

only); State

Quaife,
id., 185

Newark, 37
aside which assumed to
State «.

excessive tax
23

N. J.,

assessed

89 (where

it

if an

u.

will

a

decided that

is

(where
the excess

is

it

;

tiorari may be brought though the tax has been collected by distress and sale:
But see, as to this, National Bank of Chemung v. Elmira, 53 N. Y., 49) Ohio,
etc., R R. Co. V. Lawrence Co., 27 111., 50; State «. MoClurg 27 N. J., 253
be set aside for

similar ruling

was

(where, on certiorari, an assessment was
be made by benefits, where from the nature of

73

;

Eng. (Ark.)

Carroll t. Mayor,

13

Ala.,

4

;

;

8

;

the case there could be no benefits) California, etc., R. R. Co., ■».Supervisors
of Butte, 18 Cal., 671 Swann v. Cumberland,
Gill, 150 Buckner Bxparte,
173.

In New York, where street assessments were to be submitted to the common council for confirmation, and that body was empowered to alter the
same in such manner as, in its opinion, justice might require, the act of confirmation was held to be an exercise ofjudicial authority, and subject to be removed into the supreme court by certiorari.
Leroy v. New York, 20 Johns.,
Wend., 564 Matter of Mount Morris Square,
430 Starr v. Rochester,
Hill,
3

;

6

;

■'

9

5

Barb., 43; People <o. Brooklyn,
14; People v. New York,
id., 535. So in
Massachusetts, the proceedings of county commissioners in reviewing assess-
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cipal bodies in levying assessments for local improvements exceed
their authority, or lay down erroneous principles to govern the
action of the assessors or commissioners who are to make them.^

In reviewing

certiorari the court is confined to the

a case on

Extrinsic evidence cannot be
received to contradict or control it.'^ If the tax is rendered illerecord of the tribunal

reviewed.

gal by facts not appearing of record, some other remedy must be
sought.^ On certiorari the court will not set aside the whole of a
tax proceeding if justice can be done to the party without doing
KO,* unless, perhaps, where by law, in case they are vacated, there

in which

vacating the whole may
be most likely to accomplish the general purposes of the law for
can be a new assessment

;

case,

making the levy.'
ments on appeal were lielcl reviewable in this mode. See Parks v. Boston, 8
Pick., 218; Gibbs v. County Commissioners, 19 id., 398; Newburyport v.
County Commissioners, 13 Met., 311 ; Lincoln v. "Worcester, 8 Cush., 55, 61.
A similar ruling in New Jersey: State ■«.Falkinburge, 15 N. J., 330; State o
Parker, 34 id., 49. And in Missouri : State v. St. Louis County Court, 47 Mo.,
594; State v. Bowling, 50 id., 134. And see Floyd v. Gilbreath, 37 Ark., 675.
'

In New Jersey, it

is said tbat tbe action of municipal bodies in levying as
must be kept strictly within the limits as-

sessments for local improvements

signed to them by the statute, and if the assessments appear not to be within
those limits, they shall not only bo liable to reversal on certiorari, but also be
held void and iusufflcient to support a title professing to be founded on them.
State
5

V.

Jersey City,

Charlestown

falo, 38

N. Y.,

' Floyd

o.

35

N. J.,

381 ;

State

v.

Hudson City,

County Commissioners,

39 id., 104, 475.

109 Mass., 370.

See

Hatch

v. Buf-

376.

■».Gilbreath, 37

Ark.,

N. J.,

675 ;

Hatch

».

Bufifalo, 38

N. T.,

376.

this case. Carpenter, J., says: "But
t. Kingsland, 23
though this vote was illegal, we do not think we are bound to proceed under
this writ, and set the vote and proceedings aside. The money has been col■*
State

lected and disbursed

under

83, 88.

In

that vote without obj ection, so far as it appears,

Mueh inconvenexcept on the part of the prosecutor, Cornelius Van Vorst.
ience might result from such judgment to the township, while, on the other
hand, it is not necessary for the protection of Mr. Van Vorst, whose grievance

will

be redressed

such proceedings,

The power of the court to restrain
exerted
in the case of The State v. Albright,
and which was

under

another writ.

is indisputable. But there are cases when the court)'will not interfere with
the assessment of taxes, from regard to the public inconvenience, and particularly when not necessary for the protection of any individal who may complain. The writ will, in the discretion of the court, under such circum-

King v. King,
stances, be refused or dismissed.
2
Caines, 182; Myerson,
missioners of Highways,
' State

V.

Bergen, 34

N. J.,

438.

3

T. R., 335; Lawton

J.,

3

v. Com-

Green, 333."

But whether on certiorari the court will

set
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To entitle a party to relief in equity
against an illegal tax, he must by his bill bring his case under
some acknowledged head of equity jurisdiction.
The illegality
of the tax alone, or the threat to sell property for its satisfaction,
can not, of themselves, furnish any ground for equitable interposition.^
In ordinary cases a party must find his remedy in the
courts of law, and it is not to be supposed he will fail to find one
adequate

to his proper relief.

take, cases of cloud

Cases of fraud, accident or mis-

title to one's property, and cases
"where one is threatened with irremediable mischief, may demand
other remedies than those the common law can give, and these in
upon the

proper cases may be afforded in the courts of equity.
The available remedy in equity, when any is admissible, is comIt is probable that this remedy has
monly that by injunction.
many times been awarded in equity with too little regard to any
other consequences than those which concerned the individual applj'ing for it. But the personal consequences are not the only ones
which must be kept in view in these cases.
When the illegalities
complained of affect only the person complaining, an injunction
which restrains the collection as to him may cause no considerable mischief,
case

and

may very properly

be awarded

if

a

sufiicient

out; but when they affect the whole tax levy,

is made

as

court should be extremely cautious in awarding,
on the complaint of one person, or even of several, a process which
may reach the cases of others not complaining, and which may
they often do,

a

Ark.,

even though

V. Chicago, 11 Wall, 108; Hunnewinkle v. Georgetown, 15 id., 547;
and Loan Society ii. Austin, 46 Cal., 415, 488 Floyd v. Gilbreath, 27

675;

Columbia,
■vvood D.

to confirm

;

Dows

Savings

Mooers

v.

50 Barb.,

Buffalo,

312; McDonald

14

Smedley,

190;

N. T.,

6

'

aside an assessment after an act of the legislature
that act be invalid, see State v. Apgar, 31 id., 358.

it,

seriously embarrass all the operations of the government depending on the source of revenue which by means of it would be

Hanlou
584;

Johns. Ch., 27; Messeck

«. Supervisors

of

Chester County, -57 id., 383; HeySusquehanna Bank v. Broome County, 25 id.,
».

West

45 Miss., 705; Sayre v. Tompkins, 23 Mo., 443;
First National Bank of Hannibal ®. Meredith, 44 id., 500 Barrow v. Davis, 46
id., 394; McPike s.Pew, 48 id., 525; U. P. B. R. Co. u. Lincoln County,
Dill.,
297; Weaver v. State, 39 Ala., 535; Cook County b. Chicago, etc., K. R. Co., 35
But see Williams ». Piuney, 25 Iowa, 436 Jeffersonville v. Patter111., 460.
Ind.,
32
140; Burnes v. Leavenworth,
son,
Kans., 454; Warden v. Supervisors, 14 Wis., 618.
;

2

;

Murphree,

3

v.
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" How," it has been
justly remarked, ''could a government calculate with any certainty upon the revenues, if the collection of the taxes was subject to be arrested in every instance
stopped.

in which
a

*

a

technical

*

tax payer or tax collector could make out prima facie
case for arresting such collection?
Far better is it

individual pay to the government what it demands of him, at the time of the demand, as he will be certain of
getting it back with interest, after more or less delay, if it was not
due."

to let the

^

So serious have been the embarrassments

by an improvident employment of the writ of injunction and other obstructive
process, that the legislature has in some cases deemed in necessary
to interpose and forbid the

issue of injunction, replevin or other

specified writs, the tendency of which would be to embarrass col-

The courts also have sometimes imposed conditions to
equitable remedies in cases where they deemed the public interest
to demand it.
Thus where an injunction has been applied for to
lections.^

restrain the collection of

tax, partly legal and partly not, the
court has made the payment of the legal a condition precedent,''
a

'Benning, J., in Eve -o. State, 21 Geo., 50. This approved in Cody v. Lennard,
it was Iield that the act providing that " no replevin shall
lie, or any judicial interference be had in any levy or distress for taxes under
this law, but the party injured shall be left to his proper remedy in any court
of law," was valid. The party must pay the tax, even though illegal, and
See also Scofield i). Perkerson, 46
pursue his remedy against the collector.
45 id., 85, where

Geo.,

-350.

'That restraining collection of
singer,

2

Abb. U.

S., 94 ; 9

taxes may be prohibited, see Pullan

Am. L. Reg., N.

v.

Kin-

S., 557.

'Conway i). Waverley, 15 Mich., 257; Palmer v. Napoleon, 16 id., 176;
Herseyi). Milwaukee Count3r, 16 Wis., 185; Bond jj. Kenosha, 17 id., 284; Myrick
V. La Crosse, 17 id., 442; Mills v. Johnson, 17 id., 598; Mills v. Charleston,
30 id., 236; O'Kane «. Treat, 25 111., 557;
29 id., 400; Dean ». Borchsenius,
9;
Briscoe ■«.Allison, 43 id., 291; Reed ». Tyler,
Taylor B. Thompson, 42 id.,
56 id., 28S; Barnett v. Cline, 60 id., 205; Harrison v. Haas, 23 Ind., 281; Roseberry v. Huff, 27 id., 12; Board of Commissioners v. Elston, 32 id., 27; Adams V. Castle, 30 Conn., 404; Morrison i}- Hershire, 32 Iowa, 271 ; Corbin v.
Woodbine, 33 id., 297; Shelton v. Dunn, 6 Kans., 128; Lawrence v. Killam, 11
id., 499; Twombly ®. Kimbrough, 24 Ark., 459; Frazer v. Siebern, 16 Ohio,
N. S., 614. If the tax is excessive by reason of the list not including some

lots which should have been embraced, the collection will not be enjoined until the amount really chargeable to complainant has been paid. Ottowa v.
the bill shows precisely the amount of the excess
Barnes, 10 Kans., 370.
to be illegal, and only asks to have the collec
are
claimed
which
taxes
the
of

If

lion of the illegal taxes restrained, the bill will not

be dismissed

for want of
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and it has been strongly intimated, in a case where it was alleged
that by fraud the assessment had been made too high, that the
payment of what the party conceded would be his just proportion,
ought to be required before injunction should issue, in order that
the proceeding may be as little as possible injurious to the public
interest.^

Personal

When

tax is assessed

personal charge
against the party taxed, or against his personal property, it is difficult
to suggest any ground of equitable jurisdiction. Presumptively the
remedy at law is adequate. If the tax is illegal and the party makes
Taxes.

a

as a

payment, he is entitled to recover back the amount.

The

not differ in this regard from any other

a

in which

case does

party is comthe illegality alone affords no
case

pelled to pay an illegal demand ;
ground for equitable interference, and the proceedings to enforce the
tax by distress and sale can give none, as these only constitute an orTo this point the decisions are numerous.^ The
dinary trespass.
exceptions to this rule, if any, must be of
a formal offer to pay the legal taxes.

cases

Clement v. Everest,

pare Board of Commissioners v. Elston, 32 Ind., 27.
taxes are so blended that they caauot be distinguished,
for the whole. State u. Hodges, 14 Rich., 2f>6.

which are to be
29

If the
a

Mich.,

19.

Com-

legal and illegal

prohibition may go

Humphrey, 24 Mich., 170 ; Prazer v. Siebern, 16 Ohio, N. S., 614.
is filed praying that the levy of state, county and township taxes
be restrained, alleging them all to be invalid, if complainant fails to show any
Pillsbury
illegality in the state and county taxes, the bill will be dismissed.
V. Auditor General, 26 Mich., 245.
* Brewer v.
Springfield, 97 Mass., 152; Durant v. Eaton, 98 id., 469; Loud v.
Charlestown, 99 id., 208; Whiting ». Boston, 106 id., 89; Hunnewellc. Charlestown, 106 id., 3.50 ; Rockingham Savings Bank v. Portsmouth, 62 N. H., 17 ; Hitter ». Patch, 12 Cal., 298; Berri «. Patch, 12 id., 299; Worth «. Fayetteville,
Winst. Eq. (N. C), 70; Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich., 560; Conley v. Chedic, 6
Nev., 222 ; Van Cott v. Supervisors of Milwaukee, 18 Wis., 247 ; Greene v.
Mumford, 5 R. I., 4^2; McCoy v. Chillicothe, 3 Ohio, 370; Dodd v. Hartford,
25 Conn., 233; Sayre v. Tompkins, 23 Mo., 443;
Barrow v. Davis, 46 id., 394;
McPike V. Peru, 48 id., 525; Hopkins ». Lovell, 47 id., 103; Leslie v. St. Louis,
47 id., 474; Lockwood c. St. Louis, 24 id., 2C; Fowler v. St. Joseph, 37 id., 228;
Deane «. Todd, 22 id., 90. The doctrine of these cases is very succinctly
" Until
stated by Bigelow, Ch. J., in Brewer v. Springfield, 97 Mass., 152, 154.
the plaintiffs have been compelled to pay the tax which they allege to have
When they
been illegally assessed upon them, they have suffered no wrong.
have paid it they can recover it back by an action at law, which would furnish
See also Brooklyn v. Messerole, 26
them an adequate and complete remedy."
'

Merrill

Where a

v.

bill

Wend., 133.
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ment of
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when the enforce-

tax might destroy a valuable franchise ;' or when property is levied upon which possesses a peculiar value to the owner
beyond any possible market value it can have ;^ and other like
a

cases where the recovery of damages would be inadequate redress.

It

must be conceded, however, that the cases in some stales go
further, and sustain the remedy by injunction in all cases of illegal
taxation ; proceeding in doing so upon the ground that " when
officers or individuals have no legal authority to lay a tax, and
they assume the right ; or when persons are vested with the legal
authority to lay a tax for a specified purpose, but instead of exercising that power they proceed to impose a tax which the law has
not authorized, or lay it for fraudulent or unauthorized purposes;
then a court of equity will interpose to afford preventive relief,
by restraining the exercise of powers perverted to fraudulent or
^
B ut in the large majority of cases in which
oppressive purposes."
taxes are illegal, there is no fraud, actual or intended, and the

illegality consists in an erroneous construction of powers, or in the
omission of some necessary proceeding, or in other
defect not inconsistent with good faith on the part of officers ; and
it seems a great stretch of equitable principles to treat such a case
unintentional

of legal fraud, and to be remedied on that ground. The equitable jurisdiction in these cases has grown up somewhat imperceptibly, and perhaps owes its origin as much to an idea that municipal
as one

officers,

in the authority which affects the property of the people, are

trust over which equity may properly assume a supervision, as to any supposed fraud, actual or constructive, which may be
In view of the conflict in the deinvolved in their illegal action.*
exercising

a

' Osborne

v. Bank of United States, 9 "Wheat., 735, where an officer was enjoined from enforcing a heavy state tax unlawfully laid on a branch of the
Bank of the United States, on the ground that to enforce it would drive the
See Foote v. Linck, 5
bank from the state and work irreparable mischief.
McLean, 616.
2 See Henry ii. Gregory, 29 Mich., 68, 70.
s Drake d. Phillips, 40 Ills., 388, 393, per Walker, Ch. J.
See also Foote v.
Toledo,
K.
La
E. Co. v.
etc.,
Fayette, 23 Ind., 262;
Milwaukee, 18 Wis., 370;
Commissioners of Clay Co. v. Markle, 46 id., 96 ; Knight v. Flatrock, etc., Co.,
45 id., 134; Shoemaker v. Grant Co., 36 id., 175; Riley d. Western Union Telegraph Co., 47 id., 511 ; Spencer «. Wheaton, 14 Iowa, 38 ; St. Clair Board's Ap-

peal, 74 Penn. St., 252.
' Mr. High, in his valuable Treatise on the Law of

Inj unctions,

says

:

"It will
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cisions regarding the basis of equitable jurisdiction, it seenas advisable to classify somewhat the cases which have been decided,

indicating, wherever necessary, the points of divergence.

The action of the proper authorities in
Preliminary Action.
voting a tax cannot be restrained on the ground that they are
voting more than is necessary for the purpose ; ' nor on an allegation that there is an intent to appropriate some portion of the sum
^
purpose not authorized by law ; nor because complainant is injured by unreasonable delay in doing the work for
which the tax is laid,^ nor can the making of an assessment be

voted to

a

enjoined,

the act being judicial.''

Excessive Assessments.

For excessive

assessments, when fraud

The remedy

is not charged, there can be no relief in equity.
must be such as the statute has given.^

Irregular Taxation. A tax will not be restrained on the ground
Errors in the assessment
merely that it is irregular or erroneous.
do not render the tax void, nor, as a general rule, do they constitute any reason whatever against its being strictly enforced.
But
however that may be in any particular

case, the

law has provided

te found on examination tliat courts of equity have been inclined, in the case
of assessments by municipal corporations, to relax somewhat the stringency of
the rule of noninterference as applied to the collection of state taxes.
Though
it is difficult to perceive any sufficient reason for such distinction, yet the
distinction itself remains." § 368.
'Wharton «. School Directors, 42 Penn. St., 358. The levy of a tax within
limits of legislative authority is an act of sound discretion, and cannot
render the board ordering it liable to the parties whose property is taken for
the

Moore «. School Directors,

its satisfaction.

' Truesdell's Appeal,

58 Penn. St., 148.

59 Penn. St., 232.

The principle was involved in Mor-

gan v. Graham, 1 Woods, 124, in which it was attempted to restrain state
officers from issuing bonds under what was alleged to be an unconstitutional
law.
3 Whiting

V.

Boston, 106 Mass., 89.

^ Western

E.

R. Co. «. Nolan, 48

5 Kimber v.

ett's

Appeal,

Schuylkill,
71

id., 216;

N. Y.,

513.

20 Penn. St., 366 ; Hughes

Hutchinson

■».Pittsburgh,

«.

Kline,

30 id., 237 ; Ever-

72 id., 320.

An injunc-

tion would seem to be the appropriate remedy where a town makes
inations in the discounts on taxes, this not rendering the tax illegal.
Wareham, 2 Allen, 594. Equity can not relieve on the ground of the
ing become burdensome by depreciation of property. White Sulphur
Co.

V.

Robinson,

3

W. Ya.,

543.

discrim-

Toby

v.

tax hav-

Springs
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all such mere irregularities and erxors

as do not go

to the foundation of the tax, and parties complaining must be
confined to these. In this the authorities are agreed.^
But it is
not a mere irregularity when one is denied his legal right to work
out a road tax, and the amount is demanded in money ,^ nor when
a tax once paid is demanded a second time ; ' nor when property
is unlawfully exempted from taxation, thereby increasing the
burden upon complainant ; * nor when property which is exempt
from taxation by law is assessed ; ^ nor when one's assessment
has been increased without giving him the notice to which by law
he is entitled.
In all these cases the party taxed is denied a sub-

that in

it

a

is

If,

stantial right, or his tax is unlawfully increased beyond his due
proportion, and his right to an adequate remedy is unquestionable.
however, the tax
will appear
personal tax only,
from the references to decisions, which have already been made,
a

majority of the states the remedy by injunction would
not be given, and the ]3arty would be turned over to his suit at law.'

;

1

Dows 11. Chicago, 11 Wall., 108; Hughes v. Kline, 30 Penii. St., 337; Clinton, etc., Appeal, 56 id., 315 Chicago, etc., K. E. Co. v. Fraiy, 23 111., 34; State
V. Eremond,
38 Texas, 116; Jones v. Summer, 37 Ind., 510; Center, etc., Co.
Black, 32 id., 468; Ottowa v. Walker, 31
463; O'Neal «. Virginia, etc,, Co., 18 Md.,
V.

111., 605;

Mills

Metz s. Anderson,

23

id.,

Gleason,

11

2

;

6

a

9

a

it

;

8

;

9

5

v

1;

Wis., 470;
Mills D. Johnson, 17 id., 598; Brooklyn «. Messerole, 36 Wend., 133; Marklot
■i,.Davenport
Whittaker, 37 id., 598; Dodd v. Hart17 Iowa, 379; West
R. I., 472; Lawrence v. Killam, 11
ford, 35 Conn., 232; Greene v. Mumford,
id., 396 Kansas Pacitic R. R. Co. b. RusKans., 499 Smith v. Leavenworth,
sel,
id., 558 Merrill v. Gorham,
Cal., 41. If equity should give relief on
mere Irregularity,
would require payment of the tax as
the ground of
condition. Savings and Loan Society v. Ordway, 38 Cal., 679. Equity will
not relieve on the ground of a very slight excess in the levy. Smith v. LeavKans., 396. Nor on the ground of an illegal tax collected of comenworth,
plainant in former years. Fremont v. Mariposa County, 11 Cal., 361.
».

Miller

38 Penn. St., 309.

v. Gorham,

Supervisors of Colby, 39 Penn. St., 131. To entitle one
Commonwealth
must appear that he has paid once. Savings
to relief from double taxation,
and Loan Society t. Austin, 46 Cal., 415.

vania R. R. Co.,

'

«

30

Penn.

St.,

See what

;

17 111., 291

Mott

v.

Pennsyl-

said on this subject, ante, Chap-

VI.
Morris,
Darling

etc., Co. v.
v.

Gunn,

Jersey City, Beas. Ch., 237.
Cleghorn v. Postlewaite,
1

5

ter

McLean County,

v.

is

Central R. R. Co.

9.

Illinois

50 111., 424

;

*

it

"

v.

To the point that equity will give no relief in tax

43 id., 438.

cases where the remedy
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Tax upon Lands. "When a tax is assessed against the owner of
lands, and is a personal charge upon him, and not a lien upon the
land, there can be no grounds for equitable interference which
not exist in the case of a tax assessed upon personalty.'

would

In

those states in which a personal tax would be restrained if illegal,
a tax upon land constituting a personal charge would be restrained

In other

also.

it would not

states

be,

unless some special ground

of equity jurisdiction was shown.

If

Child upon Title.

the tax is a lien upon lands,

it may then

cloud upon the title; and one branch of equity jurisdiction is the removal of apparent clouds upon the title, which
may diminish the market value of the land, and possibly threaten
constitute

a

A

cloud upon one's title is something
or an apparent
which constitutes an apparent incumbrance upon
defect in
something that shows prima facie some right of third

it to the owner.
;

a

it

it,

a loss of

is

it

if,

;

a

party, either to the whole or some interest in it. An illegal tax
cloud. If the alleged tax has
may or may not constitute such
no semblance of legality
upon the face of the proceedings,

wholly unwarranted by law, or for any reason totally void,

so

;

it

is

it

that any person inspecting the record and comparing
with the
at once apprised of the illegality, the tax,
would seem,
law
an
neither
constitute
nor
an
could
incumbrance,
apparent defect
of title
If this
and, therefore, in law, could constitute no cloud.
which

exercised

it

a

law

is

at

is

by courts of equity, to
relieve parties by removing clouds upon their titles, could not
case.
And so has been held in many cases.'
attach in such

be so, the jurisdiction

adequate, the following additional cases maybe referred to.

Weaver

7

;

9

5

;

;

6

;

9

;

9
;

3

;

9,

4

;

4

;

8

'

;

5

;

3

1

5

i>. State, 39 Ala., 535; Dodd v. Hartford, 25 Conn., 283; Magee v. Denton,
Biatch., 130; Missouri River, etc., R. R. Co. v. "Wheaton, Kans., 333.
Mich., 560 Brewer v. Springfield, 97 Mass.,
See "Williams v. Detroit,
R. I., 474; Hannewell i;. Charlestown, 106 Mass.,
153; Greene v. Mumford,
350 Henry v. Gregory, 39 Mich., 68.
Messerole v. Brooklyn,
Paige, 198 Wiggin b. N. T., id., 16 Van Doren
Livingston v. HoUenbeck,
«. ]Sr. Y., id., 388
Barb.,
16
Van Rensselaer
id., 17; Bouton v. Brooklyn, 15 id., 375; Cox ■».Clift,
B. Kidd,
N. Y., 118;
Hatch v. Buffalo, 38 id., 376
Scott -0. Onderdonk, 14 id.,
Newell v. Wheeler,
Wis., 403 Head v. James, 13 id., 641
Dean v. Madison,
48 id., 486
Sliepardson v. Supervisors of Milwaukee, 28 id., 593; Milwaukee Iron Co. v. Hubbard, 29 id., 51; Floyd v. Gilbreath, 37 Ark., 675; Mobile, etc., R. K. Co. s.
Peebles, 47 Ala., 317; Robinson v. Gaar,
Cal., 278; Bucknall ii. Story, 36 id.,
67; Ewing v. St. Louis,
Wall., 413; Hannewinkle d. Georgetown, 15 id., 547.
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When, however, the illegality or fatal defect does not appear on
the face of the record, but must be shown by evidence aliunde, so
that the record would make out a prima facie right in one who
should become purchaser, and the evidence to rebut this case may
possibl}' be lost, or be unavailable from death of witnesses or other
cause, or when the deed given on a sale of the lands for the tax
would

good title in the
purchaser, so that the purchaser might rely upon that for a recovery of the lands until the illegalities were shown, the courts of
by statute be presumptive evidence of

a

equity regard the case as coming within their ordinary jurisdiction, and have extended relief on the ground that a cloud on the
title existed or was imminent.
The cases on this point are numerous, and in considerable variety, as would be anticipated in view

of the different tax systems under which they have been made.'
'Hannewinkle
id., 108; Dean

v.

v. Georgetown, 15 Wall., 547; Dows «. City of Chicago, 11
Matlison, 9 Wis., 403; Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 id., 343; Jen-

kins V. Rook County, 15 id., 11 ; Mitchell v. Milwaukee, 18 id., 92 ; Crane ».
Janesville, 20 id., 305; Grimmer v. Sumner, 21 id., 179; Hamilton «. Fond du
Lac, 25 i'd., 490; Siegel v. Outagamie County, 26 id., 70; Judd s. Fox Lake, 28
id., 583 ; Shepardson v. Milwaukee, 28 id., 593 ; Wals v. Grosvenor, 31 id., G81 ;
Conway v. Waverley, 15 Mich., 357; Palmer ». Rich, 13 id., 414; Scofield v.
Lansing, 17 id., 437; Kenyon v. Duchene, 31 id., 498; Shell u. Martin, 19 Ark.,
139 ; Chaplin i>. Holmes, 27 id., 414 ; Polk ti. Rose, 25 Md., 153 ; Weller ?). St.
Paul, 5 Minn., 95; Gage ■o. Rohrbach, 56 111., 262; Gage ». Billings, 56 id.,
363; Reid B. Tyler, 56 id., 388 ; Gage ». Chapman, 56 id., 311; Barnett «. Cline,
60 id., 205;

Reed v. Reber, 62 id., 340; Lee

-c.

Ruggles, 63 id., 427; Moers

v.

Johns. Ch. 38 ; Pettit i>. Shepherd, 5 Paige, 493 ; Oakley v. Trustees
of Williamsburg, 6 id., 263; Hanlon v. Supervisors of Westchester, 57 Barb.,
383 ; Van Doren v. New York, 9 Paige, 388 ; Scott ®. Onderdonk, 14 N. Y.,
9 ; Ward v. Bewey, 16 id., 519 ; Hatch v. Buffalo, 38 id., 376 ; Allen v. Buffalo,
39 id., 386 ; Overing «. Foote, 43 id., 390 ; Crooke v. Andrews, 40 id., 547 ;
Newell V. Wheeler, 48 id., 486; Hej'wood v. Buffalo, 14 id., 534; Lapp v. Morrill, 8 Kans., 678; Harmer v. Boling, 8 Cal., 384; Cohen v. Sharp, 44 id., 39;
Ward V. Ward, 3 Hayw., 326 ; Leigh v Everheart's Executors, 4 T. B. Monr.,
879; Harrison «. Haas, 35 Ind., 281; Morris Canal, etc., Co. o. Jersey City, 1
Beas. Ch. 227; Lockwood b. St. Louis, 24 Mo., 20; Fowler d. St. Joseph, 37 id.,
228; Morrison «. St. Paul, 9 Minn , 108; Weber v. San Francisco, 1 Cal., 455;
Robinson i). Gaar, 6 id., 273; Hardenburg d. Kidd, 10 id., 403; Bern i). Patch,
12 id., 299 ; Pixiey v. Huggius, 15 id., 127 ; Burr v. Hunt, 18 id., 303 ; Bucknall
V. Story, 36 id., 67; Houghton ii. Austin, 47 id., 646; Arrington v. Liscom, 34
id., 365; Coulson «. Portland, Deady, 481 ; Huntington b. Central Pacific R.
R. Co., 2 Sawyer, 503. It is no answer to the bill in such a case that the tax
might have been collected from personal property. Scofield v. Lansing, 17
Mich., 437. The cloud upon the title is presumptively removed when personal
Smedley,

6
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which ignore the distinction between proceedings void on their face for illegality, and proceedings which, though illegal in fact, are on their face presumptively^
valid. Such cases, if they do not give relief on the ground of illeThere are manj'

cases, however,

gality alone, will give it on the ground that any sale of the land
tinder proceedings which assume to be by authority of law, and
are conducted by public officers empowered to make such sales, is
such a cloud upon the title of the owner as he ought, in equity,

if the officers are proceeding unlawfully,

to be relieved against,

and have no authority in fact.'

If

Tiih after a Sale.

land has been actually sold and
conveyed for a tax, the original owner remaining in possession
may have the validity of the sale tested by a bill in equity, filed
Quieting

for the purpose of quieting his title. This is the general rule.
Courts of law cannot give him relief in such a case, as he can not
bring ejectment, being himself in possession; and no other form
of action is given by the common

law for such

And

a case.

where the case has proceeded to sale and conveyance,

even, though

the defects in the title are apparent of record, and the deed is not

prima facie evidence of title, it may perhaps be possible to distinguisli the

from one in which the void proceedings are only
While they are in progress, it may be assumed that

case

impending.
the officers

will pause in their illegal action before any sale

is

but when the proceedings have reached that point, and
a conveyance has been given, which, though void, may affect the
market value of the land, there would seem to be no very conclureached

;

sive reason why equity should

If

ment of the void clairn.^
property sufficient

Micli.,

not interfere and decree a cancel-

the tax purchaser has entered

to satisfy the tax

is levied

Henry

upon.

».

into

Gregory,

29

68.

' See

Burnetts. Cincinnati, 3 Oliio, 73; Culbertson ». Cincinnati, 16 id., 574;
Ottowa V. Wallier, 2110., 60,5, and oases cited; Cliicago, etc., R.,R. Co. d. Frary,
23 id., 34; Barnard v. Hoyt, 63 id., 341; Holland ». Baltimore, 11 Md., 186;
Baltimore v. Porter, 18 id., 284; Litchfield ». Polk Co., 18 Iowa, 70; Leslie s.
And see Blackweli en Tax Titles, 483; High on InSt. Louis, 47 Mo., 474.
junctions, ch. VII., where the cases are collected with the author's usual
industry and care. The occupant of lands, though he be not the owner, may
file a

bill

to remove the

cloud

cast by an illegal tax.

Barnard

b.

Hoyt,

63

111., 341.

'See Yancey

v.

Hopkins,

1

Mumf., 419;

Holland

v.

Baltimore,

11

Md., 186;
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possession of the land, the original owner has an adequate remedy-

by suit at law in ejectment

and to this he must resort.^

;

When

neither party has actual possession, if the statute has authorized
the action of ejectment to be brought on the constructive posseswhich either may claim by virtue of the conveyances which
he holds, the suit at law would appear to be the adequate remedy
sion,

in sach

a case also.^

Joint Complaint hy Several Persons Taxed. When the supposed
illegality in a tax affects a single person only, or affects him in a
peculiar manner, distinguishing his case from that of others, he
can not unite with others in a suit to restrain its collection.
A

joint bill by two or more parties, setting out distinct grounds on
which each sought relief, would be dismissed as multifarious.'
But where the illegality extends to the whole assessment, or
where it affects, in the same manner, a number of persons, so that
the question involved can be presented without confusion by one
bill filed by all or any number of those thus affected, there seems
to be no sufficient reason why a joint bill should not be permitted.
The reasons favoring it are, that it avoids the necessity of a mul-

tiplicity of suits, and the attendant trouble and expense; and the
objection that the interests of complainant are several is suffiHicks, 3 Head, 39 ; Head «. Pordyce, 17
488; Fonda v. Sage, 48 N. Y., 173.
Conn.,
Cal., 149; Hartford v. CliipmaD,
complainant by liis bill makes out a case for relief, it is not necessary for
him to aver that he has paid the taxps. Polk v. Kose, 25 Md., 153.

Polk

V.

Rose, 25 id., 153

;

Almony

«.

31

If

The court of chancery is not the proper tribunal for settling titles to land
Munson ®. Munson, 38 Conn., 582; Thayer v. Smith, 9 Met., 47C;
generally.
Sunderton v. Thompson, 3 Dev. Ch., 539; Devaux s. Detroit, Har. Ch., 98 ;
Blackwood ii. Van Vleet, 11 Mich., 352.
'

20 Ark., 114; Scott i\
relief in equity against
the party in actual possession; he having a constitutional right to a trial by
jury. Tabor v. Cook, 15 Mich., 332. See Springer v. Rosette, 47 111., 223. As
to bill by tax purchaser, and what he must aver, see Belcher <o.Mhoon, 47
*

Parish
Watkins,

«. Eager,

23 id., 556.

15

Wis., 532; Bonnell B.Roane,

It

is not competent

to give

Miss., 613.

' Kerr

Lansing, 17 Mich., 34 ; Hudson v. Atchison County, 12 Kans., 140 ;
compare Cutting v. Gilbert, 5 Blatch., 259. One person cannot file a bill to
restrain tlie collection of a tax from another. Missouri River, etc., R. R. Co.
To a bill filed by a stockholder to restrain illegal
V. Wheaton, 7 Kans., 232.
-c.

taxation of the corporation,
port v. Dows, 18 Wall., 026.
35

the

corporation

must be made a party.

Daven-
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ciently met by the fact that complete justice may be done to all
in one suit on the single issue ; whereas, if the parties did not
join, the same issue must be passed upon in separate suits brought

Although there has been some
by the several complainants.
hesitation in sanctioning such bills, the weight of authority is now
decidedly in favor of supporting them, and this method of redress
is now mOvSt commonly resorted to where the case is appropriate
for it.'

But the mere saving of the expense of several suits at law,
where each of the complainants has an

adequate

remedy, is no

ground for sustaining a joint suit in equity where no other ground
This is well explained by the
of equitable relief is apparent.
supreme court of Connecticut, in a case in which a joint petition
was filed to restrain the collection from several
sewer

assessments

complainants

made upon their lands severally, and

of

which

" The multiplicity of suits, which the
were claimed to be illegal.
petition seeks to avoid, does not injuriously affect any one of the
petitioners.

No one of them has occasion to expect any such mul-

One suit is all that any one of them has
tiplicity affecting himself.
to fear, and the object of this bill would seem to be to relieve these
parties severally from that one suit, and to consolidate the apprehended litigation.

In

other words, to enforce a consolidation rule

If
by means of the extraordinary powers of the court of chancery.
the assessment were against one person only, it is not claimed
that he could transfer from a court of law to a court of equity the
question of his

'Bull

liability.

But how is the condition of any

Grat, 78; Johnson

■<;.
Drummond, 20

one

id., 419; Floyd v
R. R. Co., 29 Vt., 545;
Holmes v. Baker, 16 Gray, 259 ; Mott v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 30 Penn. St.,
39; Page v. Allen, 58 id., 388; Manly v. Raleigh, 4 Jones Eq., 370; Galloway
1). Jenkins, 63 N. C, 147; Kerr «. Landing, 17 Mich., 34; Scofield v. Lansing,
17 id., 437; Motz v. Detroit, 18 id., 435; Webster v. Harwinton, 32 Conn., 131;
Terret i). Sharon, 34 id., 105 ; Sherman v. Carr, 8 R. I., 431 ; XJpington v. Oviatt,
24 Ohio, K. S., 232; Vanover ■».The Justices, 27 Geo., 354; Baltimore v. Porter,
La Fayette v. Cox, 5 Ind., 38; Baltimore v. Sill, 31 Md., 375;
18 Md., 284;
Nill V. Jenkiason, 15 Ind., 425; Oliver v. Keightley, 24 id., 514; Ilarward i).
St. Clair, etc.. Company, 51 111., 130; Hooper i). Ely, 46 Mo., 505; Steiner v.
Franklin County, 48 Mo., 167; Barr d. Beniston, 19 N. H., 170; McMillan v.
Lee County, 3 Iowa, 311 ; Mandeville «. Riggs, 2 Pet., 482; King v. Wilson,
For a case under the Kansas
1 Dillon, 555; Coulsoo -o. Portland, Deady, 481.
statute, see Wyandotte, etc.. Bridge Co. v. Wyandotte County, 10 Kans., 326.
«. Kead, 13

Gilbreath,

27

Ark.,

675;

Stevens «. Rutland,

etc.,
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of these petitioners the worse because others are assessed for the
same improvement?
It would undoubtedly be convenient to try
the questions

relating to these warrants in one comprehensive

But it does not seem to the court that the case presented
by the bill is one of such irreparable injury, or of inadequate relief
at law, as to warrant us in taking it away from the legal tribunals." '

law suit.

A

Fraud.

tax founded on an assessment which, from corrupt
and malicious motives, is made excessive, may be enjoined.'^
So
may any other tax which is rendered unequal and unfair by fraudulent practices of the officers, or in which the party is deprived by
like practices of important rights which the law intends to secure
to him

right of appeal from an assessment, or to be heard by the board of review before his assessment
should be raised.^
;

such, for instance,

Bills of Interpleader.

It

as the

is possible for cases to arise

the same sum of money is demanded

— or, in city

claims by different officers
nances, by a contractor and an officer.

tax under conflicting
cases under peculiar ordi-

as a

Conflicting

also arise where one is taxed as representing another,

claims may

in the ca-

or as officer of a corporation

pacity of agent, trustee or otherwise,
representing the shareholders,

in which

and where the person beneficially

Such cases may possibly justify a bill
of interpleader, as the most ready method of determining to whom
the custodian of the fund is under obligation to make payment.*

interested contests the tax.

'
Seymour, .!., in Dodd v. Hartford, 25 Conn., 332, 238. And see Sheldon v.
Scliool District, id., 224. Compare Savings and Loan Association v. Austin,
46 Cal., 415 ; Houghton «. Austin, 47 id., 64G ; Central Pacific K. K. Co. v. Cor-

coran, 48 id., 65.

'Albany, etc., R. R. Co. v. Canaan, 16 Barb., 244; Leffertst). Calumet, 21 Wis.,
688; Milwaukee Iron Co. i,. Hubbard, 29 id., 51; Merrill v. Humphrey, 24
Mich., 170; Republic Life Ins. Co. «. Pollak, Sup. Ct. Illinois, 7 Chicago Legal
News, 357.
Gunn, 50 id., 434. Each
of these was a case in which an assessment was increased without notice to
The case is not distinctly
the person assessed, and the collection was enjoined.
3 See

Cleghorn

n.

Postlewaite, 43

111., 438 ;

Darling

d.

that
put on the ground of fraud, it being sufficient under the Illinois decisions
his
heard
before
to
be
his
of
right
deprived
illegally
been
the party had
increased.
assessment should bo
*See Thomson v. Ebbets,
Clute, 4 Paige, 384.

Hopk. Ch.,

372;

Mohawk

and H. R. R. Co. ».
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are hopelessly divided

on

whether individual tax payers may file a bill on
their own behalf to restrain unlawful municipal action, when it
the question,
constitutes
instance,

the preliminary step leading to taxation.
Such, for
the
ultra
allowance
of
a
debt
of
vires,
contracting

as tne

an illegal claim, the consent to a collusive

judgment, or the misOn the one hand it is in-

appropriation of the public moneys.
sisted that, until a tax is actually laid, the grievance, if any, is
purely a public grievance, and public grievances must be redressed
on the application of the proper public authorities ; that individuals can proceed in equity only when their interests are separate

individual ; and such interests are only affected by the unlawful action when a tax is laid and has become an individual
and

On the other hand, it
charge against the several persons taxed.*
is said that the case is to be distinguished from the cases of public
wrongs, in which the general public are alike concerned ; that the
tax payers constitute a class specially damaged by the unlawful
act, in the increase of the burden of taxation upon their property.
They have, therefore, a special interest in the subject matter of the
suit distinct from that of the general public.^
The decided preof authority is in support of the right of the tax payers to file bills on their own behalf in such a case.
The jurisdiction of equity may be sustained on the ground that the injury
ponderance

which would be done by the unlawful municipal action would be
irreparable ; and this would meet any objection on the ground
that the parties would have a remedy at law when the tax came

In

to be levied.

most cases the

it might become so in all
cannot render

a

injury would be irreparable, and

misappropriation of corporate funds
tax
subsequent
illegal, even though levied for the
;

as

very purpose of meeting the deficiency thereby caused ; ^ and consequently, all remedy may be lost if the misappropriation is not
It may be lost also in any case in which a corporate
enjoined.
'

Supervisors of Broome, 18 N. Y., 155 ; Koosevelt «. Draper, 23
v. Grandy, 13 Micli., 540 ; Conklin v. Commissioners, 13 Minn.,
Morgan v. Graham, 1 Woods, 124. la Massachusetts, a remedy is given

Doolittle

id., 318
454 ;

;

V.

Miller

Cooley v. Granville, 10 Cush., 56, and many subsequent cases were
by statute.
brought under statutes conferring jurisdiction.
^Bartol, Ch.
? See

Wright

J., in Baltimore
v.

Dunham,

18

».

Gill,

Mich.,

31

414.

Md.,

375, 394.

CH.

XXIV.J

REMEDIES

FOR ILLEGAL

TAXATION.

549

debt is evidenced by some negotiable instrument given under an
authority to contract in that form, and is put into circulation. The
effective remedy must usually in such cases be preliminary to the
threatened illegal action ; and though the state may interfere in
such cases through its proper law officer, to restrain an abuse of

it has granted,^ its right to do so is commonly
held not to preclude redress on the application of individual tax
the limited powers
payers.*

Delay in Proceedings.
It has been held in Massachusetts that
persons taxed for school purposes, when the district has been illegally constituted, may unite in a bill to restrain the collection
of the tax, notwithstanding a delay of thirteen months since
the illegal action to establish the district, and notwithstanding in
the meantime a tax has been levied and collected, and other im_-

portant action has been had by the district.'

In Michigan,

after

several years had elapsed, the court refused to permit the regularity of the organization to be attacked in equity, and the cases

referred to in the opinion tend strongly in the direction of holding
that, on grounds of public policy, it should not be suffered, even
after a short delay,

if the district, in the mean time, had become

peaceably organized, and was in the exercise of authority
Actions at Law

against

Assessors.

as such.*

When questions are re-

Attorney General v. Detroit, 36 Mich., 203, and cases cited.
Mandeville c. Kigga, 3 Pet., 483 ; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How., 331 ;
Sliarpless v. Philadelphia, 31Penn. St., 147; Mercer County ». Pittsburgh, etc.,
K. R. Co., 37 id., 484; Page «. Allen, 58 id., 338; New London ii. Brainard, 23
Conn., 553; Webster v. Harwinton, 33 id., 131; La Fayette ». Cox, 5 Ind., 38;
Oliver ». Kcightley, 24 id., 514; Jewett v. Sharon, 34 Conn., 105; Barr v. Deniston, 19 K. H., 170; Merrill v. Plainfield, 45 id., 126; Colton «. Hanchett, 13
111., 615; Drake ». Phillips, 40 id., 388; Rice b. Smith, 9 Iowa, 570; McMillan
B. Lee County, 3 id , 311 ; Grant v. Davenport, 36 id., 396 ; Fleming v. Mershon,
id., 413 ; Wade v. Richmond, 18 Grat., 583 ; Douglass v. Placerville, 18 Cal.,
643; Stevens v. Rutland, etc., R. R. Co., 39 Vt., 546; Gifford v. New Jersey R.
R. Co., ION. J. Eq., 171; Baltimore v. Gill, 31Md., 375; Hooper «. Ely, 46
Mo., 505; Steines v. Franklin County, 48 id., 167: see also Gray v. Chapin, 3
Sim. & Stu., 367; Bromley ii. Smith, 1 Sim., 8.
^ Holmes v. Baker, 16 Gray, 359.
The opinion barely refers to the delay,
saying that " The plaintiffs have been guilty of no delay or negligence which
should deprive them of a remedy by injunction against the future illegal proceedings of the defendant."
■*
Stewart v. Kalamazoo, 30 Mich., 69, citing People v. Maynard, 15 id., 463 ;
Fractional School District v. The Joint Board, 27 id., 3.
' See

= See

550

[CH. XXIV.

LAW OF TAXATION.

ferred to the decision of an officer selected for the purpose
of deciding them, and who, in making the decision, must act
upon his own judgment, it is of the highest importance, that
in their consideration, he shall be entirely unembarrassed
by

in

to cause them to be reviewed

collate-

This principle

an erroneous judgment.

is

ral proceeding, instituted before some other tribunal for the
covery of compensation for damages sustained in consequence

reof

the law permitted

it,

if

a

any possible consequences to himself, and left free to the exercise of an unbiased judgment.
He must, consequentl}', be
wholly exempt from responsibility to private parties who may
be dissatisfied with his conclusions, and who might be disposed,

so plain and reasonable

is

meets with universal assent, and

the law requires courage

in

a

without fear

may determine

;

a

it

applied in all cases
"
where functions of
judicial nature are exercised.
They who
are entrusted to judge ought to be free from vexation, that the}''
that

judge,

provides security for the support of that courage."'
Judges have not been invested with this privilege for their own
calculated for the protection of the people
protection merely
and therefore

is

it

;

"

is

a

by insuring to them
calm, steady and impartial administration
And this principle of protection
of justice."''
not limited in its
application to the judges of courts, but extends to all officers
who have duties to perform which in their nature are judicial,
and which are to be performed according to the dictates of their

is

Barnardiston

v.

Soane,

6

>

is

a

a

judgment. Instances of this nature are the decisions of highway
road assessofficers, that
person claiming exemption from
ment
not exempt in fact,' or that one assessed
in default
How.

St.

Tr.,

1096, per

North, Ch.

J.

v.

;

3

;

8

;

2

5

9

v. Commissioners,

;

etc.,

3

'Harrington

McCord,

400.

«,

;

6

;

3

;

7

;

3

S.

3

;

6

;

6

;

v.

6

;

3

2

Downes,
Moore, P. C, 36, n.
See Floyd v. Barker, 13 Rep., 23
Fabrigas, Cowper, 161 Garnelt ii. Farrand, B. & C, 611 Mills v.
Collett,
Bing., 85 Holroyd v. Bean, B. & Aid., 473 Pike v. Carter, Biug.,
78 Bicas 11. Lord Brougham,
C. & P., 249
Lowtlier v. Earl of Radnor,
East, 113; Basten i). Carew,
B. & C, 632; Yates v. Lansing,
Johns., 282,
C.
id., 306; Stewart v. Hawley, 31 Wend., 553; "Weaver b. Deven291;
Denio, 117; Vail B.Owen, 19 Barb., 22; Hill •«. Sellick, 21id., 207
dorf,
How., 89 Hoggett v. Bigley,
"Wilks V. Dinsman,
Humph., 236 Walker
Hallock, 33 Md., 339; Gordon ». Parrar, Doug., Mich., 411; Wall v. Trumbull, 16 Mich., 338 Gregory v. Brooks, 37 Conn., 365 Bradley v. Fisher, 13
Wall., 335; Fuller v. Gould, 30 Vt., 644; Wilson v. Marsh, 34 id., 353.
Taaffe

Mostyn
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for not -working out the assessment/ or that a road should or
should not be laid out on a prescribed line ; ^ to the appraisement of damages when property is taken under the eminent do-

' to action of
inspectors of elections who are to decide questions of fact which determine the qualifications of voters;^ of
school directors in deciding upon the removal of a teacher ; ' of
main

;

authorities in passing upon questions of suspension of
members ; ^ of members of a township board in deciding upon the
allowance of claims ; ' and the like. In many of these cases it will
corporate

be perceived that the officer who is held exempt is one who,
the main, performs ministerial

if in

porant,

functions only

;

in

but this is unim-

the particular case

complained of he was exercising
a discretionary authority, or one which, by law, was confided to
his deliberate judgment.^

No question can be made that these principles apply to
the case of assessors.'
The proper remedy for erroneous decisions on their part is not by suit at law to hold them to personal responsibility.
"In the imperfection of human nature," it
has been said by an eminent judge, " it is better that an individ' Freeman
=

Sage

' Van

D.

«.

Cornwall,

Laurain,

10

Johns.,

Mich.,

19

470.

137.

Steenburgh ii. Bigelow,

3

Wend., 43.

Doug. (Mich.), 511 ; Jenkins v. Waldron, 11 Johns., 131 ;
1
Bush, 135; Carters. Harrison, 5 Blaokf., 138; Rails
Miller v. Rucker,
Potts, 8 Humph., 325 ; Peavy v. Rohbins, 3 Jones L., 339 ; CauWeld v. Bullock,
18 B. Monr., 494; Elbin v. Wilson, 33 Md., 135; Friend «. Hamill, 34 id., 398;
*

Gordon v. Parrar,

Geotchens

'Burton

v.

Matliewson,

v.

Fulton,

' Harman
' Wall

v.

3

49

Penn.

v. Tappenden,

Trumbull,

16

Lans., 314.

5

1

St., 151.

East, 555.

Mich.,

338.

Jenkins v. Waldron, 11 Johns.,
Wall 1). Trumbull, 16 Mich., 328.
*

"Dillingham
Weaver

v.

121;

Weaveru. Devendorf,

3

Denio,

117;

Snow, 5 Mass., 547; Easton v. Calendar, 11 Wend., 90;
Barb., 33; Brown v.
3 Denio, 117; Vail v. Owen, 19

v. Devendorf,

Smith, 34 id., 419; People v. Reddy, 43 id., 539; Vose v. Willard, 47 id., 330;
Bell V. Pearoe, 48 id., 51; Barhyte v. Shepherd, 35 N. Y.,338; Western R. R.
Co. V. Nolan, 46 id., 513; Pentland v. Stewart, 4 Dev. & Bat, 386; Steam Kavigation Co. v. Wasco County, 3 Oregon, 209 ; Macklot v. Davenport, 17 Iowa,
379; Muscatine Western R. R. Co. v. Horton, 38 id., 38; Walker v. Hallock,
83Ind., 239; Lilienthal v. Campbell, 22 La. An., 600; Wall v. Trumbull, 16
W'ch.

238.
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ual should occasionally suffer a wrong, than that the course of
justice should be impeded and fettered by constant and perpetual restraints and apprehensions on the part of those who are
to administer it."' And the remark is as true of assessors as it is
of the judges of courts ; it is of the higheHt importance that they
should be protected in the honest exercise of their judgment.'
Assessors are therefore not liable for an excessive assessment,
even though it may be made such by erroneously including in
the estimate property not belonging to the party assessed, or not
■within the district.'
Nor are they liable for erroneously listing
for taxation persons or property which, though within their jurisdiction, are not taxable,^ or for an error of judgment, influenced
'

Lord Tenterden, Ch. J., in Garnelt

Ferrand,

v.

6

C,

B. &

611.

^ That

while the assessors are protected, the collector who collects
is protected also, as well as the town, county, etc., to which the money
over, see Holtonr. Bangor, 23 Me., 264; Gilpatrick v. Saco, 57 id., 277;
ton «. Birmingham, 37 Penn. St., 371; Ontario Bank ■». Bunnell, 10
Little

v. Greenleaf, 7 Mass., 236; Osborne v.

■5.Boston, 5

57;

Bowse,

93 ;

Howe

43

■!).Boston

7

id., 374

Pick., 98;

Lincoln

v.

Worcester,

;

313; People v. Arguello,37 Cal.,524;

Calendar,

Bates
8

id.,

Glascow

Mo., 479.

V.

Hiason,

1

Huggins

WharWend.,

6

Stickney v. Bangor, 30 Me., 404; Hemingway v. Machias,
Brown v. Smith, 24 Barb., 419; Dow v. Backer, 61 id., 597.
-

is paid

Danvers,

^

V.

Cush.,

Greene ». Mumford,4 R.

I.,

186;

the tax

Wend.,

Phil. N. C,

126;

Vail

i).

Owen,

19

33

id., 445;

Barb., 22; Easton

11

90; Weaver

«.

Denio, 117;

;

a

2

;

;

Smith, 24 Barb., 419

Devendorf,

3

Brown v.
Bell v. Pierce, 48 id., 51 Barhyte v. Shepherd, 33 N.
Y., 238, 255. Compare National Bank of Chemung v. Elmira, 53 id., 49. A
conti-ary decision was made in Gridley v. Clark,
Pick., 402, but the point
was not discussed. Afterwards statutes were passed in that state to protect
assessors in some cases.
As, where through mere error and while acting with
integrity and fidelity, they assessed
person not taxable.
See Baker v. Allen,
21 Pick., 382
Durant v. Eaton, 98 Mass., 469. So the statute of 1823 provided
that assessors shall not be responsible for the assessment of any tax upon the
inhabitants of any city, town, district, parish or religious society of which
V.

tliey are assessors, when thereto required

by the constituted authorities thereof, but the liability, if any, shall rest solely with such city, etc. Held, under
this, that assessors were not liable for errors of law committed without fraud
or intentional wrong.
Ingraham ». Doggett,5 Pick., 451; Dwinnelle v. ParBut where the regular assessment has been made for the
sons, 98 Mass., 469.

;

;

4

5

year, and without authority of law they make another, they are liable. Inglee
Pick., 498. And see further, Gage v. Currier,
V. Bosworth,
id., 399; Freeman v. Kenney, 15 id., 44; Suydam v. Keys, 13 Johns., 444; People t>. Supervisors of Chenango, 11 N. Y., 573 Lyman ». Fisk'e, 17 Pick., 231 Baker v.

Allen,

21

id., 383; Griffin

v.

Rising,

11

Met., 345.

The above statute held not
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by whicli they omit from their roll persons or property -which
ought to be taxed, thereby increasing the tax upon others.'' And
the rule is general, applying to all errors of law and mistakes of
fact in the exercise of their lawful authority.'
But to bring one within this rule of protection, he must be
careful not to assume a jurisdiction which the law does not confer
\ipon him. If persons assume to be assessors when they are not,
they may justly be held responsible as trespassers;^ and the law-

ful assessor, if he assumes an authority to decide upon the rights
of others in cases which the law has not confided to his judgment,
is in general responsible to the same extent as if he possessed

The office protects him only when
within the limits which have been prescribed for his

no official character whatever.
he keeps

official action

when he exceeds those he lays aside his official
character, and must rely for his protection on the same principles
behind which citizens in private life must defend themselves.
;

A

case in illustration

to

apply to school districts.

personal tax
upon persons who are not resident within the district, and consequently not subject to the jurisdiction of the assessors.^ Others are

An

14 id., 362.

is that of the assessment of

Little

act exempting

v.

Merrill,

10

Pick.,

a

543 ;

Taft

v.

Wood,

assessors from responsibility except " only for

the want of integrity and fidelity on their own part," held not to protect them for
assessing a school tax for a district having no legal existence. Bassett i>. Por-

C,

ter, 4 Cush., 487 ; 8.

Dickinson

10 id., 418 ;

».

such a suit it does not devolve on the assessors

The organization in fact, and action
Stevens o. Newcomb, 4 Denio, 437.

Billings,

4 Gray, 42.

But in

to prove a legal organization.

as a district,

are sutflcient

prima facie.

' Dillingham d. Snow, 5 Mass., 559.
Where taxes were irregularly assessed
and paid over to the county and town, and the assessors, to avoid suit, refunded
it to the taxpayers, and the town voted to refund to them, this was held a good

promise

Pick.,

as to the town

As

18.

to the

not as to the others.

tax, but

liability of

Nelson

assessors for refusing to assess

whereby he lost his right to vote, see Rising

v.

Granger,

11

Met,

v.

Milford,

7

the plaintiflf,
339.

'

Assessors held not liable to a.parish for negligence in not levying a tax
equal to the amount voted by the parish, where they acted under an honest belief that tliey were carrying out the views of the parish. First Parish in
Sherburne v. Fiske, 8 Gush., 264. Nor for neglect to take the oath of office. Id.

'Allen

V.

Archer,

course void.
^

Mygatt

V.

49 Me., 346.

Shewalter

Washburn,

v.
15

A

Brown,

K. Y.,

tax levied

without an assessment is of

35 Miss., 433.
816 ; Wade v. Matterson, 4 Lans., 159 ;

nan v. Stevens, 43 Me., 437; Martin

«.

Mansfield,

8

Mass., 419; Ware v.

HenPerci-
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upon the roll a sum never lawfully voted,* or
a sum in excess of that which by law is to be levied for the year,
or a sum
or in excess of that which has been lawfully voted
where they spread

f

if,

which has been voted for an unlawful purpose.^
'
by neglect
Possibly, the assessors should be held liable also
of duty, they deprive the taxpayer of the opportunity of being
heard before the board of review.^ The distinction which runs
val,

Me., 391;

61

C,

S.

14

Am. Rep.,

565;

Agry

v.

Young,

11

Mass., 220; Gage

;

3

9;

;

5

;

4

4

id., 361 Inglee ii. Boswortli,
Pick., 399 Sumner v. Dorcliester,
id., 498; Freeman d. Keuney, 15 id., 44; Lyman v. Piske, 17 id., 231 Henry
Bailey «. Buell, 59
Vt, 488; Fairbanks t;. Kittridge, 24 id.,
«. Edson,
Barb., 158; Beunet ». Buffalo, 17 N. T., 383; Clark ». ISTorton, 49 id., 248;

■o.Currier,

Dorwin i>. Strickland, 57 N. Y., 493. But
in the wrong town by his own request, he^ cannot mainaction against the assessors for so assessing him. Pease «. Whitney,
o. Preston, 49 Barb., 349;

■where one

an

assessed

Mass., 93.

5

1

is ,

7

a

3

;

4

a

v.

is

;

;

;

Little

void.

a

Kellar v. Savage, 20 id., 199 Worthington v. Eveleth, Pick
Merrill, 10 id., 543. A tax list made out before
tax
voted
Hill, 109 S. C, Denio, 333. This was case in which
Mead v. Gale,

gyle, 20 id., 296
106

;

;

;

5

;

3

V.

13

3

Leavitt,

Bussey
Russell,
id., 227
133 Paine v. Ross,
v.

levied which was voted at

meeting not legally
id., 103; Colby
Me., 378; Baldwin v. McClinch,
390
Gardiner
v.
id.,
Gardiner,
White,
v.
Mussy
id.,
id., 400 Johnson d. Goodrich, 15 id., 29 Barnard v. Ar-

school tax

is

where

called:

;

'As

a

8

tain

is

Westfall

tax had been voted and the vote afterwards

a

a

later meeting
repealed, and at
vote itself repealed. Held, that the tax was to be regarded as
voted at the date of the last meeting. But assessors are not bound to go bethe repealing

the records to see that
meeting was properly called.
Mass., 315; Libby ij. Burnham, 15 id., 144.
a

ty

3

Stetson

V.

Kempton,

13

Mass., 144

v.

Numes,

Joyner v. School District,
Cush.,
■».Kimball, 20 N. H., 107.
3

'

15

506;

;

Libby u. Burnham,
Drew V. Davis, 10 Vt.,
in such

Saxton

567

Grafton Bank

371
Drew v. Davis, 10 Vt., 506. The liabiliprobably depend upon the position the assesof his state relatively to the vote. If the asses-

Mass.,

;

14

;

hind

cases, however, would

is

is

is

sor occupies under the statutes
himself to take from the township records the sums voted, and spread
sor
them upon the roll, or if they are certified to him in detail, so that he
necesrequired to act officially what sums are legal
sarily informed before he
seems clear that he cannot

is

But

is

protection.

if, it

fall back upon the vote for his
ou the other hand, some other officer
required to certify
then to spread the amount on the roll,
to him in gross the sums voted, and he
this certificate, if in due form, like process fair on its face, should constitute
his sufficient protection, and he cannot be held bound to inquire for illegalities
and what illegal,

behind it.

See

Wall

v.

Trumbull,

16

Mich.,

338;

Parish

v. Golden, 35

N. Y.,

Manufacturing Co.

appeared that the law required

v.

Lathrop,

the assessment

Conn., 550.

list

to be filed

In

this case,

it

■■See Thames

7

463.

for inspection
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through the cases is between an unlawful assumption of authority
which has not been conferred, and a naistaken, erroneous or
irregular

exercise

of authority

actually

possessed

;

the

former

:

a

is

is,

will render any officer liable irrespective of the good faith of his
action ; for the latter he
in general, not liable at all.^ The law
which governs the whole subject
summed up in few words
" When judicial
in
leading case decided in Massachusetts
a

officers, deriving their authority from the law, mistake or err in
the execution of their authority, in
case clearly within their

which they have not exceeded, we know of no law
vi et armis. If the law were otherwise
respecting assessors, who, when chosen, are compellable to serve
or pay
fine, hard indeed would be their case.
But the same
law must apply to them as to inferior judicial officers.
If, therejurisdiction,

a

declaring them trespassers

a

a

by the first of December.
It was not filed until the twentieth of that month,
but this was ten days before the meeting of the board of relief.
Held, that
the selectmen who took out
tax warrant on this list, by virtue of which the
property of
person taxed was seized, were liable in trespass. See note on
this case in 35 Vt., 37. In New York, where by statute, the last assessment

a

a

7

a

;

a

1

it

a

roll of the township was to govern in levying school tax, except as changes
were made, of which notice was to be given to the parties affected before the
assessment was completed,
was held, that the omission of this notice did
not render the assessors liable as trespassers. Randall v. Smith, Denio, 314,
citing with approval Eaton «. Callendar, 11 Wend., 90, where trustees of
school district were held not liable, though they had erroneously added collection fees to the amount to be raised, and omitted to assess three individuals
the court holding, that the apportionment of the tax was to
certain extent
judicial act, and that, " though the trustees may err in point of law or in
judgment, they should not be either civilly or criminally answerable, if their
motives are pure."
The court distinguish Alexander b. Hoyt, Wend., 89, in
town assessment not finished
which the school assessment was made from
and afterwards changed, and where the trustees were held to be trespassers.

a

is

'In many cases, jurisdiction depends on questions of fact; as where, for
But these questions the assessor
one of residence.
instance, the question
jurismust decide correctly at his peril; he cannot, by his own error, obtain

;

a

Dorwin ®. Strickland, 57 N. Y., 493.
diction which the law has not conferred.
Where the assessor increased the valuation of person's property, after the
list had passed beyond his control, he was held liable. Bristol Manufacturing Co. «. Gridley, 38 Conn., 301. That an iiregular assessment affords uo
cause of action against assessors, see Sanford v. Dick, 15 Conn., 447 Sprague
National banks, not being taxable as such by the
V. Bailey, 19 Pick., 436.
states, are not within the jurisdiction of assessors, who are liable if they
assess them. National Bank of Chemung v. Elmira, 53 N. Y., 49, citing many
cases.
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the persons acting as assessors have been duly chosen and
qualified to execute that office, if the sum assessed has been

fore,

legally ordered to be assessed, if the assessment be made and the
warrant of collection be issued by them or a major part of them,
in due form of law, if the poll and estate of the party complaining of the assessment be legally taxable, he cannot, in our
opinion, maintain an action against them as trespassers vi ei armis
for any error or mistake of theirs in the exercise of their discretion."^

It

has been made a question whether these principles

apply to a case where
actuated

these officers

should

are accused of having been

by malice, and where the impelling motive has been to

inflict injury upon the parties

assessed.

It

has already been seen

that assessments, purposely made excessive through evil motive,
may be reached and corrected in equity. But to subject every
tax officer to the necessity o£ being compelled to justify his moof others, under a penalty of personal responsibility, is perhaps to go beyond what is necessary to the protection of tax payers; and in matters depending on judgment of
values, would be so dangerous to the officers that it is doubtful if
tives to the satisfaction

In

leading case in New York it
is declared that the question of motive is not to be raised in a
suit against assessors who have kept within their jurisdiction.
" The assessors," it is said, " were judges acting clearly within the

sound policy could sanction it.

scope and

a

limit of their authority.

They were not volunteers,

but the duty was imperative and compulsory ; and acting, as they
did, in the performance of a public duty, in its nature judicial,
they were not liable to an action, however erroneous or wrongful

This case might be disposed
their determination may have been.
of on narrow ground, for there was no evidence to justify the
conclusion that the defendants acted maliciously in fixing the
value of the property of the plaintiff, or of any one else ; and
surely it will not be pretended they were liable for a mere error
of judgment. But 1 prefer to place the decision on the broad
ground, that no public officer is responsible, in a civil suit, for a
however erroneous it may be, and however
malicious the motive which produced it. Such acts, when cor-

judicial determination,

rupt, may be punished criminally,
' Parsons,

Cli.

J., in Dillingham

v.

Snow,

but the law will not allow
5

Mass., 559.
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malice and corruption to be charged in a civil suit against such
an officer, for what he does in the performance of a judicial
duty.
The rule extends to judges from the highest to the lowest ; to
jurors, and to all public officers, whatever name they may bear,
in the exercise of judicial power.
It of course applies only where
the judge or officer had jurisdiction of the particular case, and

authorized to determine it.
If he transcends the limits
of his authority, he necessarily ceases, in the particular case, to
act as a judge, and is responsible for all consequences.
But with
■was

these limitations, the principle of irresponsibility, so far as respects
a civil remedy, is as old as the common law itself."^

Action against superrisors.

The supervisors of townships in
They are members of the

some states act in several capacities.

township board, and as such pass upon claims against the township ; they meet in convention and constitute the county board
which audits the county claims and votes the county taxes, and
perhaps they act as assessors also, and issue process for the collection of the taxes after they have been properly spread upon

Thus their action in each of these capacities may affect
tax
the
payer ; but the cases must be rare in which the party
aggrieved could go back of the supervisor's action as assessor, if
the roll.

that was not in itself illegal, and maintain an action against him
as supervisor for something done in another capacity.
Thus, it
has been held in New York that supervisors who issue a tux
warrant, having jurisdiction to do so, are not liable in trespass for
having included in the levy a sum improperly allowed by them
The like decision has been made in Michito a county officer.^
gan, where a supervisor was sued for placing upon the roll allowances unlawfully made by the township board of which he was a

But in Michigan, the supervisor who undertakes to

member.'

tax warrant, does not make out his justification by proving his official character merely ; he must show

justify the issuing of

a

J., in Weaver v. Devendorf, 3 Denio, 117, 120. Compare Baker
Ind., 485; Walker v. Hallock, 33 Id., 339; Gregory v. Brooks, 37
Conn., 365 ; Burton v. Fulton, 49 Penn. St., 151 ; Pike v. M'egoun, 44 Mo., 491,
497; Auditor v. Atchison, etc., R. R. Co., 6 Kans., 500.
' Beardsley,

«. State, 37

5 Parish v.

'Wall
ningham

v.
V.

Golden, 35

Trumbull,
Mitchell,

N. Y.,

463.

16

Mich.,

67

Penn. St., 78.

338.

See

Smith

v. Crittenden,

id., 163; Cun-
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levied have been certified to him by the competent authorities, and that the assessment roll has come to him
These are
from the board of supervisors as provided by law.
De

prerequisities to his jurisdiction to issue any tax warrant.^ And
if a tax is assessed on lands as a personal charge against a resident, the description on the roll must be sufficient to identify the

if not, that particular assessment will be void and its
enforcement will render him liable.^ In Iowa, township trustees
land

;

and

are held not liable for a refusal to issue a certificate of compliance

with the conditions upon which a tax has been voted in aid of
corporation, unless they act willfully and corruptly.'

Resisting

if

It

collection.

a

is stated on a preceding page that

tax is unlawful, the person taxed may resist the exaction instead of submitting to it and bringing suit afterwards.
This is
a

only

a statement of a general

principle of the common law, which

individual liberty of every person to that extent.
recognizes
Where, however, the tax warrant on its face discloses no illegality, it
the

has been held that resistance to the officer is not permitted, notwith-

standing illegalities lie back of it; and it can seldom be advisable
or even safe to do otherwise than submit to the process and seek
the proper remedy afterwards.
But where lands are sold, the peaceful and quiet remedy which consists in retaining possession, and

leaving the purchaser to resort to his suit at law, is usually all
that is necessary, and under the statutes of limitation will, after a
time, become completely effectual,

unless the purchaser resorts to

the courts for a remedy on his own behalf.^
■Clark V.

Axford,

2

V. ZelufF,

Atwood

' Muscatine

5

Mich.,
36

183.

Mich.,

118.

Western R. R. Co.

v.

Horton,

38

Iowa,

33.

^We

have referred, on a preceding page, to the decisions in Wisconsin, that
the holder of a tax deed of lands is to be considered constructively in possession, -where the land is unoccupied.
The rule was laid down in Sydnor !).
Palmer, 39 Wis., 236, that, under statutes of limitations, " evidence of
adverse

possession is always to be strictly construed, and every presumption is to be
made in favor of the true owner."
In Wilson v. Henry, 35 Wis., 241, 345, this
rule is explained as applying to the holder of the tax title when he claims
" true
owner" is in such case to be reby constructive possession, and the
garded as the original owner, notwithstanding any technical defects that may

This just and reasonable rule was applied to
particular case in the following language : " The plaintiff seeks

be found in his claim of title.
the facts

of

the

CH.
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cer to whom process

In

general, any mere ministerial

559
offi-

from an officer,
board or other body having authority to issue process of that nature, which process is legal in form and contains nothing on its
is issued, which proceeds

to cut off the remedy and destroy the right nf the true owner, and to sliow an
indefeasible title in himself, by virtue of an adverse constructive possession

of the land for three years next after the recording of his tax deed. Within
the rule, the evidence of such adverse constructive possession must be strictly
construed, and the defendant may avoid the bar and defeat the right asserted
by the plaintiff on this ground, by showing any actual occupation and use of
the premises under his title for any portion of the three years so required to
This
perfect the title of the plaintiff, or to debar the remedy of the defendant.
principle has already been settled by this court in the case of Lewis v. Dishor,
32 Wis., 504, and it is needless to add to the discussion which will there be
found.
The court there say : •' In order that the claimant by tax deed may
assert or acquire title to unoccupied land in that way, or by lapse of time
under the statute, it must appear that the land remained and was continuously
unoccupied for the whole period during which the statute was runijing.
Any
owner,
or
intervention and actual occupancy during the time by the former
any person for him, disengages the bar of the statute, and relieves the former
owner from the conclusive effect which would otherwise be given to the tax
deed.' But, as will be seen from the same decision, and others by this court,
with which counsel are familiar, the effect of an actual possession taken and
held by the former owner, during the whole or any considerable portion of
the three years, is not only to disengage the bar of the statute, when resorted
to in favor of the grantee by tax deed, but also to create a bar against him,
It operates in favor of the
and in favor of the title of such former owner.
true or former owner thus entering and holding, to cut off the remedy of the
grantee by tax deed, and to annul his title, whatever it may have been. In view
of these well settled principles, this court is of opinion that it was error for
the court below to reject the offer of proofs made by the defendants on the
trial." The offer is recited, and consisted in substance of a proposal to siiow
that persons mined for lead on the land in controversy during what was called
the mining season, in the winter, recognizing the defendant's right, and paying
rent to him; also that a custom exists where this land is situate, making it
obligatory upon the land owner to hold mineral diggings for the miner operating them during the summer season, though the miner does not work during
" The time
such summer season upon such diggings. And it is then added :
included in the foregoing offer embraced the whole period of the three years
from and after the recording of the plaintiff's tax deed ; and the facts, if established, woukl divest the plaintiff of all constructive possession during the
They would not only disprove and destroy his constructive
same period.
possession, but they would turn the statute of limitation against him by showing the actual possession and occupancy of the former owner, thus cutting off
any title acquired under the tax deed, unless the plaintiff saw tit to bring his
action to recover the possession within the three years. The offer, if proved
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rule, not only

es-

a

a

sential to the protection of such officers, but absolutely I'equired
It would seem to
also for the due dispatch of public business.^
be impolitic in
very high degree to compel such an officer to
ascertain, at his peril, the illegalities that might lie back of
proas made, would have shown that the plaintiff was thus uuder the necessity of
bringing his action, and that, not having done so, he had lost his title, if any,
acquired by the tax deed, and could not maintain this action, which was not
instilutod until after the expiration of the three years. It would have sustained the plea or answer of the statute of limitations made by the defendants,
so as to jirotect them and the title under which they claim against the present
action, and the right now set up by the plaintiff."

Me., 334; Kellar v. Savage, 20 id., 199; Tremont ».
Clough,
id., 4S3; State v. McNally, 34 id., 310; Caldwell v. Hawkins, 40 id.,

■Ford

Clark,

526; Bethel

Tripp,

8

V.

33

«.

Mason,

id., 501;

5.5

id., 426; Savacoul

Judkins

v. Reed, 48 id., 386;

Nowell

o.

Wend., 171; McGuinty v. Herrick,
Boughton,
id., 240, 243; Wilcox v. Smith, id., 231; Alexander «. Hoyt,
id., 89; Beach v.
Furman,
Johns., 228; Warner «j. Shed, 10 id., 138; Reynolds v. Moore,
Wend., 35, 36; Coon v. Congden, 13 id., 496, 499; Bennett v. Burch,
Denio,
v.

1

9

9

7

5

01

Patchiii v. Ritter, 27 Barb., 34; Webber «. Gray, 24 Wend., 485; Abbott
Denio, 86; Dunlap b. Hunting, id., 643 Cornell d. Barnes,
Yost,
Hill,
35 People v. Warren,
id., 440 Sheldon v. Van Buskirk,
N. Y., 473 CheN. Y., 376; Turner v. Franklin, 29 Mo., 285; Glascow v.
garay v. Jenkins,
Rouse, 43 id., 479; St. Louis Building, etc., Ass'n v. Lightner, 47 id., 393;
State V. Dulle, 48 id., 283 Walden v. Dudley, 49 id., 419
Holden v. Eaton,
Pick., 436 Colman v. Anderson, 10 Mass., 105 Sprague v. Bailey, 10 Pick.,
436; Upton «. Holden,
Met, 360; Lincoln D.Worcester,
Cush., 55; Aidrich V. Aldrich,
Met., 103 Hays v. Drake,
387
Gray,
Howard «. Proctor,
id., 128 Williamstown v. Willis, 15 id., 437 Cheever v. Merritt,
Allen,
563; Underwood v. Robinson, 106 Mass., 296; Braincrd v. Head, 15 La. An.,
489; Blanchard e. Goss,
N. H., 491; Henry ». Sargent, 13 id., 331; States.
Weed, 31 id., 263; Rice ». Wadsworth, 27 id., 104; Kenniston s. Little, 30
id., 318; Kelley «. No5'es, 43 id., 209; Moore «. Alleghany City, 18 Penn. St.,
55; Billings i). Russell, 33 id., 189; Dennis v. Shaw,
Gihn., 405; Hill ii. Tigley 25 111., 156; Allen v. Scott, 13 id., 80; State v. Jervey,
Strobh., 304; Cunningham ». Mitchell, 67 Penn. St., 78; Loomis v. Spencer,
Ohio, N. S., 153;
Tliames Manufg Co. ». Lathrop,
Conn., 550; Watson i;. Watson,
id., 140;
Nethi). Crofut, 30 id., 580; Grumon v. Raymond,
id., 40; Prince ». Thomas,
11 id., 473; Burton v. Fulton, 49 Penn. St., 151; McLean v. Cook, 23 Wis.,
364; Noland v. Busby, 38 Ind., 154; Le Roy n. East Saginaw City Railway
Co., 18 Mich., 233 Lott v. Hubbard, 44 Ala., 593 State v. Lutz, 65 N. C, 503
Gore V. Martin, 66 id., 371 Bird v. Perkins, Sup. Ct. Mich., Oct. Term, 1375
Erskine v. Hcjhnbach, 14 Wall., 613.
;

2

;

8
;
;

;

;

;

1

9

7

1

4

5

3

;

5

;

6

;

;

7

8

8

5

;

;

;

;

5

;

5

;

2

7

141;

e.
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cess apparently legal, and

prudent men to decline the

to force

or to proceed with
as sometimes to render the

office altogether,

such hesitation and circumspection
The general
process of little or no avail.''
officer
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that such an

is

process which comes to him as

a

it

is

legally protected against any illegalities, except those
committed by himself, and
not illegal for him to -execute
officer, from

ministerial

other

He

officers whose action he has no authority to revise or review.^

is

is

unlawfully taxed, by
consequently not liable to one who
of not residing within the district for which the tax
nor does the fact that sums are included in the warrant,
levied
;

*

is

reason

is

which were never lawfully voted, render him liable.* And he
protected in executing his warrant by arrest, notwithstanding the
person taxed has been discharged in bankruptcy.'

In Vermont

a

a

is

a

■

the ruling
treasurer sued in trespass, for
different, and
of
for
cannot rely on
valid wardistress,
on
warrant
taxes,
taking goods
" It has
that
all
the
were
rant, but must show
previous proceedings
legal.
never been considered in this state that the tax bill and warrant were of them-

Willson

i>.

is

Seavey, 38 id., 221.
426

S.

C,

14

C,

14

Tripp,

61

Me., 436

;

u.

Cush., 55; Abbott v. Yost,

2

■•Lincoln «. Worcester,

8

8

;

5

3

Savacool «. Boughton, Wend., 171 Nowell
Pick., 436.
Am. Rep., 573; Holden r. Eaton,

S.

;

:

»

Erskine «. Hohnbach, 14 Wall., 613 Nowell v. Tripp, 61 Me.,
Am. Rep., 573 Moore v. Alleghany City, 18 Penn. St., 55.

;

ter, 44 Vt., 285, citing

is

it

;

5

a

is

selves any sufficient justification to the officer. Neither the vote of the town,
in the nature of the proceednor the assessment of the tax by the selectmen,
The legality of all
ings of court, either of general or special jurisdiction.
the proceedings must be shown by the collector." Redfield, J., in Collamer 11.
Drury, 16 Vt., 574, 578. To the same point are Downing ®. Roberts, 21 Vt.,
id., 65; Spear ■». Tilson, 34 id., 420; Shaw ^.
441; Hathaway «. Goodrich,
Peckett, 25 id., 423. See also Downer i>. Woodbury, 19 id., 329 Wheelock v.
Archer, 26 id., 380. But the rule seems to be the reverse of this in that state,
upon the deheld the burden
when suit is brought for taxes, for then
Macomber v. Cenfendant to impeach the regularity and validity of the list.

Denio, 86.

30

v.

9

15 id., 427.
27

Compare

Md.,

237

Waters

«. State,

Commonwealth

1

D.Willis,

School Commissioners,

;

;

Gill

O'Neal

;

3

;

id., 321; Williamstown
302

:

;

8

is

it

a

8

v.

7

Met., 103; Wilmarth v. Burt,
id., 257. The colAldrich,
warrant from an authority of competent jurisdiction to issue
cannot inquire into the precedent steps. Cunningham ®. Mitchell, 67 Penn.
He may even officially receive voluntary payments where his auSt. 78.
Ired., 104; Same v. Same,
id., 496;
State v. Woodside,
defective.
thority
Orono
29
v.
44
49
Trescott
Me.,
id.,
15
VVedgewood,
Johnson v. Goodridge,
Sandwich v. Pish,
Gray, 298 Cheshire v. Howland, 13
11. Moan, 50 id., 347

'Aldrich

lector having

v.
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It

is not easy to lay down any general rule as to what will
constitute a defect in the process which should put the collector

Where the law required the assessment roll to be
attached to the warrant, and the certificate attached thereto was
not in accordance with the law, it was held^ that the warrant
on his guard.

could not be said to be fair on its face, and the collector was
liable for executing it.^ The same ruling was made where the
warrant showed on its face that a certain tax included in it could
not lawfully have been placed in the list for that year.^ And so
whei'e the affidavit which was required to be attached to the roll
after the time for reviewing the assessments had expired, appeared
So where the warrant was issued by a
to be made prematurely.'
justice of the peace, where, by law, it should have been issued by
the supervisors.*
But mere clerical errors may be overlooked in
any

case."

If the
27 Penn. St., 497; Moore «. Alleghany City, 18 id., 55.
collector's warrant was sufficient when propei'ty is seized under
subseof
the
who
for
the
quent alteration, by
signed
purpose
making
magistrate
it,

warrant for another tax,

win

v.

Perkins,

39

Van Kenssclaer

Vt.,
v.

will

not invalidate

the

collector's

action.

Good-

598.

Witbeck,

7

■

a

it

it,

a

Philadelphia,

N. T.,

517.

a

4

a

a

4

'Eames ». Johnson, Allen, 383. So the collector was held liable in colbank which, by law, was taxable on its realty
personal tax fl'om
lecting
Mumford,
Bank
c.
R. I., 478. Compare National Bank of
American
only.
T.,
and
cases cited.
49,
That, however, was suit
Chemung v. Elmira, 53 N.
against tlie town after the money had been paid over.
4

Chalker

s. Ives, 55 Penn. St., 81.

"Process issued

And

see

to one as "const.able and

Hilbish

v.

Hoover,

collector" will

id.,

58

93.

be sufficient,

if

*

V.

"Westfall V. Preston, 49 N. Y., 349. See, also, JSational Bank of Chemung
Hill, 109.
Elmira, 53 id., 49; Gale v. Mead,
in

is a

though

it

fails

to recite the fact

Torrey,

of removal.

was held to be fair on its

their

of law for

the township,

Cheever

v.

Sheldon

names.

pursuance

Merritt,

is

a

2

a

tax list, and signed by the supervisors,
face, though they failed to add the official title to
N. T., 473. A warrant issued in
Van Buskirk,
collection of tax from one who has removed from
tached to

5

6

a

is

it

was issued to him. Hays i>.
fact he was authorized to act as collector when
And
collector
not
Drake,
387.
in seizing properly
trespasser
Gray,
two
if
warrants,
of
either
of
them
Id. A warrant atsufficient.
by virtue
».

the

sufficient,

Allen,

563.

v.

99

1

a

it

is

see Sherman

;

Mass., 472
Hubbard v. Garfield, 103 id., 73.
will protect the officer where the only defect
failure to insert the
So
direction to sell distrained goods within seven days, according to law. King
!;. Whitcomb,
Met., 328. And for other cases, where questions of validity

And
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valid process will protect an officer against personal responsibility, it will not enable him to build up a title to
either general or special.
"While,
property seized by virtue of
it,

a

a

a

he might havs
suit brought
perfect defense to
him
in
he
against
might not successtrespass, for seizing property,
fully defend an action of replevin, or any other action in which

therefore,

it

be valid on its face, but

should be valid in

fact.^

This

is

it

the legal title to the property, or the legal right to possession, was
the question at issue.
In any such action
would not be sufficient for him that the process under which he acted appeared to
an

his warrant, that officer
the tax payer, though

is

if

is

sometimes overlooked.
important distinction, which
It has been decided that taxes are collected by color of law, and
actually paid over by the collector according to the command of

not liable for the amount at the suit of

it

turn out that the authority under which
he acted was void for unconstitutionality or other reason.^
This
seerns but reasonable,

still has his remedy,

as

be seen further on.

If

the collector levies distress for

a

will

since the tax payer

tax and afterwards abuses

a

is

his authority, the warrant becomes no protection to him, and he
held to be trespasser ah initio. This rule has been applied in
one case where the collector sold the property at half its value

within two hours after seizure, and without giving public notice
a

a

It has been applied also where
of the time and place of sale.'
sale on which he had received
the collector, after
surplus, failed
to render to the owner an account in writing of the sale and
charges, as required by the statute under which the sale was made.^

v.

N. Y.,

26

467

i.

;

6

41 Me., 539

Brown,

;

nango

Stephens v.

;

Thompson,

White, Me., 290; Bachelder
Wilkins,
Penn. St., 260
Bank of CheBarnard v. Graves, 13 Met., 85. And see

see Mussey ».

3

of process have been raised,

'Earl

V.

Camp, 16 Wend., 562; Beach

Mich.,

v.

Botsford,

2

ante, pp 304, 305.

Doug. (Mich.), 199; Le

Roy V. East Saginaw,
Dickens «. Jones, 6Terg., 483; Crutchfield «. Wood, 16 Ala., 702; Lewis
County V. Tate, 10 Mo., 650. In Wood v. Stirman, 37 Texas, 584, however,
county treasurer collects taxes without authority of
was decided that where
liable, and not his sureties or the county, though the money
law, he alone
actually paid in to tlie county treasury, and disbursed as
been
have
may
233.

is

a

it

«

18

•"

Blake d. Johnson,
Blanchard v. Dow,

1

3

other county funds.

N. H.,

91.

33 Me., 557.

the collector is liable as a trespasser ab initio,

distress

until

after

it

and then sells

;

^

time limited

the

if,

And
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or

by law

if

he keeps the

for making sale,

having sold enough to satisfy the tax, he

proceeds to sell more.^

is

The rules which have been given apply to collectors under the
internal revenue laws of the United States, who are protected in
like manner in the collection of taxes committed to them by lists
fair on their face.^ The case of the collector of customs duties

a

3

a

it

;

;

4

7

1

Pierce v. Benjamin, 14 Pick., 356, 360, citing Purrington v. Loring, Mass.,
Pick., 249. See to the same effect Brackett v. Vin388 Nelson v. Merriam,
ing, 49 Me., 356 contra, Ordway «. Ferriu, N. H., 69. Where collector of
for sale, neglected
distress and advertising
taxes, after seizing property as

7

a

it

it

at the time appointed, but afterwards again advertised'it the requisite
to sell
upon such new advertisement: Seld, that neither the negperiod, and sold
lect to sell at the appointed time, nor the subsequent sale, could make him
N. H.,
trespasser ab initio. Souhegan Nail, etc., Factory v. McConike,
309.

is

v.

a

Williamson

the excess.

1

;

it

it

S.

;

is

;

8

a

a

a

a

is

to

;

'

trespasser only
Dow, 32 Me., 559. But in such case he
Leckins v. Goodale, 61 Me., 400 S. C, 14 Am. Rep., 568.
Compare Polk v. Rose, 25 Md., 153. If an officer under two rate bills, one
authorized to
valid and the other invalid, seizes no more property than he
by virtue of the valid process, and sells the same for more than enough to satisfy the valid process, and then appropriates the excess to satisfy the invalid
trespasser ai initio.
process, such misapplication does not render the officer
To make him
trespasser ab initio, the wrongful act must be done to the
property taken, not to the fund realized from
legal sale. Wilson v. Seavey,
For the Hw as to what will I'ender one trespasser ai initio,
38 Vt., 221, 230.
Coke, 290; S. C, Smith's Leading Cases, 163
see the Six Carpenters' Case,
C, 13 Johns., 413. If one
notes
Brundt
v.
11 Johns., 377
Schenck,
and
Van
and
whose property
sold by the collector causes
to be
unlawfully seized
to his own use, he can recover in an
bid in for himself and appropriates
action against the collector only what he paid for the property on the sale
Hurlburt v. Green, 41 Vt., 490.
as that was the extent of his injury.

as

Hohnbach, 14 Wall., 613, 616. In this ca.se Mr. Justice Field
of protection very clearly and concisely as follows: " Whatever
may have been the conflict at one time in the adjudged cases, as to the extent
of protection afibrded to ministerial officers, acting in obedience to process
or orders issued to them by tribunals or officers invested by law with authority
to pass upon and determine particular facts, and render judgment thereon,
the officer or tribunal possess jurisdiction over
well settled now that
which
jitdgmeut is passed, with power to issue an
the subject matter upon
order or process for the enforcement of such judgment, and the order issued
thereon to the ministerial officer is regular on its face, showing no departure from the law, or defect of jurisdiction over the person or property
affected^ then, and in such case, the order or process will give full and entire
^Erskine

v.

if

is

it

states the rule
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He lias no tax warrant or other process to protect

different.

him, and he proceeds at his peril in demanding and receiving
what he claims to be demandable as duties.
If he collects illegal or excessive duties, and they are paid under protest, he is
liable to the party paying for the amount ; ^ but he is excused if
he pays over the moneys before protest

Liability of

town^

county, etc.

is made.'

The town, village, city or

county for which a tax has been levied and collected, may also,
under some cii'cumstauces, be liable to an action at the suit of

The authorities
parties from whom the tax has been exacted.
warrant us in specifying the following as the conditions on which
any such action may be maintained :
The tax must have been illegal and void, and not merely

1.

irregular.
2. It must have been paid under compulsion or the legal equivalent.

It

must have been paid over by the collecting officer, and
have been received to the use of the municipality.
3.

And
4.

to these should perhaps be added

:

The party must not have elected to proceed in any remedy

he may have had against the assessor or collector.'

merely irregular assessment, it has already been stated in
several places, the remedy of the party is that which the statute
may give him. Irregularities do not make a tax void, nor com-

For

a

monly do they attach to it any circumstance of inequality or injusto the ministerial officer in its regular enforcement against any
prosecution which the party aggrieved thereby may institute against him,
although serious errors may have been committed by the officer or tribunal
protection

in reaching the conclusion or judgment upon which the order or process is
issued:" citing Savacool ». Bough ton, 5 "Wend., 170; Earl «. Camp, 16 Wend.,
563 ; Chegaray v. Jenkins, 5 N. Y., 37G ; Sprague v. Burchard, 1 Wis., 457. To
the same eifect is Haffin v. Mason, 15 Wall., 671. And see Cutting v. Gilbert,
5 Blatch., 259; Nelson v. Carman, id., 511; Braun v. Sauerwein, 10 Wall.,
218 ; The Collector ii. Hubbard, 12 id., 1 ; Coblens v. Abel, 1 Woolw., 293.
V.

Swartwout,

10 Pet., 137;

'Elliott V.
' In Ware

Swartwout,

10 Pet., 137.

'

Elliott

v.

Perclval,

and recovered
and satisfaction

Kep.,

565.

10

How.,

243.

illegally assessed sued the town
Afterwards he sued the assessors, but his first
were held conclusive.
See same case, 14 Am.

61 Me., 391, the person

satisfaction.

revovery

Maxwell v. Griswold,
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municipal corporation is sued for money collected
and paid over to it as a tax, the idea on which the suit is predicated
that the corporation has received that which, in justice,

When

a

is,

tice.

;

it

But the merely irregular action of the
ought not to retain.
officers in their proceedings in a,>3sessing and levying the tax do
not show injustice there must be something further in the case
which either exempts the party from the tax altogether, or which,
illegality or inequality, deprived the officers of juris-

because of

Municipalities do not guaranty to their people correct
they did, no one would
action on the part of their oificers, and
Irbe entitled to rely upon the guaranty until he was injured.

if

diction.

a

a

;

is

it

regular action does not necessarily injure the parties concerned;
and where
does, the remedies given by review or appeal are
Any further remedy must prosupposed to afford full redress.
That
mere nullity.^
void
ceed upon the idea that the tax

a

is

tax voluntarily paid cannot be recovered back, has been held by
immaterial in
It
the authorities with very few exceptions.^
or
even that the
such
case that the tax has been illegally lai(3,

it

law under which

was laid was unconstitutional.^

;

8

7

7
;

4

9

'

Cusb., 233, 241, per Shaw, Cli. J., citing Preston v. Bos"Wright V. Boston,
Met., 181 Howe v. Boston,
Boston, etc., Glass Co. v. Boston,
ton, 12 Pick.,
Cush., 273; Lincoln «. "Worcester,
id., 55; approved in Rogers e. Greenan illegal state tax
collected and paid over, the state
busli, 58 Me., 390.
is

If

is

it,

and their remedy
becomes trustee of tlie monej'S for the persons paying
to
make
the
Shoemaker
proper
appropriation.
ask
tlie
law-making power
to

If

the state has any auditing board competent
Grant County, 36 Ind., 175.
to allow such claims, their power might be adequate to the case. "Whea the
town collector collects
state, county and town tax levied on property not
a

V.

K R.
;

mont Central
tree, 24 id., 414

will

Co.

v.

Slack

v.

will

be

not embrace the

limited
stale

to what was paid over

and county taxes.

Ver-

Burlington, 28 Vt., 193. See, also, Spear v. BrainNorwich, 32 id., 818 Mathcson v. Mazomauie, 20

191.

308;

1).

Readfield,

"Walker

».

27

New York, etc., R. R. Co. s. Marsh, 13 N.
563; Christy's Administrators v. St.
Philadelphia County, 24 Penn. St., 229 Phillips

Me., 145

St. Louis,

15

Mo.,

3

5

;

Louis, 30 id., 143 Hospital v.
Kans., 412; "Wabaunsee County
S.Jefferson County,
Maxwell,
413; Elliott v. Swartwout,
Blatch.,
Corkle d.

;

Smith

d.

"Walker,

10

Pet., 137.

8

=

Wis.,

y.,

sued, tlie recovery

;

town

is

if the

for its own use, and

;

to

it

taxable,

id., 431;

back, even though no power existed to require it. Mays

v.

Cincinnati,

1

is

a

5

;

5

Taylor v. Board of Healtli, 31 Penn. St., 73 Barrett v. Cambridge, 10 Allen,
Cush., 115. Money paid to secure
license,
48. And see Forbes v. Appleton,
the
of
party,
on
the
and
petition
voluntarily paid,
cannot be recovered
issued
Ohio,
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The principle is an ancient one in the common law, and is of
general application.
Every man is supposed to know the law ;
and if he voluntarily makes a payment which the law would not
compel him to make, he cannot afterwards assign his ignorance
of the law as the reason why the state should furnish him with
legal remedies to recover it back. Especially is this the case
when the officer receiving the money, who is chargeable with no
more knowledge of the law than the party making payment, is
not put on his guard by any warning or protest, and the money
is paid over to the use of the public in apparent acquiescence in
the justice of the exaction.
Mistake of fact there cannot well be

in such a case ; as the illegalities which render such a demand a
nullity must appear from the records, and the taxpayer is just as
much bound to inform himself what the records show or do not
The rule of law is a rule of
show, as are the public authorities.
public policy also ; it is a rule of quiet as well as of good faith,
and precludes the courts being occupied in undoing the arrangements of parties which they have voluntarily made, and into
which they have not been drawn by fraud or accident, or by any
excusable ignorance of their legal rights and liabilities.'
N. S., 268, citing Brisbane
Pet, 150; CUi-ki). Butcher,

Elliott

v.

Dacres,

9

Cow., 674; Robinson v. Charleston, 4 Rich., 317;

5

Taunt., 143;

v. Swartwout,

10

Eeadfield, 27 Me., 145. To the same effect is Ligonier v. Ackerman,
In California it is held that a tax imposed by city ordinance,
of law, may be recovered back, even though paid without
authority
■without
protest. Galveston v. Snyder, 39 Texas. 236, citing Marshall v. Snediker, 25
id., 460 ; Baker v. Panola County, 30 id., 86.
Smith

1).

46 Incl., 553.

who have acquiesced in a tax for eleven years, Jield to have yielded
forever their right to question the law which imposed it. Commonwealth v.
Philadelphia, 27 Penn. St., 497. In Kentucky it has been held that where a
party pays taxes illegally assessed without knowledge of the illegal it}-, he
may recover back, though he made no protest. Underwood v. Brockman, 4
Dana, 309 ; Ray «. Bank of Kentucky, 3 B. Monr., 510; Louisville ii. Zanone,
But in Iowa it has been
1 Met. (Ky.), 151 ; Covington v. Powell, 2 id., 226.
the
law
under
which it was levied
that
held that a tax, paid under ignorance
Kraft v. Keokuk,
was invalid, could not on that ground be recovered back.
And see Lester v. Baltimore, 29
14 Iowa, 86 ; Espy v. Fort Madison, id., 226.
Md., 415. A competent authority, having jurisdiction, assessed the plaintiffs
1 Parties

They complained, and appealed to the courts. Bethe officer having charge
fore the court of appeals rendered a final decision,
requiring payment, and
to
the
plaintiffs,
notice
of the collection of taxes gave
not paid, a wiirraut would issue to collect the same.
sta-tint' that if the tax was
for personal

property.
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of taxes are supposed to be voluntary which are
not made under protest or under the apparent compulsion of legal
When a protest is relied upon, nothing very formal is
process.^
payments

requisite; "taxes illegally assessed may always be recovered
back, if the collector understands from the payer that the tax
is regarded as illegal, and that suit will be instituted to compel
the refunding."

'

A

payment made to release goods from seizure is a payment
on compulsion,' and so is payment after threat of distress of
the plaintiffs paid tlie tax. There iDeing no warrant, seizure, or
seizure, payment of money to free the property from the possession of another, or ignorance of facts, it was lield, that it was a purely volunThereupon
threatened

tary payment, and no action would lie to recover back the same.
V.

New York,

Union Bank

51 Barb., 159.

' Where a town offers a discount

to those who make payment promptly, a
made
to
obtain this discount has been held to be voluntary, though
payment
made under protest. Lee v. Templeton, 13 Gray, 476. In Connecticut it has
been decided that if one's land is sold for a tAX after protest, and he buys it
in, this purchase must be regarded as a voluntary payment, and
no right of action.
Sheldon «. School District, .24 Conn., 88.

will

give him

In Taylor

v.

Board of Health, 3] Peun. St., 73, taxes levied under an unconstitutional law
liad been demanded and paid for a series of years, and the law being then
held void, suit was brought to recover back. The taxes wei-e in the shape of
head money on immigrants, and were collected of consignees of ships, without process. Lowrie, J. . " If the matter complained of here was a wrong, then
the state did it in the only way a state can do a wrong — by its public functionaries.
The suit is not against the state, and could not be ; but it is against
the executive officer of the state; for in this matter the board of health was
nothing else. A state imposes certain taxes, and orders a certain officer to
collect them and apply them in a certain way, and if he does so, how can the
state compel him to refund them to the taxpayer?
Will it be said that in this
case the order was void, and therefore the officer acted on his own authority
and at his own risk? The plaintiff cannot well say that, seeing that he paid
voluntarily, and without attempting to deny the duty or to warn the officer
that he must proceed at his own risk. Had he given such warning, the validity of the tax would have been tested by the superior officers of the colHe paid without dispute, and thus assented to the collection of the
lector.
tax for public purposes, and of course, to the application of it ; and he has
no shadow of equity against the collecting functionary." In Busby v. Noland, 39 Ind., 234, it is said that one who pays without protest is estopped
from disputing the legality of the tax.
=

Cliaae, Ch.

3

Briggs

jaid

!).

J., in Erskine

Lewiston,

29

v.

Van Arsdale,

Me., 472.

were not recoverable back.

15

Wall.,

75, 77.

But it was held in this
And see Dow v. Sudbury,

case that the costs
5

Met, 78; Shaw
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1

and much more would be the satisfaction of the demand by
actual sale of goods distrained ; '^ and it seems that if the officer calls
" demands a sum of
■upon the person taxed, and
money under a warrant directing him to enforce
the party of whom he demands
assume
that
may fairly
he seeks to act under the warrant at all,
;

equivalent to

a

The demand itself

effectual.

is

will make

he

it

if

it

it,

goods

is

;

it

a

is

is

service of the writ on the person.
to be regardAny payment
ed as involuntary, which
made under
claim involving the use
of force as an alternative as the party of whom
demanded
cannot be compelled or expected to await actual force, and cana

a

not be held to expect that an of&cer will desist after making
demand.
The exhibition of
warrant directing forcible proceedand
the
of
ings,
receipt
money thereon, will be in such case equivalent to actual compulsion."^
The proper action against

;

a

is

ascorporation, in these cases,
sumpsit for money had and received the liability not attaching

District,

57

Penn.

11

Penn.

St., 433,

citing Henry

St., 60; Allentown

And see Guy e. Washburn, 23 Cal., 111. A payment
where the payer lays down money, but forbids the collector
421.

^

linger

V.

Gray, 51

Hurley

N. T.,

«. Texas, 20

610.

Wis.,

J., in Atwell

And

see Qreenabaum

v.

King,

».

v.

Horstick,

in
9

■».School

Watts, 414; Caldwell v. Moore,

suit were brought against the ofBcers
Shaw u. Becket, supra.

is

if the

would be otherwise.

Saeger, 20 id.,
not voluntary

to take it.
4

Grimm

it

Cush., 442; thougli

propel' case,

'

a

7

Becket,

V.

Bel-

Kans., 833.

634.

v. Zeluff, 26

And

see

;

and delivery of

a

a

it

2

1

7

6

a

;

;

8

3

6

7
;

Met., 181.

;

4

^

Mich., 118, citing Boston, etc., Glass Co.
Amesbury, etc., Manuf'g Co. v. Amesbury, 17
Mass., 461 Preston v. Boston, 12 Pick.,
George v. School District,
Met.,
District,
567;
«.
School
Lincoln
v.
497; Joyner
Cush.,
Worcester,
id., 55.
Upon the right to maintain this action in general, see Henry v. Chester, 15
Vt., 460; Allen D.Burlington, 45 id., 203; Richards ti. Stogsdell, 21 Ind., 74;
Hubbard u. Brainard, 35 Conn., 563 Goddard ii. Seymour, 30 Conn., 394 Callaway «. Milledgeville, 48 Geo., 309; Wilkey «. Pekin, 19 111., 160; Allentown
The question what constitutes
V. Saeger 30 Penn. St., 421.
voluntary payment was quite fully discussed, and the English authorities cited in Baker ».
Cinncinnati, 11 Ohio, N. S., 534, and Taylorw. Board of Health, 31 Penn, St., 73.
The latter case quotes particularly FuUan v. Down, Esp., 36 Valpy v. Manly, C. B., 594; Parker v. G. W. Railway Co., M. & G., 353; Morgan v. PalB. & C, 729. In Carleton v. Ashburnham, 102 Mass., 348, the maxim
mer,
that where two acts are done at the same time, the one shall take effect first
effect
which ought in strictness to have been done first, in order to give
of
was
to
simultaneous
tax
13
applied
payment
Gray, 459),
(Claflin ». Thayer,
Campiell,

■u.Boston,

protest against its exaction.
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until the money is paid over, and being then based upon the

re-

ceipt of the money, and not upon the illegalities which preceded
it.i The recovery will of course be limited to the money received ;

while in an action of trespass against the assessors, or trespass or
trover against the collector, the party might recover such actual
It is possible that
damages as he could show he had sustained.^

in the case of municipal corporations existing under special charIf such corporations, in the exerters, the rule may be different.
of an illegal
tax, and process is issued to their officers for its collection, such
officers may well be regarded as the agents of the corporation iu
cise of their legislative

power, order the collection

the execution of the process, and

the

corporation held liable in

A town is not liable for any mistake or misfeasance of the assessors or collector by means whereof one has been compelled to pay a tax wrongfully levied, the money not having been paid into the treasury of the town. These of'

ficers are not, in a legal sense, the agents of the town in its corporate capacity,
in performing duties under the txx laws. Lorillard of Monroe, 13 Barb., 101,
and 11 N. Y., 373. And see People v. Supervisors of Chenango, 11 N. T., 563;
Preston

i).

13 Pick., 7; Chapman v. Brooklyn, 40 N.Y., 373; Newman
of Livingston, 45 N. Y., 676. "When one is illegally assessed a

Boston,

c. Supervisors

tax afterwards abated, and is arrested by the collector, the payment by the
town to the collector of the cost of the arrest is not such a ratification of the
act as to render the town liable.
Parley i>. Georgetown, 7 Gray, 464. In a
suit against a town to recover back an illegal tax, the town cannot defend by
showing that the assessors were not legally elected. Sudbury ». Heard, 103
On the other hand, it is no ground for recovering back a tax, that
it was collected by one who was not collector de jvre where he was such de
facto. "Williams v. School District, 31 Pick., 75. "Where a tax has been collected and paid over to a city, and is afterwards set aside, suit will lie against
the city to recover it back, even though the assessors were not appointed or
controlled by the corporation.
Bank of Commonwealth v. New York, 43 N.
Y., 184. See also Chapman ■o.Brooklyn, 40 id., 373; Newman d. Supervisors
of Livingston, 45 id., 676 : compare Swift ». Poughkeepsie, 37 id., 511. If the
tax is charged to the collector in a general settlement with him, this is equivalent to a payment into the treasury.
County Commissioners ii. Parker, 7
Minn., 367 ; Slack v. Norwich, 27 Vt., 810 ; Babcock v. Granville, 44 id., 325.
Mass., 548.

»

Dow

Sudbury,

Met.,

Shaw «. Becket,

And see Inglee
Pcrcival, 61 Me., 891, per
Appleton, Ch. J. If the proceedings in the collection of a tax are wholly void,
and the person taxed neither has been nor can bo disturbed in liis possession,
there is no ground for an action against the town, as the plaintiff has lost
Such would be the case of a void sale of shares in a corporation.
nothing.
Noyes a. Haverhill, 11 Cush., 338.
V.

1).

Bosworth,

5

Pick.,

5

73 ;

498, per Morton,

J.;

"Ware

7

Cush., 443.

v.
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for its enforce-

ment.-'

A

demand is not necessary before bringing suit to recover back

illegal taxes. '^ Interest is recoverable from the date of demand,
but not before.' If only a part of the tax was illegal, the recovery will be limited to that part, if capable of being distinguished.*
' Howell v.
Buffalo,

15 N. T., 513.
See Conrad v. Ithaca, 16 iiL, 158; West v.
Brockport, id., 116, note ; Bennett «. Buffalo, 17 id., 383 ; Sheldon v. Kalamazoo
34 Mich., 383.
' Look V. Industry, 51 Me., 375. See Pierce v. Benjamin, 14 Pick., 356.

' Boston,

Mich.,
"

etc.,

Glass Co. v. Boston,

4 Met.,

181.

See

Atwell

v. Zeluff,

36

118, 130.

Torrey

Pick., 64. See this case commented on in Lincoln v.
Whether cost of the proceedings to collect the tax
can be recovered from the town, see Briggs v. Lewiston, 39 Me., 473 ; Dow v.
Sudbury, 5 Met., 73; Shaw d. Becket, 7 Gush., 443. The following illustra.
tions of illegal taxes recovered back may be cited : One who pays a personal and poll tax In a town of which he is not a resident may recover it back,
if paid under the threat of a warrant, notwithstanding he was properly taxed
for real estate in that town. This would not be regarded as a case of excessive taxation from which the party should appeal ; the tax on the personalty
and poll being wholly unauthorized.
Preston «. Boston, 13 Pick., 7. Further, as to the recovery of a town, etc., by nonresidents unlawfully taxed withSumner v. Dorchester,
Pick.,
see Hathaway v. Addison, 48 Me., 440
in
id., 498 Dow d. Sudbury,
Met., 73 Lee o. Bos361 Inglee v. Bosworth,
id., 43; People v. Supervisors of
ton,
Gray, 484; Dickinson «. Billings,
v.

Millbury,

31

3

4

;

5

4

;

;

5

;

it,

Worcester, 8 Gush., 55.

Chenango,

11

N. Y.,

It

563.

has been held that

if

school

taxes are levied un-

;

;

;

6

;

;

;

;

3

4

7

is

6

7.

a

is

a

it

a

is

a

lawfully in district by vote of the town, they may be recovered back of the
taxed on personPowers «. Sanford, 39 Me., 183. If nonresident
town.
back cannot
town where he does not reside, his right to recover
alty in
be affected by the fact of his having real estate in the town which was omitHathaway v. Addison, 48 Me., 440. Where an inhabitant
ted from the list.
on property held in trust for him abroad, and has no
taxed
wrongfully
tax assessed to
he may recover back of the town
him,
to
property taxable
so
held
in
trust.
Dorr
v. Boston,
the
of
property
and paid by him in respect
Pick.,
13
Boston,
When by law the
Gray, 131, relying upon Preston"^.
assessed in the shares of the company, but
personal estate of corporations
the assessors tax to the corporation both their personal and real estate, and
Dunnel
they pay the taxes, they may recover back the tax on the personalty.
see
v.
Dover,
Perry
377.
For
further
cases,
Pawtuoket,
Gray,
v.
Manuf. Co.
Boston,
Huckins
«.
District,
567;
Gush.,
School
b.
13 Pick., 306; Joyner
Gush., 543 Bacon v. School District, 97 Mass., 431 Mathewson v. Mazomanie,
19 La. An.,
20 Wis., 191; Hurley ii. Texas, id., 634; James ■!).New Orleans,
Y.,
53 Atwater v. Woodbridge,
Hill V. Supervisors of Livingston, 13 N.
109
v. Hartford, 31 id., 351
137
Gillette
id.,
Litchfield,
10
v.
Adam
323
Conn.
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A

municipal corporation or body, for -whose benefit taxes are enforced, does not warrant to the purchaser the title to property
sold for their satisfaction, or the legality of. the proceedings on
which the sale was based.
The purchaser in such a case buys at
his own risk, and at his peril investigates the proceedings.
This
is

a general

A

rule in tax

sales.-'

misapplication by a corporation, actual or threatened, of
moneys collected by taxation, will give no right of action to an
individual to recover his proportion of the tax. The money,

it

it,

and not
when collected and paid to the corporation, belongs to
For misapplication
to those from whom
has been collected.
there may be remedies on behalf of the public, and perhaps indiit,

;

a

it

but
suit to recover the moneys
vidual taxpayers may enjoin
must be based upon an individual right to
which could not
exist in the case.^

In

Remedy by replevin.

some cases, one whose goods

have

satisfaction of

a

tax may recover them by
writ of replevin. But to justify this process the ta,x must be absolutely void, and not merely unjust, excessive or irregular. The
been seized for the

must consequently be brought within the rules already laid
down, regarding the invalidity of tax levies, or the suit in replevcase

The liability of this process to vexatious use
has been deemed proper in some of the
so considerable, that
it

is

in must fail.

states, on grounds of public policy, to provide that replevin shall

not lie for property distrained for taxes.
Taking away this
remedy would still leave to the party all the other remedies which
;

are applicable to the case

and he may therefore

still contest the

7

;

;

«. East Saginaw, 25 Mich., 456; Supervisors
JSTicodemus
of Stephenson v.
Manny, 56 111., 160; Lauman ». Des Moines County, 29 Iowa, 310; Aliens.
Burlington, 45 Vt, 203 Judd d. Fox Lake, 28 Wis., 583 First Ecclesiastical
Minn.,
Society v. Hartford, 38 Conn., 274; Foster «). County Commissioners,

».

Vermont,

Melrose,
is

In

Lynde

it

'

140.
10

Allen, 49; Packard

otherwise by statute.

d.

New Limerick,
Victory,

See Saulters i).

84 Me., 266.
35

Vt.,

351.

8

'Wilmington «. Harvard, Cush., 68; Moore v. School Directors, 59 Penn.
A tax on corporate dividends
St., 232; Wright D.Dunham, 13 Mich., 414.
cannot be disputed by creditors of the corporation on the ground of its having been declared when the corporation was insolvent.
Pennsylvania Bank
Assignees' Account, 39 Penn. St., 103.
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suit to recover the money after it has been
paid, or in an action to recover the value of his goods, if the tax
was collected by distress and sale.^ And it has been held that a

validity of the tax in

a

statute taking away the remedy by replevin is not to be held applicable to a third person whose goods are seized for a tax for
which he is no way liable
assessed for taxation.^

;

'^

nor to one who was not liable to be

Where replevin is allowed, it cannot be maintained by the
party taxed unless the whole tax is illegal ; as it must assume
that the seizure of the goods is without warrant of

Estoppel.

Under some circumstances,

a

law.^

party who is illegally

assessed may be held to have waived all right to a remedy by a

course of conduct which renders it unjust and inequitable to others that he should be allowed to complain of the illegality.
Such
a case would exist if one should ask for and encourage the levy
of the tax of which he subsequently complains ; and some of the
cases referred to in the note go far in the direction of holding, that
a mere failure to give notice of objections to one who, with

knowledge of
is expending

the person taxed, as contractor or otherwise,
money in reliance upon payment from the

may have the

taxes,

same

> Dudley v.

Boss, 27 Wis., 679

= Traverse

v. Inslee,

Cleino,

2

Dillon,

the

;

Macklot

Mich.,

19

175 ; Cardinel

effect.'

v. Davenport,

Compare

98.

But the duty to speak
17

Iowa,

879.

Atlantic, etc., R. R. Co.,

v.

v. Smith, Deady, 197.

See Ross v. East Saginaw, 18 Mich.,
v. Good, 43 Barh., 531 ; McO'Reiley
As
333.
Mt.
etc., R. R. Co., v. Andrews,
Carbon,
117
;
39
111.,
Claughey », Cratzenburgh,
Co., 33 Geo., 633; Cady
Manuf.
etc.,
53 id., 176; Yancey i>. New Manchester,
are
complained of, replevin
Where mere Irregularities
V. Lennard, 45 id., 85.
Buell v. Ball, SO Iowa, 282 ; Bilbo v.
•will not be the appropriate remedy.
s

Stockwell

V.

Vietch,

Ab. Pr.,

15

412.

to such statutes in general, see

Henderson,

31

id., 56, and cases cited.

<Brackett v. Whidden,

3

N. H.,

17;

Emerick

v. Sloan, 18

Iowa,

139.

Ohio, N. S., 64;
'Weber ». San Francisco, 1 Cal., 455; Kellogg i). Ely,
Tash V. Adams, 10 Cush., 252 ; Motz v. Detroit, 18 Mich., 495 ; Warner v. Grand
Haven, 30 id., S4; Peoria i). Kidder, 36 111., 351; Sleeper «. Bullen, 6 Kans.,
300; Pease i). Whitney, 8 Mass., 93; La Fayette «. Fowler, 34 Ind., 140. In Indiana it is held that one who has seen a public improvement go on without
15

until it is accepted 'as completed by the city, cannot afterwards enjoin the collection of the assessment on the ground that the work was not
Evansville «. Pfisterer, 36 Ind., 31. Or that the
done according to contract.
whole proceeding was invalid. La Fayette v. Fowler, 34 Ind., 140, citing Helobjection,
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estoppel.'

Remedy

A

mandamus.

summary remedy by the writ of
mandamus may be had by parties illegally assessed in a few cases,
which are more particularly referred to in another chapter.^
They
embrace cases in which the property or subject taxed is not taxaIby

ble by law, and the remedy is given by compelling the proper
officer to strike off the assessment or to discharge the tax.^ But
an excessive assessment is not to be corrected

by means of the

writ, it not lying to correct mere errors of judgment in the exercise of judicial or discretionary powers.*

Remedy by prohibition.

The common law writ of prohibi-

tion lies to keep inferior courts within their jurisdiction, and is
inapplicable to tax cases, except, perhaps, under very peculiar
statutes.
A statutory remedy has been given in some states
tinder this

name.^

This is the process by means of which usurQuo warranto.
It may
pations of corporate franchises may be inquired into.
on
behalf
of
the
in
doubtless be made available
state
some cases
unlawfully . claimed, but is not
adapted to the redress of individual wrongs under the revenue
where powers

of taxation

are

v. La Fayette, 30 id., 192; Palmer v.
Sleeper e. Bullen, 6 Kans., 300. One contesting
mitting before the supervisors that the land is
topped from disputing that fact on certiorari.
47 Cal., 222.

lenkamp

'

Strumpli,

29 id., 329.

And

a drainage proceeding,

swamp and overflowed

Hagar

see

but 'adis

es-

Supervisors of Yolo,

d.

city property is assessed by city officers and sold as individual
this
does not estop the city from setting up its title. St. Louis v.
property,
JIo.,
Gorman, 29
593.
Taxing lots as privnte property whose boundaries include part of what is actually used as a street does not estop the city from
Where

claiming it
5

Chapter

as a street.

V.

Mich.,

v.

Grand Rapids, 27 Mich., 250.

XXIII.

"See People
pie

Ellsworth

r>.Barton, 44

Supervisors

Barb., 148; People

of Otsego,

51

N. Y.,

401 ;

v.

Olmstead, 45 id., 644; Peo-

People

i).

Auditor General,

9

134.

ETdridge, 43 IS". Y., 457 ; School Directors b. Anderson, 45 Penn.
Gibbs v. Hampden Co. Commissioners, 19 Pick., 298; Miltenberger
Louis County Court, 50 Mo., 172.

■"
Howland v.

St., 388;
«. St.

5 See

Mour.,

People

«.

Supervisors

526 ; State b Gary, 33

of Queens,
Wis., 93.

1

Hill,

195;

Talbot

«.

Dent,

9

B.
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held not to be the proper process to correct
corporate action, where a city, instead of establishing remunerative
water rates to pay the interest and part of the principal of the
water loan — which it was claimed was its duty to do annually'—
has been

established nominal

only, and levied
large to pay the debt and interest.'

Conclusion.

rates

It will

a

tax on the city at

be apparent from what has appeared

in

this chapter, that many serious errors may be committed and
many wrongs done in the exercise of the power to tax, which the
parties wronged must submit to, because the law can afford them
no redress whatever. All injuries which result from an exercise
of political or legislative authority are to be included in this category

;

and these are often the most serious

which, in matters of

In all such cases, the autaxation, the people are visited with.
thority of the judiciary is confined to an inquiry into the jurisdictional question, and if it appears that the political or legislative
body has kept within the limits of its authority, the judiciary must
pause there, and admit its incompetency to inquire into wrongs
which, within those limits, may have been committed. The wrongs
which spring from errors on the part of assessors are, in a large
proportion of all the cases, as little susceptible of correction, unless
Courts
the legislature shall have provided a remedy by statute.
of equity have but a limited jurisdiction, extending to few cases
motive on the part of the
The chief
assessors has been to do injustice and inflict injury.
at
last
be
in
the
sought
intelligence
protection of the citizen must
besides those in which

the impelling

and integrity of public officers, and where these fail, as too often
they do, the injury must frecjuently prove irreparable.
'

Attorney General v. Salem,
proper remedy for such a case.

103 Mass., 138.

Carlton

n.

Neitlier is

a

bill in

Salem, 103 Mass., 141.

equity the

INDEX.
A.
ABANDONMENT—
of

seated

lands, what is, 276.

ABATEMENT—

right to apply for sometimes taken away if property not listed,
of one tax cannot be made by levying another, 90, 91.

263-264.

cannot be compelled by mandamus, 518.
is the appropriate remedy in cases of unequal taxation, 527.
can only be had as the statute provides, 528.
be had in equity, 528.
party failing to apply for is generally concluded, 528.
decision on application for, is final, 529.

•cannot

interest in cases of, 263.

ABBREVIATIONS —
in descriptions
ABUSE —

of land for taxation, when sufficient,

286, 287.

liability. of a power to, no argument against its existence,
of legislativt power to tax, remedy for is in responsibility

213.
to constituents,

4, 71, 575.

why this an unsafe reliance,

513.

of power to tax may be corrected when it exceeds limits, 35,
(See JuKisDiCTiON.)
of power to levy special assessments, 428, 531.
of authority of collector, may make him trespasser ah initio,
564.

of power, derives no sanction from time, 94.
Illegal Taxation.)
(See Remedies fob

ABUTTING- LOTS —
(See

Assessment

for Local

Impbovembnts.)

ACCEPTANCE —
of work is conclusive on persons
ACCIDENT —

assessed,

468, 469.

remedy in equity in cases of, 536.

ACCIDENTAL OMISSIONS —

of property from assessment roll, effect of,
(See Omtssions.)
•87

154-156.

36.

304, 305, 563,
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ACCOUNTING —
direction for, in tax warrant, 220.
suits against collector for failure in, 497-499.
against sureties for collector's failure in, 499-504.
failure to call collector to, by auditing board, 503, 504.
by auditing offlcer sometimes made conclusive on collector, 504-506.
(See

Collector of Tasks.)

ACCUMULATIONS

—

unnecessary', in public treasury, in .policy of,

8.

ACQUIESCENCE —

in municipal organization, effect of, 530, 549.
in official action by one assuming to be an officer,
(See De Facto Officers.)
in illegal taxation,
(See Estoppel; Voltxntaey Payhents.)

ACRE —
assessments

by the, in levee cases, 454r-i57.

ACTION—
preliminary, cannot be enjoined, 540.
of assessors is judicial, 550-552.
judicial, cannot be set aside on mandamus,

514-416.

(See Mandamus.)

judicial liability in
(See

case of,

Judicial Action ; Judicial Officer.)

political,
(See

Political Action.)

ultra vires,
(See

Ultra Vires.)

discretionar}',
(See

Discretionary Action.)

ACTION AT LAW—
usually lie for collection of
may in some cases, 18, 300.

does not

taxes, 300.

by collector who has advanced taxes, 301.
to recover lands sold for taxes, 371-383.

condition that betterments shall

(See Lands.)
pending when curative act passed, must be governed by
(See Curative Laws.)
against collectors of taxes for moneys collected, 496, 497.

for neglect to collect, 499.
on collector's bond, 499-504.
against assessors, 549-561.

it,

be paid for, 371.
that taxes shall be paid, 372-375.
short, limitation to, 376-382.
" color " and " claim "
of title, 382, 383.
281.
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continued.

against supervisors, 557, 558.
against collectors of taxes for enforcing illegal taxes, 559-665.
against town, county, etc., 565.
against treasurer for abuse of authority, 304, 305.
(See

for

Remedies

Illegal Taxation.)

Excessive and

ACTS OF THE LEGISLATURE —
(See

Statutes.)

ADEQUATE REMEDY—
(See

Equity; Mandajius.)

ADJACENT PROPRIETORS —
assessment of, for local improvments,
(See

416^73.

Assessments, Local.)

ADJOINING —

meaning of, 432.

ADJOURNMENT—
of sale, iDresumption in regard

to, 338.

ADJUDICATION—
sometimes required before lands sold for taxes, 357.
proceedings usually begin after failure to collect, 357.
court must have jurisdiction, 358.

showing of delinquency,

359.

notice to parties, 359.
proceedings to, are in rem, 361.
what defects

will

avoid, 360-363.

sales under, 363.

irregularities will not defeat, 363.
that taxes are not paid,, when conclusive, 333.
whether penalties may be imposed without, 313-315.
(See Penalties.)
■whether lands may be forfeited

for taxes without,

316-319.

(See FOKPBITTJRES.)
not required before process may issue for taxes, 37.
summary process against collectors without, 496.
protection

in making,

Judicial Officer.)
ADMINISTRATOR —
(See

suit against, for tax against the estate, 301.

AD VALOREM TAXES—
what are,

176.

ADVANCEMENTS—
for public purposes, taxes may
for bounty purposes, taxes for,

be

laid

to repay, 101.

101.

ADVERSE CLAIMANT—
whether he may buy at tax sale, 348-350.
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ADVEESE CLXUlAi:^T —

continued.
recovering in ejectment may be required to pay for betterments,
other conditions to recovery, 372-875.

short statutes of limitation against, 37G-383.
"color" or " claim of title" by, 382, 383.

ADVERSE POSSESSIOTSr—
extinguishment of title by, 376-382.
doctrine of, as applied to vacant tenements, 376-382,
improvements by one holding by, 371, 372.

558, 559.

ADVERSE PROCEEDINGS —
general right to notice of,
(See

Heabing.)

ADVERTISEMENT—
(See

Notice.)

AFFIDAVIT—
-what cannot be compelled

by assessors,

by mandamus, 519, 520.

proof by, of giving notice.
(See Notice.)
to taxpayer's list,
to

failure to make,
roll, made prematurely, 562.

263.

AGENCIESof government, not

be taxed by state,
what are and what are not, 56-59, 60.

of

states, not to be taxed by

United

56- -59, 74.

States,

56-59, 74.

(See Exemptions.)
AGENTS —

not to buy land of principal at tax sale, 347
municipal corporations act as, in making local assessments,
"whether officers are, in their official action, 570.

of non resident, taxation of personality

463.

to, 270.

AGREEMENTS —
(See

Contracts.)

ALABAMA —
constitutional

provision for assessment of property by value,

ALCOHOLIC DRINKS —

(See Spikitdous Liqtjobs.)

ALIENATION —
of lands,
ALIENS —

does not divest lien, 306.

taxation of,

15, 64.

ALLEGIANCE —
(See

Personai. Allegiance.)

ALLOWANCE
for debts

in

—
assessments,

136, 142.

,

436.

371

372.
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ALTERATION —
of bond, discharges sureties, 502.
of asssesments cannot be made without notice, 368, 547.
of tax waiTant does not invalidate previous action, 563.

ALTERING STREETS —
special assessments for, 423.
(See Assessments,

Local.)

AMENDMENTS —
of merely clerical errors, when unnecessary, 334.
of proceedings in court, must be by order of court,
showing of facts necessary, 235.

335.

notice to parties concerned, 235.
counter affidavits, 235, 336.

by ministerial officers, of their own motion,
where the omission

236.

is, merely to make a record, 236.

in New Hampshire by permission of the court,

in
in

236-240.

Massachusetts, 240.
Vermont,

340-343.

in New York,

341.

cannot be made by one who has gone out of office, 341, 343.
cannot be made to prejudice of right of redemption, 243.
what defects cannot be cured by, 343, 343.
of tax deed, only to be made in equity, 343.

of returns, canuot

AMUSEMENTS

be made by officer to whom they are made, 243.

—

taxation for, is not admissible,

92, 93.

taxation of, 30.
taxation under police power, 411.
private, whether taxable, 411.

ANCESTRAL ESTATES —
(See Successions.)

ANNIHILATION

—

taxation may be carried to extent of, 57.
(See

Ekanchisb.)

ANNUAL MEETINGS —

Meetings.)
APPEAL —
(See

to take, sometimes made to depend on list being furnished,
alteration of assessments when tax payer does not take, 268.
officers depriving party of right of, 547.

right

compelling hearing
(See Mandamus,)

'

263-364.

on, 521.

when given by statute, usually the sole remedy for unequal or unjust assessments, 528.
cannot in general be taken to the courts, 528.
are supposed to furnish a complete remedy, 538.

i
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AVPHAl, —

continued.
party failing to avail liimself of, is concluded, 528.

right

to, does not exist unless given by statute, 528.
is not essential if tax is void, 528.

by

a city, from an assessment,

■where

529.

given, certiorari will not

be allowed,

531.

APPELLATE BOARD —
may be compelled by mandamus to proceed to hearing, 521.
action by, is in general conclusive, 529.
when action may be reviewed on certiorari,

534.

APPOINTMENT —
without authority, officer de facto in
(See De Facto Oppicbk.)
of township meetings, etc.,
(See

case of, 185, 186.

Notice.)

APPORTIONMENT OF TAXES —
must be districts for, 103-123.
equality the purpose of, 124-164.
involves the right to make exemptions, 145.
what it consists in, 175.
methods of 175.
specific taxes, 175.
ad valorem taxes, 175.
taxes with reference to special benefits, 175, 176.
general principles of, 177, 178.
by legislature is presumptively just, 179.
is imperative, 180.
burdens levied without, are arbitrary, 180.
diversity in methods of, may be just, 181.
failure to do justice in, does not render levy void, 181.
nor failure in strict enforcement of, 181, 182.
must be confined to the district, 182.
does not admit of invidious exemptions, 182, 183.

in

case

of highways passing through

or into two towns, etc., 106-110,

419, 478.

APPORTIONMENT OF DEBTS —
on division of municipality, may be made by legislature, 176, 177, 479, 481.

APPORTIONMENT OF ASSESSMENTS —
general principles,
by benefits, 449.

447^56.

by foot front, 451-454.
by the acre, 454, 455.
by value of lots, 456.
districts for, 449, 450.
(See Assessments, Local.)
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APPRAISAL —
(See

Valtjatiok.)

APPRAISERS —
(See AssBSsoHS.)

APPROPRIATION —
under eminent domain, how it differs from taxation, 175.
(See Eminbnt Domain.)
unlawful,
(See MlSAPPKOPEIATION'.)

ARBITRARY EXACTIONS —
how they differ from taxes, 2,
levies without apportionment
ARBITRARY POWER —

360.
are, 180.

to tax does not exist, 68.
See

Limitations on the Taxino Power.)

ARBITRARY RULES —
of apportionment, 180, 453,
(See Apportionment.)
ARKANSAS —

454.

exemptions in, 133.
constitutional

ARMY

provisions

to secure equality

of taxation in,

436.

—

taxation for, 73.

Boitnties.)
—
ARREST
after discharge in bankruptcy,
for nonpayment of taxes, 301,
(See

561.
389.

ASSENT —

of owners sometimes required before special assessment can be laid, 455.
of people to the imposition of taxes, 44-48, 178.
in case of local taxation, 474-495.
of municipal corporations to contracts, cannot be dispensed with by
legislature, 483-494.

to payment of illegal taxes,
(See VOLUNTAKT

Payjibnt.)

to illegal taxation,
(Seo

Estoppel.)

ASSESSMENT —
invidious or fraudulent may

be set aside, 157-547.'

cannot be confirmed, 338.
necessity for, 258, 259.

what it is, 258.
from what time it dates,
to be made periodically,
by several assessors,

194.

260.
200, 361.
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continued.
lists for, 261-264.

right

to notice of, 265-268, 547.
meetings for review of, 267.

change of without notice, 268.
personal, how made, 269-272.
only on residents, 269.
and at place of residence, 14, 270.
to trustees,

270, 271.

of partnership property,
principles of, 271, 272.

271.

of corporations, 273.
of railroad property, 274.
what included in " taxable property," 272.
of " certificates of deposit," " debt," " income " and " machinery,"
of stock, 272, 274.
of real property, 275.
seated and unseated lands, 275-277.

what are seated, 276, 277.

how

assessed,

27S.

tracts to be separately valued, 279, 280, 289.
when owner or occupant to be named, 278, 279.
what are separate parcels, 281.
what a sufficient description, 282-286.
valuation, necessity for, 287.
is a judicial act, 288.
legislature cannot make, 288.

how authenticated, 289, 290.
of distinct interests separately,
equalization

288, 289.

of, 290.

evidences of in special cases, 332.
review of on certiorari,
(See

Cebtioraki.)

for the purposes of special levies,

447-452.

by benefits, 448-451.
by other standards, 451, 452.
duplicate,
(See

Duplicate Taxation.)

fraud in,
(See Fraud.)
relief against,
pok Excessive and
(See Remedies
action in making is judicial, 550-552.
ASSESSMENTS, LOCAL —

Illegal

Taxation.)

exemptions from taxation do not apply to, 146-151.
are not taxes in the ordinary sense of that term, 146, 456.
general subject cousidered, 416-473.
'

principles which underlie them,

416.

272.

INDEX.
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continued.

are "based upon supposed benefits, 416, 417.

must be special authority
cases

of law for,

418.

for, 418-428.

court houses and other isublic buildings, 419.
streets and highways, 419, 420.
land for opening streets, 430.

grading

streets, 431.

paving, planking and improving streets, 431, 433.
altering, widening and extending streets, 433.
repaving or repairing streets, 423.
drains, sewers, etc., 433-i37.
culverts, etc., in cities, 435-437.
levees and embankments, 427.
water pipes in streets, 437.

lighting

streets

with

gas, 438.

other special cases, 428.

in point of policy and justice, 438, 439.
principles and provisions, 489-446.
that they take property without due process of law, 439, 430.
that they take property for public use without compensation, 430-4.

objections

to,

objections under constitutional
1.

3.

3. that they violate express constitutional

provisions,

435-444.

in Alabama, Arkansas and California, 436.
in Illinois and Indiana, 487.
in Kansas, Louisiana and Massachusetts, 438.
in Michigan and Minnesota, 443.
in Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio and Oregon, 448.
in Rhode Island and Wisconsin, 444.
objections not sustained b}' the authorities, 444-446.
general principles of apportionment, 444-446.
methods of apportionment, 447-449.
1. by an estimate of benefits, 448.
3. by a standard fixed by the legislature, 448.

fixing the district for assessment, 449^51.
one district for several improvements,

445.

assessments by frontage, 451-454.
is really an assessment by benefits, 454.
assessment by the acre, 454r-456.
assessment by value of lots, 456.
property subject to assessment, 456.
case of railroad property, 456, 457.

of personal property, 457, 453.
of property devoted to special use, 458.
case of public property, 458, 459.
proceedings in levying and collecting, 459.
district is conclusively fixed by legislative authority,
case
case

assessment is conclusive upon benefits, 460.
courts powerless to relieve against hardships,

459.

461, 403.
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ASSESSMENTS, LOCAL — continued.
in case of street occupied by plankroad, etc., 463.
assessment must be limited to cost of work, 463.

proceedings

may be made before work done, 463, 463.
excess in estimate will not defeat, 463.
must be distributed through the district, 463.
must not go outside the district, 464.
may be against the land or against separate interests, 464.
statute

must be strictly followed in making, 464.
precedent must be complied with, 464, 465.

conditions

collection of assessments,

465.

may be as the statute shall prescribe, 465.
by contractor, 466, 467.

by enforcing lien against land, 466, 467.
no defense that work not done according
sale of lands for, 469, 470.
personal liability for assessments, 470-473.
enjoining, when illegal, 540.
(See

to contract, 468, 469.

Injunction.)

review of on certiorari,
(See

535.

Cbrtiobari.)

ASSESSOES —
election of, 359.
enforcing oflBcial duties by, 513-536.
cannot be coerced in the exercise of their judgment, 517, 518.
may be compelled by mandamus to deliver correct copy of roll, 530.
and to put on roll omitted property, 530.
and to perform any ministerial duty, 531.
act

judicially in making

assessment,

joint action by, 194.
not liable for excessive assessment,

550-553.
553.

even though it was made so by including property not taxable, 553.
nor for errors of judgment, 553, 558.
are

liable for exceeding their jurisdiction,

553-555.

as where personal tax is assessed upon nonresident,

553.

or where tax was levied which was never voted, 554.
or an excessive tax, 554.
or one voted for an illegal purpose, 554.
or for neglect of duty in some cases, 554.
whether liable for fraud or malice, 556, 557.

liability of supervisor as, 557,
form of action against, 570.

55.8.

ASSUMPSIT —
action of, for taxes, 300.
against collector to recover illegal taxes paid, 559-565.
against town, county, etc., 56c.
against collector of internal revenue, 564.
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A.SSUMPSIT —

eontinued.
actions against collector of customs, 564, 565.
(See

AcTioH at Law

;

Ebmbdies

for

Excessive and

Illegai,

Taxation.)

ASSUMPTION OF POWEKS —
(See Db Facto Oppiceks ; Jurisdiction.)

ATTORNEY GENERAL —
(See Law Officer of the State.)
ATTORNEYS —
(See

Lawyers.)

AUCTION —
lands to be sold at, 344.

AUCTIONEERStaxation of, 389.

AUDITING BOARDS —
mandamus to compel action by, 515.
may be compelled to hear, and also allow legal demands, 515-517.
reviewing action of, on certiorari, 533.

AUDITING CLAIMS —
is a

judicial

function, 481.

by legislature

against muuioipalities,
against collectors of taxes, 504, 507.

481.

Collector of Taxes.)
AUTHENTICATION —
(See

of assessment, 289, 290.
of tax warrant, 293, 294.
of notices of tax sales, 336.

AUDITOR GENERAL —
may be required to reject illegal taxes, 520.
discretionary action, not reviewable on certiorari, 533.
action of, does not estop the state, 333.

AUTHORITY —
to tax,

strict execution

of, 257.

Taxing Powers.)

(See
to sell must be express, 324.

must be strictly followed, 333-325.
whether special is necessary, 333.
is terminated by payment or tender, 333, 333.
for assessments, must be express, 418.
and be strictly pursued, 418.
to tax, exhausting,

256.

tax, exhausting, 295.
of boards of review, what doe:3 not exhaust, 391.
of collector, defect in, no excuse for not paying over, 498.
to collect

abuse of, by collector, may make him treasurer ab initio, 304, 305.

'
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B.
BANK CHECKS —
taxation of, 22.

BANK OF UNITED STATES —
not taxable by the states, 58.
restraining tax upon, 539.

BANKERS —
taxation of in general, 388, 392, 393.

BANKRUPTCY —
arrest after discharge in, 561.

BANKS —
when tax on shares presumed to exclude tax on bank, 167.
when tax on capital excludes tax on shares, 167.

when tax on stock excludes tax on business,
paying specific tax not taxable on collaterals,
restraints on taxation in charters of, 55.

167.
167.

savings, taxation of, 169, 392, 393.
taxation of, in general, 273, 274, 388, 392, 393.
shares in, are taxable property, 210.
duplicate taxation in cases of, 165-171.
(See CORPOBATIONS.)
national,
(See

National Banks.)

BANKS, NATIONAL —
may be taxed by states, 61.
rules for the taxation of, 394, 395.

BENEFITS —
always flow from taxation, 3.
of taxation, what are, 16, 17, 406, 416.

of local assessments, what are, 416.
failure of in particular case cannot defeat tax,

3.

apportionment by, 176.
sj^ecial assessments must be based upon, 417, 418.
not otherwise valid, 417, 418.
set off of, against damages for land taken,
how estimated, 459-464.

430.

must be governed by market value, 459.
what to be taken into account, 461, 462.
must be limited to the cost, 462,

BENEVOLENCES
distinguished

—
from taxes,

BEQUESTS —
(See Successions.)

3.

463>

INDES.
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BETTERMENTS —
recovery of value of, where title proves defective, 371, 373.
cannot be exempted from taxation without authority of law, 154.

BEVERAGES —
taxation on manufacture and sale of, 390.
taxation in regulation

and restraint of sale of, 404-407, 413.

BIDDER —
who entitled to be

at tax sales, 341, 345.

not the officer who makes sale, 341.
not one whose duty it was to pay taxes, 345-351.
whether adverse claimant may be, 348-351.

BIDDER, HIGHEST —
tax sale must be made to, 344.
tax deed must run to, 344.

BILL IN EQUITY
(See

—

Equity.)

BILL OP RIGHTS —
(See

CoNSTiTTjTioNAii

Principles.)

BILLS OP EXCHANGE —
taxes on, 33.

BLOCKS —
of lots, assessment

of, 381, 383.

BOARDS OP EQUALIZATION —
powers and duties of, 890, 291.
act judicially, 391.

how composed,
are assessors,

291.

391.

election of members of, 291.
action of, not reviewable on certiorari,

534.

of errors of description by, 285.
BOARDS, LOCAL —
decision of, as to amount, etc., of taxlevy, not reviewable
correction

BOARDS OP

on certiorari,

RELIEF —

of Review.)
BOARDS OP REVIEW —
(See BoAEDS

compelling hearing by,
conclusiveness of action

531.
of, 534.

BOARDS OP SUPERVISORS —
may be compelled by mandamus to proceed to hear claims, 515-517.
and to allow the legal claims, 515-517.
and to assess state taxes, 523.

BOATS AND VESSELS —
taxation
(See

of, 370.

Tonnage Duties.)

531.
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BONA FIDE PURCHASERS —
not to be affected by amendments, 239.
purchasers at tax sales are not, 339, 375.
owned out of state not taxable within

it,

BONDS —
15, 16, 169.

taxable in general, 65.
to be taxed where owner resides, 66, 370.
tax on the interest upon, 169.
irreparable

injury in the issue of,

OFFICIAL

BONDS,

549.

—

required to secure performance of public duty, 500.
of collector, not according to statute, may be good at common law, 499.
remedies upon, 500, 504.

BOUNDARIES —
(See

Desckiptioh".)

MILITARY —

BOUNTIES,

taxation for, 74, 09-101.

BOUNTY BONDS —
mandamus to compel taxation for, 525.

BRIDGES —
taxation

for,

94.

Highways.)
BROKERS —
(See

taxation of, 169, 888.

BUILDINGS —
sometimes excluded in taxing lands, 181.
recovery of value of as betterments, 371, 373.
assessment

of, as personalty, 375.

exemption of,
(See

Chhrches.)

BURYING GROUNDS —
exemption of, from taxation, 130.
may be subjected to assessments, 144, 456-458.

BUSINESS —
taxation of, in general, 30, 129.
of nonresidents, taxable where carried on, 44.
admissible, though property required to be taxed
141, 144.

duplicate taxation of, 169.
not admis.siblc to build up monopolies,
general right to tax, 384, 394.
taxation by United States, 484.
methods of, 384, 385.

of privileges, 385, 386, 393.
kinds usually taxed, 387, 393.
construction of powers to tax, 387.

173.

by value, 133, 138,

INDEX.

ENTERPRISES —

BUSINESS

taxation not admissible

in aid

of, 76-80, 89, 90.

BUYERS AT TAX SALES —
wlio may

be, 345-351.

Sales of Lands fob Taxes.)

(See

BY LAW —
effect of failure of corporation
illegal taxation by, 567.

to observe, 534.

c.
CALIFORNIA —
in, 133.

exemptions

provisions to secure equality of taxation in, 436.
do not preclude special assessments, 436.

constitutional

liability

to contractor in, 467.

CALAMITIES —
protection

(And

see

against, 101, 102.

Lbvbbs.)

CANALS —
taxation of, 151.
taxatipn for, 94, 96.
special levy for special benefits from, 490, 491.

CAPITATION TAXES —
levy

of, 18, 73.

can only be assessed on residents, 369.

CARRIAGE OF PROPERTY —
taxes on, 21, 61-63.
when a tax on, is a tax on commerce, 63, 63.

CARRIERS, COMMON —
taxation of, 31, 388.

CARS —
taxation

when

of, 388.

a tax on, is a tax on commerce, 63.

CAVEAT EMPTOR —
rule of, applied

to tax purchasers,

339, 375.

CELEBRATIONS —
taxation for, by government, 93.
towns no general authority to tax for, 93.

CEMETERIES —
exemption

of, from taxation, 130.

(Sec EXEilPTIONS.)
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CEMETEEIES — continued.
liable for special

147, 458.

assessments,

CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT —
what are, 273.

CERTIFICATE OF SALE —
■what

it

is, 352.

is evidence of sale, but not conclusive, 352.
does not convey title, 352, 353.
recording, to cut off redemption, 366.
compelling delivery to purchaser, 522.

CERTIFICATES, OFFICIAL —
of, 195.

conclusiveness

liability of otBcers for false,
to assessment,
protection

196.

289, 290, 563.

of officer by,

554, 557.

CERTIORARI —
may be made the exclusive remedy for illegal or irregular taxation, 530.
forbidding other remedies, 234.
general nature of the writ, 530
is not of right,
will not be allowed where likely to do serious mischief, 531.

be dismissed if improvidently issued, 531.
dismissing where defect has been cured, 333.
political action not reviewable on, 533.
not usually awarded where an appeal is given,

will

533.

action not reviewable on, 533.

discretionary
proper office of, to inquire, iut-e- jurisdiction, 533.
will not be issued to collector, 533.
nor in case of merely unequal assessments, 533.
nor for mere errors or Irregularities, 533.
assessments erroneous in point of law reviewable

on, 533.

and cases where mandatory statutes are disregarded, 533.
and cases of erroneous action by municipalities in laying assessments,

only

534.

the record can be reviewed on, 534.

CHANCERY —
(See

Equity

;

Injunction

;

Remedies pok Excessive and Ille&aIi

Taxation.)

CHATTELS —
state, 14, 42.

unless having an actual situs within

it,

of nonresident, not taxable in

15.

taxed to owner at his place of domicile, 269.
property in, accompanies owner wherever he goes, 270.
held by trustee, where taxed, 271.

of partnership, where taxed, 271.
of in bulli, and by separate articles,

ta.xation

273.

INDEX.
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cordinued.

cUstrainiug- for taxes, 301-304.
objections to this process, 302.
it,

taking property of another upon
803, 303.
municipal corporation cannot authorize, witliout special authority,
303.

enjoining illegal
(See

taxes upon,

Injunction.)

levy upon, presumptive

satisfaction

of tax,

543, 544.

CHARITABLE SOCIETIES —
exemption of, from taxation, 150.
are subject to special assessments,

458.

—

CHARITY

taxation in aid of, 88, 89, 93.

CHARTERS —
are contracts between the state and the corporators,

55.
state, 53, 55, 56.

IDresumption against exemption, 54, 373.
stipulation subject to legislative action where I'ight to amend or repeal
reserved, 55, 56.

of exemptions from taxation by,

strict construction

grant of, may be subject to conditions

150-153,

373.

as to taxation, 44.

CHARTERS, MUNICIPAL —
are not contracts, 56.

MtnsiciPAL Cokpoiiations.)
CHURCH PROPERTY —
(See

exemption of, from taxation, 130, 143, 143.

liable for special

assessments,

147, 458.

CITIES AND VILLAGES —
(See

Municipal Corpokations.)

CITIZENS —

to be abridged in taxation, 64.
does abridge, 64.
taxation
unequal
nonresident traders, 64
to
doctrine applied

privileges of, not

different methods of procedure admissible

in

case

(See NONRBSIDENT.)
are not, 64, 65.

corporations

CITY ORDINANCE —
By Law.)
WAR —

(See

CIVIL

pendency of, does not enlarge right to redeem, 364.

CLAIM OF TITLE —
what is, 383, 383.
Adyekse Possession.)
(See
38

of nonresidents,

64.

is

stipulation in, for exemption- from taxation binding on
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CLAIMS —
against municipalities, auditing of, 479, 481.

compelling recognition

of, 91.

allowance of, by mindamus,
(See Mandamus.)
cases of allowance,

certiorari in

533.

CLASSIFICATION —
of taxes, 5.
of lands as
of lands in

CLERGYMEN

seated and unseated, 275-377.
case

of levee assessments,

454-457.

—

taxation of, 389.

CLERICAL ERRORS —
may be disregarded, 234, 563.
(See Amendmbnts.)

CLOUD UPON
■what

TITLE —

constitutes, in taxes, 543.

whether a void tax is, 543, 543.
relief in equity in case of, 543.
illegality alone no ground of relief,
(See Eqihty.)

544.

COERCION —
(See

VoLDNTAET Patmbnt.)

COLLECTION

OP SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS -

must be made as statute

provides, 465.

by enforcing a lien, 466, 467.
by the contractor, 466, 467.
from special fund, 466, 467.
defenses to, 468, 469.
by sale of lands, 469, 470.
by proceedings against the owner, 470-478.

COLLECTION

OF TAXES —

summary process for, 38, 39, 398.
by intruders, estoppel in case of, 191, 192, 498.
warrant for, 393.
must comply with statute, 293.
must be properly directed, 393.
effect of errors in, 293, 294.
diiferent for different taxes, 294.
delivery of, 295.
exhausting authority under, 295.
excess in, makes void, 296, 297.
direct and indirect methods of, 398, 399.
by suit, 300.
by arrest of person taxed, SOL

INDEX.
COLLECTIOjS!

of taxes-

695

mitinwd.

by distress of goods, 301-304.
by detention of goods, etc., 305.

by sale of lands, 305-309.
return of no goods, etc., as a condition
by imposition of penalties, 309-315.
by forfeiture of property taxed, 315-319.
(See

307.

FoRFEiTUSES.)

by conditions to the exercise of a right, 319, 320.

through municipalities, 331.
by stamps, 320.
in license fees, 385, 386, 414.
of special assessments, 465-473.
by state from the collector, 433-511.
enjoining, not in general admissible,
may be

if

irreparable

536.

injury threatened,

(See Injunction.)
resisting, when proper, 558.

COLLECTOR

539.

OF CUSTOMS —

liability of, for exacting illegal duties,

564, 565.

COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE —
liability of, for illegal collections, 564.
COLLECTOR
■warrant of,

OF TAXES—
for collection,

a trespasser

if

292.

he acts without, 292.

direction of, 293.
should follow statutory form, 293.
what defects in, do not vitiate, 293, 294.
delivery of, 295.
exhausting authority in issuing, 295.
effect of blending taxes in, 395.
demand by, before levying distress, 304.
notice by of, distress and sale, 304.
when may become trespasser ab initio, 304, 305, 563, 564.
return by, of tax uncollected, 307, 308, 359.
remedies of state against, 496.
suit at the common law, 497.
defect of authority no defense to, 497, 498.
suit in case, for neglect of duty, 499.
bond of, valid though not in statutory form, 499.

liability

upon, 499, 500.

liable on, though tax illegal, 500.
may refuse to collect illegal tax, 500, 501.
must receive money only, 501.
must not speculate in his oiEce, 501.
liable for failure to keep moneys safely, 501.
must account without demand, 501.
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COLLECTOR OF TAXES—

continued.

sureties of, only liable on their bond, 501, 503.
alteration in bond discharges, 502.
■whether extension of time to principal does, 502, 503.
not released by repeal of lav/ under which the bond was given, 503.
concluding, by auditor's statement of account, 504-506.
summary remedies against, 504.
judgment on notice, 504, 505.
distress warrant, 506.
statute

for, must be strictly complied with, 507.

principles governing,
right to a hearing on,

507, 508, 510, 511.
508, 509.

must be proper evidence of right to, 509.
not entitled to jury trial of delinquency, 507.
summary removal of, 508.

compelling issue of distress warrant against, 521.
is protected by his process if fair on its face, 559.
but not against his own illegalities, 561.
what is process fair on its face, 562.
not where tax appears to be illegal, 562.
nor where process issued by wrong oiflcer, 562..
the protection does not give him title, 563.
not liable where taxes actually paid over, 563.
proper form of action against, 563.

COLLECTOR'S BOND —
is for security of the public only, 503.
op Taxes.)
(See CoLiiECTOK

COLLECTOR'S WARRANT —
(See CoLLECTOK

OF

Taxes.)

COLOR OF LAW —
taxes

collected

by and paid over, canuot be recovered back from col-

lector, 563.

COLOR OF TITLE —
what is, 382-3.

Adverse Possession.)
COLORABLE TAXATION —
(See

is void, 33,

34, 486.

COMBINATIONS —
of bidders

at tax sales, are fraudulent,

COMMERCE, TAXES ON —
on exports, 24.
on imports, 24.
by states, what forbidden, 61.
on imports and exi^orts, 61.
on tonnage, 61.
on trade with Indian tribes, 62.

239, 240.

INDEX.

_

COMMERCE, TAXES ON — contimed.
by states, on importers as such, 63, 63.
on freight passing from state to state, 63.
on masters of vessels, 64.
what not a tax upon, 63, 64.
duties on for protection, 10, 74.

COMMISSION DEALERS —
taxation of, 389.

COMMISSIONERS —
for maliing special assessments,
certiorari to, 535.

448-451.

COMMON BURDENS —
should

be sustained by common contributions,

153.

(See Apportionment.)
COMMON CARRIERS —

taxes on business of, 21, 383.
when they become taxes on commerce, 61-63.

COMMON COUNCIL —
certiorari to, 534.
(See MuNiciPAi, Cokpohations.)
COMMON LAW —
protection
(See

of in tax

cases, 36-40.

Constitutional Pkinciples.)

COMMUTING —
for taxes, admissible,

173.

cases of, 137, 173.

COMPENSATION —
is,

(See

2,

for taxation, what
14, 16, 406, 416.
for special assessments are benetits received, 416-418.
in case of exercise of eminent domain, 430-434.
for loss by riots.
Riots.)

COMMON LAW REMEDIES —
of

state against
(See

collector of

Collector of Taxes.)

to compel performance
(See

taxes, 497.

of official duty under tax laws,

513-526.

Mandamus.)

general right to, in tax cases, 36-40, 538.

COMPETITION —
at tax sale must be allowed,

COMPLAINTS —
Remedies
COMPULSION —
(See

for

239, 240.

Excessive

and

Illegal Taxation.)

what payments are deemed to be made under.
(See

Voluntary Payments.)
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TAXATION —

(See Mandamus.)

COMPULSORY LOCAL TAXATION —
general right of people to vote taxes they are to pay, 474.
state must grant powers to tax, 474, 475.

but

and may modifj^ them at -will, 474.
to tax, value of, 475..
meaning and extent of, 475.

local power

is not inherent,

475.

is not discretionary in matters of state concern, 475.
what are matters of state concern, 476.

of order, 476.
of
support
courts, erection of court houses, etc., 477.
construction and repair of highways, 478.
maintenance of schools, etc., 478.
payment of corporate debts, 479.
apportionment of debts, elc, when municipality is divided,
making compensation for destruction by rioters, 480.
indemnifying officers, 480.
whether the legislature may audit claims against mnnicipalities,
municipal corporations, two fold nature of, 482.
subjection of, to state in their political capacity, 483.
corporate rights in their private capacity, 482, 483.
judicial decisions thereon, 483-486, 489, 494.
judicial decisions questioning, 486-493.
preservation

conclusion,

CONCLUSIVENESS

Eminent

481.

493-495.

—

ol assessment on parties taxed in
(See Judgment.)
CONDEMNING LANDS —
(See

479, 481

case

of special assessments,

Domain.)

CONDITIONS —
imposed on power to tax must be observed, 254, 255.
imposed to compel payment of taxes, 319, 320.
to render tax chargeable, must be observed, 215.

must be complied with, 364, 365.
cannot be added to by officer or purchaser, 369.
imposed on recovery of land sold for taxes, 371-375.
to redemption,

imposed on the privilege of doing business, 385, 386.
to special assessments,
must be observed, 464.

CONFIRMATION —
of defective proceedings,
(See CuKATivE Laws.)
of tax sale, who may oppose,

360.

CONFLICTING CLAIMS—
bills of interpleader

in

cases of, 547.

449, 450.

INDEX.
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CONGEESStaxation by,

FiajERAL Taxation.)
CONSENT —
(See

cannot give jurisdiction to tax, 371.
cannot pass title to land, 337.
(See

Estoppel.)

CONSIDERATION —

a,

is,

for taxation, what
16, 17, 406, 416.
for special assessments, 417, 418, 456, 471-473.
state may relinquish right to tax for
52-56.
gifts to public purposes may support taxation,

101.

but not gifts to private purposes, 491.

CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATES —
provisions in, regarding introduction of revenue bills, 33.
may restrain legislative powers of taxation, 244, 251.
municipal taxation subject to, 251.
protection of minorities by, 251, 252.
admit of summary remedies to collect taxes, 398, 303.
of recovery of betterments, 371, 373.
of summary remedies against collectors of taxes, 504-511.
provisions in to secure equality in taxation, 132-144.
right to levy special assessments how affected by, 136-146.
provisions in, affecting local assessments, 436-446.
are framed in contemplation of existence of local powers, 474.
provisions in for taking land for private ways, 76.
provisions for the taxation of legal process in certain, 23.
laws which violate spirit of, not necessarily void, 488.
assume the existence of fundamental principles, 41.
CONSTITUTION OF UNITED STATES —
forbids states passing laws which impair obligations
instances of such laws, 52-56, 65.

of contracts,

53.

stipulations by states not to tax, sometimes contracts, 53-56.
charters of private corporations are contracts under, 55.
forbids state imposts, or duties on imports and exports, 61,
what are exports under this provision, 61.
forbids duty of tonnage by states without consent of congress, 61.
what are duties of tonnage, 61, 63.
state taxes on foreign and interstate commerce are in violation of,

63.

but not taxes on property as such, 63.
taxes on importers are, 62, 63.
taxes on freight, when are, 63.
taxes on cars and vessels, when are, 63.

violated by taxes which abridge
zen

s,

is

taxes on immigrants, are, 63.
Illustrations of what are not, 68, 64.
64, 65.

the privilege and immunities

of citi-
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CONSTITUTION OF TXITED STATES — eontinued.
of federal taxation of the state, or its agencies, 58.
or of state taxation of the agencies of the federal goveinment, 57.
illustrations of what are government agencies, 57-61.
when a tax on passengers out of the state is in violation of, 59.
requires duties, imijorts and excises to be uniform throughout the United
does not admit

States, 73.

provision in, regarding direct
forbids duties on exports, 78.
limitations in, are applicable
CONSTITUTIO^N'AL

taxes, 73.
to

local taxation,

250, 251.

PKINCIPLES —

that taxation and protection are reciprocal,
meaning of, 16, 406.
that taxation and representation

14.

go together, 44.

original meaning of the maxim, 44.
meaning of in America, 44r-48.
can only be understood in territorial

sense, 46.

does not entitle all persons taxed to suffrage, 46.

application of

to territories

and District of Columbia,

47, 48.

that life, libertj' and property are protected by the law of the land, 36-39.
tliis not a guaranty of judicial proceedings, 37.
is not violated by healing statutes, 2^3-232.
exceptions, 227-329.
admits of distress for taxes, 302, 303.
whether legislative forfeitures violate, 316-319.
whether it admits of imposition of penalties without judicial hearing, 313-315.
not violated by enforcing any valid tax, 425.
protection of municipal property, 494.
not admissible under, 173, 403.

*

monopolies

on basis of benefits not obnoxious to, 429-431.
summary process against collectors and their sureties, admissible under,
special assessments
504-511.

influence of custom in understanding of, 39.
giving jury trial, not applicable in tax cases, 36-40, 507.
(See

JuKY Tkial.)

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT —
hearing is matter of, 229, 365-268.
local government a matter of, 474-495.

CONSTRUCTION —
of contracts not to tax must be strict, 53.
of exemptions must be strict, 54, 146.
effect of this in case of special assessments on real property,
instances of construction of exemptions, 148, 149.
application in case of corporations, 149-151.
of township powers

to tax,

not of celebrations,

will

93, 94.

147.

admit of indemnifying officers, 91.

INDEX.
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CONSTRUCTIOJSr — continued.
of township powers to tax, general observations upon,
of local powers to tax generally, 209-211, 217.

98, 99.

reasons why this should be strict, 209.
the rule applied in case of assessments, 418.
rule where apparently modilied or affected by general statutes, 310,
231, 323, 255, 236.

of constitutional provisions regarding

equality and uniformity in taxa-

tion, 1C2-144.

in Arkansas and California, 132.
in Georgia and Illinois, 133-137.
in Indiana, 137.
in Iowa and Louisiana, 138.
in Maryland, 139.
in Massachusetts and Jlichigau, 140.
in Minnesota and Missouri, 141.
in Ohio, 142, 143.
in Tennessee, 143.
in Virginia and Wisconsin, 144.
rules of, in construing statutes, 197.
of revenue laws, 199-208.
whether to be strict or not, 200.

views of Mr. Dwarris, 200, 208.
citations from English reports, 201.
from American reports, 202-207.
penal provisions in. 308, 263.
what provisions to be held mandatory, 312-219.
what to be considered only directory, 219, 220.
of remedial laws, 204, 205.
of laws permitting redemption, to be liberal, 3G3.
of provisions apparently retrospective, 221, 233.
of powers to tax business, 387.
of power to levy license fees, 396-398.
where it warrants the levy of fees for revenue, 408.
influence of custom upon, in case of powers to tax, 396,
in case of town votes, 347.
(See CnsTOM.)

CONSTRUCTIVE

FRAUD —

whether illegal taxation is, 539.

in tax purchases,
CojiBiNATiONS
(See

;

Bidder.)

CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION —
Possession.)
CONSUMPTION —
(See

indirect taxes on,
(See Indirect Taxes.)
of luxuries, taxation of, 23.

397.

LAW OF TAXATION.

602

CONTRACTOK —
collection of
fraud of,

will

by, 466, 467.
not defeat assessment where work is accepfGd, 468, 469.

assessments

CONTRACT —
not to tax, states may make, 52-56.
charters of private incorporation are, 55.
but not municipal charters, 56.
exemptions from taxation from motives of state policy are not, 54.

Exemptions.)
obligation of, not to be violated in taxation,
by corporations ultra mres,
(See

(See

65.

Ultea Virbs.)

tax laws are not, and state may repeal, 253, 253.
tax purchases are, 370.
power of legislature
state cannot make,

over redemption

for municipalities,

from, 869, 370.

483-494.

taxation of money contracts,
(See Bonds, Ceedits.)

in fraud of revenue laws,

are

illegal,

299.

CORPORATIONS —
charters of are contracts, 55.
restrictions on taxation in, are binding, 55, 65.
property of, is represented by stock, 164.
exemptions of, from taxation, 55, 150-153.
instances of special or partial exemptions, 148, 151, 153.
duplicate taxation in case of, 166-171, 571.
whether to be classed as "persons," etc., 273.
taxation of in general, 15, 16, 25, 58, 60.
questions of equality in, 139.
valuation of the franchise, 135-137.
effect of consolidation

on, 151.

capital and shares may both be taxed, 164, 274.
effect upon this of the presumption against duplicate taxation, 166,
methods of, are in legislative discretion, 373.
may be on franchise, capital, shares, or taxable property, 273.

171.

other methods admissible, 373, 274.
case of railroad property, 373, 274.
"
meaning of stock " in tax law, 274.
shares should be taxed at owner's domicile, 44.
general methods of taxing, 392, 393.

on the franchise, 393.
on the property by valuation,
on the capital stock, 393.

393, 571.

on the business done, 273, 274, 393.
on dividends, profits or receipts, 137, 138, 221, 393.
specific tax cannot be levied on, under a power to ttix " taxable property," 310.

INDEX.

603

CORPORA.TIONS — continued.
general notice of taxation of, 267.
recovery by for excessive taxes, 571.
(See

Chaktbks ; Franchises

CORPORATION

;

National Banks.)

OFFICERS —

may be compelled by mandamus to perform duties under tax laws, 523.
(See Chaktek ; Franchises
CORRECTIONS —

;

National Banes.)

by judicial action, 233, 234.

Amendments ; Ccrative Laws ; Reassessments.)
—
COSTS
recovery of, in suits for illegal taxes paid, 568, 570, 571.
COUNTIES —
(See

apportionment of debts, etc., on division of, 176.
may be made debtors for state taxes, 331.
bids by, at tax sale's, 351.

liability

of, for illegal taxes, 565.
Remedies
for Illegal and Unjust Taxation.)
(See
COUNTY BUILDINGS —
local taxation for, 115, 419, 477.
COUNTY BOARDS —

(See

Boards of Equalization

;

Boards

of Review.)

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS —
(See Boards of Review.)
COUNTY TREASURER —
default of, county to respond for, 321.
may be compelled to issue distress warrant against collector, 521.
cannot question an assessment as unjust, 521.

COUNTY TRUSTEE —
compelling levy of tax by,

522.

COURT HOUSE —
special tax on county town foi-, 115, 419.
municipalities may be compelled to tax for, 477.

COURTS —
support of, municipalities may be compelled
(See

to tax for, 477.

Judiciary.)

COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES —

have limited jurisdiction in matters of state taxation, 535, 526.
mandamus by, to compel payment of tlieir judgments, 525.
taxation by commissioners

appointed by, 526.

CREDIT —
not to be given at tax sales, 344.

CREDITS —
are property, 159.
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continued.
taxation of, 15, 65, 134, 270.
taxation of, in liands of agent, 270.
(See Bonds.)

wlien secured by mortgage,
(See MOKTGAGE.)

CULVERTS —
special asse.ss^icnts for, 425-437.

CUMULATIVE TAXES —

Duplicate Taxation.)
CURATIVE LAWS —
(See

healing defects in tax proceedings by, 223-232.
cannot establish conclusive rules of evidence, 223.
must not take the form of legislative mandates, 224.
may be special acts, 225.

limitation upon
■what

the right to pass such, 225-226.
defects cannot be cured by, 227-229.

may be prospective, 230.
may be made applicable to pending suits, 231.
but not to cases passed into judgment, 231.
may provide for reassessment,
(See

232.

Judicial Corkections.)

CURB STONES —
for, 423.

assessment

(See Assessments,

Local.)

CURTESY —
tenant in, may redeem, 366.

CUSTODIAN —
(See Interpeadek.)
CUSTOM —
of power to tax, 397.
in
effect
determining what are public purposes, 80.
influence of, in construction of public powers, 39.
to be considered in construing town votes, 347.
etiect on construction

CUSTOMS DUTIES —
what are,

3.

levied by the United States, 24, 384.
liability of collector of, 564, 565.

1).
DAMAGES —
cannot be set ofl against assessment, 420.
by rioters, towns, etc., may be compelled to pay, 480.
to which one is entitled, not taxable as a debt until definitely fixed, 272.
by local improvements,
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DAMAGES —

continued.
assessment of, is a judicial act, 551.
party making, not personally liable for error in, 551.
recovery of, in actions against collector, etc., 570.

towns, etc., not liable for, in case of illegal action
by officers, 570
whether this rule applies under special charters, 570, 371.

DAMS —

for water power, taking land for, under right of eminent domain,
DEBT, PUBLIC —
taxation for payment of, 102.
unlawful engagement does not create, 102.
of municipalities, state may compel payment of,
including moral obligations, 479, 480.

77.

479.

not to be audited by the state, 481.
not to be created by the state, 483^95.
action in creating unlawfully, not a private wrong, 548.
enjoining, on application of taxpayers, 548.

failure

to provide

for, cannot be remedied

by means of the writ of

quo warranto, 575.

of the United

States,

not taxable, 50.

DEBTS —
taxes are not, 13.
allowance for in assessment, 136, 143.
of municipalities, compulsory taxation for,
(See

Debt, Public.)

taxation of,
(See

Ceedits;

MoRTaAOE.)

DECEASED PERSONS —
estates of, where taxable. 270.

assessment of to widow and heirs, 278.
assessment to, is no debt against administrator,

DECISIONS
(See

Discretionary Action

DEDICATION
of

801.

—
;

Judgments.)

—
opening at expense of owners, 421.

streets, authorizes

DEED —
Tax Deed.)
DE FACTO GOVERNMENTS —
(See

Alienation

;

may levy taxes, 4,

DE FACTO OFFICERS —
who

are, 185.

action of, how far binding, 187-191.
protection of, 188, 189.

questioning title

of, 187-189.

that taxes are collected by, is no ground for recovering them back, 570.
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DE FACTO OFFlCEHa —

continued.
collector, cannot defend against an accounting
title, 191, 193, 498.
(See

lay showing

defect

in his

Officers.)

DEFAULT —
that one is in, is

determination

judicial

action, 550.

(See FOEFEITDKBS.)
must be, before distress levied, 304.

or before land can be sold, 323, 333.

in payment of municipal debts,

Debt, Public.)
DEFAULTING COLLECTOB —
(See

suits against, at common law, 497-499.
suits on bond of, 499-504.
summary remedies against, 504r-511.
(See

Collector of Taxes.)

DEFECTS —
in title of
(See

de

facto officer, eflfect of, 187-191, 498.

Officers.)

in tax proceedings which render them void on their face, prevent their
being a cloud on the title, 542-544.
in process, what will prevent it being fair on its face, 562.
(See Fair on its Face.)
DEFENSE —
of collector under his process,
(See Process.)
to illegal taxes,
(See Kemedies of Excessive and

DEFICIENCY

Illegal

Taxation.)

—

may be provided for by tax, 548.
occasioned by misappropriation,
no private right of action for such wrong, 573.

DEFINITION —
of

taxes,

1.

tax legislation, 1.
of taxable property, 130, 373.
(Tf

of
of
of
ol
of
of
of
of
of
of
of

capital, 150, 151.
duplicate taxation, 164.

" actual value " of capital stock,
office, 184.

officer, 184.
officer (Ze/arto, 185.
officer dejure, 185.
revenue laws, 199.
directory statutes, 313-215.
mandatory statutes, 313-215.
assessment,

258.

165.

INDEX.

607

DEFINITIOK

— continued.
of certificate of deposit, 373.
of income, 273.
of "seated, " resident " and " occupied " lands,
of levy, 298.
of color of title, 383.
of claim of title, 382, 383.
of license, 406, 407.
of "bounding or abutting," 453.
of " adjoining," 453.
of " in front," 452.
of cloud on title, 542.
of direct taxes, 5.
of law of the land, 37-38.
DE JURE OFFICERS —

276.

who are, 185.
from officers

distinguished

de

facto, 185.

Opficbks.)

(See

DELAY —
in taking objections promptly, reason for denying a certiorari, 530, 531.
in case of irregular organization of school district, may preclude objections, 530, 549.

in doing

the worli for which tax is levied, no defense
of collector in selling goods distrained, effect of, 564.
(See

to the tax, 540.

Estoppel.)

DELEGATION —
of power to tax cannot be made to the judiciary, 33,
nor to any subordinate authority, 48-51.
questions affecting amount of taxes may be referred,

34.
49, 50.

power to decide upon licences may be granted, 49, 413.
to municipal corporations, of power to tax, admissible, 51-53.
(See

Assessments, Local

DELINQITENCT

;

Compulsoet Local Taxation.)

—

must exist to authorize sale of goods for taxes, 304.
and before the power to sell laud attaches, 332, 323.

in

case

of highway labor, determination
TAXES —

DELINQUENT

distress and sale for, 301-304.
(See

DisTEEss.)

sale of lands for, 305-309.
(See Sales of Lands foe Taxes.)
forfeiture of property for,
(See

FOEFEITUEE.)

DEMAND —
for

taxes, before suit, 301.

before distress, 304.
before sale, 358.

of, 550.

LAW OF TASATIOIS'.

COS

532.

it

for jury, the proper remedy where party entitled to
for tux, when
amounts to compulsion, 571.
when necessary to entitle party to interest, 571.

it,

DEMAND — continued.

DEilANDS —
;

Ckedits

Debts.)

;

Bonds

(See

DE MINIMIS LEX NON CURAT —
maxim, application

of, to excessive taxes, 29(5, 397.

what

is

DEPOSIT —
certificate of, 273.
is

taxation in respect of, 3U4.
held invalid, 165.
what tax on,

no defense to

DESCRIPTIONS

a

is

DEPRECIATION OF PROPERTY —
tax, 540.

OF LAND —

separate, must be separately assessed, 279-283, 287.
if grouped, the assessment void, 279.

in

assessment,

what

is

what are separate, 281, 283.
must be separately sold, 341, 343.
sufficient, 382.

correction of by county board, 385.

it

must identify land, 282.
must not be calculated to mislead owner, 282, 283.
would not mislead in party's own conveyance,
not enough that
384.

result of the cases, 385, 280.
instances of defective, 286, 387.
must not be divided in making sale, 383.
is

in notice of sale, what sufficient, 336, 337.
if defective in tax roll, tax void, 558.

DESTITUTION —
taxation for relief of,

Chakity.)
DESTRUCTION —
(See

taxation may be carried to extent of, 57.
taxation for the purposes of, 10, 403.

of franchise by taxation may
DIFFICULTIES —
in enforcement of tax laws,

be enjoined,

539.

513.

DILATORY PROCEEDINGS —
statutes to prevent in tax cases, 507, 508, 573, 573.

DIRECT TAXES —

how laid by the United States, 78,

142.

5.

5.

what the term means,
meaning of, as used in the federal constitution,

283,
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DIRECTORY STATUTES —
what are, 212-215.
instances of, 219, 220,
(See CONSTEUCTION.)

DISABILITY —
redemption

in

case of, 364, 365,

DISASTERS —
(See Calamities.)

DISCHARGE —
in bankruptcy of person taxed, does not render officer liable for arresting
liim, 561.
of lands illegally taxed, 520, 574.
(See Abatement ; Makdamus.)
of tax by payment,
(See Patmbnt.)
of lien by tender,
(See

Tender.)

of sureties by change in their obligation,
(See

Sureties.)

of tax by levy on goods, 543, 544.
of lands from tax sales by redemption,
(See Redemption.)
of municipal obligations by compulsory taxation,
Compulsory Local Taxation ; Mandamus.)
(See

DISCOUNTS —
discriminations in making, may be enjoined, 540.
payments made to obtain, are deemed voluntary, 568.

—

DISCOURAGEMENT

of trades or occupations

in taxation,

(See Police Power.)
DISCRETIONARY ACTION —

cannot be reviewed on certiorari,
instances of

532.

532.

cannot be enjoined, 540.
not render the officer personally

will

liable,

Judicial Oppicer.)

(See
not be controlled

will

on mandamus,

(See Mandamus.)

DISCRETIONARY POWERS —

not to be interfered with, 157, 514-525.
(See

Mandamus.)

effect of fraud upon exercise of, 157.
liability to abuse, no argument against, 212.
are vested

in

assessors,

550-553.

DISCRETIONARY WRITS —
(See

Cbrtiokaki;
30

Mandamus.)

550.
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DISCRIMINATIONS —
in duties, sometimes made for purposes of protection,
against articles of luxury, 23, 25.
unavoidable in taxation, 128, 130.

10, 24, 25.

taxes not void for, 129.

in taxation of business,
what inadmissible,

138, 139.

158, 179.

between real and personal property in special assessments, 456.
against undesirable occupations, 396.
(See

Police Powbb.)

unlawful, may

be enjoined, 540.
between residents and nonresidents, not allowed in taxation, 64,
in retrospective taxation, 226.

65, 158.

DISMISSAL OF WRIT —
(See Cbetioraki.)
DISTRESS —
taxation for relief of,
(See

Charity.)

DISTRESS OF GOODS —
legal warrant for, 301, 302.
is a summary remedy, 302.
founded on long practice, 302.
leaves party his common law remedy, 303.
common law remedies sometimes taken away in case of, 302.
levy of on goods of another, 302, 303.
demand before, 304.
statutes regarding notice to be strictly complied with, 304.
when action in, renders officer trespasser ab intio, 304,305, 563, 564.
certiorari may be brought though tax has been collected by, 584.
what defects in process render collector liable, 562.
cannot generally be enjoined, 538.
(See

Injunction.)

when threat of, amounts to compulDion, 568, 569.
replevin in case of, 302, 572.

DISTRESS WARRANT —
against collector of taxes,

(See Collector of Taxes.)
compelling issue of by mandamus,
DISTRIBUTIONS —

521.

(See Successions.)

DISTRICTS —
necessity for in case of taxation, 104, 176.
object of the tax must sometimes determine, 104.

for road taxes., 108, 109.
for local taxes generally, 109.
in case of special improvements,

110.
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continued.

miist be established by legislative authority, 110, 111.
judicial tribunals cannot control establishment of, 111, 119.
legislative methods of establishing, 112, 113.

diversity in,

113, 114.

for public buildings, 114-117.
for improvement of streets, 117, 118.
in case of general city taxes, 118, 119.
taxation must be for purposes of, 104-108.
taxation beyond limits of, not admissible, 131-133,
exemptions of property in, 133, 135.
overlying,

169.

(See ExKMPTiOHS.)
apportionment must be uniform within, 180.
diflerent, may be differently taxed, 172.

diflferent methods of collection in, 181.

for levee taxes, 437.
for local improvements

generally,

Local.)
DISTRICTS FOR SCHOOLS —
(See School Distkicts.)
DIVERSITY —
(See A.SSESSMBNTS,

of taxes,
(See Taxes.)
of taxation in districts, 173.
in methods of collection, 181.
in case of residents and nonresidents,
(See NONKESIDENTS.)

DIVIDENDS —
taxes on, 32, 170, 310, 272.
as a measure for taxation, 171.
hovr evidence of, may be required, 523.
tax on, cannot be disputed by creditors on the ground that they should
not have been declared, 572.

DIVISION —
of
of
of
DOGS

parcels of land in tax sales, 383.
municipalities, apportionment of debts and property on, 479, 481.
powers of government, 33.

—

taxation of, for revenue, 21.

for regulation,

412.

DOLLAR MARK —
of in assessment, effect of, 289.
omission of in judgment is fatal, 389.
DOMAIN —
omission

(See

Eminent Domain.)

public,
(See

Public Lands.)
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DOMICILE —
right

to tax when dependent upon, 42-44.
residents must be taxed at place of, 369-272.

exceptions in case of tangible proi^erty, 14.
and of located business, 270, 271.
of trustee, determines place of taxation of the trust, 371.
what constitutes, 269.
(See

Nonresidents.)

DOUBLE TAXATION —
one complaining of, must show that he has paid once, 541.

Duplicate Taxation.)
DOWRESS —
(See

right of,
DRAINS —

to redeem, 366.

taxation for, to protect the public health, 101.
special assessments for, 423, 434.
(See Assessments, Local.)
■whether health a necessary consideration

in

case of, 424.

special beneiits from, may be made the basis of assessment,
for purpose of reclaiming large tracts of land, 402, 434.

423, 424.

assessments for, under the police power, 402.
cannot be made by taxation for private benefit solely, 434.
-instances of special assessments for, 423.
assessors must meet to make, 195.

illegal, cannot

be enforced, 235.

estoppel against disputing benefit of, 574.

DRAINAGE —
(See

Drains.)

DRAYMEN —
taxation of, 391.

DUE PROCESS OF LAW —
(See Law of the Land.)

DUPLICATE —
(See

Collector's Warrant.)

PUPLICATE TAXATION —
results from taxation of personalty, 28.
iropossibility of avoiding in some cases, 158, 161.
indirect taxation results in, 159.
sometimes
it,

taxation of corporation and its stockliolders
taxation of property and the debt owed for

is,

■

159.

159.

a

is

it

taxation of mortgage and the property
covers, 159.
not
injustice of,
legal question, 160.
not necessarily invalid, 160.
tax on sales which reaches property twice, 160.
decisions upon the validity of such taxation, 161-163.
if the same burden reaches twice the same subject,

is invalid

164.

INDEX.

613

DISTRICT TAXATION —

it,

continued.
taxation of a corporation and its franchise is not, 165, 170.
revenue statutes are to be construed so as to prevent, 165.
instances in which this rule has been applied, 166-168.
instances which have been held not within
168-170.
is

instances of special corporation taxes, 171.
tax on merchant's stock and his business
not, 389.
meaning of the term,
upon imports, 24.

C.

DUTIES —

upon exports, 24.

for what purposes levied, 24, 25.
are required to be uniform, 73.
frauds in the collection of, 309-313.
contracts in fraud of, 299.
illegal collection of,
(See CoLLECTOK

OF Customs.)

DUTY —
16, 17, 406, 416.

7.

(See Apportionment.)
of the government in laying and collecting taxes,
ofi&cial, how performance of compelled, 513-536.

6,

6.

to pay taxes, the correlative to protection,
how this should be apportioned,

(See Mandamus.)
of collector, how performance of secured,

(See Collector of Taxes.)
of asgessor to give notice, whether neglect of will render him liable, 554,
of municipality to paj' judgments, etc., maybe compelled by mandamus.
624^526.

or by compulsory taxation by state,
(See

Compulsory

Local Taxation.)

of municipality to levy water rates, cannot be coerced on quo warranto,
575.

E.
EDUCATION —

a

proper purpose for taxation, 83, 84.
secular, taxation for, 84-88.
extent of, a question for the legislature, 85.
may be provided for by public schools, 85.

religious, not

or by assisting private schools, 86.
local taxation to erect state buildings for, 87, 88.
municipalities may be compelled to provide for, 478.

exemption of property used for purposes of, 130, 145.
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EJECTMENT —
for lands sold for taxes, 371.
condition to recovery that improvements shall be paid for,
condition that taxes shall be paid, 373-375.
short statutes of limitations for, 376.
hoTv affected by constructive

371, 373.

possession, 378-382.

Adveksb Possessiost.)
cannot be brought by one in possession, 544.
in case of vacant tenements, 378-383, 545.
(See Land Titles.)
ELECTION —
(See

of remedy where

jjaid an illegal tax, 565.
—
ELECTION OFFICERS
not liable for errors in the exercise of their judgment,
ELECTIVE FRANCHISE —
one has

551.

payment of taxes may be made condition to, 319, 330.
action for depriving one of, by not taxing him, 330.

EMBANKMENTS —
to prevent inundations,
(See

special assessments for, 437.

Levees.)

EMINENT DOMAIN —
principles governing its exercise, 76-83, 430.
meaning of public purposes in the law of, 76-83.
may be employed to obtain water power, 77.
distinction between exercise
'

special assessments

of, and taxation, 175, 178.

in case of, 76-83, 430.
not an exercise of the, 431-434.

special compensation

to be made

assessments for land taken for, 420, 421.
appraisal of damages under, is judicial, 551.

EMPLOYMENTS —
taxes on privilege of following, 385, 386, 393.
what usually taxed, 393.
taxation of, for regulation,
(See

396-415.

Business.)

ENCOURAGEMENT

—

with improvements, may operate
Estoppel.)
(See
of business, discriminations for purposes of,
to proceed

(See

as an estoppel, 573.

Pkotection.)

ENFORCING OFFICAL DUTY —
(See Mandamus.)

ENFORCING PAYMENT —
by cojlector,

Collector op Taxes.)
municipalities
by
Compulsory Local
(See Mandamus ;
Taxation.)
(See

IKDEX.
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ENFORCING TAXES —
(See Collection of Taxes.)
ENGLAND —
taxation in, 36, 37, 31.
sewer assessments in, 436, 460, 473.
land taxes in, 18-30.
monopolies

in, 173, 433.

the maxim in, that taxation and representation

EQUALITY

go together 44.

—

taxation must aim at,

2, 103.

impossibility of attaining,

124-128, 183.

may exist, though but few articles taxed, 138
but not, if exemptions made from the classes taxed, 133, 129.
exemptions admissible, 130.
(See Exemptions.)
invidious assessments inadmissible, 157.
duplicate taxation not necessarily void, 158-165.

when may be, 164.
presumption
(See

against, 165-171.

Duplicate Taxation.)

commuting taxes does not produce inequality,
nor diversity in rules, etc., 173.
monopolies,

inadmissible,

173.

173, 423.

permanence in legislation essential to, 174.
discriminating assessments cannot be cured, 238.

Ctjuative Laws.)

(See

assessment by benefits is supposed to be, 416-445.
apportionment essential to, 175-183.
want of, in a tax does not render it void,
(See Excessive Assessments.)
remedies where it is wanting,

Remedies
—

(See

fok Excessive and Illb&al Taxation.)

EQUALIZATION

boards for, 290.

conclusive nature of, 291.
limited authority of boards of, 291.
judgment on, is final if no appeal given, 528, 529.
errors in, do not invalidate, 530.
decisions on, not subject to review on certiorari, 534.

—
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL

EQUITY—

has the elements

may require

recognition of,

unless

3.

of any particular exaction, cannot support
of taxation,
of demands against the public, legislature

it

Estoppel.)

it,

(See

479, 481.

of special assessments,

428, 429.
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EQUITY, COURT OF —
relief in, against fraudulent assessments,
cannot enjoin political action, 34.

157, 158, 547.

cannot abate taxes, 528.
cannot

give remedy

to one -who has neglected that given

by statute,

529.

enjoining collection in,

536.

not allowed, unless the case comes under some head of equity juris-

diction,

536.

mischiefs flowing from, 536.
remedy refused where mischief serious, 536, 537.
on, 537, 538.
not generally allowed in case of personal taxes, 538.
allowed where injury irreparable, 539.
conditions

will

not enjoin preliminary action, 540.
nor merely excessive assessments, 540.
nor merely irregular taxation, 540.

what are not mere irregularities, 540, 541.
may enjoin when discriminations are made, 540.
will not enjoin a double tax unless once paid, 541.
whether personal tax in respect to lands can be enjoined, 543.
may relieve from cloud upon title, 542-544.
what is such, 542.
whether it is cloud where the proceedings

are

void on their face,

542.

may quiet title after sale, 544.
not the proper tribunal for trial of land titles generally, 544.

relief by, in respect

to possession, 545.

joint

suit by several persons taxed, 545.
question must be same as to all, 545.

and be capable of being presented without confusion, 545.
cannot quiet title as against party in possession, 545.
saving of expense not a reason for complainants' joining where there is
no other ground of equitable relief, £46, 547.
may enjoin malicious or corrupt assessment,
bills of interpleader in, 547.

547, 556.

taxpayers' bills in, to enjoin illegal corporate action, 547,548.
action ultra vires usually a public wrong, 547, 548.

relief on ground of irreparable injury,

547,548.

delay in proceedings may bar right in, 549, 573.
cannot compel the levy of taxes, 34, 35.
will not enjoin an assessment where a party seeing the work go on has
made no objecticns, 573.
redemption cannot be had in, 364.

EQUIVALENT—

benefits are, for special assessments,
for taxes, what is the, 13-17.

416, 417.

when the eminent domain is employed, 76.
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'

in description

of land, effect of, 28^-286.
what may be rejected, 283.
in assessment and in private conveyance, effect of, 284r-286.
in records, etc., amendment of,
(See Amendments.)
in valuations, not to be corrected by the courts,
(See JtJDiciABY.)
correction of, by statute,
(See Curative Laws.)
in tax proceedings, must usually

be corrected

by the statutory tribunal,

528, 532.

cannot usually be corrected in equity, 536, 540.
(See Equity, Coubt op ; Injunction.)

of

assessors,

do not render them personally

liable, 550-553.

(See Assessors.)
deprivation of a legal right not a mere error, 554.
distinction between, and want of jurisdiction,
(See

Jurisdiction.)

resisting collection in case of, 558.
what, on the part of the collector, will render him liable, 563, 564.
what, in collector's warrant, renders it not fair on its face, 562.
clerical, may be overlooked in any case, 234, 562.
in tax deed, correction of in equity, 353.
waiver of, by action of the party,
(See Estoppel.)
effect of, in general,
(See

Irregxilaritibs.)

ERRORS OF JUDGMENT —

not to be corrected by mandamus,
(See

Mandamus.)

(See

Certiorari.)

(See

Judicial Officer.)

by the courts, 528.

assessments, cannot be reviewed
cannot be reviewed on certiorari,

in

liable,

do not render an officer personally

m legislative action, not subject to judicial correction,
Legislative Action.)
(See

ERRORS OF LAW —

what may be corrected by mandamus,

_

(See Mandamus.)
extending to jurisdiction, may be reviewed on certiorari,
(See Certiorari.)
what will render proceedings
(See

ERRORS

Jurisdiction

;

void,

Nullity.)

IN POLITICAL ACTION

cannot be corrected on certiorari,

-

5;-ll.
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ACTIO'S — continued.

cannot be corrected on mandamus, 518, 519.
nor on

bill in

equity, 34, 35.

(See YoTiSTG

the Tax.)

ESTATE —
the whole, in lands, may be sold for taxes, 341.
and for special assessments, 469.

in common, taxation
(See

of,

Tbnakts in

redemption

Common.)
of separate, 365.

in dower, redemption

of, 366.

set apart as a homestead, 366.
(See

Homestead.)
taxation of, 278.

wife's separate,

ESTATES —
recovery of, at law,

Ejectment.)
quieting title to,
(See
(See

Quieting Title.)

removal of cloud upon title to,
upon Title.)
(See Cloud
adverse possession, iu case of,
(See

Advebse Possession.)

ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS —
taxation of 270, 278, 301.

ESTIMATE —
for purposes of general taxation,
(See

Valuation.)

for the raising of
(See

taxes,

Political Action.)

for local improvements, effect of excess in,
departure by assessors

463.

from statutory method of, 533.

ESTOPPEL —
against intruders who have collected taxes, 191.
against collectors de facto, 498.
against one who has collected a void tax, 498.
against the state in case of illegal organization of municipal
tions, 549.

in case of ta
of tax payer

corpora-

to bring in list, 264.
giving in list of property not taxable, 264
state may be bound by, in case of officer de facto, 187-189.
of tax payer by encouraging levy of a tax, 573.
by failure to give notice of objections, 573.
v

payer neglecting

by

by failure to take objections on hearing, 574.
city not bound by, in consequence of taxing land covered by a street, 574.
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EVIDENCE —
legislative control over rules
does not authorize

rights,

of, 333.

rules which preclude

a party from

showing his

333, 3.34.

tax deed cannot be made conclusive, 856.
must be put in by tax purchaser to show regularity of tax proceedings,
336, 338.

strictness required in these cases, 337.
how he may be aided by presumptions,

339-333.

how far presumptions may depend on delays, 330, 331.
bow they may be afl'ected by possession, 330, 331.
presumption cannot supply want of record, 333.
cannot presume existence of record where none is found,

333.

secondary, where record is lost, 348, 333.
of tax votes, must be of record, 347.
can only be shown by record, 348.
sale, by cerliticate, 353, 353.

of tax

record is better evidence, 353.

by tax deed, of the proceedings to a sale, 353-357.
deed is not evidence of tlie previous steps, 353, 854.
statutes changing this rule, 354, 355.
some statutes make it evidence of regularity of sale, 855.
necessity in such case to prove prior proceedings, 355.
other statutes make the deed evidence of title, 355, 356.
cannot make deed conclusive. 356.
do not apply to deeds on sales for assessments, 356, 857.
against the collector, by the accounting of the auditor, 505, 506.

of giving notice of meetings of towns, etc., 348.
on certiorari, is only gone into to determine jurisdiction,

533.

not to review case on the merits, 533.
extrinsic, cannot be received on, 535.
necessity for, to show defect in tax title,

will

render deed a cloud upon

title, 543.

for the purposes of amendments,
(See Amendments.)

action by one as officer, evidence of official character,
(See

Officbks Db Facto.)

official returns

as, 195, 196.

are generally conclusive, 195.
except in action against the officer, 196.

EXACTIONS —

equity of, will not support them
EXCESSIVE ASSESSMENTS —

as taxes, 3.

abatement of taxes in cases of, 537.
(See

Abatement.)

reviews and appeals in cases of, 538-580.
remedy must generally be the statutory remedy, 538.

refunding tax in

cases of, 530.
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EXCESSIVE ASSESSMENTS —

continued,
cannot be corrected on certiorari, 533.
assessorg not personally liable for, 553, 556.
collector not liable in cases of, 552.
equity cannot correct in general, 540.
may correct in cases of fraud, 547.

conditions may

EXCESSIVE

be imposed

in such

cases, 587, 538.

DUTIES —

tend to defeat the purpose of their levy, 34.
illegal, may be recovered back of collector, 564, 565.

EXCESSIVE MOISTURE —
taxation for drawing
(See

oft",

Drains.')

EXCESSIVE SiVLEsale for taxes must be of only what is necessary, 343.
sale for more, is void, 343, 345.
power to sell, is exhausted when tax is paid, 344.
illegal addition of percentage, or costs, may render sale excessive, 344.

EXCESSIVE TAXES —
tax in excess of authcity, spread upon the roll, renders it void, 296, 297.
one excessive tax docs not defeat others which are severable, 296.

what

will

render tax excessive, 290.

excessive in individual cases does not avoid roll generally,
the maxim de minimis, etc., in such cases, 296, 397.
made so by fraudulent

assessment,

296.

157, 158, 547.

will

only be enjoined on payment of what is legal, 538.
in suit for, only what was illegal can be recovered back, 571.
one excessive tax does not avoid levy if aggregate not too large, 230.

EXCISE TAXES —
what are, 3.
on business, 384-393.
(See

Business.)

on corporations,

392, 393.

(See COKPORATIONS ;

Fkanchises.)

EXECUTION —
tax warrant is in the nature of,
(See

Collector's Wabrant.)

process against collector in nature of,

Collector of Taxes.)
EXECUTION OF POWER —
(See

must be strict in tax cases, 257.
of collector, must be strict, 304, 308.
to sell, must be exact, 333-327.

EXECUTIVE, THE —
cannot levy taxes, 33.
not subject to mandamus, 538.
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EXECUTIVE AND MINISTEKIAL OFFICERS —
must keep within limits of their authority,
cannot refund taxes, 530.

33.

compelling performance of duty by,
Mandamus.)
of by process, 559-563.
protection of by certiiicate on which they must
EXECUTOR —
(See

protection

act, 557.

taxation of for estate property, 270, 371, 278.
suit against for tax on estate, 301.

EXEMPT PROPERTY —
inserted on roll, assessors may be compelled to strike off, 520, 574.
taxes collected from, may be required to be refunded, 520.
taxes on auditor general may be required to reject, 520.
abatement of taxes upon, 528.
refunding taxes upon, 530.
including in assessment, will not render assessor personally liable,
taxation of, not a mere irregularity, 541.
(See Exemption.)

552.

EXEMPTION —
of agencies of federal government from state taxation, 56-01.
of agencies of state government from federal taxation, 58-61.
of property, by contract, 52-54.
from taxation, generally subject to be recalled, 54, 145.
by charters of incorporation, 55, 56.
implied, in case of all public property, 130-132.
of persons in a class taxed, produces inequalit}^, 128, 129.
customary, of household furniture, tools of trade, etc., 180, 145.
from motives of charity, 130, 145.
of church property, school property, etc., 130, 145.
constitutional provisions bearing on right to make, 132.
of Arkansas, 132.
of California, 132, 133.

ofUlinois,

133, 134.

of Indiana, 137, 138,
of Iowa, 138.
of Ohio, 142, 143.
general right of the state to make, 144, 145.
is involved in the power to apportion, 145.
exists whenever it is not forbidden, 145.
general right of the state to recall, 145.
intent to make must be clear, 146.
strictly construed, 146.

mu.st be

from taxes, will not apply to special assessments, 147.
instances of special cases, 148-152.
of corporation, which employs its means for other purposes than thoso
for which its powers are given, 149-151.
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EXEMPTION—

continued.

principles whicli should support, 153-154.
invidious, not admissible, 129, 130, 153.
not to be made without legislative authority, 153.
motives cannot support, when not lawfully made,

153.

power to make, is a discretionary power, 146.
construction of certain exemptions, 151-154.

unlawful, may render roll void,

153, 541.

unintentional, will not avoid the levy, 154-156.
decision upon right to, a judicial act, 550.
party entitled to, may replevy property seized, 573.

without regard
Exempt Property.)

state may make,
(See

to

municipal power to tax,

253.

EXEMPTION FROM RESPONSIBILITY —
officers performing judicial functions have, 550.
(See

of

Judicial Officer.)

assessors

under statutes,

d53, 553.

EXHAUSTINa AUTHORITY —
to tax, sometimes by single exercise, 356.
abortive attempt is not, 256.
influence of custom in such cases, 856.

in

of license taxes, 256.
of one process,
by boards of review, what is not, 291.
EXHIBITIONS AND SHOWS —
case

to collect

taxes, by issue

295.

taxation of, 391.
(See Amusements.)

EXONERATION —
from taxation, cannot be compelled
,

(See

by mandamus,

518.

Abatement.)

EX PARTE PROCEEDINGS—
tax sales are, 324, 325.
necessity for strict compliau-ce with law in such cases, 333-826.

EXPENSE —
saving of, by joint suit in equity, 545, 546.
not of itself a reason for equitable jurisdiction, 546, 547.
of local works, assessment of on parties benefited, 416-473.
(See

Assessments, Local.)

EXPENSES

OF GOVERNMENT —

general, taxation for, 73-75.
(See

Purposes

of Taxation.)

EXPORTS —
taxation of, by the states, limited to inspection
not to be taxed by the United States, 7-3.

fees, 24, 61.

EXTENSION OF TIME —
to collector, whether discharges

sureties, 502, 503.

INDEX
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TAXATION —

to levy, 121.

case of contracts made in state and owned abroad, 65.
case of bonds on a road lying in two states, 169.

in

case

of municipal corporations,

48.

whether they can be authorized

their limits,

to tax persons

or property beyond

131-133.

EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE —
cannot be received on certiorari, 535.

r.
FACT, ERRORS OP —
how corrected in records,

ect.,

(See Amekdments.)
not corrected on certiorari,

Cektiorari.)
liability for,

(See

personal

JtTDiciAL

(See

FACTJLTT-

Officer.)

assessment on the, 394.
(See PRivrLBGBS.)

FAILURE OF BENEFITS —
will

not defeat local assessment, 417.

certificate that is, protects officer who is to act upon

554, 557.

559, 560.

a

process that is, will protect ministerial officer,
when process is not, 562, 563.
FAITH, PUBLIC —

it,

FAIR ON ITS FACE —

municipal bodies may
(See

be compelled

to tax for purposes of keeping, 479.

Mandamus.)

FALSE DESCRIPTION —
of land in assessment, whether may
(See

Description.)

FALSE RETURNS —
liability of

officer for, 196.

FARES ON RAILROADS —

Receipts Tolls.)
FARMING THE REVENUE —
what is,

;

(See Gross

300.

not admissible

FAVORITISM

in exemptions,
(See

in this country,

—
153.

Invidious Exemption.)

300.

be rejected, 383, 388.
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FEDERAL COURTS —
(See CouETS of the United States.)
FEDERAL LICENSES —
grant and force of, 414, 415.
do not displace state regulations, 406, 415.

FEDERAL TAXATION —
(See

United States.)

FEE SIMPLE —
is usually valued, instead of separate estates, 288.
separate payments on separate interests, 389.
is usually sold in selling lands for taxes, 851.

FEES —
for licenses,
(See License Fees.)
for inspection,
(See Ikspection.)
FEMALES —
ta.xability of, 45.
(See Do\viiESS

;

Married

Woman.)

FERRY BOATS —
taxation of, 270.

FICTIONS OP LAW —
work injustice, 381.
applied to case of adverse possession, 381.
doctrine
the
application of, where two acts done at same time, 569.
are not to

FIGURES IN VALUATION —
without dollar mark,
(See

FILING

Dollar Mark.)
OF ASSESS JIENT-

requirement

FINALITY

of, must be complied

with,

267.

—
it,

of judgment as to facts covered by
(See Judgment.)
of assessment as to value of property,
(See Assessment.)
of legislative action as to purposes of taxation,
(See Public Purposes.)
FINES AND PENALTIES —
(See

Penalties.)

FIRE, PREVENTION OF —
taxation

for, 103.

FIRE ENGINE
taxation

—

by town for, 98.

FISCAL AGENT —
of United

States, not taxable by states, 58.

INDEX.
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FLORIDA —
taxation ot property in, must be liy yalue, 435.

FORCE —

taxes collected by coercion, may be recovered back
wbat constitutes, 569.

VoLUNTAET Payments.)
FORCED CONTRIBUTIONS —
distinguished from taxes, 2.
taxes levied without apportionment

if illegal,

569.

(See

are, 180.

tax levies where the statutory i)rovisions are disregarded

FORECLOSURE

OF REDEMPTION

are, 260.

—

statutes for, must be strictly performed, 365.
notice required for, must be given, 365, 366.
right to, cannot be waived by any but the party himself, 865, 360.
must be given otEcially, 366.
should be in writing, 366.

judicial

proceedings for a, 364.
must be strictly pursued, 364.

do not apply to sales for municipal
vided, 364.

taxes, unless

so expressly pro-

FOREIGN BONDHOLDER —
not taxable in the state on his bonds, 15, 16.

FOREIGN CORPORATIONS —
doing business in

state must submit to its

conditions of taxation,

44.

are not citizens, 65.

owning

a road

in two

states, taxation

of, 168.

FOREIGN RESIDENTS —
(See NONEBSIDENTS.)

FORFEITURES —
(See

Penalties.)

FORFEITURES OF PROPERTY—
provisions by law for, in case of delinquent taxes, 315,
question of legislative competency to make, 316.
decisions thereon in several states, 316.
intent to create a forfeiture must be clear, 317.
meaning of the term, 317, 318.

310.

sale, no more than a forfeiture, gives a judicial hearing, 318.
if forfeiture admissible, questions of compliance with the law would

be open afterwards, 319.
proof of regularity of proceedings

in case of,
317.
strictly,
statutes for, construed
delay in returning list, when will defeat, 317.
FORMAL DEFECTS —
(See

Amendments.)

FORMS—

pi escribed by statute, necessity for following,
in case of collector's return, 307, 308.
40

337.

319.
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FORMS — continued.
in the authentication of the assessment,
in the warrant for collection,
in

289, 290.

Collector's Wakkant.)

(See
case

of tax deeds, 353, 363.
when intended for benefit of taxpayers, 316.

FORTIFYING TITLE —
right

of, by

FRANCHISES

buying
—

at tax sale, 347-349.

may be taxed as well as persons, 15.
in what cases taxation is just and in what not, 35.
granted by congress for federal purposes, not taxable by states, 58.
what granted by congress are taxable by states, 60, 61.
provisions in charters regarding taxation of, 55.
valuation of, for taxation, 135-137.
may be taxed though the property is taxed also, 165, 168, 170.
application

in

case

of, of the presumption

against duplicate

taxation,

166-168.

when exemption of, from taxation will exempt property also, 171.
may be taxed though capital invested in government securities, 58.
exemptions of, from taxation, how they affect special assessments, 148-153.
confjolidation of, effect on taxation, 151.
exemptions of, does not exempt propertJ^ 171.
taxation that would annihilate, may be enjoined in equity, 539.

National Banks
FRANCHISE, ELECTIVE —
(See Elective Fkanchisb.)
(See

Banks

;

;

Railroad

Companies.)

FRAUDS—

in assessment, may justify an injunction, 157, 528.
on the federal revenue, enumeration of, 309-313.
in tax sales will avoid them, 839-340.
in redemption, may be relieved against,
of contractor, no defense to assessment,

367.
468, 469.

conditions may be imposed when tax is enjoined for, 536-539.
do not necessarily exist where tax is illegal, 539.
relief against, where they deprive parties of substantial rights, 547.

FRAUD, CONSTRUCTIVE —
in tax

sales, renders them void, 341.
instances, of purchase by the oflScer himself, 341.
of purchase by tenant who should have paid the tax, 345.
of purchase by the mortgagor, 345.
by tenant in common, 346.

by one whose laud was grouped with that of another, 346, 347.
by agent buying the principal's land, 347.
by any one wliose duty it was to pay, 347.
case
case

of the' mortgagee, 347.
of an adverse claimant,

348-351.

INDEX
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FEAUDULENT COMBINATIONS —
at tax sales, render them

void,

339.

one not aware of them, not affected thereby, 340.

FRAUDULENT CONTRACTS—
those in fraud of the revenue are, 399.

FREE BRIDGE —
taxation to establish, 94, 310.

FREE SCHOOLS —
taxation, 84r-88.

(See Education.)

FREEDOM, PRINCIPLES OF —
Principles.)
(See CoKSTiTUTiONAL

FREIGHT—
taxes on, 61-63.
on the carriers of, 388.

FRONTAGE —
assessment by the, for local improvements,

Assessments, Local.)
FUND, SPECIAL —
payment for local ilnprovement

451-454.

(Bee

from, 463, 463.

FUNDAMENTAL LAW—
(See

Constitdtional Principles.)

G.
GAMES —
(See Amusements.)

GAMING IMPLEMENTS —
taxation of, for the purpose of prohibition, 10.
impositions on keepers of, under police power, 403, 404.

GAS LIGHT—
special assessments to provide, 428.

GAS PIPES—
laid in streets,
GAS WORKS —

are taxable as machinery,

373.

taxation for, 99.

GENERAL EXEMPTIONS —

from taxation, do not apply to local assessments,
right to recall, 146.
(See Exemptions.)

GENERAL LAW —
for municipal taxation, 310.
modifying local powers by,

355.

146-148.
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GENERAL POWERS —
to tax, are strictly construed aa against municipalities, 209-311.
what they cover in case of towns, 211.

will

not authorize special assessments, 418.
to sell lands, construed strictly, 469
to levy fees under police power, will not justify taxes for revenue, 396,
397, 408, 409.

construction

of,

in general,

(See CoNSTRTJCTioN OF

Tax Laws.)

"

GENEROSITY —
not legally demandable of tax pa3'er, 158.

GEORGIA —
provisions for uniform taxation in, 133.
are not violated by taxes on business, 133.
provisions for ad valorem taxation, 133, 435.

GIFTS —
taxes cannot be laid for making, 78, 86, 90.
the rule applied to manufacturing corporations,

78.

as pensions, may be made,

Pensions.)
military service,

(See

as bounties for

Bounties.)

(See

GOLD —
states may collect taxes in, 13.

GOOD

FAITH-

action in, by members of board of equalization,

gives no right of action,

530.

absence of, in assessors,

does not render them personally

liable, 556,

557.

GOODS —
taxation of,
(See

Personal Property.)

levy of distress upon, for satisfaction of taxes, 301.
must be the projier warrant for, 301-3.
not liable to constitutional
case

objections, 303.

of levy on property of one not taxed,
replevin in such case, 573.

303, 303.

demand to be first made, 304.
personal notification to party concerned, 304.
notice of sale, etc., 304.
authority in making, must be strictly pursued, 304.
what will render officer trespasser ab initio, 304, 563, 564.
municipal corporations cannot authorize without statutory authority,
304.
sale of, not usually

enjoined, 538-540.

levy on, is presumptive satisfaction of tax, 539.
when collector liable for, 559-564.
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GOODS — continued.
payment to relieve from seizure, is payment under duress, 568.
so is payment after tlireat of seizure, 569.
'
exhibition of process is such threat, 569.
sale of, for illegal tax, gives right of action, 569.

GOVERNMENT —
taxes, the property of, 1.
taxing power essential to, 3, 4.

maxims which should govern in taxing, 7, 8.
other purposes than revenue in taxing, 10, 11.
may collect taxes in kind, 13.
is to give protection for taxation, 14-17.
customary taxes hy, 18-31.
general right of to tax, 30.

division of powers

of, 33.

checks and balances of, 33.
representative r.esponsibility

in, 178.

(See Bbpresbntatives.)
agencies of, are exempt from taxation, 56.
property of, not within the intent of tax laws, 130, 131.
public domain, not taxable, 59, 60.
general purposes for which it may lay taxes, 67-103.
(See Public Purposes.)
United States, taxation by,

(See United States.)
municipal, taxation by,
(See Mdnicipai Corpoeations.)
can only exercise its powers through officers,
contracts by, for exemptions,
(See Contracts; Exemptions.)
principles which should govern its taxation,

184.

(See Principles op Taxation.
can only act through officers, 184.
construction

of revenue acts of, 197-333.
may tax all kinds of business, 384.
may regulate rights and occupations, 306-415.
has general control of its municipalities, 474.
powers of, are liable to abuse, 313.
any, is better than none, 313.
political remedies for wrongs in, 575.

privilege of choosing representatives in, is insignificant in value
pared with other rights, 45.
powers of, are held in trust, 539.

GOVERNMENT OF THE STATES —
Legislative Power ; States.)
(See
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES —
(See

United States.)

as com-
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GOVERNMENT STOCKS —
Public Securities.)
GOVERNOR OF STATE —
(See

■whether subject to mandamus, 523.

GRADE OP STREETS —
assessments for, 431.

right to change,

401.

(See Assessments,

LICENSE PEES —

GRADUATING
in reference

of town, 179.
of lawyers, 179.

to the size

as between classes

in

Local.)

of liquor dealers,

case

180.

general methods of, 384, 385.
right to make when no restrictions

in

of merchant's

case

are

imposed, 387.

sales, 160.

GRANT —
of lands for taxes,
(See Tax Deed.)
of the power to tax,
(See

Power to Tax.)

of franchises,
(See Peanchisbs.)
of taxes by the people's representatives,
(See

Representatives.)

of taxes by
(See

the people,

Voting the Tax.)

of exemptions,
(See Exemptions.)
of power of local taxation, 51, 209-211.
of power to lay local assessments, must be special,
of privileges,
(See

418.

Privileges.)

of the power to tax business, 387. ■
of power to make exemptions, is not compulsory,

146.

GREAT BRITAIN —
early taxation in, 26, 27.
excise fees in, 31.

land tax of,

18, 19.

hearth and window taxes in,

19, 20.

GRIEVANCE,- PRIVATE —
remedies for, at the common law,
(See Common Law Remedies.)
remedies for, in general,

Remedies for Excessive and
joinder of complaints for,
(See Joint Complaints.)
(See

Illegal Taxation.)

IIS^DES.
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continued.

must exist to authorize

private party to apply for manclamus, 522.
does not exist unless one is injured, 154.

GRIEVANCE, PUBLIC —
what may be remedied by mandamus, 523.
in case of threateuod illegal corporate action, 548.
where municipal bodies do not meet their obligations,
GROSS RECEIPTS —

479, 480, 524.

taxation of, 64, 137, 138.

GROUPING

OF LANDS —

not admissible, where statute requires them to be separately assessed, 279.
is not a mere irregularity, 279.
reasons for not allowing, 280.
statute against, is mandatory, 280.
what to be considered separate parcels, 281.

in valuation, not admissible, 287.
what amounts to a, 287.
in making sale, renders sale void,
reasons for the rule, 342, 343.

341.

when several lots may be treated as one parcel, 342.

GUARANTY —

none by municipalities, of correct action on the part of their officers, 566.

Caveat Emptok.)
GUARANTIES, CONSTITUTIONAL —
Pkinciples.)
(See Constitutional
(See

GUARDIAN —
tax on, for the minor's estate, 271.

H.
HACKMBN —
taxation of, 391.

HARBORS —
taxation for, 96.
487.
special taxation of municipalities for, 484,

HEAD MONEY —

imposed in respect to immigrants, 568.

HEALING ACTS
what admissible, 225-232.
liability of to abuse, 226.
retroactive, forbidden in some states, 336.
may be special, 226.
must not be invidious, 226, 227.
cannot cure want of jurisdiction, 227.
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HEALING ACTS — continued.
may heal irregularities, 237.
cannot make good what could not originally have been authorized,

287.

instances of defects not cured by, 227, 238.
unlawful discriminations cannot be made good, 228, 239.
sale of wrong land cannot be validated, 228.
general principle as to what may be made good, 229.
may be prospective, 230-333.
instances of prospective curative laws, 331, 232.
may apply to pending suits, 231, 232.
not to cases which have passed into judgment,

233.

HEALTH —
taxation for protection
draining lands for, 402,

of, 101.
423, 434.

whether health must be a purpose of drainage assessments, 433, 424.
board of, is a state functionary, 477.

HEARING —
right to, not to be taken away retrospectively, 339.
is of right in tax cases, 265, 266.
provisions of law for, are mandatory, 260, 267.
alterations in assessments without opportunity for,

are

illegal,

notice of, must be given as statute provides,
(See

Notice.)

in review of assessment, parlies dissatisfied may have, 538.
if not applied for, all remedy is usually lost, 529.
decision upon, is final, 529.
on certiorari,
(See

only extends to jurisdiction, 532.

Certiorari.)

when may be had in equity,
(See

Equity.)

general right to,
(See

Law of the Land.)

HEARTHS —
taxation of houses by, 20.

HEIRS —
assessment
(See

of

estate to, 270, 278.

Estates of Deceased Persons.)

HIGH SCHOOLS —
taxation for,
(See

Education.)

exemption of buildings for,
(See

Exemptions.)

HIGH WATERS —
protection against,
(See

Levees.)

268, 541.
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HIGHWAYS —
duty of government to provide for, 94.
difl'erent varieties of, 94.

cliartering corporations to malie, 94.
principles applicable to, whether they apply

to railroads, 95-97.
cannot tax to make, unless the land has been appropriated, 97, 98.
methods of providing for construction of, 106.

taxing districts for, 106.
burdens for construction

exceptional

of, 107.

special assessments for, 108.
are state works, 106, 109, 110, 428.
are constructed by localities,

labor contributions

109, 110,419.

for, 13.

of, in the nature of a police regulation, 430.
states may compel municipalities to construct, 478.
whether this principle can apply to a road exceptionally
requirement

expensive,

487-489.
apportionment of cost of, between counties, etc., 478.
special districts for, 113, 114.
(See BRiDaES ;

HIGHWAY

Pebb Bkidoe

;

Plankroads

;

Streets

;

Turnpikes.)

LABOR —

requirement of, 13.
is in nature of police regulation, 430.
right to perform, not to be taken away by officer, 541.
decision on exemption from, is a judicial act, 550.
officers not liable for error in, 550.
for, 173.

commutation

HOMESTEAD

—

exemption of, from taxation, 145.
redemption of, from sales, 366.

HORSES —
taxation in respect of, 31.

HOUSES —
taxes on, measured

by rents,

19.

by hearths, 30.
by windows, 20.
(See

Betterments; Improvements.)

HUSBAND AND WIPE —
(See

Homestead;

Married

Woman.)

I.
IGNORANCE —

of one's rights, in paying an illegal tax, no ground for recovery back,
567, 568.

different ruling in Kentucky, 567.
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IDENTIFICATION —
of land in tax proceedings,
(See Description^.)

ILLEGAL ACTION —
of ofBcers, presumption that it will not
remedies for,
(See

Remedies fob Excessive and

be persevered in, 544.

Illegal

Taxation.)

ILLEGAL CONTRACTS —
those in fraud of the revenue are, 299.
not be enforced, 299.

■will

whether the rule applies to contracts in fraud of foreign

revenue laws,

299.

ILLEGAL OCCUPATIONS —
taxation of, under internal revenue law, 406, 414.
may be taxed by the state, 403, 404, 406.

ILLEGAL TAXES —
collector may refuse to collect, 500.
whether he should raise question of illegality, 500, 501.
if collected, must be paid over, 498.
cannot be validated retrospectively by the legislature, 375.
those laid for private purposes are, 42.
Purposes op Taxation.)
(See

those are, which violate contracts with the state, 52-56.
or impair the obligation of contracts, 65.
(See Contr.^cts.)
or which are laid in disregard of constitutional provisions, 66.
or which the states lay on foreign or inter-state commerce, 61-64,
(See Commerce.)
or which are laid without apportionment,
or otherwise than by official action, 184.

175.

or by local boards, etc., without legislative authority, 309.
or in disregard of mandatory provisions of statute, 212-219.
'

or which are in excess of statutory authority, 395-297.

may be abated, 528.
may be contested without applying for abatement, 528.

of errors which constitute,
enjoining collection of, 536.
cases

534, 541.

not usually permitted on grounds of illegality alone, 536, 538.
combined with legal, will only be enjoined on the legal being paid,
537, 538.

will

be enjoined when they constitute cloud on title, 543.
(See

Equity.)

protection of collector in enforcing, 559-563.
liability of collector of the customs for enforcing, 564, 565.
are not necessarily or usually fraudulent, 539.
error in the assessment will not of itself make, 540.
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town, etc., for, after it lias been paid over, 565.

only exists when
does not exist

if

the tax is a

nullity,

566.

tax voluntarily paid, 566, 567.

what are voluntary payments, 568, 569.
form of action upon, 569, 570.
recovery on, is limited to money paid, 570.
recovery where tax only in part illegal, 571.

liability of assessors for levying, 570.
of collector for enforcing, 570.
remedy by replevin in case of, 573, 573.
estoppel of party taxed, by his conduct in some

cases, 573.

remedy by mandamus, 574.
the political remedy sometimes the only one, 575.

ILLEGALITIES —
correction

of, by certiorari,

530, 533.

(See Cektiokaei.)
in municipal organization,

enjoining collection in
(See

may be cured by delay, 530, 549.

case of, 536, 538, 540.

Injunction.)

protection in case of, where officer is to act upon certificate, 554, 557.
or upon process which is fair on its face, 559-563.

ILLIKOIS —
constitutional provisions for equal taxation in, 133-136.
taxation of property must be by value, 435.
constitutional provisions affecting special
special fund for assessments in, 466.

assessments,

437.

IMMIGRANTS —
tax in respect of, is a tax on commerce, 63.
assessment of head money in respect of, 568.

IMMUNITIES —
of citizens of the several

states, not to be abridged

—

IMPAIRING CONTRACTS
(See

in taxation,

Contracts.)
—

IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL
right of every party
(See

to a

hearing before,

527.

Hbaking; Law of the Land.)

IMPLICATIONS —
are against contract not

tJ

tax, 53, 53.

against duplicate taxation, 165-171.
(See

Duplicate Taxation.)

(See

Exemptions.)

against exemptions from taxation, 145-147.

in favor of correctness of legislative apportionment, 179.
in favor of legislative action as to purposes of taxation, 69.

64, 65.
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IMPLIED EXEMPTIOXS —
from taxation, what are, 130, 131.

IMPOLITIC TAXES —
imposition

IMPORTED

of, 387.

PACKAGES—

(See Importers.)
IMPORTERS —

tax on, is a tax on commerce, 62, 63.
tax by states on goods imported, -when admissible, 63, 63.

IMPORTS

—

taxation of, a cnstomary resource of government,
not to be taxed by tlie states, 61.

21.

what is a tax upon, 63, 63.

IMPOSITIONS —
special exemptions from, construed, 148.
exemption from " civil imposition," construed, 149.

IMPOSTS —
wliat arc, 3, 34.
discrimination in, 74.
unlawful, may be recovered back, 564, 565.
unless paid without protest, 567, 568.
"
tax or impost,"
exemption from

IMPRISONMENT

144.

—

for

taxes may be authorized, 14.
this not imprisonment for debt, 14.

not now generally allowed, 301.
may be provided for in case of license fees, 301.

IMPROVEMENT —
of wet lands, special

assessments for, 433-435.
must have reference to the public interest, 438, 434.
the public health not the sole consideration, 423, 434.

(See Drains.)

IMPROVEMENTS

—

(See Bettermbnts.)
discrimination in favor of,

134.

INADEQUACY OP PRICE —
will

not defeat tax sale, 345.

is usually found to exist, 323-325.

INADEQUATE RELIEF —

legal remedies aflbrd, in some oases, 541, 542
remedy in equity in such cases, 541, 543.
in case of cloud upon title, 543.

in

case

in

case
(See

.

of one in possession whose land another claims,
of threatened irreparable injury, 538, 539.
Equity.)

544.
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INCIDENTAL BENEFITS —
will

not support taxation, 90.

(See
■will

Maudfactueing Entbrpkises.)

not support special

(See Benefits.)
to those not taxed,

will

assessments,

457.

constitute no objection to a tax, 137, 128.

INCIDENTAL INJURIES —
from exercise of lawful powers cannot entitle a citizen to compensation, 91.
compensation

INCOME

sometimes made in case of, 91.

—

taxes on, 20, 168, 170.
meaning of, 160, 273, 393.
diflSculty in adequate enforcement of tax on, 20.
reasons which render it unequal, 30.
taxes should be in proportion to, 16.
exemption of, from taxation, how construed, 168.
of a corporation may be taxed, though its dividends are exempt, 170.
tax upon, in lieu of tax upon property, 172.

INCONVENIENCES —
to result from setting aside a tax levy, may be reason for refusing

orari,

530.

must be considered in deciding upon injunction, 536.
from delays in collection, may justify summary remedies,
(See

Summary Remedies.)

(See

Replbyin.)

or the taking away of common law remedies,

INCORPORATIONS —
(See

Coeporations.)

INCREASE —
in assessment without notice, 268.
this not a mere irregularity, 541.
INCUMBRANCE —

when an illegal tax may constitute an apparent, 543.

removal of, in equity, 542-544.
(See

Cloud upon Title.)

taxation of,
(See MOETGAOE.)

INDEBTEDNESS —
public, taxation for, 103.
incurred for illegal object is void,

103.

private, may be taxed,
(See Bonds ; Ceedits.)
of, 524-536.
of municipalities, mandamus to compel payment
479.
meet,
to
compulsory taxation by state
to recovering, 320.
payment of taxes on, as a condition

municipal,

as a tender for taxes, 413.

a certi-
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INDEMNIFICATIOlSr —
of municipal

acting in good faith, 91, 93.
legislature sometimes compels, 91, 480.
of purchaser at tax sale, municipalities not bound to, 566.
officei-s

of losers by riots, 480.
of losers by exercise of taxing power,

91, 93.

INDIAN LANDS —
taxation of, after Indian title extinguished,

275.

INDIAN TRIBES —
trade with, not taxable by states, 62.

INDIANA —
constitutional

for equal taxation in, 137, 138.

provisions

requiring property

to be taxed by value, 435.

affecting special taxation, 437, 488.
special fund for assessments In, 467.

INDIRECT TAXES —
what are,

5.

not illegal, 392.
may be equally just with any other, 6.
what may be unjust, 6.
on luxuries, jiolicy of, 6.

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS —
protection of, by constitutions,
(See COHSTITDTIONAL

INELIGIBILITY

—

to office, effect of,
(See

Pkinciples.)

if

the party acts, 186.

Oppiobks De Facto.)

INEQUALITY —

is meant to be avoided in taxation, 3, 124.
apportionment to secure against, 126, 137.
(See

Apportionment.)

cannot always be prevented, 134, 126, 138, 160.
may exist in case of single tax, 124.
why a tax on luxuries not subject to objection for, 135.
does not render a tax illegal, 125, 128.
case of school taxes on nonresidents, 127.
necessarily exist where tax Is restricted to few subjects, 138.
not
does
discriminations which produce, not necessarily unlawful, 188.
are unlawful when special and invidious, 138, 129, 130, 152-154, 158.

In the

taxing one kind of corporations and not others, may not cause, 139.
constitutional provisions designed to guard against, 133, 144.
produced by exemptions,

(See Exemptions.)
accidental omissions of property, do not invalidate the levy, 154, 156.
fraudulent assessments, relief against, 157, 158, 547.
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INEQUALITY -couij/iMCfZ.
caused by cUiplicate taxation, 158, 1C5.

Duplicate Taxation.)

(See

it

is

it,

taxing land and the mortgage upon
159.
taxing income and tlie property
invested in, 160.
presumption against intent to cause, in tax laws, 165-171.
produced by granting monopolies,
(See Monopolies.)
must result from frequent changes in legislation, 174.
in the case of license fees, 412.
purposely caused in case of prejudicial employments,
abatement of taxes in cases of, 527.

396, 404.

533.

is

(See Abatement.)
caused by unequal assessments, cannot be corrected by certiorari,
or in equity, when fraud
not charged, 540.
no remedy against assessors for, 550-557.
unless they deprive the tax payer of some legal right, 554.
does not necessarily result from illegalities, 566.
political redress the principal security against, 575.

INFANTS —
are taxable, though they have no voice in representation, 45, 46.
the exceptional benefits received from government by, 16, 17.
can only redeem from tax sales on the statutory conditions, 364, 365.

taxation of property of, to guardian,

371.

INFERIOR JURISBICTIONS —
corrections
(See

of errors of, by certiorari,

530.

Cbrtioeabi.)

the remedy by prohibition in case of, 574.
errors of judgment in, cannot be corrected by mandamus, 514.
may be compelled by mandamus to perform ministerial action, 523, 533.
conditions to appeals from, 374.

(See

Ekroks

INHABITANTS
(See

;

INFORMALITIES —

Iiiiiegularities.)

—

Residence.)

INHERITANCES —
taxes on,
(See

Successions.)

INJUNCTION —

,

the available remedy in equity in case of illegal tax, 536.
not awarded unless the case comes under some recognized head of equitable jurisdiction, 536.

tliat may flow from awarding, in tax cases, 536, 537.
equitable conditions sometimes imposed, 537, 538, 541.
not usually awarded in case of personal taxes, 53S.
mischiefs

awarded in cases of irreparable

injury,

539, 548.
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INJUNCTION
b}- some

— conUiiued.
couils in anj' case- of illegal municipal taxation, 538-540.

not awarded against political action, 540.
nor in case of merely excessive assessments,
nor of merely irregular taxation. 540, 541.

540.

not generally awarded in case of personal tax in. respect of lands, 543.
joint bills for, 545-547.
not awarded where the remedy at law is adequate, 538, 543, 546, 548.
to restrain fraudulent assessments, 547.
to restrain illegal corporate action, 548.
■nhether taxpayers can tile

bill

for, 548, 572.

irreparable injury in such cases, 548, 549.
effect of delay in applying fiu- remedy, 549.
what will estop one from applying for, 573.

INJURIES WITHOUT REMEDY

—

must be cases of, under tax laws, 575.
(See I^-EQUALITY.)

INJURY

—

from riots, municipalities may be compelled to indemnify, 480.
from an exercise of the taxing power, may be indemnmed, 91, 93.

INJUSTICE —
of taxation cannot render it void, 8.
of legislative action, judiciary cannot take cognizance of,
excejit in case of wanton perveri<ion of power, 71.
impossibility of avoiding, in taxation, 134^129.
intentional, may render tax illegal,
(See Invidious Assbssmbkts ; Invidious Exemptions.)
resulting from accidental omissions,
(See Omissions.)
by the state, will not be presumed, 508.
of tax, no excuse for county treasurer for not proceeding

what

will

(See

35.

with,

render tax voi"l,

Illegal

Taxes.)

what cannot be validated by legislation,

CuKATivE Laws.)
abatement of tax in cases of,
(See

537.

reviews for the correction of, 538, 529.
certiorari not a remedy for,
(See CEKTioR.Ani.)
remedy in equity in case of intentional, 547.
of state in enforcing local taxation for local purposes, 493-495.

—
INQUEST OF OFFICE

whether essential in forfeitures

for delinquency,

(See Forfeituees.)
INQUISITORIAL PROCEEDINGS —

necessary in case of tax on income, 20.
objections to, 20, 20, 3r.

316-319.

531.
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continued.

cannot be effectual, 20.
in case of hearth taxes, 20.

In

of taxes on personalty,
INSPECTION LAWS —
of

case

26, 27.

states, fees under, 61.
(See

Head Money.)

INSPECTORS

OF ELECTION —

not liable for erroneous exercise of

(See Judicial Officehs.)
INSTITUTIONS OP LEARNING —

judicial

functions, 551.

exemption of, from taxation,
(See

Exemptions.)

INSURANCE COMPANIES —
inequality is produced in singling out for taxation,
capital of mutual, what is, 273, 394.
■whether

129.

surplus of, what is, 392.
taxes on foreign, 393.
guaranty stock of mutual, 898, 394.
English joint stock, taxation of, 394.
(See CORPOKATIONS.)
specific tax on, 210.

INTEGRITY —
statutes to protect officers acting with, 552, 553.
whether want of, will render assessors liable, 556, 557.

of officers, the chief protection in tax matters,
INTELLIGENCE —

575.

taxes upon,
(See Newspapers.)
of public officers, reliance upon in taxation,

575.

INTENT —
must govern in construction of statutes, 198.
if plain, rules of interpretation are unimportant,

199.

aids in arriving at,
(See CONSTKUCTION.)
to defraud,
(See

Fraud.)

of party in describing lands, may be aided, 282,
whether this principle applicable to descriptions

283.

in assessment roll, 282-

286.

malicious, whether it will render assessors liable,

556, 557.

INTEREST —
taxes on, 22.
what recoverable in suit for illegal taxes paid, 571.
it,

imposed as a penalty for delay in paying taxes, 313-315.
93.
requiring county to pay, on debt apportioned to
41
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IXTEIiESTS, SEPARATE —
in lands, sometimes separately

assessed,

289.

assessed together, separate payments on, 289,

liens, etc., in case of, 306.
purchases by one joint owner, 346, 347.
redemption in cases of, 365, 367.

IXTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS —
taxation for, 94-97.
grounds on which it must be supported, 96, 97.
compulsory, not admissible,
(See

Compulsory Local Taxation.)

INTERNAL REVENUE —
penalties for frauds upon, 309-313.
construction

of statutes for,
OF

(See CoNSTEUCTiON"

liability of collector
(See

Collector

Tax Laws.)

/

of, 564.

op Taxes.)

taxes laid for,
(See

Excise Taxes

INTERPLEADER
bills

;

Taxes.)

—

of, may sometimes be necessary, 543.

INTERPRETATION —
of revenue

should aim at the intent in passing them, 193.

statutes,

aids to, where intent is not apparent, 199.
rules for reaching, 197.
(See CONSTEUCTION.)

INTOXICATING DRINKS —
taxation of, as luxuries, 23.
frauds and evasions when taxes heavy, 24.
taxation of manufacturers and dealers in, 390.
license to keep tavern, whetlier it includes license to deal in, 391.
laws prohibiting dealing in, 404.
may be taxed, though the sale unlawful, 404^06.
taxation of, under the police power, 412.
federal licenses to dealers in, 404, 414.

INTRUDERS
into office, who are, 186, 187.
distinguished from officers
acts of, are void, 186, 187.
are estopped from

de

facto, 186, 187.

disputing their authority when called upon

for moneys collected, 191.

INVIDIOUS ASSESSMENTS —
illustrations of, 129.
relief in equity from,
(See

Injukctios.)

to account

INDEX.
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INVIDIOUS CURATIVE LA.W8 —
are not admissible,

illustrations of,

225-227.

226, 227.

INVIDIOUS EXEMPTIONS —
are not admissible, 152.
grounds on which exemptions should be supported, 152, 153.
selecting particular individuals, are void, 153.
selecting pai-ticular parcels of property, 153, 154.
not make one's tax void if it is not thereby increased, 154.
in case of manufacturing enterprises, 129, 130.
illustrations of, 129.

■will

INVOLUNTARY PAYMENTS —
of illegal taxes, recovery back in

cases of, 565.
those made under protest are deemed to be, 567.
or under threat of distress, 569.

or on presentation

of legal process,

Voluntary Payments.)

(See

collection of interest in

■

569.

case of, 571.

IOWA —
constitutional provisions for equal taxation in, 138.
do not admit of exemptions of corporate property,
special fund for assessments in, 467.

138.

IRREGULAR ASSESSMENTS —
are not to be corrected on certiorari,
(See Cbbtiokaki.)
not be enjoined,

will

Injunction.)

(See

do not render assessors trespassers, 555.

Assessors.)

(See

towns are not liable for, 565.

Ikregulakities.)

(See

IRREGULAR TAXES —
are not
(See

void for that reason alone,

540.

iLLsaAL Taxes.)

IRREGULARITIES —
methods of curing in tax cases, 223-243.
cannot be cured by conclusive rules of evidence, 223, 234.
or by legislative mandates, 224.
may be cured by special curative laws, 225-229.
or by prospective laws, 230.
(See

Curative Laws.)

or by reassessing the tax, 233, 283.
or on a judicial hearing, 233, 234.

curing by amendment, 334-343.
(See Amendments.)
in the execution of directory statutes, may be overlooked,

319, 330.
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IRREGULARITIES — continued.
clerical, may be disregarded, 234, 563.
conditions sometimes imposed, to the taking adrantage of, 372, 378.
in cases of judgments for taxes, do not render the proceedings invalid, 362.
but may authorize a reversal, 362.
■what not mere irregularities,
not corrected on certiorari,

(See

360, 361, 539.

Certiokakt.)

not a ground for relief in equity,

EqmTY; Injunction.)
IRREPARABLE INJURY —
(See

which will cause, may be restrained, 538, 539.
instances of a tax which mipht destroy a franchise, 539.
distress of goods is not supposed to cause, 538, 539.
a tax

exceptional

cases, 539.

IRREPEALABLE EXEMPTIONS —
states may grant, 52-56.

necessity of consideration

for, 54.

by corporate charters, 55.
do not exist where right to repeal is reserved, 56.
implication against intent to grant,
(See

Exemptions.)

ISSUING LICENSES —
proceedings on, 413.
conditions imposed, 413.
whether they are of right when the conditions are complied with, 413.

J.
JOINT BOARDS

—

must meet and consider subject refen-ed to them, 193.
separate action of members is invalid, 193.
custom cannot change this rule, 193, 194.

if only two of three members are chosen, they cannot act, 193.
majority may act if all cannot agree, 194.
presumption in favor of action of, 194.
are subject to the writ of mandamus, 522, 523.
(See Boards op Equalization;
Boards of Review; Supervisors,
Board of.)
JOINT COMPLAINTS —
where an illegal tax affects all tax payers alike, 530.
where two or more are alike affected, 545.
cannot be entertained where the grounds of complaint are
distinct, 545.
reasons favoring them, 545, 546.
cannot be entertained on sole ground of saving expense,
546, 547,
to restrain political action, 548.

by tax payers

INDEX.

JOINT OWNERS

6-±5

—

assessment of proijevlj' of, 279.
interest to be separately assessed, 288, 289.
separate payment of taxes by, 289.

■when

redemptions

by, 367.
separate judgments against for taxes, 362.
separate purcliases by,
(See

Tenant in

JUDGMENT

Common.)

—

compelling payment of, by mandamus,

524, 525.

by federal courts, 525, 536.
of board of review, is final, 529.
cannot be set aside by statute, 233.

JUDGMENT, ERROBS OF —
do not render taxes illegal, 468.
do not render an otficer liable,
(See

JxiDiciAL Officer.)

JUDGMENT FOR TAXES —
provisions for in some states, 357.
preliminary review of proceedings,
court must have jurisdiction, 358.

357, 358.

jurisdiction must appear by the record, 358, 359.
report to the court as a basis for its action, 359.
notice of application for judgment, 359, 360.
defects which avoid the proceedings,
■who may appear and defend, 860.

360, 361.

irregular action will not avoid, 363.
judgment in case of joint owners, 862.
is void if no jurisdiction, 362.
proceedings subsequent to, 862.
recitals in record, 363.

JUDGMENT OP ONE'S PEERS —

the guaranty of, in magna charta, 36^0.
(See

Constitutional

JUDICIAL ACTION
assessors exercise,

Pkinciples;

Jury Trial; Law of the

—

in valuing

property, 550-552.

is had by boards of equalization, 291.
by boards of review, 291.
by highway officers in some cases, 550, 551.

by appraisers of damages, 551.
by inspectors of election, 551.
by school directors, 551.
by township boards, 551.
is void if it is usurped, 554-556.
ministerial officers do not exercise, in enforcing
(See

Judicial Officers.)

taxes, 40, 41.

Land.)
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—

of tax pioceedings, sometimes provided
on certiorari,

Cbrtiobaei.)

(See

hj

for, 333, 334.

allowing amendments,

(See AilEHDMBNTS.)

JUDICIAL DUTY —
discretion in exercise of, cannot be controlled by mandamus, 514r-516.
performance of, wlien'may be compelled, 414

liability in performance
(See

of,

Judicial Officers.)

JUDICLVL OFFICERS —
are not liable for errors of judgment,
reasons for the exemption, 550.

550.

the principle extends to all who exercise

judicial

functions,

550.

instances of such ofBcers, 550, 551.
the principle applies to assessors, 5.51, 552.
ai'e

what it protects them against, 553, 553.
liable for exceeding their jurisdiction, 553.
instance, of personal tax on nonresident, 553.
or of assessing a tax never voted, 554.

....

or an excessive tax, 554.

or a sum voted for an illegal purpose, 554.
are liable for depriving a party of a substantial right, 554.

distinction between error of judgment and excess of jurisdiction,
whether

malice

will

JUDICIAL POWER

render liable, 556, 557.

—

what it consists in, 40, 41.
not to be exercised by the legislature,
(See

JUDICIAL PROCESS
(See

224, 335.

Judiciary.)

Certiorari

JUDICIAL

;

—

Judiciart;

Makdamus.)

SALES —

sometimes provided for in tax cases, 357.
proceedings to, are in rem,
(See

Judgment

JUDICIARY

for

Taxes

)

—

can afford no redress against oppressive taxation, 4.
the levy of taxes does not belong to, 33-85.
cannot question the policy of tax laws, 34, 74.
can only restrain excess of jurisdiction, 35, 71, 104-108.
as where tax legislation is merely colorable, 36.
or has private purposes in view, 67-69.
(See

Remedies

for

Excessive and

Illegal

Taxation.)

is sometimes vested with statutory power of review, 36.
must presume in favor of legislation, 69, 70.

555, 556.
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'

is not to judge of legislative motives in taxing, 75.
is sometimes autlioi-ized to correct irregularities, 233, 234.
power of, to ijermil amendments in tax cases, 335-242.
cannot control discretionary local powers of taxation, 249, 350.
sitting to revise tax proceedings, must observe statutory regulations, 366.
whether forfeitures must be declared by, 816-819.
(See FOKFEITTJEES.)
cannot redress wrongs in special assessments, 461.
cannot limit the acknowledged powers of the legislature, 4.

right

to a

hearing Ijy,

(See La"w of the Lakd.)
officers of the, not personally
(See

Judicial Ofpiceks.)

judgments

liable for errors,

by, for taxes,

(See JUDGMEHTS FOR TAXES.)
power to compel performance of
(See

oflicial duty,

Makdamus.)

JURISDICTIOISr —
to tax, what gives, 14.
extends to all the subjects ol taxation, 4.
exists where protection

is due, 15.

may exist in behalf of government de facto, 4, 5.
is confined to territorial limits, 43.
does not exist in the case of nonresidents, 43.
of personalty depends on residence of owner, 43, 269-273.
cannot reach corporate shares of nonresident corporators, 43.
of states, does not embrace agencies of government, 56-61.
must be limited to the district taxed, 104-106.
excess of, in taxation may be restrained, 84.
(See

JuDiciABY.)

want of, cannot be cured retrospectively,

227-229.

(See CuBATivB Laws.)
consent cannot give, in tax cases, 371.
necessity for, when judgments are to be taken for
Judgment for Taxes.)
(See
to levy special

taxes, 358, 359.

assessments depends upon property

being benefited,

461.
(See Assessments, Local.)
in summary proceedings, must appear by the recitals,
limitations upon, in the nature of taxation,
upon the Taxing Power.)
(See Limitations
limitations specially imposed by constitutions, 66.
limitations imposed by the federal constitution,
(See Constitution of the United States.)
of the United States to tax,

(See United States.)
an assessment made without, is void, 539.

509, 510.

460,
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JURISDICTION—
certiorari

coraiTOt/ed

to review questions of,

Certiokari.)

(See

municipal bodies must keep strictly within, 535.
want of, in judicial officers will render them personally liable,
what constitutes a want of, in assessors, 553, 554.
of supervisor, what necessary to, 557, 558.
tax laid without, may be resisted, 558,
keeping inferior tribunals within, by jsrohibition, 574.
JURISDICTION, INFERIOR —

553, 555

(See Inferior Jurisdiction.)
JURY TRIAL —

guaranty of, in Magna Charta,

Law of the Land.)

(See

not of right under tax laws, 36^0, 303.
reasons why it could not be allowed, 37.

right

of, is not violated by special assessments,

435.

summary remedies in tax cases an exception to, 303.
not of right on question of collector's delinquency, 507.
is of right when land is demanded of one in possession, 545.
where one is entitled to, on demand, that is his remedy for an excessive
assessment,

JUSTICE

533.

—

of special

438, 439.

assessments,

is determined by the law providing therefor, 438.
of taxation cannot be determined by the courts,
(See

Judiciary.)

claims founded in,

will

support taxation, 88.

municipalities may be compelled
right of trial of, 481.

to

provide for,

480.

JUSTICE OF THE PEACE —
certiorari

to,

in

case

of militia penalties,

533.

JUSTIFICATION —
of officer by his warrant,
(See Process.)
of officer by certific I'e on which he is to act,
(See Supervisor.)
of local assessments by the special benefits conferred,
of taxation by the protection afforded by government,

K.
KANSAS —
special fund for assessments in, 466.
such case, 466.

liability of city in

416-418.
3, 14.
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laiNTUCKY—
liability of city for

special assessments, 467.
special fund for, 467.

KIN, NEXT OF —
(See

Successions.)

L.
LA.BOR —
taxes sometimes made payable in, 13.

discrimination in privilege

to pay in, 173.

on highways, 419, 430.

deprival of rights to pay in,

541.

LACHES —
in applying for certiorari, 531.
in objecting to irregular organization of municipal corporations,
in bringing suit to recover lands,
(See

Limitation, Statutes of.)
will be estoppe.1 by,

when one
(See

Estoppel.)

LAND —
taxes on, in England, 18.
taxes upon, by value, 36-30.
assessment of, for taxation, 375-383.

classification of, as seated and unseated,
meaning of these terms, 376, 377.
classification of, is imperative, 377.
changing from one list to other, 3'7.
resident

375.

lands, assessment of, 378, 379.

separate tracts to be separately assessed, 379-383.
what are separate tracts, 381, 383.
description, what requisite, 383-386.
valuation, must be of parcels separately, 387.
is a judicial act, 388.
cannot be made by legislature, 388.

of separate interests, 388, 389.
equalization of, 390.
lying in two townships, how assessed, 131,
single parcels not to be divided in, 383.
forfeiture of, for taxes, 315-319.
(See FOBFEITUKB.)
sale of, for taxes, 805-308, 331-361.
requires legislative authority, 305.
lien of the tax, 305.
not prevented by change in ownership,

306.

383.

549.
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LAND — continued.
sale of, of separate interests, 306.
municipalities cannot order, without legislative authority,

conditions precedent,

307.

307.

evidence that tax is unpaid, 307, 308.
special authority for, 308 333.
payment discharges right to make, 333.
or tender, 333.
proceedings rui, must be regular, 333.
is made exclusively under statutory power, 334.

insignificant consideration

received on, 334, 335.

purchaser must show proceedings

correct, 336-339.

presumptions of regularity in, 339-333.
notice of, must comply strictly with statute, 334.
(See

Notice.)

time and place of, 338.
competition

must be allowed at, 339, 340.

officer selling, must not be buyer, 341.
separate parcels must be sold separately, 341-343.
surplus bond on, 343.
excessive, is void, 343, 344.
must be made to highest bidder, 344.
must be for cash, 344.
certain persons may not buy at, 345-351.
to state or county, 351, 353.

different sales at same time, 353.
certificate of, 353.
deed on, and recitals in, 353.

the deed as evidence of regularity of, 353-357.
(See Tax Deed.)
judicial proceedings for, 357-363.
Judgment por Taxes.)
(See

redemption from, 368-370.
favored by the law, 303.
is a statutory right only, 364.
conditions

to cut off, must be complied

with,

365.

foreclosure of, 364, 365.

who may make, 366, 367.
relief against mistakes and frauds,
waiving conditions in, 368.

367.

gives no new title, 368.
conditions cannot be added to by officer or pui'chaser, 369.
power of legislature over, 369, 370.
recovery of, after conveyance, 371-383.
statutory conditions upon, 371.
requirement that betterments be paid for, 871, 373.
and that taxes be paid, 373-370.

draining under the police power,

403.

INDEX
LAND —
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continued.

draining by means of special assessments, 423,
whetlier this may be done for improvement

434.

merely, 433-425.

special assessments upon,
(See

Assessments, Locai,.)

sale of, for municipal taxes requires special authority,
personal liability for taxes upon, 378.
■where lands have been sold, 306, 307.

469-471.

for special assessments upon, 470-473.
can only be taxed within the district,

(See ExTBA Tekeitokial Taxation.)
discriminations in taxing, within the district,
(See

Overlying Disteicts.)"

remedies for excessive or illegal taxation of, 537.
by abatement, where it is excessive, 527, 538.
against assessor when land not taxable, 541.
when land is assessed to owner, 543.

in

of cloud upon title,

case
(See

quieting title to,

joint

542.

Cloud upon Title.)
544.

suits by several owners, 545-547.

relief in
(See

cases

of fraudulent assessments,

547.

Fraud.)

resisting collection of tax upon,

568-570.

adverse possession of,
(See

Adverse Possession.)

mandamus to relieve from taxes on, 574.

LAND CONTRACT —
,

assessment of, to agent, 370.

LAND TITLES —
change in ownership
personal

liability for

will

not affect lien for taxes, 306.

taxes on, 378, 306, 307.

recovery of, when sold for taxes, 371-383.
loss of, by adverse possession,
(See Adverse Possession.)
cloud upon, how relieved against,
(See Cloud upon Title.)

quieting,
(See

Quieting Title.)

equity not the proper tribunal for trying, 545,

LANDLORD —
title of, cannot be cut off by purchase by tenant, 345, 846
assessments of lands of, to occupant, 378, 379.

LAW, ERRORS OF —
correction
(See

of, by certiorari,

Certiorari.)
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LAW, EREORS 0¥ —

continued.
extending to jurisdiction, render officers liable,
(See

Jurisdiction.)

in judicial officers, create no personal liability,

Judicial Officers.)
LAW OFFICER OF THE STATE —
(See

interference by, in case of illegal corporate action, 548, 549.
mandamus on application of, to compel assessment of property, 520.
to compel county to assess state tax, 523.
to compel corporate officers to
to compel levy

of tax

furnish list of stockholders,

523.

to pay demands, 524.

LAW OP THE LAND —

is,

the guaranty of, 36.
does not necessarily imply judicial
■what

proceedings,

37.

36-40.

what curative laws are, 223-232.
(See

Curative Laws.)

whether

it

admits of distress for taxes, 302, 303.

will

sanction

imposition of penalties by ministerial officers,

313-315.

or of legislative forfeitures, 310-319.
(See

Forfeitures.)

not violated by enforcement of any valid tax, 425.
not violated by special assessments, 429.
nor by summary process against collectors
(See Collector op Taxes.)

right

and their sureties,

to an effectual remedy by,

(See

Cokstitutional Principles.)

LAWS —
impairing obligation of contracts forbidden, 53-56, 65.
by states, imposing certain duties, forbidden, 61, 63.
curative, may heal defects in tax proceedings, 223-232.
what cannot be cured by, 327-229.
may be made applicable to pending suits, 331.
construction of, in general, 197-322.
(See Construction.)
limitation, application
(See

of,

in tax

Limitation, Statutes

cases, 376-383.

op.)

must have revenue for their purpose,
directory, what are, 313-316, 319, 330.
mandatoiy, what are, 316-219.

9.

1,

retrospective, may cure want of power to tax, 100, 101.
presumption against, 331, 333.
199.
revenue, what are,

allowing redemption, are favorably construed, 363.
violative of spirit of constitution, not necessarily void, 488.
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LAWS — continued.
establishing rules of evidence,
(See Evidence.)
LAWYERS —

323, 234.

taxation of, 388, 394.
apportionment of taxes on, 179, 388, 389.

LEGACIES —
taxation of,
(See Successions.)

LEGAL PROCESS —
taxation of, 23.

LEGALITY —
in tax proceedings, is not warranted by municipal corporations,
Cayeat Emi"tok.)
(See
how to be shown in cases of tax titles,
(See

572.

Evidence.)

LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY —
is necessary for any tax, 244, 274.
must be had for assessments, 418.
may change local institutions at will, 474, 475.
but cannot take all power to itself, 474.

in

what cases it may compel local taxation, 475-480.
matters of police, courts, etc., 476, 477.

construction of highways, support of schools, 478.
payment of debts, indemnification of officers, 479, 480.
compensation for losses by riots, 480.
no compulsory power in matters concerning only the corporators, 482^93.
may abate state taxes, 571.
cannot make assessments, 288.
cannot set aside judgments

LEGISLATIVE DUTIES
performance
(See

by curative laws, 232.

—

caunot be compelled

by mandamus, 532.

PoLiTicAi, Action.)

LEGISLATIVE INTENT —
(See

Construction.)

LEGISLATIVE POWER —
taxing power is a, 32-40.
must grant taxes, 32.
must decide upon the purposes of taxation, 67.
and upon questions of policy involved, 34.

decision not absolutely conclusive,
presumption in its favor, 68, 69.

67.

must apportion taxes, 75, 125, 175.
discretion of, not subject to judicial control, 111.

districts for taxation. 111, 112.
may determine for itself the methods of establishing
must prescribe

districts, 112.
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LEGISLATIVE POWE'R—

continued.

may make exemptions from taxation,
(See Exemptions.)
limitations upon, by federal constitution,

the United States.)
limitations upon by state constitutions, as regards exemptions,
limitations upon, as regards local assessments,
Constitution

(See

(See Assessments,

presumption

op

Local

133-144.

)

in favor of correctness of apportionment,

179.

may delegate local powers of taxation,
(See

Local Poweb, to Tax.)

may levy retrospective taxes, 221, 222.
power of, to cure defects in tax proceedings, 223-233.
(See CuRATn'B

Laws.)

power to declare forfeitures, 316-319.
(See

Fokfbitures.)

whether it may extend or shorten time to redeem, 369, 370.
may prescribe districts for special assessments, 449, 450.
may determine the principles of apportioning such assessments, 449-456.
wliether it may audit claims against municipalities, 481.
cannot at pleasure impose debts upon municipalities, 483, 484, 498, 497.
cannot grant monopolies,
(See

Monopolies.)

cannot confer power to tax upon the judiciary, 84.
territorial limitations on power of,
(See

Extra Territorial Leoislation.)

exercised by local bodies,

Political Action.)
LEGISLATION —
(See

importance of permanence in,
lobby services to procure, 99.

174.

restraints upon, by constitutional
(See

principles,

Constitutional Principles.)

colorable taxation by, is void, 35, 36.
(See

Statutes.)

LESSEE —
cannot buy lessor's title at tax sale, 347.

LEVEES —
construction

of, ijiay be ordered under power of 'police, 401, 402,

special assessments for, 427.
districts for, 454.
apportionment of expense, 454.
different standards of apportionment
general taxation for, 427.
equality in such taxation, 162.

LEVY OP DISTRESS —
cannot in general be enjoined, 538.

in different

cases, 455.

INDEX.
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C07i<MiMe«2.

ability to make collection by, no defense
collection of illegal tax by, 568, 569.
(See

to a

bill

to remove cloud, 543.

Distress.)

LEVY OF TAXES —
mandamus lies to compel, by supervisors,
and by county trustee, 533.

compelling, to pay judgments,

533.

534-536.

or other settled demands, 534, 535.
by the state for municipal demands,
CoiTpuLSORT Local Taxation.)
(See

LEVY ON THE PERSON
(See

—

Arrest.)

LIABILITY —

Assessors ; Judicial
Towns; Usurpers.)

(See

Officers; Officers; Personal Liabilitt;

LIBERTY —
has come from contests over taxation, 45, 40.

principles of,

Constitutional Principles.)
LICENSES —
(See

granted to give privileges, 385.
granted for purposes of regulation,
granted to give monopolies,
(See

403-415.

403.

Monopolies.)

what they are, 406, 407.
granted by the federal government, 414, 415.
412.
by the state, cannot be nullified by town or county, 411,
may be taxed, 21, 386.

for issuing, 413.
right to, when conditions complied with,
power to recall, 414.
regulations

LICENSE FEES—

413.

^
.„o .n.
payment of, a condition to doing busmess, 403, 404.
imposed for purposes of regulation, 403, 412, 413.
imposed for revenue, are taxes, 403, 408, 409.

imposed for monopolies,

,

.

.

173, 403.

imposed for prohibition, 403, 404.
may be imposed on any employments,

410, 413.

on marriages, 410, 411.
on amusements, 411.
on lotteries, 411.
on games of chance, etc., 411, 413.

collection of, 414.
414.
whether to be rotarned when license revoked,
money paid for, when voluntarily paid, 566.
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LICENSED TRADERS —
among the Indians, not taxable by states, 03.

LIEN OF LOCAL ASSESSMENTS

—

sometimes establisbed by statute, 466-468.
attaches to the buildings, 468.
remains, though a void sale has been made, 468.

LIEN OF TAXES —

only exists by legislation, 305. '
municipal authorities cannot create, 307.
not affected by change in ownership, 306.
■who liable for tax in such case, 306, 307.
enforcing
(See

by sale,
op Land

Sale

relief in cases of.
(See Cloud tjpon

for

Taxes.)

Title.)

LIGHTING STREETS —
special assessments for, 428.

LIQUORS —

taxation of manufacturers

and dealers in, 390.

fees imposed on, under police power, 404r-407, 413.

policy in these impositions, 396.
may be imposed though the busines s is illegal, 404-400.
taxation, of as articles of luxury, 33, 135.

LIMITATIONS, STATUTES OF —
general power of the legislature to establish, 376.
short statutes of, for tax cases, 376.
questions of right and policy involved in, 376-378. '
application of to case of vacant tenements, 377-383.
who to be deemed the true owner, 558, 559.
nature of the claim which is affected by, 383, 383.
general principles governing, 381.

LIMITATIONS ON THE TAXING POWER —
general doctrine, 41.
must be for the public good, 43.
for public purposes, 43.

territorial,
(See

43.

Extra Terkitoeial Taxation.)

must be voted by people or their representatives, 44-48.
power must not be delegated, 48-51.
except to municipalities, 51.
power how affected by contracts, 53-56.
government agencies, officers, etc., not to be taxed, 56-61.
states not to tax the public domain, 59, 60.
nor to lay taxes on commerce, 61-04.
nor tonn.ige duties, 01, 63.
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IJMITATION ON THE TAXING FOWEB.—
states not to tax

continued.

in abridgment of privileges and immunities of citizens,

64, 65.

nor those

■wliicli

impair obligation of contracts,

express, imposed by state constitutions,

65.

66.

in case of special assessments, 438.
cannot be exceeded under orders of courts, 534.

LISTING —
by assessors, what is, 358.
by taxpayers, for assessment,
(See Tax Payees' Lists.)

LISTS —
of members, corporate officers may be required
furnishing by taxpayers, 37, 39, 363.
penalties for not bringing in, 368-264.
effect of including property not taxable, 364.

to

LITEEARY AND SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS

farnish,

5a8.

-

special exemptions of from taxation, 149, 150.
taxation in aid of, 86, 87.

LOANS —
not taxable by states, 58.
by corporations, taxation of, 168, 169.
by individuals, may be taxed, 163.

government,

(See

Credits.)

secured by mortgage, may be taxed though the land is taxed also, 159, 163.
to corporations by nonresidents, not taxable within the state, 65.

LOBBY SERVICES —
taxation for, not admissible,

99.

LOCAL ASSESSMENTS —
(See

Assessments, Local.)

LOCAL COMPULSORY
by legislature,
admissible

in

TAXATION —

not generally
case

admissible, 474, 475.

of objects of state

concern, 475.

of the peace, 476.
of
court
courts,
houses, etc., 477.
support
construction and repair of highways, 478.
support of public education, 478.
payment of corporate debts, 479.
making compensation for destruction by rioters,
indemnifying officers, 480.
such as, preservation

480.

whether legislature may audit claims against towns, etc., 481.
duplicate nature of municipal corporations, 433.
decisions regarding right to compel taxation in matters concerning

only themselves, 483-493.
42
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LOCAL POWERS TO TAX —
autliority to confer, 51.
in case of lands partly in different municipalities,
for higliway purposes, etc., 108-110.
are to be strictly construed, 98, 209-311.
instances of action in excess of, 98, 99.
constitutional

111.

not to be exercised to influence legislation, 99.
for military bounties, must be special, 100.
may be conferred retrospectively, 100.
cannot be exercised for private purposes, 100.
exercise of, must be confined to the district, 121-133.
exemptions from exercise of, 153.
general, must be confined to ordinary jDurposes,
liability to abuse, no argument against, 212.

310.

exercise of, 244^257.
meetings to vote taxes, 245.
must be regularly called, 346.
must be limited in action to purposes specified in call,

warning

24G, 247.

of, 246.

notice of, 246-249.
action of, to be favorably construed, 347.
votes must appear of record, 347-349.

informalities in action,
legislative

judiciary cannot control,
(See

to be overlooked,

349.

control over, 249.
249, 250, 531.

Political Action.)

restrictions

on exercise of, 250-354.

those imposed by federal constitution,
those imposed by state constitution,
other restrictions, 351.
restraints on, to protect minorities,

250, 351.

351.

251, 252.

precedent must be observed, 254.
what is the evidence of observance, 254, 255.
confiding exercise of to tax payers, 355.
conditions

are always subj ect to repeal, 255, 256.

and to modification,

231,222.

exhausting authority under, 256.
mubt be strictly executed, 259.
when state has an interest in their exercise,
compelling exercise of, to pay debts, 534-536.
for the purposes of local improvements,
(See Assessments, Local.)
conferred under the police power,
(See Licenses ; License Feks ; Police Power.)

are compulsory,

taxes on business under,
(See

Business

;

Privileges.)

attempted illegal exercise of, how restrained, 548
contracting debts an incipient step to exercise of, 479.

475-481.

INDES.

6."3£

LOCAL "WORKS —
payment for, out of special fund, 463, 463.

city the agent ot parties assessed, 463.
collection of cost by contractor, 466, 467.
acceptance of, conclusive on persons taxed,
(See Assessments, Local.)

468, 469.

LOCALITY OF PROPERTY —
gives jurisdiction

to tax, 14-16.

(See JuKisDicTiON
LOCOMOTIVES —

;

Noheesidents ; Pbbbonaltt.)

tax upon as property, 6
taxes upon are not admissible,

■what

(See

Raileoad

Companies.)

LOSSES —
by riots, indemnity for, 480.
by officers acting in good faith, indemnity for,

91, 92, 480.

(See Damages.)

LOTTERIES —
for regulation of, 411.
tax upon, adjudged to be a penalty, 264, 265.

fees

LOUISIANA—

constitutional provisions for equal taxation in,

138.

do not preclude special assessments, 438.
special fund for assessments in, 466.

liability of public in
property

such cases, 466.
taxed
by value, 435.
in, must be

LOWER HOUSE —
origin of revenue laws in,
LOW LANDS —

33.

taxation for draining, 101.
draining under the police power,
(See

402.

Drains.)

LUXURIES —
instances of taxes upon, 21, 23, 30.
effect when excessive, 34.

justice of special taxation of,

135.

M.
MACADAMIZED

ROADS —

taxation for, 94.

MACHINE SHOPS—

.
. ^„
,.
,
exemption from taxain
general
exempted
whether
of railroad company,

tion,

151.

LAW
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MACHINERY

OF

TAXATION.

—

tlie term held to include gas pipe, etc., 372.

MAGNA CHARTA—
protection by principles of, 36-iO.

Constitutional Principles.)

(See

MAINE —
property in, must be taxed by value, 435.

MAJORITY —
of joint boards, when may
(See

act, 193, 194.

Joint Boakds.)

of voters, cannot vote away property of minority,

78, 79.

MAKING ASSESSMENT —
is a judicial act, 551, 553.
assessors
(See

not liable for errors in,

Assessors.)

MALICE —
whether assessors

liable in

case of, 556.

MALT LIQUORS —
duties on, under police power,
(See

Police Power.)

taxation of, for revenue,
(See

Liquors.)

MANDAMUS—
general nature of the writ, 514, 520, 521.
award of, rests in discretion, 514.
right to redeem may be enforced by, 365.
is denied when another adequate remedy exists, 514, 520.
not lie to enforce a discretionary authority, 514.

will

or to enforce performance of political duties, 518, 519.
cannot control them in their judgments,
this rule applies to all assessments, 518.
and to other discretionary duties, 518, 519.

to assessors,

517, 520.

not to mere ministerial duties, 520, 521.
may compel them to insert taxable property on roll, 530.
to school directors, will not lie to compel them to exonerate a person
taxed, 518.

judicial oiBcers, when may be issued, and what its scope, 514-516.
to boards of review, may compel them to proceed to a hearing, 531.
to county treasurer, to compel issue of distress warrant against collector,
to

531.

to supervisors, to compel them to levy state tax, 533.
to county trustee, to compel tax to pay damages awarded, 533.
to compel issue of certificate of tax sale, 532.
to compel payment of surplus moneys at tax sale, 523.
will not lie to coerce bc-islativo duties, 523.
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MADAMUS — continued.
will lie to enforce ministerial
■will

duties, 520, 531.
even by a board liaviug legislative functions, 523, 523.
not lie to the executive, 523.

will lie

to compel

levy of tax

to pay

corporate duties in tax cases, 523.

judgments may

be compelled by, 523, 524.
and sometimes to pay other settled demands, 534, 525.
but not an unadjusted demand, 523.

■will

not lie to compel an official act by one not an officer, 523.
nor an act that could not voluntarily have been done, 523.

nor in advance of the time for doing the act,
jurisdiction of federal courts to issue, 525, 526.

523, 524.

MANDATORY STATUTES —
what is understood by, 312-315.
instances of, 216-219, 304.
necessity of obedience to, 212-215.
failure to observe, is not a mere irregularity, 534.
(See

Statutes.)

MANUFACTURE —
right

from tiic

to remove property

state

for purposes of,

MANUFACTURES —
taxation

of, 391.

MANUFACTURERS —
business taxes upon, 390.

of liquors, taxation of,
(See LiQUOES.)
what corporations

are held to be, 391.

MANUFACTURING ENTERPRISES —
taxation not admissible

in aid of, 78-80.

exercise of the eminent domain for, 77-83.
exemptions in favor of, 129, 145.
discriminations in duties, in aid of,
(See

Protection.)

MARRIAGES —
are sometimes taxed, 30.

license fees imposed upon for regulation,

410, 411.

MARRIED WOMEN —

taxation of land of. to husband, 278.
redemption of homestead interest by, 366.
must redeem imder the statutory conditions,

special provisions for redemption by, 364.
no implied exemption in favor of, 146.

MARSHES —

taxation for the purpose of draining, 403.
424.
special assessments for draining, 433,
(See

Drains.)

364.

61.
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MARYLAND —
property -in, must be by value, 435.
liability for special assessments in, 466.

MASSACHUSETTS —
constitutional

provisions

for equal taxation in,

of, to special assessments,

application

special fund for assessments

140.

438-443.

in, 467.

MAXIMS —
of policy in taxation, 6-8.
that taxation is for revenue,

9.

qualifying tliis for purposes of protection,

10, 396.

or to discourage cerlain occupations, 11.
tbat taxation and protection are reciprocal, 14-17, 43-44.
that every man has a remedy in the law, 36-40.
that taxation is only for public purposes, 42, 67.
that taxation and representation go together, 44-48. 1
that sovereign powers are not to be delegated, 48-51.

qualification of this in case of local taxation, 51.
that one sovereignty cannot be taxed by another, 56-61.

Principles of Taxation.)

(See

that he who seeks equity must do equity, 537, 538.

MEANING OF WORDS —
(See CoNSTKncTiON ;

MEETING
(See

Definitions.)

HOUSES —
Churches.)

MEETINGS —
of aggregate bodies, are essential to valid action, 193, 195.
presumption that meeting has taken place, 194.
action by majority in case of, 194.
of towns, etc., to vote taxes, 345-250.
are only legal as they comply with the law,
how appointed, 245.
notification

of, by statute,

346.

limiting subjects, to be considered
must be regularly called, 246.
notification must be regular, 346.
proof of notice of,
(See

345.

at, 346.

Notice.)

what sufficient warning of, 246, 347.
action of, to be favorably construed, 347.
votes must appear of record, 247 , 248.
must be strictly confined to purposes of the call, 247.
courts cannot control, 249, 250.
power of legislature over action of, 249.
of boards of review,
(See BoAKDS

of Review.)
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MERCHANTS —
taxation of business of, 389.
meaning of, 389.

discriminations against tliose not residents,

390.

may be taxed on stock and also on occupation,

MERITS

389.

—

of assessment will not
(See

be reviewed on certiorari,

533.

Ceetiobaki.)

METHODS —
of taxation,
(See

Taxation.)

of apportionment,

(See APPOHTIONMENT.)

of collection,
op Taxes.)
of obtaining relief in tax cases,
(See Remedies fob, Excessive and
(See

Cou.ECTiON

Illegal

of enforcing official duty,

Taxation.)

(See Mandamus.)

of enforcing tbe responsibility of collectors,

Collector
MICHIGAN —
(See

op

thb

Customs;

Collectob

uniformity of taxation in, 140.
taxation of property by value in, 435.
constitutional provisions affecting special
special fund for assessments in, 467.

op Taxes.)

assessments,

443.

MILITARY BOUNTIES —
taxation for by municipal corporations,
(See

Bounties.)

MILITARY COMPANY —
furnishing uniform for, not

MILITARY PENALTIES
certiorari in

a proper town charge, 100.

—

case of, 533.

MILITARY SERVICE

-

taxation of property of one engaged in,

146.

one exempt from, may be taxed to pay bounties for volunteers, 431.

MILL DAMS

—

condemning

MINISTERIAL

lands for, 77-83.

DUTIES —

performance of may be compelled by mandamus, 530-535.
the principle applicable to bodies having discretionary powers,
(See

Mandamus.).

MINISTERIAL

OFFICIIRS —

confined strictly to their statutory authority, 33.
cannot refund taxes unless specially empowered, 530.

514-516.
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MINISTERIAL OTYlCEJiS — continued.
certiorari

does not

lie

to, 533.

protection of by j)rocess, 569.
(See

Pkocess.)

compulsory process against, 512-536.
(See Mandajitos.)

MINNESOTA —
equality and uniformity of taxation in, 141.
taxation of property by value in, 485.
constitutional provisions affecting special assessments,

MINORITIES

441.

—

property of, cannot be voted away by majority, 78, 79.
constitutions framed for protection of, 351, 353.

MINORS —
taxation of, 45.
redemption

by, must be made under the statutory conditions,

364.

special provisions for redemption b3', 364.
may sell their rights subject to redemption, 364.
guardian maj- be personally taxed for property of, 371.

MISAPPROPRIATION —
levy will not be enjoined, on allegation of intent to make, 540.
may be restrained as a public wrong, 548.
restraining on bill filed by private parties, 548, 549.
no individual action at law for, 573.
does not render a tax levy illegal, 573.

MISCHIEFS —
of improvident use of certiorari, 581,533.
of enjoining taxes, 536.
of the remedy by replevin, 572, 573.
in tax cases, mostly corrected only by political remedies,
MISCONDUCT —
(See CoLLBCTOR OF TAXES ;

MISFEASANCE

False Return

;

575.

Mai.ice.)

—

of officer, does not render town, etc., liable, 570.
of collector, when it will render him trespasser ab initio,
(See Collector of Taxes.)
of otBcers in making false returns,
(See

of

Officers.)

assessors,

etc., damages for, 570.

MISSISSIPPI —
constitutional

provisions in, bearing upon special assessments, 443.
taxation of property b}' value in, 435.

MISSOURI —
constitutional

provisions

uniformity of taxation in,

in, bearing upon special assessments, 443.
141.

INDEX.

665

MISTAKE —
in description of land, effect of,
(See

382-286.

Description.)

in naming tlie party liable to assessment, 331, 278, 279.
in redemption, not relieved against, 368.
except where it is mistake of ofQcer or purchaser, 367.
in assessments, correction of by abatement, 528, 539.
in listing property for taxation, 264.
may give jurisdiction to equity, 536.
of party in paying an illegal tax, 567.
of officers, towns are not liable for, 570.
in omitting property from assessment will not render levy void,
(See Omissioks.)
correction of by amendments,
(See Amendments.)
correction of by statute,
(See CuBATivB Lavs's.)

'

MISTAKE OF LAW —
in

assessors,

does not render assessment void, 155, 156.
judicial officers liable,

does not render
(See

Judicial Officek.)

MODIFICATION —
of local powers
construction in

to tax,

right

of, 310, 255, 25G.

cases of, 331, 332.

MONEY —
taxes on the interest of, 32.

presumptively payable in, 501,
collector limited to receiving, 501.
collector must safely keep at his peril, 501.
demands against the public not receivable instead
coin may be demanded by states, 13.
taxes

are

of, 501.

MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED —
action of, by state against collector, 497, 498.
defense to, must be on substantial grounds, 497.

insufficiency of collector's authority, no defense,
or defect in his official title, 498.
or the illegality of the tax, 498.
action on collector's

498.

bond for, 499-504.

action against town, etc., for, 565-570.
will only lie when tax is void, 565.
and where it has been paid under compulsion, 565.
and where it has been paid over by the officer, 565.
and where no other remedy has been elected, 565.

will

not lie for an irregular assessment,

what to
(See

Voluntary

565, 566.

voluntary payment,
Payment.)

be deemed a

567.
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MONEY HAD AND H'EC'EIY ED —

continued.
action against town, demand not necessary before bringing, 571.
interest recoverable in, 571.

refunding,

in

case

of illegal collections,

530.

MONOPOLIES —
taxation capable of being employed to build up, 173.
spirit of tlie constitution forbids, 173.
instances of, in England, 173, 403.

of patented pavements, 173.
license fees for purposes of, 403.
taxation for private purposes, compared to, 403.
case

MONUMENTS —
power of municipal corporations

to erect, 211.

MORAL OBLIGATIONS —
■will

support taxation,

municipalities may

91.

be required

to recognize, 479, 481.

MORTGAGEE —
purchase by, at tax sale, 347, 348.
whether mortgagor's title may be cut off thereby, 347.
title of, cannot be cut off by mortgagor's purchase, 345.

MORTGAGES —
to be taxed to owner where he resides, 43.

given by railroad company, docs not make bonds held by nonresidents
taxable in state, 65.
must be taxed, where taxation is required to be in proportion to property,
134.

may be taxed, though the property mortgaged is taxed also, 134, 159.
whether this constitutes duplicate taxation, 159.
not in existence at date of assessment,

cannot be taxed, 261.

MORTGAGOR —
cannot cut off mortgage by tax purchase, 345-351
whether title may be cut off by mortgagee's purchase, 347-351.

MOTIVES —
(See

JtrorciAL

Officer; Malice.)

MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS

—

joinder of complaints in equity in order to avoid, 545.
mere saving of expense not a reason for, 546, 547.
necessity that there should be some ground of equity jurisdiction,
546, 547.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS —
may be empowered to tax, 51.
powers may be changed at the discretion
charters of, not contracts, 56.
h.ive no inherent power to tax, 475.

of the legislature,

474.

ixDEz.
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — coraijnuei.
may tax business, 387.
but must be specially empowered, 387.
construction of powers to tax, 98, 209-311, 387.
grant of licenses by, 408.
enforcing licenses by imprisonment,

301.

cannot nullify state licenses, 411, 413.
(See Licenses.)
special assessments for streets in, 419-433.
for sewers, drains, etc., in, 433-437.

for water pipes in streets, 437.
for lighting streets of, 438.
constitutional objections to, 429-446.
apportionment of, 444-456.
may be left to discretion of municipality, 444.
property subject to, 456-459.
proceedings
personal

in levying and collecting,

liability

459-470.

for, 470-473.

acceptance of work, conclusive on persons assessed, 468, 469.
act as agents for tax payers in levying and collecting assessments, 463.
not taxable by Unifed States, 58.
taxation of, under legislative compulsion,

473-495.

in what cases allowable, 475-480.
cases of preservation of the peace, support of courts, etc.,
construction of highways and support of schools, 478.
payment of corporate debts, 479.
compensation for injuries by rioters, 480.
indemnification of officers, 480.
in what cases not allowable, 483-493.
local improvements, 484.
state buildings, 484, 485.
city parks, 485, 486.
cases which recognize the supreme authority of the legislature,
apportioning cost of roads between, 478.
and cost of suits, 480.
and debts and property on division of, 177, 178, 479, 481.
state cannot make contracts for, 483, 484, 493, 497.
of, to trial on question of indebtedness, 481.

right

power of, to erect monuments, etc., 311.
ownership of property of, on division, 176.

collection of taxes on division, 176.
abatement of taxes by authorities of,
appeal by, from assessments, 529.
refunding taxes by, 530.
review of proceedings of, 530-535.
(See

Cebtioeaki.)

(See

Political Action.)

537.

540.
action preliminary to taxation cannot be enjoined,

476, 477.

487-493.
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MUNICIPAL CO'RPO'RA.TIO'NS — continued.
failure to observe by-laws does not avoid action, 534.
whether merely illegal taxation by, may be enjoined, 539.
exercise powers in trust for corporators, 539.
remedies against, for misappropriation,

540.

(See MlSAPPKOPRIATION.)

restraining action ultra vires, 548.
illegal organization of, must be complained of promptly,
action against, for moneys illegally collected, 565, 566.
Money Had and Received.)
(See
liability of, for acts of officers, 570, 571.
do not warrant title to propertj' sold for taxes, 572.
remedy for usurpation by, 574.
(SeeCouKTY; Town.)
compelling taxation by, to pay judgments, 524.

530, 549.

or other settled demands, 524, 525.
taxation by, under orders of federal courts, 525, 526.
cannot be cimpelled to tax beyond statutory powers, 524.
action of, cannot be questioned on ground of members of the council
having been improperly seated, 188.

MUNICIPAL REVENUES —
are presumptively

derived from taxation, 494.

state control of,
(See

Local Compdi.sort Taxation.)

N.
NAME —
error in, in assessment,

231, 278.

NATION —
(See

United States.)

NATIONAL BANKS —
may be taxed by states, 61.
statutory provisions concerning, 394, 395.
to be taxed as state banks, 394, 395.
may be required to pay taxes on shares, 395.

only

action against asessors for illegal taxation, 555.

NATIONAL DEBT —
(See National Secueities

;

Public Debt.)

NATIONAL SECURITIES —
not taxable by the state, 58.
mandamus in case of illegal taxation of, 520.
excise tax on corporations whose moneys are invested in, 394.

INDEX

669

NATURE OF THE TAXING POWERwliat it is, 32-40.

Taxing

(See

Po^YBK.)

NAVIGATION —
(See Ships.)

NEBRASJIA —
taxes on legal process in, 33.

NECESSITY—
for

a government, is imperative, 313.
the foundation of the right of eminent domain, 76-83.
and of taxation, 1, 4, 513.

private convenience must yield to, in collection of taxes, 398, 404, 536, 573.

NEGATIVE PROVISIONS —
may render statute mandatory,

314.

.

NEGLECT OP DUTY—
of collector, action for, 499.
by assessor, liability for, 554.
correction of, by mandamus,
(See

Mandamus.)

by municipal corporations
(See CoMPULsoKT

in not paying debts,

Local Taxation.)

NEGLIGENCE —
of assessors in not levying tax, liability for,
in not taking official oath, 558.

553.

NEGOTIABLE PAPER —
of municipalities, issue of, may cause irremediable

mischief, 549.

taxation of, 33.

NET INCOME —
not same thing as dividends,
(See

170.

Income.)

NEVADA—
taxes on legal process in, 33.
taxation of property to be by value, 435.

NEW ASSESSMENT—
Reassbsshbnt.)
STATES —

(See

NEW

may not tax the public domain in, 59, 69.
may tax possessory interests, 60.
when lands in, are so disposed of as to be taxable, 60.

NEW TERRITORIES
(See

-

Tbkritokies.)

NEW YORK —
special fund for local assessments in, 487.

'
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NEWSPAPERS —
taxes on, 33.

NEXT OF KIN —
taxation of distributions to, 270.
(See SuccEssoKS.)

NONAGE —
(See

MixoKS.)

NONRESIDENT LANDS

-

separate from resident, 275.
this requirement imperative, 276.
must be correctly described, 286.
assessed

Desceiption.)
railroad track is not, 274.
(See Unseated Lakds.)
(See

a

assessmout fixes character of, for tax purposes, 334,
assessment of, as resident, 277

8.59.

NONRESIDENTS—
personal tax cannot be assessed against, 14, 42.
right to collect a debt in the state, not taxable, 14-16.
personalty of, actually in the state may l)e taxed, 15, 43.
owning shares in a corporation, cannot be taxed thjough the coporotion, 43.
cannot be taxed on personalty being carried through the state, 43.
may be taxed on their business within the state, 64.
must not be discriminated against, 64.
dilferent methods of procedure in case of, 64.
incidental benefits to, from taxation, 127.

discriminations between those living

within or without

a

city,

130,

158.

bonds held by, not taxable within the state, 14-16, 169.
not chargeable with constructive notice of action of assessors, 366, 267.
are taxable on their lands, 64.
assessment
(See

of lands of,

Nonresident Lands.)

notice of tax sale in case of, 334.
personal assessment upon, is a nullity, 571.
recovery by, of personal tax paid, 571.

NORMAL SCHOOL —
local taxation for,

NORTH

114, 115.

CAROLINA-

taxation of property in, to be by value, 435.

NOTARY PUBLIC-

" trades,
authority to tax
occupations

and professions,"

does not include,

INDEX.
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NOTICE —
of town meetings, the statute itself may be, 345, 246.
omission of public notice in such cases not fatal, 246.
of special town meetings, must be given, 246.
business of special town meeting must be confined to objects mentioned in, 246.
effect of neglect to give, or of giving misleading notice, 248.
how proof of sliouid be made, 248.
of assessments, right of parties to, 265, 263.
.statutes for, must be strictly observed, 265.
not personall}' bound by constructive, 266, 267.
upon corporation, failure to give, is not fatal when subsequent notice
provided for, 267.
nonresidents

of adverse proceedings, in general, is matter of right,
of road taxes, necessity for, 304.
to be given before distress levied, 304.

is

of tax sales, must comply with statute, 334.
if not described in statute, must be in writing, 384.
may be given by publication, 334.
required to be given to occupant, how complied with, 334.
is a prerequisite to any authority to sell, 335.
is void if it omits statement of taxes where statute requires
or gives incorrect statement, 336.
not for full time, 335.
or
or does not appear to be otBcial, 386.
or varies from the assessment, 336.
or gives an imperfect description,
or is in the wrong paper, 836.
instances of other defects in, 336, 837.

how proof of, to be made,

386, 837.

337, 338.

is

it,

837.
given, sufficient to follow
of the paper, 337.
issues
in
regular
be
must
of,
publication

if form

after tax sale, when required to be given, 353.

of application for judgment for

taxes, 359.

to foreclose redemption, 365, 366.
of meeting of board to review assessments,

580.

a

record thereof, 580.
of increase of assessment, right to, 541, 547.
of change in assessment, 555.
of objections to public worli, duty of party to give, 573.

curing defect in retrospectively, 281.
limitation upon the right, 239.
(See Hbaking.)
constructive,

from records,

(See Records.)

NUDUM PACTUM —

obligations contracted without authority of law
399.
contracts in violation of revenue laws are,

are, 103.

it,

of tax,

266.

385.
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NUGATOKY PROCEEDINGS
(See Nullity.)

—

NUISANCE —
taxation in order to abate,
(See

riglit

Dradts.)
to declare

liquor selling

to be, 413.

NULLITY —
colorable taxation is a, 33-40.
delegation of power to tax is
what burdens are a,

a, 33.

LniiT.iTiONS on the Taxing Poweb.)
whicli is a, may be resisted, 538.

(See
ta.x

and collector may refuse to collect, 501.
excess of municipal powers is a, 535.
an excessive tax is a,
(See

ExcEssiTE Taxes.)

tax sale after payment or tender is
tax without apportionment is a,
(See

a, 323, 323.

Appoktionment.)

any tax without jurisdiction is a,
(See

Jurisdiction.)

a merely
(See
a levy
(See

irregular assessment is not

a, 540.

Irregularities.)
which is a, if paid without objection
Voluntary Payment.)

sale for two taxes, one of which is a, 564.
liability of town, etc., whore tax is a, 566.
town not liable for a void sale never enforce
legislature
(See

cannot be recovered back,

a, 570.

cannot validate a,

Curative Laws.)

when a local assessment is a, 465.

o.
OATH —
to tax payer's list,

failure

to make,

268.

Affidavit.)
OATH, OFFICIAL —
(See Official Oath.)
(See

OBJECTION —
to take in season, may work an estoppel,
Estoppel.)
payment of illegal tax without, no recovery in case of,
(Sec Voluntary Payment.)

failure
(See

563.
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OBJECTS OF TAXATION —
(See PuBPOSBS of Taxation.)

OBLIGATION —
(See Bond ; Moral Obligation

;

Nudum Pactum.)

OBLIGATION OP CONTRACTS —
must not be impaired iu taxation, 53-56.

this precludes

state setting aside its own contracts, 53, 53.

Exemptions.)
owing in tlie states to nonresidents,
taxing residents on debts owing tliem does not impair, Go.
(See CoNTKACTS ;

states cannot tax debts

65.

OCCUPANT —
purchaser at sheriff's sale of right of, may redeem, 366.
of land, personal tax upon, 377, 378.
must be assessed for land, if statute so provides, 378.
assessment of lands of several to one as agent, 378.
whether he may acquire title at tax sale, 347-351.

holding he may not, 848, 349.
holding the contrary, 350, 351.
may be compensated for betterments,
claiming land but losing
notice, 365.
cannot waive for the owner the right to
possessory right of on public lands, may be taxed, 60.
cases

371, 373.

a

it,

cases

what

is

OCCUPATION —
sufBcient to entitle one to notice, 334.

what constitutes, 376.
a

(See Seated Lands.)
of part of parcel of land, fixes character of all

as occupied,

376.

OCCUPATIONS —
taxation of,
(See Business; Pbofessions.)
what to be deemed privileges under tax laws, 385, 392.
licenses for permission to follow, 385.
whether business unlawful if license not taken out, 386.
privileges liable to taxation, 386.
licensed by state, municipality cannot preclude being carried on, 386.

(See

Police Power

)

may be licensed by state and also by county or town, 386.
construction of municipal powers to tax, 387.
what included in "occupation, trade or profession," 393.
may be licensed for purposes of regulation, 396^15.
but not for purposes of monopolies,
(See

Monopolies.)

illegal, may still be taxed,

405, 406.

OPFENSES —
taxation for punishm'ent of, 476, 477.
against the revenue laws, 399, 309-315.
48
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OFFICE FOUND —
wliether necessary to a forfeiture, 317-319.
(See

FoBPBiTtfEES.)

OFFICERS —
taxation may be imposed to indemnify,

91 , 93.

municipalities may be required to indemnify,
taxation can only be had by means of, 184.
definition of,

184.

kinds of, legislative, executive and judicial,
inferior ministerial, 184.
de

480.

184.

facto, what are, 184r-186.
ousting by judicial proceedings, 185.
distinguished from usurpers, 186, 187.
acts of, not to be assailed collaterally,

187-190.

cannot by his action build up rights in his own favor, 188.
these rules apply in tax cases, 190, 191.
intruders, when estopped from denying official character, 191, 193.

joint action by,

193, 194.

must be meeting for, 193.
custom cannot change this rule, 193, 194.

invalid if requisite number not chosen, 193.
majority maj' act, 194.
presumptions which support action , 194.
returns and certificates of, are evidence, 195.
generally held conclusive, 195, 196.

liability for false,

196.

amendment of records, rolls, etc., by, 334r-343.
(See Amendments.)

curing irregularities of by statute,
(See CuKATivB Laws.)
correcting irregularities judicially,
fSee

.Judicial Cokkections.)

mistakes of, when parties are making redemption, may be relieved against,
:;67.

may be compelled by mandamus to permit redemption, 365.
refusal of, to give certificate for purposes of redemption, 368.
cannot add to the conditions of redemption, 369.
re:]uirement of otficial oath, 513.
(See Oath, Official.)
r;quiremeut of olflcial bond, 513.
(See CoLLECTOn of Taxes ; Sureties.)
penalties against, for nonperformance of duty,
compelling performance of duty by, 512-526.
(See Mandajius.)
excess of jurisdiction by,
(See

Jurisdiction.)

518.

IKDEX.
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continued.

judicial, not liable for errors, 550-557.
whether this principle applies in case of malicious action,
(See

protection

Judicial Officer.)

556, 557,

of, by process,

(See Process.)
presumption that they will pause in illegal action, 544.
of highways, judicial action by, 550.
what is not, 541.
protection of by certificate, 558.
municipalities not liable for conduct of, 566.
collecting moneys, are not liable after they are paid over,

Collector,

568.

op Taxes.)
(See
for
action
damages against, 570.
proceedings by quo warranto against, 574.

political remedies in case of, 575.
of municipalities, action by, ultra vires,
(See

Ultra Vires.)

cannot refund taxes unless specially empowered, 537.
taxation of salaries of,
(See

Salaries.)
CORPORATE —

OFFICERS,

may be compelled

by mandamus to perform duty under tax laws, 533.

OFFICES —
federal, may be taxed by United States, 391.
state, may be taxed by states, 391, 392.
state, may be taxed by county, etc., under proper authority,
of one government, cannot be taxed by the other, 58, 393.

taxation of county, 144.

OFFICIAL ACTION —
necessity for, in tax cases, 184.
(See

Offices.)

by persons irregularly claiming office, 184-191.
cannot bo required of those no longer otficers, 533.

liability
(See

for,

Remedies fob Excessive ahd

by usurpers,
(See

Usurpers.)

OPFCIAL AUTHORITY—
protection
(See

by,

Process.)

excess of,
(See JuEiSDiCTiON.)

Illegal

Taxation.)

393.
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OFFICIAL BOND —
of collector may

be

valid though not in compliance with

statute,

499.

or 'not required by statute, 499.

liability of sureties upon, 500-504.
(See Collector of Taxes.)

OFFICIAL OATH —
neglect to take, does not create personal liability, 553.
does not preclude one being officer de facto, 186.
reliance upon for protection of the public, 513.

OFFICIAL RETURNS —
conclusiveness

of, 195.

liability for false, 196.
of failure to collect tax,
■what

307, 359.

should be shown by, 308.

disproving,

359.

OFFSET —
of damages against special assessment,
of rents and profits against redemption
(See

420.
monej^s, 365.

Set Off.)

OHIO —
exemptions of property from taxation in, 143.
constitutional provisions bearing upon special assessments,
payment of special assessments

in,

443.

467.

OMISSIONS —
of property from tax roll, when may

be corrected by mandamus, 530.

will

not vitiate the whole tax, 155.
caused by error of law, 156.
unlawful, if purposely made, vitiate tax, 153.
accidental,

are not mere irregularities,

553.

ONUS OF PROOF —
purchaser must take, when tax title is in question, 336-339, 353-355.
change of this rule by statute, 355-357.
(See

Presumption

;

Tax Deed.;

OPENING STREETS —
special assessments

for, 420, 431.
offsetting benefits against damages in case of, 430.
principles governing proceedings in, 431.

Assessments, Local.)
OPINIONS —
(See

(See

Judicial Officers.)

OPPRESSIVE
(See

TAXES —

Political Remedies.)
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ORDER —
preservation

of, is

a state

municipalities may

duty, 476.

be compelled

and to make compensation

to tax for, 476, 477.

for losses by riots,

480.

ORDERING SALE FOR TAXES —
(See

Jddsment

for

Taxes.)

ORDERING TAS LEVY —
(See

Judgment; Compulsoky Local Taxation.)

ORDERLY PROCEEDINGS —
are essential in taxation, 3.

ORDINANCES —
for special assessments, instances of,
(See McNiciPAL Cokpokations.)

464, 465.

OREGON —
constitutional provisions in, bearing upon special
taxation of property in, must be by value, 435.
ORES —

assessments,

assessment of, for taxation, 259.

ORGANIZATION —
of school districts, delay in questioning,
estoppel in case of, 549.
defective, unlawful tax in case of, 558.

530.

OVERFLOW —
of streams, assessments for prevention of,
(See

437.

Levees.)

OVERLYING DISTRICTS —
for the purposes of state buildings, 114^117.
iu street cases, 117.
(See Assessments, Local.)
in the case of general city taxation, 118-130.
(See RuKAii Lands.)

OWNER—
when land to be assessed to, 376-279.
assessments of lands when unknown, 277, 278.
effect of consent to assessment in wrong list, 377.
former, assessment to, 278.
transferring title after assessment, 278.
when wife is, lands not to be assessed to husband, 378.
assessment to one of several, 278.
mistake in not assessing to, 278.
assessments to persons unknown, 279.
when must petition for local assessment, 464.

liability of, for assessments,
Assessments,
Local.)
(See

personal

470-473.

443.
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OW'N'E'R — continued.
recovering lands ma}' be reqtiired to pay for betterments, 371, 372.

losing title by adverse possession,
(See Limitation, Statutes of.)
who is, for purposes of redemption,

366.

PACKAGES—
imported, when they become taxable by states, 63.

PAPEES AND BOOKS —
(See Ambndme^'ts ;

PAKOELS OF LAND

Kecouds.)
—

must be separately assessed, 279, 280.
failure, renders assessment void, 279.

separate,

reason for this, 280.
whether grouping is

a

mere irregularity, 279, 280.

■what are, 281, 282.

case of lots occupied together, 282.
water rights not to be assessed separate from the land, 282.
must be separately valued, 287.

and separately sold, 341-343.
must not be divided in assessment,

282.

dividing for sale when tax on part is paid,
(See

Tenant in

(See

Dbsckiption.)

Common.)
erroneous descriptions of, avoid tax, 558.

PARKS —
taxation for, 93.
(See

Compulsory Local Taxation.)

EVIDENCE-

PAROL

to show vote

of

a school tax, 248.

to prove lost records, 248, 249.

Evidence.)
LEGAL —
(See

PART

(See

Tax Pakt Lesal.)

PARTIALITY —
in tax laws, 128.
in customs duties,
(See

in

Protection.)

assessments,
(See

Invidious Assessments.)

in exemptions,
(See Exemptions.)

341.

INDEX.
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PARTIES —
(See

JoiKT Complaint

PARTNERSHIP

—

;

Relatoh.)

taxation of members severally, 371.
assessment of lands of, 283.

PASSAGE —
from one state to another, right of, 59,

PASSENGERS —
taxation on carriage of, when in violation of federal
constitution,
taxation of carriers of, 388.

59, 63.

PATENT—
description of land by, in assessment,
PATENTED PAVEMENT —

283, 387.

taxation for, 178.

PAUPERISM —
taxation in relief of, 88, 89.

PAVING STREETS —
assessments for the purpose of, 431.

for repaving, 433.
(See Assessments, Local.)

PAYMENT OF MUNICIPAL DEBTS —
compelling tax for, by mandamus, 534-536.
levy of tax for, under state compulsion, 479.

PAYMENT OF PUBLIC DEBT —
taxation for, 103.

PAYMENT OF TAX —
demand of, before levy of distress, 304.
extinguishes

authority

to sell, 832.

by one part owner, 341.
whether it can be shown to defeat judgment, 363.
requirement of, as condition to recovery of land, 373.

in what

cases this is not admissible,

374, 375.

is

is

is

it,

requirement of, as condition to maintaining suit, 319, 330.
in license cases, as condition of doing business, 385, 386.
in labor, is of right wlten the law permits
541.
if tax illegal, the law affords adequate remedy, 538, 543, 545.
if voluntary, no remedy- against town, etc., though tax illegal, 565.
what
voluntary payment, 567.
all not made under protest or apparent compulsion of process,
what is involuntary payment, 569.
(See VoLiTNTABY Payment.)
only part illegal, 571.
recovering back, where tax

PAYMENT, OVER —
by collector, before town can be liable, 565.
whether collector afterwards liable. 563.

568.
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PAYMENT, OVER — continued.
compulsory proceedings against collector to enforce,
(See CoLLECTOJi op Taxes.)

PEACE, BILLS OF —

Title.)
PEACE, PRESERVATION OF —
(See

QuiBTiKG

is a state dut}', 476, 477.

PEACEFUL REMEDY —
by not yielding to illegal demands,
PEDDLERS —

558.

taxation of, 390.

PENALTIES —
'

for delinquency in payment of taxes, 309-315.
for frauds, evasions, etc., 309.
under federal revenue laws, 309.

liow imposed, 310.
forfeiting right to appeal,

etc., 311-313.

Tvlietlier Ihey may be imposed without judicial investigation,
imposed on redemption, 314, 315.

313-815.

of official duty, 513.
for failure to list property for taxation, 141, 261-263.

for nonperformance
(See

Tax Patbks' Lists.)

construction

of laws which impose,

208, 262, 263.

PENSIONS —
taxation for, 74.

PEOPLE —
voting taxes by,

Voting

the Tax.)
(See
to
assent of,
taxes, 44-48, 178, 474^495.
PEOPLE'S REPRESENTATIVES —
(See

Repeesektation.)

PERMANENCE IN LEGISLATION —
importance of, to equal taxation, 174.

PERMANENT IMPROVEMENTS —
(See

Betterments.)

PERNICIOUS EMPLOYMENTS —
propriety of discriminating against, 396.
taxation in regulation and restraint of, 304^307.
(See

Police Powek.)

PERSON —
corporation

considered as being, for purposes of an appeal, 529.
to corporations generally, 273.

application of the word

PERSONAL ALLEGIANCE —
has no necessary connection witb right to tax,
(See

Nonbesidbnt.)

15.

INDEX.
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PERSONAL LIABILITY —

of residents for taxes, 269-373, 277.
depends upon domicile, 369.
in case of trusts, 371.
in case of partnerships, 371.
in case of private banlier, 371.
in cases of discretionary authority,

of
of
of
of
of

(See Discretionary Action.)
purciiasers of land for taxes previously
owners of land for special assessments,

assessed,

303.

470-473.

officers for false return, 196.
officers for neglect of duty, 513.
assessors,

549-557.

(See Assessors.)
of judicial officers generally,
(See

Judicial Officers.)

549-551,

556, 557.

of supervisors, 557.
(See Supervisor.)
of collector, 559-565.

(See Collector of Taxes.)
of collector of the customs,
(See

Collector of the

Customs.)

PERSONAL PROPERTY —
within the

state may he taxed, though the

owner is a nonresident, 15, 64,

270.

bonds, etc., held abroad, not taxable in state,

15, 16.

taxation of, by value, 26-30.

inquisitorial proceedings necessary to, 36.
temptations held out to fraud, 28.
injustice of, in many cases, 28.
leads to duplicate taxation, 38.
large official force required for, 28, 29.
reaches but small part of property, 29.
is to be taxed where the owner resides, 269-271.
held in trust, where taxable, 271, 539, 571.
belonging to estate of deceased person, where taxable, 370.
distress and sale of, for taxes, 301.
must be proper legal process for, 301, 803.
may be constitutionally authorized, 303.

taking away dilatory remedies in case of, 303, 303.
demand of tax to be first made, 304.
notice of sale, etc , 304.
necessity for strict compliance with statute, 304.
liability of officer in case of abuse, 304, 563.
(See

Trespasser

ah

initio.).

to be exhausted before lands are sold, 307.

official evidence of that fact,

307, 308.
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V'RO'PERTY — coniinued.
levy upou for tax, is prima facie satisfaction, 543, 544.
not generally assessed for local works, 457, 458.

PERSONAL

cannot be excused from taxation witliout authority of law, 154.

will

not generally be restrained, 538.
except in cases of fraud, 538, 539.
the legal remedy generally adequate, 538, 539.

taxes upon,

the rule applies to a persoual tax assessed in respect of lands, 543.
illegal tax on, may be recovered back, 571.
unlawfully taken, may be recovered by replevin, 572, 573.
case of house owned by one on laud of another, 375.
assessment of railroad property as, 150.
of corporations should be assessed at the place of the business office, 373.
PETITION —

for local improvement, sometimes required, 465.
to state for refunding of illegal tax, 566.
for license, will preclude recovery back of license
PHYSICIANS —

fees, 566.

taxation of, 388, 389, 394.

PLANKING —
of

streets, special assessments for, 431.
(See Assessments,

Local.)

PLANKROADS —
existence of, in city sti eets,
proving,

will

not preclude

special

assessments

462.

POLICE —
compulsory
regulation

local taxation for,

576, 577.

of, is a state duty, 576, 577.

POLICE POWER —
levying burdens under,

to discourage certain trades, etc.,
this proper in case of pernicious employments, 396.
taxation for regulation and restraint under the, 396^15.

this distinguished

from taxation generally, 396.
case of highway labor, 396.
case of sidewalk assessments, 398-401.
case
case

of levee assessments,
of drain taxes, 403.

401, 402.

olher cases, 403.
license fees under, 403, 404.
sometimes have restriction
what a license is, 404, 405.

in view,

grant of, 408.
fees, when a tax, 408-410.

what may be licensed under, 410.
employments generally, 410.
marriages, 411.

404, 405.

11.

for im-

INDEX.
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continued.

be licensed under

— continued.

amusements, 411.
lotteries, 411.
games of hazard, etc., 411.
keeping of dogs, 412.

what occupations usually licensed, 413, 413.
discriminations in, not unlawful, 412.
case of inspection fees, 413.
issuing the license, 413.
right of applicant to license
recalling license, 414.

if he

complies with conditions,

413.

whether fee must be returned on, 414.

collection of license
state regulations

fees, 414.

not interfered with by federal licenses, 414, 415.

POLICY —
must govern in determining suffrage, 4.5.
must always be had in view in taxation, 9.
discriminations in taxation from considerations

of, 896-398.

(See PKOTECTioif.)

of special assessments, 428, 429.
maxims of, in taxation, 6-8.
1.

that each ought to be taxed in proportion

to

his revenue,

6.

3. that the tax, as to time, manner and sum, ought to be certain

not arbitrary, 6.
8. that the tax ought to be levied
venient to the contributor,
4. that

it ought

and

in the time and manner most con-

6.

to take and keep from the peojDle as

little

as possible

beyond what it brings to the public treasury, 7.
5. that the heaviest taxes should be imposed on prejudicial commodities, 396.
(See

Public Policy.)

POLITICAL ACTION —
when it exhausts the power to tax, 256.
cannot be controlled by the couits, 247-249.
not to be reviewed on certiorari,

531.

cannot be enjoined, 540.

POLITICAL DUTIES —
performance

of, cannot be enforced by mandamus, 519.

POLITICAL ECONOMY —
rules of, which should govern in taxation, 6-8, 396.
(See

Policy.)

POLITICAL EEMEDIES —
in

case

of abuse of legislative power,

4, 71.

redress of wrongs in taxation by, 155.
these often the only redress, 575.
reasons why they are of little value in some cases, 485, 512, 518.

68J:
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POLLS, TAXES BY —
not a common resort, 18.
not often just or politic, 18.

in labor,
can only
POOR —

13, 397.

be levied on residents, 269.

taxes in aid of,
(See

Charity.)

POOR HOUSES —
presumptively
(See

exempt from taxation,

Public Pkopbety.)

POPULAR ASSEMBLAGES —
voting taxes by,
(See

245-250.

Voting the Tax.)

POPULARITY —
not to be expected for tax laws, 512, 513.

POSSESSION —
arising from, as affecting titles, 329, 332.
may support a title under which possession has been held, 329, 330.
cannot support a title where no possession has been held, 330-332.
limitation of time to bring suits in case of, 876-382.

presumptions

(See Limitation, Statutes op.)
constructive, in case of vacant tenement, 379-381.
who to be considered the true owner, 558, 559.

betterments made during, recovery of value of, 271, 272.
removing cloud on title in case of, 542-544.

Cloud upon Title.)
quieting title in case of, 544,
(See

(See

545.

Quieting Title.)

of personalty, trying right to,
(See Replevin.)
rights by, may be taxed, 60.
POSSESSORY RIGHT —
on the public lands, may be taxed, 60, 275.
purchaser of, at sheriffs sale may redeem, 366.
(See

POSTAL

Occupant.)
SERVICE —

charges for, not considered taxes, 30.

POSTPONEMENT—
of tax sale, 338.
of time for collecting taxes,
POWER —

503, 503.

abuse of, derives no sanction from time, 94.
'

liability of to abuse, is no argument against existence
to sell for taxes, is terminated by payment, 322.
or by tender, 333.

of, 212.
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POWER — eontinved.
to sell, must be express, 334.
must be strictl3' executed, 823-336.
compliance with must be affirmatively
to tax, exists in every sovereignty, 3.

shown, 336-339.

extent of, 11, 41, 56.
nature of, 33-40.
exhausting,

256.

limitations upon, 41-66.
for local purposes, must

be strictly construed,
for special assessments, must be express, 418.
and be strictly executed, 418.

209-311.

to tax business, construction of, 387.
to levy police taxes, 396-398, 408.
to divest one of his estate, must be strictly pursued, 317.
to license, when permissory, 413,
weight of custom in construction of, 39, 897.
(See

Taxing Potek.)

in taxation, does not exist,
POWER OF POLICE —
arbitrary,

68.

(See Police ; Police Poweh.)
PRACTICE —
(See

Custom.)

PR ACTITIONE

RS —

of law and medicine, taxation of,

388, 389.

PREFERENCEof occupations

in taxation,

PRELIMINARY

ACTION —

10, 25, 74, 396.

in laying taxes, cannot be enjoined, 548.
leading to tax sales, necessity that it shall comply with

statute,

PREMATURE SALE —
by collector,

liability in

case of, 568.

PRESUMPTION —
against duplicate taxation, 165.
force of this, in construction
that apportionment is just, 179.

in

^
of

statutes,

165-171.

support of tax titles, 329.

can aid in case of possession under the title, 330.
cannot aid where possession is held against the title, 330-333.
cannot supply the want of a record, 333.

in

favor of the purposes for which taxes are laid, 69.
in favor of joint official action, 194.
in favor of action of persons assuming to be ofBcers,
that assessment is properly made to person unknown,
that process fair on its face is lawful, 561.
(See Process.)

189.
379.

333, 334.
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PRICE —
paid down, 344.
inadequacy of, will not defeat sale, 345.
valuing, for the purposes of taxation, 287-289.
at tax sale must be

PRIMA FACIE RIGHT —
to lands,
(See

will

constitute cloud upon title, 548.

Cloud upon

Title.;

PRIMARY SCHOOLS —
(See

Education

;

School Districts.)

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT —
(See

Agent.)

PRINCIPLES —
of apportioning taxes, 16, 17.
of constitutional protection,
(See

Constitutional Pkinciples.)

underlying special

assessments,

416, 417.

(See Assessments,
Local.)
liability of to erroneous application, does not invalidate, 417.

of representative government, protect the right of local taxation,
of equity,
(See

493-405.

JIaxijis.)

PRINCIPLES OF TAXATION —
that taxes must be regular and orderly, 2.
apportioned by some uniform ratio of equality, 2, 104.
each person contributing in proportion to his revenue, 6.
the tax as to time, sum and manner of payment to be certain, 6.
to be levied at the time and in the manner most convenient for payment,

6.

to take from the people

as

little

as possible over what is brought to

the treasury, 7.
that taxes should bear some proportion to what government protects,
should be laid by the people's representatives, 32, 44, 244.
who must select the subjects of taxation, 130, 144.
and ought to select for the heaviest taxes prejudicial

14.

commodities,

396.

that taxes must be laid according to the law of the land, 36.
only to provide for public necessities, 41.
and for the public good, 42.
and for public purposes, 42, 89.
which the legislature must declare, 67.
nnd only within the jurisdiction of the government
that the sovereignty is not to delegate its power, 48.
nor bargain it away, 52, 58.
and can only act through officers, 184.
that one sovereignty is not to tax another, 56.

laying them,

42.

INDEX.
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PRINCIPLES OF TAXATlOl^ — continued.
that revenue laws are not to be strained by construction, 199-208.
that in collection private convenience must yield to public
necessity, 298
404, 536, 572.

but leaving every man a remedy in the law, 265, 527.
that the law favors the efforts of the citizen to preserve his estate ft'om
forfeiture, 363.
that it allows moral obligations to be recognized in taxation, 91.
and justifies special burdens in return for special benefits, 416.
and leaves local communities to regulate concerns that are exclusive-

ly their own,

474, 483, 403.

PRIVATE CORPORATIONS —
protection of charters of,
(See

Charter

;

Corporations

;

Fhakchisb.)

organized for cliarity, etc., may be aided by tlie government, 86.

PRIVATE ENTERPRISES —
taxes cannot be laid in aid of, 78-80.
the rule applied to manufacturing corporations, 78-80.
employment of the eminent domain in aid of, 78-83.

PRIVATE PURPOSES —
taxation must not be for, 67-69.
but pensions, bounties, etc., may be paid, 74.
PxjRPOSBs op Taxation.)
(See

discrimations for protection,
(See

Protection.)

PRIVATE RIGHTS —
(See

Constitutional Peinciples.)

PRIVATE SCHOOLS —
taxation in aid of, 86, 87.

,

PRIVATE WAYS —
taking land for, 76.
taxation for, is inadmissible, 77.
effect of existence of, in case of local assessment,

453.

PRIVATE WRONGS —

misuse of corporate powers may constitute, 548, 549.
injunction in such case, 549.
redress of, in tax cases,

Remedies fob Excessive and
PRIVILEGES —
(See

Illegal

Taxation.)

taxes on, 385, 386.
usually confined to employments which are exceptional, 385.
are usually collected in the form of license fees, 385.
when failure to pay tax may render the business illegal, 385.

taxing successions as, 392.
keeping billiard tables, may be, 393.
taxation,
of citizens of other states must not be abridged in

64.
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PRIVILEGES — continued.
taxation of property or but,iness in the state does not abridge, 64.
unless it discriminates against them, 64.
different modes of procedure in taxation do not abridge, 64.
nor requiring foreign corporations to submit to special conditions,

65.

PROCEEDINGS —
in

asses-sing lands for taxation,

Assessment.)

(See

in the levy of special assessments,
(See AssESSMEKTS, Local.)
correction

iiTegular,

of by amendment,

Amexdments.)

(See

correction of, by statute,
(See OuRATiTE Laws.)
correction of, by judicial
(See

action,

Judicial Cokeeotions.)

correction of, by reassessments,

Reassessmekts.)
of official duty,

(See

to compel performance
(See Makdamus.)

if

cases, statutes to prevent, 507, 508, 536, 573.

on its face apparently valid,

will

protect officer executing

it,

dilalory, in tax
PROCESS —

559-561.

importance of this rule, 560.
does not protect officer against cor sequences of his own illegalities,

561.

a

protects collector, though
party is unlawfully taxed, 561.
or though the tax was not lawfully voted, 561.
or though the party arrested had been discharged

in bankruptcy,

not, if certificate atttached
not valid, 563.
if the warrant shows that an illegal tax included, 563.
if an affidavit attached appears to have been made prematurely,
if the warrant does not emanate from the proper officer, 568.

or
or

is

or

is

tax roll

is

what

is

561.

rule in Vermont, 561.
not fair on its face, 562.

which do not vitiate, 563.
building up title upon, 563.
abuse of authority under, 304, 568.
(See TiiESPAssER An Initio.)
for collection of tax from personalty,
defects

Goods.)
(See Distress
to compel performance of official duty,
op

(See

in the
(See

Masdamus.)
of illegal taxation,
Remedies for Excessive akd

case

summary, against collectors, 504-511.
op Taxes.)
(See Collector

Illegal

Taxation.)

563.

INDEX.
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PRODUCTION —
taxation of land by,

18.

PROFESSIONS —
taxation of, 388, 389, 394.

PROFITS —
apportionment of taxes by,

384, 385.

taxes on, 392.

meaning of,
(See

1.60.

Income.)

PROHIBITION —
of Importation, by excessive duties,
of occupations not licensed, 385.
the licensed occupations

10.

are privileges,

of occupations under the police power, 403,
taxes should not go to extent of, 10, 408.

385, 386, 392.
404.

PROHIBITION
(See

OF REMEDIES —
Injunction ; Replevin.)

PROHIBITIONS ON THE STATES —
not to impair the obligation of contracts in taxing, 53-55, 65.
not to tax the agencies of government, 56-61.
or commerce regulated by congress, 61-64.
not to tax imports or exports without consent of congress, 61.
not to levy duties of tonnage, 61.
not to abridge the privileges and immunities
(See

Constitutional
Power.)

Pkinciples;

of citizens, 64, 65.
on the

Limitations

Taxing

PROHIBITORY LIQUOR LAW —
does not preclude

taxation of liquors, 406.

PROMISE —
town vote to refund illegal taxes, when it amounts to a, 553.
(See Nudum Pactum.)

PROOF —
of giving notices, should recite the manner iu which they were given,
general averment of legality not sufficient, 248.
sufficient if it complies with statutory form, 337.
strictness required in making, 338.
of tax proceedings must be made by the record, 247.
(See Record.)
of right to redeem, need not be presented, 337.
ontis of, in case of tax sale,
(See Sale of Lands for Taxes.)
of legal existence of a school district, 554.
of tax proceedings, in order to justify the collector,
44

561.

248.
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PROPERTY —
of

ia a creature

constitutional
(See

Law

the law, 17.

protection to,
op the Land.)

taxation of, by value, 26-30, 61, 175.
diiEcultes of this, in case of personalty, 26-30.
generally regarded equitable and just, 445.
local levies upon, 416.
principles supporting these levies, 417.
public, not to be taxed, 56-59.
(See Public Pkoperty.)
taxable, what is understood by, 130, 210, 272.

of private corporations may be taxed, though the franchise is
(See Corporations.)
impossibility of avoiding duplicate burdens on, 158-168.
(See

taxed,

Duplicate Taxation.)

of municipal corporations, constitutional
assessment of, for taxation, 258-291.

protection to, 493-495.

(See Assessment.)
distress and sale of, for taxes, 301-304.
(See

Distress or

collection

Goods —

of tax by detention of,

305.

sale of real, for taxes, 305, 322-361.
(See

Sale of Lands

for

Taxes.)

redemption of, from tax sales, 363-370.
(See

Redemption.)

taxation of, does not preclude taxation of business, 389,
levies upon, for purposes of regulation, 396-415.
(See

Police Power.)

recovery of, after sale for taxes, 371-383.
destroyed by rioters, compensation for, 480.
of, on division of municipality, 479, 481.

apportionment

PROPRIETORS —
of wet lands,
(See

assessments

upon for draining, 402, 423.

Adjacent Proprietors;

Owners.)

PROTECTION —
and taxation, are reciprocal,

right of

2,14.

the people to, entitles government

to tax, 14, 406.
value of, to life and liberty, cannot be estimated, 16.
attempts to apportion taxes by value of, 16, 17.

against calamities, taxation for, 103, 401, 437.
of property, by cons'itutional principles,
op the Land.)
(See Law
jjgainst oppressive taxation,
(See

Political Remedies; Feinciples

against pernicious
(See

occupations,

Police Power.)

etc., by

op Taxation.)

discriminating

fees, etc., 396.

170.
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PROSPECTIVE ACTION —
statutes are to have, unless the contrary intent appears, 331, 333.
the principle applied to tax laws, 333.

PROTECTIVE DUTIES —
are levied

in some

cases,

10, 35, 74.

PROTECTIVE HEALING ACTS —
right of the

state to pass, 383.
instances of, 233-334.

(See CuKATrvB Laws.)

PROTEST —
when neglect to make, will preclude complaining of a tax, 573.
illegal tax, paid without, cannot be recovered back, 567,568.

PUBLIC BUILDINGS —
special taxation for, 115, 419.

compulsory local taxation for,

477, 484, 490.

Local Taxation.)

(See CoMPULSOKT

PUBLIC CORPORATIONS —
MuKiciPAL Cokpokations.)
PUBLIC DEBT —
(See

taxation for payment of, 103.

of municipalities, compulsory taxation for,

479.

mandamus to compel levies for, 534, 536.
(See

Debt, Public.)

PUBLIC DOMAIN —
not taxable by the states, 59, 60.
possessory rights on, may be taxed, 60.
(See

Reservation.)

PUBLIC GOOD —
taxes must be laid for the, 43.
questions of, must be determined by the legislature, 43.
(See

Policy.)

PUBLIC GROUNDS —
presumptively exempt from taxation,
may be assessed for local improvements,
are

PUBLIC HEALTH —
(See

Health.)

PUBLIC INSTRUCTION —
(See

Education

PUBLIC LANDS
(See

;

Schools.)

—

Public Domain.)

PUBLIC MONEYS —
treasurer liable for safe keeping of, 501.
impolicy in accumulations of, 8, 9.

misappropriation of,

573.

130, 131.
458, 459.
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PUBLIC NECESSITY —
(See

Necessity.)

PUBLIC POLICY —
forbids officer who sells being purchaser,

341.

favors redemption, 363.
maxims of, in the levy of taxes, 6-8, 396.
(See

Policy.)

exemptions based on considerations

of,

(See Exemptions.)
PUBLIC PROPERTY —

of the United States, not taxable, 59, 60.
of the state and its municipalities, is presumptively excepted from tax
laws, 130-132.
may be assessed for local improvements,
assessed and sold by mistake, 574.

458, 459.

PUBLIC PURPOSES —
taxes must be laid for, 42, 67.
what are, 67-103.
general meaning of the term, 76.
must pertain to the district taxed, 104-123.
(See

Purposes of Taxation.)

PUBLIC SCHOOLS —
taxation for, 85-87.
(See

Education.)

PUBLIC SECURITIES —
are not taxable by the states, 58.

of

the states and their

municipalites, taxation of,

investing capital of corporation
chise, 58.

in, does

PUBLIC SQUARE —
taxation for, 93.

PUBLIC USES —
taking property for, 75-80,420, 421.
(See Eminent Domain.)
what will justify taxation, 67-103.
Ptibposes of Taxation.)
(See

PUBLIC VENDUE —
tax sale at, 344.

PUBLIC WORSHIP —
taxes cannot be levied for purposes of, 83, 84.
houses of,
(See

Chueches.)

PUBLIC WRONGS —
in the

case

of illegal corporate action,

548,

66.

not preclude

taxation of fran-
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PUBLIC WIlO:^aS -cmtiimed.

in the misapplication of public moneys,
correction of, by political action,
(See

Political

correction

572.

Remedies.)

of, by mandamus,

(See MANDAiitis.)

PUBLICATION —
(See

Notice.)

PUNISHMENT —
FoRFBiTUKEs; Penalties.)
PURCHASER —
(See

by executory contract, may redeem, 367.
subject to assessments, may contest them, 446.
may be made personally liable for tax on lands bought, 303.
must take title subject to right to reassess taxes, 233.
(See

Bona Fide Pukchaser.)

at tax sale,

(See

Sale

PURCHASER

op Lands

for

Taxes.)

AT TAX SALE —

who may not be, 341, 345-351.
the officer who sells, 341.
a tenant bound to pay taxes, 345.

mortgagor

in possession,

340.

any one whose duty it was to pay taxes, 346.
or to pay any part thereof, 346, 347.
the agent of the owner, 347.
whether the mortgagee may, 347, 348.
or an adverse claimant, 348-351.
must talie the risk of the title,
(See Caveat Emptor.)
may have mandamus to compel issue of certificate, 522.
or of deed, 522.
may be compelled to assign on redemption, 367.
right of, to redeem from prior sales, 364.
notice by, to owner of land purchased, 865, 366.
cannot be compelled to accept redemption of undivided interest, 367..
frauds of, in redemption may be relieved against, 367.

right of, cannot be acquired by stranger,

367.

may accept redemption without strict compliance
cannot add to conditions of redemption, 369.

with the

time to redeem from, cannot be enlarged, 369, 370.

PURPOSES OP TAXATION —
what

are admissible,

67-103.

must decide upon, 67.
decision not absolutely conclusive,

legislature

67, 68.

must determine extent of taxation, 69.

limits of judicial authority in deciding upon,

67-69.

statute,

368.
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PURPOSES OF TAXXTIO'S — continued.
affected by the grade of government, 71, 73.
general expenses of government, 73.

how

purposes in general, 76.
•will not embrace private business enterprises, 76-79, 90.
general enumeration of, 81-83.

religious instruction,
secular instruotjon,

public charity,

83, 84.
84r-88.

89, 90.

moral obligations, 91.
amusements and celebrations, 93, 93.

highways and roads,

94^96.

canals, railroads, etc., 97.

municipal purposes, 98, 99.
military bounties, 99-101.
the public health, 101, 423-437.
protection against calamities, 103, 437.
payment of the public debt, 103.
interest need not be exclusively public, 103,103.
for what the municipalities may be compelled to tax, 476-480.

for what they cannot

be, 483-495.

must pertain to the districts taxed, 104^133.

Q.
QUALIFYINa —

by oflBcer, proof by parol of, 193.
effect of failure in, 185, 186.

QUESTIONING
in
in

OFFIOAL TITLE —

of usurpers, 186, 187.
of officer de facto, 187-189,
QUIETING TITLi; —
case

case

574.

bill

may be filed for, by claimant of lands in possession, 544.
whether this maybe done in case of procedingsvoid on their face, 544, 545
cannot be done by one not in possession against one who is, 545.

QUO WARRANTO —
against officers de facto, 187-189.
for usurpation of corporate powers, 574.
by state to restrain unlawful taxation, 574.
not adapted to the redress of individual wrongs, 574.

E.
RAILROAD

COMPANIES —

may be taxed, though made use of by government, 60.
exception of the Union Pacific, 60, 61.
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EAI LRO AD COMPAN

l^S — cont inued.
caanot, be taxed on freight carried from state to state,
nor on llie use of locomotives and cars run from

63.
state to state, 63.

may be taxed on locomotives as property, 03.
cannot be taxed on tlieir bonds beld by nonresidents, 65.
valuation of franchises of, for taxation, 135-137.

specific tax on, precludes taxation of property, 150.
but not of branch road for gravel, 150.
consb'uction of exemption from taxation in charters, 150, 151, 153, 171, 172.
general exemption from taxation, whether applicable, to municipal taxation, 149, 151.
effect of consolidation of, upon taxation, 151.
exemption from taxation of pr,>perty " necessarily used," etc., 151, 153.
whether general exemption will apply to machine shops, etc., 153.
specific tax on, held to exclude tax on shares, 106.
value of property in, is included in tax on shares, 167.

tax on interest paid by, is

a tax on the creditor,

169.

may be taxed on franchise, and also on property, 170.
exemption of property from taxation, held to exempt franchise also, 171.
tax on capital stock, held to exempt the franchise, 171.
may stipulate in the charter to pay the state a proportion of earnings, 173.
shares in, owned by resident, whether

" within " a city, 310.
erty,
rolling stock of, where to be assessed,

to be regarded

as personal

prop-

373.

whether to be treated as real or personal, 373, 374.
properly of, may be taxed as personal, if statute so provides, 374.

districts for taxation of, 374.
personally of, should be assessed at the place of the business office,
track of, cannot be assessed as nonresident lands, 374.
property of, is subject to special assessments, 456.
but only with reference to special benefits, 456, 457.
easement of, in a street, does not preclude special assessments,
assessment of property as personal, 150.
(Sec COEPORATIONS.)

RAILROADS —
state may tax

for constructing,

taxation in aid of construction,
(See Railroad Companies.)

65.
65-67.

RAILWAYS, STREET —
Railways.)
(See Street
RATES —

exemption

from, how construed, 148.

for construction of sewers,
(See Water Rates.)

RATIFICATION —

436.

by town of illegal action by the collector, 570.
101.
by statute, of previous action taken by towns, etc., 100,

463.

373.
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KEAL ESTATE —
taxing by the production,

Impolicy of this,

18.

18.

taxation by rents, 18.
taxation by value, 18, 19, 26-30.
why this is preferable to taxation of personalty, 26-30.
of, for taxation, 375-286.
discrimination between seated and unseated,
how to be described in assessment, 281-286.
valuation of, for taxation, 287-289.
assessment

sale of, for taxes, 305-309,
(See

Sale of Lands

276-279.

332-362.

for

Taxbs.)

forfeiture of, for taxes, 315-321.
(See

FoRFEiTtniES.)

redemption
(See

of, from tax sales, 363-370.

Redemption.)

recovery of, by tax purchaser, 371-383.

Recovery of Lands Sold

special assessments

for

Taxes.)

upon,

(See Assess.ments,

Local.)

outside a taxing district, whether may be taxed within

Extra Territorial Taxation.)

tax upon, when
(See

it

what taxation of, out of the district,

is

(See

it,

(See

irregular merely,

538, 529.

may be enjoined, 543.

Injunction.)

cloud upon title may be remov-ed
(See Cloud upon Title.)

in equity,

542.

quieting title to, 544.
(See

Quieting Title.)

joinder of complaints in case of illegal taxation of, 545-547.
(See Joint Complaints.)
equity not the proper tribunal for trying titles to, 545.
right of claimant in ijossession, to jury trial of his claim, -545.
(See

Betterments

;

improvements upon,

Improvements.)

personal liability for taxes and assessments upon,

Personal Liability.)

acquiring right
(See

to, by adverse possession,

Adverse Possession

judicial sales for

;

(See

Limitation, Statutes of.)

taxes, 357-362.

REAPPORTIONMENT —
of cost of road in several lowns, 478.
of debts among municipalities, 455.
REASSESSMENTS —
curing defects in taxation by,
may be autliorized
cases

of hardship

may be authorized

232.

by general or special law, 232.
after change in title, 233, 234.
where tax was laid without authority of law, 233.

KEASSESSMENTS

INDEX.

-

697

continued.
may be ordered to correct neglect of apportionment, etc., 233.
judgment against a tax does not preclude a reassessment, 233.
may be had in case of local taxes, 233.

authority

REBELLION

to make, may be reason

—

for setting aside irregular levies,

535.

collection of internal revenue during tlie, 181.
collection of direct land tax during the, 181^

Civil

(See

Wak.)

RECALLING LICENSES —
power of, 414.
■whether fees must be returned on, 414.

RECEIPT —

for taxes, is evidence of payment,
RECIPROCITY —
of duty

823.

as between the tax payer and the state, 14.

RECLAMATION OP LANDS —
(See Drains.)
RECITALS —

in process, how they may affect its validity
in tax deeds, 344, 353, 363.
corrections

as a protection,

563.

in, by amendment, 334-343.

(See AlIBNDMEKTS.)
what necessary to show jurisdiction of court, 358, 359.
in judgments for taxes, 363.

in

case

of summary proceedings against collectors,

509, 510.

UECORDS —
amendment of defects in, 234r-343.
(See

Amendments.)
of lands is supposed

purchaser

to examine, 233, 233.

tax purchaser must take notice of, 573.
(See

Caveat Emptor.)

levy of taxes must appear by, 247, 248.
assessors may rely upon votes appearing by, 248.
secondary evidence of, when lost, 248.
want of, cannot be supplied by presumption,

of tax judgment,
reviewing defects in, on certiorari,

333.

361, 362.

(See

Certiobaki.)

fatal defects ou face of,

will

protection of assessors by,

330.

preclude tax being cloud
554.

tax payer must take notice of defects in, 567.
of sale, are better evidence than the certificates, 353.

RECOVERY OF LANDS SOLD FOR TAXES —
general remedy \)y ejectment, 371.
special rules sometimes provided, 371.

on the title, 543.
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RECOVERY OF LANDS SOLD FOR TAXES —

continued.

payment for betterments as a condition, 371, 373.
payment of taxes, wlietlier may be recfuired, H72-375.
may be if tax is legal, 374.
not if it were illegal, 375.
short limitation acts for, 376.

construction of that of Pennsylvania, 377.
of tliat of Wisconsin, 378.
adverse possession under, 878-383.
" color " or " claim " of title, 383, 383.

"true owner" in

case of, 558, 559.

equity not the proper tribunal for, 545.
right to jury trial when suit is brought for, 545.

RECOVERY FOR TAXES ILLEGALLY COLLECTED —
cannot be had if tax merely irregular, 531, 565.
may bo had against assessors who have acted without jurisdiction, 553.
or against collector whose process is void, 563.

if

he makes himself trespasser ab initio, 564.
not
after moneys paid over by him, 563.
but
may be had against collector of customs, 564, 565.
or

may be had against town, couuty, etc., 565.
what are the conditions to such recovery, 565.
tlie suit must be for money actually paid over, 566.
it can 0UI3' be for void taxes, 565, 566.
and only for what the municipality has received for its own use,
cannot be had for taxes voluntarily paid, 565, 566.
even though the levy was unconstitutional,
566.
immaterial

that the party did not know his legal rights, 567.

what are voluntary payments, 568.
not those made under protest, 568.
or to relieve goods from seizure, 568.
or under compulsion of process, 569.

will

be limited to money received, 570.
demand not necessary before suit, 571.
what interest recoverable on, 571.

from the state, must be obtained by legislation, 566.
(See

Refubding.)

REDEMPTION —
is favored by the policy of the law, 363.,
for, are liberally construed, 363.
is a statutory light, 364.

statutes

courts cannot give where the statutes do not, 364.
pendency of civil war does not enlarge time for, 364.
cases of minors, etc., sometimes specially provided for, 364.
statutory provisions for foreclosing, 364, 365.
necessity that these be strictly observed, 364, 365.

566.
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KEDEMPTION — continued.
vi-ho entitled

to make, 365-367.

purchaser

by executory contract, 367.
tenant in common, 365, 367.

original owner, tbougli there is
having a homestead right,
lien creditor, 366.
•wife,

purchaser

at sheriff's

a tax title, 366.
366.

sale, 366.

dowress, 366.
husband, of the wife's lands, 366.
mortgagee or his assignee, 366, 367.
not a mere stranger, 367.

relief in

oases of accident or fraud, 367, 368.
can be none against the party's own mistakes, 364, 367, 368.
purchaser may accept, waiving conditions, 368.

or officer cannot impose conditions on,
legislature cannot enlarge time for, after sale, 369,
purchaser

369.
370.

whether it may shorten time, 370.
no new title acquired by making, 368.

right of one who makes

to himself,

to compel assignment

367.

REFUNDING —
by the state, of illegal taxes, 498, 530, 566.
by municipalities, of taxes collected for their

use, 530.

officers have no general authority for, 530, 568.
when may be compelled by mandamus, 520.

REFUSAL —
to assess a person, who loses right to vote in consequence, 553.
of auditing boards to allow claims, may be corrected by mandamus, 515517.

to perform official duty, how corrected,
(See

Mandamus.)

to levy tax to pay judgment,

of municipalities to perform
to perform political duties,
(See

Political

etc., 524-536.
state duties, 476-481.

Duties.)

EEGRADING —
of

streets,

taxation for, 432, 423.

REGULARITYof tax sales must
(See

be

shown by purchaser,

want of, when may

be corrected by statute,

(See Curative Laws.)
correcting, record to show,
(See

336-339.

Sale of Land foe Taxes.)

Amendments.)
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EEGULATION —
taxation for, 11,

13.

burdens ilnposed under the police power for, 396-415.

Police Power.)

(See

KEJECTINa TiXES —
when may be compelled by mandamus, 530, 574.

requiring, on certiorari,

533.

RELATION" —
of protest, to a time preceding payment,
of tax deed to time of purchase, 853.

569.

KELATOR—
in tax cases, wheu private parties may be, 523-534.
when law officer of tlie state should be,
(See
"

Law Officer of the State.)

RELEASE OF GOODS —
payments made to obtain, are not voluntary,

568.

RELEASE FROM TAXATION —
(See

Contracts; Exemptions.)

RELIGIOUS IXSTRUCTION —
taxes not to be levied for, 83, 84.

RELIGIOUS

SOCIETIES —

wliat protection from government they are entitled to, 84.
exemption of property of, from taxation, 130.
reasons for this, 145.
must be strictly construed, 140, 147.
do not preclude special assessments,

147, 458.

exemption ceases when property is sold, 151.

REMAINDER —
(See

Surplus Moneys.)

REMEDIAL STATUTES —
what are, 204, 205.
may be presumed to reach back, for purposes of justice, 233.
the proper pioviuce of, 374.
laws for imposing

revenue are not, 204, 205.

REMEDIES FOR EXCESSIVE AND ILLEGAL TAXATION
are always afforded by the law, 537.
hy abatement,
assessors

537.

miy malie, while they retain roll,

537.

legislative authority may make, 527.
taxing oScTS must have authority for, 537.
hy reviews and appeals, 533.
these by assessors or by appellate board, 538.
need not apply for, if tax is void, 528, 529.

-
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REMEDIES FOR EXCESSIVE AND ILLEGAL TAXATION -con.
by reviews and appeals

— continued.

the proper remedy for excessive or unequal
assessment, 528.
decision by reviewing authority final, 529.
for irregular assessment, statutory remedy is exclusive, 529.
right of city to appeal, 529.
by refunding, 530.
officers cannot refund without express authority, 530.
by

certiorari,

530.

the remedy at common law, 530.
the writ not of right, 530.
promptness required in applying for, 531.
the writ only brings up the record, 535.
discretionary action not reviewed on, 532-535.

only reaches jurisdictional questions,
■what

by

will

injunction,

532.

be set aside upon, 535.
536.

use of this writ, 536, 537.
conditions imposed on issuing, 537, 538.
not generally awarded in case of personal

mischievous

taxes, 538.

except to prevent irremediable mischief, 539.
not awarded to restrain political action, 540.
nor for merely excessive assessments, 540.

nor for merely irregular assessments, 540.
what are not merely irregular, 541.
case of personal taxes in respect of land, 542.
joint complaint by several persons, when allowable,
allowed in cases of fraud, 547.
in case of illegal corporate action, 548, 549.
effect of delay on proceedings, 549.
by removing cloud

from title,

545-547.

542.

what constitutes a cloud, 543, 544.
by liaving title quieted, 544.
for this, complainant must have possession, 545.
by action against assessors,

549.

this will not lie for mere errors, 549-553.
will lie in case of excess of jurisdiction,

553.

and where by neglect a party is deprived of his rights, 554.
bad motive in the assessor will give no right of action, 555-557.
by action against

supervisor, 557.

what necessary to his justification, 557, 558.
by

resisting collection,

558.

by action against collector,

559.

his protection by his process,
fatal defects in process, 562.

561, 562.

process does not protect against his own illegalities, 563, 564.
these rules apply to federal collectors, 564, 565.
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EEMEDIES rOR EXCESSIVE AND ILLEGAL TAXATION — core.
iy

action against town, etc., 565.
this only lies when tax was void, 565.
and when payment was compulsory, 565.
and after money is paid over by collector, 5C5.
and where party has not elected to proceed against the officers, 565.
all payments are presumed to te voluntary, 567.
what are not, 568, 569.
recovery limited to amount I'eceived, 570.
demand in case of, 571.
recovery of interest, 571.
case

of misapplication by corporation,

by replenin

of

572.

goods, 572.

this sometimes taken away, 573, 573.

iy proJiibition,

574.

hy quo warranto, 574.
by mandamus, to strike

illegal assessment from the roll,
for illegal taxes paid, 520.

to compel allowance

estoppel against resorting to, 57-3.

political redress,
(See

Political Remedies.)

REMEDY —
for false official return,
by suit for recovery of
(See

196.
taxes, 300.

Collection of Taxes.)

by suit against collector of taxes, 497.
on collector's bond, 499-504.
summary against collectors, 504.
(See Collector op Taxes.)

for neglect of official duty,
(See

MANDAMtJS.)

for taxes,
RECOTEiir
of
Lands Sold pok Taxes.)
(See
against corporations for neglect of officers, 570.
limitation of time to apply for,
to recover lands sold

(See

Limitation, Statutes

op.)

political,

Political Remedies.)
REMISSION —
(See

(See

Abatement.)

REMOVAL —
summary of collector,
of persons taxed, from

508.
the district,

562.

REMOVAL OF CLOUD UPON TITLE —
(See

Cloud Upon

Title.)

520, 574.
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KENTS —
taxation of, 18, 19.
offset of, against redemption

moneys, 365.

REPAIRING WAYS —
special assessments for, 422, 423.
(See Assessments, Local; Highways.)

REPAYING STREETS —
riglit

to

levy special assessments for,

422, 423.

REPEAL —
by implication from general laws, not favored, 210, 255, 256.
construction of acts of, 231, 233.

of exemptions, general right of,

54, 145.

exceptions to this, 52-55.

of local powers to tax, 14, 474.
of law under which collector's Ijond was given,

503.

REPLEVIN —
for property seized for tax, 572.
liability of the process to abuse,

573.

the remedy sometimes taken away, 303, 573.
this does not take away right of third person, 573.

nor of one not liable to taxation, 573.
collector cannot defend action of, unless tax was legal,

563.

REPORTS, Ob^FICIAL —
(See

Rettjens, Official.)

REPRESENTATION —
and taxation go together, 44-48, 178.

origin of this maxim, 44.
meaning of, in America, 44^8.
application of, to local taxation, 474, 483-494,
precludes levy of taxes by the executive, 44.
does not ensure low taxes, 46.
is only fully true when applied to the state at large,
does not preclude

46.

taxes on those who cannot vote, 47.

application of maxim
(See CoMPULsoBY

to federal government,

48.

Local Taxation.)

REPRESENTATIVES —
of the people must grant taxes, 33, 43-47.
responsibility of, to the people, the security against oppressive taxation,
4, 71, 178, 575.

Political

(See
who to have a voice

Remedies.)
in choosing,

45.

REPUBLIC —
arbitrary power does not exist in,

431.
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REPUBLICAN GOYERNMEXT —
principles

of,

(See CoNSTiTTjrioNAL

Principi^es.)

REPUTED AUTHORITY —
of one assuming
(See

to be an oflBcer, 189, 190.

Officers)

REQUEST—
for jury trial

when the right is given, 554.

RESERVATIONS —
persons living on, not taxable by the state, 269.
(See

Petition.)

RESIDENCE —
personal assessments

to be made at place of, 269.

what constitutes, 269.
(See

Domicile.)

out of state not personally taxable within

Nonresidents.)

out of district, may be taxed on property in

it,

(See

it,

RESIDENT —

46.

RESIDENT LANDS —
taxation of, separate from nonresidents, 275, 288.
(See

Real Estate.)

l)ersonal liability for taxes on,
(See

Personal Liability.)

RESIDUE —
(See

Surplus Moneys.)

RESPONSIBILITY —
taxation,
(See

4,

of representatives

to their

constituents,

the securitj'

71.

Representatives.)

RESPONSIBILITY, PERSONAL —
(See Personal Liability.)
RESTRAINING COLLECTION —
(See

Injunction.)

RESTRAINTS —
on the power to tax,
(See

Limitations on the Taxing Power.)

taxation for purposes of,
(See

Police Power.)

RESTRICTIONS —
oa the power of the states to tax,
(See

Constitution of the United States.)

against

oppressive
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ctf?i<raw(Z.

on the power of the United States to tax,
(See

Constitution of the United States ; Constitutional Princiis,

ples.)
on municipal powers to tax, what
253.
are sometimes the purpose in taxation, 11,

Police Powbr.)
RETAILERS —

39fi.

(See

of liquors, taxation of,
(See

396, 404.

Spirituods Liquors.)

RETROSPECTIVE LEGISLATION —
may cure want of power to tax, 100, 101.
presumption against intent to adopt, 321, 223.
for curing defects iu tax proceedings, 223-329.
(See

Curative Laws.)

RETROSPECTIVE TAXATION —
may be imposed, 169.
presumed intent not to impose, 331, 333.

OFFICIAL —

RETURNS,

is

it

in general are conclusive, 195.
officer liable for false, 196.
liability for failure to make, 563.
of failure to collect tax, 307, 359.
void if made prematurely, 307.
void if defective in its recitals, 307, 308.
should show, 308.
what
evidence in favor of the officer, 308.
disproving,

359.

taxation must be for purposes of,

9.

REVENUE —
other incidental purposes,
(See

Policy.)

(See

Police Power.)

not the purpose of police taxation, 396-398.
license fees, when are for, 408-'110.
farming out the, 300.
contracts in fraud of, are void, 299.
frauds on the federal, 309-313.
collection of the, 398-321.
(See

Taxation; Taxes.)

what are,

1,

REVENUE LAWS —
199.
9.

general purpose of,
in some states originate with the popular house, 32.
construction of, in general, 199-208.
45
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l^AWS, — continued.
for local taxation, construction of, 209-211.
directory and mandatory provisions in, 212-220.

REVENUE

presumption

against retrospective

action of, 221, 222.

(See CoNSTKncTiON.)

REVENUE STAMPS —
collection of taxes by, 22, 23, 320.
not taxable by the states, 58.

REVIEW —
right of parties to notice of meeting of boards of, 266-268.
remedy by, in case of excessive taxation, 528.
decision of board of, when final, 529.
failure to apply for, effect of, 529, 531.
errors in decision on, do not invalidate action, 530.
certiorari iu cases of, 534.
increasing

assessments

upon, 547.

REVISION —
of revenue laws, effect
(See Repeal.)

of, 222.

RHODE ISLAND —
constitutional

provisions

of, bearing upon special assessments,

RIGHT —
constitutional,
(See CoNSTii'tTTiONAL

Principles.)

RIGHT TO A HEARING —
(See

Heaking.)

RIOTS —
taxation to indemnify losers by, 480.

RIVERS —
protectioa
(See

against overflow of,

Lbvebs.)

ROADS —
taxation for, 94.
(See

Highways.)

taxation for, under legislative compulsion,
(See

478.

Compulsory Local Taxation.)

labor, taxes in,
(See

Labor.)

ofHcers of, not liable for error in their decisions, 550.

ROBBERY —
under the forms of law in tax cases, 428.
of collector, 50L

444.

INDEX.
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RULES —
fixed, taxation must be based upon,
(See Peinciples of Taxation )

3, 3.

RULES OF CONSTRUCTION —
of statutes in general, 197.
of revenue laws, 199.
of local powers to tax, 211.
CojStstkdction.)

See

RULES OF EVIDENCE —
right of the legislature

to establish and change, 233.
must not preclude parties from showing their rights,
833, 224.
application of, to tax sales, 353-857.

(See

Evidence

Pkesumptions.)

;

RURAL LANDS —
in cities, sometimes taxed at different rates from other city
properly, 118.
brought into city without sufficient reason, taxation of, 119, 130.

S.
SACRIFICE —
in taxation, equality of, 137.
sale of land for taxes, 345.

in

SAFE KEEPING —
of public moneys, oiBcer is liable for,

501.

SALARIES —
of federal officers, states cannot tax, 58.
of state officers, United States cannot tax, 58.
state and United States may tax those of their own officers,
collection of taxes on, 298, 299.

391, 393.

SALE —
of chattels for taxes,
must be warranted

301-303.

by statute, 303.

ordinary defensive remedies sometimes taken away,
(See

302, 303.

Replevin.)

demand of the tax should be first made, 304.

misconduct of officer may render him trespasser,

304, 568, 564.

will not preclude proceedings being set aside on certiorari, 534.
payment of tax to prevent, is payment under compulsion, 508, 569.
title obtained by, is not warranted, 573.
(See

Caveat Emptok.)
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SALE OF LAISDS FOR TAXES —
collection

by, 305-309.

conditions precedent must be observed,
return of no goods, etc., 307.
payment discharges right to make, 332.
land must be liable, 322.

307-309.

proceedings must be regular, 323-826.
regularity of, to be shown by purchaser, 826-329.

rule of caveat emptor applies, 329.
how far presumptions may support,

329-332.

special authorit}' for, 333.
notice of, 334-337.

description of land in notice,

836, 337.

must be made at time and place appointed, 338.
adjournment
competition

of, 338.

must be allowed at, 339, 340.

oflBcer cannot buy at, 341.
must be of separate parcels separately, 341-343.
undivided interests may be sold, 341.

surplus bond required in some states, 343.
excessive, is void, 343, 844.
must be to highest bidder, 344.
must be for cash, 344.
must not be for more than is due, 345.
may be of complete title, 345.
inadequacy of price will not defeat, 345.
what persons may not buy at, 345-351.
case of tenant and mortgagor, 345, 347, 351.
case of tenant in common, 346.
case
case

of an agent, 347.
of party in possession,

848-351.

bids by state or county, 351.
for different taxes at the same time,

352.

certificate to purchaser, 852.
how issue of, compelled, 522.
deed and its requisites, 353.

force of, as evidence, 853-357.

how execution of, compelled,
judicial proceedings for, 357.
court must have jurisdiction,
report of inability to collect,

532.
358, 363.
359, 861.

notice to parties, 359.
proceedings are in rem, 860.
what defects invalidate, 860, 361.
of, who may oppose, 300.
questions of regularity concluded by judgment,
redemption from, 862-370,

confirmation

(See

Redemption.)

863.
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continued.

recovtiy of lauds sold, 371-383.
(See Recovery of Lands Sold fos Taxes.)
surplus moneys, compelling payment of, 523.
SALE OP LANDS FOR ASSESSMENTS — '
must be special authority for, 469,
power usually conferred, 470,
(See Assessments, Local.)

470.

SALES OF MERCHANDISE —
taxation of, 33.
"by sample, license for may be required, 413.
taxation of business of selling,
(See

Trades.)

taxation of property also, 389.

SALOON KEEPERS —
(See Spirituous Liquors.)

SANITARy PURPOSES —
taxation for, 101.
special assessments for, 423, 434.
levies for, under the police power, 403.

SATISFACTION —
of municipal debts, compelling taxation for, 479, 534-526.
of tax on lands by levy on goods, 307, 543, 544.
of illegal tax voluntarily, precludes action to recover back,
(See YoLUNTART Payment.)

SAVING OF EXPENSE —
not a sufficient reason for uniting suits in equity, 546.
(See

SAVINGS

Joint

Complaints.)

BANKS AND SOCIETIES —

tax on deposits in, not a tax on property, 168.
excise taxes upon, 393, 394.
tax on deposits invested in nontaxable

securities, 165.

SCHOOL DIRECTORS —
by mandamus to abate taxes, 518.
authority of, to make exemptions, 146.

cannot be compelled
permissory

SCHOOL DISTRICTS —
may be authorized to support free schools, 85, 353.
meetings in, to vote taxes, 345.
of, 345-348.
must be regularly called, 346, 554.
proceedings must appear of record, 347, 348.
notice

warning of, 347.
construction of particular votes, 211, 347,
if not legally called, action is void, 247.

248.

565.

LAW OF TAXATION.

710

SCHOOL 'DlSTHlCTS —

conimued.

by record of, 248.
acquiescence in, -when invalid, 248.

meetings in, protection

informalities

to be overlooked,

249.

joint

meetings of, for taxation, 212.
cannot build -school house on site not legally established, 254.

conditions precedent to taxes, must be observed, 254.
informal organization of, 530, 549.
protection of ofiicers of, in discretionary action, 552, 553.
votes of taxes cannot be controlled by mandamus, 519.

SCHOOL PROPERTY —
exemption of, from taxation, 130, 149, 150.

liability

of, to special assessments,

458.

instances of special exemptions and their construction,

SCHOOLS

149, 150.

—

taxation for, 84-88, 245-248, 253, 254.
(See

School Distkict.)

municipalities may be required to tax for, 478.
taxes for, unlawfully levied by town, may be recovered back, 571.
taxes for, levied at a meeting not lawfully called, may be recovered back
554.

special taxation for, in difTerent counties, 189.
construction of power to tax for, 210-312.
private, aid of the state to, 86, 87.
exemption of from taxation, 149, 150.

voting taxes for,
(See VoTiNa the Taxes.)

SEATED LANDS —
meaning of the term, 276.
are required to be taxed separate from unseated, 275.

what an abandonment of,

276.

taxes on, are a personal charge, 277.
transfer of, to unseated list, 277.
(See

Unseated Lakds.)

SECULAR INSTRUCTION —
taxation for, 84-88.
(See

Schools.)

SECURITYfor business taxes, may be required, 321.
for performance of collector's duties,
op Taxes.)
(See Collector

SECURITIES —
taxation of,
(See

Bonds ; Cbedits

;

Mortgages

;

Public Securities.)
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—

of the person for taxes,
of property for taxes,

301, 389.

(See DisTKESs.)
payment of tax to relieve from,
(See VoLUNTAET Payment.)
replevin in case of unlawful, 573,
SEMINARIES —
exemption

SEPARATE

from taxation,
INTERESTS —
of,

573.

149, 150.

may be separately valued if statute so provides, 288, 289.
and separately sold, 341, 342.
redemption in case of, 364, 365.

SEPARATE

PARCELS —

separate assessments of, 379, 280.
(See GKOTjpiNe.)
what are, 281, 282.
separate sale of, 341, 343.
must not be divided in assessment, 282.

SERVANTS —
taxation in respect of, 31.

SERVICES —
in procuring legislation, payment for, 99.
military, one exempt from, may be taxed
SETOFF —

to procure volunteers, 431.

of demands against taxes, not allowed, 18.
of benefits against value of land taken for streets, 420.
of demands receivable for taxes, against taxes collected,
(See

501.

Offset.)

SEWERS —
of, may be ordered under police power, 399-401.
special assessments for, 423-427, 469.
construction
(See

Assessments, Local.)

assessments for, in England, 426.
illegal exemption from tax for, 154.

SHARES
(See

IN CORPORATIONS

—

Stock in Cokpokations.)

SHERIFF —
(See CoLLECTOB

OF Taxes.)

SHIPS —
tonnage duties on, cannot be laid by states, 61.
are taxable as property by states, 61.
but not as vehicles of commerce, 63.
tax on masters of, 63.
where to be taxed, 370.
taxes on consignees of, 568.
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SHORT STATUTES OF LIMITATION —
(See Limitation, Statutes of.)

SHORTENING TIME TO REDEEM —
question of right of, 369, 370.

SHOWS —
taxation

of, 391.

(See Amdsembnts.)

SIDEWALKS —
construction

of, under police power, 398.

special assessments for, 450, 451.

SIGNING —
of assessment roll, necessity for, 289.
signing certificate attached, not equiyalent
of tax roll by supervisors, 393, 294.

to, 390.

SILENCE —
when may work an estoppel, 573.

SOLDIERS —
bounties for,
(See

Bounties.)

exemption of property from taxation, 149.
taxation while in service, 146.

SOUTH CAROLINA —
assessments of property in, must be by value, 435.

SOVEREIGN

POWERS —

apportionment of, in govei-nment, 33.
general nature of the division, 33-40.

SOVEREIGNTY —
the taxing power an incident of, 3.
taxation an act of, 146.

of

state or nation, not to be invaded by the other, 56-60.
(See

Extra TEKRiTORiAii Taxation.)

SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS —
(See

Assessments, Local.)

SPECIAL BENEFITS —
levying assessments with reference
(See Assessments, Local.)

to, 416-473.

SPECIAL JURISDICTION—
of courts to review proceedings in taxation,
of courts to render judgments for taxes,
Judgment fob Taxes.)
(See

333, 334.

to review assessments.
(See

Boards

of Equalization

;

Boards op Review.)
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SPECIAL LAWS —
implied repeal or modification of, by general laws,
imposing new burdens, should be prospective, 221.
to be construed to harmonize with the general law,
for curing defects in tax proceedings,
(See

255, 256.
210.

Curative Laws.)

SPECIFIC TAXES —
what are, 175.

SPECULATION —
lands held for, may properly be taxed, though producing no income, 20.
and be subjected to special asssessments for draining, 456.
collector not to make use cf his oflSoe for, 501.

SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION—
statutes which violate are not necessarily void, 488.
(See COKSTITDTIONAL PRINCIPLES.)

SPIRITUOUS

LIQUORS —

why especially selected for taxation,
policy in indirect taxation of, 6.

390,

heavy taxation of, sometimes defeats the purpose, 24.
manufacturers and dealers in, are taxed on their business, 390.
stock taxed as property

at same time, 890.

discriminations in taxing dealers,

390.

whether one licensed as a tavern keeper may sell, 391.
taxation of, where regulation is the purpose, 404, 412.
may be taxed though the business is illegal, 406.
tax law not invalid for discriminating against, 412.

power to declare the unlicensed selling a nuisance, 413.
license fee for regulating sale of, is not a tax, 410.
issuing licenses
conditions

to sell, 413.

to a license of the business, 413.

revoking licenses

to sell, 414.

SPORTS —
'

taxation of, 30.
(See Amusements.)

SQUARES —
at street crossings,

assessments for, 463.

public, taxation for, 93.

STAMPS —
revenue, are not taxable by the states, 5?.
collection of taxes in, 320.
economy of such collection,

STATE -

22, 23.

bids by, at tax sales, 851.
power of, to coerce local taxation, 474-495.
(See

Compulsory Local Taxation.)
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STATE — continued.
remedies of, against its collectors, 496-511.
(See COLLECTOK OF T.4XES.)
abatement of taxes by, 537.

refunding of illegal taxes by, 530, 566, 568.
license by, cannot be nullified by county or town,
determination of tax levy for, 344.
(See LEGiSLAxr^E

AcTIO^'

;

411, 412.

Legislatiye Power.

STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION —
review of assessments by,

393.

STATE BUILDINGS —
(See

Public Buildings.)

STATE CONSTITUTIONS —
(See CONSTITUTIOKS

OF THE StATBS.)

STATE PAPER —
publication of notice in,

335.

STATE PURPOSES —
taxation for, must be apportioned
cases of state buildings, 114-120.

through the

state,

104-108.

taxation b3' municipalities for, 475-480.
what are, 475^80.

of Taxation.)
STATE TREASURY —
(See

Purposes

refunding illegal taxes received
STATES —

at, 566, 568.

may require taxes to be paid in gold, 12.
may make contracts not to tax, 53, 54.
power of to tax, how limited by the federal constitution,
(See

Constitution of the United States.)

of, are not grants of power, 425.
general right of, to tax and select the subjects, 406, 407.
constitutions

STATIONS —
railroad, exemption of fi'om taxation,

151.

STATUTES —
revenue, what are, 1; 199.
must have revenue for their purpose,

9, 200.

impairing obligation of contracts forbidden, 52-56,
(See Contracts.)
construction of in general, 197-333.
must be governed by the intent, 198.
must find intent in the words employed, 198.

extrinsic aid

to,

in

cases

of doubt,

198, 199

65.

53-65.

INDEX.
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construction of revenue laws, 199.
main purpose of such laws is revenue, 200.
incidental purpose to protect against extortion, 200.
Mr. Dwarris' views, 200, 208.
opinions of English judges, 201, 202.
opinions of American judges, 202-207.
leaning should not be to liberal construction, 208.
penal provisions should be strictly construed, 208.
conferring local powers to tax, should be strictly construed,
directory and mandatory, 212.
what should be held mandatory, 216-219.
instances of directory provisions, 219, 220.
may lay taxes retrospectively, 231, 232.
presumption against retrospective effect, 231.
curative, the various classes of, 223.
establishing conclusive rules of evidence, 223.
legislative mandates, 234.
for special cases, 225.
what is within their compass, 227-229.

209, 211.

prospective, 280-233.

for reassessments,

23,

may give summary remedies for collection of taxes, 298, 308.
allowing redemption, are to be favorably construed, 363.
whether redemj)tion can be shortened by, after sale made, 369, 370.
or lengthened, 869, 370.
what conditions may be imposed by, in suits to recover lands
taxes, 871-875.

(See Recovery of Lands Sold fok Taxes.)
remedial, what are, and how construed, 208-305, 222, 874.
of limitation, application of in tax cases, 876-383.
(See

Limitation, Statutes of.)

retrospective, may cure defect in power to tax, 100, 101.
m'ay abate taxes, 527.
may protect officers acting in good faith, 553, 558.

taking away common law remedies,
or remedies in equity, 587.

573, 578.

STATUTORY POWER —
divesting one of his estate, must
and strictly executed, 217.

be

STATUTORY REMEDY—
for abatement of taxes,

538-580.

STAYING COLLECTION —
(See

Injunction.)

STEALING FROM COLLECTOR —
(See Theft.)

strictly construed,

317.

sold for
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STEAMBOAT —
made use of for railroad purposes, question of exemption

in

case of, 152.

STOCK, PUBLIC —
of the United States, not taxable by the states,
of states and their municipalities, taxation of,
investing capital
chise, 58.

m

STOCK

of corporation in,

does not

58.
66.

preclude

taxation

of fran-

CORPORATIONS —

to be taxed where owner has his domicile, 16, 274.
subject to conditions imposed by state in granting permission
business, 65.

wlien taxation of will preclude taxation of corporate property,
property of corporation is represented by, 167.

to transact
166, 167.

when exempt from taxation where corporation is exempt, 167, 168.
tax on, is a different thing from a tax on the corporation, 169.
sometimes corporation made collector of taxes upon, 274.
sale of, by process fair on its face passes title, 303.
held by nonresidents, cannot be taxed to corporation, 43.
may be taxed as the charter shall provide, 44.

what words in a tax law held not to embrace, 310.
meaning of the word " stock " in a certain tax law, 274.
(See Banks; Corpora.tions ; Raileoad Companies.)

STOCK

IN TRADE —

may be taxed though the business is taxed, 389, 390.

STOCKHOLDERS —
obtaining lists of, by mandamus,

523.

taxation of,
(See

Stock in Cobpokations.)

STRANGER —
to title, cannot redeem from tax sale, 367.
payment of tax by, 322, 323.

STREAMS —
special assessment for preventing
(See

inundations by,

427.

Lbvees.)

STREET RAILWAYS —
taxation of, 167, 409.
assessment of track of, for widening the street, 458, 462.

STREETS —
general taxation for, 420.
special assessments for land taken for, 420.
for cost of grading, 421.

for paving or otherwise improving,
for altering, widening or extending,
for repaving, replanking, etc., 422.

421.
422.

INDEX.
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STREETS — continued.
special assesaments, for cost of curbstones, etc., 423,
for sewers for, 423-437.

for -water pipes in, 427.
for ligiiting, 428.
constitutional objections to, 429-444.
apportionment of cost, 447-456.
property subject to, 456-459.
proceedings in levying and collecting, 459-470.
payment of, from special fund, 470, 471.
personal

liability

for, 420, 470-473.

estoppel of parties assessed, by failure to make objections in due season, 573, 574.
dedication

of land for, will autborize opening

at expense

of owners,

421.

STRICT CONSTRUCTION —
of power
(See

to tax,

Power.)

of power

to divest one

(See STATtiTOKY

of his

estate,

Power.)

STRICT EXECUTION —
of authority
of authority
of authority

to tax, 457.

for taxes, 323-325.
lay special assessments,

to sell
to

418, 464.

STRIKING FROM THE BOLL —
of property not taxable, may
compelled by certiorari,

SUBSIDIES

be compelled

by mandamus, 520, 574.

533.

—

distinguished from taxes,

3.

SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS —
action for depriving one of, 554.
irregularities which do not take away, will not render tax void,

533.

SUCCESSIONS —
to estates, may be taxed as a privilege, 392.
taxation of, in general, 22.
of an alien, may be taxed, 64.
taxation of personalty received from an estate abroad, 270.
taxation of bequests to colleges, etc., 150.

SUFFRAGE —
right

of, sometimes dependent on payment

of

taxes, 553.

SUITS —
pending, application of curative laws to, 331.
(See

Actions; Equity; Remedies

tion.)

for Excessive

and

Illegal

Taxa-
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SUMMAKY REMEDIES —
for collection of

taxes, necessity for, 298, 496.

are not uncoustitutipnal,

303, 303.

against collectors of taxes, 496, 497, 504.
(See Collector op Taxes.)

SUPERVISOK —
action against, 557.
protection of, by certificate, 557, 558.

SUPERVISORS, BOARD OP —
mandamus will not be issued to,
may be compelled

by mandamus

wliere party lias another remedy, 514.
to proceed to consider an account, 515.

may be compelled to allow legal accounts, 516-517.
and to refund moneys illegally collected, 520.
and to assess state taxes, 533.
and to levj' a tax to pay judgments,
issue of tax warrant by, 393, 294.

etc., 534^526.

SUPPLEMENTARY LIST —
when signing of, a good verification of the original, 390.

SUPPOSED BENEFITS —
levy of assessments
(See

by, 437.

Assessments, Loc.vl.)

SURETIES —
in collector's bond, liability of, 501.
obligation of, is strictissimi juris, 503.
are only bound by the terms of their bond, 503.
alteration in the obligation discharges, 503.
whether extension of time for collection will discharge,
summary remedy against, 504, 510, 511.
efi'ect of change of law upon liability of, 511.
whether liable for an illegal tax collected, 563.

SURPLUS —
of insurance company, taxation of,

393. ,

SURPLUS BOND —
provision for,

343.

consequence of failure to give, 373, 373.

SURPLUS MONEYS —
on tax sale, disposition of, 343.
payment of, to party entitled, how compelled, 533.

SWAMPS —
taxation for draining, 101.
special assessments for draining,
(See

Drains.)

draining under the police power,

403.

503, 503.
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TAKING AWAY KEMEDY —
cases of, 537, 572.

Constitutional

(See

Principles.)

TAKING OF PROPERTY —
for puplic

use,

Eminent Domain.)

(See

for taxes,
(See

Distress.)

TARIFF —
revenue, 25.
protective, 25.

prohibitory,
(See

10, 74.

Duties, Exports, Impobts.)

TAVERNS—
taxation of keepers of, 391.
extent of license to keep, 391.

TAX COLLECTOR—
(See Collector of Taxes.)
TAX DEEDright of higliest biclder to, 344.
recital in, as to the quantity of land sold,
recital in, as to authority to sell, 353, 362.
other recitals in, 353.
does not prove a valid sale, 353.

344.

except as statutes so provide, 354r-357.
errors of form may not avoid, 353.
error in, may be corrected in equity, 243.

recording of,
constructive

as a

period from which actions may

possession by virtue of, 379-381, 558.

it does not give color of title, 382, 383.
setting aside as a cloud on title,

•when

(See

Cloud upon Title.)

mandamus to compel delivery of, 522.

TAX DUPLICATEissue of, 292.
(See

Collector's Warrant.)

TAX LAWS —
what are,
(See

1, 199.

Revenue Laws.)

repeal of, terminates proceeding's under them, 14.
construction
(See

of, 199-222.

Construction.)

be limited,

378, 379.
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for curing defects in proceeilings,
(See CtJBATivB Laws.)

323-232.

oflBcial duty under,

enforcipg

(See Mandamus.)
limitations on the power to pass,

Taxing Poweb.)
(See Limitations on the
should aim at equality in the burden imposed, 124.
may make exemptions, 130, 144.
can only have eflFect through otHcial action, 1S4.
summary remedies under,
(See Summary Remedies.)
contracts in fraud of, are void, 399.

TAX LEGAL IN PART —
will

be enjoined

only when the legal part is paid, 537.

recovery of town in case of, 571.

replevin in

case of, 573.

TAX LEVY—
authority for,
(See

is void

244-257.

Voting the Tax.)

if

excessive,

Excessive Taxes.)
enjoining, 536.
(See

(See

whole

Injunction.)
will not be enjoined

to redress

individual wrongs,

setting aside on certiorari,
(Sec

Cektiorabi.)

compelling by mandamus,
(See Mandamus.)

TAX PAYERS' LISTS —
objections to, 27, 29.
requirement of, 861.
penalties for failure to hand in, 262.
construction of penal provisions respecting, 262, 263.
awa}' appeal, for refusal to hand in, 263.
failure to make oath to, 263, 264.

taking

mistake in,

will

not create estoppel, 264.

effect, where it misleads the assessors,

disregard 'ng, by the assessors,

264.

534.

TAX PROCEEDINGS —
curing defects in, by statute,

233-233.

by reassessments, 232, 233.
by the action of courts, 333, 234.
by amendments, 234-343.
what departures from the statutes
(See

Irregularities.)

will

not defeat, 219, 220.

536.
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TAX ROLL —
premature issue of, 393.

striking properly from,
(See

Striking from the Roll.)

warrant

to,

(See CoLLKCTOK's Waiiiiant.)
compelling assessor to put omitted property on, 520.
and to deliver correct copy of, 520.

TAX SALES —
(See

Sales

op Lands fob.
Taxes.)

TAX WARRANT —
(See

Collector's

Waekant.)

TAXABLE PROPERTY —
meaning of, 130, 210, 213, 273.

TAXATION —
definition of,

1.

and protection, are reciprocal, 2, 14, 16.
differs from forced contributions, etc., 3, 260.
must have equality for its basis, 3.

unlimited nature of,

4.

is submitted to as a hard necessity, 513.
direct and indirect, 5.
maxims of, 6-8.
1.

that it should be in proportion to revenue enjoyed, 6.'
it ought to be certain, and not arbitrary, 6.

3. that

it ought to be levied at the time and in the manner
venient for payment, 6.

3. that

most con-

it ouglit to take and keep out of the pockets of the people
little as possible, 6, 7.

4. that

5. that the heaviest taxation

should be on commodities

the consump-

tion of which is prejudicial, 896.
must be laid for revenue, 9.
regulation may be a purpose in, 11.
discriminating in, for protection, 10.
jurisdiction for, 14-16.
should be in proportion to benefits, 16, 17.
English, 26, 31.
heavy, dates from the time power of the commons was established,
power of, is a legislative power, 32-40.
colorable, may be treated as void, 33, 34.

in the District of Columbia,
in the territories, 47, 48.

47.

power of, not to be delegated, 48-51.
except to the municipalities, 51.
abridgment of power of, by contracts, 52-55.
general purposes of, 67-103.
(See PtTRPOSBs OF
46

Taxation.)

as

46.
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TAXATION —

continued.

districts for, 103-123.
(See

Apportionment.)

extra territorial, 131-123.
equality anil uniformity in, 124^174, 448.
duplicate, sometimes unavoidable, 28, 158-171.
against intent to lay duplicate,
exemptions from, 180, 144.

presumption
(See

165-171.

Exemptions.)

accidental

omissions from, 154-156.

diversity of, in different districts, 172, 173.
disfiuguislied from legislative appropriation of private
178, 430-434.

and representation go together, 44-i8, 178.
curing defects in, 223-243.
(See Tax Pkocekdings.)
restrictions upon municipal, 250-253.
conditions precedent to, 254, 255.
repeal or modification of power for, 255.
exhausting authority for, 250.
ofBcial action in, 184-196.
(See

Ofpiceks.)

assessments of property for, 258-291.
(See Assessment.)
of business and privileges,
general right of, 384.

384-392.

methods of, 384, 385.
by federal government, 384.
what to be deemed privileges, 385, 386.
construction of powers for, 387.

kinds usually taxed, 387-392.
of corporations, 392, 393,
(See Corporations.)
of national banks, 394, 395.
imposed for purposes of regulation,
(See

396-415.

Police Power.)

by special assessment, 416-473.

in England, 460, 473.
Assessments, Local.)

(See

compulsory

local, 474-495.
admissible in matters of state concern, 475-480.
not formatters of mere local concern, 481-495.
to indemnify for losses by riots, 480.
to pay corporate debts, 479.
general, for a mere local purpose, is unjust, 439.
enforcing official duty in regard to, 512-536.
(See Mandamus.)

property,

175,
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TAXATIQ'N —

continued.
remedies for excessive and illegal, 537-575.
by abatement, 527.

by review and appeals, 528.
by certiorari, 529-534.
by injunction, 536-543.
in equity to remove cloud on title, 543-544.
in equity to quiet title, 544, 545.
by several jointly, 545-547.
in cases of fraud, 547.
by suit against assessors, 550-557.
by suit against supervisor, 557, 558.
by resisting collection, 558.
by suit against collector, 559-564.
by action against collector of customs, 564,
by suit against town, etc., 564r-573.
by action of replevin, 572.
by mandamus, 574.
by prohibition, 574.

TAXES —
definition of, 1.
classification of,

4, 5.

direct, 5.
indirect, 5.
payable in kind, 12.
capitation,

18.

on credits, 13.
(See

Bonds

;

Credits

;

Moktgages.)

on lands, 18.
on bouses, 19.
on income, 20.
on employments, 21.
on carriage of propertj^,

31.

on wages, 31.
on servants, etc., 21.
on interest, 32.
on dividends, 23.
(See

Dividends.)

on successions, 22.
(See

Successions.)

on sales, bills, etc., 23.
on newspapers, 33.
on legal process, 23, 373.
on consumable luxuries, 33.
on exports, 24.
on Imports, 24.
on corporate franchises,
(See COBFOKATIONS.)

25, 60, 64, 393.

565.
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TAXES —

continued.
on property by value, 26, 61,
on marriages, 30.

176.

on amusements, 30.
on public securities, 58.
(See

Public Secubities.)

specific, 175.
on licensed traders, 63.
(See

Teadeks.)

on business, 384-892.
(See

Business.)

on privileges, 385, 093.
on offices, 891.
(See

Offices.)

on national

banks, 394, 395.

apportionment

of, 2, 103-123,

175-183.

'

(See Appohtionment.)
maxims governing levy of, 6-8.
(See PwNcrPLES op Taxation.)

apportioning by benefit received, 14-17.
contributions when not otherwise exjalained,

are pecuniary

are not debts, 13.
are granted by the people's representatives, 32.

public good, 43.
for public purposes, 42.
not to be extra territorial, 43.
right to representation in levying, 44-48.
in violation of contracts are void, 51-54.
impairing obligation of contracts are void, 65.
on agencies of federal government by the states, 56-61.
on agencies of state government by United States, 56-61.
to be levied for the
to be

on revenue stamps, etc., 58.
on salaries of federal and state officers, 58.
on travel, 59.
on the public domain,
on railroads,

60.

60.

(See Railroad Companies.)
on commerce by the states, 61-64.
(See Commerce.)
■which abridge

rights of citizens,

Privileges

64.

op Citizens.)
(See
for
-which
purposes
they may be laid, 67-108.

Purposes of Taxation.)
how direct are laid by the United States,
(See

73.

should be equal, 124.

invidious discriminations in laying,
exemptions from, 130-149.
(See

Exemptions.)

128, 129.

18.
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continued.

inridions exemptious from,
dnplioate

154^156.

levies of, 156-171.

Duplicate

(See
Taxation.)
commuting for, 173.
official action in levying, 184-196.
(See Opficeks.)
construction of laws for,

197-232.

(See CONSTKTJCTION.)

Curing defects in jDroceedings
(See CtnRATivE

voting

to obtain, 323-243.

Laws.)

of, 344-257.

must be legislative

authority

for, 32, 344.

(See VoTiKa the Tax.)
assessment of property for, 358-391.

Assessment.)

(See

collector's

warrant for, 393-397.

Collector's Wakeant.)

(See

collection of, 398.
by suit at law, 300.
by arrest of person taxed, 801.
by distress of goods and chattels,
(See

301-304.

Distress.)

by detention of goods and chattels, 305.
by sale of lands, 305-307.
by imposition of penalties, 309-315.
by forfeiture of property taxed, 815-819.
(See

POKFEITURES.)

by conditions to the exercise of

a

right,

819-331.

See Conditions.)
lion of, on lands, 305-307.

collection by the
sale of lands for,

of Its municipalities,

331.

fob Taxes.)
judicial sales for, 357-363.
Judgment fob Taxes.)
(See
(Sec

Sale

state

333-857.

redemption
(See

from sales for, 363-870.

Bedbmption.)

proceedings
(See

op Lands

to recover lands sold for, 371-383.

Kbcoveey

of Lands Sold foe Taxes.)

under the police power, 396,
how they differ from other taxes, 396, 397.
case of sidewalks,

398.

of sewers, 399-401.
case of levees, 401-3.
case of drains, 403,
case

other cases, 403, 409-418.
license fees, when are, 403-405,

408-410.
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TAXES — continued,
license fees, collection of, 414.
must not be prohibitory, 408.
special assessments not classed as, 146, 456.
(See

Assessments, Local.)
duties in levy and collection of,

enforcing

Mandamus.)
decision of proper authority

513-526.

(See

as to amount

of levy, cannot

by mandamus, 519.

rejection of, when illegal, 520.
Steiking prom the Roll,)
(See
illegal, collector may refuse to collect, 521.
injustice of, cannot defeat tliem, 3, 35, 124-129.
or excuse officer for not proceeding with, 521.
compelling levy of to pay judgments, etc., 524^526.
levy of, by municipalities under state compulsion,

574-594.

(See CoJEPULSOEY Local Taxation.)
remedies by the state foi-, against collectors, 496-511.
(See

Collector of Taxes.)

remedies where they are excessive or illegal, 527-574.
(See

TAXING

Kemedies fob Excessive and

Illegal

Taxation.)

DISTRICTS —

taxes levied must pertain to the, 104^106.
instances of violation of this rule, 106-108.
general rule as to, 108-110.
legislature must establish, 110-113.
different for different purposes, 113, 114.
overlying,

114-120.

(See DiSTEicTS.)

taxation beyond limits of, 121-123.
(See

Extra Territorial Taxation.)

in cases of special assessments,

449-451.

TAXING POWER —
is an incident of sovereignty, 3.
is granted for the benefit of all, 4.
proper exercise of, affords no ground of complaint, 4.
extent of, 11, 41, 56.
is not an executive power, 33.
is not a judicial power, 33.
is legislative in its nature, 32-40.
is not to be delegated, 48-51.
except to the municipalities, 49.
may be restrained by contracts, 52-56.

limitations upon, by constituional principles,
(See

Constitutional Principles.)

limitations upon, by the federal constitution,
See

Constitution

op

the United States.)

be controlled

INDEX.
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continued.

restrictions upon, 66.
construction of, in general,

state

Construction.)

(See

local, construction of, 209-311.
in case of business taxes, 387.

In

of levies for regulation, 396-398, 408.
of, to abuse, 212.
principles on which it should be employed,
case

liability
(See

Pkixciples of
Taxation.)

TENANT —
may not buy his landlord's title at tax sale, 345.
(See Occupant.)

TENANT BY THE CURTESY —
right

of, to redeem, 366.

TENANT IN COMMON —
interests of, may be separately assessed, 288, 289.
and separately sold, 341, 342.
cannot buy interest of the others at tax sale, 346, 347.
one may redeem for all, 367.
redemption

of separate interest by,

323, 365.

TENANT IN DOWER —
right

of, to redeem, 366.

TENDER —
extinguishes
■will

lien for taxes,

308.

prevent a sale, 323.

must be of the

full

amount due, 323.

for purposes of redemption, 368.
of certificates of public indebtedness, for license
in settlement with collector, 501.

fees, 413.

TENNESSEE —
constitutional provisions for equal taxation in, 143,
assessments of property in, must be by value, 435.

144.

TERRITORIAL LIMITATION —
on power of states to tax, 42.
on power of municipalities to tax, 121-123.
(See NONEESIDENTS.)

in case of municipal license tax, 47.
the maxim that taxation and representation go together, 42-48.

TERRITORIES —
taxation in, 47, 48.

TESTAMENTARY GIFTS —
taxes on, 22.
(See

Successions.)
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TESTIMONY —
(See

Evidence.)

TEXAS —
proiaei'ty in, must be assessed

by value, 435.

THEATRICAL . EXHIBITIONS —
taxation of, 391,
what is equality in case of, 138.

THEFT —
fi-om collector, does not discharge him, 501.

THREAT —
of illegal enforcement of taxes, 536.
of illegal distress, is compulsion, 56S).
(See VoLDXTARY Payment.)
TIME —
taxes must be voted at the proper, 217.
taxpayer must have notice of that fixed for appeal, 217.
allowed for notices, must be given, 218, 230, 335.
proceedings fatally defective if statute regarding,
sale prematurely

is not observed, 218.

made cannot be validated, 229.

computing, in case of notices, 335.
to redeem, cannot be enlarged, 369, 370.
to redeem, shortening

the, 369, 370.

of advertising, to cut off redemption,
TITLE —
at tax sale is not warranted,
(See

573.

Caveat Emptob.)

trial of,
(See

365.

371-383.

Recovery of Lands Sold

for

Taxes.)

extinguishing by adverse possession,
(See Limitation, Statutes of.)
removing cloud upon, 542.
upon Title.)
(See Cloud
quieting, in equity, 544.
(See

Quieting Title.)

collector cannot build up,
tax deed as evidence of,
(See

if tax

is void, 563.

Tax Deed.)

purchaser must take, subject to right to reassess a tax, 232, 233.
power to divest, must be strictly construed and strictly pursued, 217,

TITLE, OFFICIAL —
not to be questioned collaterally, 187-189.
questioning
questioning

on quo warranto, 188.
in suit by or against officer

TOLL —
meaning of the term,

3.

cle

facto, 188, 189.

324.
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TOLL BRIDGE —
duplicate taxation in

case of, 163.

TOLL HOUSE —
exempt from taxation, 151.

■wlien

TOKNAGE —
taxes of, not to be laid by tbe states, 61,

wbat

are,

61, 63.

TOWN AUDITORS —
action of, in allowing

accounts not to be reviewed in tbe courts, 533.

unlawful allowances by,
TOWN BOARD —

557.

members of, not liable for errors in their judicial action, 551.
(See

Judicial Opficek.)

TOWN BONDS —
mandamus to compel payment of, 525.
compulsory levies for payment of, 429.

TOWN MEETINGS —
(See

Towns.)

TOWN PLATS —
assessment of lots and blocks upon,
(See

Separate Parcels.)

TOWN PURPOSES,—
repair of fire engine, 99.
compensation for use of building, 99.
procuring legislation, 99.
purchase of a public square, 93.
paying bounties for military services,
general enumeration

100, 101.

of, 311.

TOWN TREASURER —
(See

Collector of Taxes.)

TOWN TRUSTEES —
liability of, for refusing

certificate, 558.

TOWN VOTE —
meetings for, 345-249.
(See

Voting the Tax.)

control of, by the courts,

(See Political Action.)
protection of olBcers by, 561.
what will constitute a promise, 553.

TOWNS —
general power to tax usually conferred
purposes of taxation "by,
(See

Town Purposes.)

upon, 98, 475, 476.
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TOWNS — continued.
apportionment of debts and property on division of, 176.
must liave legislative power to tax, 244.
voting taxes by, 344-257.
meetings for the purpose, 245.

how appointed,

245, 346,

notice of, 246.
must confine themselves to the purpose of the call, 246-248.
warrant for, 347.
action of, to be favorably construed, 247.
must be record of, 247, 24S.

proof of record of, when lost, 249.
courts cannot control political action of, 349, 350.
restrictions
conditions

on powers to tax, 250-253.
imposed on power of to tax must be observed, 355, 356.

legislative

control over taxation by, 253, 255, 256.

exhausting power to tax, 256.
strict execution of power by, 257.
taxation under legislative

refunding

liability

compulsion,

474r-495.

taxes by, 530.

of, for

illegal taxes collected,

565.

only attaches where the tax was void, 565.
and was paid under compulsion, 565.
and has been paid over by the officer, 565.
what is a compulsory

payment, 567-569.

do not guaranty correct action by

their

ofl3cers,-'566.

proper action against, for money collected, 569.
extent of recovery in, 570.
not liable for mistakes, etc., of officers where money is not received, 570.
cannot defend suit for illegal taxes by showing assessors not legally
elected, 570.
no action against, where the proceedings
demand not necessary before suit, 571.

ai'C

wholly void,

570.

recovery of interest in suit against, 571.
do not warrant title to property sold for taxes, 572.

MuxicrpAL Corpokations.)
allowance of moneys to collector is equivalent to payment
indemnifying collector not a ratification of his illegal act,
(See

to, 570.
570.

suit against on promises, 553.

TOWNSHIPS —
(See TowKS.)

TRACK —
of railroad company, assessment
is not nonresident land, 274.
(See

Railkoad

Comp-^nies.)

TRACTS, SEPARATE —
(See Sepakate Parcels.)

of,

for paving the

street, 463.
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TRADE —
wliat taxation of, is forbidden,
(See Commerce.)
taxation of, in general,
(See

Traders.)

TRADERS—
licensed to trade with Indians, not taxable by states, 63.
importing goods, not taxable by states as importers, 63, 63.
exobange and money brokers, taxes on, 63, 64.

dealing in articles not the growth of the state, whether specially taxable'
on their business, 64.
taxes on business of, as a privilege, 385, 393.
licensed by the state, cannot have the license nullified by city, etc., 386.
may be taxed by state and municipality under proper legislation, 386.
licence of, may be taxed, 386.
power to tax, construed strictly, 387.
graduating licenses of, 387, 390.
what kinds of, generally taxed, 387-389.
taxes on auctioneers and commission

dealers, 389.

on merchants, 389.
on peddlers and transient dealers, 390.
on dealers in liquors, 390.

for regulation,
(See

Police Power.)

TRANSIENT DEALERS —
taxation of, 390.
fees

for regulating business

of, 413, 413.

TRAVEL —
unlawful taxation

of, 59.

(See Commerce.)

TREASURER —
protection of, by process,
(See Collector of Taxes.)
liability for stolen moneys, 501.
(See

County Treasurer.)

TRESPASS —
against assessors, recovery in, 570.

when it will lie,
(See

Judicial Officer.)

570.
against the collector, recovery in,

when it will lie,
(See

Collector of Taxes.)

against supei-visor, 557, 558.
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TRESPASSER AB

INITIO —

law," 304.
collector is, if he sells distress before the time fixed by
or if he keeps it beyond the time fixed by law, 304.
568.
or if he sells and fails to render account of surplus moneys,
564.
necessary,
or if he sells more than is
563.
what abuse of official authority will render the officer a, 304,
(See

CoLLECTOB

OP

Taxes.)

TRIAL —
right of every party
(See

to,

Law of thb Land.)

by jury, not always of right, 435.
(See JOKY Tkiai.)
of question of corporate indebtedness,

481.

TRIBUNAL —
right of every one

to an

impartial.

537.

(See

Heaeing; Law of the Land.)

(See

Remedies

what is open, in case of illegal taxation,

for

Excessive akd

Illegal

Taxation.)

TRIBUTE —
distinguished from

taxes, 3.

TROVER —
action of, in case of illegal levies, 570.

TRUE OWNER —
who deemed to be, when title in contest, 558.

TRUST —
municipal officers hold their powers in

539.

TRUSTEE —
cannot buy property for himself at tax sale, 348.
(See

Trusts.)

TRUSTS —
property belonging to, may be assessed to trustees where they reside, 371.
assessment in case of two trustees, 371.
investment of moneys in another state, 371.
abroad, cannot be taxed by state, 571.

TURNPIKE —
taxation for, 488.
(See

Highways.)

easement of, in street,

will

not preclude special

assessment to improve

463.

of road
Corporations.)

appropriation
(See

of, under the eminent domain, 176.

it,

TURNPIKE COMPANY —
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to vote the taxes,

chief check upon, ia some coun-

TYRANNY—
right of the people
tries, 46.

of enforced local taxation,

475, 483.

u.
taxation which
(See

is,
is

TJITTRA VIRES —
void,

Nullity.)

contracting debts which are, may work irreparable injury,
restraining tlireatened action, 548, 549.
interference of_the state for the purpose, 549.

548, 549.

UNANIMOUS VOTE —
what is evidence of, 465.

UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAX —
may refuse to collect, 500.
collected, must be accounted for by collector, 498.

voluntarily paid, and paid over by collector, he
payer,

is

collector

not liable for, to tax

56.3, 566.

duplicate

taxes not necessarily

unconstitutional,

158-160.

UNDIVIDED INTERESTS —
may be separately assessed, 288, 389.
and separately sold, 341, 343.
but not without statutory authority, 341.
and separately redeemed, 338, 364, 365.
redemption

by one owner for all, 367.

UNEQUAL TAXATION —

a

impossibility of avoiding, 134-138.
the purpose of government to avoid, 134.
what does not create, in legal sense, 138.
special exemptions produce, 128, 129.
invidious exemptions not allowable, 153, 153.
caused by accidental omissions, 154^156.
caused by fraudulent assessments, 157.
caused by duplicate taxation, 158-171.
not caused by permitting commutations,

173.

caused by want of permanence in legislation,

174.

not supposed to flow from rssessment by benefits, 416, 417.
taxation, 134,
does not necessarily result Irom S3lecting few subjects for
135, 387, 388, 411, 413.

legislature

must determine questions of, 136.

abatement in cases of, 537.
(See Remedies

for

Excessive akd

Illegal

Taxation.)
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—

must be aimed at in taxation, 124^174.
constitutional provisions intended to secure, 133-144, 436-444.
apportionment with a view of securing, 175-183.
required in federal duties, imposts and excises, 73.
general consideration of questions of, 124-174.
(See

Equality.)

application of rules
(See Assessments,

of, to special assessments, 416, 417, 428, 429.

Local.)

TjNITed states—
maj' levy direct taxes, 5, 73.
taxation of liquors by, 24.

of exports, 24.
of imports, 24.
general right of, to lay taxes, 5, 32, 56, 71.
tax bills to originate in lower house, 33.
taxation in territories by, 47.
in District of Columbia, 47.
cannot tax the states or their agencies, 58.
or salaries of state oificers, 58.
or municipal corporations, 58.
public domain of, not taxable by states, 59, 60.
constitutional limitations on power to tax, 73, 74.
may tax for bounties, 99.
collection of taxes by penalties, 309.
taxation of business by, 884.
licenses by, 414, 415.
do not give rights as against slate laws, 415.
not granted under police power, 415.
interest of, in railroad, precludes taxation of, 60, 61.
salaries of offlcers of, cannot be taxed by states, 58.
contracts to defraud revenue of, are void, 399.
customary frauds upon, 809, 312.
special regulations for collection of internal revenue, 181.
direct land tax, collection of, 181.

UNITED STATES COLLECTOKS —
of

the customs,
(See

Collector of the

of intcrual revenue,
(See CoLLECTOB, OP

Customs.)

Internal Revenue.)

UNITED STATES LANDS —
(See

Public Domain.)

UNITED STATES PROPEBTY —
(See

Public Pbopebtt.)

UNITED STATES RESERVATIONS —
personal assessments of people living upon, 369.
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UNITED STATES SECURITIES —
not taxable by the
corporations

UNIVERSITIES
exemption

states, 58.

taxable on their franchises,

though moneys invested in, 58.

—

of, from taxation, 149.

UNJUST TAXATION —
is frequently laid, 387.

Unequal Taxation.)

(See

remedies for,
(See

Remedies pob Excessive

and

Illegal

Taxation.)

UNKNOWN OWNERS —
assessment of lauds of, 278, 279.
is presumptive evidence that owners are unknown, 279.

■what

UNLAWFUL CONTRACTS —
those in fraud of the revenue are, 299.
those in excess of power are, 553.
(See

Ultea Vihes.)

UNRESTRICTED POWER —
to tax, does not exist, 6, 68, 431.
(See

Limitations on the Taxing Power.)

in case of municipal taxation, 486.
Compulsory Local Taxation.)
(See

UNSEATED LANDS —
separate taxation of, 275.
meaning of the term, 276.
what

will

constitute land once occupied unseated, 276.

lien of tax upon, 277.
description of, 282-286.
proceedings in selling must follow assessment,
notiqe of sale in case of, 334.
surplus bond in case of, 843.

384, 859.

UNWARRANTED ASSESSMENTS —
what are, 438, 431-484.

USAGE —
cannot change the law, 194.
of, in construction of town powers, 93, 94.

influence
(See

Custom.)

USURERS —
impolicy of robbery of,

6.

USURPATION —
of powers not conferred,
(See

Jurisdiction ; Nullity; Ultra Vibes.)
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rSURPERS —
distinguished from officers de facto, 186,
inquiry into autliority of, 574.
must pay over public moneys collected,

187.
191, 193, 498.

VACANT TENEMENTS —
limitation of actions in

case of, 377.

■whether it may be done when ejectment cannot be brought,

377.

decisions tliat holder of tax title has constructive possession, 378-381.
possession in case of, is purely matter of fiction, 381.

vacatikct assessments

—

proceedings for, on certiorari,
(See

Certiorari.)

(See

Striking from the Roll.)

by striking property from the roll,

valuation—
necessity for, in assessment, 287.
separate parcels, separately, 287.
is a judicial act, 288.
cannot be made hy legislature, 388.
effect of omitting dollar mark in, 289.
assessors
(See

not liable

fen-

errors in, 549.

Judicial Officers.)

remedies for excessive and illegal,
(See

Remedies

for

Excessive and

Illegal

Taxation.)

value—
taxation of property by, 26-80.
objections to this in case of personalty, 36-30.

provisions for taxation by,
imposition of duties by, 176.

constitutional
assessments
(See

133-144,

by,

Assessment.)

certificate to assessment,

showing how value estimated,

for taxation by, affect special
special assessments by, 456, 459.

how provisions
(See

Assessments, Local-^

VERIFICATIONof tax list, 316, 393, 394.
of assessment, 390, 563.
of notices of tax sales, 336.

VESSELStaxes on, 61, 64,370.
(See

435.

Snirs.)

390.

assessments, 433-448.
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VESTED RIGHTS —
under contracts,
(See

Contracts.)

of municipal corporations

in tlieir property, 494, 495.
cannot be taken away by arbitrary rules of evidence, 333, 324.
nor by legislative mandates, 334.
nor by statutes whicli undertake
(See

VICINITY

—

meaning

Law of the Land.)

to beal fatal defects, 327.

of, 464.

VILLAGES —
(See

Municipal Cokpokations.)

VIRGINIA —
provisions for equal taxation in,
property in, must be assessed

144.

by value, 435.

VOID ON ITS FACE —
tax record that is, creates no cloud on title, 543-544.
process that is, may be resisted, 558.
process that is, no protection to collector, 561.
what will render process invalid, 562.
mere clerical errors will not, 563.
protection where one of two tax warrants is not,

562.

VOID SALE —
does not divest the
(See

lien for the tax, 468.
op Lands fob Taxes.)

Nullity; Sale

VOLUNTART PAYMENT —
town, etc., not liable for illegal tax in case of, 565.
party making, is supposed to know his rights, 567.
payment made without warning or protest is, 567.
unless there was fraud or mistake, 567.
protest need not be formal, 568.
payment to release goods from seizure is not, 568.
nor payment after tlireat of distress, 568, 569.
nor one made on exhibition of process, 569.
payment made for a license petitioned for is, 566.
recovery when the payment was not, 568, 569, 570.

VOLUNTEERS —
taxation of property of, 146.
taxation to pay bounties to,
(See

Bounties.)

one may be taxed to raise bounties for, though
vice, 431.

VOTE —
on ordering special improvement,
(See

Town Vote.)
47

465.

exempt from military ser-
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TAXATION.

OF

VOTING THE TAX —
must be legislative authority for, 244.
special regulations for determining amount of state taxes, 244.
determination
1.
2.
3.

of local

taxes,

244.

by the legislature, 244.
by local boards acting in legislative capacity, 244, 245.
by the vote of popular meetings, 245.

meetings to vote taxes, 245.
must be lawfully convened, 245, 246, 554.
statutes fixing time are notice of, 245, 246.

failure to give additional notice not fatal,
limiting subjects to be considered at, 246.
limiting the amount to be voted at, 246.
special, must be regularly called, 246.
methods of notifying, 246. ■
action of, is political, 247.

246.

is to be favorably construed, 247.
is not to be overruled by judiciary, 247.
proceedings of, must appear of record, 247, 248, 249.
construction of particular warrants for, 247.
and of particular votes taken at, 247-250.
notice of,

proof

if fraudulent

or misleading,

is void, 248.

of, how made, 248.

secondary proof of records of, 248, 249.
may rely upon records of votes at, 248.
action of, not to be assailed as unwise, 249, 250.

assessors

statutory appeal from, 249, 250.
levy in excess of that voted, is void,
{See

Excessive Taxes.)

action in, not reviewable on certiorari, 531.
nor subject to be enjoined as being more than is necessaay, 540.
or on ground nf intended misappropriation,
540.
or because of unreasonable delay, 540.

w.
WAGES —
taxation of, 20.

WAGONS —
tax on, in proportion to animals drawing them, 139.

WAIVER —
by purchaser, of conditions to redemption, 368..
by tax payer, of objections to illegal tax,
(See VoLTJNTAKT

of right

Payment.)

to notice, cannot be made by occupant for owner, 865.

INDEX.
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continued.

of right to certiorari by dehi}', 531.
of objections to a public work by silence,

Estoppel.)

(See

739

573.

WAREHOUSE —
belonging

to

railroad company, taxation

of, 151.

WARNING —
payment of illegal tax without,
(See Voltjntaky Patmbnt.)
of town meeting, etc., 346.

will

preclude

recovering

back, 567, 568.

will limit

business to be done at meeting, 346.
necessity that it be legal, 346.
what is a sufficient, 346.

construction of special warnings,

WARRANT

347.

—

for town meeting, etc., 346, 347.
return upon, 347.
must be duly signed, 347.
for collection of taxes,
(See CoLLECTOE's Warrant.)
against collector of taxes,

Collector of Taxes.)

(See

protection by,
(See

Process.)

WARRANTY —
none in tax sales,
(See Caveat Emptor.)
municipalities give none,

as to action

of their officers,

573.

WATER —
privilege of supplying

a

city wilh, is taxable,

283.

power, is not taxable separate from the land to which it is attached, 383.
special assessments to lay pipe for, 437.
levees to protect against,
(See

Levees.)

assessments for drains and sewers to carry off,
(See

Drains

;

Sewers.)

WATER POWER —
appropriating land for,
(See Eminent Domain.)

WATER RATES —
action establishing insufficient,

WATER WORKS —
taxation for, 98.

cannot be corrected by quo warranto, 575.
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WATS —
private,

Private Ways.)

(See

public,
(See

Bridges

;

Canals ; Highways

WEEKS —
required in notices, must be

WEST

full

;

Tuukpikes

;

Streets.)

weeks, 335.

VIRGINIA —

provisions for equal taxation in, 144.
taxation of property in, must be by value, 435.

WHARF BOAT—
taxation of, 152.

WHARFAGE FEES —
right

to, not included

in the term " property,"

272.

WIDENING STREETS —
assessments

for, 422, 468.

(See Assessments,

WIDOW —
right of,

Local.)

to redeem from tax sale,

866.

WIDOW AND HEIRS —
assessment of estate to, 278.

WILL —
taxation of gifts by,
(See Stjccessions.)
taxation of estate under,
(See

Executor.)

WINDOW TAX —
formerly levied, now abolished,

20.

WISCONSIN —
equality of taxation in, 144.
constitutional provisions bearing upon special assessments,
special fund for payment of city contracts in, 466.

WOMEN —
are taxable, 45.
(See

Maeried Women; Widow.)

WORDS —
(See

Definitions.)

WORK —
right to pay taxes in, not
(See

Labor.)

to be taken

away by officers, 541.

444.
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WORSHIP —
taxation for, not allowed, 83, 84.
houses of, generally exempt from taxation, 145.
exemjjtions may be recalled, 145.
must be strictly construed, 146.

will

not preclude

special assessments, 147.
estimate of benefits in such cases, 462.

or

"WRIT

(See

CERTIORARI —

Certiobaki.)

WRIT OF INJUNCTION —
(See

Ikjunction.)

WRIT OF MANDAMUS —
(See

Mandamus.)

WRIT OF PROHIBITION —
(See

Prohibition.)

WRIT OF QUO WARRANTO —
(See

Quo

Warranto.}

WRIT OF REPLEVIN —
(See

Replevin.)

WRONG —
committed

by the state in the levy of illegal tax, 568.

(See State.)

WRONGFUL ACT —
(See

Trespasser ab Initio.)

WRONGS, REMEDY FOR —
(See

Remedy

;

Remedies

for

Excessive and

Y.
YEARLY LEVIES —
one, exhausts the power for the year, 356.

Illegal Taxation.)

